CRIMINAL LAW 1

Criminal Law- is that branch of law which defines

crimes, treats of their nature and provides for their
punishment. (12 CYC 129 & Lacson vs. Executive
Secretary, 102 SCAD, l999)
It is a branch of public law because it treats of acts
or omissions of the citizens which are deemed
primarily as wrongs against the State more than
against the offended party.
 Different branches of laws: Political Law,
Mercantile Law, Commercial Law,
Constitutional Law, Civil Law & others.
Crimes: Theft (Article 308)-committed by any
person who, with intent of gain but without
violence against, or intimidation of persons nor
force upon things, shall take the personal
property of another without the latters consent
 Rape (Article 266-A ( as amended by RA
8353) is committed by a man who shall
have carnal knowledge with a woman :
through force, threat or intimidation, x x x .
Punishment Theft depends on the
amount of the thing stolen ex. Amt. is
over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000
penalty is Prision Correccional in its
minimum and medium periods ( 6 mos.
and 1 day to 4 yrs.& 2 mos.
 Penalty for Rape committed with the use
of deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty is Reclusion
Perpetua to Death.
 CRIME
What is crime (Book of Reyes ) is an act
committed or omitted in violation of a public law
forbidding or commanding it.

Crime is the commission or omission by a

person having capacity, of any act, which is
either prohibited or compelled by law and the
commission or omission of which is punishable
by a proceeding brought in the name of the govt.
whose law has been violated. (Whartons Crim.
Law)
 DIFFERENT NOMENCLATURE
OF CRIME
Crime punished by the Revised Penal
Code is called FELONY.
Crime punished by special laws is known
as OFFENSE.
Crime punished by an Ordinance is known
as INFRACTION.
 Power to define and punish an act as a
crime- Only the State, through the
Legislative Department where the
legislative power is vested. Exception;
Chief Executive through an Executive
Order may perform this prerogative in the
exercise of emergency power. This is
provided under the l987 Constitution.
 SOURCES OF CRIMINAL LAWS

1) Revised Penal Code Act 3815 as

amended (January 1, l932);
2) Special Penal laws passed by the
Philippine Commission, Philippine
Assembly, Congress of the Philippines,
and the Batasang Pambansa.
3) Presidential Decrees.
 CHARACTERISTICS OF
CRIM.LAW
A) Generality That the law is binding
upon all persons, who reside or sojourn in
the Philippines, irrespective of age, sex,
color or personal circumstances.
Exceptions: 1) Provided by Public
International Law Art. 14 Civil Code &
Schneckenburger vs. Moran 63 Phil.
250) Sovereigns, heads of states,
ambassadors, ministers plenipotentiary
 Ministers- resident, charges daffairs and
attaches. As regards consuls and vice-
consuls, their exemption will depend upon
a treaty stipulation, except an Honorary
Consul.
2) Treaty Stipulations; (Ex. PI & US
Military Bases Agreement & Visiting
Forces Agreement)
 RA 75 extends immunity to the
domestic servants of duly accredited
ambassadors, if registered in the DFA, if in
the country of the ambassadors, also
provided similar protections to duly
accredited ambassadors of the Phils.
 Does immunity from suit of officers of
international bodies include that of defamation?
(Liang vs. People-ll9 SCAD- January 2000)-
Petitioner is an economist working with ADB. For
allegedly uttering a defamatory words against
his fellow ADB worker, he was charged before
the MeTC w/ 2 counts of Grave Oral
Defamation. The judge received an offer of
protocol from the DFA stating that Liang is
covered by immunity from legal process under
 Sec. 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and
the Phils. Based on said protocol, the judge
without notice to the prosecution dismissed the
case.
First courts cannot blindly adhere and take
on its face the communication from the DFA that
petitioner is covered by any immunity. The
DFAs determination that a certain person is
covered by immunity is only preliminary which
has no binding effects in courts. In receiving
 ex-parte the DFAs advice and in motu
proprio dismissing the cases w/o notice to
the prosecution, the latters right to due
process was violated. It should be noted
that due process is a right of the accused
as much as it is of the prosecution. Mere
invocation of the immunity clause does not
ipso facto result in dropping the charges
 Second Under Sec. 45 of the
Agreement, the immunity therein is not
absolute but subject to the exception that
the act was done in official capacity.
Thus the prosecution should have been
given the chance to rebut the DFA
protocol and it must be accorded the
opportunity to present its controverting
evidence, should it desires.
 Third slandering a person could not
possibly be covered by the immunity
agreement, because our laws do not allow
the commission of a crime, such as
defamation, in the name of official duty.
This is ultra vires and cannot be part of
official functions. It is a settled principle
that a public official may be liable in his
 personal capacity for whatever damage he
may have caused by his act done with
malice and in bad faith beyond the scope
of his authority or jurisdiction.
Fourth Under the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent
enjoys immunity from criminal prosecution
of the receiving state except in the case of
an action relating to any professional or
 commercial activity outside of his official
functions. As mentioned, the commission
of the crime of defamation is not part of his
official duty.
 3) Laws of Preferential Applications-
Constitution- Ex. Members of Congress
are not liable for Libel or Slander in
connection with any speech delivered on
the floor of the house during a regular or
special session ( Art. IV, Sec. 11, l987
Constitution)
 B)TERRITORIALITY Article 2, RPC provs. of
the RPC shall be enforced within the Philippine
Archipelago, including its atmosphere, interior
waters and maritime zone( before it was 3 miles
from the outermost coastline. But now, under the
Archipelagic Doctrine adopted in the new Phil.
Const. and the Conference of the Law on the
Sea, this distance is now 12 Nautical Miles from
the baselines. Beyond the maritime zone, is the
high seas, which are beyond our territorial
jurisdiction.

 The national territory comprises the

Philippine Archipelago with all the islands
and waters embraced therein, and all
other territories over which the Phils. has
sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its
terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains,
including its territorial sea, seabed, subsoil
insular shelves and submarine areas.
 The waters Around, Between, and
Connecting the islands of the archipelago
regardless of their Breadth and
Dimensions, form part of the internal
waters of the Philippines (Archipelagic
Doctrine- Art. 1, l987 Constitution).
 Our criminal law has also an EXTRA-
TERRITORIALITY chars. Article 2, RPC:
1) Should commit an offense while on a
Philippine ship or airship- this must be duly
registered under the Phil. Laws and considered
an extension of the Phil. National Territory, But
if said Phil. Vessel or aircraft is within the
territory of a foreign country when the crime is
committed, the laws of that country will apply.
 But if the accused in a registered
Philippine vessel committed homicide on
board said vessel while in the territorial
waters of a foreign country, like Vietnam,
was not prosecuted before the Vietnam
Court, he could be tried before our Court,
following the provs. of Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedures
(Pp. vs. Togoto- CA- 68 Off Gaz. 8317)
 If the Phil. Ship is not registered and a
crime is committed in the high seas, our
rules will not apply as said law clearly
provides that only duly registered vessel is
covered (Pp. vs. Julmain May 30, l959).
Under the New Rules on Criminal
Procedures (Jan. 1, l985), the phrase
registered or licensed under the Phil.
Laws are deleted & substituted with
 subject to the generally accepted
principles of international law.
 Philippine warship, whatever it is, is an
extension of the Philippines and its
sovereignty. If the foreign vessel is also a
warship, our courts have no jurisdiction as
such is an extension of the country to
which these vessels belong ( US. vs.
Fowler 1 Phil. 614)
 On foreign merchant vessels, there are
two rules that are followed:
1) FRENCH RULE that crimes
committed on board a foreign merchant
vessel while on the waters of another
country are not triable in that country
unless those affecting the peace and
security of that country or the safety of that
state is endangered.
 2) ENGLISH RULE that such crimes are triable
in that country unless such crimes affect merely
the internal management of the vessel. This is
also known as the Anglo-American Rule. This is
the rule that we followed in our jurisdiction (US
vs. Bull- 15 Phil. 7). This includes continuing
crime committed on board a foreign vessel
sailing from a foreign port and which enters
Philippine waters is triable in our courts.
 U.S. vs. Look Chow - 18 Phil 573- mere
possession of opium on board a foreign
vessel in transit in Philippine waters as
such does not involve a breach of public
order unless the opium is landed in our
Philippine soil.
U.S. vs. Wong Cheng- 46 Phil 729 this
already involves breach of public order
 because the accused smoked opium while
inside the vessel. This already causes
such drugs to produce its pernicious
effects within our country.
 2) Should forge or counterfeit any coin or
currency note of the Philippine Islands or
obligations and securities issued by the
Govt. of the Philippine Islands.- reason
behind is to maintain and preserve the
financial credit and stability of the State.
Ex. of obligation- sweepstakes ticket &
lotto.
 3) Should be liable for acts connected with
the introduction into these islands of the
obligations and securities mentioned in the
preceding number.
4) While being a public officers or
employees, should commit an offense in
the exercise of their functions. Ex. Bribery,
Malversation.
 Article 203 RPC- Who are public officers-
Any person, who, by direct provision of the
law, popular election, or appointment by
competent authority, shall take part in the
performance of public functions in the
Govt. of the Philippine Islands or shall
perform in said Govt. or in any of its
branches, public duties as an employee,
agent or subordinate official or any rank or
class.
 5) Should commit any of the crimes
against National Security and the Laws of
Nations. Ex. Piracy and Mutiny (Article
122 RPC) Laws of Nations.
Treason (Article 114 RPC) and Espionage
(Article 117 RPC) Crimes against
National Security.
 Piracy shall be committed by any person, who
on the high seas or Philippine waters, shall
attack or seize a vessel, or not being a member
of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize
the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its
equipment, or personnel belonging to its
complement or passengers.
Mutiny is the unlawful resistance to a superior
officer, as the raising of commotions and
disturbance on board a ship against the
authority of the commander.
 Treason is committed by any Filipino citizen
who levies war against the Phils. or adheres to
her enemies, by giving them aid or comfort
within the Phils. or elsewhere.
Espionage: - is committed by any person:
1) who without authority, enters a warship, fort,
or naval or military estab., or reservations to
obtain any info., plans, photographs or other
data of a confidential nature relative to the
defense of the Phil. Archipelago;

 2) being in possession, by reason of the

public office he holds, of the articles, data
or info, discloses their contents to a rep. of
a foreign nation.
 C) Prospectivity or Irretrospectivity- means
that generally penal laws should have only
prospective application (Arts. 21 & 22-
RPC).
Exception if this is favorable to the
accused ( has retroactive effect).
Exception to the exception if the
accused is a habitual delinquent.
 Ex. Re-imposition of Death penalty under RA
7659, which took effect on December 31, l993.
This cannot be given a retroactive effect on the
accused who committed a crime on September
23, l987 ( Pp. vs. Bracamonte- 257 SCRA ).
Reason behind this provision Lex prospicit,
non respicit (the law looks forward not
backward). The rationale against retroactivity is
that a law usually
 derides rights which may have already
become vested or impairs the obligation of
contract and hence is unconstitutional.
Example of a law which can be given a
retroactive effect Pres. Decree No. l866
( which took effect on April 4, l973)
penalizes Illegal Possession of Firearms
for Reclusion Temporal Maximum to
 Reclusion Perpetua ( 17 years, 8 months
and 1 day to Reclusion Perpetua)
This was amended by RA 8294( which
took effect on June 6,l997) - wherein the
penalty for illegal poss. of firearms is now
based on the caliber of the FA if low
caliber Prision Correccional in its Max.
Period ( 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to
6 years); if high powered penalty is
 Prision Mayor in its Minimum Period- 6
years and 1 day to 8 years.
Example of the exception to the exception
no retroactivity because the accused is
habitual delinquent if within ten years
from the date of his release or last
conviction of the crime of Serious or Less
Serious Physical Injuries, Robbery, Theft,
 Estafa or Falsification, he is found guilty of
any of said crimes a third time or oftener
(Multi-recidivist) .
Does the prospectivity rule only cover
laws passed by Congress? No. The
prospectivity rule applies also to penal
circulars. For instance, DOJ Circular no.
12 issued on August 8, l984 declared
 that all checks including guarantee checks
are covered by BP. Blg. 22. The court
ruled that this Circular cannot be applied
retroactively because petitioners cannot
be faulted for relying on the earlier
pronouncement of the Secretary of Justice
that guarantee checks issued prior thereto
are not covered by said Circular. The
decision further states that the principle
 of prospectivity of statutes, original or
amendatory has been applied to
administrative rulings and circulars, and to
judicial decisions which although in
themselves are not laws, are evidence of
what the laws mean, this being the reason
why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code,
judicial decisions applying the laws or the
 Constitution shall form part of the legal
system ( Co vs. Court of Appeals- 45
SCAD October l993).
Same application on the courts
interpretation upon a written law the
interpretation of the court on a written law
has the force of law. When a doctrine of
the court is overruled and a different view
 is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively and should not apply
to parties who relied on the old doctrine on
the faith thereof. This is especially true in
the construction and application of criminal
laws, where it is necessary that the
punishability of an act be reasonably
foreseen for the guidance of society ( Co
vs. CA- Ibid).
 Effect of the repeal of penal laws on the
accused:
The effect depends upon the nature of
the repeal of the penal laws:
a) In absolute or total repeal or express
repeal, the act or omission is
decriminalized so that if a case is
pending, it shall be dismissed whether
 the accused is a habitual delinquent or not
because there is no more crime for which
he should be tried. If he was already
convicted and /or serving sentence, he
shall be released if he is not a habitual
delinquent or unless the law provides that
detention is to continue.
b) In partial or relative repeal or implied
 repeal or repeal by re-enactment, the first
law will govern if the accused is a habitual
delinquent or if the favorable second law
prohibits retroactivity. While the second
law will govern if favorable to the offender
who is not a habitual delinquent or the law
is silent as to its retroactivity. Ex. Pp. vs.
Velasco 67 SCAD or 252 SCRA the
 beneficent provisions of RA 7659 can be
applied retroactively to judgments which
have become final and executory prior to
December 31, l993 and even to those who
are already serving sentences.
 RULES OF CONSTRUCTION

1) A penal law is liberally construed in

favor of the accused (Pp. vs. Terrado
l25 SCRA 648 & Corpuz vs. People
February l991)- Presumption of innocence.
2) In case there is ambiguity of the law
the original text in which a penal law is
approved will govern in case of a conflict
 with the official translation. Hence, the
RPC which was approved in its Spanish
text is controlling over its English
translation- (Pp. vs. Manaba 58 Phil.
665).

 THEORIES
Different philosophies underlying the criminal
law system: (4 schools of thought):
1) Classical or juristic theory
a) Basis of criminal liability is human
free will. Man has the capacity to
choose between right and wrong,
good and evil. Hence, when he

 does or omits an act, he does so willingly

and voluntarily with full knowledge of the
effects and consequences thereof. The
purpose of the penalty is retribution. In
view of the voluntariness of the act or
omission, the offender should be given the
penalty that he deserved. As to the
penalty, the same should be mechanically
 determined in direct proportion to the
crime committed. The emphasis of the law
is on the offense and not on the offender.
Man therefore should be adjudged or held
accountable for wrongful acts so long as
free will appears unimpaired ( Pp. vs.
Genosa l34 SCAD September, 2000).
 2) Positivist or Realistic Theory Basis of
criminal liability is that man is inherently
good but the offender is socially sick. He is
a product, not only of biological factors,
but also of his environment. His thoughts
and actions are influenced by his
upbringing, social environment and
associations. The purpose of the penalty is
reformation.
 Since the offender is a product of his
environment, then the penalty should be
corrective or curative to reform him. (Thus
jails are called reformatories). The penalty
is arrived at after an examination of the
offender. The penalty should be suited to
the individual offender precisely because
the purpose is to reform him. The
emphasis of the law is on the offender
 and not on the offense.

3) Ecclectic (or mixed ) Philosophy This

combines the good features of both the
classical and positivist theories. Ideally,
the classical theory should be applied to
grievous crimes, whereas the positivist is
made to apply to economic & social
crimes.
 4) Utilitarian Theory This espouse the
idea that the primary function of
punishment in criminal law is to protect
society from potential and actual
wrongdoers. The retributive aspect of
penal laws should be directed against
them. Thus it behooves upon our courts
of law that in applying the punishment
 imposed upon the accused, the objective of
retribution of a wronged society should be
directed against the actual and potential
wrongdoers.
Magno vs. CA June l992 Magno issued four
checks to collateralize an accommodation but
not for an account or for value. The SC ruled
that Magno should not be punished for the mere
issuance of the check in question.
 Constitutional limitations on the right to
enact penal laws: (Article III-Bill of Rights-
of the l987 Constitution:
a) No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws (Article 1)
b) No torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means
 which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him (Sec. 12-2)
c) No law, therefore, must be passed
imposing cruel and unusual punishment or
excessive fines.
d) No ex-post facto law or bill of attainder
shall be enacted Sec. 22. Ex-post facto
law- it makes an act or omission criminal
which when committed was not yet so.
 Ex-post facto laws:
1) Statutes that make an act punishable as a
crime when such act was not an offense when
committed;
2) Law which, while not creating new offenses,
aggravate the seriousness of a crime;
3) Statutes which prescribe greater penalty for a
crime already committed; or
4)Laws which alter the rules of evidence as to
make it easier to convict an accused.
 Lacson vs. Executive Secretary-
supra
RA- No. 8249 Law amending the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is not
a penal law. Rather, it is a substantive law
on jurisdiction. The original law on
jurisdiction of the SB is PD 1606, which
was amended by RA 7975 and then
recently by RA 8249. Not being a penal
law, the retroactive effect of RA 8249 is
not unconstitutional.
 ARTICLE 3-
FELONIES (Delitos)- acts or omission
punishable by law.
Ways of committing it:
1) Deceit/Malice (Dolo)
2) Fault (Culpa)
Whether done with Malice/deceit or fault
act is voluntary. Voluntariness is an
element because it is specifically stated
 in Article 3 which refers to dolo be done
with deliberate intent; while in Art. 365
referring to reckless imprudence (culpa),
it expressly states that it consists in
voluntarily but without malice, doing or
failing to do an act.
Dolo is intentional Intentional Felonies,
while culpa is not Culpable Felonies.
 Where there is intent, there can be no
negligence Pp. vs. Nanguil 43 Phil.
A) Dolo (Malice/Deceit)
Elements:
1) Freedom absence of constraint
in the choice or action. When a per-
son acts w/o freedom, he is not a
human being, but a tool.
 Freedom is negated by irresistible force
and uncontrollable fear ( Exempting
Circumstances Article 12, pars. 5 & 6)
2) Intelligence is the moral capacity to
determine what is right from what is wrong
and to realize the consequences of ones
act. Intelligence, is therefore, negated by
minority, insanity and imbecility ( Exemp-
 ting circumstances Art. 12 pars. 1, 2 &
3)

3) Intent is the purpose to use a parti-

cular means to effect such a result.
Intent is presumed from the commission
of the acts. The presumption of criminal
intent may arise from the proof of the

 criminal act and it is for the accused to

rebut this presumption (Pp. vs. Abando
March 22, l962).
Intent is a mental state, the existence of
which is shown by the overt acts of a
person. What was the external demeanor
which accused showed from which the trial
court and respondent court inferred
 animus furandi? In the case of Lim vs. CA-
May l993 41 SCAD the sinister mental
state is presumed from the commission of
an unlawful act in bringing out the tires
from the bodega which were loaded on his
pick-up. The presumption of fencing under
Sec. 5 of PD 1612 is that mere possession
of any good or article or anything of value
 which has been the subject of the crime of
robbery or theft. It is therefore presumed
that the unlawful acts were done with full
knowledge and criminal intent and it is up
for the accused to rebut the same.
Distinguish Intent from motive :
Motive is the moving power or force
which impels a person to a desired result.
 Intent is an element of a crime, while
motive is not. Motive may become
necessary to be proved in case there is
doubt whether the accused committed the
crime or not or when the evidence on the
commission of the crime is purely
circumstantial or inconclusive. The rule is
that proof of motive is unnecessary to
 impute a crime to the accused if the
evidence concerning his identification is
convincing. A converso, if the evidence of
identification is unclear, then the
jurisprudential doctrine is that proof of
motive is a paramount necessity ( Pp. vs.
Bautista May l998 94 SCAD).
Ppv. vs. Macoy July l997 84 SCAD -
 It has been held that where the identity of
the assailant is in dispute, motive
becomes relevant, and when it is
supported with sufficient evidence for a
conclusion of guilt, a conviction is
sustainable or when the acts brings about
variant crimes (Pp. vs. Puno-Feb. l993)
Kinds of intent:
1) General intent- presumed
 2) Specific intent this is an element of
the crime, hence not presumed but must
be established.
Ex. In Libel or defamation, criminal
intent is presumed from the publication
where the acts imputed concern the
private life of the offended party, because
no one has the right to invade ones
privacy.
 Definition of Libel
Article 353-Libel is a public and
malicious imputation of a crime,or of a vice
or defect, real or imaginary, or any act or
omission, condition, status or
circumstance tending to cause dishonor,
discredit or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory
of one who is dead.
Article 358- Slander (Oral Defamation)
 In the crime of Attempted or Frustrated
Murder or Homicide specific intent to kill
must be proven. It is not presumed
because if the intent to kill is not duly
established, then the crime will only be
physical injury. But if death results,
criminal intent becomes a general intent
which is presumed.
 What negates intent - Mistake of facts an
act or omission which is the result of a
misapprehension of facts that is voluntary
but not intentional. The actor performed an
act which would be lawful had it been true
as he believed it to be. This must be done
in good faith or under an honest belief (Pp.
vs. Ah Chong-15 Phil. 488).
 This is contrary to Mistake of Identity ( Pp.
vs Oanis-(74 Phil. 257).

May a crime be committed without criminal

intent? Yes -1) culpable felonies or crimes
committed by means of culpa; and 2)
offenses punished as Mala Prohibita.
 Mala Prohibita an act is wrong because
it is prohibited by law. W/o the law
punishing it the act, it cannot be
considered a wrong. Ex. Possession of
Unlicensed FA (PD l866 as amended by
RA 8294; carrying a FA within a polling
place (Election Code) and mere issuance
of a bouncing check (BP Blg. 22).
 Mala in se an act is wrong from its very
nature. The test to determine whether an
act is mala in se is not the law punishing it
but the very nature of the act itself.
B) Culpa (Culpable Felonies)
Elements:
1) Freedom
2) Intelligence
 3) Negligence or imprudence
Culpa results from negligence,
imprudence, lack of foresight or lack of
skill.
Negligence is deficiency of perception;
while imprudence is deficiency of action.
Negligent act must still be voluntary.

 In negligence, what is principally punished

is the mental attitude or condition behind
the act , the dangerous recklessness. The
law punishes the negligent or reckless act,
not the result thereof.
Test of negligence Did the defendant in
doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an
 ordinary prudent person would have used
in the same situation?
A person driving his motor vehicle
beyond the allowable speed bumped a
person resulting to his death Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide. If the
victim was riding in his bicycle, which was
also damaged, then the offender can also
be held liable of the complex crime of
 Reckless Imprudence Resulting To
Homicide and Damage To Property(
Article 365 RPC).
Article 4. CRIMINAL LIABILITY Criminal
liability shall be incurred :
1) By any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended;
 ELEMENTS:
a) felony is committed;
b) the wrong done is the direct,
natural and logical conse-
quence of the felony
committed, even if different
from what is intended.
 Basis Spanish maxim El que causa
de la causa es causa del mal causado
He who is the cause of the cause is the
cause of the evil caused thats why one
is liable for all the direct and natural
consequences of his unlawful act, even if
the ultimate result had not been intended
(Pp. vs. Ural 56 SCRA 138 ).
 Pp. vs. Ulep- June 20, l988 Even if the
victim is suffering from an internal ailment,
liver, heart disease or tuberculosis, if the
blow delivered by the accused is the
efficient cause of his death, then there is
criminal liability.
Pp. vs. Opero 105 SCRA 40 where the
offenders after robbing the victim, tied her
 hands and feet & stuffed her mouth w/ a
piece of pan de sal to prevent her from
screaming, & the victim died of
asphyxiation because the pan de sal slid
into her neckline, caused by the
movements of the victim, it was held that
the death of the victim, even though not
intended, was the direct consequences of
the felonious acts of the offenders.
 3 SITUATIONS UNDER THIS:

1) Error en personae (Mistake in the

identity of the victim Pp. vs. Oanis 74
Phil. 257- Chief of Police Oanis & his co-
accused Cpl. Galanta were under
instructions to arrest one Balagtas, a
notorious criminal and escaped convict,
and if overpowered to get him dead or
 alive. Proceeding to the suspected house,
they went into a room and upon seeing a
man sleeping with his back towards the
door, simultaneously fired at him w/ their
revolver, w/o first making any reasonable
inquiry as to his identity. The victim turned
out to be an innocent man, Tecson, and
not the wanted criminal. Accused were
convicted with Murder.
 2) Aberratio Ictus- Mistake in the blow
Pp. vs. Mabug-at 51 Phil. 967- Where
the accused, having discharged his
firearm at Juana Buralo, but because of
lack of precision, hit and seriously
wounded Perfecta Buralo, it was held that
the accused was liable for the injury
caused to the latter.
 3) Praeter intentionem-Injurious result is
greater than that intended Pp. vs.
Cagoco- 58 Phil. 524 where the accused
w/o intent to kill, struck the victim w/ his fist
on the back part of the hand from behind,
causing the victim to fall down w/ his head
hitting the asphalt pavement and resulting
in the fracture of his head, it was held that
the accused was liable for the death of
 the victim, altho he had no intent to kill
said victim.
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred-
Bataclan vs. Medina 102 Phil. 181.
 When death is presumed to be the natural
consequences of the physical injuries
inflicted:
1) That the victim at the time the
physical injuries were inflicted was in
normal health;
2) That the death may be expected
from the physical injuries inflicted; and
 3) That death ensued within a
reasonable time.
Circumstances w/c are not considered
efficient intervening cause:
1) weak or diseased physical condition
of the victim (Pp. vs. Ilustre 54 Phil. 594
& Pp. vs. Reyes 61 Phil. 341);
2) nervousness or temperament of
 the victim- Pp. vs. Almonte 56 Phil. 54;
3) causes w/c are inherent in the victim
such as not knowing how to swim;
4) neglect of the victim;
5) erroneous or unskilled medical or
surgical treatment.
Felony is not the proximate cause of the
resulting injury when:-
 1) there is an active force that intervened
between the felony committed and the
resulting injury, and the active force is a
distinct act or fact absolute foreign from
the felonious act of the accused; or
2) the resulting injury is due to the
intentional act of the victim.
 Death is not the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the felony committed:
1) accused deliberately immerses his
body in a contaminated cesspool, thereby
causing his injuries to become infected
and serious De Los Santos case.
2) death caused by prevalent fever
Pp.vs. Palalon 49 Phil 177.
 Article 253- RPC Attempting to commit suicide
is not punishable under the RPC.
Therefore, if A, in attempting a suicide,
jumped out of the window to kill himself but
when he dropped to the ground he fell on an old
woman who died as a consequence, A is not
criminally liable for intentional homicide. A was
not committing a felony when he attempted a
suicide. (Reyes).
 (Boado) has a contrary opinion. A is
liable because when A jumped he did not
ascertain that there is somebody on his
suicide path.

2) Impossible crimes- is one where the

acts performed would have been a crime
against persons or property but which is
 not accomplished because of its inherent
impossibility or because of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means (Intod vs. CA- October l992). There
is intent (subjective) to commit a crime but
actually no crime is committed (objective).
The reason for punishing an impossible
crime is that subjectively the offender is a
 criminal although objectively no crime is
committed. If the acts constitute another
distinct felony, an impossible crime is not
committed because objectively a crime is
committed. Ex. If the accused
administered abortive drugs upon his
girlfriend whom he believed to be
pregnant, which turns out not be to be
true, this is an impossible crime because
 Abortion is a Crime against Persons. But if the
girlfriend suffered injuries, then the accused is
liable for Physical Injuries.
There is now an Impossible crime of Rape
because under The Anti-Rape Law, Rape is now
a crime against persons.
There is no attempted or frustrated stage of
impossible crime because there is no crime
committed.

