BP Oil Spill I

Drilling for oil off the Southeast coast of the United States had grown increasing complex as exploration is forced to move from the shallower waters to deeper waters where the risks increase.

One such exploration site, the Macondo well, called the BP Deepwater Horizon was drilled 50 miles off the coast of Louisiana in the Gulf of Mexico. It was drilled to a depth of 18,000 feet in 5,000 feet of water

It was an especially troublesome project from the beginning. The rig had fallen 45 days behind schedule and was $58 million over budget.

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BP Oil Spill II
In the early morning hours of April 20th 2010 the drilling of the well was in its final stages of testing. But there were some indications of problems. Then at 9:45 PM a large blowout of methane gas travelled up the pipe to the platform. A massive explosion was followed by a devastating fire. 3/28/12

BP Oil Spill III

Of 126 workers on the platform, eleven died.

The rig continued to burn until it fell into the ocean the next day. When it collapsed, the drill pipe, almost one mile below the platform, bent and fractured where it entered the ocean floor. Immediately, oil started gushing through the broken pipe and into the ocean.

Attempts were made to cut off the flow by closing relief valves, called blowout preventers at the point where the pipe entered the ocean floor, but they failed.

At first, BP minimized the extent of the oil leaking from the ruptured pipe and expressed confidence that the problem would be resolved quickly, but the flow continued unabated and in the weeks that followed, estimates of the flow increased as did the environmental damage to wildlife, fishing habitats and tourist areas in Louisiana. 3/28/12

BP Oil Spill IV
Estimated of the leakage varied widely from initial estimates of 5,000 barrels a day to as much as 60,000 barrels a day. Accurate estimates were difficult to obtain simply because the problem was occurring one mile below the surface of the ocean and it was difficult to collect accurate data at this depth.

On June 3rd 2010, a containment cap was placed over the well head in an engineering feat that pushed state-of the art capabilities; a feat that had never been attempted at such depths and under such atmospheric pressure. This cap was successful in allowing some but not all of the oil to be recovered by ships on the surface.

But there were still concerns. The cap lowered into place could force a leak elsewhere in the well bore and permit the escape of oil and gas through nearby bedrock and mud thereby making the environmental disaster even worse. 3/28/12

BP Oil Spill V
The cap did work, but it was a temporary fix. The permanent fix would require the drilling of a relief well and the infusion of mud and cement to permanently seal it. But the fix would take time.

It was not until late August 2010, four months after the disaster occurred, that the relief well was completed. Fortunately the fix did work but not until 200 million gallons of oil had escaped into the ocean making this spill the worst environmental disaster in US history. The second worst was the 11 million gallon spill from the Exon Valdez in Prince William Sound, Alaska on March 24, 1989.

How did this disaster happen? Was the company aware of the risks and what had they done to mitigate them? Did they have a contingency plan should a disaster like this occur?

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One can only guess that the company experts focused on the fact that events like this are rare and that they need not be considered in the planning process.

But, what BP failed to recognize was that impact from such an event would be so high. It would take an enormous toll on the environment, the company itself, and the industry in general

There was considerable evidence that BP had neglected the establishment of an effective risk management program. Fortune Magazine (February 7, 2001) learned that in a December 2008 internal report that the company acknowledged, that process safety manor hazard and risks are not fully understood by engineering or line operating personnel. Insufficient awareness is leading to missed signals that precede incidents and response after incidents, both of which increases the potential for and severity of process-safety related incidents. 3/28/12

BP Oil Spill VII

Here is an excerpt from the Fortune Magazine article of the disaster.

The final well design called for 21 centralizers to correctly position the casing (the carbon-steel lining inside the drill hole) so the cement could provide a good seal. BP didnt have that many centralizers on the rig and ordered more. But when they arrived, they appeared to be the wrong kind. Using too few, BP contractor Halliburton warned, could result in a severe gas flow problem. But facing delays and added costs, BP went with the six centralizers it hand on hand. Who cares BP drilling engineer Brett Cocales wrote from Houston to a colleague aboard the Horizon. Its done, end of story, we will probably be fine.

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BP Oil Spill VIII

Underscoring the toll that such an incident could take, William Reilly who was appointed as panel co-chairman to the Oil Spill Commission, a group investigating this spill, said that the oil industry had not kept up with the way they assess the risk of catastrophic damages from spills.

Stanford physics Professor Douglas Osheroff said that this disaster reminded him of other NASA accidents including the Columbia Shuttle disaster. None of these systems are fail safe, he said, People dont spend enough time thinking about what could go wrong.

Professor Nancy Levenson of MIT suggested that there were flaws in the safety culture and that these companies suffer from a culture of denial. They accept that their industry is risky, that accidents are inevitable, and the safety is improving. And by accepting these risks they are denying their part in preventing such disasters. These are management and human problems, she continues and that the emphasis needs to be on changing humans rather than changing the 3/28/12 systems in which humans work.

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The University Of Wisconsins Update (Fall 2010/inter 2011) asked Emeritus Professor Dan Anderson about the steps taken by the company to prevent this disaster. The company tried to save on costs and were rushing because they were behind schedule. They skipped steps in the testing and operations. They were getting unusual pressure readings, but rather than stopping to address them, they moved forward with them because they wanted to get the rig online. Ironically, if they had taken that extra time and followed proper steps, they would have spent maybe a few extra million dollars as opposed to the $40 billion they now face.
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BP Oil Spill X
One of the consequences of denial is that warning signs can be overlooked. Bob Bea, a University of California engineering professor said in congressional testimony that BP ignored the signs that something was wrong through overconfidence and incompetence.

While there are many lessons to be learned from this disaster what becomes clear is that some organizations and some managers prefer not to spend time thinking about failure. If they do think about it they tend to underestimate the likelihood that it will occur and even ignore the impact it will have both inside and outside the organization. As a result they are unprepared when a failure does happen.

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