INDO-PAK WAR

(1965)

Capture of Haji Pir Pass (1965)

 PREVIEW
PHASE I : EVENTS LEADING TO
THE CRISES
PHASE II : BATTLE OF CHHAMB
AND ITS CRITICAL ANALYSIS
PHASE III : INDIAN COUNTER
OFFENSIVE
 PHASE I
EVENTS LEADING TO THE CRISES
 PERSNALITIES

Ayub Khan Lal Bahadur Shastri

Studied from AMU, in India,
and at the British Royal
Military College, at Sandhurst,
he was commissioned as an offr
in the Indian Army(1928).
Gen JN Chaudhuri
COAS, 19 Nov
1962 - 07 June 66
Armd Corps,
16 CAV and 7 LC
 BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT
INDIA-CHINA CONFLICT OF 1962- LOW
MORALE. POSSIBILITY OF TWO FRONT
CONFLICT
SINO-PAK RELATIONS
HAZRATBAL SHRINE INCIDENT (26 DEC 1963)
DEATH OF NEHRU IN 1964 AND TRANSFER OF
POWER TO SHASTRI
CANAL DEFENCE IN PAKISTAN
- MARALA - RAVI LINK CANAL (MRL)
CONNECTS CHENAB AND RAVI
- BAMBANWALA - RAVI – BEDIAN (BRB) /
ICHHOGIL CANAL/ AYUB LINE
CONNECTS RAVI AND SUTLEJ
- ANTI TK OBSTACLE : 90 TO 140 FT WIDE
AND 18 FT DEEP WITH CONCRETE PILL
BOXES AND GUN EMPLACEMENTS ON WN SIDE
PATTON TANK
RANN OF KUTCH
 BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT
RANN OF KUTCH CONFLICT
-09TH APR : PAK 51 INF BDE ATTACKED THREE
MILES SOUTH WEST OF KANJARKOT
-24TH APR: PAK 8 INF DIV AGAINST IND BDE
ATTACK ON KANJARKOT, SARDAR POST AND
VIGKOT WITH TKS AND ARTY
-30TH JUN: AGREEMENT
- PAK CONCLUDED IND ARMY TO BE
ILL-EQUIPPED, WITH LOW MORALE AND
CHANCE OF WN INTERVENTION
CONVOY DISTURBANCE BY PAK, CAPTURE
TWO PAK POSTS ON 16TH MAY, RETURNED BACK
ON UN ASSURANCE
PAK INFLITRATORS IN KASHMIR:
GIBRALTOR FORCE
HIGHLY TRAINED GUERILLA FORCE OF
30,000 MEN INFILT BY PAK DURING 05 AUG-
10 AUG FOR PURPOSE OF SABOTAGE,
UNDERMINE THE LOCAL GOVT AND MAKE
THE ENVIRONMENT CONDUCIVE FOR
LAND OFFENSIVE
NO OF TASK FORCES RAISED, EACH
COMPRISING 3-6 COY’S : EACH COY
CONSISTED OF 35-40 POK SOLDIERS, 3-4 OR
FROM SPL SERVICE GP AND ABOUT 66
MUJAHIDS. COY COMMANDED BY
REGULAR PAK OR POK ARMY OFFRS
INFIL FORCES EQP WITH PAK ARMS,
AMMU, EQPT AND CLOTHING/RATIONS
INFILTRATION BY GIBRALTER FORCE