 ELEMENTS:
A) Act performed would be an offense
against persons or property;
1. Parricide Art. 246
2) Murder Art. 248
3) Homicide Art. 249
4) Infanticide Art. 255
5) Abortion Arts.256, 257, 258 &
259;
 6) Duel Arts. 260 & 261
7) Physical Injuries Arts. 262, 263, 264,
265 & 266.
Crimes against Property:
1) Robbery Arts. 294, 297, 298, 299,
300, 302 & 303;
2) Brigandage Arts. 306 & 307
3) Theft Arts. 308. 310 & 311
 4) Usurpation Arts. 312 & 313;
5) Culpable Insolvency Art. 314;
6) Swindling & other Deceits Arts. 315,
316, 317 & 318
7) Chattel Mortgage Art. 319
8) Arson & other crimes involving
destruction Arts. 320, 321, 322, 323,
324, 325 & 326.
 9) Malicious Mischiefs Arts. 327, 328,
329, 330 & 331.
Why only crimes against persons &
property?- Because these crimes involved
moral depravity.
Ex. Inadequate means Using a small
quantity of poison by mixing it in the food,
thinking it was enough.
 Two kinds of inherent impossibility:
1) Legal impossibility it occurs where
the intended acts, even if completed would
not amount to a crime. It would apply to
those circumstances where: 1) the motive,
desire and expectation is to perform an act
in violation of the law; 2) there is intention
to perform the physical act; 3) there is
performance of the intended physical act;
 4) the consequence resulting from the
intended act does not amount to a crime.
(ex. Killing a dead person).
2) Factual or physical impossibility- This
occurs when extraneous circumstances
unknown to the actor or beyond his control
prevent the consummation of the intended
crime. Ex. A thief who picks the pocket of
& finds the same empty.
 Article 49: Penalty to be imposed upon the
principals when the crime committed is
different from that intended:
1) If the penalty prescribed for the
felony committed be higher than that
corresponding to the offense which the
accused intended to commit, the penalty
corresponding to the latter shall be
imposed in the maximum period.
 2) If the penalty prescribed for the felony
committed be lower than that
corresponding to the one which the
accused intended to commit the penalty
for the former shall be imposed in its
maximum period.
 Article 59 Penalty for impossible crimes
the court having in mind the social
danger and the degree of criminality
shown by the offender, shall impose upon
the offender the penalty of Arresto Mayor
or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.
 ARTICLE 5-
- Duty of the courts in connection with acts
which should be repressed but which are
not covered by the laws and in cases of
excessive penalties.
Whenever the court has knowledge of
any act which it may deem proper to
repress and which is not punishable by
law, it shall render the proper decision,
 and shall report to the Chief Executive,
through the DOJ, the reasons which
induce the court to believe that said act
should be made the subject of penal
legislation.
In the same way the court shall submit
to the Chief Executive, through the DOJ,
such statement as may be deemed proper
 without suspending the execution of the
sentence, when a strict enforcement of the
provisions of the Code would result in the
imposition of a clearly excessive penalty,
taking into consideration the degree of
malice and the injury caused by the
offense. ( Cases of former Pres. Estrada
and Jalosjos).
CLASSIFICATION OF CRIMES
Two:
1) Formal crimes are those which are
always consummated by a single act. Ex.
Slander.
2) Material crimes are those which
have 3 stages :Attempted, Frustrated and
Consummated.

 DEVELOPMENT OF CRIME

1) Internal acts not punishable.

2) External acts: a) Preparatory
usually not punishable, except in some
cases, such as: Art. 304- Unlawful
Possession of a Picklocks & Art. 115-
Proposal and conspiracy to commit
Treason.
b) Acts of execution: Attempted,
 Frustrated and consummated.
Attempted stage- when the offender
commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of
some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance.
 Overt acts acts w/c must refer to the
crime - elements of the crime.
Ex. Pp. vs. Lamahang 61 Phil. 703-
Lamahang was caught after he has made
an opening on the wall of a store before
entering it, he cannot be held liable for
Attempted Robbery because the purpose
of his intended entrance is not yet known.
 He is liable only for Attempted Trespass to
Dwelling as undoubtedly the opening was
made to enter the store.
Murder/Homicide Accused fired his gun
at the victim, hitting the latter not at the
vital parts of his body or if the wound
inflicted is not fatal Attempted stage.
Rape when the accused had the inten-
 tion of lying down with the woman victim,
by raising her skirt. (element of his desire
to have sexual contact).
Frustrated stage When the offender
performs all the acts of execution which
would produce the felony as a
consequence, but which, nevertheless, do
not produce it by reason of causes
 Independent of the will of the perpetrator.
Consummated stage when all the
elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present.
Examples:
1) Theft Art. 308 U.S. vs. Adiao-
38 Phil. 754 mere abstraction by the
accused of the belt from the baggage of
 the passenger of a vessel and secreting it
in his desk in the customs house, where it
was discovered is consummated Theft.
(All the elements of the crime of Theft are
present. Altho he was not able to dispose
it, disposal is not an element of the crime
of Theft).
2) Pp. vs. Dino Theft is frustrated
because while the accused has performed
 all the acts of execution, the crime was not
consummated because the accused were
caught with the stolen articles at the check
point. (items were guns bulky)
3) Pp. vs. Espiritu - Linen- passed
through a check point. Crime is
consummated.
4) Rape (RA 8353) Only Attempted and
Consummated no Frustrated stage.
 Pp. vs. Hernandez 49 Phil. 980- the
gravamen of the offense is carnal
knowledge, hence, no matter how slight is
the penetration, the felony is
consummated. If the male organ failed to
touch the pudendum of the woman, for
some causes other than his own
spontaneous desistance, the felony is only
attempted.
 The case of Pp. vs. Erina ( 50 Phil. 998),
which ruled that there is a frustrated stage
of the crime of Rape is no longer
applicable. In this case the offended party
is a child 3 yrs. & 11 mos. and it was
proven that due to the disparity of their
organ or the smallness of the organ of the
child, penetration could hardly be done.
 But in the case of Pp. vs. Velasco 73
SCRA 574 penetration of the labia of
the pudendum or entry of the labia or lips
of the female organ, is a consummated
Rape.
5. Arson PD l6l3
Small portion of the bldg. is burned
consummated.
 Total burning of the bldg. is not necessary.
But when all acts necessary to burn a
bldg. have already been performed as
setting on fire some rags soaked in
gasoline to burn the bldg. but no portion is
burned, the crime is frustrated (Valdez
39 Phil 240). Pp. vs. Garcia no fire yet,
then attempted stage.
 6). Estafa (Art. 315-RPC)in the Dominguez
case 41 Phil. 409- the salesman pocketed the
part of his sales, but before he could get out, he
was discovered, then the crime is frustrated.
Damage is an element.
7 ) Bribery (Art. 210-RPC) U.S. vs. Tan Gee- 7
Phil. 738 Offer of a Chinaman to allow his
companion to land without investigation was
refused Attempted Bribery.
 Pp. vs. Diego Quinn- G.R. No. 42663-
Where the money handed by the offeror
was returned by the public official
Frustrated Bribery. It will be noted that in
both cases, the accused were private
persons who attempted to corrupt public
officials, therefore the decisions
disregarded the requisite that Bribery can
 be committed only by a public officer.
Recent ruling where the accused was
charged of Attempted Bribery for offering a
patrolman money to dissuade him from
arresting the accused, the lower court
convicted the accused of Frustrated
Corruption of Public Officials (Article 212
RPC). But the SC changed the crime to
 Attempted Corruption of Public Officials
Pp. vs. Ng Pek 81 Phil. 562, because
altho the money was actually offered and
delivered, the public official refused to be
corrupted. Frustrated Corruption of Public
Officials, therefore, may occur if the
offender already handed the money to the
public officer to corrupt him, already
received, but which was returned, since
 all the acts of execution were already
performed but the corruption was not
consummated because the officer
returned the money, an act independent
of the will of the perpetrator.
But in a decision of the CA Pp. vs.
Elago, it is ruled that upon a careful
review of our jurisprudence, we are unable
 to find a single case of Frustrated Bribery
or Frustrated Corruption of Public Officials,
considering the essential elements of
these offenses, thus we are bound to
deduce that they are not subject to
frustration, for the reason that if the
corruption of public official is
accomplished, the crime is consummated,
 otherwise, it is nothing more than an
attempt.
ARTICLE 7 WHEN LIGHT FELONIES
ARE PUNISHABLE Light felonies are
punishable only when they have been
consummated, except crimes against
persons or property.
- Reason for the exception involved
moral depravity. ( Light felonies committed
 against persons and property, are
punishable even if attempted or frustrated.
Reason for Art. 7 light felonies produce
such light, such insignificant moral and
material injuries that public conscience is
satisfied with providing a light penalty, for
their consummation, thus there is no need
for a penalty for those not consummated.
 What are light felonies those infractions of law
for the commission of which the penalty of
Arresto Menor or a fine not exceeding 200
pesos, or both, is provided. ( Article 9, par. 3).
1) Slight Physical Injuries & Maltreatment-
Art. 266
2) Theft Art. 309 pars. 7 & 8
3) Alteration of Boundary Marks Art. 313
 4) Malicious Mischief Art. 328, par. 3 &
Art. 329, par. 3
5) Intriguing Against Honor Art. 364

Article 8 CONSPIRACY & PROPOSAL

TO COMMIT FELONY- Not punishable,
unless the law specifically provides.
 Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a crime and
decide to commit it.
Proposal exists- when the person who has
decided to commit a felony proposes its
execution to some other persons.
Reason for the rule these are only pre-
 paratory acts, and the law regards them as
innocent or at least permissible except in
rare and exceptional cases.
Exceptions:
1) Art. 115- Conspiracy & proposal
to commit treason;
2) Art. 136- Conspiracy & proposal
to commit rebellion, insu., or coup d etat;
 3) Conspiracy to commit arson.
4) Conspiracy to commit sedition ( no
proposal).
Conspiracy to commit a crime
distinguished from conspiracy as a means
to commit a crime Conspiracy to commit
a crime is not to be confused with
conspiracy as a means of committing a
 crime. In both cases, there is an
agreement but mere conspiracy to commit
a crime is not punished except in Treason,
Rebellion, Coup detat & Sedition or
Arson. Even then, if the Treason for
example is actually committed, conspiracy
will be considered as a means of
committing it and the accused will all be
liable for Treason and not for conspiracy
 to commit a crime. In conspiracy to commit
a crime, mere agreement is sufficient
whereas in conspiracy as a means to
commit a crime, overt acts to realize the
criminal purpose must also be performed,
meaning the crime must be committed.
 In conspiracy, even though the act of the
several perpetrators are different, they can
be imposed the same penalty, based on
the concept that the act of one is the act
of all (Antonio vs. Sandiganbayan G.R.
57937). Conspiracy must be shown to
exist as clearly and as convincingly as the
commission of the offense in order to
uphold the fundamental principle that no
 one shall be found guilty of a crime except
upon proof beyond reasonable doubt
(Pecho vs. Pp.- 74 SCAD).
To establish conspiracy, it is necessary
that there be proof that the malefactors
have acted in concert and in pursuance to
same objective, to achieve the same
result. Conspiracy can be inferred from the
 acts of the accused. Their actions must be
judged not by what they say, for what men
do is the best index of their intentions
(Pp. vs. Mada-I Santalani, et al-G.R. No.
L-29979).
There must be intentional participation in
the transaction with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and
purpose (Pp. vs. Realon, et al. 99 SCRA
 422).
From the legal viewpoint, conspiracy
exists, it at the time of the commission of
the offense, the accused had the same
purpose, and were united in its execution
(Pp. vs. Danilo Sy, et al 113 SCRA 207)
Conspiracy must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. Mere suspicion,
 speculation, relationship, association and
companionship do not prove conspiracy
(Pp. vs. Sosing 11 SCRA 368). Mere
presence is not indicative of conspiracy.
Pp. vs. Tabuso 114 SCAD The court
noted the eye defect of the accused-
appellant (for which he was known as
bulag in the locality) and doubted his
ability to perform the role of a look-out.
 Implied conspiracy one that is deduced
from the mode and manner in which the
offense was committed. The concerted
acts of the parties to achieve the same
objective signify conspiracy. This doctrine
was first enunciated in the case of Pp. vs.
Guevara 179 SCRA 334, which held that
the act of holding the victim from behind
immediately before the latter was stabbed
 by Eduardo constitutes a positive and over
act towards the realization of a common
criminal intent which may be classified as
instantaneous. The act was impulsively
done at the spur of the moment.
In the absence of conspiracy, the
criminal responsibility arising from the acts
directed against the victim is individual and
not collective (Tapalla vs. CA 41 SCAD).
 Conspiracy cannot co-exist with
negligence because this is done
intentionally ( Narciso vs. Sandiganbayan).
Can a head of office be held liable for
conspiracy for the acts of his
subordinates? Yes. He can likewise be
held liable through his negligence, which
brought about the commission of the crime
 of Falsification, Malversation of Public
Funds, without which the crime could not
have been committed. ( Cebu City Hall
Officials case- Omb. vs. Alvin Garcia).
There is however an exception- Arias vs
Sandiganbayan 180 SCRA. Heads of
offices have to rely to a reasonable extent
on their subordinates and on the good
faith of those who prepared the same.
 ARTICLE 9-
GRAVE FELONIES, LESS GRAVE
FELONIES and LIGHT FELONIES.
Grave felonies are those which the
law attaches the capital punishment or
penalties which in any of their periods are
afflictive, in accordance with Article 25 of
this Code.

 Article 25: Capital punishment Death

Afflictive penalties:
1) Reclusion Perpetua 20
yrs. and 1 day to 40 yrs.
2) Reclusion Temporal 12
yrs. & 1 day to 20 yrs.
3) Perpetual or temporary
 absolute disqualification
4) Perpetual or temporary special
disqualification
5) Prision Mayor 6 yrs. & 1 day
to 12 years.
(whether min., medium or maxi-
mum) .
 Less grave felonies- are those which the
law punishes with penalties which in their
maximum period are correctional.
Article 25: Correctional penalties:
1) Prision correccional 6 mos. & 1
day to 6 years.
2) Arresto Mayor 1 mo. & 1 day to
6 months;
 3) Suspension
4) Destierro
(D & S have the same range with PC)
Light felonies infractions punished
with Arresto Menor or a fine not exceeding
200 pesos.
 ARTICLE 10 -
OFFENSES NOT SUBJECT TO THE
PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE Offenses which are or in the near
future may be punishable under special
penal laws are not subject to the
provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the
latter should specifically provide the
contrary.
 Offenses punished under Special Penal
Laws- Statutes enacted by the Legislative
branch, penal in character, which is not an
amendment to the RPC.
Provisions of the RPC not applicable to
SPL- Art. 6- Attempted & frustrated stages
of the commission of a crime;
- Arts. 13 & 14- Mitigating &
 aggravating circumstances.

5 Circumstances Affecting criminal

liability:
1) Justifying circs. Art. 11
2) Exempting circs. Art. 12

 3) Mitigating circs- Art. 13

4) Aggravating circs Art. 14
5) Alternative circs. Art. 15.

ARTICLE 11 JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES are those where the
act of the person is said to be in
accordance w/ law, so that such person
 is deemed not to have transgressed the
law and is free from both criminal and civil
liability.
- No civil liability- except under par. 4
by the person benefited.
The law recognizes the non-existence
of a crime do not incur criminal liability.
1) Self-defense any one who acts in
 defense of his person or rights, provided
the following circs. Concur:
a) Unlawful aggression
b) Reasonable necessity of the
means employed to repeal it; &
c) Lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending
himself.
 .
1) Unlawful Aggression positively strong
act with wrongful intent.
a) Actual means an actual attack with
the use of physical force or weapon- ex.
act of stabbing; shooting.
b) Imminent an attack that is impending
or at the point of happening- Pp. vs.
Nabayra (1991)- There must be a real
danger; not a mere threatening attitude-
 - ex. aiming a gun and brandishing
a bolo; (not holding his waistline).
Agreement to fight not unlawful
aggression except if one violates the
agreement.
If unlawful aggression ceases no more
aggression- not justified revenge (Pp. vs.
Alconga 78 Phil. 366)
 Unlawful aggression is a material
aggression, an offensive act which
positively determines the intent of the
aggressor to cause the injury (Pp. vs.
Sabio 19 SCRA -901)
There is no unlawful aggression when the
peril to ones life, limb or right is neither
actual or imminent (Pp. vs. Crisostomo-
108 SCRA- 288)
 Impt. element -UA w/o it no complete
self-defense- Pp. vs. Bausing 1991;
( Incomplete self-defense).
2) Reasonable necessity of the means
employed to repeal it Pp. vs. Gatual
254 SCRA no need of mathematical
calculation of the material
commensurability between the means

 of attack and defense.

This depends on the two elements:
1) whether the means was the only
one which the defender could avail at the
time of the attack; and
2) the defender is acting on the
instinct of self-preservation- based on the
danger of the injury, not on the actual
 harm several stab wounds negate self
defense.
The gauge of rational necessity is to be
found in the situation as it appears to the
individual who is the object of aggression.
The instinct of self-preservation more often
than not is the moving factor in mans
action in defending himself Pp. vs.
Artuz- 71 SCRA 116).

3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself
Provocation must be immediate (does
not allow interval of time).
Sufficient proportionate to the
damage caused by the act, and adequate
to stir one to its commission.
 Rights that can be defended:
1) Right to chastity Pp. vs. Jaurigue-
76 Phil. 174
2) Right to property -Pp. vs. Apolinar
38 O.G. 2879;
- Pp. vs. Narvaez (Art. 429 CCP-
April 30, l983) - in relation to Article 11-
par. 5 exercise of a right.

 3) Right to honor self-defense in

libel/oral defamation/slander- once
aspersion is cast, the sting is still there.
Reason for self-defense- Under the
Classical School because the State
cannot always come to the aid of a person
unlawfully attacked; he has then to defend
himself by following his instinct of self-
 preservation.
Under the Positivist School because it
is an exercise of a right and anything done
to repel an unlawful attack is an act of
social justice ( Pp. vs. Boholst-Caballero
61 SCRA 180).
The accused who claims self-defense
must prove its elements clearly & convin-
 cingly. The rationale is that such proceeds
from the admission of the accused that he
killed or wounded another, which is a
felony, for which he should be criminally
liable, unless he establishes to the
satisfaction of the courts the fact of
legitimate defense ( Castanares cs. CA
92 SCRA 567).
 Gen. principle proving the commission of
a crime lies with the prosecution and this
must be done w/ proof beyond the cavil of
a doubt. But this is not so in claims of self-
defense. The burden of proof- shifted to
the accused ( Pp. vs. Magallanes July
l997- 84 SCAD ). He must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not
 on the weakness of that of the prosecution
for, even if the prosecution evidence is
weak, it could not be disbelieved after the
accused himself admitted the killing ( Pp.
vs. Arroyo- Sept. l991) .
2) Anyone who acts in defense of the
persons or rights of his spouse,
ascendants, descendants, or legitimate
 natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or
of his relatives by affinity in the same
degrees, and those by consanguinity
within the fourth civil degree, provided that
the first and the second requisites
prescribed in the next preceding
circumstance are present, and further
requisite, in case the provocation was
given by the person attacked, that the
 one making the defense had no part
therein- Defense of Relatives
Consanguinity within the fourth civil
degree first degree cousin.
Same degree refers to relatives already
mentioned as brothers and sisters, so a
brother-in law, or a sister-in-law is a
relative within the same degree. A second
 degree cousin is not a relative under this
particular provision ( Par. 3- Defense of
Stranger).
In the event that not all the requisites for
the defense of a relative are attendant, the
accused should be entitled to either an
ordinary mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense of a relative
pursuant to Art. 13 (1) or a privileged
 Mitigating circumstance under Article 69.
However, the Supreme Court has held that
for the claim of incomplete defense of a
relative to prosper, it is essential to prove
the primordial element of unlawful
aggression. If there was no unlawful
aggression, there would be nothing to
prevent or repel. In that event, there could
be no defense, complete or incomplete.
 ( Pp. vs. Santos -69 SCAD or 255 SCRA &
Pp. vs. Agapinay 186 SCRA 812).
3) Anyone who acts in defense of the
persons or rights of a stranger, provided
that the first and second requisites
mentioned in the first circumstance of this
article are present and that the person
defending be not induced by revenge,
 resentment, or other evil motive.
Pp. vs. Valdez 58 Phil. 31- A person
who grappled for the possession of the
bolo with the husband who was attacking
his wife and in the course wounded the
husband, is said to have acted in defense
of a stranger.
 4) State of Necessity-any person who, in
order to avoid an evil or injury does an act
which causes damage to another,
provided that the following requisites are
present:
a) that the evil sought to be avoided
actually exists;
b) that the injury feared be greater
than that done to avoid it;
 c) that there be no other practical and less
harmful means to prevent it;
Damage is caused to persons or property
by a person to avoid an evil or injury.
Pp. vs. Norma Hernandez- 55 O.G. 8465-
an accused was acquitted of the crime of
Slander by Deed, when she eloped with
another man after all wedding
preparations with the offended party were
 made, since there was a necessity on the
part of the accused to avoid a loveless
marriage with the offended party.
The civil liability will be incurred by the
persons who benefited by the avoidance
of the injurious act, not by the actor.
The state of necessity must not be caused
by the negligence or violation of the law
of the actor.
5)Fulfillment of Duty or Lawful Exercise of Right
or Office- Any person who acts in the fulfillment
of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right or office.
Elements:
a) The offender acted in the performance
of a duty or a lawful exercise of right or office;
 b) The injury caused or offense
committed is the necessary consequence
of the due performance of such right or
office.
A Policeman who was attacked by an
escaping prisoner when he demanded his
surrender, dodged it, and then fired his
revolver w/o hitting the prisoner, but who,
 when he ran away was again fired upon by
the policeman, this time hitting and killing
him, is exempt from criminal liability as the
deceased was under obligation to
surrender and had no right to commit the
assault after evading his sentence- Pp. vs.
Delima- 46 Phil. 768.
Appellant was not in the performance of
 of his duties at the time of the shooting for
the reason that the girls he was attempting
to arrest were not committing any act of
prostitution in his presence. The fatal
injuries that appellant caused the victim
were not necessary consequence of his
performance of duties as a police officer.
His duty to arrest the female suspects did
 not include any right to shoot the victim to
death Pp. vs. Peralta- 142 SCAD Jan.
2001.
For this circumstance to be invoked, the
above-mentioned elements must be
present, otherwise the absence of the
second element will only make the
circumstance an incomplete one thereby
 converting it into a mitigating circumstance
under Arts. 13 and 69 RPC-Pp. vs. Pinto
Jr. Nov. l991.
The lawful exercise of a right exists if the
owner or possessor of a thing employs
reasonable force to repel or prevent an
actual or threatened unlawful physical;
invasion of his property- Art. 429 CCP.
 Under the doctrine of self-help in rt. 429
of the CCP, the law justifies the act of the
owner nor lawful possessor of a thing in
using such force as necessary to protect
his proprietary rights.
6) Any person who acts in obedience to
an order issued by a superior for some
lawful purpose- Obedience to superior
 Order.
Elements:
a) an order has been issued by a
superior;
b) the order is for a legal purpose; &
c) the means used to carry out such
order is lawful.
 Pp. vs. Margen, et al -85 Phil. 839- If a
soldier upon order of his sergeant, tortured
to death a person for bringing food
different from that ordered, he is liable
because the order to torture is illegal and
the accused was not bound to obey it.
Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan- Feb. l997-
even if the order is illegal but it is
apparently legal and the subordinate
is not aware of its illegality, the subordinate
is not liable. This circumstance was
appreciated in the case of Tabuena where
it was shown that l) the subordinate-
superior relationship between Tabuena
and Marcos was clear; 2) the lawfulness of
the order was apparent as it has for its
purpose the partial payment of the liability
 -
of one government agency to another; 3) if
it were illegal, Tabuena was not aware of
its illegality.
B) EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES-
Circumstances where, altho the act is
criminal, the law exempts the actor from
liability. A crime is committed, but the law
exempts the actor from criminal liability.
 Since there is a crime, although there is
no criminal liability, there is civil liability
except in ACCIDENT ( c) and
INSUPERABLE CAUSE (f) which strictly
are not criminal.
a) IMBECILITY/INSANITY unless the
latter has acted during a lucid interval.
 When the imbecile or an insane person
has committed an act which the law
defines as a felony (delito), the court shall
order his confinement in one of the
hospitals or asylums established for
persons thus afflicted, which he shall not
be permitted to leave without first
obtaining the permission of the same
court.
 Imbecility is exempting in all cases, while
insanity is not if the offender committed
the crime during a lucid interval.
Sec. 1039 Rev. Adm. Code Insanity
is a manifestation in language or conduct
of disease or defect of the brain or a more
or less permanently diseased or
disordered condition of the mentality,
 functional or organic, and characterized by
perversion , inhibition or disordered
function of the sensory or of the intellective
faculties or by impaired or disordered
volition.
Imbecility an adult person who thinks
and acts like a seven year old child.
The test of imbecility or insanity is
complete deprivation of intelligence in the
 Commission of the act, that is, that the
accused acted without least discernment
Pp. vs. Aldemita G.R. No. 55033-34
Nov. 13, l986. There is absence of power
to discern, or there is total deprivation of
freedom of the will.
Mere abnormality of the mental faculties
will not exclude imputability( Pp. vs.
Danao- Nov. l992).
 Mere mental aberration or eccentricity is
not exempting but mitigating Pp. vs.
Bonoan- 64 Phil. 87.
Who has the burden of proof? Article
800 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
provides that the law presumes that every
person is of sound mind, in the absence of
proof to the contrary.
 If the accused interposes the defense of
mental incapacity, the burden of
establishing such fact rests upon him- Pp.
vs. Morales 121 SCRA 426. Hence, in
the absence of positive evidence that the
accused had previously lost his reason or
was demented moments prior to or during
the perpetration of the crime, the courts
 will always presume that he was in a
normal state of mind (Pp. vs. Medina- Feb.
l998- 91 SCAD).
The degree of proof needed is proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
Insanity must be at the time of the
commission of the crime, not after.
 If insanity occurs after the commission of the
crime or during the trial of the case, the trial will
be suspended and will only resume by the time
the accused regains his sanity.
If insanity occurs after final sentence, the
execution of said sentence shall be suspended
with regards to personal liability. If at anytime the
convict shall recover his reason, his sentence
shall be executed except when it already
prescribed (Art. 79 RPC).

 Two tests or criteria of insanity:

1) Cognition test or complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing
the criminal act;
2) Volition test or total deprivation of
the freedom of the will.
(Our case law shows common reliance on
the test of cognition, rather than in the
 Volition Test.
Under foreign jurisdiction, these are the
three major criteria in determining the
existence of insanity:
1) Delusion Test an insane person
believes in a state of things, the existence
of which no rational person would believe;
 2) Irresistible Impulse Test when by
reason of duress of mental disease, he
has lost the power to choose between
right and wrong, to avoid the act in
question, his free agency being at the time
destroyed;
3) Right or Wrong Test a person is
insane when he suffers from such
 perverted condition of the mental and
moral faculties as to render him incapable
of distinguishing right & wrong.
An insane person has no full and clear
understanding of the nature-
Pp. vs. Dungo July 31, l991.

 B) MINORITY :
Youthful offender is a child, minor or
youth, including one who is emancipated
in accordance with law, who is over nine
but under eighteen years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense.
( Art.189 Pres. Decree No. 603- Child &
Youth Welfare Code).
 Minors are classified as:
1) person under 9 years old
2) person over 9 years of age and
under 15, unless he has acted with
discernment, in which case, such minor
shall be proceeded against in accordance
w/ the provs. of PD 603 ( Child & Youth
Welfare Code).
 Old provisions of the law:
1) children under 9 years- absolute
exemption;
2) children over 9 but under 15- w/o
discernment absolute exemption;
3) children over 9 but under 15- w/
discernment- tried- if convicted sentence
 will be suspended- if he commits another
crime, he will be charged and if convicted
the suspended sentence will be
promulgated and he will serve his previous
conviction and the second conviction.
4) children over 15 but under 18 tried
and if found guilty promulgation of
sentence is suspended. Same proc.
 as in no. 3.
Basis: Arts. 189 & 192 PD 603:
A child over 9 years of age or under at
the time of the commission of the offense
shall be exempt from criminal liability and
shall be committed to the care of his or her
father or mother, or nearest relative or
family friend in the discretion of the court
 and subject to its supervision. The same
shall be done for a child over 9 but under
15 years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense, unless he
acted with discernment, in which case he
shall be proceeded in accordance with Art.
192.
 Discernment-means the mental capacity to
fully appreciate the consequences of ones
unlawful acts (Pp. vs. Navarro) or to
determine the difference between right
and wrong. This may be shown and
should be determine by considering all the
circumstances afforded by the record of
the case, his appearance, his attitude,
 and his behavior and conduct, not only
before and during the commission of the
act but also after and even during the trial
(Pp. vs. Doquena 68 Phil. 580).
Pp. vs. Alcabao- 44 O.G. 5006- a child, 11
years of age, with a sling shot hit the right
eye of the offended party causing serious
injuries, and after hitting him, still uttered
 bad remarks. This showed that the
accused realized the nature of his
wrongful act and he, therefore, acted with
discernment.
Art. 196: If it is shown to the satisfaction of
the court that the offender whose sentence
has been suspended, has behaved
properly and has shown his capability
 to be a useful member of the community,
even before reaching the age of majority,
upon recommendation of the DSWD, it
shall dismiss the case and order his final
discharge.
Art. 197: Whenever the youthful offender
has been found incorrigible or has wilfully
failed to comply with the conditions of
 his rehabilitation programs, or should his
continued stay in the training institution be
inadvisable, he shall be returned to the
committing court for the pronouncement of
sentence.
When the youthful offender has reached
the age of 21 while in commitment, the
court shall determine whether to dismiss
 the case or pronounce the judgment. In
this caser, the offender can avail of
probation and he shall be credited in the
service of his sentence with full time spent
in the actual commitment and detention.

