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Interrelationship of

Protection and
Communication to
Improve Power System
Reliability
Davis Erwin and Tom Kruckewitt

Pacific Gas and Electric Company


Galina Antonova

ABB Inc.

PG&E 500kV Transmission Line


Overview
Geographically central component of Pacific AC Intertie
Portion of major WECC energy corridor (northwest

hydro to load pockets in southwest)


Twenty-three 500 kV transmission lines
Ten Stations
Three interconnected neighbors
Eight Lines Shared

Traverses more than 500 miles


Individual line lengths: 7 to 145 miles
Most lines are series compensated
All relays are susceptible to complications created by

capacitive compensation
Single-pole tripping and reclosing

PG&E 500kV Transmission Line


Overview

PG&E 500kV Transmission Line


Protection
Secure line protection schemes
Misoperations - intolerable
Regulatory scrutiny
Congestion charges
Dependable line protection schemes
High-speed clearing is essential
Avoid instability
Preserve coordination

PG&E 500kV Transmission Line


Protection
Distance protection
Zone 1: Instantaneous tripping(No intentional
time delay)
Zone 2: Time delayed tripping (Remote back-up)
Permissive overreaching (POTT)
Requires Telecommunication channel
Zone 2: Keys permission

Direct transfer trip (DTT)


Breaker failure (Stuck breaker)
Ensure remote end clearing
DUTT

PG&E 500kV Transmission Line


Protection
Series capacitor complications - distance
Subharmonic frequency transients
Reduced/supervised zone 1 reach
No overlap of instantaneous protection

PG&E 500kV Transmission Line


Protection
Model Power System Testing: Z1 Distance Element Operation at Each Fault Location

(2760 faults - 120 Faults/Location)

Station 2:
Z1

Station 1:
Z1

PG&E 500kV Transmission Line


Protection
High speed, dependable line protection

is essential
Communication assisted protection

schemes
100% of the line protected with no intentional

time delay
Maintain protection coordination
Reliable telecommunication circuits
Multiple Relays with differing protection

algorithms (Four levels of protection ~


early 90s)
Operating Rule: At least one level of

PG&E 500kV Transmission Line


Protection Legacy Design
Two cabinets
Two relays in each cabinet
Total: Four relays
Directional Comparison (POTT)
Segregated phase comparison

Three levels of communication

assisted schemes
Two diverse digital communication
routes
Two levels of DTT

PG&E 500kV Legacy Line


Protection Cabinets/Racks

Protection Engineer Perspective on


Telecommunication Infrastructure

Protection Engineer Expectations on


Telecommunication Infrastructure
Digital circuit Bit Error Rate (BER)
Determine BER setting and verify relays alarm for channel failure

at that BER test value


Verify relays do not misoperate, (effectively disable the Pilot portion
of the algorithm), for BER above the specified setting
Verify that Channel Banks alarm when appropriate
Verify relay sequence of events accurately captures accounting of
channel down time
Verify channel fail alarms will be available to operators.

Variable Channel Delays


Establish maximum channel delay value
Verify relays alarm for abnormal delay
Verify Differential protection restraint for channel delays beyond the

relay specifications

Protection Engineer Expectations on


Telecommunication Infrastructure
SONET switching - 50 msec hits (digital

circuits)
Document behavior of Differential relays for a standard

SONET switching event and resynchronization.


Document behavior of Directional Comparison for standard
SONET switching event and resynchronization.
Where DTT intertrip is used, document behavior of the
feature during standard SONET switching events and
resynchronization. (Misoperation, etc.)

Intertrip not used on legacy designs


Verify Telecom Channel Alarming is immune to standard

SONET switching event (No nuisance alarm to operators)


Verify relay sequence of events accurately captures
accounting of switching event and channel unavailability

Protection Engineer Expectations on


Telecommunication Infrastructure
Channel Asymmetry
Document behavior of Differential relays while varying channel

Asymmetry. Log asymmetry values that cause relay misoperation.


Verify value is above any expected asymmetry in PG&E system.
Evaluate information to determine if it is essential to maintain
Locked bandwidth for new differential relays (Evaluation will be
combined with the other digital circuit tests).

Channel bank failures


Disable channel bank cards and document response of relays.

(Verify relay communication channel failure)


Verify Alarm can be received and documented by Telecom
maintenance organization

Protection Engineer Expectations on


Telecommunication Infrastructure
Switch channel bank DS

0 circuits to alternate relays

Verify relay alarms and disables Pilot tripping when it receives

package information from itself (inadvertent loop back)


Verify relay alarms and disables Pilot tripping when it receives
package information from another relay (Set A talks to remote end
Set B relay for example). This ensures unique relay
telecommunication ID was programmed properly.