 GIBRALTOR FORCE
CONSISTED OF FOLLOWING TASK FORCES
TARIQ FORCE- AREA KARGIL
QASIM FORCE- AREA GURES
KHALID FORCE- TITHWAL SEC
F FORCE IN URI
SALAHUDDIN FORCE- AREA GULMARG-SRI
AND MANDI
NUSRAT FORCE- AREA RAJAURI-
MENDHAR
GHAZNAVI FORCE IN AREA DARHAL-
THANAMANDI-BUDIL
BABUR FORCE IN AREA NAUSHERA-
CHHAMB
 RAIDERS TO INF IN SMALL GPS IN
KASHMIR FROM ALL DIR AND
CONCENTRATE IN VALLEY BY 7 AUG 1965
5TH AUG RPTD BY MOHAMMAD DIN AND
WAZIR AHMAD
COUNTER INF OPS BY INDIA : CROSS CFL
ON 15 AUG:
- CAPTURE OF HAJIPIR PASS
- CAPTURE OF KRISHNAGANGA BULGE
• OP GRANDSLAM :01 SEP- FULL FLEDGED
ATTACK BY PAK ARMY ON CHHAMB
• INDIAN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE : ATTACK
ON LAHORE AND SIALKOT ON 6TH / 7TH OF
SEP
• ENDED AT 0300 HRS ON 23 SEP WITH
TASHKENT DECLARATION
 PHASE II
BATTLE OF CHHAMB AND ITS
ANALYSIS
 PAK ATT ON CHHAMB-JAURIAN
OP ‘GRAND SLAM’
SELECTION OF CHHAMB-JAURIAN SEC:
A. THIS WAS OPEN AND PLAIN COUNTRY AND
THE ONLY TANKABLE AREA ALONG THE CFL
B. AKHNOOR WAS A STRATEGIC POINT ON
JAMMU-RAJOURI-POONCH LINE OF
COMMUNICATIONS
C. PAK HAD A SHORT LINE OF COMMUNICATION
FOR LOG
D. THIS SEC ALLOWED THE NEAREST AND MOST
DIRECT APPROACH ACROSS THE CFL TO THE
ONLY BRIDGE OVER RIVER CHENAB AT
AKHNNOOR.
 SELECTION OF CHHAMB-JAURIAN SEC
E. FOR INDIA, BRINGING UP OF HEAVY
ARMOUR FROM JAMMU WOULD BE A
PROBLEM AS AKHNOOR BRIDGE WAS CL18-
LOG HANDICAP
F. ACC TO CFL AGREEMENT OF 1949, INDIA
COULD ONLY KEEP A STIPULATED NO OF
TPS IN THIS AREA. REINFORCEMENT FROM
JAMMU WOULD HAVE THINNED THE DEF
AT JAMMU
G. THE AREA WAS SUITABLE FOR DEP OF HVY
ARTY
H. PAK COULD CONC ITS ASSAULT FORCE IN
OWN TERRITROY WITHOUT VIOLATION OF
CFL AGREEMENT
SELECTION OF CHHAMB-JAURIAN SEC
J. PAK HAD EASY AND QUICK ACCESS TO
THIS SEC FROM SIALKOT AND KHARIYAN
K. TAC ADV FOR PAK WAS THAT RIVER
CHENAB PROTECTED THE EASTERN
FLANK OF THEIR OFF, WHILE THE WN
FLANK WAS PROTECTED BY ROUGH MTN
TERRAIN
L. BEING OPEN COUNTRY ON PAK SIDE IT
ALLOWED PAK ARMOUR COMPLETE
FREEDOM OF MANOEUVRE IN ITS
APPROACH TO OUR DEFENCES.
 ORBAT PAK FORCES