Now new law Republic Act No. 9344-

Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006.
 Sec. 4.Definition of terms:
Child refers to a person under the
age of 18 years.
Sec. 6. Minimum age of criminal
responsibility A child l5 years of age or
under at the time of the commission of the
offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be sub-
 jected to an intervention program pursuant
to Sec. 20 of this Act.
A child above 15 years but below 18
years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he acted with
discernment ( appropriate proceedings).
 PROCDURE:

Sec. 20. Children below the age of

criminal responsibility If it has been
determined that the child taken into
custody is 15 years old or below, the
authority which will have an initial contact
with the child has the duty to immediately
release the child to the custody of his
 parents or guardian, or in the absence
thereof, the childs nearest relative. Said
authority shall give notice to the local
social welfare and development officer
who will determine the appropriate
programs in consultation with the child and
to the person having the custody over the
child. If the parents, guardians or nearest
 relatives cannot be located, or if they
refuse to take custody, the child may be
released to any of the following: non-
governmental or religious organization; a
barangay official, or a member of the
Barangay Council for the Protection of
Children (BCPC), a local social welfare
and development officer; or when and
where appropriate, the DSWD. If the
 referred to herein has been found by the
Local Social Welfare and Development
Officer to be abandoned, neglected or
abused by his parents, or in the event that
the parents will not comply with the
prevention program, the proper petition fpr
involuntary commitment shall be filed by
the DSWD or the Local Social Welfare
 and Development Officer pursuant to PD
603.

C) ACCIDENT:
Accident- is any happening beyond
the control of a person the consequences
of which are not foreseeable. If
foreseeable there is culpa.
 Accident is an occurrence that happens
outside the sway of our will, and altho it
comes about through some act of our will,
lies beyond the bounds of humanly
foreseeable consequences. It connotes
absence of criminal intent.
Elements:
a) performance of a lawful act;
 b) with due care;
c) causes injury to another by mere accident;
and
d) without any fault or intention of causing it.
Pp. vs. Bindoy- 56 Phil. 15- if in the struggling
with another who sought to wrest away his bolo,
to defend his possession the defendant
wounded a bystander, who died as a conse-

 quence, the injury caused is accidental.

- Other cases of accidents:
- Pp. vs. Hatton the blow-out of a tire,
there being no proof of excessive speed,
resulting in the death of a passenger of the
truck is also accidental.
- Pp. vs. Trinidad- an accidental
shooting due to legitimate self-defense
 is exempting.
Accident presupposes the performance
of a lawful act. The act of drawing a
weapon during a quarrel not in self-
defense is unlawful as it is Light Threat
under Art. 285 RPC, par. 1. So, the
accident cannot be invoked as an
exempting circumstance (Pp. vs. Reyta-13
CAR 1190).
 Under this exempting circumstance, there
is no civil liability.

D) COMPULSION OF IRRESISTIBLE
FORCE Any person who acts under the
compulsion of irresistible force.
- The irresistible force must be physical
and must come from a third person.
 It cannot spring primarily from the offender
himself (Pp. vs. Fernando 33 SCRA 149)
The accused acted not only without will
but against his will.
U.S. vs. Caballeros 4 Phil. 850 the
offender was struck with the butts of the
guns of those who killed another to compel
him to bury their victim, he is not liable as
 accessory because he acted under the
compulsion of an irresistible force.
Irresistible force- must produce such an
effect upon the individual that in spite of all
resistance, it reduces him to a mere
instrument and as such, incapable of
committing a crime. Such a force can
never consist in anything which springs
 primarily from the man himself; it must be
a force which acts upon him from the
outside and by means of a third person
(Pp. vs. Serrano- 136 SCRA 391).
The duress, force, fear or intimidation
must be present, imminent and impending
and of such nature as to induce a well-
grounded apprehension of death or
 serious bodily harm if the act is not done.
The compulsion must be one of such a
character as to leave no opportunity to the
accused for escape or self-defense in
equal combat (Pp. vs. Lorenzo 130
SCRA 311; Pp. vs. Patog 144 SCRA
429; Pp. vs. Nalipanat- 145 SCRA 483).
 Elements:
1) The force must be physical, must
come from an outside source, and the
accused must act not only w/o a will but
even against his will;
2) The accused must be reduced to a
mere instrument, such that the element of
freedom is wanting; and
 3) The duress, force, fear or intimidation
must be present, imminent and impending
and of such a nature as to induce a well-
grounded fear of death or serious bodily
injury if the act is not done.
The fear should not be speculative,
fanciful of imagined. It must be real. It is
based on the complete absence of
 freedom on the part of the accused and
has its roots in the Latin maxim ACTUS
ME INVITO FACTUS NON EST MEUS
ACTUS which translates to AN ACT
DONE BY ME AGAINST MY WILL IS NOT
MY ACT.
The compulsion employed upon the
accused must have been of such
 character as to leave no opportunity for
him to spring an escape to himself foist
any act of defense for self-preservation.
Thus, duress has been unavailing where
the accused had every opportunity to run
away if he had wanted to or resist any
possible aggression because he was also
armed (Pp. vs.Salvatierra- 71 SCAD)
 E) IMPULSE OF UNCONTROLLABLE
FEAR the fear must be insuperable and
he who acts under this situation is
completely deprived of freedom.
Elements:
1) The threat which caused the fear
was of an evil greater than, or at least
equal to, that which the accused was
 required to commit; and
2) it promised an evil of such gravity
and imminence that the ordinary man
would have succumbed to it ( Pp. vs.
Arizobal -5 CAR 901).
The compulsion must be of such
character as to leave no opportunity for
the accused to escape (Pp. vs. Parulan).
 U.S. vs. Exaltacion 3 Phil. 339 the
accused was compelled under fear of
death to join the rebels, thus he is not
liable for Rebellion.
Pp. vs. Rene Siao Accused Reylan
Gimena, under gun point, was directed by
accused Siao to rape Erlinda. Both
Gimena and Siao were charged of the
 crime of Rape. During the trial, accused
Gimena was able to prove that he was
acting under controllable fear. Between his
life and that of raping Erlinda, although he
knew that the act is illegal and wrong, he
had no other recourse but to do it,
otherwise, he would be killed. Instinct of
self- preservation is very important.
Gimena was acquitted. Siao was
convicted.
 Distinction between IRRESISTIBLE
FORCE (IF) and UNCONTROLLABLE
FEAR ( UF) :

1) IF the force must be physical and

must come from outside source;
 UF- is an impulse coming from within
the person of the actor himself;
2) IF- the actor acts without a will;
UF- the actor acts not against his will
but because he is endangered by the fear;
Similarities: - both refer to external
influences and not to physiological need.
 F) INSUPERABLE OR LAWFUL CASE
any person who fails to perform an act
required by law, when prevented by some
lawful or insuperable cause.
This applies to felonies committed by
omission. The law imposes a duty on the
part of the person to perform an act. If he
fails to do so, he violates the law. But if
 the failure is due to a lawful cause or
insuperable cause, he is not criminally
liable. In this instance, there is also no civil
liability because his acts are lawful.
Ex. Article 125 RPC- provides for the
number of hours (12-light penalties; 18-
correctional penalties & 36-afflictive
penalties) when a person arrested must
 be delivered to the proper judicial
authorities. If the peace officers failed to
do so because of circumstances beyond
his control, such as being stranded in an
island, or a far-flung area (Sayo vs. Chief
of Police 80 Phil.), that is insuperable
cause and the peace officers will not be
liable under Article 125.
 ABSOLUTORY CAUSES analogous
circumstances to exempting circs.- in
absolutory causes, the act committed
constitutes a crime but the law does not
punish the offender for reason of public
policy.
1) INSTIGATION takes place when a
peace officer induces a person to commit
 a crime and without the inducement, the
crime would not have been committed.
The person instigating must not be a
private individual as he would be liable as
Principle by Inducement (Art. 17, par. 2)
ENTRAPMENT signifies the ways and
means devised by a peace officer to
entrap or apprehend a person who has
 committed a crime. In an entrapment,
ways and means are resorted to for the
purpose of trapping and capturing the
lawbreakers in the execution of their
criminal plan; whereas, in instigation, the
instigator physically induces the would-be-
defendant into the commission of the
offense and himself becomes a co-
principal (Pp. vs. Ramos Jr. G.R. No.
 88301-Oct. 28, l991).
In the case of Pp. vs. Lua Hua, et al.-50
Phil. 52-54- the accused wrote to his
correspondent in Hong Kong to send him
a shipment of opium. The opium had been
there for sometime, awaiting a ship that
would go direct to Cebu. The Collector of
Customs of Cebu received information
 that the accused was intending to land the
opium in the port. The Collector promised
the accused that he would remove all the
difficulties in the way, and for this purpose
agreed to receive some amounts. Juan
Samson, a Secret Serviceman, pretended
to smooth the way for the introduction of
the prohibited drug. The accused started
 landing the opium. At this time, the agents
of the law seized the opium and had the
accused prosecuted. The Court held that
it is true that Juan Samson smoothed the
way for the introduction of the prohibited
drug, but that was after the accused had
already planned the importation and asked
for the said drug. Juan Samson neither
 induced nor instigated the accused to
import the opium in question but
pretended to have an understanding with
the Collector of Customs, who had
promised them that he would remove all
the difficulties along the way of their
enterprise so far as the customhouse was
concerned. This is not a case where an
innocent person is induced to commit a
 crime merely to prosecute him, but simply
a trap set to catch a criminal (Pp. vs.
Valmores, et al L-58625,- 122 SCRA
922).
It was held in Araneta vs. Court of
Appeals L-46638- 146 SCRA 532- that
the difference between ENTRAPMENT
and INSTIGATION lies in the origin of the
criminal intent. In ENTRAPMENT means
 rea originates from the mind of the
criminal. The idea and resolve to commit
the crime comes from him. In
INSTIGATION, the law officer conceives
the commission of the crime and suggests
it to the accused, who adopts the idea and
carries it into execution (Cabrera vs.
Judge Pajares 142 SCRA 127).
 ENTRAPMENT is no bar to the
prosecution and conviction; in
INSTIGATION, the defendant would have
to be acquitted (Pp. vs. Payumo July 2,
l990).
The process of entrapment is buy-bust
operation- Pp. vs. Balidiata- G.R. No.
101831- May 21, l993.
 Distinction between Entrapment &
Instigation:
Entrapment - Instigation
1)The mens rea - Evil idea originated
originated from the from the peace offi-
accused who was cer who induced the
merely trapped by accused to commit

 the peace officer in the act.

flagrante delicto.
2) This is not abso- Absolutory by
lutory as to the reason of public
offender since he policy.
authored the evil
idea.
 3) Consistent with pub- Contrary to
lic policy. public policy.
4) Trap for the unwary Trap for unwa-
criminal(Pp. vs. Marcos- ry innocent.
L85 SCRA).
 5) The peace officer The peace
is without criminal officer is a
liability for their principal by
acts are in accor- inducement
dance with law. (Pp. vs. Ramos-
supra).
 2) Article 6, par. 3- Spontaneous
desistance during the attempted stage of a
felony.
3) Article 7- Light felonies are not
punishable unless consummated except in
crimes against persons or property.
4) Article 16 - Accessories are not liable in
light felonies.
 5) Article 247- death or physical injuries
under exceptional circumstances.

6) Article 332 exemption of certain

persons from criminal liability, such as in
crimes of Theft, Estafa and Malicious
Mischief.
 Distinction between Justifying and
Exempting circumstances:
Justifying - Exempting
1. Act is w/n the - the act is criminal
bounds of law
2. There is no - there is a crime and
crime, hence no a criminal
criminal
 3. Since there is no - since there is a
crime, there is no crime, there is
criminal & no civil a criminal (but
liability. exempted from
criminal liability)
& there is civil
liability.

 4. The emphasis of the - the emphasis

law is on the act. of the law is on
the actor.

ARTICLE 13- MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCES circumstances
which show the lesser perversity of the
offender and which are considered to
 lower the penalty imposable generally to
the minimum period of the penalty
prescribed in the law. They are matters of
defense which do not have to be alleged in
the information. Since this is so, the
accused must proved it with concrete
evidence to the satisfaction of the Court
( Pp. vs. Malunay).
 The rationale behind the whole concept of
mitigating circumstance is to show mercy
and some extent of leniency in favor of an
accused who has nevertheless shown
lesser perversity in the commission of an
offense.
Classification of mitigating
circumstances:
1) Ordinary that whereby the penalty is
 lowered to the minimum period -pars. 3 to
10);
2) Privileged- one whereby the penalty
whether divisible or indivisible is lowered
one or two or more degrees-pars. 1 & 2;
3) Specific applies to specific felony.
This is an additional classification and
applicable to analogous mitigating circs.
 Exs. a) Concealment of Dishonor- crimes
of Infanticide (Art. 255) & Abortion (Art.
258);
b) Voluntary release of a person
detained within 3 days w/o the accused
attaining his purpose & before the
institution of the criminal action- Article
268 (Slight Illegal Detention).
c) Unjustified abandonment of the
 spouse in the crime of Adultery (Article
333).
Distinction between Ordinary &
Privileged mitigating circumstances:
1) Ordinary mitigating circ. can be off-
set by a generic aggravating circ.;
whereas privileged mitigating circ. cannot
be offset by any aggravating circ.- passion
 by treachery.
Privileged mit. circ. cannot be offset by
any aggravating circ. minority;
2) Ordinary mit. circ. If not offset by a
generic aggravating cir. has the effect of
imposing the lesser penalty plea of guilt.
Privileged mit. circ. has the effect of
imposing the penalty by one or two
 degrees lower than that provided by law.
3) Ordinary mit. circ. not considered
when what is prescribed is single
indivisible penalty Death or Reclusion
Perpetua (this is considered if what is
prescribed is composed of two indivisible
penalties under Art. 63- par. 3);
Privileged mit. circ.- always considered
 no matter what penalty is imposed.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
1) PRIVILEGED MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF INCOMPLETE
JUSTIFYING OR EXEMPTING
CIRCUMSTANCES - Those mentioned in
the preceding chapter, when all the
requisites necessary to justify the act or to
exempt from criminal liability in the
 respective cases are not attendant - In
self-defense, defense of relatives or
defense of strangers, it is essential that
unlawful aggression be present; otherwise,
there can be no such defense, whether
complete or incomplete.
Ex. If in self-defense, what is present is
unlawful aggression appreciated as
 ordinary mitigating circ.; if unlawful
aggression is coupled with reasonable
means, the penalty is one or two degrees
lower Article 69 (Pp. vs. Deopante- 75
SCAD)
Exempting circumstance of Accident if
the requisites of due care and without fault
in causing the injury are absent, the result
will be negligence and the case will be
 covered by Art. 67, w/c provides for the
same penalty as that provided in Art. 365,
par. 1. The effect is the same as that of a
privileged mitigating as the penalty is one
degree lower than that provided for an
intentional felony. If the requisites of lawful
act and without intention of causing the
injury are absent, an intentional act
results, and there can be no mitigating
 circumstance based on the absence of
such requisites.
2) MINORITY/OLD AGE- That the
offender is under 18 years of age or over
70 years. In the case of a minor, he shall
be proceeded against in accordance with
the provisions of Art. 80 (Art. 80 is already
amended by PD 603 now by RA 9344-
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act).
 Over 18 years but under 70 years full
criminal responsibility but may be entitled
to Probation (PD 968 as amended).
Over 70 years is ordinary mitigating
circumstance.
3) LACK OF INTENTION TO COMMIT
SO GRAVE A WRONG Praeter
Intentionem (Article 4, par. 1)- That the
offender had no intention to commit so
 grave a wrong as that committed.
The injury shall befall upon the same
person, not upon another. There should be
a great disparity between the intent
(means employed to accomplish the
criminal act) and its consequences.
Intent as a mental process is shown by
the external acts of the offender and is
 judged by the facts showing notable
disproportion between the means
employed, its consequences and the
attendant circumstances, like the nature
and kind of the weapon employed, the
location of the wound inflicted, the number
of wounds, and the conduct of the
accused at the time of its commission
 (Pp. vs. Amit 32 SCRA 95).
Art. 13, par. 3, addresses itself to the
intention of the offender at the particular
moment when he executes the act or
commits the criminal act; not his intention
during the planning stage ( Pp. vs.
Garachico- 113 SCRA 131).
Since intention partakes of the nature of
 a mental process, an internal act, it can,
as a general rule be gathered from and
determined only by the conduct and
external acts of the offender, and the
results of the acts themselves.
Ex. Pp. vs. Opero supra.
Pp. vs. Cagoco- 58 Phil. 526- act of
the offender in striking at the victim w/ his
 fist, who fell down and as a result his head
hit the pavement causing cerebral
hemorrhage which caused his death;
Pp. vs. Abejuela-supra shooting the
victim in his leg, not on the vital parts of
his body.
Cases showing circs. w/c contradict this
claim: 1) Pp. vs. Reyes G.R. No. 33767-
 - the accused in raping the two-year old
child, applied a lighted cigarette over her
body as to cause blisters and in hitting her
with a piece of bamboo on the head acts
were considered necessary to produce the
result, which is the death of the victim;
2) Pp. vs. Yu- L- 13780-Jan. 28, l961-
 the brute force employed in choking a
girl;
3) Pp. vs. Mationg, et al 113 SCRA
167- strangling the victim with a piece of
rope tied around her neck till she died.
4) Pp. vs. Retubado G.R. no. 58585-
June 20, l988 accused caused the death
of his 5-month old son by delivering upon
the child two fist blows thrice with the full
 force of his clenched fists.
This mitigating circumstance is
applicable only to felonies resulting in
material or physical injuries. It does not
apply to felonies committed thru
negligence.
Intentionem denoting intentional
felonies.
 4) SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION That
sufficient provocation or threat on the part
of the offended party immediately
preceded the act.
Requisites:
A) Provocation must be sufficient;
-sufficient means adequate to
excite a person to commit the crime and
 must accordingly be proportionate to its
gravity.
Ex. a) U.S. vs. Firmo 37 Phil. 133- ill-
treating and abusing the offender by
kicking and cursing him.
b) Pp. vs. Mansale,Jr. 31 SCRA
401- hitting the victim in the eye before the
fight.
 c) People vs. Marquez- 53 Phil. 260
infidelity of the wife which made the
husband kill her.
Not sufficient:
a) Pp. vs. Laude- 58 Phil. 933- a
request for an explanation to the accused
regarding his derogatory remarks against
certain ladies;
 b) Pp. vs. Sayson 43 O.G. 3219- act of
the accused in intentionally asking for
more wine, however unreasonable or
annoying it might have been;
c) Bautista vs. CA G.R. No. L- 46025-
Sept. 2, l992- It is not enough that the
provocating act be unreasonable or
annoying.
 B) It must be immediate.
Immediate means that there is no
interval of time between the provocation
and the commission of the crime (Pp. vs.
Pagal, et al 79 SCRA 570).
- Pp. vs. De Guia G.R. No. L-3731-
where the accused, who was charged by
the offended party of stealing jackfruits,
 went home and returned fully armed and
killed the deceased, provocation was
considered mitigating.
Not immediate:
a) Pp. vs.Benito 62 SCRA 351- 24
hours before the commission of the crime;
b) Pp. vs. Co- 67 O.G. 7451- one hour
before the stabbing incident;
 Pp. vs. Padilla June l994- 52 SCAD- not
mitigating Accused cannot invoked that
he was provoked by Pfc. Ontuca when the
latter ran away from him because,
understandably so, the hapless victim
feared for life having been beaten up twice
by his assailants that same evening. To
flee when danger lurks is human and can
never be regarded as a source of provo-
 cation sufficient to come within the ambit
of the Code. When the offended party
flees from the aggressor, the latter has no
reason to pursue and attack him.
Pp. vs. Alconga provocation given by
the deceased during the first stage of a
fight is not mitigating where the accused
pursued and killed the deceased while
 as the deceased, from the moment he fled
after the first stage of the fight, to the
moment he died, did not give any
provocation for the accused to pursue,
much less to further attack him.
Sufficient provocation is included in
incomplete self-defense and cannot be
appreciated as an independent circ.
 C) It must originate from the offended
party.
5). IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A
GRAVE OFFENSE: that the act was
committed in the immediate vindication of
a grave offense to the one committing the
felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, legitimate natural or adopted
 brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity
within the same degree.
a) Grave offense- need not be a felony or
an act punished by law. It may be any act
or event which offends the accused
causing mental agony to him and moves
him to vindicate himself of such offense.
Ex. U.S vs. Ampar- 37Phil. 301 -
 a remark to the accused, an old man 70
years of age, in the presence of so many
guests that he would make a roast pig out
of him ( because of his age).
Pp. vs. Diokno- 63 Phil. act of the
victim in eloping with the daughter of the
accused is a grave offense to his family.
Pp. vs. Rosal 66 Phil. 323 - remarks
 of the victim in the presence of the guests
during a celebration that the accused lived
at the expense of his wife- highly offensive
to the accused.
In determining the gravity of the offense,
the age of the accused, his social
standing, the time and place when the
offense was committed and other
attendant circumstances are to be
 considered.
The relatives against whom the grave
offense may be committed are the same
relatives mentioned in defense of relatives
except that relatives by consanguinity
within the fourth civil degree are excluded.
Ex. Accused is entitled to a mitigating
circumstance of having acted in proximate
 vindication of a grave offense committed
by the victim against the honor of his
daughter when said victim told him
anyway my nephew is already through
with your daughter and someday well be
in-laws.
Pp. vs. Regulacion March 18, l983
accused sought to vindicate the honor of
his family and appease his self-respect
 when he killed the victim.
b) Immediate means proximate and
hence, an interval of time may lapse from
the commission of the grave offense to the
commission of the crime in vindication
thereof Pp. vs. Parana 64 Phil. 331-
the accused was slapped by the deceased
in the presence of so many persons, and
 he attacked the deceased the following
day, this mitigating circumstance was
appreciated because it was shown that the
slapping engendered perturbation of mind
and although, not so immediate, by reason
thereof, lasted until the moment the crime
was committed.
Immediate means proximate (Pp. vs.
 Babor 74 SCAD September l996.
Distinctions between provocation and
vindication of a grave offense:
1) In provocation- it is directed against
the person committing the felony;
in vindication of a grave offense-
may be committed only against the
offender but also against the relatives who
 are mentioned in the law;
2) Provocation must be immediate to
the commission; whereas, vindication
may be proximate.
6) PASSION OR OBFUSCATION That
of having acted upon an impulse so
powerful as naturally to have produced
passion or obfuscation- to be mitigating,
 it is necessary to establish the existence of
an act both unlawful or unjust and
sufficient to produce such a condition of
mind to commit the felony and said act
which produced the obfuscation was not
far removed from the commission of the
crime by a considerable length of time,
during which the perpetrator might recover
 his normal equanimity (Pp. vs.
Alangguilang- 52 Phil. 663).
Facts must be proved to show causes
sufficient to produce loss of self-control
and to overcome reason (PP. vs. Mojica-
70 SCRA 502).
Rule For passion or obfuscation to be
considered as a mitigating circumstance,
 it is necessary to establish the existence of
an unlawful act, sufficient to produce such
a condition of mind, and it must not be far
removed from the commission of the crime
by a considerable period of time, during
which the perpetrator might recover his
normal equanimity (Pp. vs. Cauyan L-
33677-128 SCRA 504).
 It is necessary that the passion or
obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments.
There must be an act unlawful and
sufficient to excite passion or obfuscation
on the accused (Pp. vs. Tiongco- l994-55
SCAD).
Ex. of cases where passion or
obfuscation is appreciated as mitigating
 circumstances:
1) Pp. vs. Castro 117 SCRA 1014-the
accused boxed the victim after he saw the
latter box his four year old son.
2) Pp. vs. Muit 117 SCRA 696- where
the shooting of the victim was aroused by
a fit of jealousy due to wild rumors of
amorous relationship of the victim with the
 wife of the accused. The feeling of
resentment from the rivalry in amorous
relations with a woman is a powerful
stimulant to jealousy and is sufficient to
produce loss of reason and self-control.
Not considered as mitigating circs.:
1) Pp. vs. Tiongco- supra The anger
of Eduardo at Francis did not arise from
 lawful sentiments. The delay of Francis in
obeying Eduardos request to buy a
ballcaster bearing is too trivial a matter as
to fairly and justly cause such
overreaction.
2) U.S. vs. Sarikala- 37 Phil. 486- if
more than 24 hours had elapsed from the
insult and the commission of the felony.
 3) U.S. vs. Hicks -14 Phil. 217- killing the
deceased with whom the offender lived for
several years because she left him to live
with another man. Reason: because the
passion did not originate from legitimate
feelings.
Different views: U.S. vs. De La Cruz- 22
Phil. 429 & Pp. vs. Marquez- 53 Phil.260
killing the common-law wife surprised
 in flagrante in carnal intercourse with a
friend is passion that is mitigating because
the offender acted under an impulse
caused by the sudden discovery that the
woman proved untrue to him.
Pp. vs. Engay- 47 O.G. 4306 & Pp. vs.
Yuman- 61 Phil. 786- killing by the
accused of her common-law-husband
 with whom she lived for 15 years but who
married another woman, produced
passion that is mitigating because it arose
from the natural feeling of despair in a
woman who saw her life broken and found
herself abandoned by the very man for
whom she made so many sacrifices.
Acting on revenge not mitigating
 - Pp. vs. Rabanillo- 107 SCAD & Pp. vs.
Caliso 58 Phil. 283.
- Passion or obfuscation cannot co-exist
with treachery because in passion the
offender loses his control and reason;
while in treachery, the means employed
are consciously adopted. One who loses
his reason and self-control could not
 deliberately employ a particular means,
method or form of attack in the execution
of the crime Pp. vs. CA- 144 SCAD.
Passion or obfuscation cannot also co-
exist with evident premeditation because
in the latter there must be a lapse of time
to enable the offender to meditate and
reflect in the consequences of his acts.
 7) VOLUNTARY SURRENDER &
VOLUNTARY PLEA OF GUILT- That the
offender had voluntarily surrendered
himself to a person in authority or his
agents, or that he had voluntarily
confessed his guilt before the court prior to

 the presentation of the evidence of the

prosecution.
These two circumstances are
independent of each other and if present
in the commission of the crime, can be
appreciated in favor of the offender. These
are the only mitigating circumstances
based on the lesser perversity of the
 offender and are present after and not at
the time of the commission of the crime.
A) VOLUNTARY SURRENDER:
Elements:
1) The offender has not been
actually arrested;
2) He surrendered himself to a
person in authority or an agent of a
 person in authority; and
3) The surrender must be voluntary.

Voluntary surrender must be made to a

person in authority or his agents. It may be
present if made after the issuance of a
warrant of arrest but before actual arrest is
made (Pp. vs. Yecla-68 Phil. 740 &
 Pp. vs. Comsi 71 Phil. 595).
The law does not require that surrender
must be before or after the issuance of a
warrant of arrest (Pp. vs. Javier 112
SCRA 186; Pp. vs. Clamor- July 1, l991;
Pp. vs. Bausing- July 18, l991 & Pp. vs.
Tismo-Dec. 4, l991).
Pp. vs. Taraya- G.R. No. 135551-
 October 27, 2000 If a warrant of arrest
has been issued, or an information filed,
surrender is no longer voluntary because
his arrests imminent.
Pp. vs. Amaguin 47 SCAD voluntary
surrender is present even if the accused
turned themselves one week after the
crime. The fact is they voluntarily surren-
 dered to the police before arrest could be
effected.
To be voluntary, a surrender must be
spontaneous, i.e. there must be an intent
to submit oneself to the authorities, either
because he acknowledges his guilt or
because he wishes to save them from the
trouble and expense to be necessarily
 incurred in his search and capture.
Thus, the surrender is not voluntary if
the offender was merely forced by
circumstances.
Pp. vs. Rebamontan (en banc)- April
l999- 105 SCAD the SC did not consider
as voluntary surrender the act of the
accused in not resisting the arrest or
 in not denying the crime, because it was
the police officer who went looking for the
accused after obtaining information from
an eyewitness as to who committed the
crime.
B) VOLUNTARY PLEA OF GUILT-
Elements:
1) Made in open court;

 2) spontaneous and unconditional; and

3) prior to the presentation of the
evidence of the prosecution.
Voluntary plea of guilt is mitigating
because it is an act of repentance and
respect for the law; it indicates a moral
disposition in the accused favorable to his
reform (Pp. vs. De la Cruz- 63 Phil. 874
 and Pp. vs. Gano- Feb. 2001- 144
SCAD).
An extra-judicial confession is not
mitigating- Pp. vs. Undong- 66 SCRA 386-
because this is not made in open court.
An offer to enter a plea of guilty to a
lesser offense than that charged in the
information is not mitigating (Pp. vs.
 Magat 332 SCRA).

8) THE OFFENDER IS DEAF AND DUMB

OR BLIND- That the offender is deaf and
dumb, blind or otherwise suffering some
physical defect which thus restricts his
means of action, defense, or
communication with his fellow beings.
 The physical defect contemplated in this
article must affect the means of action,
defense or communication of the offender
with his fellow beings. The nature of the
offense is, therefore, to be considered as
to whether such physical defect is
mitigating.
The commission by a blind person of
 the crime of Estafa by misappropriating a
sum of money entrusted by a friend to him
for safekeeping will not entitle him to this
mitigating circumstance.
In the crime of Treason, the physical
infirmities of the accused were not
considered mitigating as he had shown
such fire of purpose, zeal and vigor in the
 execution of his treasonous activities (Pp.
vs. Lupera 83 Phil. 120).
A blind person or one who is crippled or
lame is entitled to this mitigating
circumstance if he commits the crime of
physical injuries.
In the crime of Robbery, it was held that
the accused who is deaf and dumb or
 whose right hand is missing is entitled to
this mitigating circumstance (Pp. vs.
Garillo- August 2, l978).

