NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY OF MALAYSIA

FACULTY OF DEFENCE AND MANAGEMENT STUDIES -Department

of Strategic Studies-

Irregular Warfare:
Terrorism and Insurgency
(DUS 2022)
Prepared by:
Mior Roslan bin Mior Mohd Jaafar
23rd March 2011

Irregular Warfare:
Terrorism and Insurgency

At the heights of the period in irregular

warfare (1962-1965) known as war of
national liberation Robert Talbert a
journalist described the situation in Cuba
as
The guerilla fighter's war is political and
social, his means are at least as political as
they are in military, his purpose almost
entirely so. Thus we may paraphrase
Clausewitz: Guerilla war is the extension of
politics by means of armed conflict

Irregular Warfare:
Terrorism and Insurgency

The aim of this chapter is to

demonstrate that the spirit of
Clausewitz is still very much relevant
to current and future terrorist and
irregular campaign
Religious, social, cultural, and
economic factors shapes the conduct
of irregular conflict
Terrorist and Insurgents ultimately
seek to achieve political from their

Related Terminology

Freedom Fighter- suggest heroism

Guerilla rebellion and Che Guevara
Political violence
Terrorism
Irregular warfare
Military operations other than war (MOOTW)
Low-intensity conflict
Peoples war
Revolutionary warfare
Guerilla warfare
Hybrid warfare

Definitions
Terrorism : the sustained
(continued) use of violence against
symbolic or civilian targets by small
groups for political purpose, such as
inspiring fear, drawing widespread
attention to a political grievance,
and/or provoking a draconian (zalim)
or unsustainable (tidak boleh
bertahan) response..

 Terrorism cannot result in change on its own

Terrorism is to provoke a response terrorist
hope their opponent will overreact
Some claimed that terrorism is a tactic in
the strategy of insurgency or a strategy of
terrorism
Hijacking, remote bombing, and
assassination are criminal acts but the legal
status can change if the violence is carried
out for a recognized political cause

Two examples
The bombings conducted by anarchists against
monarch in late 19th century and early 20th Century
is considered as act of terrorism because their stated
objective was to change the political environment
The pizza bomber in 2004 in Pennsylvania was
considered as criminal act because the motivation
was financial gain
The motives is politic- who will recognize them
Terrorist seek attention for their cause to generate
domestic and international empathy (sympathy)- for
the reason why they take up arms

Definition
The problem of defining Insurgency
Insurgency is not conventional war or
terrorism
But it use force to achieve political end
The difference between terrorism and
insurgency is the scope and scale of the
violence
Insurgency attempts to effect political
change through force of arms where as
terrorism cannot effect change on its own.

The difference between irregular and

conventional war :
Conventional war involve enemy more or less
the same(symmetric) in equipment, training
and doctrine
In insurgency the enemy is asymmetric (not the
same) the weaker is almost a sub-state group
attempts to bring political change by using
guerilla tactics
Guerilla tactics hit - and run raids and
ambushes the local security forces

 Insurgency, unlike terrorism, is

characterized by support and
mobilization of significant of the
population
Each insurgencies has its character
and type but the objective is always
the same obtaining political power
and control
For insurgent to succeed , they have
external physical and moral support

Subvert the System:

The Theory and Practice of Irregular
Warfare
Those undertaking insurgency and terrorism are
trying to find way to use their strengths, (mobility,
organization and anonymity), against the
weaknesses of their more powerful enemy
Bernard FallWhen a country is being subverted (undermined), it is
being out-administered, not out fought
Subversion is time- consuming and resource
-intensive activity that does not guarantee success
Insurgent achieve success by gaining an advantage
over their adversaries in terms of time, space,
legitimacy (legality) and or support

 The goal of irregular leader is to pit the

organization's strength against the enemy
weaknesses
Time is the most important element
required for the successful conclusion of an
insurgent and terrorist campaign
With sufficient time, an insurgent can
organize, sap the resolve (keazaman)
of its enemy, and build a conventional
force capable of seizing control of the state

