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Kaplans Theory of

Indexicals
Introduction to Pragmatics
Elizabeth Coppock
HHU, Summer 2012

Indexicals
Indexical: A word whose referent is dependent
on the context of use, which provides a rule
which determines the referent in terms of
certain aspects of the context.
(Kaplan 1977, Demonstratives, p. 490)

Examples: I, my, you, that, this, here, now,


tomorrow, yesterday, actual, present

Demonstratives
Demonstrative: An indexical that requires an
associated demonstration.

Examples: this, that

Cf. Fillmores gestural uses of deictic terms.

Pure Indexical
Pure indexical: An indexical for which no
demonstration is required.

Example: I, now, here, tomorrow.

(Although here has a demonstrative use:


In two weeks, I will be here [pointing])

Two obvious principles


1. The referent of a pure indexical depends on the
context, and the referent of a demonstrative
depends on the associated demonstration.

2. Indexicals, pure and demonstrative alike, are


directly referential.

Directly referential
An expression is directly referential if its
referent, once determined, is taken as fixed for
all possible circumstances.
(Like Kripkes rigid designators)

Proper names (John) are directly referential


Definite descriptions (the man) are not

Said by me today (in the US):


The president is a Democrat

Alternative World 2

The actual world

Alternative World 1

true

tru

false

Said by me today:
The president is a Democrat

Alternative World 5

Alternative World 3

Alternative World 4

true

false

true

Said by me today:
Barack Obama is a Democrat

Alternative World 2

The actual world

Alternative World 1

true

tru

true

Said by me today:
Barack Obama is a Democrat

Alternative World 5

Alternative World 3

Alternative World 4

true

true

true

Said by Barack Obama today:


I am a Democrat

Alternative World 2

The actual world

Alternative World 1

true

true

true

Said by Barack Obama today:


I am a Democrat

Alternative World 5

Alternative World 3

Alternative World 4

true

true

true

Conclusion
Barack Obama designates the same individual
in every possible world; it is directly referential.

The president can designate different


individuals in different possible worlds.

When Barack Obama says I, he means


Barack Obama. I is directly referential too.

(Complication)
There are so-called descriptive uses of indexicals.
Says a prisoner on death row (Nunberg):
I am traditionally allowed a last meal.
[I a person on death row.]

But nevermind that. Ignore this slide.

Recall: Directly referential


An expression is directly referential if its referent,
once determined, is taken as fixed for all possible
circumstances.
Kaplan continues:
This does not mean it could not have been used to
designate a different object; in a different context,
it might have. But regardless of the circumstance
of evaluation, it picks out the same object.

Alternative World 5
I am a Democrat
Actual World

Context:
Speaker=Obama: true
Context:
Speaker=Obama: true
Speaker=McCain:
false

Speaker=McCain: true

Context vs. Circumstance


Context of utterance: Who is speaking to whom,
where, when, what theyre gesturing to, etc.

Circumstance of evaluation: A possible world at


which the truth of the utterance might be
evaluated.

Direct Reference
The word I, uttered by Barack Obama (or
whoever), picks out the same individual in every
possible world / circumstance of evaluation.

You dont have to look to see what properties


the object has in the possible world in order to
decide what it refers to.
Unlike definite descriptions, whose referent
depends on who is, for example, the president.

The only thing that can affect what I refers to


is who the speaker is (the context).

Fixed/Variable Meaning
The meaning of an indexical like "I" is:
Fixed across all circumstances of evaluation
Variable across contexts of use

The meaning of a definite description is:


Variable across circumstances of evaluation
(Arguably variable across contexts of use as well.)

Same or different
meaning?
May 11, 2010:

I am turning 30
today.

May 12, 2010:

I am turning 30
today.

Same or different
meaning?
May 11, 2010:

I am turning 30
today.

May 12, 2010:

I turned 30
yesterday.

Frege's answer
If somebody wants to say the same today as he
expressed yesterday using the word today, he
must replace this word with yesterday.
Although the thought is the same its verbal
expression must be different so that the sense,
which would otherwise be affected by the
differing times of utterance, is readjusted.

G. Frege, in "The thought: A Logical Inquiry"

Content vs. Character


Character: The aspect of meaning that two
utterances of the same sentence share across
different contexts of utterance.

Content: The proposition expressed by an


utterance, with the referents of all of the
indexicals resolved.

Same character, different


content
May 11, 2010:

I am turning 30
today.

May 12, 2010:

I am turning 30
today.