9) ILLNESS THAT DIMINISHES THE

EXERCISE OF WILL POWER Such
illness of the offender as would diminish
the exercise of the will-power of the
 offender without however depriving him of
consciousness of his acts the nature of
the illness affects the will of a person but
must not deprive of the consciousness of
his acts; otherwise, such will be
exempting.
Exs. A) a mother who killed her child
after delivery as she was suffering under

 the influence of a puerperal fever;

b) acute neurosis (Pp. vs. carpenter)
c) feeblemindedness (Pp. vs.
Formigenes- 87 Phil. 658)
d) mild psychosis or schizophrenic
reaction ( Pp. vs. Puno).
 10)ANALOGOUS
CIRCUMSTANCES:
- Any other circumstance of a similar
nature and analogous to those above
mentioned.
This lies within the discretion of the
court, taking into consideration all the facts
of the case that would best serve the
interest of justice.
Ex. 1) Restitution of the public funds
 used mitigating in Malversation of Public
Funds- analogous to voluntary plea of guilt
(Nizurtado vs. Sandiganbayan- Dec. l994-
57 SCAD) & voluntary surrender (Pp. vs.
Luntiao & Pp. vs. Amante);
2) Over 60 years old, w/ failing eyesight-
analogous to over 70 years old (Pp. vs.
Reantillo);
 3) Jealousy- similar to passion or
obfuscation (Pp. vs. Ubengen).
4) Extreme poverty- similar to justifying
circumstance of State of Necessity (pp. vs.
Macbul 74 Phil. 436). (But if the accused
impoverished himself and lost his gainful
occupation by committing crimes, extreme
poverty is not considered as analogous
 circumstance;
5) Testifying for the prosecution without
being discharged analogous to voluntary
plea of guilt ( Pp. vs. Navasca- 76 SCRA
70);
6) Where the victim previously
threatened the accused for non-payment
of debt arising from gambling, causing the
 accused humiliation and shame, is a
mitigating circ. analogous to passion or
obfuscation (Pp. vs. Ong);
7) Where the accused killed the
deceased, who took away his carabao
and held it for ransom and thereafter failed
to pay its value after the carabao died, the
accused would be entitled to a mitigating
 circumstance analogous to vindication of a
grave offense (Pp. vs. Monaga, et al- 118
SCRA 966).

ARTICLE 14: AGGRAVATING

CIRCUMSTANCES:-Those which serve to
increase the penalty without exceeding the
maximum provided by law because of the
greater perversity of the offender as
 shown by the motivating power of the
commission of the crime, the time and
place of its commission, the means
employed or the personal circumstances
of the offender.
Kinds of Aggravating Circumstances:
1) Generic- that w/c generally applies to
all crimes- ex. Recidivism.

 2) Specific that w/c applies to a

particular felony- ex. cruelty in crimes
against persons.
3) Qualifying- that w/c changes the nature
of the felony- ex. treachery in Murder.
4) Inherent- that w/c is part/element of the
felony committed thus no longer
considered against the offender in the
 determination of the penalty- ex. Unlawful
entry in the crime of Robbery.
Distinction between generic and
qualifying aggravating circumstances:
1) G- can be offset by an ordinary
mitigating circs.
Q- cannot be offset by any mitigating
circs.
 2) G- increase the penalty to the maximum
period of the penalty prescribed in the law;
Q- change the nature of the crime and
the designation of the offense, thus
generally, it will increase the penalty by
degrees.
Old provision a qualifying aggravating
circumstance cannot be proved as such
unless alleged in the information, whereas
 a generic aggravating may be proved even
though not alleged. A qualifying aggravating
circumstance if not alleged in the information
may be proved as a generic aggravating
circumstance (Pp. vs. Butler- Jan. 27, l983 & Pp.
vs. Deberto 205 SCRA (l992)
Under the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure it is now required that generic
aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the
information just like qualifying circs.
 If not alleged, this cannot anymore be proven,
otherwise this would violate the right of the
accused to be informed of the nature of the
accusation against him. The distinction between
the generic and qualifying aggravating
circumstance as to the allegation in the
information has been obliterated.
Cases: Pp. vs. Gallego- 338 SCRA Aug. 2000;
Pp. vs. Albert-251 SCRA (l995); Pp.
vs.Abuyen- Sept. 1992.
 AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES:

1) TAKING ADVANTAGE OF PUBLIC

POSITION- the offender is a public officer
who availed of the influence or reputation
inherent in his position for the purpose of
committing the crime. The offender must
avail himself of the prestige or ascendancy
 which goes with his position as a means of
securing the execution of the crime. In
other words, the public position must in
any way facilitate its commission.
The essence of the matter is presented
in this inquiry- Did the accused abuse his
office in order to commit the crime?
 Examples:
1) U.S. vs. Yumul 34 Phil. 169-
accused policeman effected the abduction
of the offended party when he was
wearing his uniform;
2) U.S vs. Torrida 23 Phil. 189- Accused,
a councilor, ordered that the death of large
cattles be reported to him and their owners
 pay him certain fees which they did in the
belief that it was required by an ordinance,
but which was not true, and the accused
spent the money he received. This
aggravating circumstance is present in the
crime of Estafa.
3) Pp. vs. Pinto, et al. G.R. No. 39519-
November 21, l991 this aggravating
 circumstance was appreciated against the
police officers who killed the person they
were supposed to arrest.
Not appreciated:
U.S. vs. Dacuycuy- 9 Phil. 84- Accused,
a councilor, received some money from
the offended parties who requested that
he purchase for them Cedulas, but instead
 of doing it, he spent the money. This agg.
circ. is not present, because the crime
committed is independent of his official
functions and also because, this is not
connected with his duties.
Pp. vs. Cepaloc- 117 SCRA 874
accused, a policeman pistol-whipped the
deceased because of the latters vicious
attack upon his brother. This agg. circ.
 is not considered as the brother was
purely avenging the attack upon his
brother.
If the abuse of official position is an
integral element of the felony, as in
Falsification of Public Document (Article
171 RPC) Pp. vs. Teves 14 Phil. 275- not
considered. Likewise, in the crimes of
Bribery ( Art. 210) and Malversation of
 Public Funds (Article 217 RPC).
2) CRIME COMMITTED IN CONTEMPT
OF OR WITH INSULT TO PUBLIC
AUTHORITIES:
Requisites:
1) public authority is engaged in the
discharged of his duties; and
2) he is not the person against whom the
 crime is committed;
3) the offender knows of the identity of
the public authority.
Public authority is a person in authority-
Chief of Police is now a person in authority
(Pp. vs. Rodil- Nov. 20, l981). Same with
Barangay Captains (under the Local Govt.
Code).
The crime must not be committed against
 public officer, otherwise it would be Direct
Assault and this circ. is absorbed.
If the crime is committed in the presence
of a policeman, this is not present, bec. he
is only an agent of a person in authority.
3) AGE, SEX, RANK, DWELLING:- Act
committed with insult or lack of regard due
to the offended party by reason of age,
sex, or rank or the crime is committed in
 the dwelling of the offended party, if the
latter has not given provocation.- There
are four agg. circs. in this par., w/c if
present in the commission of the crime are
considered as one agg. circ. only.
W/ insult or in disregard means the
specific fact of insult or disregard of sex,
age, rank of the offended party, who is a
 woman, older or of higher rank than the
accused. These circumstances are
considered in crimes against persons,
security or honor. It is not considered in
crimes against property.
In Robbery w/ Homicide not
considered bec. this is a crimes against
property, not person (Pp. vs. Punzalan-
Nov. 8, l991 & Pp. vs. Ponciano- 12/5/91).
 1) Age Pp. vs. Bugho- Sept. 30, l991- victim
being 73 years old at the time he was hacked to
death; Pp. vs. Lapan- 7/92-victim was 6 yrs old,
stabbed 14 times; Pp. vs. Lora- March 30, l982-
victim of the crime of Murder is a child 3 years
old.
2) Sex For this circ. to be considered, there
must be a showing that the accused specially
saw to it that his victim would be a woman.
There must be some specific
 insult or disrespect of her womanhood
(Pp. vs. Ursal 121 SCRA 400).
U.S. vs. Quevengco -2 Phil. 412-
compelling a woman to go to the house of
the accused against her will.
Pp. vs. Manalang- 123 SCRA 583- killing
of a woman, a sexagenarian, was
attended by disrespect done on her on
account of her sex.
 Sex is not considered in crime where
being a woman is an element thereof as in
the crimes of Parricide, Rape, Abduction
or Seduction.
These circs. were not considered when
the offender assaulted the victim due to
passion or obfuscation because the
offender who has lost his reason would
 not have deliberately and consciously know that
the act was done with disrespect to the offended
party.
3) Rank refers to high social position or
standing, or graded official standing-Killing of a
judge bec. he was strict (Pp. vs. Valeriano
G.R. L- 2159); the deceased was a consul, while
the accused was a clerk (Pp. vs. Godinez- L-
12268), or the accused, a clerk, killed the victim,
a ranking official of CSC (Pp. vs.
 Benito- 74 SCRA 271; the deceased was
the Chief of Police and the accused was
the Chief of Secret Service (Pp. vs.
Hollero 98 Phil. 162).
4) Dwelling a building or structure,
exclusively used for rest or comfort. This
includes dependencies, staircase, and
enclosures under the house. It is not
necessary that the house is owned by the
 offended party. It may include a room in a
boarding house, for home is that which the
law seeks to protect or uphold whether the
dweller is a lessee, a boarder or
bedspacer.
A combination of a store and house is
not a dwelling Pp. vs. Magnaue- May 30,
l951; nor a market stall (Pp. vs. Macaso )
nor a gambling house or house of pros-
 titution (U.S. vs. Balmori- 28 Phil.578).
It is aggravating, although the victim was
staying temporarily in order to escape the
brutalities of the appellant because of
jealousy (Pp. vs. Sto. Tomas- 138 SC%RA
206); in Robbery w/ Violence or
Intimidation bec. this can be committed
w/o necessarily entering a house (Pp. vs.
Dejaresco- June 19, l984); even if the
 victim was killed in the staircase of the
house (Pp. vs. Alcala- 46 Phil. 731); in the
case where the victim was taken from his
house although the offense was not
completed in the house as he was killed
outside (Pp. vs. Jardiniano, et al -103
SCRA 530).
Not considered: a) if the offended party
 has given provocation (Pp. vs. Dequena-
60 Phil. 279), but if not immediate agg.
b) if both the offender and offended party
are occupants of the same house (U.S. vs.
Rodriguez-9 Phil. 136).
The rationale for appreciating this agg.
circ. is the deliberate invasion of the
tranquility of ones domicile, thus showing
greater perversity (Pp. vs. Pagal- supra).
 4) ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE OR
OBVIOUS UNGRATEFULNESS-
Requisites:
1) the offended party had trusted the
offender;
2) the offender abused such trust; and
3) that such abuse of confidence
facilitated the commission of the crime
 ( Pp. vs. Zea, et al- L-23109, Pp. vs.
Barcena- L- 34202).
For abuse of confidence to exist, it is
essential to show that the confidence
between the parties must be immediate
and personal as would give the accused
some advantage or make it easier for him
to commit the criminal act. The confidence
must be a means of facilitating the
 of the crime, the culprit taking advantage
of the offended partys belief that the
former would not abuse said confidence
(Pp. vs. Arojado 350 SCRA, January
2001).
Examples: Abuse of confidence-
a) Pp. vs. Marasigan IXL, J. 12- this
circumstance is present in the killing of his
sweetheart whom he invited to a ride after
 he had determined to kill her and who
went with him not knowing his plan;
b) Pp. vs. Villas 29 SCRA 947- when
the accused was hired by the deceased as
a trusted houseboy for 4 years prior to the
commission of the crime; that in the
discharge of his duties he was allowed to
enter and clean her room and to close the
flower shop and therefore had access to
 the private room where he killed her;
c) Pp. vs. Caliso 58 Phil. 283- offender
was the servant of the family and
sometimes took care of the child, whom
she later killed;
d) Pp. vs. Lora- 113 SCRA 366- where
the victim, a 3 year old boy, was entrusted
to the custody of the accused, whose duty
in the household was to take care of the
 minor victim, whom she killed.
Exs. of obvious ungratefulness:
a) Pp. vs. Bautista- 72 O.G. 2117- when the
victim was suddenly attacked while in the act of
giving the assailants their bread and coffee for
breakfast, there was obvious ungratefulness;
b) Pp. vs. Baloyo 106 Phil. 972- where the
accused killed his employer who allowed him to
maintain a store in his compound without
 paying rent;
c) Pp. vs. Lupangco 106 Phil. 972- the
accused who was living in the house of the
victim, employed by the victim as an
overseer and in charge of the carpentry
work and had free access in the house of
the victim who was very kind to him and
his family and who helped him solved his
problem;
 d) Pp. vs. Lobetania-116 SCRA 297-
where the accused and his companions
killed their hosts after they had supper and
slept in their house.
5) CRIME COMMITTED IN THE a)
PALACE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE; b)
IN HIS PRESENCE; c) WHERE PUBLIC
AUTHORITIES ARE ENGAGING IN THE
DISCHARGE OF THE DUTIES; or d) IN
 A PLACE DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS
WORSHIP- only in the 3rd circumstance
(where the authorities are engaged in the
discharge of their duties), is performance
of function necessary. The other 3 circs.
require merely that the crime be
committed in the places specified: in the
palace of the Chief Executive; in his
presence, or in a place dedicated to
 religious worship. It is necessary though
that the offender must have sought the
above places for the commission of the
crime which shows his lack of respect for
the said places.
Ex. Pp. vs. De Ananias-96 Phil. 979- the
accused stabbed the victim in the office of
the Chief of Police who was investigating a
fist fight between them.
 - It is necessary to show that the offender
must have sought any of the above places
for the commission of the crime (Pp. vs.
Jaurigue- 76 Phil. 174). Any of the said
places, therefore, is not aggravating, if the
crime was casually committed therein.
This agg. circ. of having committed the
crime in a place where the public
authorities are in the discharge of their
 duties is absorbed in the crime of Direct
Assault (Pp. vs. Perez).
6) NIGHTTIME, UNINHABITED PLACE
OR BAND- If all these aggravating
circumstances concur in the commission
of the crime, all will constitute one
aggravating circumstance only as a
general rule, but these can be considered
separately if their elements are distinctly
 perceived and can subsist independently,
revealing a greater degree of perversity-
(Pp. vs. Damaso May 20, l978)
a) NOCTURNITY/NIGHTTIME- to be
aggravating, it is essential that this
circumstance facilitated the commission of
the crime, or the offender took advantage
of it; or it was purposely sought for the
purpose of impunity (Pp. vs. Soriano-
 35 SCRA 633 & Pp. vs. Pasiliao- G.R.
No. 98152- Oct. 26, l992).
Nighttime- period of darkness beginning
at the end of dusk and ending at dawn;
period from sunset to sunrise (Pp. vs.
Garachico).
- To be agg., the crime must be
committed exclusively at nighttime. If the
commission of the crime was commenced
 at daytime and it was consummated at
nighttime, such is not aggravating (U.S. vs.
Dowdell- 11 Phil. 4);
- where the meeting of the victim and the
accused was merely accidental and attack was
made at the impulse of the moment and as a
consequence of unexpected turn of events not
agg.(Pp. vs. Veloso- 92 SCRA 515 & Pp. vs.
Damo 128 SCRA 615);
 If nighttime forms part of a treacherous
means and manner adopted to insure the
execution of the crime, it will be absorbed
in treachery (Pp.vs. Pardo-70 Phil.564);
otherwise, it may be considered
independently from treachery- the crime
was committed during nighttime, the
victims hand were tied at the time of the
stabbing (Pp. vs. Artieda- 90 SCRA 144);
 Pp. vs. Ong- L-34497- January 30, l975-
when the victim was stabbed twice with an
ice pick at night while his hands were tied
and his mouth was gagged, nighttime is
not absorbed in treachery because in this
crime, treachery arose from the
defenseless position of the victim when he
was killed, while nighttime was purposely
sought by the accused to facilitate
impunity in the commission of the crime.
TW0 TESTS OF NOCTURNITY
1) Objective test nocturnity is agg. bec. it
facilitates the commission of the crime;
2) Subjective test under which
nocturnity is agg. bec. It was purposely
sought for.
These two tests are to be applied in the
alternative. Even if not purposely chosen,
 it will still be present if it facilitated the
commission of the offense (Pp.Garcia, et
al.-Oct. 31, l979 & Pp. vs. Palon- Feb. 20,
l984);
Altho., subjectively, nighttime was not
purposely sought for, if objectively, it was
a circumstance that facilitated the
commission of the crime and which the
accused took advantage of for the purpose
 of impunity, nighttime should be
appreciated (Pp. vs. Morales 121 SCRA
426).
B) UNINHABITED PLACE is determined
not by the distance of the nearest house to
the scene of the crime but whether or not
in the place where the crime is committerd
there was a possibility of the victim
receiving some help (Pp. vs. Bangug-
 52 Phil. 87. So, the place is not
uninhabited if where the crime was
committed, it could be seen and the voice
of the deceased could be heard from a
nearby house ( Pp. vs. Laoto- 52 Phil.
401).
The Supreme Court ruled that a place
where there are no people or any number
of houses w/n a perimeter of less than 200
 Meters is uninhabited (Pp. vs. Egot- 130
SCRA 134).
- Pp. vs. Rubia-( 52 Phil. 172) where
the crime was committed at sea not so far
away from another banca, the place is
uninhabited as it was difficult for the victim
to receive any help and it was easy for the
accused to escape punishment.
 Pp. vs. Capillas 102 SCRA 173-
uninhabited place was not considered
aggravating although the house nearest
the dwelling of the offended party was
about 2 kms. away because it was not
apparent that the offender selected the
place either to better obtain their objective
without interference or to secure
themselves against detection &
punishment.
 Uninhabited place is not aggravating if it is not
purposely sought for or taken advantage of to
facilitate the commission of the crime (Pp. vs.
Mesias, jr 127 SCRA- 792).
3) BAND consists of at least four armed
persons (more than 3 armed persons organized
with the intention of carrying out any unlawful
design (Pp.vs. Lee- Dec. 20, l991). They must
act together in the commission of the crime.
 If one has no direct participation in the
commission of the crime, as one is a
principal by Inducement, there is no band
(Gamara vs. Valero 51 SCRA 322);
Even if there are 20 members, but only 3
of them are armed, there is no band ( Pp.
vs. Lungbos- June 21, l988).
Pp. vs. Estante,Jr.- 92 SCRA 122- where
four armed persons were charged with
 Robbery w/ Homicide and during the trial
one of them was acquitted, it was held that
the crime was committed by a band. A
strong dissenting opinion maintained that
the acquittal of one would not result to a
band.
Band is inherent in Brigandage but not in
simple Robbery.
 In Pp. vs. Ombao- 103 SCRA 243- it was
held that in the crime of Robbery w/
Homicide, band is not taken into account,
citing, Pp. vs Moros Amajul, et al., 111
Phil. 254. There is a strong dissenting
opinion holding that band should be
considered a generic agg. cir.
In the case of Pp. vs. Puesca- 87 SCRA
130- band was considered a generic
 aggravating circumstance in Robbery w/
Homicide, Robbery w/ Rape, Intentional
Mutilation or Physical Injuries resulting in
insanity, impotency and blindness (Subdiv.
2, Art. 263, RPC), which means it can be
offset by an ordinary mitigating
circumstance.
7) CALAMITY OR MISFORTUNE- that the
crime be committed on the occasion of a
 conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake,
epidemic, or other calamity or misfortune.
The term other calamity or misfortune
refers to conflagration, shipwreck,
earthquake or epidemic (Pp. vs. Arpa, et
al. 27 SCRA l037). It cannot refer to
acts of men because they are of a nature
different from the events enumerated
(under the principle of ejusdem generis).
 This refers to the occasion during which
the crime is committed. These circs. are
considered aggravating because it shows
greater perversity, who, instead of lending
aids to the victims, adds to their suffering,
by taking advantage of their misfortune to
despoil them (U.S. vs. Rodriguez- l9 Phil.
150).
 8) AID OF ARMED MEN that the crime
be committed with the aid of armed men or
persons who insure or afford immunity.
Requisites:
1) the armed men or persons took part
in the commission of the crime, directly or
indirectly; and
2) the accused availed himself of their
aid or relied upon them when the crime
 was committed. This circ. cannot be
appreciated if the armed men are
conspirators, by acting under the same
plan and same purpose because in this
situation, they are all principals (Pp. vs.
Piring- 63 Phil. 546) .
U.S. vs. Abaigar- 2 Phil. 417- casual
presence is not aggravating, if the offender
did not avail himself of their aid.
 Band may absorbed aid of armed men,
since in the existence of a band the
employment of more than 3 armed men is
automatically included (Pp. vs. Manayao-
78 Phil. 721).
Distinction bt. Band & Aid of Armed Men:
1) Band all offenders are principals;
Aid of Armed Men merely
accomplices.
 2) Band there must at least 4 armed
persons, whereas in Aid of Armed Men-
the number of armed men is not
considered.
9) RECIDIVISM- that the accused is a
recidivist.
Recidivism is one who, at the time of
his trial for one crime, shall have
previously been convicted by final
 judgment of another crime embraced in
the same title of this Code. This requires
at least two convictions: the first by final
judgment and must take place prior to the
second conviction. Both offenses must be
embraced in the same title of the same
code.
Ex.- July 20, 2007- accused is on trial for
Homicide; on said date, he has already
 been convicted by final judgment, the
crimes are within the same title: crimes
against property: Theft, Robbery, Estafa;
or in crimes against persons: murder,
homicide, parricide or physical injuries; he
must be convicted of the second offense
and in the computation of the penalty, the
court will increase it to the maximum.
Recidivism is imprescriptible. It is taken
 Into consideration no matter how long a
time had lapsed between the first and the
second conviction ( Pp. vs. Calocar- 60
Phil. 878). It is likewise considered even if
the offender has been given absolute
pardon for the first conviction, since
pardon merely extinguishes the penalty,
(U.S. vs. Sotelo- 28 Phil. 147) but not in
Amnesty, as this extinguishes all the
 effects in law of the crime committed (U.S.
vs. Francisco- 10 Phil. 185).
Pp. vs. Compendio,Jr. 259 SCRA-
Recidivism must be alleged in the
information and must be proven by a
certified true copy of the final judgment
(after the lapse of 15 days from
promulgation of decision).
 10) REITERACION OR HABITUALITY-
that the offender has been previously
punished for an offense to which the law
attaches an equal or greater penalty or for
two or more crimes to which it attaches a
lighter penalty. This requires that the
offender shall have served out his
sentence for the prior offense (Pp. vs.
Layson, et al. Oct. 31, l969).
 The offenses are not necessarily
embraced under the same title of this
Code. This is not always aggravating.
Ex. Accused was convicted or Malicious
Mischief and had served the penalty of
Arresto Mayor. Again, he was charged and
convicted of the crime of Incriminating
Innocent Persons, with an imprisonment
term of Arresto Mayor- (Equal penalty).
 Mal. Mischief crimes against property, while
Incriminating is a crime against honor.
Another ex. accused was charged and
convicted w/ an imprisonment term of six (6)
month for the crime of Less Serious Physical
Injuries. He served this. Then again, convicted of
the crime of Slander, and served the
imprisonment term of one (1) month (Greater
penalty).
 Another ex. accused had been convicted
of two crimes, namely: Slander and
Malicious Mischief, wherein he was meted
the imprisonment terms of one (1) month
each. After serving the same, he was
again, charged and convicted of the crime
of Theft, w/ an imprisonment term of one
(1) year.
 Distinction bt. Recidivism and Reiteracion
(Habituality):
1) Reiteracion- the offender is
previously punished;
Recidivism- it is enough that there be
previous conviction by final judgment;
2) Reiteracion- the offenses are not
embraced under the same title of the
Code;
 Recidivism- these offenses must be
embraced under the same title of the
Code;
3) Reiteracion- is not always aggravating
as its appreciation rests upon the
discretion of the court;
Recidivism- if present, is always
considered aggravating;
 4) Reiteracion- prior crime must have been
penalized with an equal or greater penalty
or two or more crimes with lighter penalty;
Recidivism- no requirement as to
penalty imposed in the prior conviction.
Habitual delinquency- is a special
aggravating circumstance for which is
imposed an additional penalty which
escalates with the increase in the number
 of convictions. A person is a habitual
delinquent if:
1) Within a period of ten (10) years from
the date of his release or last conviction;
2) Of the crimes of Falsification, Robbery,
Estafa, Theft, Serious or Less Serious
Physical Injuries (FRETSeL);
3) He is found guilty of said crimes a third
 time or oftener.
Distinctions bt. Recidivism & Habitual
Delinquency:
R-1) Convictions- two are enough;
2) Crimes both under the same title of
the Code;
3) Prescription- none as there is no time
limit bt. the first and second convictions;
 4) Nature Generic can be offset by
ordinary mitigating circ.
Habitual Delinquency:
1) Three convictions necessary;
2) Crimes FRETSeL;
3) Prescribes if the 10 year limit between
the convictions exceeded;
4) Special agg. circ cant be offset .
 Quasi-Recidivism- the offender has been
previously convicted by final judgment and
before beginning to serve such sentence
or while serving the same he committed a
felony. This is a special aggravating
circumstance.
May an offender be a recidivist and a
habitual delinquent at the same time?
Yes, if the offender was convicted for the
 third time of Theft within the conditions
prescribed by law, the first and the second
convictions referring to Robbery & Estafa.
May an offender be a habitual deliquent
w/o being a recidivist? Yes- if the three
convictions refer to a specific felonies not
embraced in the same title of the Code,
like Falsification, Robbery & Serious
Physical Injuries.
 11) PRICE, PROMISE, REWARD- That
the crime be committed in consideration of
a price, reward or promise. They affect
equally the offeror and the acceptor (Pp.
vs. Canete, et al- L-37945-May 28, l984).
The offeror is a Principal by Inducement,
and the acceptor, the Principal by Direct
Participation (Pp. vs. Opero- 51 Phil. 201).
The inducement is the primary considera-
 tion in the commission of the crime for this
aggravating circumstance to be
considered against the person induced
(Pp.vs. Paredes- 24 SCRA 635).
If the money was given, w/o any
previous promise, after the commission of
the crime as an expression of sympathy,
this circumstance cannot be present (U.S.
vs. Flores- 28 Phil. 29).
 12) INUNDATION, FIRE, POISON,
EXPLOSION,etc- That the crime be
committed by means of inundation, fire,
poison, explosion, stranding of a vessel or
intentional damage thereto, derailment of
a locomotive, or by the use of any artifice
involving great waste. This is the only
aggravating circumstance that may
constitute a crime in itself (Art. 62, par. 1).
 If the building is set on fire, the crime is
Arson. If a person is killed by means of
poison, it is Murder. These circumstance
will no longer be considered aggravating.
If a hand grenade is thrown into a house
and as a result of the explosion, the house
was damaged, but no one was injured, the
crime committed is the crime involving
Destruction (Pp. vs. Comporedondo). If
 the explosion was used as a means to kill
the occupant, who died as a consequence,
the crime will be Murder.
13) EVIDENT PREMEDITATION-
Elements:
a) The time when the accused determined
to commit the crime;
b) An act manifestly indicating that the
accused has clung to his determination; &
 c) a sufficient lapse of time between such
determination and execution, to allow him
to reflect upon the consequences of his
acts.
Evident premeditation must be based
upon external acts and must be evident
not merely suspected (Pp. vs. Yturriaga-88
Phil.534), indicating deliberate planning
(Pp. vs. Florida, September l992).
 What must be clearly established for
evident premeditation to be considered?- It
must be shown when the plan to kill was
hatched or what time elapsed before it
was carried out for the essence of evident
premeditation is that the execution of the
criminal act must be preceded by cool
thought and reflection of the resolution to
carry out the criminal intent during the
 space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment.
Evident premeditation means that a
period sufficient in a judicial sense to
afford full opportunity for meditation and
reflection and sufficient to allow the
conscience of the actor to overcome the
resolution of his will if he desires to
hearken to its warnings has elapsed.
 31/2 hours from the plan to the
commission of the crime is sufficient time
for the accused to dispassionately reflect
upon the consequences of his act or to
desist from its execution.
Evident premeditation must be clearly
proven, established beyond reasonable
doubt. But if this is inherent element of a
 crime, then it has already been considered
by the law. Evident premeditation is
inherent in crimes against property (Pp.
vs. Daos- 60 Phil. 13), but it may
considered in Robbery w/ Homicide,
because the evident premeditation relates
to the killing and not to the robbery (Pp.
vs. Manansala- July 1992).
 Relationship between conspiracy &
evident premeditation- under normal
conditions, where conspiracy is directly
established, with proof of the attendant
deliberation and selection of the method,
time, and means of executing the crime,
the existence of evident premeditation can
be taken for granted. But in the case of
implied conspiracy, evident premeditation
 may not be appreciated, in the absence of
proof as to how and when the plan to kill
the victim was hatched or what time
elapsed before it was carried out, so that it
cannot be determined if the accused had
sufficient time between its inception and
its fulfillment dispassionately to consider
and accept the consequences.There
should be a showing that the accused
 has the opportunity for reflection and persisted
in effectuating his criminal design. Absent such
showing, this aggravating circumstance should
be rejected ( Pp. vs. Manansala- July 1992).
Proof of conspiracy does not imply the
existence of evid. premeditation. Evident
premeditation can be presumed only where
conspiracy is directly established , not where,in
this case, conspiracy is only implied (Pp. vs.
Padlan- 94 SCAD- May l998).
 14) CRAFT, FRAUD AND DISGUISE- That craft,
fraud or disguise be employed-These are
intellectual means in the commission of a crime
and are separate aggravating circumstances.
CRAFT is cunning or intellectual trickery or
chicanery resorted to by the accused to carry out
his evil design (Pp. vs. Barrios,et al- 92 Phil. 89;
Pp. vs. Zea, et al. L- 23109-10- June 29, 1984-
130 SCRA 77).
Pp. vs. Timbol- 47 O.G. l859-There is craft
when the accused assumed a position of
 authority to gain entrance in a house to enable
him to be alone with the offended party to
commit acts of lasciviousness.
Pp. vs. Tanchico- 93 SCRA 575- Deigning
friendship, accused was able to lure the victim to
the uninhabited place where the crime was
thereafter committed.
Pp. vs. Napili- 55 Phil. 581- In the crime of
Robbery when one of the accused shouted from
 the outside that they wanted to buy cigarettes
which induced the offended party to open the
kitchen for them and which also paved the way
for their intrusion into the house.
FRAUD constitutes deceit and is manifested
by insidious words or machinations.
Pp. vs. De Leon- 50 Phil. 539- Stepfather of
the offended party, taking advantage of the
absence of her mother, took the young girl away
and told her she was to be taken to the house of
her grandmother but instead she was taken to
 another house where she was raped.
DISGUISE is resorted to conceal the identity (if
in spite of the disguise, the offender was
recognized, such is not aggravating).
Pp. vs. Piring- 63 Phil. 548- covering the face
with handkerchief.
Pp. vs. Gonzales 56 Phil. 842- illegally wearing
constabulary uniform.
Pp. vs. Veloso- 112 SCRA 206- In Robbery w/
Homicide, accused wearing masks.
 These circumstances are not aggravating if they
did not facilitate the commission of the crime or
not taken advantage or by the offender in the
course of the assault.
15) ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH OR
MEANS TAKEN TO WEAKEN THE DEFENSE-
That advantage be taken of superior strength, or
means be employed to weaken the defense-
ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH-
Intentionally employing excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to
the offended party. There must be a notorious
 inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, and to appreciate it, it is necessary to
evaluate the physical conditions of the
protagonists and the arms employed by each
side ( Pp. vs. Cabiling 74 SCRA- 285).
There must be deliberate intent to take
advantage of the same (Pp. vs. Bello 10 SCRA
298).
This circumstance is appreciated in the
following cases:
 a) Pp. vs. Apelado- 113 SCAD- The aggressors,
who were all armed, first hit the legs of their
unarmed victim, causing the latter to fall
kneeling, then stabbed him above the knee; and
having deprived him of his means stand or run,
took turns in inflicting mortal wounds on him.
b) Pp. vs. Ocumen- 116 SCAD-male accused
attacked a defenseless woman with a deadly
weapon (his sex and weapon gave him
superiority).
 Not appreciated as aggravating:
a) If the assault is characterized with passion or
obfuscation; or made during a quarrel (U.S. vs.
Balines 4 Phil.594).
MEANS EMPLOYED TO WEAKEN THE
DEFENSE-
Pp. vs. Ducusin- 53 Phil. 280- Intoxicating a
victim with intention to kill him.
Pp. vs. Siaotong- March 29, l957- by suddenly
casting sand or dirt upon the eyes of the
offended party and then wounding him.
 16) TREACHERY That the act be
committed with treachery (alevosia)- There
is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in
the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might
make.
 The following requisites must concur:
a) the culprit employed means, methods or
forms of execution which directly and especially
tend to insure the offended party which means
that no opportunity was given to the latter (Pp.
vs. Samonte- 68 SCRA 90);
b) that such means, methods or manner of
execution was deliberately or consciously shown
(Pp. vs. Clemente- 21 SCRA 261).