Time
Time is the most important element
to ensure success of an insurgent
and terrorist campaign
This is a commodity to make up for
other weaknesses
Malayan Emergency 40 years
through negotiation
LTTE 35 years

Space
Space allow irregulars to decide where and when to fight.
If their enemy appears in big numbers, they make use of
space to withdraw and fight when the odds are in their
favour
The defending forces cannot be every where at once , this
can make their forces too thinly and open to guerilla forces
Guerilla exploit the formidable (difficult) terrain to their
advantage to offset technological advantage of enemy
Example-Mujahiddin used this Afghan terrain to fight the
USSR, Vietcong use the jungle landscape to fight the US
Urban Terrain also can be difficult eg Chechen guerilla
using building and narrow roads to offset their weaknesses

 Force-to space ratio influence the course

and duration of insurgencies
Insurgent will always find to achieve tactical
superiority
Govt.forces will always give priority to
defence territory or resources that have
political, economic, social and military value
Force-to space ratio does not require
irregulars to operate over a huge
geographic area in order to be successful

Support
Support is a very important element
Insurgent needs supply, ammunitions,
intelligence, medical supply etc..
Violence without political purpose will
generate little support
Without support insurgent or terrorist will
succumb to the efforts of the state.
Insurgent or terrorist can look for support
from domestic and external sympathizer

 Support can be forced from the

population
Although Maos anology about the
relationship between guerilla and the
people is like fish that swim in a
sea and has become a cliche but
some still said it still evocative

Ligitimacy
Insurgents and terrorists fighting irregular wars
require internal and external support to sustain their
struggle
They often seek to legitimize their use of violence,
obtain support for their cause, supplanting the
function of the stae at the local level
Moral superiority of the guerillas is a cornerstone of
all irregular and terrorists theory
Mao introduce the code of conduct for the guerilla
known as The three rules and Eight remarks as a
way to demonstrate their moral superiority

 The most important job of the guerilla is to

demonstrate this moral superiority when in
contact with the people so that they are not
branded as bandits or counter-revolutionaries
Govt brutallity only allows insurgent to act as
avengers of the people
Absolute popular support can never be
guaranteed. Populations usually are split into
willing assistants, staunch foes and undecided
majority

 The most powerful method in

legitimizing a struggle is to link
military operations with a justifiable
political ends
Causes vary, self-determination has
been the most common and
successful rallying cry
Eg CPM war against the British rule

Maos 3 Rules and 8

Remarks
Remarks
Rules
1. All actions are subject
to command
2. Do not steal from the
people
3. Be neither selfish or
unjust

1. Replace the doors when you

leave the house
2. Roll up the bedding when
you have slept
3. Be courteous
4. Be honest in your transaction
5. Return what you borrow.
6. Replace what you break.
7. Do not bathe in the presence
of women
8. Do not without authority
search the pocketbooks of
those you arrest

Maos Three Stages of Insurgency

Stage 1, Strategic Defensive

In this stage is to avoid at all cost of
set piece battles. Tactical offensives
are carried out to stretch enemy
resources. The moral superiority of
guerilla is established with the
population, political indoctrination is
carried out and new recruits are
trained to fight as irregulars in
remote, safe bases

Maos Three Stages of

Insurgency
Stage II, Stalemate
This stage is the stage of long battle to attrit
the enemy physical and moral strength.
Govt. control is targeted and representative
killed or force to leave
Govt. presence in rural areas are neutralized,
population are drawn upon for moral and
physical support.
Support obtain to built strong conventional
main force

Maos Three Stages of

Insurgency
Stage III, Strategic offensive
The end game of the conflict, where
popular and main forces conduct
battle of maneuver and use
overwhelming force to destroy
decimated (destroyed) enemy forces
in their defensive positions

Key Points
Time is important element in the
success of insurgencies
Terrain is important to offset
weaknesses and gain tactical advantage
including force-to-space superiority
Support is dependent on legitimacyderived internally or externally
Moral justification provides the cornerstone to sustain the struggle.

