Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Corporate governance is
a relationship among stakeholders that is
used to determine and control the strategic
direction and performance of organizations
concerned with identifying ways to ensure
that strategic decisions are made effectively
used in corporations to establish order
between the firm’s owners and its top-level
managers
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Corporate Governance Mechanisms
Ownership Concentration
2
Separation of Ownership and
Managerial Control
Basis of the modern corporation
shareholders purchase stock, becoming
residual claimants
shareholders reduce risk by holding
diversified portfolios
professional managers are contracted to
provide decision-making
Modern public corporation form leads to
efficient specialization of tasks
risk bearing by shareholders
strategy development and decision-making
by managers
3
Agency Relationship: Owners and
Managers
Shareholders
(Principals)
• Firm owners
4
Agency Relationship: Owners and
Managers
Shareholders
(Principals)
• Firm owners
Managers
• Decision makers
(Agents)
5
Agency Relationship: Owners and
Managers
Shareholders
(Principals)
• Firm owners
Managers
• Decision makers
(Agents)
Shareholder Managerial
(business) (employment)
S risk profile risk profile M
Risk
A B
Dominant Related Related Unrelated
Business Constrained Linked Businesses
Diversification
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Governance Mechanisms
Board of Insiders
• The firm’s CEO and other top-level
Directors managers
Affiliated Outsiders
• Individuals not involved with day-
to-day operations, but who have a
relationship with the company
Independent Outsiders
• Individuals who are independent
of the firm’s day-to-day
operations and other relationships
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Governance Mechanisms
10
Governance Mechanisms
• Salary, bonuses, long term incentive
Board of compensation
Directors • Executive decisions are complex and
non-routine
Executive • Many factors intervene making it
Compensation difficult to establish how managerial
decisions are directly responsible for
outcomes
11
Governance Mechanisms
• Stock ownership (long-term
Board of incentive compensation) makes
Directors managers more susceptible to
market changes which are partially
Executive beyond their control
Compensation • Incentive systems do not guarantee
that managers make the “right”
decisions, but do increase the
likelihood that managers will do the
things for which they are rewarded
12
CEO Pay and Performance
Unfortunately, this
CEO Pay
relationship is weak
The stronger
relationship is with
firm size
Firm Performance
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CEO Pay and Firm Size
Relationship between
pay and firm size is
curvilinear.
Firm Size
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Relationship Between Firm
performance and Firm Size
Relationship between
firm performance and
firm size is curvilinear.
Performance
BUT…
From the graph of CEO
pay vs. firm size, pay
doesn’t decline
Firm Size
15
Relationship Between Firm
performance and Equity Ownership
Relationship between
firm performance
(Tobin’s Q) and
managerial ownership
is curvilinear.
Firm Value
Managerial Ownership in %
16
Governance Mechanisms
• Large block shareholders (often
Board of institutional owners) have a
Directors strong incentive to monitor
management closely
Executive
Compensation • Exit vs. Voice – Cannot costlessly
exit due to equity stake
(transaction costs) so they press
Ownership for change (exercise voice)
Concentration
• They may also obtain Board seats
which enhances their ability to
monitor effectively (although
financial institutions are legally
forbidden from directly holding
board seats)
17
Governance Mechanisms
• Types of institutional investors
Board of - Mutual funds, pension funds,
Directors foundations, churches,
universities,
Executive insurance companies
Compensation
• Pressure-resistant versus
Ownership pressure-sensitive
Concentration - Mutual and pension funds are
pressure resistant
• Are Institutional investors the
same?
- Short vs. long term
• Components of voice:
- Pension fund hit lists
- Shareholder liability suits 18
Governance Mechanisms
• Firms face the risk of takeover
Board of when they are operated inefficiently
Directors • Many firms begin to operate more
efficiently as a result of the “threat”
Executive of takeover, even though the actual
Compensation incidence of hostile takeovers is
relatively small
Ownership • Changes in regulations have made
Concentration hostile takeovers difficult
• Acts as an important source of
Market for discipline over managerial
Corporate Control incompetence and waste
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Managerial Defense Tactics
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Takeover Defenses:
Poison pills
Financial
Leveraged recapitalizations
Mechanisms
Greenmail
Litigation
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Takeover Defenses:
Poison pills
Financial Leveraged recapitalizations
Mechanisms Greenmail
Litigation
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Takeover Defenses:
Poison pills
Financial Leveraged recapitalizations
Mechanisms Greenmail
Litigation
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