Masood Ur Rehman Khattak

Lecturer
Department of Politics and I.R

A N A N A LY S IS O F A LQ A ED A A S A
TR A N S N ATIO N A L
M ILITA N T G R O U P

O utline
1. Introduction
2. Al Qaedas Agenda/Goals
3. Measures to achieve these goals
Islamic reform
Defensive jihad
Attacks on the far enemy.
Removal of apostate regimes
Economic warfare
Attacks on non-Sunni Muslim religious

groups

O utline
4. Al-Qaedas Affiliate Groups
Al-Nusra in Syria
TTP/ LeJ in Pakistan
Haqqani Network/ Afghan Taliban
Boko Haram in Nigeria
Al-Shahab in Somalia
Afghan Taliban
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
Jemaah Islamiyah
East Turkestan Islamic Movement

O utline
5. Primary source of funding for Al-Qaeda
Wealthy individual patrons/ Private

donations
Infiltrated charities
Criminal activities/ Bank robberies
Legitimate businesses
Human trafficking
Piracy
The drug trade.
Kidnapping for Ransom

O utline
6. Al-Qaeda Strength
7. Pakistans efforts against ALQ
8. Counter measures
Capacity building
Counter-Radicalization/Countering

Extremism
Development and Aid
Democracy Promotion
Curb Terrorist Financing
Improve Intelligence/ coordination with
other states

Introduction
In 1988, Osama bin Laden formally established Al Qaeda from

a network of veterans of the Afghan insurgency against the

Soviet Union.
The group conducted a series of terrorist attacks against U.S.

and allied targets, including the 1998 bombings of U.S.

embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the 2000 attack
on the U.S.S. Cole docked in Aden, Yemen.
After

the attacks of September 11, the United States

redoubled its counterterrorism (CT) efforts, forcing the groups
leadership to flee Afghanistanwhere they had been hosted
by the Talibanand seek refuge in the tribal belt of northwest
Pakistan.

224- Killed
4000injured

19 killed
500
wounded

17- US Soldiers
Killed
34- Injured

1993 W orld Trade C enter

bom bing

BaliBom bing-2002
202- Killed
209injuries

A ym an al Zaw ahiri leader

of A l-Q aeda
U.S. forces in 2011 located and killed Bin Laden

in Pakistan, and Bin Ladens deputy Ayman al

Zawahiri assumed leadership of the group.
U.S. intelligence officials have argued in open

testimony to Congress that persistent

operations against Al Qaeda since 2001

CT

have significantly degraded the groups ability to

launch another major attack in the United States.

A l Q aedas A genda/G oals

1. The expulsion of foreign forces

and influences from traditionally or

predominantly Islamic societies.
2.

The eventual creation of an

Islamic state ruled by a system
of Islamic law (Sharia).

M easures to achieve these

goals
1. Islamic reform
2. Defensive jihad
3. Attacks on the far enemy.
4. Removal of apostate regimes
5. Economic warfare.
6. Attacks on non-Sunni Muslim religious

groups

1. Islam ic reform
The group advocates for the enforcement

of a strict interpretation of sharia,

although Al Qaeda leadership has differed

on how quickly sharia should be imposed

on
populations under the groups control or

that of its affiliates.

2. D efensive jihad
Adherents

are called to pursue

armed resistance to counter what Al
Qaeda
describes
as
Western
aggression.

They are instructed to fight Western

encroachment, such as the presence

of U.S.
Troops in the Arabian Peninsula or in

3. A ttacks on the far

enem y.
The organization largely achieved its notoriety for

the series of fatal attacks

it

planned and implemented against symbolic

targets, including the September 11 attacks in the
United States and

Subsequent attacks in London, Madrid, and Istanbul.

It justifies these attacks as part of its effort to

eradicate foreign influences.

4. R em oval of apostate
regim es
Al Qaeda calls for the removal of governments not

based on its interpretation of sharia law

because it views such governments as empowering

human rulers and man-made legal systems over divine

law.
Al Qaeda leaders have described democratic principles

as un-Islamic and tantamount to apostasy, which is

punishable by death.
They have also called for the overthrow of regimes they

judge to be insufficiently Islamic, such as the Saudi

monarchy.

5. Econom ic W arfare.
Bin

Laden and Zawahiri urged

followers to attack economic targets
to weaken both the West and local
regimes.

In

particular,
they
called
on
supporters to conduct attacks on oil
infrastructure in the region to deny
the West access to the regions oil

6. A ttacks on non-Sunni
M uslim religious groups
Al

Qaeda considers Shia Muslims to be

apostates, and some leaders have encouraged
attacks against local Shia populations.

Other

Al Qaeda leaders argue that such

attacks should not be a priority as they can
alienate the broader Muslim population.

Al Qaeda leaders also regularly espouse anti-

Israeli rhetoric, although there have been few,

if any, operational missions against Israel.