 Treachery is applicable only in crimes against

person. It is qualifying in Murder (Art. 248), or in
Serious Physical Injuries (Art. 263). In Parricide
and Homicide, it is generic.
Gen. rule- If the attack is frontal, there is no
treachery, except when the attack is sudden and
unexpected (Pp.vs. Macarubbo- Sept. 9, l965);
there is treachery if the attack is sudden,
unexpected and from behind and the deceased
did not have the slightest opportunity to defend
himself except if it is a continuation of a previous
attack (U.S. vs. Baluyot- 40 Phil. 385).
 Treachery absorbs nighttime and taking
advantage of superior strength (Pp. vs.
Bechayda- August l992).
17) IGNOMINY- means employed or
circumstances brought about to add IGNOMINY
to the natural effects of the crime.
This is a circumstance pertaining to the moral
order, which adds disgrace and obloquy to the
material injury caused by the crime. It is akin to
the adage adding insult to injury. It produces
more suffering on account of its humiliating
 effects. Ignominy relates to moral suffering
whereas, cruelty refers to physical suffering.
Pp. vs. Torrefiel- 45 O.G. 8803- accused winding
a cogon grass around his penis before
committing rape.
U.S. vs. Iglesia- 21 Phil. 55- when the accused
raped a woman in the presence of her husband
(Pp. vs. Soriano- June 24, l983).
 18) UNLAWFUL ENTRY That the crime be
committed after an unlawful entry. There is
unlawful entry when an entrance is effected by a
way not intended for the purpose, ex. entering
through a window.
Unlawful entrance must be made for the
purpose of committing a crime like rape or
murder. But this is inherent in the crime of
Trespass To Dwelling or Robbery W/ force Upon
Things.
 Unlawful entry must be for entrance, but
not for escape.
19) BREAKING WALL, ROOF, FLOOR,
DOORS OR WINDOWS- That as a means
to the commission of a crime a wall, roof,
floor, door or window be broken.
Means for committing a crime. Inherent in
the crime of Robbery w/ Force Upon
things.
 20) AID OF MINORS/USE OF MOTOR
VEHICLES- That the crime be committed with
the aid of persons under 15 years of age or by
means of motor vehicles, motorized watercraft,
airships or other similar means-
There are two aggravating circumstances:
a) Use of minors- shows greater perversity of
the offender in taking advantage of the
youthfulness of these persons for criminal
purposes.
 b) The second is intended to meet the
problem created by modern criminals in
resorting to faster means of conveyance to
commit a crime.
Exs. a) Pp. vs. Lacsamana- 70 Phil. 517-
using a taxicab in committing robbery;
b) Pp. vs. Marasigan- 70 Phil. 583-
victim was killed in a taxi hired and used
by the accused.
 Not considered:
a) Pp. vs. Bagtas- Sept. 12, l955- in the crime of Estafa
wherein a jeep was used in carting away the property,
because Estafa was not committed by means of said
vehicle.
b) Pp. vs. Espejo 36 SCRA 400- if vehicle is used to
facilitate the escape of the accused
Other similar means refer to other means of
transportation that are similar to motor vehicles or
airships (such as scooter or motorcycles or motorized
water craft). Excluded- horse-driven carriage.

 21) CRUELTY The wrong done in the

commission of the crime is deliberately
augmented by another wrong not
necessary for its commission There is
cruelty when the culprit enjoys and
delights in making his victim suffer slowly
and gradually, causing unnecessary moral
or physical pain in the consummation of
the criminal act which he intended to
 commit (Pp. vs. Dayug- 49 Phil. 423 & Pp. vs.
Dr. Satur).
Cruelty requires deliberate prolongation of the
suffering of the victim.
U.S. vs. Oro- l9 Phil. 548- mouth and other
parts of the 11 months old baby were burned.
Pp. vs. Mariquina- 45 O.G. 6053- extracting
the left eye of the victim from its socket with a
pointed end of a cane and stuffing his mouth
with mud.
 Pp. vs. Lora- 113 SCRA 316- Gagging of the
mouth of a three year old child with stockings,
dumping him with head downward into a box,
and covering the box with sacks and other
boxes, causing slow suffocation, and as a result
the child died.
The number of wounds alone is not sufficient
to conclude cruelty. It must be clearly shown that
the same was used to prolong the agony of the
victim.
 DISTINCTION

RECIDIVISM HABITUALITY HABITUAL DELINQUENCY QUASI-RECIDIVISM

1) ACCUSED ON 1) ACC. HAS BEEN 1) ACCUSED HAS BEEN 1) ACCUSED

TRIAL PUNISHED OR CONVICTED/SERVED HIS PREVIOUSLY
2) By this time, he has SERVED HIS SENTENCE CONVICTED BY FINAL
already a conviction SENTENCE JUDGMENT

3)CRIMES OF WHICH HE 2) IST OFFENSE IS 2) WITHIN 10 YEARS 2) BEFORE BEGINNING

IS ON TRIAL ARE WITHIN
THE SAME TITLE OF THE
SAME CODE
4) CONVICTED OF THE
SECOND OFFENSE
PUNISHED OF EITHER FROM HIS LAST TO SERVE OR WHILE
EQUAL OR GREATER CONVICTION /DATE OF SERVING HIS
PEN. OR 2 OR MORE LAST RELEASE SENTENCE-
CRIMES W/C THE LAW CONVICTED FRETSeL COMMITTED ANOTHER
ATTACHES LIGHTER FELONY
PEN.
3) CONVICTED IN THE 3) FOUND GUILTY OF 4) SPECIAL
SECOND OFFENSE SAID CRIMES 3X OR AGGRAVATING CIRC.
OFTENER

5) GENERAL 4) NOT ALWAYS AGGR- 4) SPECIAL AGGRAVATING

AGGRAVATING CIRCS. DEPENDS UPON THE CIRC.- ADDL. PEN.
DISCRETION OF THE
COURT
 Examples:
1) Recidivism Robbery & Theft- Property
Homicide & Murder- Person
2) Habituality- Greater- Mal. Misch (AMa).
& Incriminating Innocent Person (AMe)
Equal Mal. Misch-AMa & Intriguing
Against Honor (AMa)
2 or more Intrig- AMe & Slander-
AMe) and Estafa - PC
 3) Habitual Del.-
Crimes- Date of Conv.-Date of Last Rel.
Theft - April, 1920 - April, l923
Rob -May, l928 - March, l935
Estafa - June, l943 - June 1950
Falsification- Jan. l951
Effects: Additional penalty:
1) 3rd conviction- PC in its med. & max.
periods;
 2) 4th conviction PM in its min. and med.
periods;
3) 5th conviction PM in its max. to RT in
its min. periods.
But in no case will the total of the two
penalties exceeds thirty (30) years ( Article
62).
4) Q-Rec. RPC- SPL ( RA 7610)
- RPC - RPC
 ARTICLE 15 -ALTERNATIVE
CIRCUMSTANCES:
ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES- are
those which must be taken into
consideration as aggravating or mitigating
according to the nature and effects of the
crime and other conditions attending its
commission. They are relationship,
intoxication and degree of instruction and
education of the offender.
 (RIDE/RIE).
1) Relationship taken into consideration when
the offended party is the spouse, ascendant,
descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted
brother or sister or relative by affinity
(SADBroSA). Step-parents and step-children are
included by analogy, similar to ascendant and
descendant (Pp. vs. Bersabal 48 Phil. 439).
But relationship between uncle and niece is not
included ( U.S. vs. Incierto 15 Phil. 358).
 Rule relative to relationship:
1) Crimes against Property- mitigating (applying
by analogy Art. 332- crimes of Theft, Swindling
and Malicious Mischief is exempting).
2) Crimes against Persons- if the offended party
is a relative of higher degree or of the same
level, relationship is aggravating; but if the
offended party is a relative of a lower degree,
relationship is mitigating. Exception- Murder,
Homicide, Serious Physical Injuries.
In crimes of Parricide- element of the crime,
hence neither mit. nor agg.
 3) Crimes against Chastity- relationship is always
aggravating, whether the offended party is of a lower or
higher degree. This is because of the nature of the crime
( Ex. Acts of Lasciviousness (Pp. vs. Marino- 143 SCAD
& Rape (RA 8353)- Pp. vs. Manhuyod, Jr. 94 SCAD).
2) Intoxication- meant that the offenders mental faculties
must be affected by drunkeness. The state of
intoxication must be proved (Pp. vs. Apduhan, Jr- 24
SCRA 798). Mere drinking of liquor prior to the
commission of the crime does not necessarily produce a
state of intoxication.
Rule: a) It is mitigating if it is not habitual or it is not
subsequent to the plan of the commission of the felony.

 B) It is aggravating- if it is habitual or
intentional.
Pp. vs. Hernandez- No. L- 3391- accused
who plotted to kill the victim, had drunk
wine in order to embolden him carrying out
with his evil plan- aggravating.
Pp. vs. Calinawan G.R. No. 21413-R- if
one is somewhat drunk at the time of the
incident for having drunk tuba- mitigating.
 To be aggravating, there must be evidence of
excessive and habitual use or specific purpose
to commit the crime by getting drunk, otherwise,
it will be mitigating (Pp. vs. Moral- 132 SCRA
474).
Pp. vs. Dumo 128 SCRA 663- The accused
cannot claim intoxication when he was able to
drive his tricycle to the place where he brought
the victim, made love to her, following which he
killed and dumped her in a well and then drove
 his vehicle back to the place where he came
from, as such conduct shows that he had
complete control of his mental faculties.
3) Degree of Instruction & Education/ Lack of
Education- whether to be considered mitigating
or aggravating, depends upon the nature of the
crime committed. It is not illiteracy alone, but the
lack of intelligence of the offender that is
considered. If one is not considered literate but
is highly or exceptionally intelligent or mentally
 alert or comes from a family of professionals, so
that he realizes the significance of his acts, there
is no mitigation.
If the crime is basically wrong, such as Parricide,
Theft or Rape- it is immaterial whether the
offender is schooled or not, because these are
forbidden by natural law.
High degree of learning is aggravating if he
takes advantage of it in the commission of the
crime. Ex. Lawyer- in the crime of Falsification or
a Doctor who kills his victim by the medicine he
prescribed.
 In the crime of Treason, the decisions
vary. In the case of Pp. vs. Marasigan 47
O.G. 3229- it was held mitigating. But in
the case of Lansanas- 82 Phil. 193- it was
considered aggravating, because love of
country is the natural feeling of every
citizen no matter how unlettered or
uncultured he may be.
 ARTICLE 16- WHO ARE
CRIMINALLY LIABLE-

A) For Grave & Less Grave Felonies:

1) Principals
2) Accomplices
3) Accessories
B) For Light Felonies:
1) Principals
2) Accomplices
 In the commission of a crime, there are
two (2) subjects:
1) Active (criminal/offender)
2) Passive ( injured party /victim).
As far as active subjects are concerned,
they must only be natural persons,
because of the highly personal nature of
the criminal responsibility :
 Reasons:
1) Because of the requirement under the
RPC that the culprit must act with personal
malice or negligence.
2) Because of the penalty of impisonment
or deprivation of liberty (destierro), as
these can only be executed upon a natural
person.
3) Only natural persons can be arrested.
 Exceptions:
1) Criminal actions directed upon the
officers of the corporation ( not against the
corp).
2) Under the Corporation Law, Public
Service Law, Securities Law and Election
Code corporations may be fined for
certain violations.
 Passive subject- State, the natural person,
juridical persons or a group.
Corpse cannot be a passive subject as he has
no more rights. Exception- under Art. 353-, the
crime of Defamation may be committed if the
imputation tends to blacken the memory of one
who is dead.
ARTICLE 17- PRINCIPALS:
1) PRINCIPAL BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION-
those who take a direct part in the execution of
the act;
 2) PRINCIPAL BY INDUCEMENT-those who
directly force or induce others to commit it; and
3) PRINCIPAL BY INDISPENSABLE
COOPERATION those who cooperate in the
commission of the offense by another act
without which it would not have been
accomplished.
A) DIRECT PARTICIPATOR- they are those
who materially execute the crime. They must
appear at the scene of the crime and perform
acts necessary in the commission of the offense
 to be liable. Ex. One who shoots at and kills
another, or one who burns the house of another.
He is the Principal by Direct Participation in the
crime of Homicide and in the crime of Arson.
When a single individual commits a crime,
there is no difficulty in determining his
participation in the commission thereof. In fact, a
single individual committing a crime is always a
Principal By Direct Participation, because he
must take direct part in the execution of the act.
 But when two or more persons are involved in
the commission of the crime, it is necessary to
determine the participation of each.
To establish conspiracy, proof of previous
agreement is not essential. What is necessary is
that the assailants are animated by one and
same purpose and that they act in concert
pursuant to the same criminal objectives (Pp. vs.
Sazon- 189 SCRA 700). In conspiracy, there is
collective criminal responsibility, as the act of
one is the act of all.
 B) INDUCER- there is a Principal By Induction or
Inducement only if it is shown that the crime was
actually committed by another who was induced
(Pp. vs. Ong Chat Lay- 60 Phil. 788).
Inducement comprises reward, promise,
command and pacto.
Regarding Induction, it is essential that :
a) it be made directly with the intention of
procuring the commission of the crime;
b) such inducement be the determining
cause of the said commission by the one
 induced (Pp. vs. De La Cruz- 97 SCRA
385). The inducement must precede the
act induced and must be so influential in
producing the criminal act that without it
the act would not have been performed.
For such act to be considered direct
inducement, it is necessary that they be as
direct, as efficacious, as powerful, as
physical or moral coercion or as violence
itself (Pp. vs. Kiichi Omine-61 Phil. 609).
 Pp. vs. Lao- 110 Phil. 643)- a wife who induced
the killing of the mistress of her husband by
giving money to the killer is a Principal by
Inducement.
If there is evidence of conspiracy, the
requisites to convict a Principal by Inducement
need not be present.
The Principal by Inducement must intend that
his inducement should be obeyed. Mere
careless comment made by one who does not
 possess dominance or moral ascendancy
over the offender will not make the former
a Principal by Inducement. To be one, the
inducers utterances must be of such a
nature and made in such a manner as to
become the determining cause of the
crime. Where the words uttered did not
make any great dominance or influence on
the offenders or is no longer necessary
 as the offenders were already determined to
commit the offending acts, the utterance will not
make the utterer an inducer (Pp. vs. Parungao-
76 SCAD).
Is there a Principal By Inducement in
Falsification of Residence Certificate?- The
person who supplied to the innocent employee
in the treasurers office the false facts to be
written on the residence certificate he was
buying is a Principal By Inducement as he was
 the one who induced the employee to
write those false facts which he supplied
(Pp. vs. Po Giok To- April 30, l966). This is
an example of a case wherein only the
Principal by Inducement is liable and the
person induced is not, as he acted without
malice or criminal intent, aside from the
fact that there was no conspiracy between
the inducer and the induced.
 Kill him and we will bury him an imprudent
utterance said in the excitement of the boss or in
the heat of anger and not in the nature of a
command that had to be obeyed, does not make
the utter a Principal by Inducement (Pp. vs.
Agapinay- 186 SCRA 812).
Principal who directly forces others to commit
a crime- if the force employed is irresistible or is
caused by an uncontrollable fear, only the one
employing it is liable as the executor is exempt
 under pars. 5 and 6 of Article 12 (Pp. vs. Sia and
U.S. vs. Caballeros).
C) INDISPENSABLE COOPERATOR there
must be immediate participation in the criminal
design of the Principal by Direct Participation by
an act without which the crime would not have
been committed. The cooperation of this
principal is by an act indispensable to the
commission of the felony.
 To cooperate means to desire or wish in
common a thing. The common purpose does not
necessarily mean previous understanding, for it
can be inferred from the circumstances of each
case (Pp. vs. Aplegido, et al 76 Phil. 571).
Ex. If an employee of a bank in connivance
with a depositor placed in his initials on the
check in connivance of the depositor drawn
against the bank knowing that there were no
 sufficient funds, the employee is a Principal By
Indispensable Cooperation. The act of initialing
the check is indispensable to the act of
defraudation as without it the check would not be
encashed (U.S. vs. Lim Buanco 14 Phil. 484).
Pp. vs. Labis- 21 SCRA 875- by holding the
deceased from behind in such a manner that the
latter could not move and while thus being held
by the co-accused, the other accused stabbed
 the deceased, the co-accused, performed an act
without which the crime would not have been
accomplished which makes him a Principal by
Indispensable Cooperation.
Pp. vs. Tigalo, et al Nov. 7, l979- where one
of the accused removed the panties of the
offended party and held her feet while the sexual
act was performed by the other accused, the first
accused is a Principal By Indispensable
Cooperation considering the extent of his
cooperation.
 The participation of the cooperator must
be indispensable to the commission of the
crime. If his participation is not
indispensable, that is, with or without his
participation, the offense will be
committed, the liability may only be that of
an accomplice. In the case of Pp. vs.
Sotto- March l996- the pumpboat owner
who helped the offenders by pretending
that his pumpboat needed towing by the
 passing boat of the victims was held to be
merely an accomplice. Here, the offenders
transferred to the boat of the victims and later
robbed and killed them. The court ruled that the
offenders could have asked for the help of other
pumpboat owners.
A Principal By Indispensable Cooperation may
be a conspirator under the doctrine of implied
conspiracy (Subayco vs. Sandiganbayan).
 ARTICLE 18- ACCOMPLICES

Accomplices- are those persons who, not being

included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution
of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
Under this provision, a person is considered as
an accomplice if his role in the perpetration of
the crime is of a minor character (Pp. vs.
Fronda- May l993- 41 SCAD).
Two elements are required:
1) He takes part in the execution of the
crime by previous or simultaneous acts; and
2) He intends to take part in the commission
of the crime.
In the case of accomplices, there is
no conspiracy. An accomplice has
knowledge of the criminal design of
the principal and all that he does is
to concur with the latter in his
purpose, by cooperating in the
execution of the crime by previous
or simultaneous act, for the
 for the purpose of supplying material or moral
aid to the principal in an efficacious way (Pp. vs.
Fronda-supra). Mere presence does not by itself
constitute a simultaneous act of cooperation
sufficient to make one an accomplice.
In some exceptional situations, having
community of design with the principal does not
prevent a malefactor from being regarded as an
accomplice if his role in the perpetration of the
homicide or murder was, relatively speaking,

 of a minor character. Since the participation is

not absolutely indispensable to the
consummation of the murder, the rule that the
court should favor the milder form of liability may
be applied (Pp. vs. Nierra, et al 96 SCRA 1;
Pp. vs. San Miguel, et al July 31, l981; Pp. vs.
Medrano 114 SCRA 335).
A relation must exist therefore, between the
act of the principal and that committed by the
accomplice. (Pp. vs. Tamayo). It is essential
 that the accomplice must have known of the
criminal design of the principal and he thereby
cooperates knowingly or intentionally by an act
which even though not rendered, the crime
would be committed just the same.
Examples:
1) Pp. vs. Lingad 51 O.G. 6191- the driver
of the taxicab knowing that his co-accused were
going to commit robbery permitted them to use
the taxicab in going to the place where the
robbery was committed is an accomplice;
 2) Pp. vs. Suarez- 267 SCRA; Pp. vs. De
Vera- August l999-119 SCAD- a lookout
who was not part of the conspiracy but
participated only after such decision was
reached incurs criminal liability as an
accomplice since he is merely an
instrument of the crime who cooperates
after the decision to commit the same had
already been made;
 3). Pp. vs. Chua Huy- 87 Phil. 258- one is an
accomplice in the crime of Kidnapping if he
guarded the detained person to prevent him
from escaping;
4) Pp. vs. Moral 132 SCRA 474- after some of
the accused had already delivered fatal blows
upon the victim, subsequent infliction of a wound
by the other accused would make him only an
accomplice, as he did not inflict the fatal wound;
 5) Pp. vs. Vicente, et al May 21, l969-
where the acts of one of the accused in
inflicting wounds upon the victim several
times with a small knife and after the latter
had fallen down seriously if not already
dead, is not necessary and indispensable
in the consummation of the criminal
assault but merely a show off or an
expression of sympathy or feeling of
camaraderie with the other co-accused;
 6) Pp. vs. Doble- 114 SCRA 131- where the
participation of the two accused were limited
only to looking for a banca, despite knowledge
that they would use this in the crime of Robbery,
because the Robbery could still be committed
even without this participation.
Accomplices are also known as Accessories
Before the Fact. Any doubt as to the
participation of an individual in the commission
of the crime, is always resolved in favor of a
lesser
 responsibility (Pp. vs. Abiog- Oct. 31,
l961). The complicity which is penalized
requires a certain degree of cooperation,
whether moral, through advice,
encouragement, or agreement or material,
through external acts.
Both the principal and the accomplice
act before or during the commission of the
crime.
 ARTICLE 19- ACCESSORIES
Accessories are those who, having knowledge
of the commission of the crime, and without
having participated therein, either as principals
or accomplices, take part subsequent to its
commission in any of the following manners:
1) By profiting themselves or assisting the
offender to profit by the effects of the crime;
2) By concealing or destroying the body of the
crime, or its effects or instruments thereof, in
order to prevent its discovery;
 3) By harboring, concealing, or assisting in
the escape of the principal of the crime,
provided the accessory acts with abuse of
his public functions or whenever the
author of the crime is guilty of Treason,
Parricide, Murder, or an attempt to take
the life of the Chief Executive, or is known
to be habitually guilty of some other crime.
 All the acts specified in Article 19 :
are performed by the accessory after the
commission of the crime. An accessory does not
participate in the criminal design nor cooperate
in the commission of the crime (Pp. vs. Verzola-
80 SCRA 600). Mere knowledge or
acquiescence to, or approval of the act, without
cooperation, is not enough to make one liable
for conspiracy.
There is no accessory if the crime committed is
light.

 A) Profiting from the effects of the

crime:
Any person who received any property from another, and
used it, knowing that the same property is stolen, is
guilty as an accessory.
Exs:
1). Taer vs. CA- 186 SCRA 598- Taers act of
employing the two carabaos in his farm, knowing these
to be stolen, is an act of profiting by the object of Theft;
2) U.S. vs. Galanco- 1 Phil 672- a person who
received from another property which he knew to have
been stolen, and sold it, and gave the proceeds to the
thief, is an accessory after the fact.

