Remedies after a Judgment

becomes Final and Executory

Francheska Joanne Q. Cruz-Am
 Remedies available…
1. As provided by the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure:
a) Petition for relief from judgment (Rule 38)
b) Petition for annulment from judgment (Rule 47)
2. As provided by jurisprudence:
a) Direct action for certiorari (Rule 65)
b) Collateral attack of a judgment that is void on its
face (Escareal v. Phil. Airlines, Inc.)
 Bar Question
A default judgment was rendered by the RTC
ordering D to pay P a sum of money. The
judgment became final, but D filed a
petition for relief and obtained a writ of
preliminary injunction staying the
enforcement of the judgment. After hearing,
the RTC dismissed D’s petition, whereupon P
immediately moved for the execution of the
judgment in his favour. Should P’s motion be
granted? Why? (2002 Bar)
 Answer
P’s immediate motion for execution of the
judgment in his favor should be granted
because the dismissal of D’s petition for relief
also dissolves the writ of preliminary
injunction staying the enforcement of the
judgment, even if the dismissal is not yet
final (Golez v. Leonidas, G.R. No. L-56587
August 31, 1981).
 Bar Question (2014 Bar)
Tom Wallis filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition
for Declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Debi Wallis
on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter.
Before filing the petition, Tom Wallis had told Debi Wallis
that he wanted the annulment of their marriage because
he was already fed up with her irrational and eccentric
behaviour. However, in the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage, the correct residential address of Debi
Wallis was deliberately not alleged and instead, the
resident address of their married son was stated. Summons
was served by substituted service at the address stated in
the petition.
 Bar Question (2014 Bar)
For failure to file an answer, Debi Wallis was declared in default
and Tom Wallis presented evidence ex-parte. The RTC
rendered judgment declaring the marriage null and void on
the ground of psychological incapacity of Debi Wallis. Three
(3) years after the RTC judgment was rendered, Debi Wallis
got hold of a copy thereof and wanted to have the RTC
judgment reversed and set aside. If you are the lawyer of
Debi Wallis, what judicial remedy or remedies will you
take? Discuss and specify the ground or grounds for said
remedy or remedies.
 Answer
Debi Wallis may file a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule
47 of the Rules of Court, on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction,
extrinsic fraud and denial of the right to due process (Leticia
Diona v. Romeo Balange, G.R. No. 173589, January 7, 2013).
– An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law
independent of the case where the judgment sought to be
annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to have
the final and executory judgment set aside so that there will
be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of the appellant and is base on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction (Aleban v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156021, September 23, 2005).
 Answer
• Relative thereto, the act of Tom Wallis in deliberately keeping
Debi Wallis away from the Court, by intentionally alleging a
wrong address in the complaint constitutes extrinsic fraud.
• Moreover, the failure of the Court to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the respondent, being an indispensable party,
necessitates the annulment of judgment of the Regional Trial
Court.
• Likewise, there is denial of the right to due process when Debi
Wallis was not given an opportunity to be heard in the case.
Hence, the judgment rendered by the RTC may be annulled by
the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
 Answer
• Moreover, it is evident that the ordinary remedies of
new trial, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of
Debi Wallis because she was able to obtain a copy of
the Decision only three (3) years after the same was
rendered by the Trial Court.
• At any rate, the Court erred in declaring the defendant
in default because there is no default in a Petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage (Sec. 3, Rule 9). Thus,
a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court could have been an appropriate remedy within
the reglementary period allowed by the Rules.
 Cases
1. Francis Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes
P. A. Sereno, The Judicial and Bar Council, and
Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. (G.R.
No. 213181, August 19, 2014)
2. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo v. People of the
Philippines and the Sandiganbayan (G.R. No.
220598, July 19, 2016)
3. Concepcion Macabingkil v. PHHC (People’s
Homesite and Housing Corporation, and Irene
De Leon and her husband, Vicente Llanes (G. R.
No. L-29080, August 17, 1976)
Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Sereno
 Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Sereno
JBC announced the opening
for application or
recommendation for the
position to be vacated.
• Nomination of petitioner Francis
H. Jardeleza, incumbent Solicitor
General of the Republic
• Jardeleza was interviewed by the
JBC (May 29, 2014)

JBC ex-officio Chairperson Chief Justice Sereno manifested that she

would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against him.
•Directed to “make himself available” before the JBC on June 30,
2014,
• During which he will be informed of such “Objections to his
integrity”
 Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Sereno
• Jardeleza filed a letter-petition praying that the Court, in the exercise of its
constitutional power of supervision over the JBC, issue an order:

1. Directing the JBC to give him at least five (5) working days
written notice of any hearing of the JBC to which he would be
summoned; and the said notice to contain the sworn
specifications of the charges against him by his oppositors, the
sworn statements of supporting witnesses, if any, and copies of
documents in support of the charges; and notice and sworn
statements shall be made part of the public record of the JBC;
2. Allowing him to cross-examine his oppositors and supporting
witnesses, if any, and the cross-examination to be conducted in
public, under the same conditions that attend the public
interviews held for all applicants;
 Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Sereno
• Jardeleza filed a letter-petition (letter-petition) praying that the Court, in
the exercise of its constitutional power of supervision over the JBC, issue
an order:

