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Understanding Economics

6th edition
by Mark Lovewell

Copyright 2012 by McGraw-Hill Ryerson


Limited. All rights reserved.

Understanding
Economics
6th edition
by Mark Lovewell

Chapter 6
Monopoly and Imperfect
Competition
Copyright 2012 by McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited. All rights reserved.

Learning Objectives
After this chapter you will be able to:
1. outline the demand conditions faced by
monopolists, monopolistic competitors, and
oligopolists
2. distinguish how monopolists, monopolistic
competitors, and oligopolists maximize profits
3. understand nonprice competition, and the
arguments over industrial concentration

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Monopolists Demand

A monopolists demand curve is the same as


for the entire market
it is downward sloping

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Demand Faced by a Monopolist


Figure 6.1, Page 145

Demand Curve for Megacomp

Demand Schedule
for Megacomp

($ millions per
computer)
$160
120
80

(computers
per year)
1
2
3

160

Price ($ millions
per computer)

Quantity
Demanded

Price

200
a
b

120

80

40
0

Quantity (computers per year)

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Monopolistic Competitors Demand

A monopolistic competitors demand curve is


elastic because of many substitutes for the
businesss product

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Demand Faced by a Monopolist


Competitor
Figure 6.2, Page 146
Demand Curve for Jaded Palate

Demand Schedule for


Jaded Palate
Price
($ per meal)
$11
10
9
8

(meals per
day)
100
200
300
400

12

Price ($ per meal)

Quantity
Demanded

10
8

6
4
2
0

100

200

300

400

Quantity (meals per day)

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Oligopolists Demand
Oligopolies are characterized by mutual
interdependence.
Oligopolists in a market characterized by
rivalry face a kinked demand curve.

A business raising price finds rivals keep theirs

constant, so demand is relatively flat.


A business reducing price finds rivals raise
theirs as well, so demand is relatively steep.

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Actions and Reactions among Rivals in an


Oligopoly
Figure 6.3, Page 147
Action of
Company A

Probable
Response of
Competitors

raise price

keep prices
constant

lower price

match price
drop

Effect on
Company As
Market Share

Company As
Quantity
Demanded

product now
high-priced, so
market share
falls

large increase
as market share
lost to
competitors

since all
companies
selling at lower
price, Company
As market share
stays constant

small increase
as lower prices
for all
companies
attract new
buyers

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Demand Faced Among Rivals in an


Oligopoly
Figure 6.4, Page 147

Price

Quantity
Demanded

($ thousands
per car)

(thousands
of cars per year)

$35
30
20
10

10
20
25
30

Demand Curve for Centaur Cars

Price ($ thousands per car)

Demand Schedule
For Centaur Cars

40
30
20
D

10

10

20

30

Quantity (thousands of cars per year)

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Cooperative Oligopolies

There are various ways that oligopolists can


cooperate:
price leadership
collusion
cartel

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Revenue Conditions for a Monopolist


A monopolists average revenue is the same
as the downward-sloping market demand
curve.
A monopolists marginal revenue is below its
demand curve because demand (average
revenue) falls as quantity increases.

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Revenues for a Monopolist


Figure 6.5, Page 149
Revenue Curves for Megacomp

Price
(P)

Quantity
(Q)

Total
Revenue
(TR)
(P x Q)

Marginal
Revenue
(MR)
(TR/Q)
($
($ millions
millions (computer
per
per
s per
($ millions) computer)
computer
year)
0
$ 0
)
$160
$160
1
160
80
120
2
240
0
80
3
240
-80
40
4
160

Average
Revenue
(AR)
(TR/Q)
($ millions
per
computer)
$160/1 =
160
240/2 = 120
240/3 = 80
160/4 = 40

$ Millions per Computer

Revenue Schedules for Megacomp

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200
160
120
80
40

D=AR

0
-40
-80

MR
Quantity of Computers per Year

Profit-Maximization for a Monopolist


(a)
A monopolist maximizes profit at the quantity
where marginal revenue and marginal cost are
equal. At this output, the monopolist charges
the highest possible price, as found using the
demand curve.
Monopolists meet neither the minimum-cost
pricing nor the marginal-cost pricing
conditions.