Protecting The System:

Counter-insurgency and Counterterrorism in Theory and Practice
Difficulties facing governments besieged by
insurgents or terrorists may seem
insurmountable (difficult to address)
However, Brigadier General Samuel Griffith
suggested in 1961 that antiguerilla
operations could be summed up in 3 words:
1. Location,
2. Isolation
3. Eradication

Protecting The System:

Counter-insurgency and Counter-terrorism in Theory
and Practice
Location
Most important phase in counter-insurgency or counter
terrorism campaign is recognizing the threat
This is the phase of subversion and organization at this stage
to distinguish between lawful or unlawful forms of discontent
Caution-Restricting freedom and rights will undermine the
credibility of government
Waiting too long to uphold the rule of law will give terrorist to
build strength
Upholding the law is crucial to maintain govt. legitimacy over
terrorist and insurgent
Once threat is identifies, various civil and military agencies
must localize the problem and coordinate operation.

Protecting The System:

Counter-insurgency and Counter-terrorism in Theory
and Practice
Isolation
Next step, we must isolate insurgents and terrorist from
their bases of support
Isolation can take the form of physical separation or
political alienation
Physical separation means-preventive measures such as
curfews, no-go areas, food rationing e.g Briggs Plan
Isolation means limiting mobility and range of insurgents
or terrorist i.e taking away their space and time.
Cutt off external source of support through diplomatic
pressure and military measure
Next important agenda-is defusing the irregular most
powerful assets : its political message

Protecting The System:

Counter-insurgency and Counter-terrorism in Theory
and Practice

The words of the government must be

accompanied by effective deeds to show
that the state can and will respond to what
amount of political extortion
The citizen must be convince that the state
fight is their fight
Insurgents or terrorist cause must be
discredited
Winning the heart and minds e.g. Ops
Bamboo in Malaysia-(Sir Gerald Templer)

Protecting The System:

Counter-insurgency and Counter-terrorism in Theory
and Practice

Eradication
Eradication involves the physical
destruction of the insurgents or
terrorist. According to Robert Taber
extermination and turning the
territory harboring resistance into
desert
The eradication of insurgent is often
a slow process and will take different
forms in different political and

Irregular Warfare Now and

Future
Culture
According to Samuel Huntington in 1996, future conflict on
a macro level will result from differences in culture
between incompatible civilisation
At micro level, sub state warrior cultures will become the
predominant irregular threat
States go to war with one another to achieve political aims
The 4GW-fourth generation warfare (chechnya, Somalia,
Congo, Afghanistan and Iraq) is wage by network of
warriors
Political aims does not matter to Somali Clansmen-Warriors
cultures dictates goals-honor, plunder and manhoodinstead of political

Irregular Warfare Now and

Future
Observers argue that future violence will be
ethnic or identity based
Clausewitz s trinity of war people, the
state and armed forces is irrelevant
Religious fanaticism
Religious belief often shape terrorist or
insurgent causes
History has shown that religion has been a
powerful stimulus for political violence
(muslims, christian, sikh, Jews etc)

Irregular Warfare Now and

Future
Technology
WMD
Information technology-future
irregular wars will be fought in
cyberspace-terrorist can become
cyber terrorist through the World
Wide Web

Conclusion
States will be plagued (jangkiti) by terrorism and
irregular warfare as long as individual are willing to
use violence for political purpose
Terrorism and irregular warfare have been used to
change political system and acquire power
Religion,Culture, ethnicity and technology remain
important elements of irregular warfare
The use of irregular method of war is to achieve
political result e.g. redress political imbalance.
Terrorist use of WMD is very frightening-e.g. Shoko
Asahara the spiritual leader of Aum Shinrikyo cultchemical and biological agent

 Warrior cultures may be seen as individual

violence but at the root of their struggle is
the quest for political autonomy, control
and power
So, is the trinity of Clausewitz no longer
relevant?
Violence not subordinated to policy serves
no purpose. Violence undertaken for
personal gain or financial or enhance
reputation is a criminal act.