3. Directing the JBC to reset the hearing scheduled on June

30, 2014 to another date; and
4. Directing the JBC to disallow Chief Justice Sereno from
participating in the voting on June 30, 2014 or at any
adjournment thereof where such vote would be taken for
the nominees for the position vacated by Associate Justice
Abad.
 Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Sereno
• During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC:
– incumbent Associate Justice Carpio appeared as a
resource person to shed light on a classified legal
memorandum that would clarify the objection to
Jardeleza’s integrity as posed by Chief Justice
Sereno.
– Chief Justice Sereno questioned Jardeleza’s ability
to discharge the duties of his office as shown in a
confidential legal memorandum over his handling
of an international arbitration case for the
government.
 Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Sereno
• During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC:
– Later, Jardeleza was directed to one of the Court’s
ante-rooms where Department of Justice
Secretary De Lima informed him that Associate
Justice Carpio appeared before the JBC and
disclosed confidential information which, to
Chief Justice Sereno, characterized his integrity
as dubious.
– Summoned by the JBC at around 2:00 o’clock in
the afternoon.
 Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Sereno
• Jardeleza specifically demanded that Chief Justice Sereno
execute a sworn statement specifying her objections and
that he be afforded the right to cross-examine her in a public
hearing.
– He requested that the same directive should also be
imposed on Associate Justice Carpio.
• Jardeleza then put into record a written statement
expressing his views on the situation and requested the JBC
to defer its meeting considering that the Court en banc would
meet the next day to act on his pending letter-petition.
– At this juncture, Jardeleza was excused.
 Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Sereno
Still on June 30, 2014…
• JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to
vote for the nominees to be included in the shortlist.
• Thereafter, the JBC released the subject shortlist of
four (4) nominees.
Philippine Daily Inquirer:
Atty. Theodore Te: “there were actually five (5)
nominees who made it to the JBC shortlist, but one
(1) nominee could not be included because of the
invocation of Rule 10, Section 2 of the JBC rules.”
 Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Sereno
• Jardeleza filed the present petition for certiorari and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
– with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO),
• Relief sought: To compel the JBC to include him in the list
of nominees for Supreme Court Associate Justice vice
Associate Justice Abad
• Ground: that the JBC and Chief Justice Sereno acted in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in excluding him, despite having garnered a
sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.
Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Sereno

Issue:
Whether or not the Court can assume
jurisdiction and give due course to the
subject petition for certiorari?
 Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Sereno
• Yes. A petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to
question the act of any branch or instrumentality of
the government on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
by any branch or instrumentality of the government,
even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions.
• Rationale: The concept of Judicial Review in the
1987 Constitution allows it to take cognizance of
the petition; The expanded concept of Judicial
Review
 Macapagal-Arroyo v. People
• Consolidated petitions for certiorari
separately brought to assail and annul the
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
– Ground: The Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it denied petitioners’:
 demurrer to evidence and
 motions for reconsideration
 Macapagal-Arroyo v. People
The Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan with PLUNDER
as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 the following:
1. GMA
2. Former PCSO Secretary Benigno Aguas
3. Former PCSO General Manager and Vice Chairman
Rosario C. Uriarte,
4. Former PCSO Chairman of the Board of Directors
Sergio O. Valencia,
5. Former members of the PCSO Board of Directors, and
6. Two former officials of the Commission on Audit
(COA).
 Macapagal-Arroyo v. People
The information reads as follows:

“willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate

and/or acquire. Directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or total value of
PHP365,997,915.00”
 Macapagal-Arroyo v. People
The information reads as follows:
• Diverting funds from the operating budget of
PCSO to its Confidential/Intelligence Fund
• Transferring the said fund to the aforementioned
sum

• Raiding the public treasury from the same fund

• Transferring them to their possession and control

• Taking advantage of their positions to unjustly

enrich themselves at the expense of the Filipino
people and the PH
 Macapagal-Arroyo v. People

The Sandiganbayan eventually acquired jurisidiction over most

of the accused, including petitioners.

All filed petitions for bail, which the Sandiganbayan granted

•except those of the petitioners.
•MR denied
•GMA assailed the denial of her petition for bail before the
Supreme Court. However, this remains unresolved.
 Macapagal-Arroyo v. People

After the Prosecution rested 1. GMA

its case, the 2. Aguas
3. Former PCSO General
accused separately filed their Manager and Vice Chairman
demurrers to evidence Rosario C. Uriarte,
•The Sandiganbayan 4. Former PCSO Chairman of
granted the demurrers and the Board of Directors Sergio
O. Valencia,
dismissed the case against 5. Former members of the PCSO
the accused within its Board of Directors, and
jurisdiction 6. Two former officials of
•Except: the Commission on Audit
(COA).
Macapagal-Arroyo v. People

filed this case before the

Supreme Court
on certiorari before the
Supreme Court to assail the
denial of their demurrers to
evidence, on the ground
of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
 Macapagal-Arroyo v. People

