Professional Documents
Culture Documents
to WTO Law
Features and Functions of the World Trade Organization
Simon Lacey
Common Misconceptions
The WTO is not an organization staffed by men in dark suits, wearing reflective
sunglasses and flying around at night in black helicopters.
Nor is the WTO part of some international conspiracy to take over the world.
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Non Discrimination
This is achieved by means of the MFN and National Treatment obligations, which apply
throughout all the agreements in different forms (GATT, GATS, TRIPS etc.)
Transparency
Any laws, regulations or measure which affect trade must be published BEFORE they enter into
effect, and if possible, be preceded by a process of consultation (notification obligations).
Predictability
Traders need to know the terms and conditions subject to which they will be operating, WTO
Members cannot, say, increase tariffs above bindings or re-introduce quantitative restrictions.
Consensus decision-making
All WTO bodies operate on the basis of consensus. However, consensus does not mean
unanimity, and in the WTO context merely means that no Member present when a decision is
taken, explicitly objects to it.
Single Undertaking
With the exception of a very limited number of plurilateral agreements, the Uruguay Round legal
texts must be accepted by WTO Members as a whole, (no opt-out, or choosing which
agreements to be bound by la carte)
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Each WTO Member has a Schedule of Tariff Concessions which set out the
maximum tariff levels (called bindings) it shall levy on goods from other WTO
Members.
For services trade, each WTO Member has a Schedule of Specific Commitments
which sets out the terms and conditions subject to which foreign service providers
will be allowed to enter and operate on the Members domestic services market.
Together with the rules contained in the WTO Agreement and its related Annexes,
the Schedule of Tariff Concessions (for goods) and the Schedule of Specific
Commitments (for services), these make up the package of rights and obligations
which WTO Members enjoy and are bound by.
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The use of the term Single Undertaking first came into common parlance during the
Uruguay Round
It was used to sum up the notion that the Round would not be concluded, until
consensus had been achieved in all the various negotiating groups
Today, given that the Uruguay Round is over, we still talk of the Single Undertaking
with regard to the notion that all the Results of the Uruguay Round are binding on
all WTO Members. Apart from the plurilateral agreements, Members cannot pick
and choose which agreements they wish to be bound by and which not
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The main objective of the Organization is the establishment of rules for Members
trade policy regimes which help international trade to expand with a view to raising
living standards.
These rules aim to promote non-discrimination, transparency and predictability in
the conduct of trade policy (we will look into these concepts slightly later in this
presentation).
The WTO pursues this objective by
Administering trade agreements
Acting as a forum for trade negotiations
Settling trade disputes
Reviewing national trade policies
Assisting developing countries in trade policy issues through technical
assistance
Cooperating with other international organizations.
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The WTO Agreements have a fairly unique treaty structure, which is due to the fact
that they are simply the embodiment of a long and arduous round of trade
negotiations which lasted from 1986 to 1993.
The main document is one entitled The Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
Annexed to the Final Act are all the legal texts and other documents which make up
the entirety of the WTO nomenclature, namely: The Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization (The WTO Agreement), the Ministerial Declarations and
Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.
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GATT 1994
Agreement on Agriculture
SPS Agreement
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (no longer in force)
TBT Agreement
TRIMS Agreement
Anti-dumping Agreement
Customs Valuation Agreement
Preshipment Inspection
Rules of Origin
Import Licensing Procedures
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Safeguards
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Annex 3 sets out provisions governing the Trade Policy Review Mechanism.
The trade policy review had already existed prior to the entry into force of the WTO,
and had been operational since the 1980s.
But the Uruguay Round codified the procedure more formally and brought it under
the treaty structure of the WTO.
It also established the Trade Policy Review Body as part of the WTOs institutional
structure
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Annex 4 - Plurilaterals
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Annex 4 to the WTO Agreement contains the so-called Plurilateral Trade Agreements,
namely
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These are a series (27) of decisions and declarations also annexed to the WTO
Agreement, concerning various issues, such as:
Decision on Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries
Decision on Notification Procedures
Declaration on the Relationship of the WTO with the IMF
and various other decisions and declarations
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Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services
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Although superseded by GATT 1994, the legal text of GATT 1947 is still of the
greatest relevance today, and as such GATT 1947 has been appended to the
Uruguay Round Final Act.
The GATT 1994 comprises the provisions of the GATT 1947 as well as a number of
legal instruments which entered into force under GATT 1947 before the date of
entry into force of the WTO Agreement.
The GATT 1994 also comprises a number of Understandings which are
enumerated and subsequently set out at the start of Annex 1A (in goods).
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Each Working Party is different and attracts the interest of different Members
Not every Member has resources in Geneva or the capital to dedicate to
accessions and some wont have a trade interest which is significant enough for
them to weigh in
However a core group of Members are represented on every accession working
party: Australia, Canada, the European Communities and its Member States, India,
Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United States
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Definition: a good or service which a WTO Member currently exports into the
market of the applicant
Members objectives here are clear: Improve current market access terms or lock in
current market access conditions
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Negotiate a tariff binding at or below the applied level which the product currently
enjoys;
Commitment not to set up more restrictive trade barriers where none have existed
before (TRQs, import licensing procedures);
Use of antidumping duties by the applicant (case of Belarus and Lithuania, or
Ukraine and Kyrgyz Republic);
Opposite case of antidumping duties in place by a Members and negotiating a kind
of peace clause: for them (case of Mexico and China).
