Nuclear

Nonproliferation

Michael Whitaker, Manager

International Safeguards Program
Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Early Nonproliferation Attempts

United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC)
Created on 24 January 1946
Established within the UN
Countries represented on Security Council

UNAEC: The Baruch Plan (June 1946)

International Atomic Development Authority (IADA)
Debates until 1948
First atomic test by USSR, September 1949
UNAEC: Dissolved in 1952

Atoms for Peace Speech

U. S. President Eisenhower on
December 8, 1953 at the United Nations
General Assembly
International recognition of the danger of
nuclear weapons
Realization of the danger of proliferation of
this technology
Promoted development of an international
atomic energy agency
Advanced discussions to limit the use of
nuclear weapons
Promoted peaceful use of nuclear
technology

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Development of the IAEA

Negotiation of the IAEA Statute from 1954 1956
Approved by 81 nations in October 1956
In force July 29, 1957
Establishment of the IAEA is achieved

Amended in 1963, 1973 and 1989

Available at http://www.iaea.org/About/statute.html

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The Statute
Article II - objective is to ensure that special
nuclear materials are only used for peaceful
purposes
Article III Functions:
Assistance with research and development of
nuclear energy
Technical exchange and collaboration
Training of scientists and engineers
Establish and administer safeguards of special
nuclear materials
Safety standards for peaceful atomic purposes

Article XII Agency safeguards

Establishes the rights and responsibilities for the
Agency to apply safeguards in various states
Basis for inspections and responsibilities for
inspectors
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The First IAEA Safeguards Systems

The Agencys Safeguards System of January 1961:
INFCIRC/26
The first extensive Agencys Safeguards System of
February 1965: INFCIRC/66
INFCIRC/66 Rev 1 and 2 (1966 and 1968)
Still applied for certain facilities in India, Israel and Pakistan

1962: First Safeguards Inspection (verification of design of a 3

MW(th) reactor in Norway)

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
Foundation of the nuclear
nonproliferation regime
Background
Missile crisis in Cuba (1962)
France and China joined the
Nuclear Club (1960 and 1964)
Limited Test Ban Treaty (U.S. +
USSR, 1963)

Opened for signature on

1 July 1968, at ceremonies taking
place in London, Moscow, and
Washington, D.C
59 States would become signatories
to the NPT that day
Treaty entered into force in 1970,
following ratification by 40 States
Party
Most widely accepted arms control
agreement with nearly 190 parties
today

Britains Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart (second from

right, seated) signs the NPT on 1 July 1968 at Lancaster
House, London, witnessed by United States Ambassador
David Bruce (far right, seated) and Soviet Ambassador to
Mikhail N. Smirnovsky (second from left, seated).

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)

Adopted June 12, 1968 and entered into force on March 5,
1970
Objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and
weapons technology, to foster the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy, and to further the goal of disarmament
Establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of
the IAEA, which also plays a central role under the Treaty
in areas of technology transfer for peaceful purposes
Article I prohibits NWS from transferring weapons material and
technology to NNWS
Article II prohibits NNWS from receiving such materials and
support
Article III acceptance of safeguards negotiated with each member
state (Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement or CSA)

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The NPT (contd)

Article IV State rights for developing peaceful nuclear programs
Article V shared benefits from peaceful use of nuclear explosive
devices with NNWS
Article VI nuclear weapons disarmament
Article VII regional treaties for nuclear weapons free zones
Article VIII amendment procedures
Article IX membership/signatory procedures
Article X signatory withdrawal in the case of extraordinary
events that relative to the Treaty that jeopardize the supreme
interests of the country
Article XI deposition procedures

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The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
NPT's main objectives:
To stop the further spread of nuclear weapons,
To provide security for non-nuclear weapon states which have given
up the nuclear option,
To encourage international co-operation in the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, and
To pursue negotiations in good faith towards nuclear disarmament
leading to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
Nuclear Weapon States (NWS):
Five states which had detonated a nuclear explosive device before 1
January 1967 [China, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the
United States]
Not to transfer nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices, or their
technology to any non-nuclear weapon state
To pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control (Article VI)

Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWS):

Undertake not to acquire or produce nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive
devices (Article II)

CSA Structure and Content

Information Circular 153 (corrected),
June 1972
Part I
Defines the general structure and content of
agreements for safeguards implementation in
individual States
Defines the roles and responsibilities of the
State and the IAEA relative to safeguards
implementation within the State and nuclear
materials under safeguards
Requires that the State shall establish and
maintain a system of accounting for and
control of nuclear material subject to
safeguards under the Agreement
Addresses implementation and termination of
safeguards

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INFCIRC 153 (contd.)

