Disini V Sec of Justice Digest

The Constitution:
Principles and State

Policies
1
Doctrine of Constitutional
Supremacy
Manila Price Hotel vs. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408
2
“ Constitution is the
fundamental, paramount
and supreme law of the
nation.
3
Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or
contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract
whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch
or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and
void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution
is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract. (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R.
No. 122156, Feb. 3, 1997)
4
“The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other
laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest
officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however nobly
intentioned, if it conflicts with the Constitution. The Constitution must
ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law.
Expediency must not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for
power debase its rectitude. Right or wrong, the Constitution must be
upheld as long as it has not been changed by the sovereign people lest
its disregard result in the usurpation of the majesty of the law by the
pretenders to illegitimate power.” (Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, Central Lawbook
Publishing, Co., Inc. 1991 Ed., p. 11)
5
CASE: Manila Price Hotel vs. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408
FACTS: Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), decided to sell

through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding
shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC).
Only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel

Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the
MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad,
a Malaysian firm, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00
per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
6
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning

bidder/strategic partner, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS
matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong
Berhad. Later, petitioner sent a manager's check for Thirty-three
Million Pesos to match the bid of Renong Berhad, which respondent
GSIS refused to accept.
Petitioner came to this (Supreme) Court on prohibition
and mandamus. In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par.,
Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution. 7
Petitioner submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the
Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument
which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. That it
has become a part of the national patrimony.
Petitioner also argues that any transaction involving 51% of the

shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national
economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution,
applies.
8
Respondents maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy
since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing
legislation.
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel

does not fall under the term national patrimony which only refers to
the items cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII,
1987 Constitution.
9
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national
patrimony, what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares
of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the
building stands.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on the bidding rules is misplaced.

The privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it
only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares.
10
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of

discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its
discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner
ISSUE: Whether the refusal to accept Petitioner’s Matching Bid is

unconstitutional.
11
RULING: (Constitution Defined.) A constitution is a system of

fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation.
It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the
authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as
the fundamental and paramount law of the nation.
12
(Self-executing vs. Non Self-executing Provisions) A provision which

lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed
or protected, is self-executing.
13
(National Patrimony) We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the

term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of
national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.
14
Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of

Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it
first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino,
Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue
of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history.
15
(Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy) Adhering to the doctrine of

constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it
should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent
GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the
Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws
and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land.
Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.
16
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined
efforts of respondents to sell the historical landmark — this Grand Old
Dame of hotels in Asia — to a total stranger. For, indeed, the
conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands
cannot be less than Mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner
viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation's soul for some pieces of
foreign silver.
17
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF
THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST
from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG
BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary
clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for
purpose. 18
2
Separation of Church and State
Austria vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 124382
19
“ "Strong fences make
good-neighbors."
20
Art. II, Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be
inviolable.
Art. III, Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment

of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
21
Art. IX-C, Section 2. (5) Xxx. Religious denominations and sects shall
not be registered. Xxx.
Art. VI, Section 5 (2). Xxx one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.
22
Art. VI, Section 29 (2) No public money or property shall be
appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister,
other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such
priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed
forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.
23
CASE: Austria vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 124382
FACTS: Pastor Dionisio V. Austria worked with the Seventh Day

Adventist (SDA) for twenty eight (28) years from 1963 to 1991. He
began his work with the SDA as a literature evangelist, moved to
different positions until he was promoted as District Pastor and was
transferred to Bacolod City. He held the position of district pastor
until his services were terminated on 31 October 1991.
24
Petitioner was asked to admit accountability and responsibility for

the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife, Mrs. Thelma
Austria, in his district which amounted to P15,078.10, and to remit
the same to the Negros Mission.
Petitioner reasoned out that he should not be made accountable for

the unremitted collections since it was private respondents Pastor
Gideon Buhat and Mr. Eufronio Ibesate who authorized his wife to
collect the tithes and offerings.
25
Petitioner received a letter inviting him and his wife to attend the
Executive Committee meeting to discuss the non-remittance of
church collection and the events that transpired in the prior meeting
supposed settling of the dispute.
Petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing grounds for the

termination of his services.
26
Labor Arbiter Cesar D. Sideño rendered a decision in favor of

petitioner. The NLRC vacated the findings of the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration where NLRC reinstated

the findings of the LA. The SDA filed a motion for reconsideration due
to the constitutional provision on the separation of church and state
since the case allegedly involved an ecclesiastical affair to which the
State cannot interfere. The NLRC, reversed itself once again.
27
ISSUE: Whether or not the termination of the services of petitioner is

an ecclesiastical affair, and, as such, involves the separation of
church and state.
28
RULING: The principle of separation of church and state finds no

application in this case. The rationale of the principle of the
separation of church and state is summed up in the familiar saying,
"Strong fences make good-neighbors.” The idea advocated by this
principle is to delineate the boundaries between the two institutions
and thus avoid encroachments by one against the other because of a
misunderstanding of the limits of their respective exclusive
jurisdictions.
29
The demarcation line calls on the entities to "render therefore unto

Ceasar the things that are Ceasar's and unto God the things that are
God's.”
While the state is prohibited from interfering in purely ecclesiastical

affairs, the Church is likewise barred from meddling in purely secular
matters. The case at bar does not concern an ecclesiastical or purely
religious affair as to bar the State from taking cognizance of the
same.
30
While the matter at hand relates to the church and its religious
minister it does not ipso facto give the case a religious significance.
Simply stated, what is involved here is the relationship of the church
as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular
and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or
doctrines of the church.
In this case, petitioner was not ex-communicated or expelled from the

membership of the SDA but was terminated from employment.
31
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The challenged

Resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission, rendered on 23 January 1996, is NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated 15 February 1993, is
REINSTATED and hereby AFFIRMED.
32
3
Republic Act No. 10175:
Cyberlibel
Approved Last September 12, 2012
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR. et al., vs. THE SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE , G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014
33
“ Libel is not a constitutionally
protected speech and that the
government has an obligation to
protect private individuals from
defamation. JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR. et al., vs. THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE , G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014
34
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR. et al., vs. THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE , G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014
FACTS: Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime

law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of
their constitutional rights. The government ofcourse asserts that the
law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities,
punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.
Pending hearing and adjudication the Court extended the

original 120-day temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued
enjoining respondent government agencies from implementing the
cybercrime law until further orders. 35
ISSUES: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of the following

Sections:
a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;
b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
36
g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;

h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of
Cybercrimes;
j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) and R.A. 10175;
l. Section 8 on Penalties;
m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data; 37
n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;

o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;
q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;
s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center
(CICC); and
u. Section 26(a) on CICC’s Powers and Functions. 38
RULING:
Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access:
Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of
the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech,
is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act –
accessing the computer system of another without right. It is a
universally condemned conduct.
39
Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference:
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose,

constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by
means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading
the area of protected freedoms. But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach
on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form
of vandalism.
40
Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft:
The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from
our conviction that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and
"the right most valued by civilized men," but also from our adherence
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no
one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and
"everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.“
41
Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications:
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person

the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads
addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of
speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that
given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is
nonetheless entitled to protection. The State cannot rob him of this
right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of
expression. 42
Section 4(c)(4) on Libel:
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a
constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an
obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed,
cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to
Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section
4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes
"similar means" for committing libel.
43
Section 4(c)(4) on Libel:
But the Court’s acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime

law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel
brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the penal code
provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet
media is distinct from that of print.
44
Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data :
Petitioners also ask that the Court strike down Section 12 for being
violative of the void-for-vagueness doctrine and the overbreadth
doctrine. These doctrines however, have been consistently held by
this Court to apply only to free speech cases. But Section 12 on its
own neither regulates nor punishes any type of speech. Therefore,
such analysis is unnecessary.
45
WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES:
1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

a. Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of
unsolicited commercial communications;
b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic
data in real-time; and
c. Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of
Justice to restrict or block access to suspected Computer Data.
46
2. VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL:
a. Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a computer system
without right;
b. Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data interference, including
transmission of viruses;
c. Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or acquiring domain
name over the internet in bad faith to the prejudice of others;
d. Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or the use or misuse of
identifying information belonging to another;
47
e. Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or the lascivious exhibition

of sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or consideration;
f. Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the production of child pornography;.
g. Section 6 that imposes penalties one degree higher when crimes
defined under the Revised Penal Code are committed with the use
of information and communications technologies;
h. Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for cybercrimes;
48
i. Section 13 that permits law enforcement authorities to require
service providers to preserve traffic data and subscriber
information as well as specified content data for six months;
j. Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data under a
court-issued warrant;
k. Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and examination of
computer data under a court-issued warrant;
l. Section 17 that authorizes the destruction of previously preserved
computer data after the expiration of the prescribed holding
periods;
49
m. Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of justice in relation to

cybercrime investigations;
n. Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime Investigation and
Coordinating Center (CICC);
o. Section 26(a) that defines the CICC’s Powers and Functions; and
p. Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code that
penalizes libel.
50
Further, the Court DECLARES:
1. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and
CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the original author of the post;
but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who
simply receive the post and react to it; and
2. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the
commission of cybercrimes as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL only
in relation to:
51
Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal

Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on
System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section
4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related
Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on
Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; but
VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Sections 4(c)(2) on
Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications, and 4(c)(4) on online Libel.
52
Lastly, the Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the
correct application of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the
offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act
10175 to actual cases, WITH THE EXCEPTION of the crimes of:
1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section

4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal
Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against double
jeopardy; as well as
53
2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the

offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and
Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also
constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to
these, is VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
54
Sources:
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/feb1997/gr_122156_1997.html
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1999/aug1999/gr_124382_1999.html
http://www.chanrobles.com
https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2012/09/12/republic-act-no-10175/
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/feb2014/gr_203335_2014.html
55

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Disini V Sec of Justice Digest

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The Constitution:

Principles and State

FACTS: Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), decided to sell

Only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning

Petitioner also argues that any transaction involving 51% of the

Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel

Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on the bidding rules is misplaced.

Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of

ISSUE: Whether the refusal to accept Petitioner’s Matching Bid is

RULING: (Constitution Defined.) A constitution is a system of

(Self-executing vs. Non Self-executing Provisions) A provision which

(National Patrimony) We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the

Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of

(Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy) Adhering to the doctrine of

Art. III, Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment

FACTS: Pastor Dionisio V. Austria worked with the Seventh Day

Petitioner was asked to admit accountability and responsibility for

Petitioner reasoned out that he should not be made accountable for

Petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing grounds for the

Labor Arbiter Cesar D. Sideño rendered a decision in favor of

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration where NLRC reinstated

ISSUE: Whether or not the termination of the services of petitioner is

RULING: The principle of separation of church and state finds no

The demarcation line calls on the entities to "render therefore unto

While the state is prohibited from interfering in purely ecclesiastical

In this case, petitioner was not ex-communicated or expelled from the

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The challenged

FACTS: Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime

Pending hearing and adjudication the Court extended the

ISSUES: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of the following

g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;

n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;

Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference:

Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose,

Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft:

Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications:

To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person

Section 4(c)(4) on Libel:

Section 4(c)(4) on Libel:

But the Court’s acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime

1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

e. Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or the lascivious exhibition

m. Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of justice in relation to

Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal

1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section

2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the

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