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A number of broader and more far-reaching concerns also see Members take
a tough and committed stance
Two Distinct Categories of Systemic Interests:
Applying Todays Rules Now
Creating Conditions on the Ground for Tomorrow
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Example: Immediate and Full Implementation of the TBT and SPS Agreements
Issue important for Members who want to protect their market access interests
from nullification or impairment by WTO-illegal TBT or SPS measures
The best strategy for applicants is to identify what are the most significant products
for Members and bring standards into compliance for these products
And then there is always the legislative action plan
Members generally hostile to any requests for implementation period, given the
lengthy period of time accessions usually take anyway
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A number of accessions have also seen a different set of issues leveraged within
the unique dynamic represented by the WTO accession process
Essentially two types of non-trade related issues:
Pursuit of Geopolitical Objectives (example of Kyoto Protocol)
Settling old scores (settlement of old Comecon debts)
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DOHA
DEVELOPMENT
AGENDA - DDA
Monitoring of the
negotiations and
organization of work
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Implementation (12)
Agriculture (13-14)
Services (15)
Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products (16)
TRIPS (17-19)
Trade and Investment (20-22)
Trade and Competition Policy (23-25)
Transparency in Government Procurement (26)
Trade Facilitation (27)
WTO Rules (28-29)
Dispute Settlement (30)
Trade and Environment (31-32)
Electronic Commerce (34)
Small Economies (35)
Trade, Debt and Finance (36)
Trade and Transfer of Technology (37)
Technical Cooperation and Capacity Building (38-41)
Least-Developed Countries (42-43)
Special and Differential Treatment (44)
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Since the launch of the Round in 2001, progress has been slow and tumultuous:
September 2013 Collapse in Cancun
July 2004 The July Package temporarily puts the Round back on track
December 2005 - the Hong Kong Ministerial steady progress
July 2008 Lamy bets the farm and loses, leading to an impasse
Since 2008 a number of Ministerial Conferences, without substantial progress on the Doha Work Program
December 2013 Bali, seen as somewhat of a breakthrough
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Food Security
Trade Facilitation
Least Developed
Countries
Other Issues
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Although the WTO boasts some 153 Members, some are more effective than
others at using their Membership to further the national economic interest.
Sending a negotiating team to the WTO is much like sending a team to the
Olympics or the World Cup: many teams compete, but only a handful do so
effectively.
The negotiating team needs sufficient and adequate input from those affected by
their negotiated outcomes, i.e. economic operators and the private sector in
general.
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The WTO website lists 10 benefits of the WTO and the trading system it oversees. They
are, it says:
Being a WTO Member, and thus benefiting from MFN access to other WTO
Members allows exporters to develop alternative export markets.
Market diversification makes sense if exports into one market are suddenly
disrupted (such as by an antidumping measure etc.).
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Although WTO dispute settlement is always a last resort, sometimes it represents the
only way to force a recalcitrant Member to restore market access.
There are many examples of developing countries taking on other developing and
developed countries at the WTO and having their market access restored.
Without the WTO dispute settlement process, an aggrieved country has very little
leverage over the country denying it market access. This is because the WTO also a
system of remedies and sanctions in place when a WTO Member illegally restricts
the market access of another Member.
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WTO Members have to publish any regulations or measures which affect their
trade regimes.
Some WTO Agreements (GATS, TBT, SPS) require them to establish enquiry
points which must respond to requests for information from foreign exporters and
service providers.
WTO Members enacting any measure to restrict trade (e.g. imposing a safeguard
measure) have to provide advance notice before doing so.
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WTO Members who have agreed to bind tariffs at certain levels, or to do away with
quantitative restrictions, cannot just disregard these commitments from one day to
the next.
In light of this reality, economic operators can be confident of the minimum
conditions of market access they can expect.
If WTO Members do breach these commitments, the dispute settlement system is
there to police them.
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Lack of negotiating authority in the US (will this change any time soon?)
Increasing tendency towards bilateralism and regionalism amongst WTO
Members (is this bad for the system?);
Increasing size of the Organization and out-dated decision making structures
(need for reform);
Negative perception of the Organization since Seattle Ministerial (is this
deserved?).
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Conclusion
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The benefits of the world trading system administered by the WTO are real, even
if they seem somewhat intangible sometimes.
WTO membership results in more competition, which can bring short-term
hardship as well as short and long-term benefits.
There is a clear need to manage expectations when it comes to trade
negotiations and obtaining WTO membership.
Trade policy is just one piece of the puzzle when it comes to the overall economic
reform program and must be managed sensibly.
The WTO is a institution and a system of rules created by humans and thus it is
not perfect. It does not claim to work perfectly to the satisfaction of everyone. If
Winston Churchill were to describe it, he would probably say that it is the worst
way to manage international economic relations except for all the other ways.
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Thank You
UPH MTIC Program | Introduction
to WTO Law
Features and Functions of the World Trade Organization