12 PAK INF DIV (MAJ GEN AKHTAR

MALIK)
(I) 102 INF BDE WITH 2 INF BNS
(II) 10 INF BDE WITH 2 INF BNS
(III) 4 AK BDE WITH 3 BNS
02 COYS OF 12 FRONTIER FORCE
O2 ARMD REGTS
SP OF CORPS ARTY AND OWN DIV
ARTY
 ORBAT INDIAN FORCES

191 INF BDE (BRIG MAN MOHAN SINGH)

(I) 15 KUMAON
(II) 3 MAHAR
(III) 6 SIKH LI
(IV) 3 J & K MILITIA
(V) 6/5 GR
(VI) 3 PUNJAB ARMD POLICE (PAP)
C SQN EX 20 LANCERS
14 FD REGT
39 MED REGT
 COMPARISON OF FORCES
PAKISTAN INDIAN
• 7 ½ INF BNS 6 INF BNS
• 2 ARMD REGTS 1 ARMD SQN
(PATTON ) (AMX TANKS)
• CORPS ARTY TROOP OF
MED GUNS

PAK HAD 6:1 SUPERIOTY IN ARMOUR

 PAKISTAN’S AIMS
(A) TO STALL INDIAN OFF ACROSS CFL
(B) TO CAPTURE AKHNOOR AND THE
BRIDGE ACROSS RIVER CHENAB
(C) TO COMPEL INDIA TO REINFORCE
ITS TPS IN CHAMB-JAURIAN SEC,
THEREBY THINNING OUT DEF IN
JAMMU
(D) TO STRIKE A SECOND BLOW FROM
SIALKOT SIDE TO CAPTURE JAMMU
(E) TO HAVE TERRITORIAL GAINS
 BATTLE OF CHHAMB
• Pak off started 0345 hrs on 1st Sep.
• Intense Arty bombardment along CFL for 3
hrs immediately after which made Armour
thrust and captured area upto Mandiala.
• Cdr asked for Air strike but delayed
•At 2030 hrs HQ 15 Corps ordered GOC 10 Inf
Div to assume immediate Op Comd & and 191
Inf Bde to withdraw. By 0300hrs Chhamb in
Pak hands
•2nd Sep at 1100hrs Gen Yahya Khan took
charge of Ops
 BATTLE OF CHHAMB (Contd)

• 191 withdrew 1st /2nd ni to Akhnur

• 41 Mtn Bde to occupy Jaurian with one
Sqn of Armour and one Fd Regt of Arty.
• 2nd morning one Inf Bn moved for protection
of Akhnur Bridge
• 2nd Sep Pak did not press their successful
thrust losing advantage and allowing for Indian
rft.
• 3rd Sep attack on Jaurian but 41 Inf Bde held
grd. By ni of 4th very little fight left in them.
Pulled to Akhnoor
 CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNT
1. WELL DEFINED SELECTION AND MAINT OF AIM
2. FAILURE IN MAINTAINENCE OF AIM BY PAK
3. FAILURE IN APPRECIATION OF ATTACK BY IND
4. FAILURE IN PREPARATION OF IND DEF
-Concrete def not constructed
-Enough amn not stocked for def battle
-Mines not positioned in time so could not be laid
-Tank str not boosted up in time
-Troops dep only N and W of Tawi
- S portion of E Tawi unprotected
- Bridge not str
- Meagre tk force West of Tawi
CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNT
5. IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT not available to 191 Inf
Bde , knocking out own tanks and engage own troops
and ammu dumps. Need to define bomb line
6. LACK OF INF-TANK COOPERATION
7. POOR COMMU SYSTEM : 3 Mahar remained out of
touch with the Bde throughout the war. Wireless
communication should be foolproof
8. HQ 10 INF DIV WAS NEWLY RAISED and not fit to
take Ops role
9. Effective PAK INT
10. SIG ROLE OF TANKS
 PHASE III