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Profit Maximization for a Monopolist (b)


Figure 6.6, Page 150

$160
120
80
40

Quantity
(Q)
(computer
s per
year)
0
1
2
3
4

$ Millions per computer

Price
(P)
(AR)
($ millions
per
computer)

Profit Maximization Table for Megacomp


Total
Revenue
(TR)
(P x Q)
($ millions)
$ 0
160
240
240
160

Marginal
Marginal Cost Average Cost
(AC)
Revenue
(MC)
(MR)
(TR/Q)
($ millions per($ millions per
computer)
($ millions per
computer)
computer)
$160
$ 60
$140
80
40
90
0
70
83
-80
150
100

Profit Maximization Graph for Megacomp


200

MC

160
12
09
80
0

b
c

40
0

AC

Profit = $60 million

a
1

MR
2

Quantity of Computers per Year


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Other Features of
Monopolies

A monopolist charges a higher price and a


lower quantity than would occur if the market
were perfectly competitive.
Regulators of monopolies usually adopt
average-cost pricing in an effort to make
regulated monopolies break even.

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Monopoly versus Perfect Competition


Figure 6.7, Page 151

$ per T-Shirt

S(=MC)

4
b

MR
0

18 000

22 000

Quantity of T-Shirts per Day

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Revenue Conditions for a


Monopolistic Competitor
A monopolistic competitors average revenue
is the same as its downward-sloping demand
curve.
A monopolistic competitors marginal revenue
is below its demand curve because demand
(average revenue) falls as quantity increases.

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Revenues for a Monopolistic


Competitor
Figure 6.8, Page 154
Revenue Schedules for Jaded Palate
Price
(P)
($ meal)

Total
Revenue
(TR)
(P x Q)
$
0
1100
2000
2700
3200

Marginal
Revenue
(MR)
(TR/Q)
1100/100 = $11
900/100 = 9
700/100 = 7
500/100 = 5

Revenue Curves for Jaded Palate


12
10

$ per Meal

$-11
10
9
8

Quantity
(Q)
(meals per
day)
0
100
200
300
400

D=
AR

6
MR

4
2
0

100

200

300

400

Quantity of Meals per Year


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Average
Revenue
(AR)
TR/Q)
1100/100 = $11
2000/200 = 10
2700/300 = 9
3200/400 = 8

Profit-Maximization for a Monopolistic


Competitor (a)
The profit-maximizing quantity for a
monopolistic competitor is found where
marginal revenue and marginal cost are equal.
Price is found with the aid of the businesss
demand curve.
In the short run a monopolistic competitor
may make a profit or a loss at its profitmaximizing point.

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Profit-Maximization for a Monopolistic


Competitor (b)

In the long run, a monopolistic competitor


breaks even.

If profits (losses) are being made in the short


run, new businesses enter (leave) the industry,
pushing businesses demand curves leftward
(rightward) and making them more (less)
elastic.

The business meets neither the minimum-cost


pricing nor the marginal-cost pricing rules,
since too few units of output are produced.
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Profit Maximization for a Monopolistic


Competitor (c)
Figure 6.9, Page 155
Short-Run Profit Maximization
For Jaded Palate

Long-Run Profit Maximization


For Jaded Palate

MC

$ per Meal

8.00

AC
D0

MR
200
Quantity of Meals per Day

e
7.50

MC

AC

minimum point
of AC
D1

$ per Meal

10.00

d
MR
0

150
Quantity of Meals per Day

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Revenue Conditions for an


Oligopolist
For an oligopolist in a market characterized by
rivalry, average revenue is identical with its
kinked demand curve.
This businesss marginal revenue curve has
two linear segments which are below its
kinked demand curve

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Profit-Maximization for an Oligopolist


(a)
The profit-maximizing quantity for this type of
oligipolist is found where marginal revenue
and marginal cost are equal. Price is found
using the businesss kinked demand curve.
Oligopolists meet neither the minimum-cost
pricing nor the marginal-cost pricing rules.

