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A plural word in a statute may thus apply to a singular person or thing, just as
a singular word may embrace two or more persons or things
Art. 996 CC – (law on succession) such article also applies to a situation where
there is only one child because “children” includes “child”
On gender – the masculine, but not the feminine, includes all genders, unless
the context in which the word is used in the statute indicates otherwise
Santillon vs Miranda
Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession; whereas
Art. 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being the case, it is
obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 to support his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate.
Art 892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888 thereof, the legitime
of children in testate succession.
In the New Civil Code's chapter on legal or intestate succession, the only article applicable
is Art. 996.
The theory of those holding otherwise seems to be premised on these propositions: (a) Art.
996 speaks of "Children," therefore it does not apply when there is only one "child";
consequently Art. 892 (and Art. 888) should be applied, thru a process of judicial
construction and analogy.
It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the singular. So Art. 996
could or should be read (and so applied) : "If the widow or widower and a legitimate child
are left, the surviving spouse has the same share as that of the child." Indeed, if we refuse to
apply the article to this case on the ground that "child" is not included in "children," the
consequences would be tremendous.
CONJUNCTIVE AND
DISJUNCTIVE WORDS
Amon Trading Corporation vs CA
In China Banking Corp. v. Members of the Board of Trustees, Home Development
Mutual Fund and the later case of Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and De
los Angeles v. Home Development Mutual Fund, the term and/or was held to
mean that effect shall be given to both the conjunctive “and” and the disjunctive
“or”; or that one word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the other
will best effectuate the intended purpose. It was accordingly ordinarily held that
in using the term "and/or" the word "and" and the word "or" are to be used
interchangeably.
By analogy, the words Lines & Spaces/Tri-Realty mean that effect shall be given
to both Lines & Spaces and Tri-Realty or that Lines & Spaces and Tri-Realty may
be used interchangeably. Hence, petitioners were not remiss when they believed
Eleanor Sanchez representation that Lines & Spaces/Tri-Realty refers to just one
entity. There was, therefore, no error attributable to petitioners when they
refunded the value of the undelivered bags of cement to Lines & Spaces only.
“MAY” VS “SHALL”
Director of Lands vs CA
The law used the term shall in prescribing the work to be done by the
Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latters receipt of the court order
setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus
indicates the mandatory character of a statute. While concededly such literal
mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately
depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case
the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning.
In Republic vs. Marasigan,[16] the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of
(1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. If
the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in
detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition
who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and
occupants of the land. Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of
reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise
imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed provision.
Capati vs Ocampo
The rule on venue of personal actions cognizable by the courts of first instance is
found in Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, which provides that such "actions
may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or
may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of
the plaintiff.
It is well settled that the word "may" is merely permissive and operates to confer
discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term "may be" connotes
possibility; it does not connote certainty. "May" is an auxillary verb indicating liberty,
opportunity, permission or possibility.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the aforesaid Order
of the Office of the President.