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ECONOMICS
CHAPTER 11:
THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF
GEOGRAPHICAL ECONOMICS
1
Agenda
Introduction.
Building a bridge.
Welfare implications.
Conclusions. 2
1. INTRODUCTION
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Policy implications of the core model
of the geographical economics
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2. Six basics policy
implications of the core
model
Ottaviano argues that the core model
gives rise to the following sixgeneral
policy implications :
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Tomahawk diagram
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7
8
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3. Agglomeration rents, public
policy, and policy competitions
- Corporate income taxation and the race
to the bottom:
Agglomeration rents
- Government spending.
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3.1 The standard view
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Under- provision of public goods
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Race to the bottom is not an
inevitable outcome when…
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The main contribution from
geographical economics in
this topic is:
of exogenous differences in country size, but may very well be the endogeno
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3.2 Agglomerations rents
In the core region
the mobile factors
of production
receives
- Tomahawk diagram
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As long as the agglomeration rents exceeds the tax
differential
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Model North- South
(Baldwin and Krugman)
- Costs function (i):
r + Wax xi
r – wage forK W – wage for L
- Capital moves to the region with the highest real wage after tax.
- Let s k be the share of capital in North, the resulting equilibria ( stable
or unstable) can be:
sk = 1 s k= 0 0 < sk
< 1
- The freeness of trade is such that s k = 1 is a stable long equilibrium and the
economy finds itself in the equilibrium.
- This creates the AGGLOMERATION RENT for human capital.
h to South as long as this agglomeration rent is positive, so the tax rate in the North can be
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The wiggle diagram
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3.3 Government spending
“The government spending is an instrument of
locational competition between governments in their
attempt to attract mobile production factors”
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“Locations decisions can be affected
by regional government spending and
not just be the level of taxation”
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The role of national
government spending
( the Forslid- Ottaviano model)
f j (Z j )[ r j + [ (σ
− 1) / σ ] x ]
(measures the reduction in costs and where (Z j )
- f j (Z j ) efficiency represents the level of goverment spending)
function
- r j return to human capital in
region j
Goverment production competes with privates production Optimal size of the governmen
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- Market clearing for human capital in region j
allows the determination of the number of varieties
produced in region j :
Private and public sector compete with each other on the labor market
- Equilibrium
in the public sector requires that
public spending be fully paid by taxes :
- rj Zj = tj Yj ( tj uniform income tax rate
that applies to labor and
human capital )
Public sector has to pay competing wages in order to attract human capital
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
FREENESS OF TRADE AND THE DEGREE OF
AGGLOMERATION
( to know if agglomeration becomes more likely or not )
A wide range of parameter values tending to reduce the stability of the spreading equilibrium
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4. Building a bridge (policy-
inspired experiment)
“How policy interventions that
somehow alter transport costs might
change the spatial allocation of
economic activity”
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4.1 The pancake economy
Characteristics
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The pancake economy
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Average distance, pancake economy
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Distances: pancake economy, link between
cities 2 and 12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 5 4 3 2 1
2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 5 4 3 2 1
3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 5 4 3 2
4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 5 4 3
5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 5 4
6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 5
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5
8 5 5 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4
9 4 4 5 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3
10 3 3 4 5 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2
11 2 2 3 4 5 5 4 3 2 1 0 1
12 1 1 2 3 4 5 5 4 3 2 1 0
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Distances: pancake economy, link between
cities 3 and 11
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 5 4 3 2 1
2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 5 4 3 2 2
3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 4 3 2 1 2
4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 4 3 2 3
5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 4 3 4
6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 4 5
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5
8 5 5 4 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4
9 4 4 3 4 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3
10 3 3 2 3 4 4 3 2 1 0 1 2
11 2 2 1 2 3 4 4 3 2 1 0 1
12 1 2 2 3 4 5 5 4 3 2 1 0
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Distances: pancake economy, link
between cities 4 and 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 5 4 3 2 1
2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 5 4 3 3 2
3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 4 3 2 3 3
4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 3 2 1 2 3
5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 3 2 3 4
6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 3 4 5
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5
8 5 5 4 3 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4
9 4 4 3 2 3 3 2 1 0 1 2 3
10 3 3 2 1 2 3 3 2 1 0 1 2
11 2 3 3 2 3 4 4 3 2 1 0 1
12 1 2 3 3 4 5 5 4 3 2 1 0
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4.2 Bridges and the
equilibrium spatial
distribution.
Uniform initial distribution=> stable flat earth equilibrium
for the base scenario parameter setting:
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Buildinga bridge has a large impact on
the distribution of manufacturing
production, and leads to
considerable agglomeration of
economic activity.
City Link 2-12 Link 3-11 Link 4-10
1 8.20 4.1 2.7
2 16.4 7.0 3.8
3 10.3 20.7 8.5
4 7.1 9.8 22.8
5 5.4 5.3 8.5
6 4.6 3.5 3.8
7 4.3 3.0 2.7
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Impact of buiding a bridge on spatial
distribution
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Effects of parameter changes with
a bridge between cities 4 and 10
T
Determine the long-
run equilibrium ρ
δ
Determines the
responsiveness to
real wage
differences
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Changing transport costs
(the most important parameter)
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Changing spending on manufactures
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Changing elasticity of substitution
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Changing congestion costs
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Changing adjustment speed
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Adjustment speed and long-run
equilibrium
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5. Welfare implications
… of the core model of geographical economics
For example : Mobile workforce increases welfare level
Agglomeration in
region 1
Immobile workforce in region 2 is worse
off compared to the spreading
equilibrium
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To determine the welfare level for both types of workers:
Welfare
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Welfare implications of a bridge
in the pancake economy
Building a bridge=> uneven
distribution of the reduction in
average distance =>inhabitants in
different cities enjoy different
welfare effects =>migration
=>economic agglomeration
13 economic agents:
Farm Farm Farm
Manufacturing workers in
workers in workers in
workers region 12
region 1 region 2
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Overview of welfare effects:
long-run equilibrium
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… on the welfare of the average farm worker is
a poor indicator of what happens to a
particular farm worker…
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6. CONCLUSIONS
THE WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 2009
(WORLD BANK)
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