 Take note however, of Presidential Decree

No. 1612- Anti-Fencing Law- If one
engages in the buy and sell, deals or
possesses goods which he knows or
should have known are proceeds of the
crime of Robbery or Theft, he will be liable
not as Accessory After the Fact, but for the
offense of Violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law.
 B) Concealing or destroying the
body of the crime:
The body of the crime refers to the corpus delicti
and not necessarily to the corpse. It is the
specific offense in fact committed by someone. It
means the substance of the crime and in its
primary sense refers to the fact that a crime has
actually been committed ( Pp. vs. Marquez- 43
O.G. 5).
This is a compound fact made up of two
things: 1) the existence of a certain act or result
forming the basis of the criminal charge; and
 2) the existence of a criminal agency as the
cause of this act or result.
Otherwise stated, its elements are:
a) proof of the occurrence of a certain
event; and
b) some persons criminal responsibility
(Pp. vs. Boco- June l999, l07 SCAD).
Exs. of a body of the crime- In the prosecution
for drug sale- an illegal sale of the regulated
drug; in Murder- its the killing of the victim.
 Examples:
1) Pp. vs. Saladino- May 30, l961- placing a
weapon in the hands of the deceased after he
was killed to make it appear that he was armed
and it was necessary to kill him for having
offered resistance to the authorities;
2) U.S. vs. Leal- 1 Phil. 118- assisting in the
burial of the body of the victim of a homicide to
prevent its discovery;
3) Pp. vs. Galleto 78 Phil. 820- mere act of a
person of carrying the cadaver of one unlawfully
killed to be buried, to prevent its discovery.
 C) Assisting the principal to
escape:
There are two classes of accessories contemplated
under this par.
a) Public officers who harbor, conceal or assist in the
escape of the principal of any crime (not light felony) with
abuse of public functions;
Requisites:
1) the accessory is a public officer;
2) he harbors, conceals or assists in the escape
of the principal;
3) the public officer acts with abuse of his public
functions; and
4) the crime committed by the principal is not a
light felony.
 Examples:
1) U.S. vs. Yacat- 1 Phil.433- a Mayor who
refused to prosecute the offender, making it
possible for him to escape; and
2) Pp. vs. Antonio- July 2000, l64 SCAD- a
police officer who was present when the crime
was committed abused his official function when
he failed to effect the immediate arrest of the
offender and conduct a speedy investigation of
the crime committed, thus assisting the offender
to escape.
 B) Private persons who harbor, conceal or assist in the
escape of the author of the crime- guilty of Treason,
Parricide, Murder or an attempt on the life of the
President, or one who is habitually guilty of some other
crimes.
Requisites:
1) the accessory is a private person;
2) he harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of
the author of the crime;
3) the crime committed by the principal is either, a)
Treason; b) Parricide; c) Murder; d) an attempt against
the life of the Pres.; or e) that the principal is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crimes.
 Examples:

1) Pp. vs. Talingdan- 84 SCRA 19- the accused,

who was present when her husband was shot,
did not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal to
anyone what the latter knew, but also threatened
that she would kill her if she would tell it to
somebody, and when the police officers
conducted the investigation, the wife claimed
that she had no suspects in mind;
2) U.S. vs. Calapag-21 Phil. 262- a person who,
when asked by the police officers gave false
information
 regarding the whereabouts of a person who was
guilty of murder in order for the latter to escape;
3) Pp. vs. Realon- 95 SCRA 107- when one of
the accused witnesses the principal fired at the
victim and then he ran with him when the latter
fled from the scene of the crime and while in
flight, the principal passed the fatal gun to him,
who in turn dumped the gun inside a garbage
can, it was held that he assisted the principal to
escape and conceal the instrument used in the
commission of the crime, he is an accessory.
 Effects of Acts of Accessoryship:
The responsibility of an accessory is subordinate to
that of the principal in a crime because the accessorys
participation is subsequent to its commission and it is
essential that it should be established that a crime is
committed by the principal (Pp. vs. Ong To ke- April 21,
l956) and his guilt is directly related to that of the
principal. So, if the principal is acquitted because the
facts alleged to have been committed are not proved or
do not constitute a crime, the accessory is not liable
(U.S. vs. Mendoza- 23 Phil. 194). But if the principal is
acquitted because of exempting circumstance, the
accessory is still liable.
 Rule:
1) Pp. vs. Billon 48 O.G. 1391- as long as the crime has been
committed, even if the principal has not been arrested and
convicted, the accessory may be held liable. This is so, as Art. 19
does not require the conviction of the principal. (Spanish text shall
prevail over the English text).
2) Pp. vs. Barlam April 15, l953- this principle does not apply to
par. 3, where the principal was not tried nor was final judgment
rendered against him because par. 3 requires that the crime be
proven as well as the identity of the author thereof.
3) Pp. vs. Inovera- 65 O.G. 3168/ Pp. vs. Nueva- Feb. 16, l976- the
CA overruled the Barlam ruling and reverted back to Billon doctrine-
stating that: whether the principal is brought to court or is at large,
the prosecution has to prove the commission of the crime charged,
with the same quantum of evidence, and the participation in it of all
the persons named in the information. The accessory is accorded
the opportunity to refute the evidence of the prosecution establishing
 the crime and the participation of the alleged
principal.
If a separate case is filed against the principal
and another against the accessory, the
arraignment, trial and conviction of the
accessory, without the principal having been first
tried and convicted is not proper and violation of
the legal system of procedural orderliness ( Pp.
vs. Gaw Lin- 63 O.G. 3820). Such will not
happen now in view of the provision of
consolidation of cases involving similar issues or
parties, under the Rev. Rules on Crim. Proc.
 Distinguish accomplice from principal in general
an accomplice is one who does not take a
direct part in the commission of the act, who
does not force or induce others to commit it, or
who does not cooperate in the commission of
the crime by another act without which it would
not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in
the execution of the act by previous or
simultaneous actions (Pp. vs. Silvestre- 56 Phil.
353).
 Distinguish accomplice from principal by cooperation
the participation of the offender in a case of complicity,
although necessary, is not indispensable as in the case
of a co-principal by cooperation.
Distinguish an accomplice from a principal by direct
participation:
1) in both, there is community of design;
2) as to the acts performed, there is no clear cut
distinction between the acts of the accomplice and those
of the principal by direct participation, that is why in case
of doubt, it shall be resolved in favor of lesser
responsibility, that of a mere accomplice;
 3) between or among the principals, there must
be conspiracy, but between principals and the
accomplices, there is no conspiracy.
Distinction between accomplice and accessory:
Accomplice - Accessory
1)When-participates before - takes part
or during the commis- subsequent
sion of the offense to the commission
offense
 2) Knowledge knows the - knows of the
criminal design of commission
the principal of the offense
3) Acts-provides material - acts in 3
or moral aid in an ways in Art.
efficacious way 19
but not in a man-
ner indispensable
to the offense.
 4) Liability No exemption - Some acces-
from liability. sories are
exempted
under Art. 20
of the Code.
ARTICLE 20- Accessories who are
exempt from criminal liability:
- the penalties prescribed for accessories
shall not be imposed upon those who are
such with respect to their spouse,
ascendants, descendants, legitimate,
natural and adopted brothers and sisters,
or relatives by affinity within the same
degree, with the single exception of
accessories falling within the provisions of
par. 1 of the next preceding article.
(SADBROSA).
 SADBROSA- are exempted as accessories as provided
under Art. 19, except if they profit from the crime or
assist the offender to profit by the effects of the crime.
When the relatives assist the principal by concealing or
destroying the body of the crime or by assisting the
escape of the principal, the law recognizes that they are
doing so because they are motivated by their natural
affection for the offender. They acted due to blood or
immediate relationship and not for material gain or profit.
However, when they profit or assist the offender in
profiting by the effects of the crime, the law believes that
they are doing so because of greed and not because of
filial affection.
 The exemption provided for under this
article is based on the ties of blood and
the preservation of the cleanliness of ones
name, which compels one to conceal
crimes committed by relatives so near as
those mentioned in this article.
( Nephew or niece not included
among such relatives).
 If a peace officer who is related to the principal helped
him to escape, he will be liable for dereliction of duty
under Art. 208 (RPC), for failing to prosecute.
ARTICLE 21- Penalties- No felony shall be punishable
by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its
commission.
Penalty is the suffering that is inflicted by the State
for the transgression of a law.
Penalties are the punishment imposed by lawful
authority upon a person who commits a deliberate or
negligent act (Pp. vs. Moran- 44 Phil. 431).
In its general sense, penalty signifies pain; in its
juridical sphere, penalty means suffering undergone,
 because of the action of society, by one who
commits a crime. Hence, penalty is imposed
only after a conviction in a criminal action.
Nature of system of penalties:
1) Rigid- its rigidity lies in the classification of
penalties;
2) Elastic- its elasticity lies in the range of each
class, period or degree. This is further enlarged
by the Law of Indeterminate Sentence.
 Juridical conditions of penalty:
1) Must be productive of suffering but the limit is the
integrity of human personality;
2) Must be proportionate to the crime in the sense that
different penalties are prescribed for different felonies;
3) Must be personal as it must be imposed only upon
the criminal and no other;
4) Must be legal as it must be the consequence of a
judgment according to law;
5) Must be certain so that one cannot escape from it;
6) Must be equal in the sense that it applies to all
persons regardless of circumstances;
7) Must be correctional.
 Purpose of the State in punishing crimes- for justice,
because the State has an existence of its own to
maintain, a conscience to assert and moral principles to
be vindicated. Penal justice rests primarily on the moral
rightfulness of the punishment imposed.
Theories justifying penalty:
1) Absolute theory an act of retributive justice, a
vindication of absolute right and moral law violated by
the criminal.
2) Relative theory-
a) Prevention to prevent or suppress the danger
to the state arising from crimes;
 b) Self-defense- to protect society from wrong
or threat inflicted by the offender;
c) Reformation- to correct and reform the
offender;
d) Exemplary to deter others from
committing crimes;
e) Justice that crime must be punished by
the State as an act of retributive justice, a
vindication of absolute right and moral law
violated by the criminal.
 The penalty under this Code has three-fold purpose:
1) Retribution or expiation penalty is commensurate
with the gravity of the offense;
2) Correction or reformation- as shown by the rules
which regulates the execution of the penalties consisting
in deprivation of liberty;
3) Social defense- shown by its inflexible severity to
recidivists and habitual delinquents.
Social defense and exemplarity justify the penalty of
death. When a person has proved himself to be a
dangerous enemy of society, the latter protect itself from
such enemy by taking his life in retribution for his offense
and as an example and warning to others (Pp. vs.
Carillo- 85 Phil. 611).
 Who has the power to impose penalties?
Penalties are prescribed by statutes and are
essentially and exclusively legislative. Judges
can only interpret and apply them and have no
authority to modify them or revise their range as
determined exclusively by the legislature ( Pp.
vs. Dela Cruz- Dec. 1992).
What penalties may be imposed upon an
offender? only those which have been
prescribed by law prior to its commission. Unless
there is a law penalizing an act or omission, that
act or omission cannot be penalized, no matter
 how reprehensible it may be. Nullum
crimen, nulla poena sine lege.

ARTICLE 22- RETROACTIVE EFFECT

OF PENAL LAWS- Penal laws shall have
a retroactive effect as long as it is
favorable to the accused, who is not a
habitual criminal.
 ARTICLE 24- Measures of
prevention or safety w/c are not
considered penalties
1) The arrest and temporary detention of
accused persons, as well as their detention by
reason of insanity or imbecility, or illness
requiring their confinement in a hospital.
2) The commitment of a minor to any of the
institutions mentioned in Art. 80 and for the
purpose specified therein (repealed).
3) Suspension from the employment or public
office during the trial or in order to institute the
proceedings.
 4) Fines and other corrective measures which, in
the exercise of their administrative or disciplinary
powers, superior officials may impose upon their
subordinates.
5) Deprivation of rights and the reparations
which the civil law may establish in penal form.
Preventive suspension- (Santiago vs.
Sandiganbayan- April 2001- is not a penalty, as
it is not imposed as a result of a judicial procs. It
is only intended to remove her from office
temporarily while the case is on-going.
 Deprivation of rights- deprivation of parental
authority on statutory grounds.
Preventive measures take place before
conviction, while corrective measures are
imposed not in criminal cases. So, a fine
imposed by the superior over his subordinate in
the exercise of administrative authority is a
corrective measure. But a fine imposed upon an
offender by the court after conviction is a
penalty.
 3 Scales of pen. in the Code and
their significance:
1) Article 25 - classifies the penalties into
principal and accessories.
2) Article 70 - provides for the scale when there
are two or more sentences to be served,
including the three-fold rule.
3) Article 71- graduates the penalties into the
order of its severity for purposes of applying the
rules under Article 61 in rel. to Arts. 50-57 (pen.
imposable on principal, accomplices,
accessories for consummated, frustrated and
attempted felonies.
Classification of penalties under the
RPC (Art. 25)
A) Principal-that provided by law for a felony and
that which is imposed by the court upon
conviction (ex. Prision Mayor for Falsification
under Art. 171).
B) Accessory- that deemed included in the
imposition of the principal penalty ( in the
conviction of Falsification, the accompanying
accessory penalty is perpetual disqualification to
hold public office).
Classification of principal penalties
1) According to their divisibility:
a) Indivisible- those which have no
fixed duration & no periods- ex. Death, RP
& Public Censure;
b) Divisible with fixed duration and
have three periods- min., med. and max.
(ex. Prision Mayor ).
 2) According to their gravity:
a) Capital- Death
b) Afflictive- Reclusion Temporal
c) Correctional Arresto Mayor
d) Light- Public Censure
3) According to subject matter:
a) Deprivation of freedom- RP
b) Restriction of freedom Destierro
c) Deprivation of rights suspension
d) Pecuniary fine
 Classification of Penalties
(based on gravity)-Art. 25
1) Capital Death
2) Afflictive Reclusion Perpetua
Reclusion Temporal
Perpetual or Temporary
Absolute Disqualification
Perpetual or Temporary
Special Disqualification
Prision Mayor
 3) Correctional- Prision Correccional
Arresto Mayor
Suspension
Destierro
4) Light Arresto Menor
Public Censure
Penalties common to the preceeding
classes: Fine and Bond To keep Peace
 Accessory Penalties
1) Perpetual or Temporary Absolute
Disqualification
2) Perpetual or Temporary Special
Disqualification
3) Suspension from public office, right to vote
and be voted upon, profession of calling
4) Civil Interdiction
5) Indemnification
6) Forfeiture or confiscation of instrument &
proceeds of the offense
7) Payment of costs
 What penalties may either be Principal or
Accessories?
1) Perpetual or Temporary Absolute
Disqualification
2) Perpetual or Temporary Special
Disqualification
3) Suspension ( if this is the penalty
provided in the RPC for the offense, then it is a
principal penalty; if not, it is only an accessory
penalty).
Article 78- When and how a penalty
to be executed-
No penalty shall be executed except by
virtue of a final judgment.
A penalty shall not be executed in any
other form than that prescribed by law, nor
with any other circumstances or incidents
than those expressly authorized thereby.
In addition to the provisions of the law,
special regulations prescribed for the
government of the institutions in which the
 penalties are to be suffered shall be observed
with regard to the character of the work to be
performed, the time of its performance, and
other incidents connected therewith, the
relations of the convicts among themselves and
other persons, the relief which they may receive,
and their diet.
The regulations shall make provision for the
separation of sexes in different institutions, or at
least into different depts. and also for the
correction and reform of the convicts.
 In the imposition of the penalty, the courts
are duty bound to use the legal
terminology, because the different kinds of
penalties (reclusion perpetua, reclusion
temporal, prision mayor, etc. ) have
different corresponding legal accessories
and effects ( Pp. vs. Mobe- 81 Phil. 58).
 1) Death Penalty
Article 47- The death penalty shall be
imposed in all cases in which it must be
imposed under existing laws, except when
the guilty person is below 18 years of age
at the time of the commission of the crime
or is more than 70 years of age or when
upon appeal or automatic review of the
case by the Supreme Court, the required
majority vote is not obtained for the
 imposition of the death penalty, in which cases
the penalty shall be Reclusion Perpetua.
In all cases where the death penalty is
imposed by the trial court, the records shall be
forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic
review and judgment by the court en banc,
within 20 days but not earlier than 15 days after
promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial
of any motion for new trial or reconsideration.
The transcript shall also be forwarded within
 10 days after the filing thereof by the
stenographic reporter.
What is a capital offense- it is an offense, which
under the law existing at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application to
be admitted to bail, may be punished by death,
although a lower penalty than death may be
imposed after conviction (Pp. vs. Marcos- G.R.
No. L-47388).
 Old law- death penalty is through
electrocution. But Section 19 (1) of Article
III of the l987 Constitution clearly provides
that the death penalty shall not be
imposed unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it and, if already
imposed, shall be reduced to Reclusion
Perpetua.
 Death penalty, however, was reimposed under
Republic Act No. 7659, which took effect on
Dec. 31, l993 (15 days after its publication on
Dec. 16, l993- Pp. vs. Godoy Dec. 1995).
Article 81( as am by RA 8177)- When and how
the death penalty is to be executed- The death
sentence shall be executed with preference to
any other penalty and shall consist in putting the
person under sentence to death by lethal
injection. The death sentence shall be executed
 under the authority of the Director of the Bureau
of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to
mitigate the sufferings of the person under the
sentence during the lethal injection as well as
during the proceedings prior to the execution.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections
shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection
to be administered is sufficient to cause the
instantaneous death of the convict.
 Pursuant to this, all personnel involved in the
administration of lethal injection shall be trained
prior to the performance of such task.
The authorized physician of the Bureau of
Corrections, after thorough examination, shall
officially make a pronouncement of the convicts
death and shall certify thereto in the records of
the Bureau of Corrections.
The death sentence shall be carried out not
 earlier than one (1) year nor later than
eighteen (18) months after the judgment
has become final and executory without
prejudice to the exercise by the President
of his executive clemency powers at all
times.
What is the constitutional policy on
penalty as a whole? It is that no excessive
 fines or cruel or inhuman punishment is meted.
The counterpart of Sec. 19 (1) in the l935
Constitution reads: Excessive fines shall not be
imposed, nor cruel and inhuman punishment
inflicted. In the l973 Constitution, the phrase
became cruel or unusual punishment. The Bill
of Rights Committee of the l986 Constitutional
Commission read the l973 modification as
prohibiting unusual punishment even if not
cruel. It was thus seen as an obstacle to
 experimentation in penology.
Consequently, the Committee reported out
the present text which prohibits cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment as
more consonant with the meaning desired
and with jurisprudence on the subject
(Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice
October l998- 100 SCAD).
 Is Death penalty violative of this
policy?
No. Now it is a well-settled in
jurisprudence that the death penalty per se
is not cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment. In the oft-cited case of
Harden vs. Director of Prisons, this court
held that punishment are cruel when they
involve torture or a lingering death; but
the punishment of death is not cruel, within
the meaning of that word as used in the
 Constitution. It implies something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life ( supra). Any infliction of
pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in
carrying out the execution of the death penalty.
The court which designates the date of
execution is the trial court which convicted the
accused, that is, after the SC has reviewed the
entire records of the case and has affirmed the
judgment of the lower court. The procedure is
that the judgment is entered fifteen (15) days
 after its promulgation, and ten (10) days
thereafter, the records are remanded to the
court below including a certified true copy of the
judgment for execution.
As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the
implementing rules, in conjunction with Sec. 1 of
RA 8177, provides that death sentence shall be
carried out not earlier than one (1) year nor
later than eighteen (18) months after the
judgment has become final and executory,
 without prejudice to the exercise by the
President of his clemency powers at all
times. Hence, the death convict is in
effect assured of 18 months from the time
the judgment imposing the death penalty
has became final and executory wherein
he can seek executive clemency and
attend to all his temporal or spiritual
affairs.
 In accordance with Sec. 25 of RA 7659,
amending Art. 83 of the RPC, upon finality
of the Decision, the records of the case
shall be forwarded to the Office of the
President for possible exercise of the
pardoning powers (Pp. vs. Victor- July
1998, 95 SCAD).
 Article 82-Notification & execution
of the sentence-
The court shall designate a working day
for the execution, but not the hour thereof,
and such designation shall not be
communicated to the offender before
sunrise of said day, and the execution
shall not take place until after the
expiration of at least 8 hours following the
notification, but before sunset. During the
interval between the notification and the
 execution, the culprit shall, insofar as possible,
be furnished such assistance as he may request
in order to be attended in his last moments by
priests or ministers of the religion he professes
and to consult lawyers, as well as in order to
make a will and confer with members of his
family or person in charge of the management of
his business, of the administration of his
property, or of the care of his descendants.
 Article 84- Place of Execution &
persons who may witness the
same.
The execution shall take place in the
penitentiary or Bilibid in a place closed to
the public view and shall be witnessed
only by the priests assisting the offender
and by his lawyers and by his relatives,
not exceeding six, if he so requests, by the
physician and the necessary personnel of
the penal establishment, and by such
persons as the Director of Prisons may
authorize.
 Article 85-Burial
Unless claimed by his family, the corpse
of the culprit shall, upon completion of the
legal proceedings subsequent to the
execution, be turned over to the institute of
learning or scientific research first applying
for it, for the purpose of study and
investigation, provided that such institute
shall take charge of the decent burial of
the remains. Otherwise, the Director of
 Prisons shall order the burial of the body
of the culprit at government expense,
granting permission to be present thereat
to the members of the family of the culprit
and the friends of the latter. In no case
shall the burial of the body of a person
sentenced to death be held with pomp
(viol. of this prov. constitutes Public
Disturbance under Art. 153, RPC).
 Arts. 47 & 83- Cases in w/c death
pen. be not imposed:
1) If the guilty person is over 70 years. If
over 70, he shall be sentenced to RP or
life imprisonment (Pp. vs. Del Mundo -114
SCRA 719);
2) If the death penalty is imposed by the
lower court is not affirmed by ten but not
less than eight justices of the Supreme
Court, in which case, the death penalty is
lowered to RP or life imprisonment; and
 3) If the offender is a minor under 18 years of
age at the time of the commission of the felony
(Art. 68, as amended by RA 9344). Even without
this provision, minors cannot be imposed the
death penalty as this is a privileged mitigating
circumstance.
4) When the death penalty is by operation of law
such as in the case of Qualified Theft where the
penalty is two degrees higher, because death
 penalty is imposed only in heinous crimes and
for those where it is expressly prescribed and
Qualified Theft is not a heinous crime.
Suspension of the execution of death penalty:
1) Upon a pregnant woman or within one year
after delivery. But not her pecuniary liability ( Art.
83);
2) When the convict shall become insane or
imbecile after final judgment ( Art. 79).
 Article 40- Death penalty if implemented,
no accessory penalty. But if not executed
by reason of commutation pr pardon, it
shall carry the accessory penalty of
Perpetual Absolute Disqualification and
that of Civil Interdiction during the 30 years
following the date of sentence, unless
such accessory penalties are expressly
remitted in the pardon.
 Article 30- Effects of Perpetual or Temporary
Absolute Disqualification:
1) Deprivation of the public offices and
employments which the offender may have held,
even if conferred by popular election.
2) Deprivation of the right to vote in any
election for any popular elective office or to be
elected to such office.
3) Disqualification for the offices or public
employments and for the exercise of any of the
rights mentioned.
 ( In case of temporary disqualification, such as
nos. 2 & 3, these will only last during the term of
the sentence).
4) Loss of right to retirement pay or other
pension for any office formerly held.
Article 34- Civil Interdiction deprives the
offender during the time of his sentence the
rights of parental authority, or guardianship,
either as to the person or property of any ward,
 or marital authority, of the right to manage his
property and of the right to dispose of such
property by any act or any conveyance inter
vivos.
Under Art. 38 of the New Civil Code, civil
interdiction is one of the restrictions on capacity
to act but does not exempt the offender from
certain obligations, as when the latter arise from
his act or from property relations.
 A person civilly interdicted cannot appoint an agent to
manage his property, as the act of the agent is also the
act of the principal. By acting, through an agent, the
civilly interdicted person is doing indirectly what the law
prohibits to be done directly.
But he can prepare his last will and testament, for what
the law prohibits is the disposition of his property inter
vivos. The will does not dispose of his property at the
time of its making, but at the time of his death, subject to
compliance of legal requirements under the laws on
succession and Rules of Court.
 On June 24, 2006, however, Congress
passed Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting
the imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines. So, as of this time, the highest
penalty that the court can impose upon a
convicted person, is only Reclusion
Perpetua, even if the law penalizing the
act imposed the death penalty.
 2) Article 27-a) Reclusion
Perpetua-
- 20 years and 1 day to 40 years
- Before RP has no fixed duration, but when RA
7659 was passed (Sec. 17), said penalty was
given the above-stated fixed duration. While this
is so, there was no clear legislative intent to alter
its original classification as an indivisible penalty,
because if such was the intention, then Art. 63 of
the RPC would have lost its reason and the
basis of its existence. If Congress had intended
to do so, then it should have amended Art. 63
and Art. 76 and other provisions of the RPC
 involving RP, such as Art. 41 on the accessory
penalties thereof and pars. 2 and 3 of Art. 61,
which have not been touched by a
corresponding amendment (Pp. vs. Lucas Jan.
l995- 58 SCAD).
( Art. 63- Rules for the application of indivisible
penalties- ex. pen. is single indivisible penalty
RP- despite presence of mit. or agg. cirs., said
penalty has to be imposed)
( Art. 61- Rules of graduating penalties- ex. If
the imposable pen.is single and indivisible, the
next pen. lower by one degree is RT.)
What was the reason for giving RP
a fixed duration?
It was said in Pp. vs. Reyes (Aug.l992) decided
prior to RA 7659, that penalties in the RPC as
set out in ARTS. 25, 70 and 71, RP is the
penalty next higher to RT. It follows by
necessary implication that the minimum of RP is
20 years and 1 day and with a maximum
duration thereafter to last for the rest of the
convicts natural life although pursuant to Art. 70,
it appears that the maximum period for the
service of penalties shall not exceed 40 years. It
would be legally absurd and violative of the
 scales of penalties in the RPC to reckon the
minimum of RP at 30 years since there would be
a resultant lacuna whenever the penalty
exceeds the maximum of 20 years of RT but is
less than 30 yeas. Sec. 21 of RA 7659 merely
restated the existing jurisprudence.
Any penalty exceeding 20 years is within the
RP range.
Any person sentenced to 22 years of RP is
not entitled to bail pending appeal- (Sec. 3, Rule
114, Rev. Rules of Court).
 Reclusion Perpetua under Article 70
entails imprisonment of at least 30 years.
This, however, does not mean that he will
be set free after serving for 30 years. This
only mean that after serving the said
number of years, he becomes eligible for
pardon (Pp. vs. Dela Penal- July , l997-85
SCAD) or for the application of the three-
fold rule (pp. vs. Tena- Oct. l992).
 What is the purpose of the law in
prescribing RP?
The intendment of the law is that a person
condemned to undergo the penalty of RP shall
remain in prison perpetually, or for the rest of his
natural life. However, he becomes eligible for
pardon by the Chief Executive after he shall
have been imprisoned for at least 30 years,
unless he is deemed unworthy of such pardon.
There is no automatic review of the penalty of
RP. If the accused did not file an appeal, then
the decision becomes final and unappealable
(Garcia vs. Pp., Nov. l99- ll5 SCAD).
 Article 41- Accessory penalties for
Reclusion Perpetua- Civil Interdiction for
life or during the period of the sentence as
the case may be, and that of Perpetual
Absolute Disqualification which the
offender shall suffer even though
pardoned as to the principal penalty,
unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon.
 b) Reclusion Temporal-
- 12 years and one (1) day to 20 years
(Divisible penalty):
Maximum 17 years, 4 mos. & 1 day to
20 years;
Medium 14 years, 8 mos. & 1 day to
17 years and 4 mos.
Minimum 12 years & 1 day to 14 years
and 8 mos.
 Accessory penalty for RT- same as RP
Article 41.- Civil Interdiction for life or
during the period of the sentence, and that
of Perpetual Absolute Disqualification
which the offender shall suffer even tho
pardoned as to the principal penalty,
unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted.
 c) Prision Mayor & Temporary
Disqualification
- 6 years and 1 day to 12 years-(divisible)
Max.period 10 years & 1 day to 12 years
Medium per.- 8 years & 1 day to 10 years
Minimum per. 6 years & 1 day to 8 years
(Temporary disqualification absolute or
special)
As to the penalty of disqualification this is the
range if imposed as principal penalty, but if
imposed as an accessory penalty its duration
shall be that of the principal penalty.
 Accesory penalty of Prision Mayor Article 42-
Temporary Special Disqualification and that of
Perpetual Special Disqualification from the right
of suffrage, altho pardoned, unless the same
shall have been remitted.
Bernabe vs. Memoracion- August l997-85 SCAD
the judge was wrong when he described 12
yrs., 5 mos. & 11 days as medium period of
Prision Mayor, because the med. per. is 8 yrs. &
1 day to 10 yrs.
 d) Prision Correccional,
Suspension & Destierro
- 6 months and 1 day to 6 years (divisible)
Max. period 4 years, 2 mos. & 1 day to 6
years;
Med. period- 2 years, 4 mos. & 1 day to 4 years,
2 mos.;
Min. period 6 mos. & 1 day to 2 years, 4 mos.
As to Suspension, this is the range if imposed as
a principal penalty, but if imposed as an
accessory penalty, then its duration shall be that
of the principal.
 Article 87- Destierro Any person sentenced to
Destierro shall not be permitted to enter the
place or places designated in the sentence, nor
within the radius therein specified, which shall
not be more than 250 and not less than 25
kilometers from the place designated.
Pp. vs. Jesus 80 Phil.- if the convict enters the
prohibited are, he commits Evasion of Service of
Sentence.
 Article 43- Accessory pen. of Prision
Correccional Suspension from Public
Office, Right to Follow a Profession or
Calling, & Perpetual Special
Disqualification from the Right of Suffrage,
if the duration of said imprisonment shall
exceed 18 mos. The offender shall suffer
the disqualification altho pardoned as to
the principal penalty, unless the same
shall have been remitted in the pardon.
 e) Arresto Mayor
- 1 month and 1 day to 6 months (div)-
Max. per. 4 mos. & 1 day to 6 mos.
Med. per. 2 mos. & 1 day to 4 mos.
Min. per. - 1 mo. & 1 day to 2 months
Accessory penalties- Article 44-
Suspension of the Right to Hold Office and
Suffrage during the term of the sentence.
 f) Arresto Menor-
- 1 day to 30 days (divisible)
Max. per. 21 to 30 days
Med. per. 11 to 20 days
Min. per. - 1 to 10 days
Accessory penalties are the same with
Arresto Mayor (Article 44).
 g) Bond to keep the Peace
- shall be required to cover such period of time
as the court may determine (as amended by RA
7659).
Article 35- Effects of the bond to keep the peace
: It shall be the duty of any person sentenced to
give bond to keep the peace, to present two
sufficient sureties who shall undertake that such
person will not commit the offense sought to be
prevented, & that in case such offense be
committed, they will pay the amount determined
 by the court in its judgment, or otherwise deposit
such amount in the office of the clerk of the court
to guarantee said undertaking.
The court shall determine, according to its
discretion, the period of duration of the bond.
Should the person sentenced fail to give the
bond as required, he shall be detained for a
period which shall in no case exceed six
months, if he shall have been prosecuted for
grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed
thirty days, if for a light felony.
 Article 284-Bond for good behavior-
A person convicted of Grave Threats under Art. 282 or
Light Threats under Art. 283 may, in addition to the
penalty prescribed by law, also be required to give bond
not to molest the person threatened and the bond shall
be required to cover such period of time as the court
may determine, and if he fails to do so, he shall be
sentenced to Destierro. Since Art. 284 is a specific
article applicable to Grave or Light Threats only, such
will govern in case the bond is not given by the offender
and not Article 35 for the latter is an article of general
application.

 h) Public Censure-
- May Censure be included in the sentence of acquittal?-
No. Because censure is a penalty. If the accused is
acquitted, the court has no authority to censure him,
because no matter how light a punishment it may be, is
repugnant and is essentially contrary to acquittal. (Pp.
vs. Abellera- 69 Phil. 623). But if the court finds that the
acts charged and proved are immoral, unethical or
reprehensible, but such do not constitute a crime, the
court may exercise its disapproval of those acts to avoid
the impression that by acquitting the accused the court
approves the act or of his conduct (Pp. vs. Meneses- 74
Phil. 119).
 i) Fine- (Art. 26)
1) Afflictive more than P6,000
2) Correctional- not less than P200 but not
more than P6,000
3) Light less than P200
This applies if the fine is imposed as a
single or alternative penalty (Pp. vs.
Basalo 101 Phil. 57). It does not apply if
imposed together with another penalty
(Pp. vs. Quinto- 60 Phil. 351).
 Reconciliation between Art. 9 and Art. 26- Under Art. 9,
alight felony is defined as an infraction of law in which
the penalty is AMe. or a fine not exceeding P200. Under
Art. 26, a light fine is less than P200. So, a fine which is
exactly 200 is correctional.
If the issue is prescription of felony- Art. 9 will prevail
over Art. 26. Such offense will prescribe within two
months. But if the issue is prescription of penalty, Art. 26
will prevail and as such, will be considered correctional
and will prescribe in 10 years except AMa, which will
prescribe in 5 years ( Arts. 90, 91 and 92).
 j) Pecuniary Liabilities (Art.38)
Order of Payment- in case the property of the
offender should not be sufficient for the payment
of all his pecuniary liabilities, the same shall be
met in the following order:
1) The reparation of the damage caused;
2) Indemnification of consequential damages;
3) Fine;
4) Costs of the proceedings.