7. G athering support from

N O N -A rabs
In their advocacy and recruitment efforts,

Al Qaeda leaders have expressed support

for and appealed
To non-Arab Muslimsparticularly those

engaged in conflicts in Chechnya, Bosnia,

Kashmir, and the Philippines
Emphasizing that Muslims constitute one

global nation or Ummah.

A l-Q aedas A f l
i
fiate G roups
1. Al-Nusra in Syria
2. TTP/ LeJ in Pakistan
3. Haqqani Network/ Afghan Taliban
4. Boko Haram in Nigeria
5. Al-Shabab in Somalia
6. Afghan Taliban Taliban
7. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
8. Jemaah Islamiyah
9. East Turkestan Islamic Movement

Al-Q aeda in IRAQ

In 2004 Zarqawi formally merged his

group Tawhid wal Jihad (Monotheism and

Jihad) with Al Qaeda to form Al Qaeda in
the Land of the Two Rivers (also known
as Al Qaeda in Iraq, or AQ-I).
Following Zarqawis death in a U.S.

airstrike
in
2006,
AQ-I
leaders
repackaged the group as a coalition
known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).

The N usra Front

In late 2011, the Nusra Front emerged in Syria,

rising to prominence through high profile attacks on

Syrian government military and leadership targets.
Nusra distinguished itself from other armed groups

not only with the lethality and efficiency of its

operations.
ISI leader Baghdadi stated that he had dispatched

Nusras leaders to Syria to serve as ISIs vanguard

in the struggle against the Asad government.

A l-Q aeda in Yem en and the

H orn of A frica
Al Qaedas attack against the USS Cole

in 2000, coupled with the attacks of

September 11, 2001, made Yemen a
front in the U.S. confrontation with Al
Qaeda.
After

the 9/11 attacks, the Yemeni

government became more forthcoming
in its cooperation with the U.S.
campaign to suppress Al Qaeda.

The A l Q aeda O rganization in the

Southern A rabian Peninsula
In 2006, 23 of Yemens most wanted terrorists escaped a

Public Security Organization (PSO) prison, in what many

analysts believe was an inside job from within a Yemeni
intelligence organization notorious for employing former Arab
Afghan volunteers and other jihadists.
Some of these escapees would eventually form a Yemeni

affiliate of Al Qaeda, called, The Al Qaeda Organization in the

Southern Arabian Peninsula, though most observers simply
referred to it as Al Qaeda in Yemen.
In January 2009, Al Qaeda-affiliated militants based in Yemen

announced that Saudi militants had pledged allegiance to

their leader and that the group would now operate under the
banner of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

A l-Q aedas K horasan

G roup
The air strikes against Islamist terrorist groups in Syria

that the U.S. launched on September22 included strikes

against a group that few Americans had heard about
before: the Khorasan group.
Although sometimes mistakenly characterized as a new

terrorist group, Khorasan is a new tentacle of an old

organizationthe al-Qaeda high-command or core
group.
The rise of the Khorasan group underscores that al-

Qaedas core remains a dangerous threat, and that it has

grown stronger by feeding off the corpses of failed states
and by recruiting foreign fighters.

A l-Q aeda in H orn of A frica

Al

Qaeda operatives and other violent Islamist

extremist groups have had a presence in East Africa
for almost 20 years, although the extent of their
operations there has varied over time.

Al Shabaab emerged in the early 2000s amid a

proliferation of Islamist and clan-based militias that

flourished in predominately Muslim Somalia in the
absence of central government authority. I
n 2006, an alliance of local Islamic courts established

control over Mogadishu with support from Al Shabaab.

A l-Q aeda in H orn of A frica

Loosely

affiliated with local Islamic courts, Al

Shabaab, unlike the clan militias, drew members
from across clans, ascribing to a broader irredentist
and religiously driven vision of uniting ethnic Somaliinhabited areas of Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and
Somalia under an Islamist caliphate.

Several of Al Shabaabs leaders had reportedly

trained and fought with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and

known Al Qaeda operatives in the region were
associated with the group in its formative years.

N orth and W est Africa

Armed Islamist groups have proliferated in

North and West Africa amid political upheaval

in the Arab world, governance and security
crises in Libya and Mali, and a growing
Islamist insurgency in northern Nigeria.
Many

of these groups appear primarily

focused on a domestic or regional agenda,
but some groups also have targeted U.S. or
other foreign interests in the region and some
may aspire to more international aims.

N orth and W est Africa

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM. AQIM

was formed when a former armed faction in

Algerias 1990s civil conflict known as the
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)
declared allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2003,
united with Al Qaeda in 2006, and renamed
itself the following year.
The largest-scale AQIM attacks to date, a series

of bombings targeting Algerian and international

institutions, were carried out in 2007 and 2008
in Algiers and surrounding areas.

