Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Dualism(s)
Pro
Qualia
Con
Simplicity
Irreducibility of psychology
The Zombie Argument
The Cartesian Essentialist
Argument
Essentialist Argument
It is conceivable that ones mind might exist without
ones body
Whatever is conceivable is logically possible
Therefore, it is possible ones mind might exist without
ones body
Empirical Argument
The complexity and flexibility of human behavior,
including linguistic behavior, couldnt be achieved by
mere mechanism so we need to assume some nonphysical substance as an explanation for such behavior.
Epiphenomenalism
Motivation for Epiphenomenalism
All physical events have sufficient causes that are
themselves physical events
But some mental eventsqualitative states, the what-it-islike experienceseem to be irreducibly nonphysical: it
seems implausible to identify them with brain events.
Problem: intuitively some mental states cause behavior
E. g. pain causes people to wince
Moreover, part of what we mean by pain seems to involve
an association* of with characteristic behavior
*Well leave association intentionally vague
(Philosophical) Behaviorism
Motivation
We want to hold that there are no irreducibly non-physical
causes of physical events
But we also need to accommodate the fact that what we
mean by terms designating mental states involves an
association with characteristic behavior.
Problems
Intuitively, theres more to some mental states: the problem
of qualia
Intuitively, there can be less to mental states: its
conceivable that one may be in a given state without even
being disposed to characteristic behavioror that one may
be disposed to uncharacteristic behavior
Dispositions arent causes so, while behaviorism associates
mental states with behavior, they still dont cause behavior.
Motivation
We want to hold that there are no irreducibly nonphysical causes of physical events
But we also want to understand them as inner states
that are causally responsible for behavior
Problems
Qualia again: intuitively there is more to consciousness
than brain states
Species chauvinism: if we identify a type of mental
state, e.g. pain, with a type of brain state that is
responsible for pain in humans, e.g. the firing of C-fibers,
what do we do about non-humans who dont have the
same kind of brain states but who, we believe, can
never the less have the same kind of mental states?
Functionalism
What makes something a mental state of a particular type does
not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it
functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a
part.
Note: function here related also to function in math sense.
Topic Neutrality: mental state concepts dont specify their
intrinsic character, whether physical or non-physicalthats a
matter for empirical investigation.
So Functionalism is in principle compatible with both
physicalism and dualism
Multiple Realizability: A single mental kind (property, state,
event) can be "realized" by many distinct physical kinds.
The same type of mental state could, in principle, be
realized by different physical (or non-physical) states
Disagreement about how liberal we should be in this regard
An Example: Pain
Were interested in analyzing or ordinary concept of pain
We understand it in terms of its causal role
As being typically produced by certain stimuli, e.g. bodily
injury
As tending to produce certain behavior, e.g. wincing
As producing further mental states, e.g. resolving to
avoid those stimuli in the future
We recognize that different kinds of physical (of nonphysical) mechanisms may play that role
Compare to other functional concepts like can opener
We leave empirical questions to empirical investigation
Some Chatbots
Eliza
Alice
Suzette
Jack the Ripper
POMO generator
Poetry generator
ChatbotCollection
WF
F
ENIAC
How is the question (of whether a machine could pass the Turing
Test) related to the question of whether a machine can think?
Behaviorism?
The new problem has the advantage of drawing a fairly sharp line
between the physical and intellectual capacities of a man. No
engineer or chemist claims to be able to produce a material which
is indistinguishable from the human skinbut even supposing this
invention available we should feel there was little point in trying to
make a thinking machine more human by dressing it up in such
artificial flesh.
What matters for intelligenceor whatever Turing is testing for?
Does the right stuff (brain-stuff, spiritual substance, or
whatever) matter?
Does the right internal structure or pattern of inner workings
matter? If so, at what level of abstraction?
Does the right history, social role or interaction with
environment beyond interrogation and response in the Turing
Test matter?
Some questions:
Zombies. On this account it would be a contingent fact
that intelligent computers (or humans) had souls
soulless zombies could perfectly simulate ensouled
humans or machines.
Are souls, if there are such things, what matter for
consciousness (vide Locke)
We should also ask whether various items on the list are requirements
for intelligence or whether were building in a species-chauvinistic
requirement that would exclude intelligent beings that arent like us
humans.
Final Objections
Argument from Continuity of the Nervous System
Response: a digital machine can imitate an analogue machine
Argument from the Informality of Behaviour
Response: no reason to think human behavior is any less rulegoverned
Argument from Extrasensory Perception
Taking ESP seriously, we could find ways to rule it out by
putting competitors in a telepathy-proof room. Surely, even if
ESP were a reality it wouldnt be any more of a requirement
for intelligence than the ability to appreciate strawberries and
cream.
Learning
In fact computers can, at least learn and, unless weve
established independently that they arent intelligent, no
reason to deny that this constitutes genuine learning.
Intentionality Objection
Semantic Externalism