Part II
Safeguards objective: timely detection of diversion of significant
quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to
the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive
devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion
by the risk of early detection.
Nuclear material accountancy is primary tool
Containment and surveillance are complementary tools

Means to verify the CORRECTNESS of a States declaration

Verification - NDA
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Accountancy - DA

Continuity of Knowledge C&S

International Safeguards
Article III of the NPT
Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept
safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the
International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA
and the Agencys safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the
fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices. ()

International Safeguards
International Safeguards are:
Arrangements to account for and control
the use of nuclear materials
Verification is a key element in the
international system to ensure that
uranium in particular is used only for
peaceful purposes
Nuclear safeguards are a means of
reassurance whereby non-nuclear
weapons states demonstrate to others
that they are abiding by their peaceful
commitments
Specific objective is to verify whether
declared nuclear material remains
within the civil nuclear fuel cycle and
whether or not it is being used solely for
peaceful purposes

International Safeguards
Safeguards inspections
require that:
Operators of nuclear facilities
maintain and declare detailed
accounting records of all
movements and transactions
involving nuclear material
Records and the actual nuclear
material are audited
Inspections by the IAEA are
complemented by other
measures such as surveillance
cameras and instrumentation

International Safeguards
Problems 1980-90s
Iraq, Iran and North Korea illustrate both the strengths and
weaknesses of international safeguards.
While accepting safeguards at declared facilities, Iraq and
Iran had set up elaborate equipment elsewhere in an attempt
to enrich uranium to weapons grade.
North Korea attempted to use research reactors (not
commercial electricity-generating reactors) and a reprocessing
plant to produce some weapons-grade plutonium.

The Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540)

Addresses weakness in traditional safeguards
Iraqs clandestine program discovery in 1991
Issues with verification of State declarations in the DPRK
Strengthens the effectiveness and improves the efficiency of the
safeguards system

Expands the States obligation for providing information on

all nuclear related activities
Complementary and managed access to verify information
Strengthened analysis techniques
Wide area environmental sampling

Multi-entry visas for Agency inspectors to conduct

unannounced inspections

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INFCIRC/540 (contd)
Agency responsibilities to protect sensitive information
National security
Commercially sensitive

Amendments to existing subsidiary arrangements and

facility attachments
Annex I defines activities covered under the AP
Annex II defines equipment subject to the AP
Means for verifying the COMPLETENESS of a States
declaration

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Other Nonproliferation Efforts

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
Protects against unauthorized removal of nuclear material and
sabotage

Nuclear Suppliers Group

Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear related exports
46 participants
Success dependent upon State level rules and regulations

The Zangger Committee

37 members that address specific issues related to Article III,
paragraph 2 of the NPT

Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty

Prohibits production of fissile material for nuclear weapons
Initiated in 1993 but no agreement to date
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Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors

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Technical Cooperation
Government agreements
Interagency reviewed and approved
Broad scope or focused effort
May require State governing body approvals
Not easily accomplished

Organizational agreements
Must be compliant with national rules and regulations
Require detail procedures at the organizational level
Are generally more focused to address specific
technologies

Academia
Fundamental research
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Summary
Nuclear nonproliferation efforts have been ongoing for
more than 50 years
The creation of the IAEA and enforcement of the NPT
emphasizes importance the international community places
on reducing the threat of nuclear weapons
170 States have safeguards agreements in force
89 have signed and ratified both a CSA and the AP
52 were verified to have no diversion of fissile materials and no
indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities

The IAEA encourages technical collaboration between

States
This collaboration provides advancements in safeguards
technology and methods that strengthen safeguards
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Continued success is dependent upon international support

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References
http://www.iaea.org/About/history_speech.html
http://www.iaea.org/About/statute.html
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others
/infcirc153.pdf
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/i
nfcirc540c.pdf
Van Sickle, M., Kovacic, D., International Safeguards 101:
Introduction and Overview, January 2010
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2002/sgarticle_02.sh
tml
Rauf, T., Drawing Safeguards Conclusions, Presentation to
the 2004 NPT Preparatory Committee, April 29, 2004

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