R easons of m ilitancy in
N orth A frica
In North Africa, violent extremist groups have exploited political

uncertainty and tensions over national identity in the wake of

domestic uprisings in Tunisia and Libya that toppled
authoritarian regimes.
Numerous reports suggest that southwestern Libya is a growing

hub for regional terrorist actors.

Political institutions in Algeria and Morocco have remained

comparatively stable.
Still, terrorism remains a threat within the country, and

Algerian leaders have expressed growing concern about

security threats emanating from neighboring states, especially
Libya.

N igeria, B oko H aram

In Nigeria, Boko Haram appears to draw support

predominately from an ethnic Kanuri base in the

northeast,
where

the group is most active, although

extremist operatives linked to both AQIM and
Boko Haram appear intent on expanding the
groups recruitment base,

its operational reach, and the scope of its targets.

Fund raising for A l-Q aeda

However, terrorist organizations have to

defray both the costs of carrying out an

attack and the more substantial structural
costs of maintaining the organisation and
disseminating its ideology.
In

addition to purchasing weapons,

vehicles,
explosive
material
and
detonators to be used in attacks,
terrorist groups need to anticipate
other needs.

W hy m ilitants needs funds

1. Living costs for its members and sometimes also their

families.
2. A terrorist cell also needs for its members reliable channels

of communication, including highly secret channels to its

leadership, from which it receives its instructions.
3. Training new recruits
4.Travel costs for group members in preparation of an attack
5. Propaganda for the cause via various channels of

communications.

P rim ary sources of funding

for A l Q aeda
1. Wealthy individual patrons/ Private

donations
2. Infiltrated charities
3. Criminal activities/ Bank robberies
4. Legitimate businesses
5. Human trafficking
6. Piracy and
7. The drug trade.
8. Kidnapping for Ransom

Attack

Date

Estimated Cost

Madrid Railway

11 March 2004

100,000 Euro

Istanbul

15 & 20 November 2003

40,000 US $

Marriot Hotel Jakarta

5 August 2003

30,000 US $

Bali Bombings

12 October 2002

50,000 US $

New York Twin Towers

11 September 2001

400,000-500,000 US $

USS Cole, Aden

12 October 2000

10,000 US $

US Embassies in Kenya and

Tanzania

7 August 1998

50,000 US $

A l-Q aeda Funding

Kidnapping for ransom
Al-Qaeda

is
increasingly
funding
terror
operations thanks to at least $125 million in
ransom paid since 2008.

Mainly by the European governments to free

western hostages.

The payments totaled $66 million in 2013
alone.

K idnapping for ransom

The paper listed more than $90 million paid

to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb since

2008.
Somalia's Shebab insurgents received $5.1

million from Spain,

while

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

received nearly $30 million in two payments,
one from Qatar and Oman, the other of
undetermined origin.

Bank robberies
The group al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

in Yemen also uses similar tactics, according

Saeed Obaid al-Jemhi, who is based in the
Yemeni capital of Sanaa and is the author of a
book on al-Qaeda in the country.

When

militants attacked Seyoun in the

southeast province of Hadramaut, they looted
the National Bank, the Agricultural Bank and
the International Bank of Yemen, he said.

A l-Q aeda Strength

Afghanistan- Pakistan:3003,000
The Maghreb:300800
Arabian Peninsula:1,000
India:300
Somalia:7,0009,000
Syria:5,115

A l Q aeda W eakened
In a 2013 speech on counterterrorism policy, President

Obama described Al Qaedas senior leaders in Afghanistan

and Pakistan as being on the path to defeat.
He discussed the rise of Al Qaeda affiliates, characterizing

them as lethal but less capable than the central

organization that planned the 9/11 attacks.
He also discussed a third category of armed militants,

which he described as simply collections of local militias

or extremists interested in seizing territory, with primarily
local objectives.

A l Q aeda Expanding
In

early 2014, DNI James Clapper

responded in the negative to a question
on whether Al Qaeda was on the path to
defeat, noting that the group was instead,
morphing and franchising itself.

Retired Marine Corps general James Mattis

in late 2013 described predictions of Al

Qaedas demise as premature and
discredited.

A l Q aeda Expanding
The organization is resilient and has adapted to

changes.
Proponents of this view contend that there is an

undue focus on Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and

Pakistan, even as Al Qaeda affiliates expand into
Syria, Iraq, and North Africa.
These groups, by virtue of their affiliation or

ideological similarity with Al Qaeda, will inevitably

pose a threat to the United States.

Terror attacks on rise in 2014

There were 9,707 terrorist attacks in 2013, a 43% increase from

2012, according to statistics compiled by the National Consortium

for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
Attacks resulted in more than 17,800 deaths and more than

32,500 injuries.
The majority took place in Afghanistan, India, Iraq, Nigeria,

Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, Syria, Thailand and

Yemen.
Last year's most lethal incidents were carried out by theTaliban in

both Afghanistan and Pakistan, Nigeria'sBoko Haram, al Qaeda in

Iraq, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and ISIL.