Alarms should be logged by endpoint devices

Protection Engineer Expectations on


Telecommunication Infrastructure
EndPointMonitorin
g

No Common
Times of
Failure

Channel
Availabilit
y

PG&E 500kV Transmission


TS-LB Line

PG&E TS LB Misoperations
1.
Saturday
April 5th
2014 at
11:57 pm
2.
Monday
April 7th
2014 at
09:49 am

PG&E TS LB Misoperations

PG&E TS LB Misoperations

PG&E TS LB Misoperations

PG&E 500kV Legacy Line Protection


Cabinets/Racks (TS LB line)

PG&E 500kV Legacy Line Protection


Cabinets/Racks (TS-LB Line)
Operatio
n
Rela
Mod
Principal
y
el
and
Vendor
Set A

Set B

Set C
Set D

Directional
Comparison
(Vendor #1)
Segregated
Phase
Comparison
(Vendor #2)
Directional
Comparison
(Vendor #3)
Step Distance
(Vendor #2)

Relay
Model
#1
Relay
Model
#2
Relay
Model
#3
Relay
Model
#4

Trip
Desig Description
n

Information
(Targets)

SPT

Single Pole Trip


Capable.
Normally Cut-In

N/A

SPT

Single Pole Trip


Capable.
Normally Cut-In

Downloaded file
indicates
RCVR/TTRP

SPT

Single Pole Trip


Capable.
Normally Cut-In

N/A

3PT

Three Pole Trip


Only.
Normally Cut-Out

N/A

PG&E TS LB Misoperations

Settings:
Intertrip
Feature verified
to be
Disabled at
both ends of
the line

PG&Es Telecommunication Infrastructure


Diverse infrastructure that covers mountain

ranges, rural agricultural and metropolitan


areas
Core is based on Time Division Multiplexing
(TDM) over fiber and licensed microwave
Synchronous Optical Network (SONET),
Optical Carrier OC-3 (155.52 Mb/s) or higher
Communication path diversity: geographically
different routes over separate equipment (no
overlaps)
Locked bandwidth does not permit SONET
failover on line current differential and

Telecommunication Infrastructure

Relay and Telecommunication Analysis


Potential source of Ghost intertrip:
Telecommunication channel disturbance
Last communication link disturbance
Noise on relay DTT input terminals
Known relay firmware protection security

issue

Telecommunication Channel Analysis


No telecommunication channel failures

registered
Statistics counters on telecom equipment
analyzed, no anomalies found
Statistics counters not available at the
converter, the last communication link to
the relay

Relay Connections

Last Communication Link Analysis


Communication converter and its connection

to the relay evaluated


History of power supply failures reported
Ground connections verified (cable and
relay side)
Device is not substation hardened, per
IEEE 1613, thus is susceptive to
environmental noise

Relay DTT Input Contact Analysis


Intertrip function is disabled, relay DTT input

is not connected
Older vendor recommendation to ground
input DTT input contact, if intertrip feature
not used
Grounding relay DTT inputs considered as a
possible mitigation technique

Relay Firmware Analysis


A known issue fixed in newer firmware
Disabled intertrip function blocked transmission
but not the reception of intertrip command
Safety timers added on transmit and receive (0.5
3 cycles)
Comfort of understanding restored
Mitigation strategy needed

Mitigation Options
Disabling intertrip function in relay firmware

desired
Such firmware is not available, but
communication options were studied
searching for a solutions
It was found that only digital modems
support transmission / reception of intertrip
command, while analog modems dont
The use of analog modem (that does not
transmit, and can not receive intertrip
command) essentially disables intertrip
function

Digital Modem Frame Structure

Data and Command Encoding


S0
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6
S7
S8
S9
S10
S11
S12
S13
S14
S15
GUARD1
GUARD2
OPBKR
TTRIP*
U
V
W
X
Y
Z

U
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1

V
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1

W
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0

X
Y
Z
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
Parity (Odd)
Special Code (Guard, OPBKR, TTRIP)
Phase A
Phase B
Phase C
Ground

TTRIP code (for


intertrip command)
is only supported by
digital modems
(*)

Analog Modem Interface


4-wire interface at the rear relay terminals
Differential signaling (avoids common mode

noise)
Uses Quad Amplitude Modulation (QAM) at
the carrier frequency of 1,700 Hz
Data rate is 9600 bit/s
Data is mapped into 6-bit frames, divided
into groups of 4 quad bits

Analog Modem: QAM principle

Analog Modem: Data Encoding


Absolute Phase
(Degrees)
0, 90, 180, 270
45, 135, 25, 315

Q1
0
1
0

Relative Signal
Element Amplitude
3
5

Phase Change *
Q3
Q4
(Degrees)
Q2
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
45
0
1
0
90
0
1
1
135
1
1
1
180
1
1
0
225
1
0
0
270
1
0
1
315
(*) The phase change is the actual on-line phase shift in the transition region from
the center of one signaling element to the center of the following signaling element.

Analog Modem: Modulation Diagram

Resolution Plan
Decision was made to change to relays with

analog modems
Analog telecommunication channel was
established and tested
New channel established on the same diverse

route as the old digital channel


New relays with analog modems were

provided
Keeping the existing relays wiring was
preferred to reduce field work
A solution with the use of existing outside
relay chassis and wiring was proposed:
Positions of 2 factory jumpers that select analog

Field Upgrades and Status


The proposed solution was accepted and

field work was scheduled


Relay field upgrades were successfully
performed on June 17 and 18, 2014 in TS
and LB substations
End to end tests was performed successfully
next day
Relays were put back in service on June 19,
2014, they have been operating correctly

Lessons Learned
Communication knowledge can help to solve

protection problems !
Communication parameters are interrelated
with protection parameters:
A change to analog modem resulted in addition of

7.5ms worst case communication delay (accepted,


checks needed)
In addition to basic communication expectations,
advanced inside knowledge of communication
protocol was needed
A mix of old and new com technologies, old

and new microprocessor relays adds


immense complexity
overlapping multi-disciplinary protection and

Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank
PG&E Operation management and personal in

TS and LB substations
PG&E Communication Group
PG&E System Protection Group
ABB Power System Automation &
Communication Team

Thank you
Questions ?