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Profit Maximization for an


Oligopolist (b)
Figure 6.10, Page 157
Profit Maximization Graph for
Centaur Cars
Profit Maximization Table for Centaur Cars
Total
Price
Marginal Marginal
Average
Revenue
(P)
Revenue
Cost
Cost
(TR)
(=AR)
(MR)
(MC)
(AC)
(P x Q) (TR/Q)
($ thousands (thousands
($
($
($
of cars per
($
Per car)
thousands thousands thousands
year)
millions) per car)
per car)
per car)

-$35
30
20
10

0
10
20
25
30

0
35
0
60
0
50
0
30
0

35
25
20
40

15
10
15
25

30
20
19
20

40

$ Thousands per car

Quantity
(Q)

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30

MC

Profit = $200 million

20

10

0
-10

10

20

30

-20
-30
-40

MR

Quantity (thousands of cars per year)

AC

Game Theory
Game theory is the analysis of how mutually

interdependent actors try to achieve their


goals through the use of strategy.
Originally a field in mathematics, game theory
has become a set of concepts whose use has
spread to all social sciences, especially
economics.

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The Prisoners Dilemma


(a)
The prisoners dilemma is a classic example

of how players self-interested actions can be


self-defeating.
It refers to a case in which two arrested men

are in separate cells and are facing the choice


of whether or not to confess. If both confess,
each gets a jail time of 5 years. If one confesses
and the other doesnt, the confessor gets off
and the other gets 10 years. If both dont
confess, they each get one year of jail.
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The Prisoners Dilemma


(b)
By following a narrowly self-interested

strategy that minimizes his own potential


harm, each prisoner has an incentive to
confess, even though the best possible result
would be if both stayed silent.

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The Prisoners Dilemma


Figure 6.11, Page 159
Pauls Strategies

Confess
Dont Confess

Peters Strategies

Confess

Dont Confess
Paul: 5

Peter: 5

Paul: 10
Peter: 0

Paul: 0
Peter: 10

Paul: 1
Peter: 1

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Applying the Prisoners Dilemma to


Oligopoly (a)
The prisoners dilemma can be applied

to oligopoly by looking at two businesses


that have entered a collusive agreement
to charge a high price.
If both businesses live by the
agreement, they each make $20 million
in profit. If one cheats and the other
doesnt, the cheater makes $25 million
in profit and the other makes $10
million. If both cheat, they each make
$15 million.
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Applying the Prisoners Dilemma to


Oligopoly (b)
If price cutting can be accomplished in an

underhanded way, each business has an


incentive to cheat, since the profit for the
cheater (when the other business is living
within the agreement) is higher than
otherwise.
But if both businesses cheat, each makes a
lower profit than they would do if both lived
within the agreement.
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The Case of Oligopoly


Figure 6.12, Page 160
Deltas Strategies

Dont Cheat

Cheat

D: $20 m.

G: $20 m.

D: 25 m.

G: $10 m.

D: $10 m.
Cheat

Gammas Strategies

Dont Cheat

G: $25 m.

D: 15 m.
G: $15 m.

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Anti-Combines
Legislation (a)
Anti-combines legislation represents laws

aimed at preventing industrial concentration


and abuses of market power.
The Competition Act of 1986 was a major
reform of Canadas anti-combines legislation.

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Anti-Combines
Legislation (b)
Criminal offences under the Competition Act

include:
conspiracy
bid-rigging
predatory pricing
abuse of dominant position

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Anti-Combines
Legislation (c)
Civil matters reviewed by the Competition

Tribunal include:
abuse of dominant position
mergers

horizontal merger
vertical merger
conglomerate merger

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Nonprice Competition

Nonprice competition by monopolistic


competitors and oligopolists includes:
product differentiation
advertising

Nonprice competition raises a businesss


revenue and costs.
Nonprice competition may or may not be
beneficial to businesses and consumers.