INDIAN COUNTER OFFENSIVE

INDIAN COUNTER OFFENSIVE
 INDIAN COUNTER OFFENSIVE-6TH SEP 1965
• WN COMD RESPONSIBLE FOR OPS
AGAINST WN PAK IN LAHORE, SIALKOT
AND KASUR
• LT GEN HARBAKSH SINGH GOC-IN-C, HAD 1
AND 11 CORPS UNDER HIS COMD
• LAHORE OFF WAS 3 PRONGED ATTACK BY
11 CORPS:
- FIRST ALONG GT ROAD AXIS, FROM,
WAGAH TO DOGRAI (15 INF DIV)
- SECOND ALONG BHIKKIWIND-BARKI AXIS
(7 INF DIV)
- THIRD ALONG KHEMKARAN-KASUR AXIS
(4 MTN DIV)
GEN HARBAKSH SINGH
ICCHOGIL
CANAL
PILL BOX
PILL BOX
Brigadier Niranjan
Singh shows the false
outer wall of one of the
pill boxes captured in
the Battle of Dograi.
VICTORY
AT
BARKEE
 CQMH ABDUL HAMID
4 GRENADIERS (NO 2639985)
At 0800 hours on 10 September 1965 Pakistan forces launched an
attack with a regiment of Patton tanks on a vital area ahead of village
Cheema on the Bhikkiwind road in the Khem Karam Sector. Intense
artillery shelling preceded the attack. The enemy tanks penetrated the
forward position by 0900 hours. Realising the grave situation, CQMH
Abdul Hamid who was commander of a RCL gun detachment moved
out to a flanking position with his gun mounted on a jeep, under
intense enemy shelling and tank fire. Taking an advantageous position,
he knocked out the leading enemy tank and then swiftly changing his
position, he sent another tank up in flames. By this time the enemy
tanks in the area spotted him and brought his jeep under concentrated
machine-gun and high explosive fire. Undeterred, Company Quarter
Master Havildar Abdul Hamid kept on firing on yet another enemy tank
with his recoilless gun. While doing so, he was mortally wounded by an
enemy high explosive shell.
Havildar Abdul Hamid’s brave action inspired his comrades to put up a
gallant fight and to beat back the heavy tank assault by the enemy. His
complete disregard for his personal safety during the operation and his
sustained acts of bravery in the face of constant enemy fire were a
shining example not only to his unit but also to the whole division and
were in the highest traditions of the Indian Army.[2]
[edit]
Major General Rajinder
Singh Sparrow MVC,
GOC 1st Armd Div,
leans on a captured
Pakistani Patton tank,
after the Battle of
Assal Uttar. It is here
where Pakistan's 1st
Armd Div, consisting
of American-supplied
Patton tanks, suffered
a humiliating defeat
from the Indian Army.
Manning the post,
in this image, is
Gren Mohammed
Shafi, who killed a
Pakistani Div Cdr,
with a LMG burst,
during the war.
VICTORY AT KHEM KARAN
PAKISTAN 1 ARMD DIV DESTROYED
Abandoned M-48 Patton tank at khem karan
PAKISTAN’S RETREAT
 INDIAN I CORPS OPS
• IND 1 CORPS CONSISTED OF :
1 ARMD DIV-CAPTURE PHILLORA AND ADV
TO MARLA-RAVI LINK. REDUCE PAGOWAL,
CHAWINDA ENROUTE
6 MTN DIV – BRIDGE-HEAD IN AREA
MAHARAJKE-CHARWA AND FIRM BASE TO
1 ARMD DIV
14 INF DIV – CAPTURE ZAFARWAL
26 INF DIV – CONTAIN PAK FORCES IN AREA
SIALKOT
• OP GIVEN CODE NAME ‘NEPAL’
Lieutenant Colonel Ardeshir Burzonji Tarapore
 Victory Dance
Somewhere in the
Sialkot sector, the Div
Cdr (second from left)
and a Col (third from
left) dancing with the
soldiers (Gurkhas)
from their unit.
Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh
examines a captured M4 Sherman tank in
the Chawinda sector.
 TERRITORIAL GAINS
INDIA:
- 720 SQ MILES OF PAK TERRITORY
(a) HAJIPIR BULGE
(b) STRIP OF LAND AROUND TITHWAL
(c) STRIP OF LAND IN PUN BETWEEN BORDER
AND ICHHOGIL CANAL
PAK:
-220 SQ MILE OF IND TERRITORY
(a) STRIP OF LAND IN CHHAMB-AKHNOOR
SECTOR
(b) NARROW WEDGE AROUND KHEMKARAN IN
PB
 CASUALITIES
INDIAN PAK
(a) 128 TKS INCL (a)1/3 OF ITS ARMOUR&
SHERMAN AND UPTO 60% OF ITS
AMX PATTON FORCE
(b) 35 AIR CRAFTS (b) 7O AIR CRAFTS
(c) 1250-2700
KILLED (c) EQUALLY HIGH CAS
(d) 8400 WOUNDED OF PER
(e) 1500-
PRISONERS