By the mid-80s Czechoslovakia in comparison with other countries of Eastern Europe looked quite right.

The country has got much of benefits in the structure of world market prices in favor of manufactured goods and, in particular, engineering. Strengthened its position in the CMEA . Unlike other countries, it did not get into the big debts. Its balance of payments was good enough. The country has achieved considerable success in raising agricultural production, food production, that industrialized countries should recognize as the considerable achievement. They had, as in Hungary, an agricultural policy flexible enough . There has been a fairly high standard of living of the people and created a rich counter. Thanks to special state measures it was a positive way change in the demographic situation. The political opposition, crushed and scattered in 1968-1969, did not show any special activity. So that serious political problems at the surface was not visible. Soviet relations with Czechoslovakia were developed successfully. The Czechoslovak leadership was supporting the Soviet Union foreign policy actions everywhere: in CMEA, in the Warsaw Pact and in the United Nations.

There have been settled ample communication between the public of both countries, not only at the central level but also between regions, groups of enterprises, research institutions, universities, etc. The dislike towards Soviet Union from the Czechoslovak people gave way to friendliness, closeness and good attitude. It seemed that all problems of 1968 were gone. Meanwhile, in the depths of society there were the negative processes. Even the economy had many of unresolved issues. After the modernization of machinery - this core economy - has not been implemented. Still, it remained largely technically imperfect, resource wasting , lagged behind the world level. It has been almost 20 years after the suppression of "Prague Spring", and in the development of democracy, transparency is almost nothing has changed. Strict ideological regime, avoidance of pluralism, one-sidedness in the cultural life of the country. Tens of thousands of people who were excluded at the time of the party and subjected to social ostracism, their families still had limitations in civil rights. The party remained virtually beyond the control of the public, and as a result - a manifestation of all the big signs of decay and disintegration, degeneration of individual managers. And all this in a country with centuries of democratic and humanistic traditions of high European culture. The beginning of perestroika in the Soviet Union provoked a response in the depths of the Czechoslovak society. It raised hopes for change in the situation in the country. The opposition had been activated. The growing demands for change and a change in leadership were in the letters to the Central Committee.

The visit to Prague was prepared carefully. It was especially important to choose the right tone in formal negotiations as well as in dealing with the public, so as not to reinforce negative attitude of the Czechoslovak Society for its leadership and not enter into conflict with the prevailing sentiment that was known. In Prague, had been hung flags, portraits, all prepared to receive the distinguished guest, when it was announced the postponement of the visit for two - three days due to the cold of Gorbachev. The Western press expressed the jokes about "the political cold," of the Soviet leader, but everything was exactly as reported.

On the big emotional lift were held the meetings of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship with performances of Husak and Gorbachev, and other official ceremonies, a visit to the factory "Compressor", the National Theatre, as well as a meeting between Gorbachev and members and candidate members of the Politburo and Central Committee secretaries, with the employees of the Central Committee , talks in Bratislava, acquaintance with the work of an agricultural cooperative in Slovakia. The meaning of this powerful and exciting demonstrations most fully expresses the cry of the people, addressed to Gorbachev, "Mikhail Sergeyevich, stay with us, at least for a year or even a few months!" It was both an open support of changes in the Soviet Union, and the expression of dissatisfaction with the leadership of their country, the desire to move Czechoslovakia out of the state of social and political stagnation. The urgent problems of this country, which had not primarily material and economic, but the spiritual and political nature were underlined.

At a Politburo meeting November 26, 1985, during the discussion of the scientific and technical cooperation between socialist countries, Gorbachev said: "With regard to the CMEA, the maturing of its substantial restructuring is needed. Some people want to see it weak. But we cannot accept it ". The structure of the cooperation could be expressed by the formula: "the raw material from the Soviet Union ready products from other member countries of CMEA. In particular, the Soviet Union was exporting to these countries the fuel , raw materials and energy production (from 50% in Romania to 80% in the GDR and Czechoslovakia) and it was importing the finished products (machine-building products, food and non-food consumer products) (from 65% from Poland to 90% from Bulgaria) Due to supplies from the Soviet Union it was satisfied more than three quarters of import needs for oil and oil products of the CMEA countries, more than 90% - in the gas and iron ore, 80% - in the coal, 75% - in black metal. At the same time, the USSR was for the rest of the CMEA countries the largest market for machinery and equipment. Thus, the share of the USSR in the export of these products from Bulgaria was 60%, from Hungary - 45% of the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia - 40% . With such a trade the Soviet Union was losing, since the raw material is always cheaper than the finished product. In addition, the Soviet Union in exchange for its products (oil, gas, raw materials) received goods of inferior quality than it could receive in exchange trading with the West countries. The effectiveness of Soviet trade with the countries of the European Economic Community in 1970-1980-ies was 2.5 times higher than with the CMEA.

When the Soviet Union began to openly discuss the efficiency of cooperation within the CMEA, immediately it came to light that for many years the Soviet Union was sending subsidies to their Eastern partners. It is estimated that in 1970-1984 years the total payoff received by the East European CMEA member countries on trade with the Soviet Union, has reached 196 billion dollars, and the average per capita 1760 dollars (in DDR - 3493, Bulgaria - 3486, Czechoslovakia - 2828, Hungary - 1974 in Poland - 1021, Romania - 169) .

