Stress Corrosion Cracking

Overview & Introduction

SCC History
Not a recent phenomenon
Not exclusive to pipelines
Not confined to underground
environment
Not geographically limited
Ammonia cracking of cartridge brass
Chloride cracking of stainless steel

Requirements for SCC

Environment

Metallurgy

Stress

SCC Characteristics
Factor
Location

High pH
CS discharges
Wet-dry soils
Aggressive soil

Temperature Exponential
temperature
impact

Neutral pH
Anywhere
Wet-dry soils
Aggressive soil
Little apparent
effect

SCC Characteristics
Factor

High pH

Neutral pH

Electrolyte

Carbonatebicarbonate
pH > 9.3

Dilute bicarbonate
5.5 < pH <7.5
Higher CO2

Potential

-600 to 750 mV Free potential

Cracks

Intergranular
Narrow
Not corroded

Transgranular
Wider
May be corroded

SCC near Seam Weld

Metallography of SCC

Summary of Incident Causes

ASME Causes of Gas Transmission Incidents
Third Party Damage
External Corrosion
Internal Corrosion
Natural Forces
Misc
Incorrect Operation
Unknown

Non-Pipe
Pipe

Other Failures
Constr/Instal
Mfr
Prev. Damgd Pipe
Malfunction
Stress Corrosion Cracking
Vandalism
0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

14.0

Summary of Significance
Natural gas transmission(1985-2002)
15 of 1415 total reported incidents

Liquid transmission (PPTS)

5 of 472 in database

NEB (Canada) (1992-2002)

3 of 23
None since 1995

Overall - about 1% of incidents

Why Todays Interest?

Other, higher significance threats also
being addressed

Other Threats (B31.8S)

External Corrosion
Internal Corrosion
Manufacturing Defects
Welding & Fabrication Defects
Equipment Failure
Third Party / Mechanical Damage
Incorrect Operations
Weather & Outside Force

External & Internal Corrosion

CP systems
Gas quality standards and monitoring
Relatively mature ILI capability
Correlated to hydro-test capability
Rapidly maturing DA capabilities

Manufacturing & Construction

Specifications - materials & construction

Advances in materials technology
Mill inspections
Construction inspections
Proof testing

Third Party Damage

Dig Safety
Common Ground Alliance
One Call enforcement
Enhanced public awareness

Incorrect Operation

Operator Qualification programs

Qualification of controllers
OQ-2
B31Q

Equipment Failure

Gaskets, Seals, Valves, Pumps, etc.

Generally not pipe
Generally confined
Specifications, testing, maintenance

Weather & Outside Forces

Design & Construction

Forecasting
Monitoring
Better understanding of material
responses

Why Todays Interest?

Other, higher significance threats also
being addressed
Less apparent understanding
Small, but widespread, occurrence
Methods of addressing not as mature
Inspection, characterization, assessment,
management

Todays Workshop
Share available information
Understand application of current
management techniques
Update on R&D
Future Needs
Technology development
Regulatory approach

Managing SCC
Operators have found & managed SCC
Tools as prescribed in PLSIA of 2002
In-Line Inspection
Hydrostatic Testing
Direct Assessment
Other

All have specific capabilities & limitations

Gas - Liquid Pipeline Differences

Major Challenges
Finding SCC
Shallow cracks initially
May not be visible to unaided eye

Gas - Liquid technology differences

Service disruptions
Water disposal
Assessing what is found
Mitigation and Management

Research & Development

Multi-faceted approach
Environmental factors
Surface preparation & coatings
CP system operation
Operational factors
Material behavior
Detection & sizing

Regulatory Response
Determining reasonable response
Setting investigation protocols
Communication needs

Upcoming Panels

Operator Experience with Finding and

Managing SCC
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

TransCanada
Enbridge
Kinder Morgan
Duke
Williams
Colonial

Upcoming Panels
R&D
Whats been done
Current work
Future needs
PRCI
ILIA
NACE

Upcoming Panels
Regulators
Concerns & Needs
NEB
EUB
MNOPS
USDOT-OPS

Contacts
Dave.L.Johnson@Enron.com
KLeewis@PRCI.org