Procedural Issue:
Whether or not the special civil action
for certiorari is proper to assail the denial of
the demurrers to evidence?
 Macapagal-Arroyo v. People
• Certiorari is proper since the Sandiganbayan gravely abused
its discretion in denying GMA’s demurrer to evidence.
• General rule:
– The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper
to assail such an interlocutory order issued by the trial
court because of the availability of another remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
– Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
expressly provides, “the order denying the motion for
leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the
demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or
by certiorari before judgment.”
 Macapagal-Arroyo v. People
• Certiorari is proper since the Sandiganbayan gravely abused
its discretion in denying GMA’s demurrer to evidence.
• Exception:
– “In the exercise of our superintending control over other
courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of
each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’
So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to
prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice”
(citing Ong v. People [G.R. No. 140904, October 9, 2000]).
 Macapagal-Arroyo v. People
• The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government cannot be thwarted by rules of
procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the
convenience of one side. This is because the Court
has the bounden constitutional duty to strike down
grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it
is committed.
 Macabingkil v. PHHC
• February 21, 1964: Macabingkil filed an action
for specific performance with writ of
preliminary injunction against PHHC
– Main purpose: To compel PHHC to execute a Deed
of Conditional Contract to Sell Lot No. 27, Block E-
148, East Avenue Subdivision, Quezon City
– to enjoin PHHC and those claiming under it from
ejecting petitioner therefrom, from demolishing
her house and from removing the improvements
on the premises.
 Macabingkil v. PHHC
• March 25, 1964: Spouses Llanes filed a Motion
for Intervention; Lot was sold to them by PHHC
• Final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-5866:
– declaring said PHHC Resolution No. 550 as void and
of no effect and enjoining the PHHC to respect the
Conditional Contract to Sell it executed on March 27,
1961 in favor of Irene de Leon involving Lot No. 27,
and
– to eject any and all squatters thereon; and
– that this decision, on appeal by the PHHC, was
affirmed; except as to the amount of attorney's fees.
 Macabingkil v. PHHC
• April 28, 1964: PHHC filed its answer with
counterclaim
– Macabingkil has bean illegally squatting on said Lot
– PHHC Board Resolution No. 550 has been declared
null and void; This was affirmed by CA
• Macabingkil filed reply
• Spouses intervenors filed an intervention denying
the substantial allegations and adopting the
affirmative defenses raised by PHHC
 Macabingkil v. PHHC
• Preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses
was conducted  Resolution based on the
pleadings
• Trial Court: Issued an Order stating that there is a
failure to state a cause of action
– Upheld the right of the intervenor
– the contract which the intervenor has with the PHHC
was precisely given full force and effect by the Court
of Appeals and to this Court cannot ignore the same
and instead reaward the same lot to plaintiff;
 Cannot ignore a valid judgment
 Macabingkil v. PHHC
• CA: Affirmed en toto
• Decision received on March 8, 1968  Filed
an MR more than 15 days after; Denied
• Second MR also denied
• Filed a Petition for Certiorari
 Macabingkil v. PHHC

Issue:
Whether or not the Appellate Court gravely
abused its discretion in affirming the trial court's
Order of dismissal of petitioner's action "for
failure of complaint to state a cause of action”?
 Macabingkil v. PHHC
• The rule is well-settled that once a court
renders a final judgment, all the issues
between or among the parties before it are
deemed resolved and its judicial functions as
regards only matter related to the controversy
litigated comes to an end, and the same
cannot be relitigated on its merits in the
lower court as well as in the appellate courts.
 Macabingkil v. PHHC
Under existing rules, there are three (3) ways by which a final and executory judgment
may be set aside:
1. By petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court,
when judgment has been taken against the party through fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence, in which case the petition must be filed within sixty (60)
days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, but not more than six (6)
months after such judgment was entered.
2. By direct action to annul and enjoin the enforcement of the judgment. This
remedy presupposes that the challenged judgment is not void upon its face, but
is entirely regular in form, and the alleged defect is one which is not apparent
upon its face or from the recitals contained in the judgment.
3. Either a direct action, as certiorari, or by a collateral
attack against the challenged judgment is void upon its
face, or that the nullity of the judgment is apparent by
virtue of its own recitals.
 Macabingkil v. PHHC
• Since the afore-mentioned decision in Civil Case
No. Q-5866 is NOT void upon it face, it may only
be annulled by direct action on the ground of
fraud.
– Only extrinsic or collateral fraud
• "where it is one the effect of which prevents a party
from having a trial, or real contest, or from presenting
all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon
matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to
the manner in which it was procured so that there is
not a fair submission of the controversy."
 Macabingkil v. PHHC
• Although petitioner appeared to have a direct
interest in the subject matter of the litigation,
said party did not seek a reconsideration of said
order, much less did she question on appeal the
validity of said order.
• On the basis of the foregoing, it is evident that
even if we were to consider the present appeal as
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, still the said petition
could not be granted.
 Macabingkil v. PHHC
• WHEREFORE, the present appeal should be, as
it is hereby, DISMISSED, with costs against
plaintiff-appellant Concepcion Macabingkil