Same content, different


character
May 11, 2010:

I am turning 30
today.

May 12, 2010:

I turned 30
yesterday.

Strawson made a similar point about


definite descriptions
During the reign of Louis XIV

During the reign of Louis XV

The king of
France is wise.

The king of
France is wise.

Strawson: Meaning as use


Obviously in the case of this sentence, and
equally obviously in the case of many others, we
cannot talk of the sentence being true or false,
but only of its being used to make a true or false
assertion, or (if this is preferred) to express a
true or false proposition. And equally obviously
we cannot talk of the sentence being about a
particular person, for the same sentence may be
used at different times to talk about quite
different particular person, but only of use of the
sentence to talk about a particular person.

Indexicals and Descriptive


Content
Indexicals have descriptive meaning, but this
meaning is relevant only to determining a
referent in a context of use and not to
determining a relevant individual in a
circumstance of evaluation.

I.e., the descriptive meaning is part of the


character, but not the content.

Imagine if it were otherwise!


Suppose I do not exist is true in a
circumstance of evaluation if and only if the
speaker (assuming there is one) of the
circumstance does not exist in the circumstance.
Nonsense! If that were the correct analysis,
what I said could not be true. From which it
follows that:
It is impossible that I do not exist.

Impossibility
Something that is possible is true in at least
one possible world.

Something that is impossible is false at every


possible world.

Something that is necessary is true at every


possible world.

Alternative World 8

The actual world

Alternative World 7

I am here now
This is a logical truth, in the sense that
whenever it is uttered, it is true.

But it is not a necessary truth, because the


circumstances could be otherwise.

Indexicals are weird!


Normally logical truths are necessary truths!
This is the principle of necessitation (or
necessity generalization) in modal logic.
If p is a theorem, then p is a theorem.
theorem: a provable statement
p = "necessarily p"

So indexicals produce "a distinctive and deviant


pattern of logical consequence" (Kaplan, The
Meaning of Ouch and Oops).

Solution
Indexicals have descriptive meaning, but this
meaning is relevant only to determining a
referent in a context of use and not to
determining a relevant individual in a
circumstance of evaluation.

In other words, the descriptive content of an


indexical goes into determining the character,
but not the content.

What is a content?
The content of a sentence is a proposition.
A proposition is a set of possible worlds, or a
mapping from possible worlds to truth values.
e.g. {w1, w3, w4}

Another way of saying it: a proposition


determines the circumstances in which the
sentence is true.
circumstances (of evaluation) = possible worlds.

Another way to think about propositions:


Functions from circumstances to truth values.
e.g. f(w1) = 1, f(w2) = 0, f(w3) = 1, f(w4) = 1, etc.

Intension vs. Extension


The actual truth value of a sentence in a
particular world is its extension.

The proposition that a sentence denotes can be


thought of as a function from circumstances of
evalution to extensions.

Such a function is an intension (Carnap).


Nouns like dog also have intensions and
extensions.

Intension + Possible World => Extension


Content + Circumstance => Extension

What is a character?
The character of a sentence is something that,
given a context of utterance, gives you a
content.

Formally: A function from contexts to contents

The Kaplanian Picture


Character + Context => Content
Content + Circumstance => Extension

Character + Context + Circumstance =>


Extension
Content

Strawson: Meaning as use


Meaning (in at least one important sense) is a
function of the sentence or expression;
mentioning and referring and truth or falsity, are
functions of the use of the sentence or
expression. To give the meaning of an
expression (in the sense in which I am using the
word) is to give general directions for its use to
refer to or mention particular objects or persons;
to give the meaning of a sentence is to give
general directions for its use in making true or
false assertions.
Strawson (1950), On Referring

Kaplan's Reflections on
Demonstratives
In [Demonstratives], I tried to show that by
adding context as a parameter, Strawson's
"conventions for referring" as he calls them,
even if neglected by logicians, could be
accommodated within the range of our methods.
And at the time I regarded my work as
extending current semantical methods just to
the degree necessary to incorporate the
indexicals. I regarded what I was doing as a sort
of epicycle on Carnap's method of extension and
intension and I didn't think of it as involving any
different conception of semantics or what
semantics was supposed to do.

Kaplan's Reflections on
Demonstratives, cont'd
Some years ago, it occurred to me that the
analysis of indexicals in Demonstratives could
be seen as the scientific realization of a
Strawsonian semantics of use. Ask not after
other-worldly meanings, ask only after rules of
use.

--David Kaplan, The Meaning of Ouch and Oops

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