 Reparation amount of the damage, taking into

consideration the price of the thing, whenever
possible, and its sentimental value to the injured
party (Art. 106).
Indemnification of consequential damage shall
include not only those caused the injured party,
but also those suffered by his family or by a third
person by reason of the crime (Art. 107).
P50,000 death; unearned earnings.
 k) Costs (Art. 37)
- shall include fees and indemnities in the course
of the judicial proceedings, whether they be
fixed or unalterable amounts previously
determined by law or regulations in force, or
amounts not subject to schedule.
If the convict has no property to pay the fine,
he shall be a subject to a subsidiary personal
liability at the rate of 1 day for each P8.
 Article 39 Subsidiary Penalty-
Subsidiary penalty- a penalty that takes the
place of a fine for insolvent convicts. It is neither
a principal or accessory penalty, but a substitute
penalty for fine only, subject to the following
rules:
1) If the principal penalty imposed is higher
than PC no subsidiary imprisonment;
2) If the principal penalty imposed is PC or
Arresto and Fine- shall remain under
confinement until his fine is satisfied, but his
 subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed 1/3 of
the term of sentence and in no case continue for
more than 1 year.
Ex. Offender is sentenced to 6 years of PC
and a P4,000 fine. Divide the number of days
such fine of P4,000 at the rate of P8.00 per day=
500 days.
1/3 of 6 years = 2 years (730 days)
500 days is lesser than the 1/3 term-730
In no case will it exceed- 1 year 365 days.
So, the subsidiary impris. 365 days
 3) If the principal penalty is only Fine- the
subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed 6
mos., if the culprit shall have been prosecuted
for grave or less grave felony, and shall exceed
15 days , if for a light felony.
Ex. Penalty is P4,000- divide this by P8.00 =
500 days.
Fine of P4,000 is Less Grave- so the
subsidiary impris. shall be limited only to 6 mos.
or 180 days.
 4) If the penalty is Fine and Destierro-(not to be
executed by confinement in a penal institution,
but has a fixed duration) computation is the
same as in no. 1.
5) Service of subsidiary imprisonment will not
relieve the offender of his pecuniary liabilities to
pay the fine if his financial position improves
after his release.
Offender cannot be made to undergo the
subsidiary imprisonment unless expressly
provided in the judgment because this is not
 an accessory penalty.
Subsidiary imprisonment- is not imprisonment
for debt because the constitutional prohibition
refers to debts incurred in the fulfillment of
contracts.
Distinctions bt. Degree & Period of penalty:
Degree refers to the entire penalty imposable for
a felony committed; period refers to the three
equal portions- maximum, medium and
minimum.
 Significance of the 1 day differentiates
the gravity of a degree or period of
penalty.
Ex. 6 years is PC; but 6 yrs. and 1 day is
already PM.
Art. 65- Rules in arriving the 3 periods for
the divisible penalty-
- Subtract the minimum from the max.;
divide by three to get the 3 periods-
 A) Prision Mayor- 6 yrs.& 1 day to 12
years
Max = 12 - 6= 6/3- 2 yrs.
Min= 6 plus 2 = 8 (6 yrs. & 1 day to 8 yrs)
Med= 8 plus 2= 10(8 yrs. & 1 day to 10
yrs)
Max=10 plus 2=12(10 yrs. & 1 day to 12
yrs.)
 B) Prision Correccional- 6 mos. & 1 day to
6 years
Convert 6 years to months= 72 mos.
72-6 = 66/3= 22 mos (22+6=28/12=2 yrs.
& 4 mos)
Min-6 mos. & 1 day to 2 yrs. & 4 mos.
(28 +22= 50/12= 4 yrs. & 2 mos.)
 Med-( 2 yrs. 4 mos. & 1 day to 4 yrs. & 2
mos.)
50 + 22 = 72 mos/12= 6 yrs.
Max-( 4 yrs. 2 mos. & 1 day to 6 yrs.)
Article 45- Confiscation & Forfeiture
of the Proceeds or Insts.of the
Crime-
This accessory penalty is included in every
penalty imposed for the commission of a
crime.
Confiscation is in favor of the government.
Property of a third person not liable for the
offense is not subject to confiscation.
Property not subject of lawful commerce
though it belongs to a third person shall be
destroyed.
 Articles 50 to 57-
C F A
Principal - 0 - 1 - 2
Accomplice- 1 - 2 - 3
Accessory - 2 - 3 - 4
Article 60- The provisions contained in the
above articles shall not be applicable to cases in
which the law expressly prescribes the penalty
provided for a frustrated or attempted felony, or
to be imposed upon accomplices or accessories.
 Exs. of cases wherein the law punish the
Accomplice with a penalty corresponding to the
Principals:
1) Article 346- Ascendants, guardians,
curators, teachers and any person who by
abuse of authority or confidential relationship
shall cooperate as accomplices in Rape, Acts of
Lasciviousness, Seduction, Corruption of
Minors, White Slave Trade or Abduction;
 2) Article 268- One who furnished the place for
the perpetration of the crime of Slight Illegal
Detention.
Cases in which the law punishes an accessory
with a penalty corresponding to that of a
principal or of one degree lower instead of two
degrees:
1) Article 162- Knowingly using counterfeit
seal or forged signature of the President;
 2) Article 168- Illegal Possession and Use
of False Treasury or Bank Notes;
3) Article 172 (par. 3)- Using Falsified
Document;
4) Article 173,( par. 2)- Using Falsified
Dispatch.
 Article 28- Computation of
Penalties
Effectivity of penalties:
1) From the day the judgment becomes final
temporary penalties like suspension, if the
offender is in prison;
2) From the day the offender is placed at the
disposal of the judicial authorities for the
enforcement of the penalty- penalty consisting of
deprivation of liberty if the offender is not in
prison;
3) From the day the defendant commences to
serve the sentence other penalties.
 4) Since a commitment order in case the
offender is in prison does not take effect until
after the judgment of conviction becomes final,
or fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, when
no appeal is filed- it is only then that the service
of sentence is legally commenced;
5) If the accused is in prison at the time the
judgment is promulgated, he is deemed to have
submitted himself for the execution of the said
judgment as of the date of promulgation.
 Article 29- Preventive
Imprisonment
- Offenders or accused who have
undergone preventive imprisonment shall
be credited in the service of their sentence
consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the
full time during which they have
undergone preventive imprisonment, if the
detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in
writing to abide by the same disciplinary
rules imposed upon convicted prisoners,
 except in the following cases:
1) when they are recidivists, or have been
convicted previously twice or more of any
crimes; and
2) when upon being summoned for the
execution of their sentence they have failed to
surrender voluntarily.
If the detention prisoner does not agree to
abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed
upon convicted prisoners, he shall be credited in
the service of his sentence with 4/5ths of the
 time during which he has undergone preventive
imprisonment (Pp. vs. Abanes- 73 SCRA 44).
Whenever an accused has undergone
preventive imprisonment for a period equal or
more than the possible maximum imprisonment
of the offense charged to which he may be
sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he
shall be released immediately without prejudice
to the continuation of the trial thereof or the
proceeding on appeal, if the same is under
 review. In case the maximum penalty to which
the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he
shall be released after thirty (30) days of
preventive imprisonment( Pp. vs. Magonawal, et
al- 63 SCRA 106 & Pp.vs. Bastasa- Feb. l979).
(Destierro constitutes deprivation of liberty).
- An accused sentenced to life imprisonment is
entitled to deduction (U.S. vs. Ortencio 38
Phil.941).
 This also holds true if the penalty is
Reclusion Perpetua- because the law
does not make any distinction between
temporal or perpetual penalties (Pp. vs.
Corpuz- March l994-49 SCAD). More so,
since Reclusion Perpetua now has a fixed
period altho still indivisible (RA 7659- Pp.
vs. Lucas & Pp, vs. Reyes August l992).
 - This does not apply if the sentence does not
involve a term of imprisonment like fine, as the
law says deprivation of liberty.
- An accused undergoes preventive
imprisonment if the offense of which he is
charged is not bailable or if bailable he cannot
post bail and he is not entitled to recognizance.
The offense is not bailable if it is punished with
Reclusion Perpetua to Death and the evidence
of guilt is strong. The mere fact that the offense
 is punishable with Death or Reclusion Perpetua
does not per se make the offense not bailable.
There is the other requirement that the evidence
of guilt is strong.
What is the remedy when the person has
already served the maximum penalty
imposable? The appropriate remedy of the
accused is to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus
considering that the decision in this case is now
final( In accordance with the resolution in
 Angeles vs. Bilibid- Jan. 4, l995 and Pp.
vs. Agustin- Sept. 5, l995).
Pp. vs.Labriaga- Nov. l995- 65 SCAD-
The accused-appellant Rita Labriaga
having served more than the maximum
imposable penalty of PC, should be
released.
 Article 70- Successive Service of
Sentence
-When the culprit has two or more
penalties, he shall serve them
simultaneously if the nature of the
penalties will so permit, otherwise the
following rules shall be observed:
In the imposition of the penalties, the
order of their respective severity shall be
followed so that they may be executed
successively or as nearly as possible,
 should a pardon have been granted as to the
penalty or penalties first imposed, or should they
have been served out.
For the purpose of applying the provisions of
the next preceding par. the respective severity of
the penalties shall be determined in accordance
with the following scale:
1) Death
2) Reclusion Perpetua
 3) Reclusion Temporal
4) Prision Mayor
5) Prision Correccional
6) Arresto Mayor
7) Arresto Menor
8) Destierrro
9) Perpetual Absolute Disqualification
10) Temporary Absolute Disqualification
11) Suspension from public office, the right to vote & be
voted for, the right to follow profession or calling, &
12 Public Censure
 Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next
preceding, the maximum period of the convicts
sentence shall not be more than three-fold the
length of time corresponding to the most severe
of the penalties upon him. No other penalty to
which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the
sum total of those imposed equals the same
maximum period.
Such maximum period shall in no case exceed
forty years.
 In applying the provisions of this rule the
duration of perpetual penalties (penal perpetua)
shall be computed at thirty years.
What is the rule when a convict is given multiple
sentences?
The general rule is that he shall serve them
simultaneously if the nature of the penalties
permit simultaneous service of sentence.
Otherwise, the penalties shall be served
successively in the order of severity as
prescribed under this article.
 Ex. Destierro and Fine
Prision Correccional and Perpetual Special
Disqualification
Suspension From Office and Fine
(Rodriguez vs. Dir. of Prisons-47 SCRA 353).
What are the limitations of the service of
sentence?
a) The maximum duration of the convicts
sentence shall not be more than three-fold the
length of time corresponding to the most severe
 of the penalties imposed upon him. No other penalty to
which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum
total of those imposed equals the same maximum period
(3-fold rule).
b) Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty
years.
What is the three-fold rule?
- It is the rule that the maximum duration of the
sentence should not exceed 3 times the most severe
penalty imposed upon the convict and the added
limitation that the maximum period thus computed shall
in no case exceed 40 years.
 How is the penalty computed?
Steps:
1) Get the most severe penalty meted as listed under
Art. 70;
2) Multiply the duration of the most severe penalty by
3;
3) Add the duration of all the different penalties;
4) Compare the results of steps 2 & 3;
5) Accused to serve the lesser period unless it is in
excess of 40 years in which case the accused shall only
serve for 40 years.
 Exs.1) Case of Paco Larranaga, et al-
Sentence is two Reclusion Perpetua
Range- 20 years and 1 day to 40 years.
(Altho. the highest period is 40, we do not start it with the
same, because the last provision of Art. 70 provides: In
applying the provisions of this rule, the duration of
perpetual penalties (pena perpetua) shall be computed
at 30 years).
30 x 3= 90 years
Paco, et al will only serve 40 years bec. the law provides
that shall in no case that the maximum period exceed 40
years.
 2) Conviction of four (4) PM-
Range- 6 yrs. & 1 day to 12 years
12 x 3 = 36
Add the four penalties (12+12 + 12 +
12)= 48
Compare the two results = 36 years is
lower, so this will be the penalty that will
be serve, as this does not exceed 40
years.
 3) Aspra vs. Director of Prisons- 85 Phil. 737-
This applies to equal penalties:
Conviction Six (6) Estafas-sentenced to 3
months and 11 days in each case.
3 x 3= 9 mos. / 11 x 3= 33 days
= 9 mos. & 33 days or 10 mos. & 3 days
Add all - ( 3+3+3+3+3+3)= 18 mos.
- (11+11+11+11+11+11)=66 days
18 mos. & 66 days or 20 mos. & 6 days
Acc. will only serve the period of 10 mos. & 3
days.
 The three-fold rule applies although the
penalties were imposed for different times and
under separate informations (Torres vs.
Superintendent -56 Phil. 847)
The three-fold maximum penalty does not
preclude subsidiary imprisonment. This means
to say that after the prisoner has served the
highest penalty under the three-fold rule, he still
has to serve the payment of all indemnities (fine)
with or without subsidiary imprisonment provided
the principal penalty does not exceed 6 years.
So, if the prisoner after serving the three-fold
 maximum penalty cannot pay the fine, he still
has to serve the subsidiary imprisonment as
long as the principal does not exceed 6 years
(Bagtas vs. Dir. of Prisons- 47 O.G. l743).
Should the court refrain from imposing the
correct penalties if these would exceed the
limitation of the three-fold rule?
- NO. It is the duty of the court to impose the
penalty for all crimes of which the accused was
found guilty. This article deals with SERVICE OF
SENTENCE and not imposition, hence this
article is for the Director of Prisons to follow
 and not for the court.
The rationale for imposing the correct penalty is
that when the convict is pardoned, he will still
serve the other sentences meted upon him.
Distinction bt. Imposition of Penalty & Service of
Sentence: The imposition of penalty is
determined by the nature, gravity and number of
offenses charged and proved, whereas, service
of sentence is determined by severity and
character of the penalties imposed, in the
impossibility or practicability of the service of
 sentence, since actual service is a contingency,
subject to various factors like escape of the
convict, grant of executive clemency, or natural
death of the prisoner ( Pp. vs. Peralta, et al 25
SCRA 759).
Multiple Death Penalty- Reasons:
The imposition of multiple death penalties, far
from being a useless formality, has practical
importance. The sentencing of an accused to
several capital penalties is an indelible badge of
his extreme criminal perversity, which may not
 be accurately projected by the imposition of only
one death sentence irrespective of the number
of capital felonies for which he is liable. Showing
thus the reprehensible character of the convict in
its real dimensions, the possibility of a grant of
executive clemency is justifiably reduced in no
small measure. Hence, the imposition of multiple
death penalties could effectively serve as a
deterrent to an improvident grant of pardon or
commutation. Faced with the utter delinquency
of such a convict, the proper penitentiary
authorities would exercise judicious restraint in
 recommending clemency or leniency in his
behalf.
Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in
the exercise of his constitutional power to
pardon (one of the presidential prerogatives
which is almost absolute), deems it proper to
commute the multiple death penalties to multiple
life imprisonments, then the practical effect is
that the convict has to serve the maximum 40
years of multiple life sentences. If only one death
 penalty is imposed, and then is commuted to life
imprisonment, the convict will have to serve a
maximum of only thirty years corresponding to a
single life sentence (Pp. vs. Jaime Jose, et al-
Feb. 6, l971- 37 SCRA 450; Pp. vs. Peralta
ibid).
If the multiple penalties are death, how will the
rule under Art. 70 be complied?- When the
sentence is executed, all the death sentences
are deemed simultaneously served (Pp. vs.
Peralta- ibid).
 Article 71-Graduated Scales
-In cases in which the law prescribes a penalty
lower or higher by one or more degrees than
another given penalty, the rules prescribed in
Article 61 shall be observed in graduating such
penalty.
The lower or higher penalty shall be taken
from the graduated scale in which is comprised
the given penalty.
The courts, in applying such lower or higher
penalty, shall observe the following graduated
scales:
 SCALE NO. 1

1) Death
2) Reclusion Perpetua
3) Reclusion Temporal
4) Prision Mayor
5) Prision Correccional
6) Arresto Mayor
7) Destierro
8) Arresto Menor
9) Public Censure
10) Fine
 SCALE NO. 2

1) Perpetual Absolute Disqualification

2) Temporary Absolute Disqualification
3) Suspension from public office, the right
to vote and be voted for, and the right to
follow a profession or calling
4) Public Censure
5) Fine
 - In Art. 70 the penalty next lower in severity to
Arresto Mayor regarding the successive service
of sentence is Arresto Menor; but in Art. 71, as
to graduated scales, the penalty next lower in
degree to Arresto Mayor is Destierro.
Ex. Pp. vs. Cabanban- May 7, l960- Accused
was convicted of Simple Seduction which carries
a penalty of Arresto Mayor. As he was under l8
at the time of the commission of the crime, the
penalty imposed was Destierro.
 Article 61- Rules of Graduating
Penalties
For the purpose of graduating the penalties
which, according to the provisions of Articles 50-
57, inclusive of this Code, are to be imposed
upon persons guilty as principals or any
frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices
or accessories, the following rules shall be
observed:
1) When the penalty prescribed for the felony
is SINGLE & INDIVISIBLE, the next penalty
lower in degree shall be that immediately
following such scale prescribed under Art. 71;
 Single and Indivisible penalties are Death and
Reclusion Perpetua.
- if the single penalty is Death one degree
lower to this is Reclusion Perpetua
- if the single penalty is Reclusion Perpetua-
one degree lower to this is Reclusion Temporal.
Ex. Art. 267- Kidnapping & Serious Illegal
Detention- punishable w/ Death- If the accused
is only an Accomplice penalty is Reclusion
Perpetua.
 2) When the penalty prescribed for the crime is
composed of TWO INDIVISIBLE penalties, or of ONE or
MORE DIVISIBLE penalties to be imposed to their full
extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that
immediately following the lesser of the penalties
prescribed in the respective graduated scale;
a) Two indivisible penalties- Reclusion Perpetua to
Death.
Ex. Parricide (Article 248)- Reclusion Perpetua to
Death.
One degree lower to this- if the crime is frustrated-
Reclusion Temporal.
 b) Divisible penalty imposed in its full extent-
Prision Mayor
- Penalty next lower in degree of PM is Prision
Correccional
Ex. Intentional Abortion- Art.256 (par. 2)- PM- if
the crime is only frustrated- penalty is only
Prision Correccional.
3) When the penalty prescribed for the crime is
composed of one or two indivisible penalties and
the maximum period of another divisible penalty,
the penalty next lower in degree shall be
composed of the medium and minimum periods
 of the proper divisible penalty and the maximum
period of that immediately following in said
respective scale;
- Penalty prescribed consists of ONE or MORE
INDIVISIBLE and the MAXIMUM of a DIVISIBLE
PENALTY-next lower in degree consists of
medium and minimum period of proper divisible
penalty and the maximum of the divisible penalty
immediately following:
Reclusion Temporal maximum to Death
Ex. Pp. vs. Paredes, Jr. Nov. l996- convicted
of Murder (prior to RA 7659)- carries a penalty of
 Reclusion Temporal Maximum to Death-
Period Penalty prescribed
Maximum Death
Medium Reclusion Perpetua
Minimum Reclusion Temporal Max.
One degree lower:
Maximum Reclusion Temporal Med.
Medium Reclusion Temporal Min.
Minimum Prision Mayor Max.
One degree lower Prision Mayor max. to Reclusion
Temporal medium.
 4) When the penalty prescribed for the crime is
composed of several periods, corresponding to
the different divisible penalties, the penalty next
lower in degree shall be composed of the period
immediately following the minimum prescribed
and of the two next following, which shall be
taken from the penalty prescribed, if possible;
otherwise from the penalty immediately following
in the above-mentioned respective graduated
scale;
 Ex. Penalty is Prision Mayor max. to Reclusion Temporal
medium period-
Max. - Reclusion Temporal med.
Med. - Reclusion Temporal min.
Min. - Prision Mayor max.
One degree lower:
Max. - Prision Mayor med.
Med. - Prision Mayor min.
Min. - Prision Correccional max.
One degree lower = Prision Correccional in its max.
period to Prision Mayor in its medium period.
 Article 306- Brigandage- Prision Mayor in its medium
period to Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period.
Max. - Reclusion Temporal min.
Med. - Prision Mayor max.
Min. - Prision Mayor med.
One degree lower:
Max. - Prision Mayor min.
Med. - Prision Correccional max.
Min. - Prision Correccional med.
One degree lower Prision Correccional in its medium
period to Prision Mayor in its minimum period.
 5) Penalty prescribed in a manner not provided
in the preceding 4 rules- Court proceeds by
analogy and shall impose the corresponding
penalty:
a) if the penalty prescribed by law is
composed of three periods, the penalty lower in
degree is the penalty consisting of three periods
down the scale;
b) if the penalty prescribed by law consists of
two periods, the penalty next lower in degree is
the penalty consisting of two periods down the
scale;
 Ex. Penalty for Abduction (Article 343)-
Prision Correccional in its min. and med.
periods:
Prision Correccional med.
Prision Correccional min.
One degree lower-
Arresto Mayor max.
Arresto Mayor med.
 C) if the penalty prescribed by law consists of
one period, the penalty next lower in degree is
the next period in the scale:
Ex. Art. 166 (par. 5) Forging Treasury Notes-
the penalty is Reclusion Temporal in its
minimum period- penalty next lower in degree is
Prision Mayor in its maximum period
Reclusion Temporal min.
Prision Mayor max.
 - In lowering the penalty by degree,
aggravating or mitigating circumstances
are not yet considered, because Art. 61
refers to the penalty prescribed for the
felony. After the penalty next lower in
degree is determined, aggravating or
mitigating circumstances are then
considered to determine the proper period
of penalty.
 This is so, as in arriving at the imposable
penalty, the following circumstances will be
considered by the Court:
1) Stages of the commission of the crime( C,F,
A)
2) Degree of participation (P, Acco., Acce.)
3) Presence of Aggravating or mitigating
circumstances;
4) Indeterminate Sentence law
5) Probation (if the penalty does not exceed 6
yrs).
 Art. 62- Rules for Application of
Pen. w/ Regard to Mit. & Agg.
Circs.
-Effects of the attendance of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances and habitual
delinquency:
1) Aggravating circumstances which in
themselves constitute a crime specially
punishable by law or which are included by the
law in defining a crime and prescribing the
penalty therefor shall not be taken into account
for the purpose of increasing the penalty;
 a) Those which in themselves constitute a crime
especially punishable by law. Ex. Explosion
(Art. 14, par. 12)- Art. 324- Crimes involving
Destruction (now amended by PD 1613- Law on
Arson); by means of fire- crime of Arson.
b) Those included by law in defining the crime-
Abuse of confidence (Art. 14, par. 4)- crimes of
Qualified Theft (Art. 310) and Estafa (Art. 315).
 1(a) When in the commission of the crime,
advantage was taken by the offender of
his public position, the penalty to be
imposed shall be in its maximum
regardless of mitigating circumstances.
The maximum penalty shall be imposed
if the offense was committed by any
person who belongs to an organized/
 /syndicated crime group.
An organized /syndicated crime group
means a group of 2 or more persons
collaborating, confederating or mutually
helping one another for purposes of gain
in the commission of any crime (As am. by
RA 7659).
2) The same rule shall apply with respect
to any aggravating circumstances inherent
 in the crime to such degree that it must of
necessity accompany the commission thereof.
Ex. Evident premeditation- Art. 14, par. 13-
crimes of Robbery w/ Force Upon Things (Art.
299) and Murder ( Art. 248).
3) Aggravating or mitigating circumstances
which arise from the moral attributes of the
offender, or from his private relations with the
offended party, or from any other personal
cause, shall only serve to aggravate or
 mitigate the liability of the principals,
accomplices and accessories as to whom each
circumstances are attendant.
a) moral attributes of the offender- Passion or
obfuscation If A and B killed C and A acted
with passion, such mitigating circumstance will
only affect A.
In rape- relationship as aggravating
circumstance will be appreciated only against
the person who is related to the victim.
 In Adultery- abandonment of the wife by the
husband mitigates not only the liability of the
wife, but also of her paramour because in
Adultery, the act is one, juridically (Pp. vs.
Avelino 40 O.G. 115).
4) The circumstances which consist in the
material execution of the act, or in the means
employed to accomplish it, shall serve to
aggravate or mitigate the liability of the persons
only who had knowledge of them at the time of
 the execution of the act or their cooperation
therein.
a) material execution of the act- ex. If A
cooperated with B in the killing of C who killed
the latter with ignominy. Such will aggravate not
only the liability of B but also of A, if he has
knowledge of it at the time of the execution of
the act.
b) means to accomplish the crime- ex. A
induced B to kill C. A left to B the means he
 might employ to execute the act. B killed
with treachery. Such agg. circ. will affect B
only (Pp. vs. Otero- 51 Phil. 201). But if A
was present when B was killed, such
aggravating circumstance will also affect
him. In a Per Curiam decision, the
Supreme Court held, that since there was
conspiracy, the law should be appreciated
against the mastermind as a generic
 aggravating circumstance even when he
was not present when the crime was
committed. The Otero case was not held
applicable as in that case the accused was
convicted as principal by inducement
without proof of conspiracy with the other
accused. In conspiracy, the rule is, every
conspirator is responsible for the acts of
the other accused (Pp.vs.Pareja-30
SCRA- 693).
 5) Effects of Habitual Delinquency-
Article 63- Rules for the application of indivisible
penalties-
1) Penalty is single and indivisible-penalty
shall be applied regardless of the presence of
mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Death
or Reclusion Perpetua.
2) Penalty is composed of two indivisible
penalties- Reclusion Perpetua to Death.
 i) one aggravating cir. present- higher penalty
Death
ii) no mit. nor agg. cir. present- lesser penalty
Reclusion Perpetua
iii) one mit. cir. present- lesser penalty
Reclusion Perpetua.
2) When both agg. and mit. are present, the
courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one
another in consideration of their number and
importance.
Article 64- Rules for the Application
of Divisible Penalties-
1) No aggravating and no mitigating
circumstance-medium period;
2) One mitigating- minimum period;
3) One aggravating maximum period;
4) Mitigating and aggravating
circumstances are present offset each
other.
5) Two or more mitigating and no
aggravating- one degree lower.
 6) Any number of aggravating
circumstances penalty cannot exceed
the penalty provided by the law in its
maximum period.
Cases wherein Article 64 do not apply:
1) Penalty that is single and indivisible;
2) Felonies thru negligence;
3) Penalty is fine; and
4) Penalty is prescribed by special law.
 Act 4103- Indeterminate Sentence
Law (ISL)
- Purpose- is to uplift and redeem valuable
human material and prevent unnecessary and
excessive deprivation of personal liberty and
economic usefulness (Pp. vs. Onate- 78 SCRA
43).
As a rule, it is intended to favor the accused
particularly to shorten his term of imprisonment,
depending upon his behavior and his physical,
mental, and moral record as a prisoner to be
determined by the Board of Pardon and Parole.
 Covers crimes punishable under the RPC or
SPL:
a) RPC-
-Minimum- one degree next lower to the
penalty imposed. The term of the minimum is left
to the discretion of the court and this discretion
is unqualified. The only limitation is that it is
within the range of the penalty next lower in
degree to that prescribed by the RPC for the
offense committed.
- Maximum the penalty imposed as provided
by law.
 B) SPL maximum term of the indeterminate sentence
shall not exceed the maximum fixed by law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum prescribed
by law.
Pen. 1 year to 5 years-( 1 year to 3 years or 3 years to 5
years).
ISL will not apply in the following cases:
1) Offenses punished by Death or RP
2) Those convicted of Treason , Conspiracy or
Proposal To Commit Treason, Misprision of Treason,
Rebellion, Sedition, Espionage, & Piracy.
3) Habitual Delinquents.
 4) Those who escaped from confinement;
5) Those granted with conditional pardon and
who violated the term of the same;
6) Those whose maximum period does not
exceed one year.
7) Those already serving final judgment upon
the approval of this act.
Rationale- after serving the minimum term, the
prisoner may be released on parole.
 Examples :1) Convicted of Homicide- Reclusion
Temporal 12 years and 1 day to 20 years.
Accused principal
- crime is consummated
Maximum 17 years, 4 mos. & 1 day to 20
years;
Medium 14 years, 8 mos. & 1 day to 17 years
and 4 mos.
Minimum 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and
8 mos.
 Prision Mayor- 6 years & 1 day to 12 yrs;
Max.- 10 years & 1 day to 12 years
Med.- 8 years & 1 day to 10 years
Min.- 6 years & 1 day to 8 years
Prision Correccional- 6 mos. & 1 day to 6 yrs.
Max- 4 yrs., 2 mos. & 1 day to 6 yrs.
Med.- 2 yrs., 4 mos. & 1 day to 4 yrs. 2 mos.
Min- 6 mos. & 1 day to 2 yrs. & 4 mos.
 - During the trial, he pleaded guilty (Plea of
guilt is an ordinary mitigating circ.)
12 years and 1 day to 14 years & 8 mos.
Applying the ISL- one degree for the min.
Prision Mayor min. 6 yrs and 1 day to 8 yrs.
Pen- 6 yrs. & 1 day of PM in its min. period as
its minimum to 14 years & 8 mos. of RT in its
min. period as its maximum.
 Probation PD 968 as am.
- is a disposition under which a
defendant, after conviction and sentence,
is released subject to the conditions
imposed by the court and to the
supervision of a probation officer ( for
those imposed the penalty of 6 years and
below).
 Article 67- Increasing or reducing
the pen. of Fines
A) If the law prescribes the minimum as well as
the maximum- the court cannot impose a fine
next higher.
Ex. Fine of P200 to P1,000 (each degree will
be equal to of P1,000 or P250.00. P250.00
added to P1,000 to determine the next higher in
degree without changing the minimum of P200 =
P 200 to P1,250.
Fine next lower in degree = P200 to P750.00
 B) If the law imposing the fine does not fix the minimum,
the determination of the fine is left to the discretion of the
court, provided that it shall not exceed the authorized
maximum- P4,000 ( P200 or P2,000)
Circumstances to be considered by the court:
1) Mitigating or agg. circs
2) Wealth or means of the culprit
3). Gravity or seriousness of the charge.
(Nizurtado vs. Sandiganbayan the SC reduced the
P10,000 fine to P2,000 bec. of the presence of mitigating
circumstance.
 EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
How is criminal liability extinguished?
1) Totally
2) Partially
ARTICLE 89- TOTAL EXTINCTION OF
CRIMINAL LIABILITY-
1) By the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties, and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before
final judgment;
 2) By service of the sentence;
3) By amnesty, which completely
extinguishes the penalty and all its effect;
4) By absolute pardon;
5) By prescription of the crime;
6) By prescription of the penalty;
7) By the marriage of the offended woman,
as provided in Art. 344 of this Code.
 A) DEATH
The criminal and civil liabilities are
extinguished if the offender dies before
final judgment (Pp. vs. Jose, et al- June
17, l976). This is so, as when death
occurs, nobody will serve the penalty for
the crime (Pp. vs. Bayotas- Sept. l994-55
SCAD & Petralba vs. Sandiganbayan-
Aug. 16, l991).
 What is Final Judgment?
Sentencia firma should be understood as one which
is definite. The legal import of the term final judgment is
similarly reflected in Articles 72 & 78 of this Code, which
mention the term final judgment in the sense that it is
already enforceable. Also Sec. 7 of Rule ll6 of the Rules
of Court states that a judgment in a criminal case
becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting
an appeal for when the sentence has been partially or
totally satisfied or served or the defendant has expressly
waived in writing the right to appeal.
 Judgment becomes final when:
1) No appeal is seasonably perfected;
2) Accused commences to serve the sentence;
3) Right to appeal is expressly waived in
writing, except where death penalty was
imposed by the trial court; and
4) Accused applies for probation, thereby
waiving his right to appeal ( Pp. vs. Salle- Dec.
l995- En banc- 66 SCAD).
 If death however, occurs after final judgment, the
pecuniary liabilities devolve upon the heirs only if some
properties are left.
Article 89, par. 1 applies only if the civil liability arises
from the criminal liability as its sole basis (Article 100-
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable). However, it cannot apply if the civil liability arises
not only from the crime but from another source like a
contract of purchase and sale. Ex. The accused was
convicted of Estafa for selling a parcel of land twice.
Pending appeal, he died. His civil liability was not
extinguished as it arose out of the contract of sale.
 Under the Civil Code, the civil liability of
the accused remains as this civil liability is
independent of his criminal liability. If the
accused dies while his case is pending
appeal, the motion for recovery of money
may not be dismissed; but when he dies
before final judgment by the trial court, the
money claim should be presented before
the probate or intestate court (Torrijos vs.
CA- L-40336, 67 SCRA 394).
 The possible civil liability of the deceased
accused can be determined in the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction arising from the alleged
criminal acts complained of as if no criminal
case has been instituted against him and Art. 30
of the Civil Code will apply in determining his
civil liability (Pp. vs. Sendaydiego- Jan. 20,
l978). This rule was applied in the case of Pp.
vs. Tirol- L-30588- Jan. 31, l981- where one of
the accused-appellants died pending appeal,
 the case was dismissed as to his criminal liability, but the
appeal was to be resolved concerning him to determine
his criminal liability as the basis of his civil liability for
which his estate may be liable (Pp. vs. Naboa- 132
SCRA 410).
Does Art. 30 of the Civil Code authorize the appellate
court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over
the accuseds civil liability ex-delicto when his death
supervenes during appeal? No. What Art. 30 recognizes
is an alternative and separate civil action which may be
brought to demand civil liability from a criminal offense
independently of any criminal action.
 The intendment of Article 100 on civil liability ex-delicto is
rooted in the courts pronouncement of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. Death dissolves all things
(Mors omnia solvi).
Article 30 refers to the institution of a separate civil
action that does not draw its life from a criminal
proceeding.
How about the death of the offended party?-The death
of the offended party does not extinguish criminal
liability, as it is not included in Art. 89. Neither is it
mentioned as one of the grounds for a Motion to Quash
under the Rules on Criminal Procedure (Pp. vs.
Bandalian- 117 SCRA 718).
 B) SERVICE OF SENTENCE
Article 89 of the RPC stipulates that the
penalties consisting of deprivation of liberty shall
be executed and served in the places and penal
establishments provided by the Administrative
Code in force or which may be provided by law.
The Code thus requires that the service of
sentence be in a penal institution (Martin vs.
Eduardo 121 SCRA). Thus the period during
which the accused was at large during his
escapes from the jail cannot be included in the
service of his sentences in fixing the date of his
release (Ibid).
 C) AMNESTY
Amnesty- is an act of the sovereign power
granting oblivion or a general pardon for a past
offense, and is rarely, if ever, exercised in favor
of a single individual, and is usually exercised in
behalf of a certain class of persons, who are
subject to trial but have not yet been convicted.
Amnesty extinguishes the criminal liability & not
merely the penalty but also its effects. But the
civil liability is not extinguished.
 D) ABSOLUTE PARDON

