Centrifugal Pump Isolation Hazards: Case Histories and Prevention Methodologies

Peter N. Lodal Eastman Chemical Company

What is a B.L.E.V.E.?

Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion

 Boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion, often
referred to by the acronym BLEVE, is a phenomenon which occurs when a vessel containing a pressurized liquid substantially above its boiling point is ruptured, releasing the contents explosively.

What Causes a BLEVE?

Pressure Increases Closed System T Heat Liquid P Vapor Temperature Increases

Vessel Ruptures Pressure Rapidly Decreases P Vapor 1600x Vapor Volumetric Expansion Liquid Flash Vaporizes Liquid
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Heat

What can BLEVE?

 Tanks

External pool fire If flammable, fireball is enormous BLEVE does not necessarily involve flammables External pool fire 15-20 minutes Launch Launch like a missile External pool fire Launch over 1 mile in the air Running isolated (suction & discharge closed) As little as 20-30 minutes

 Hot water heaters  Drums

 Cylinders  Railcars  Pumps

Case 1

Sludge Pump

Case 1:Description of Incident

A loud sound was heard and a 20 foot long white to whitish-gray cloud was seen in the area of Sludge Pump. Inspection showed Pump was fractured and small pieces were found as far away as 35 feet. Pump suction and discharge valves were found closed and the local pump run switch was found in the auto position.

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Case 1: Data  Pump suction & discharge valves were closed.  Pump local hand switch was set in Auto.  DCS was set telling the pump to run.  Electrical evaluation of the pump power breaker
indicated the pump was running until some incident tripped the breaker.

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Case 1: Data (continued)

 Pump fracture analysis suggests

approximately 200-210 psig pressure was generated.  Pegged pressure gauge on pump discharge suggests pressure reached 200-210 psig.  Vapor pressure data suggests temperature required to reach 200-210 psig was approximately 230 C.

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Case 1: Data (continued)  Differential Scanning Calorimeter (DSC) on actual 

pump sample showed no exotherm until 376 C. Autoignition temperature on actual pump sample was measured at 485 C.

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Case 1:Conclusions

 No evidence of deflagration.  Material does not appear to be thermally

sensitive at our temperatures.  Autoignition does not appear to be credible.  Root Cause -- Pump was inadvertently started by DCS and left running with process material blocked into the pump head which built up enough temperature to raise the vapor pressure to 200-210 psig which caused the pump to fail.
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Case 2

Caustic Pump

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Case 2: Data  Pump suction & discharge valves were closed.  Pump was inadvertently started when operator threw
a hand switch thinking it was for a ventilation fan.

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Case 2: Conclusions

 Material was non-flammable, so deflagration

was ruled out.  Root Cause = Pump was inadvertently started and left running with process material blocked into the pump head which built up enough temperature to raise the pressure to a point which caused the pump to fail.

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Case 3

Condensate Pump

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Case 3: Data  Pump suction & discharge valves were closed during 
a power interruption and system shutdown. Pump was started remotely 3 days after the shutdown.

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Case 3: Conclusions

 Material was non-flammable, so deflagration

was ruled out.  One 5-lb piece of the casing was found 400 feet from the pump installation.  Root Cause = Pump was started automatically and left running with condensate blocked into the pump head which built up enough temperature to raise the pressure to a point which caused the pump to fail.
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Common Features 1. Complete Isolation (Suction and Discharge Blocked), 2. 3. 4.

not deadheaded (discharge only blocked). Fluid Filled Remote Start Capability Seal Failure did not provide adequate pressure relief

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Case Pump Summaries

Case 1

3500 RPM, 15 HP, 140 psig 1750 RPM, 10 HP, 55 psig 2600 GPM, 75 HP, 110 psig

Case 2

Case 3

Organic Acids & decomposition solids 50% Sodium Hydroxide solution Steam condensate

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Conclusions  Pump Explosions can occur with completely isolated  

fluids, even when those fluids are non-flammable Damage potential increases as horsepower increases (increasing inability to dissipate energy) Seal failure as a relief mechanism is NOT a safe assumption

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Recommendations  So, what are the best ways of preventing pump

explosions?
1. 2. 3.

Use local start only (remote shutoff is not an issue) Avoid the ability to isolate the pump


Lock open or remove valves on the suction and/or discharge

Train operators on the significance of this issue

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Centrifugal Pump with Remote Stop

Recommendations  If local start and lock open valving are not options (e.g.,
spared pump installations with auto-throwover), there are a number of control options that can be evaluated on a case-by-case basis for adequacy of risk reduction: Relief device (rupture disc or relief valve) High Temp Shutdown High Pressure Shutdown Limit switches on isolation valves to ensure they are open (or at

least not closed) Low flow interlock Low power draw interlock (limited applicationreliability issues)

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Centrifugal Pump with Relief

Back

Centrifugal Pump with SIF

Back

Pump Protection Selection Matrix

Pump Protection Selection Guidance Type of Pump Hazard Variable Speed Drive Centrifical Pump Liquid Vapor Pressure Expansion Hazard (Bleve) Version: B 3/2/2011 By KBYount (HPCC) Safety Rated Protection Required (SIL 13) Thermal Expansion Hazard (Casing Bust Open) Positive Displacement Pump Pump Service Types Analog Control Valve/Loop Involved Interlock On-line Testing Required O C N Y Y Y na Batch (ON/OFF) Pumping Service Auto Pump Throwover Service Variable Process Composition Reactive Chemical Exotherm Pump Seal/Bearing Failure

<- Protection Method

Pump Type, Process Service/Conditions ->

Low Power Monitor Interlock Low Amps Interlock Low Flow Interlock (transmitter or switch) High Temperature Interlock (Pump Casing) High Pump Discharge Pressure Interlock Overpressure Relief Valve Minimum Flow/Recirculation Line Minimum Flow Control Loop (DCS or Mechanical FC) Block Valve Position Indication Interlock Operational Locks on Manual Isolation Valves Local Only Operator Start Switch (New) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

B N N C Y Y Y N N Y Y

C N N N N Y Y na na Y Y

D N N Y Y N C

E Y Y Y Y Y

F C

G C C Y

H Y C Y Y Y C N N C N

I Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N

J N N C Y Y Y Y Y C N

K C C

L N N Y

M N N Y Y Y Y Y

C Y Y C C C Y

N Y

Y C N Y Y

Y Y Y C C C N

Y Y Y Y

9 10 11

Y Y Y

Y Y

Y Y

Y = Yes, Typically good for this service N = No, Typically not a good fit for this service C = Conditionally good for the service, additional design details are required, see notes

na = Not Applicable

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Slurry Service

PRELIMINARY DRAFT

Variable Process Temp

Centrifical Pumps

Share Learnings
 

Communicate the hazard Identify potential pump explosion hazards in our areas
Remote start capability

Evaluate each potential pump explosion hazard Make recommendations to mitigate risk

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Questions?

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