Philosophy

Feldman: Reasonable Religious Disagreements

Klemens Kappel
Division of Philosophy
Institut of Media, Cognition and Communication
University of Copenhagen

Philosophy

Consider this disagreement

The theist: God exists
The atheist: God does not exists
Disagreement: different doxastic attitude to same proposition (here:
the proposition that God exists)
Doxastic states (belief-like states, regarding a proposition as true, or
likely to be true):
Tripartite division: believe p, reject p, suspend belief in p
Degrees of belief: credence (subjective probability) in p
represented by number [0;1]

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Disagreement about whether God exists is not just a matter of

using the word 'God' in different ways
pragmatic or prudential benefits of believing in God
differences as to whether one should adhere to various practices
or institutions

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The main question:

Can one have a reasonable disagreement? Can on insist on
ones own view, while acknowleding that ones opponent is also
reasonable? Can one agree to disagree?
Compare to
Intolerance:
Relativism (truth is relative to believers):
the proposition God exists is true relative to A, but the
proposition God exists is false relative to B.

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Some terminology to sharpen the question (6-7):

Disagreement: A and B disagree about a proposition p,
when one believes it, and the other denies it.
Reasonable disagreement: A and B have a reasonable
disagreement about p, when A and B disagrees, and both
are reasonable.
Epistemic peers: A and B are epistemic peers, when they
are roughly equal with respect to intelligence, reasoning
powers, bacground information, etc.
Shared evidence: When people will have a full discussion of
a topic and have not withheld relevant information, we will
say that they have shared their evidence about that topic
(7)

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Questions: is reasonable disagreement possible

(Q1) Can epistemic peers who have shared their evidence have
reasonable disagreements?
(Q2) Can epistemic peers who have shared their evidence
reasonably maintain their own belief yet also think that the
other party to the disagreement is also reasonable?

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What does it mean to be a reasonable (here):

(i) Reasonable person: non-crazy person.
(ii) Reasonable person: person having adopted a belief for good
pragmatic or prudential reasons.
(iii) Reasonable choice as when a practical choice has to be
made.
(iv) Reasonable person: (roughly) having made no rational
mistake in assessing the evidence, being rational in assessing
the evidence.
Feldman assumes (iv), and rejects the other renderings as too
weak, or not relevant.

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Is reasonable disagreement possible (Q1 and Q2)? Some

suggestions:

(i) Two individuals can each be reasonable in drawing different

conclusions from same body of evidence when the evidence
supports two incompatible conclusions P and not-P equally well.
Reply: One should suspend judgement about P once one
realizes this
(ii) Two individuals can each be reasonable in drawing different
conclusions from same body of evidence when they adopt
different fundamental principles, or different worldviews:
Reply: one should suspend judgement once one realizes that
there are different starting points having these consequences,
and that one has no reason to prefer one over the other.

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(iii) Two individuals can each be reasonable in drawing different

conclusions from same body of evidence when some evidence is
not shared (private evidence, religious (non-religious)
experience, intellectual seeming)
Reply: when one knows that the other part has private evidence that
one does not have, and vice versa, then one should suspend
judgment.
Suggested conclusion: there cannot be reasonable disagreement.
Then what?

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The hard line: I am right, you are wrong (and unreasonable). I

preserve full confidence in my belief, and revise my assumption
that you are my peer.
May seem fine in some cases, but hard to believe in other cases:
Modest skeptical alternative: 'one should give up one's beliefs in
the light of the sort of disagreement under discussion' (17).
'This may see to be a distressing conclusion. It implies that
many of your deeply held convictions are not justified. Worse, it
implies that many of my deeply held, well-considered beliefs are
not justified. Still, I think that this is the truth of the matter.'
(17).

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