And the very internationalist nature of our Socialist system presupposes assistance to less developed countries with a view to their being more fully involved in the Socialist division of labour and eventually coming on a par in economic development.
At a Politburo meeting , August 14, 1986, when discussing "On the Restructuring of Foreign Economic Relations," Gorbachev said: "We are lost in foreign policy. Now we have to clear up the mess. It turned out that we actually harnessed to the slave labor - to produce raw materials and supply them to other countries. Even Bulgaria offers us the car in exchange for raw materials. We are behind all the countries in the export of equipment, machinery and technical products. It is getting more difficult to increase the production of oil, fuel and raw materials and the prices are falling. We have nothing to trade with. We have to get into debt "

The new approach of the USSR in respect of its allies has been identified at the first meeting of Mikhail Gorbachev with the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries, held right after the funeral of Konstantin Chernenko. In his speech he said: "... we stand for equal relations, respect for sovereignty and independence of each country, the mutually beneficial cooperation in all spheres. The recognition of these principles means the full responsibility of each party for the situation in its country ". Gorbachev believed that by doing so he declared the rejection of the "Brezhnev Doctrine", but he was not understood and supported by all. To clarify the Soviet position after the April Plenum of Central Committee of the CPSU Alexander Yakovlev was sent . He writes: "Mikhail Sergeyevich specifically sent me to visit all the leaders of the socialist camp and explain what and how we planned, including in respect of them. Now they had to rely on themselves and build their lives as they see fit, . The complex ideas of restructuring the relationship between the socialist countries was formulated in a special Note of Gorbachev "Some current issues of cooperation," which was discussed and approved by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee July 3, 1986. It stated that it is time for "fraternal countries to stop to consider Moscow as a kind of conservative force, which prevents the pressing reforms". Discussing the Note the General Secretary noted that "we all realized that our relations with socialist countries came to a different stage. As it was - can not go on. Those methods that were applied with respect to Czechoslovakia (in 1968) and Hungary (1956), are unacceptable ... What was causing resentment, encourages centrifugal force ... Nothing will come out if we work in the old frames "

The main provisions of the Note" were reflected in the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee on August 28, 1986, which noted that "the form of relations between socialist countries came into conflict with the needs of life" and should, in cases of discrepancy, scrutinize their causes, it is strongly search for mutually acceptable solutions, based on the methods of ideological and political influence decision-making and avoiding pressure.

"Deep change of Soviet policy towards the socialist community - said a former member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee V.A. Medvedev, - expressed primarily in the rejection of the" Brezhnevs Doctrine. "In all contacts with the leaders of socialist countries, beginning with March 1985, the new nature of the relationship was approved by action .

"Gorbachev Doctrine," has turned in fact, a policy of political appeasement. The assistant of Mikhail Gorbachev, G.H. Shakhnazarov said: "Gorbachev made it a rule not to impose on the Allies, believing that any change must be fully a subject of the sovereign choice of the parties and peoples" . Gorbachev strongly defended the principle of "freedom of choice" as a generic strategic approach to international affairs. This position was reinforced not only by important statements, but also by concrete practical actions.

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importance of exchanging of experience and the growing cooperation of socialist countries. The establishing of a policy of direct production, scientific and technological ties and setting up of joint enterprises. Vigorous cooperation between Soviet and Czechoslovak production within the progress programme of CMEA to the year 2000.

Speaking about the new nature of relations between the USSR and the socialist countries, Mikhail Gorbachev did not refuse the idea of further construction of Socialism, albeit in need of the reforms. He believed that the possibilities of the socialist system are not exhausted, that he was "able to solve their most complex problems. To do this, it is vital to settle an increasingly active cooperation, which gives the effect not only of the addition but also the multiplication of our forces, which serve as a stimulus of the acceleration of the general movement forward, ". At this point it has been arisen the field of possible conflicts due to incompatibility of the two vectors - "renewal of socialism" and the rejection of it. Mikhail Gorbachev was probably not going to let the socialist countries go into free political swimming, and especially geopolitical swimming, because they understood the importance of them for the security of the Soviet Union. But while there was an intention, maintaining the leaders role of the Soviet Union, to save it from the economic burden and a headache caused by the internal political development of the "fraternal countries". The general idea was to promote the rise of the power of the reformist forces which at receiving more independence, would take a considerable responsibility for internal conversion. It would unload Moscow from taking care of the allies, allowing it to concentrate on solving the internal problems of the country. And the received support of the new Soviet reforms by the progressive minded leaders of the "fraternal countries" would create a strong political and ideological basis for the relations within the socialist community, and thus opened a new stage in their mutual collaboration.

Gorbachev's visit was taking place, and a tuning fork, and a powerful impulse for the future changes in Czechoslovakia. Of course, everyone was doing for himself the conclusions in accordance with their own understanding of what was going on around, looking, "with its bell tower." Husak, a man honest and frank, started to think seriously about his retirement, and ensuring the continued leadership of the country. In that period the political differences were detected between the leadership of the Soviet Union and some countries of the Warsaw Pact. The leaders not only of Czechoslovakia but also of the GDR, Bulgaria, Romania were attentive with Gorbachev's perestroika, realizing how dangerous it is to their political regimes. But at the same time it was exactly the opposite attitude of the majority of the citizens of these countries. The popularity of Gorbachev in their eyes was extremely high. His visits to these countries turned into action that shook the existing regimes. The masses of people were demanding democracy and transparency from their leaders.