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Industrial Concentration

Industrial concentration refers to market


domination by a few large businesses.
It can provide the consumer with benefits due

to increasing returns to scale.


It can impose costs on the consumer due to
market power.
It may or may not encourage technical
innovation.

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Concentration Ratios
Industrial concentration is measured using

concentration ratios.
The four-firm concentration ratio shows the
percentage of total sales revenue in a market
earned by the four largest business firms.
Concentration ratios overestimate
competition in localized markets and
underestimate it in global markets.

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Concentration Ratios in Selected Canadian


Industries (1988)
Figure 6.13, Page 166

Tobacco products
Petroleum and coal products
Transportation
Beverages
Metal mining
Paper and allied industries
Electrical products
Printing, publishing, and allied
industries
Food
Finance
Machinery
Retail trade
Clothing industries
Construction

Share of Industry Sales


by Four Largest
Businesses

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98.9
74.5
68.5
59.2
58.9
38.9
32.1
25.7
19.6
16.4
11.3
9.7
6.6
2.2

Concentration in the Canadian Economy


(1999)
Figure 6.14, Page 167
Share of Assets and Share of Revenues for
Enterprises with $75 million or More in
Revenues
Asset
Revenues
s
Foreign
26.2
Canadian
18.9
30.5
57.8
56.7
76.7

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The Games People Play


(a)
Thomas Schelling applied game theory

principles to military strategy, showing how


the most effective deterrence during the
nuclear arms race between the US and the
Soviet Union was not first-strike capability, but
second-strike capability.
He explained this using the example of two

gunfighters in a threatened shootout, who


would both be loath to shoot if both were
assured of living long enough to shoot back
with unimpaired aim.
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The Games People Play


(b)
Schelling also showed how, in many ordinary

social situations, a divergence between what


people are motivated to do individually and
what they would like to accomplish
collectively creates conditions for breaking the
laissez faire principle.
One example is the rationing of electricity

during summer shortages. In this case, rulesbased rationing makes more sense than merely
appealing to peoples civic virtue, says
Schelling.
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Pumping up Price (OLC)


The Role of OPEC
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries is an example of a cartel that has


had some success in the past in influencing
the global price of oil.
During the 1970s, OPEC members used
market-sharing agreements to significantly
raise this price.

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Pumping up Price (OLC)


OPEC in the 1980s
In the 1980s, the oil price fell and OPECs

influence waned. This was due to:


a reduction in quantity demanded a delayed

reaction to the high prices of the 1970s


increases in quantity supplied by non-OPEC
producers
cheating by some OPEC members, who secretly
raised output to counteract reduced prices, and
thereby made the price reductions even greater

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Pumping up Price (OLC)


OPEC in the 1990s and 2000s
During the 1990s and the early 2000s,

despite continuing conflicts within OPEC, oil


prices were driven much higher, due to a
variety of factors, including political
considerations:
the Iraq War and its aftermath
tensions between the West and Iran

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One for Another (OLC) (a)


The medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas

provided a comprehensive world view that


included a treatment of economic issues.
He argued that lending for interest was unfair
to borrowers.
According to this view, interest payments bring

into question the stability of the monetary


system, since they seem to presume that
money necessarily depreciates in value.

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One for Another (OLC) (b)


The condemnation of what was then called

usury was virtually impossible to enforce, with


interest being hidden by lenders in other
payments made by borrowers.

Aquinas extended Aristotles theory of

exchange by refining the notion of a just price.


Whereas Aristotle believed that selling for a

price higher than one paid was unethical,


Aquinas recognized traders deserved a return
that covered more than out-of-pocket costs.

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One for Another (OLC) (c)


Aquinass followers gradually extended the idea

of the just price so that it came to be seen as


the value of an item that allowed producers to
maintain their customary position in society.
The notion of the just price is still used today,
for example in markets governed by price
controls.

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Understanding Economics
6th edition
by Mark Lovewell

Chapter 6
The End
Copyright 2012 by McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited. All rights reserved.

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