FAILURE ANALYSIS OF ICE (INTER CITY EXPRESS) , GERMANY - 1998

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 ABSTRACT

Complete failure analysis of ICE

In June of 1998, one of the Germany’s Inter City Express

(ICE)884 train slammed into an overpass killing 101 people &
injuring over 200 severely. This paper gives an overview that how
this catastrophe would have been avoided if proper care had taken
in the preliminary stage itself & how playing with FOS perhaps can
cause fatal errors.

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INTRODUCTION

 ICE project started in the 1980s &

the first ICE was the inter-city
experimental, which gained a
speed record over 400km/h.

Top speed on
280km/h
high track

Top speed on
200km/h
conventional line

Speed record 408km/h

Best average
200km/h
speed

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BACKGROUND

 In 1971 IC rail system was introduced in Germany connecting towns

& cities.
 Up gradation of IC was implemented in 1980’s to provide high speed
rail system across Germany.
 During 1990’s tremendous growth of ICE was noticed (30% boost) &
it was expanded to connect neighboring countries like Switzerland,
Austria, Belgium & Netherland.
 In 1994 two German states railroads were merged into the Deutshe
Bahn AG & privatized.

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 BACKGROUND CONT

 ICE are the modern hotels which

include the amenities like
 Dining car
 Telephone services
 In-seat video BACKGROUND CONT
 Audio attachment
 Smoking area
 Internet access

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 TYPES OF ICE

GRADE CLASS YEAR SPEED

Km\h

ICE V 410 810 1985 200

ICE 1 401 801 802 803 1991 280

ICE 2 402 805 806 807 1997 280

808

ICE 3 403 406 2000 330

ICE 4 TILTING ICE 2002 300

ICE 5 TRANSRAPID 2002 400

MAGLEV VEHICLE

ICE VT DEISEL ELECTRIC 2001 200

TRAINS
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SEQUENCE OF FAILURE

• The rim of a wheel on the third axle of the first car broke, peeled away from the wheel, and
punctured the floor of the car, where it remained embedded.
• The embedded wheel rim slammed against the guide rail of the switch, pulling it from the railway
ties.
• Steering rail also penetrated the floor of the car and lifting the axle carriage off the rails.
• Derailed wheels struck the points lever of the second switch & changes its setting.
• The rear axles of car No 3 were switched onto a parallel track, and the entire car was thereby
thrown into the piers supporting a 300-tonne roadway overpass.

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 SEQUENCE OF FAILURE CONT
• Car No 4, likewise derailed by the violent deviation of car No 3, passed intact under the bridge
and rolled onto the embankment immediately behind.
• As the second half of car No 5 passed under the bridge, the bridge collapsed and fell on the car,
flattening it completely.
• Remaining cars jackknifed into the rubble in a zigzag pattern as the collapsed bridge had
completely obstructed the track.
• Cars 6 and 7, the service car, the restaurant car, the three first class cars numbered 10 to 12,
and the rear control car all derailed and slammed into the pile.

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 WHAT ARE THE CAUSES?

 Technical Causes
 Wheel design
Use of a rubber damping ring between a
metal wheel rim and the wheel body.
 Bridge design
Bridge supported on two thin piers.
 Management Causes
 Poor response by the train crew.
 Reducing the factor of safety by Duetshe Bahn.
 Pressure resistance windows & rigid aluminum frames
hobbled the intervention of the rescue workers.

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 UNDERLYING ISSUES

 Operation Maintenance decision

 The Fraunhofer Institute had told the DB management as early as 1992 about its
concerns vis-à-vis possible metal wheel failure.
 Permissible error in Wheel diameter is 0.6mm but error noticed in failed wheel is
1.1mm.
 Insufficient failure detection system.
 Design verification flaws
The rubber cushioned wheels, which
has been used successfully on street cars
were not suitable for heavier loads of ICE
train operating at much higher speeds.
 FOS
Worn out wheel diameter suggested by Fraunhofer Institute was 88cm but DB kept
this value to 85.4cm. So a only of difference of 2.6cm is also one of the causes of this
failure. 10
 NEGLIGENCE TOWARD NDT TESTING

 It was committed to use ultrasonic testing every 250,000km operation, in

fact no appropriate testing method was developed for in service inspection.
 Wheel in question was first put into operation in 1994 and ran 1.8 Million
km until the accident in June 1998. It is significant that during its 4 years of
operation through testing of the wheels have not done.
 No fracture mechanic testing of the wheel was
carried out after implementing.
 The limited testing that was done did not account
for dynamic, repetitive force that result from
extended wear.

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CONSEQUENCES

 LEGAL
2. In august 2002, 2 DB officials & one engineer were charged & fined.
3. The remarkable growth of ICE of about 30% per annum was hindered by
this incident.
4. People in Germany started traveling in car after this accident after few
month.
 Technical
6. All wheels of similar design were replaced by monoblock wheel.
7. All 59 ICE1 train were recalled for ultrasound examination of the wheel.

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 CONCLUSION

• When such a train is involved in accident , the energy released is high & damage
done is much higher than for lower speed train.
• Purely material defect has caused this accident.
• Poor reaction by the manager after noticing
the violent vibration had quintuple the after of this accident.
• The passenger traveling in such a train
should be given some basic preliminary coaching.
• Train manager refused to stop the train
until he recovered the problem himself claiming
this is against the company policy,
such policy need to be noticed carefully.
• A difference of 2.6cm can cause such an
unforgettable catastrophe.

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 STATISTICS

 Length : 358m
 Weight : 850 tons
 Max seating capacity : 651
 Total no of passenger traveling : 287
 Dead : 101
 Severely injured : 88
 Unharmed : 106
 Hazard (0-1000) : 292
 Range (km square) : 1
 Fear factor (0-10) : 2.2
 Media effect (0-100) : 70
 An example of Price:
Brussels to Frankfurt(313km)
1st class : 125 euros(7875 INR)
2nd class : 84 euros(5292 INR)

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THANKS

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