Pakistans ef o
f rts against
A LQ
Pakistan played crucial role in defeating

Al-Qaeda.
Since

2002-2015 Pakistan carried out

numerous successful operations across
Pakistan,

killed and captured over 400 Al-Qaeda

linked militants.

Palestinian A bu Zubeida.
Captured in
Pakistan March 28,
2002:
He was operational
chief of Al-Qaeda,
apprehended in
Faisalabad by Pakistan
security forces.

Ram ziBinalshibh
He was a
Yemeni
national and
one-time
roommate of
Mohamed Atta,
suspected
ringleader of
the September
11 hijackers,
was captured
in Karachi in
September
2002.

Khalid Sheikh M oham m ed

He was
arrested in
Rawalpindi a.
A Pakistani by
origin, Khalid
had grown up
in Kuwait.
Besides
having
masterminde
d the 9/11
attacks on
the US, Khalid
Sheikh
Mohammad is
also known to
have
beheaded the
Wall Street

Yassir al-Jaziri
He was a high value al-Qaeda target arrested in

Lahore.
His capture had resulted after information was

extracted from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.

He was then described as the seventh most

important al-Qaeda member.

Yassir as Osamas moneyman
and a
computer wizard who was captured with two
laptops.

Khalid bin Attash or W alid bin

Attish-2003
He was captured In
April 2003.
He
is
the
man
believed to have been
a prime suspect in the
case relating to
The October 2000
attack
on
the
American naval ship
USS Cole at Aden,

Ahm ed Khalfan G hailani-2004

On July 30, 2004 after a

14-hour
long
encounter, a Tanzanian
national and a wanted
al-Qaeda commander
Ahmed
Khalfan
Ghailani was arrested
from the city of Gujrat.

Wanted by the US for

his involvement in the
explosions outside the
US embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania in 1998.

M usaad Aruchi-2004
Musaad Aruchi, a nephew of Khalid Sheikh

Mohammed with a $1 million bounty on his

head, was arrested in Karachi in June 2004.
He was a Pakistanicourierwho worked in

connection withal Qaeda,

capture in April 2004.

before

his

Some of his files, secured when he was

captured.

M oham m ad N aeem N oor

Khan-2004
In August 2004 an

al-Qaeda computer
wizard
known
as
Mohammad Naeem
Noor
Khan
was
arrested in Lahore.
He was believed to

have had extensive

links with Khalfan
Ghailani, who was
arrested just days
before him.

M ustafa Setm arian N asar:

2006

In May 2006 a man

called
Mustafa
Setmarian Nasar was
captured Quetta.
The

dual
SyrianSpanish national was
carrying a head money
of $5 million.

He

was wanted in
Spain in connection
with the 2004 Madrid
train bombings.

191- killed
2000+
Injured
(2004)

A bu Faraj al-Libbi
May

2, 2005:
Libyan Abu Faraj
al-Libbi,
AlQaeda's number
three and the
head
of
the
network
in
Pakistan,

was arrested in

the northwest of
the country.

Abu H am za Rabia
Abu

Hamza Rabia, an al Qaeda

commander ranked the third most
senior leader in the network,

was

killed in a tribal region

ofPakistanin December 2005 while
making an IED.

M uhsin M usa M atw alli

A tw ah
Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah

(also
known
Rehman),

as

Abdul

an Egyptian al Qaeda member

wanted for involvement in the

1998 bombing of the U.S.
embassy in Kenya,
was killed by Pakistani forces

close to the Afghan border in

April 2006.

A bu Laith al-Libi
Jan 29, 2008: An Al-

Qaeda commander
in Afghanistan, Abu
Laith al-Libi,
one of bin Laden's

leading lieutenants,
was killed by a US

missile
in
northwest Pakistan.

Bin Laden D ead

May 1, 2011: US

President Barack
Obama
announces that
US forces killed
bin Laden
and

recovered
his body during a
commando
operation
at
Abbottabad.

AdnanelShukrijum a-2014
One

of

al-Qaedas most
senior leaders who had
been implicated in plots to
blow
up
the
London
Underground and the New
York metro has been killed
during a raid on his hideout
in Pakistan.

Adnan

Shukrijumah, the
terror group's chief of global
operations,

died along with two other

suspected
terrorists
in
Pakistans South Waziristan
tribal
area
early
on
Saturday,
the
countrys
military said.

C ounter m easures
Building Partner Capacity
Counter-

Radicalization/Countering
Violent Extremism Programs
Development and Aid
Democracy Promotion
Curb Terrorist Financing
Improve Intelligence Collection
and Gaps
Multilateral Engagement