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MR=100-4Q
Pm=55
P=100-2Q
Pc=10 Qm = 22.5 Qc = 45
MC=10
Now, since price is driven to MC in a competitive market with many firms, Pc = MC = 10 and the market output would be (100 - 2Q = 10) Q = 45.
The overall profit across firms would be 10(45) - 10(45) = 0. Now, lets consider a model thought up by a guy named Cournot (rhymes with tour go). Cournot said consider only two firms selling in a market. The way that each firm understands the market is that each will pick its own output level. Then when the other firms output level is added in the price will determined from the demand curve.
Now, if there are two firms in the market, the market demand would be served by both firms and we might think of the demand as P = 100 - 2Q = 100 - 2(q1 + q2),
where q1 & q2 represent the output of each firm. Each firm wants to maximize its own profit. Again, each firm will pick a level of output and when added together will determine the market price. The profit for each firm will be
In the table we have profit amounts and each firm can choose a level of output.
firm 2 1 1 2 86, 86 2 3 15 16 24 25
firm 1
15
16
24 25
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Imagine we place all these possibilities in a big game theory matrix. What is each firm to do? It has been shown that the solution to the Cournot duopoly problem is actually a Nash equilibrium. This means each firm will not have an incentive to change its output, given the output of the other firm.
Here is how we arrive at the Cournot solution: Firm 1 best response function Firm 2 best response function
q1 = (90/4) - (2/4)q2,
q2 = (90/4) - (2/4)q1,
substitute this over into that, like on the next page
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q1 = (90/4) - (2/4)q2, = (90/4) - (2/4)[(90/4) - (2/4)q1] I am going to forget the subscript on the q for a minute because it is easier to type. So, we have (when we multiply through by 4) 4q = 90 - 2[(90/4) - (2/4)q) = 90 - (90/2) + q, so 3q = 45, or q1 = 15.
P = 40.
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So, the duopoly solution is between the monopoly and perfect competition solutions.
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Cournots analysis suggests that as the number of firms increases as the market structure becomes less concentrated the mark-up of price over marginal cost shrinks.
Thus, structure influences performance. A section of the text also suggests that if firms do not have the same MC, the one with the higher cost will have a smaller market share and lower profits.
From a game theory point of view, the Cournot model assumes firms act simultaneously.
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