Two kinds of pardon:

1) Article 36-Pardon by the Chief Executive.
Pardon- is an act of grace proceeding from
the power entrusted with the execution of the
laws which exempts the individual on whom it is
bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for
the crime he has committed.
2 kinds: a) Absolute
b) Conditional
 An absolute pardon extinguishes criminal liability
of the offender. But this does not exempt the
offender from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed in the sentence. It does not also restore
the right to hold public office or the right of
suffrage unless such rights are expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon.
A pardon to be effective, must be delivered
and accepted. The pardon given by the
President upon the woman convicted of Adultery
affects her only and cannot benefit the paramour
( U.S. vs. Guarin- 30 Phil. 85).
 When may the right to hold public office and to exercise
suffrage be considered restored altho not expressly
stated in the pardon?
Only in a case when the pardon is granted after the
offender has served the term of imprisonment, because
such conviction removes all that is left on the
consequence of conviction( Cristobal vs. Labrado 71
Phil. 34). This is the exception to the provisions of the
law, that is, where the facts and circumstances of the
case clearly show that the purpose of the Chief
Executive is precisely to restore rights altho not
expressly stated in the pardon ( Pelobello vs. Palatino-
72 Phil. 441).
 Limitations of the pardoning power of the President:
1) Such power does not extend in cases of
impeachment.
2) The power can only be exercised after conviction.
3) In election offenses, it can be exercised only upon
prior recommendation of the COMELEC.
What is the effect of an appeal of judgment of
conviction on the pardoning power of the President?
An appeal brings the entire case within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the appellate court. A becoming regard for
the doctrine of separation of powers demands that such
exclusive authority of the appellate court be fully
 respected and kept unimpaired. Had not
the present Constitution adopted the
conviction by final judgment limitation,
the President could, at any time and even
without the knowledge of the court, extend
executive clemency to anyone whom he in
good faith or otherwise believes to merit
presidential mercy. To allow the President
to do so, will be a derogation of the
jurisdiction of the appellate court.
 If an appeal is filed, an appellant may be granted pardon,
but he must first withdraw his appeal, i.e. the appealed
conviction must first be brought to finality.
b) CONDITIONAL PARDON( Art. 94-par.1)-This must
be accepted to be efficacious because of the conditions
imposed which must be complied strictly.
A Conditional Pardon is in the nature of a contract
between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and
the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will
release the latter subject to the condition that if he does
not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be
recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of
 the sentence or an additional one (Alvarez vs. Dir. Of
Prison 80 Phil. 50). By the pardonees consent to the
terms stipulated in the contract, the pardonee has placed
himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or
his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the
pardonee complies with the terms and conditions of the
pardon. Under Sec. 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order the
arrest & re-incarceration of any such person who, in his
judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition/s of his
pardon (Torres vs. Dir. of Bureau of Corrections- Dec.
l995- 66 SCAD) and he can be prosecuted under Art.
159 of the RPC.
 May the grant of pardon be subject to the review of the
courts? No. It is now a well-entrenched rule in this
jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential judgment is
beyond judicial review. The determination of the violation
of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound
judgment of the Chief Executive. The pardonee, having
consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon
the judgment of the power that has granted it cannot
invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the
findings may be upon which his recommendation was
ordered (Tesoro vs. Dir. of Prisons- 68 Phil. 154).
 Is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus the remedy for a
person incarcerated because of violation of the terms of
the conditional pardon? No. Habeas Corpus lies only
when the restraint of a persons liberty has been
judicially adjudged as illegal or unlawful. Solely vested in
the Chief Executive, who in the first place was the
exclusive author of the conditional pardon and its
revocation, is the corollary prerogative to reinstate the
pardon.
Conditional pardon does not also extinguish civil liability
(Monsanto vs. Factoran,Jr.- 170 SCRA l989 & Pp. vs.
Nacional- Sept. l995- 64 SCAD).
 2) PARDON BY THE OFFENDED PARTY-(Article 23)
This does not extinguish criminal liability, except in
Art.266-C and Art. 344 of the RPC (amendment of the
Anti-Rape Law) which requires a valid marriage between
the rapist and the victim to effect an extinguishment of
criminal liability. But civil liability is extinguished by
express waiver of the offended party.
The criminal action in public crimes is not
extinguished. Thus, the criminal liability for Estafa is not
affected by the compromise or novation of contract, for it
is a public offense which must be prosecuted and
punished by the government in its own motion even
though complete reparation should have been made of
the damages suffered by the offended party (Javier vs.
 Pp. -70 Phil. 550).
Reimbursement of, or compromise as to the amount of
the crime affects only the civil liability but does not
relieve him from the penalty prescribed by the law for the
offense committed (Pp. vs. Miranda- G.R.No. L- 16122).
Regarding private crimes, which are mentioned under
Art. 344, like Rape, Seduction, Abduction, Acts of
Lasciviousness, Adultery and Concubinage, the criminal
action is barred if:
a) the pardon is made before the institution of the
action;
b) in Adultery & Concubinage, the pardon must refer
to both offenders, which may either be expressed or
implied;
 c) in Rape, and other private crimes, the pardon must be
expressed (Pp. vs. Infante- 57 Phil. 138);
d) the marriage between the offender and the offended
party totally extinguishes the criminal liability of the
offender.
In Rape cases, the pardon given by the parents of the
minor victim to be effective must have the concurrence
of the minor victim herself (Art. 266-C R.A. 8353).
Pp. vs. Lacson, Jr- The pardon given by the parents
cannot stand alone. This is inefficacious. This is not
sufficient to remove the criminal responsibility of the
offender. Rather, this must be accompanied by the
express pardon of the victim herself ( U.S. vs. Luna -1
Phil. 360 & Pp. vs. Tadulan-April l997- 81 SCAD).
 What is the effect of an affidavit of desistance?
An affidavit of desistance is merely an additional
ground to buttress the accuseds defenses, not
the sole consideration that can result to
acquittal. There must be other circumstances
which, when coupled with the retraction or
desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the
testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and
accepted by the judge (Pp. vs. Ballabare- Nov.
l996- 76 SCAD). All that the accused offered as
 defenses mainly consisted of denial and alibi
which cannot outweigh the positive identification
and convincing testimonies given by the
prosecution (Pp. vs. Echegaray- Feb. l997- 79
SCAD).
Pardon by the Chief Executive distinguished
from the pardon by the offended party:
1) Pardon by the Chief Executive extinguishes
criminal liability, whereas that is not the case if
the pardon is given by the offended party except
in case of marriage, as it only bars the institution
of the criminal action;
 2) Pardon by the Chief Executive is
granted after conviction by final judgment,
whereas pardon given by the offended
party is given before the institution of the
action; and
3) Pardon by the Chief Executive cannot
include the civil liability of the offender,
whereas the civil liability may be expressly
waived by the offended party.
 Distinction bt. Amnesty & Absolute
Pardon
Amnesty Pardon
1.Application- gen. to poli- gen.to ordi-
tical crimes nary crimes
& offenders & offenders
2.Effect obliterates the relieves the
effects of con- offender of
viction as if the penalty but
act were not the effects of
criminal conviction stay
3.Congress concurrence concurrence
required not required

 4. When given - even before - after final

conviction conviction
5. To whom
given - usually to class - specific
of persons individual
 E) PRESCRIPTION OF CRIME
(Article 90)
Prescription of crime It is the forfeiture or loss
of the right of the State to prosecute the offender
after the lapse of a certain time fixed by law.
Prescriptive periods:
a) Death, Reclusion Perpetua and Reclusion
Temporal 20 years
b) Afflictive penalties 15 years
c) Correctional penalties 10 years
Arresto Mayor 5 years
 d) Libel or other similar offenses 1 year
e) Oral Defamation & Slander By Deed 6 mos.
f) Light offenses 2 mos.
g) Compound crime highest penalty shall be made the
basis.
Article 91- Computation of prescription of offenses- The
period of prescription shall commence to run from the
day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities or their agents, and shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information,
and shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being
 convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped for any reason not imputable to
him. The term of prescription shall not run
when the offender is absent from the
Philippine Archipelago.
Prescriptive period is not waivable. Since
it is for the benefit of the accused, this
cannot be extended. Once prescription
sets in, the court loses its jurisdiction.
 In computing the period of prescription, the first
day is excluded and the last day is included (Pp.
vs. Galano- 75 SCRA 193).
February 28 and 29 of a leap year as held in
Namarco vs. Tuazon, should be counted as
separate days in computing the prescriptive
period.
When the last day to file an Information falls on
Sunday or legal holiday, the period of
prescription cannot be extended to the next
 working day. So, this should be filed on the last
working day before the legal holiday
(Yapdiangco vs. Buencamino, et al 122 SCRA
713).
What is the effect of the delay in the reporting of
crimes in its prosecution?- None. The law on
prescription would be meaningless if we were to
yield to the proposition that delay in the
prosecution of crimes would be fatal to the State
and the offended party. In fixing the different
prescriptive periods on the basis of the gravity of
the penalty prescribed therefor, the law takes
 Into account or allows reasonable delays in the
prosecution thereof. In the case of Pp. vs.
Gecomo -254 SCRA- the court ruled that 17
days, 35 days or even 6 mos. delay by a rape
victim in reporting the attack on her honor does
not detract from the veracity of her charge.
Who is the offended party referred to in Art.
91?- State or the private complainant. The law
does not make any distinction between a private
crime or public crime. In both cases then, the
discovery may be by the offended party,
 the authorities or their agents ( Garcia vs. CA-
Jan. l997- 78 SCAD). Besides, under Sec. 12,
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
the offended party is defined as the party to
whom the offender is civilly liable. Furthermore,
under Art. 100, it is expressly stated that every
person criminally liable is civilly liable.
The prescriptive is interrupted upon the filing of
the case before the Prosecutors Office or that of
the Office of the Ombudsman( Francisco vs.
CA).
 The prescriptive periods for the crimes
punished under SPL- basis is Act no.
3326- Prescription shall begin to run from
the day of the commission of the violation
of the law and if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof, and
the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment (Presl. Ad
Hoc Committee on Behest Loans vs.
Ombudsman- August 2001).
 Sec. 52 of PD 1529 (Property Registration
Decree) provides for constructive notice.
Knowledge is counted at the time of
registration. This constructive notice, in
view of registration, does not apply to the
registration of the marriage contract in the
crime of bigamy. This is so, as bigamous
marriage is really entered in secrecy in
order to conceal the legal impediment (Pp.
vs. Reyes- July 1989).
 Can brief trips abroad qualify as absence as contemplated under
Art. 91? No. This is not the absence referred to in said article, as
these trips were very brief.
Example: Slight Physical Injuries-inflicted on July 20, 2009-
prescriptive period is 2 mos.
a) If committed by a public official in relation to office no need
of going to the Lupong Tagapamayapa
31 days for July
- 20 60 42= 18 days
-------- September 18, 2009- last
11 - July day of filing
31- August
---------
42 days
 b) If not a public official or a public official
and the act is not in relation to office
undergo a conciliation at the Lupong
Tagapamayapa. Filing of the complaint at
the barangay will toll the running of the
prescriptive period but only for 60 days
and thereafter, the prescriptive period will
again run.
 F) PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTY
(Article 92)
Prescription of penalty- It is the loss or forfeiture
of the right of the government to execute the
final sentence after the lapse of a certain time
fixed by law.
Prescriptive periods of penalties:
1) Death & Reclusion Perpetua- 20 years
2) Other afflictive penalties- 15 years
3) Correctional penalties 10 years,
except Arresto Mayor 5 years
4) Light penalties 1 year
Art. 93-Computation of Prescription
of Penalty
Period commences to run from the date the
culprit evades the service of sentence. It is
interrupted:
a) if the defendant surrenders;
b) if he is captured;
c) if he should go to foreign country w/ w/c the
Philippines has no extradition treaty; and
d) if he should commit another crime before
the expiration of the period of prescription.
 Evasion of sentence is an essential element of
prescription of penalties and takes place before the
running of the period and cannot interrupt it.
ARTICLE 94- PARTIAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
1) Conditional pardon
2) Commutation of the sentence
3) Good conduct allowance which the culprit may earn
while he is serving his sentence.
4) Parole (Under ISL)
5) Probation
6) Partial repeal of penal law
ARTICLE 96-COMMUTATION OF
SENTENCE
The commutation of the original sentence
for another of a different length and nature
shall have the legal effect of substituting
the latter in the place of the former.
It is the change in the sentence of the
court made by the President which
consists in reducing the penalty imposed
upon the offender . Such substitutes the
original penalty.
 ARTICLE 97- ALLOWANCE FOR
GOOD CONDUCT
The good conduct of a prisoner in any penal
institution shall entitle him to the following
deductions from the period of his sentence:
1) First two years 5 days for each month of
good behavior
2) Third to fifth year -8 days for each mo.
3) Following years to the 10th year- 10 days
each mo.
4) Eleventh year and successive years 15
days for each mo.
 The allowance is given in consideration of the
good conduct of the prisoner while serving his
sentence (Pp. vs. Martin-68 Phil. 122).
These allowances are granted by the Director
of Prisons and once given, these cannot be
revoked (ARTICLE 99).
This right can be enjoyed even though the
prisoner has been sentenced to several
penalties and the same have been cut down by
Article 70 to three times the most severe of the
penalties.
 This does not embrace detention prisoners.
Detention prisoners are entitled only to
preventive imprisonment, if he agreed in writing
to abide by the rules of the jail (Baking vs.
Director of Prisons, et al. L-30603-28 SCRA
851).
ARTICLE 98- SPECIAL TIME ALLOWANCE
FOR LOYALTY- a deduction of one-fifth of the
period of his sentence shall be granted to any
 prisoner who, having evaded the service
of his sentence under the circumstances
mentioned in Art. 158 of this Code, gives
himself up to the authorities within 48
hours following the issuance of a
proclamation announcing the passing
away of the calamity or catastrophe
referred to in said articles.
 When is the special time allowance given?
1) The occurrence of disorder resulting from a conflagration,
earthquake, explosion or similar catastrophe or a mutiny in which
the prisoner did not participate;
2) The convict must evade the service of his sentence (This article
does not apply to the prisoners who did not escape Lozada vs.
Acenas 78 Phil. 226);
3)He must give himself up w/n 48 hours after the issuance of a
proclamation by the President announcing the passing away of such
calamity.
- Loyalty award- 1/5 deduction of the period of his sentence. If he
does not return, additional 1/5 of the term remaining to be served
will be imposed, but not to exceed 6 months.
 ARTICLE 48-COMPLEX CRIMES
In complex crimes, although two or more crimes
are actually committed, they constitute only one
crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the
conscience of the offender. The offender has
only one criminal intent. Even in the case where
an offense is a necessary means to commit the
other, the evil intent of the offender is only one
(Pp. vs. Hernandez- 99 Phil. 515). It is on this
basis that the law imposed only one penalty.
 TWO KINDS OF COMPLEX
CRIMES:
1) Compound (Delito Compuesto)- when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies;
2) Complex Crime Proper ( Delito Complejo)- when an
offense is a necessary means of committing another
crime.

1) Compound Crimes: single act results to:

a) two or more grave felonies
ex. Pp. vs. Guillen 47 O.G. 3433- single
act of throwing a hand grenade resulted

 to the death of Simeon Varela (Murder)

and attempts on the lives of many others
(Multiple Attempted Murders)- Murder is a
grave felony, same with Attempted
Murders.
- One single shot which resulted to the
death of two persons Double Homicide
( Pp. vs. Pama- 44 O.G. 3339). Both
Homicides are grave felonies.
 - when a person planted a bomb in the
airplane, resulting to its explosion and death of
several people multiple murders and damage
to property (Pp. vs. Largo 99 Phil. 1061);
- where a paper bag was given by the accused
to the occupant of the house containing some
vegetables but when opened, it exploded
resulting to the death of several persons and
injuring another complex crime of Multiple
Murder with Frustrated Murder Pp. vs.
 Villaflores 115 SCRA 570 and Pp. vs.
Carpo, et al April 2001- 149 SCAD.
Pp.vs. Paculba- 124 SCRA 383- single
act of firing shot resulting to the death of
one and mortally injuring the other
Murder w/ Frustrated Murder.
However, if the accused fired several
bullets in succession from a submachine
 gun with a single pull of the trigger, killing
several persons, the same is not covered under
this rule, because this is not considered one act.
The continued pressing of the trigger of the gun
is not considered one act. This is not a complex
crime.
b) Less grave and grave:
When a mayor while in the performance of his
duties was ambushed and killed, Direct Assault
with Murder.
 C) Less grave and less grave:
A Judge was being attacked in relation to
the performance of his function resulting to less
serious physical injuries crime is Direct Assault
with Less Serious Physical Injuries (U. S. vs.
Montiel 9 Phil. 162).
There is no complex crime of Rape with
Homicide in view of the new law-RA 8353.
Same with Arson with Homicide because of
RA 1613.

But when a single act results in a) grave felony
and a light felony; or b) grave or less grave and
an offense punished under Special Law, there is
no complex crime.
Ex. Accused act of stabbing one person killing
him and at the same time hitting another
resulting only to slight injuries no complex
crime but two crimes of Homicide and Slight
Physical Injuries.
Lontok, Jr. vs. Judge Gorgonio April
30,l979- While driving his car, accused
 bumped another car resulting to a damage of
only P2,000 and at the same time injuring its
driver with only slight injuries- no complex crime
but two crimes of Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Damage to Property (Less Grave
felony) and Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Slight Physical Injuries Light Offense.
Another reason why there is no complex crime
of grave felony and light , its because the latter
is usually absorbed.
 Pp. vs. Lawas- 97 Phil. 975- Lawas ordered the
Moros to be tied in order to be brought to
another place. When one of the guards
approached Datu Lomangcolob, the latter
refused, thereupon, Lawas fired his revolver at
him and ordered the guards to fire; the guards
following instructions fired at the Moros including
those who tried to escape. After a short time,
Lawas ordered his men to cease fire and the
firing stopped. The evidence positively shows
that the killing was of a single impulse, which
was induced by the order of the leader to fire.
 The Supreme Court held that if the act or
acts complained of resulted from a single
criminal impulse, it constitutes a single
offense.
The ruling in the Lawas case applies
only when there is no evidence at all to
show the number of persons killed by each
of the several defendants.
 Under recent rulings, the single criminal
impulse, same motive or the single
purpose theory has no legal basis, for Art.
48 speaks of a single act. However, the
theory is acceptable when it is not certain
who among the accused killed or injured
each of the victims.
 2) When an offense is committed as a means
necessary to commit another Complex Crime
Proper- The phrase necessary means has
been interpreted not to mean indispensable
means because if it did, then the offense as a
necessary means to commit another would be
an element of the other crime. It simply means
such an offense is committed to facilitate and
insure the commission of the other (Pp. vs.
Hernandez).
 Exs. 1) Pp. vs. Jaqueline Lim she changed the amount
in the check from P2,000 to P20,000 and as a result of
which, she was able to misappropriate P18,000, public
funds Malversation of Public Funds Through
Falsification of Commercial Document;
2) Pp. vs. Mayor Maamo, et al- made it appear in the
payroll that a particular person worked in the Clean and
Green Project and received P1,600 when in truth and in
fact said person is already dead. Malversation of
Public Funds Through Falsification of a Public/Official
Document.
But if the other crime is used to conceal the other
crime, then this is not a complex crime proper, but two
crimes.
 There is no complex crime of Rebellion
with common crimes Enrile vs. Judge
Salazar.
In these two situations- the penalty that
will be imposed is the penalty of the
crimes which is higher and to be applied in
the maximum.
 Plurality of Crimes
- consists in the successive execution by the
same individual of different criminal acts upon
any of which no conviction has yet been
declared.
Continued, continuous or continuing crime- is a
single crime consisting of a series of act arising
from one criminal resolution and is therefore not
a complex crime. The reason here is that
neither the criminal act nor the intention is
susceptible of division (Pp. vs. Bayot).
 A) Exs.of Continued Crimes: a) Pp. vs. De Leon-
49 Phil. 347- Taking by the accused from the
yard of a house two roosters belonging to two
different owners- is one Theft only because the
two acts of taking arose from one criminal
resolution.
b) Pp. vs. Jaranilla- 55 SCRA 563- Taking of
6 roosters from a chicken coop considered
single offense.
c) Pp. vs. Emit- G.R. No. L- 13477- accused
run amok and killed several persons, only one
crime of Murder.
 d) Santiago vs. Garchitorena- 46 SCAD or 228
SCRA- there was only one crime committed,
thus the 32 Informations filed should be changed
into one, as this falls under the so-called Delito
Continuado or Continued Crime or Continuous
Crime. The original information charged her of
approving the application for legalization of
several aliens not qualified under the law. This
was committed more or less on October 17,
1988.So the approval could be done by a single
stroke of the pen.
 B) Transitory crime- is also called a moving crime-
where the elements of the crimes happened in different
places, hence the criminal action can be instituted in the
places where any of the elements happened.
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention if
kidnapped in Cebu and detained Mandaue this can be
filed in any of these places.
BP 22- Check was issued in Makati City, but delivered
in Cebu City in payment of the goods obtained can be
filed either in the place of the issuance of the check or
the place where it was used or delivered ( Pp. vs.
Yabut).
 c) Continuing crime- Ex- offense which is
continuing at time Rebellion Garcia-
Padilla vs. Enrile 121 SCRA.
Squatting is a continuous crime
(Dacutanan vs. Pp. August l990).
D) Special Complex crimes Robbery
with Homicide has a penalty of its own
under Art. 294.