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leaks thru
sticks
rupture
Purpose
The purpose of an FMEA is to identify single equipment and system failure
modes and each failure modes potential effect(s) on the system or plant. This
analysis typically generates recommendations for increasing equipment reliability,
thus improving process safety.
Types of Results
An FMEA generates a qualitative, systematic reference list of equipment,
failure modes, and effects. A worst-case estimate of consequences resulting from
single failure is included. The FMEA may be easily updated for design changes or
system/plant modifications. FMEA results are usually documented in a columnformat table. Hazard analysts usually include suggestions for improving safety in
appropriate items in the table.
Classification of Failures
Sudden versus gradual failures
Hidden versus evident failures
According to effects (critical, degraded or
incipient)
According to severity (catastrophic, critical,
marginal or negligible)
Primary failure, secondary failure and
command fault
2. Change of conditions
or states.
Fail to open on
command
Fail to close on
command
Leakage through the
valve in closed
position
Leakage to the
environment
tube side
Resource Requirements
Using the FMEA approach requires the following data and information
sources: (1) a system or plant equipment list or P&ID, (2) knowledge of
equipment function and failure modes, and (3) knowledge of system or plant
function and responses to equipment failures.
FMEAs can be performed by single analysts, but these analyses should be
reviewed by others to help ensure completeness. Staff requirements will vary
with the size and complexity of equipment functions and failure modes and
how the failures might affect other portions of the system or plant.
The time and cost of an FMEA is proportional to the size of the process
and number of components analyzed. On the average, an hour is sufficient for
analyzing two to four equipment items. As with any HE study of systems with
similar equipment performing similar functions, the time requirements are
reduced significantly due to the repetitive nature of the evaluations. Table 4.8
lists estimates of the time needed to perform an HE study using the FMEA
technique.
Perparation
Evaluation
Documentation
Simple/Small
System
2 to 6 hr
1 to 3 days
1 to 3 days
Complex/Large
Process
1 to 3 days
1 to 3 days
2 to 4 weeks
Analysis Procedure
(1)defining the study problem,
(2)performing the review, and
(3)documenting the results.
STEP 1 :
Defining the study problem. This step identifies the
specific items to be included in the FMEA and the conditions
under which they are analyzed. Defining the problem
involves (1)establishing an appropriate level of resolution for
the study and (2)defining the boundary conditions for the
analysis. A detailed problem definition is a necessary
ingredient to performing a thorough and efficient FMEA.
Identifying the plant and/or systems that are the subject of the analysis.
Establishing the physical system boundaries for the FMEA. This includes the interfaces
with other processes and utility/support systems. One way to indicate the physical system
boundaries is to mark them on a system drawing that encompasses all equipment within
the scope of the FMEA. These boundary conditions should also state the operating
conditions at the interfaces.
Establishing the system analytical boundaries, including: (1)the failure modes, operating
consequences, causes, or existing safeguards that will not be considered and (2)the initial
operating condition or position of equipment. As an example of effects beyond the scope
of the study, an analyst may choose not to consider airplane crashes, earthquakes, or
tornadoes as causes of failure modes. An example of an initial condition is specifying
whether a valve is normally open or closed.
Collecting up-to-date reference information that identifies the equipment and its
functional relationship to the plant/system. This information is needed for all equipment
included within the system boundary and appropriate interfaces with the rest of the plant.
PAGE:
SYSTEM:
ANALYST(S):
Failure Modes
Effects
of
Safeguards
Actions
FMEA-PC
(Primatech, Inc, Columbus, Ohio)
HAZOOPtimizer
(A. D. Little, Cambridge, Massachusetts)
SAFEPLAN
(Du Pont, Westlake Village, California)
Standard word processing and spreadsheet software programs can also help
analysts document the results of FMEA studies.
Example
An FMEA study is performed to address safety hazards to plant
personnel in a DAP process. The DAP process schematic is
presented in Figure 6.7. Each component of the reaction system
is evaluated with the relevant information recorded in an
FMEA table. The section of the FMEA table for Control Valve
B in the phosphoric acid solution line is presented in Table
6.21.
UNLOADING
STATIONS
UNLOADING
STATIONS
L1
AMMONIA
SOLUTION
STORAGE TANK
F1
PHOSPHORIC
ACID STORAGE
TANK
L1
F1
ENCLOSED
WORK AREA
LOADING
STATIONS
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
OUTDOORS
off-spec. Product
NH3
excess
BOTH
excess
Table 6.21 Sample Pages from the FMEA Table for the DAP Process Example
DATE:
1/21/91
PAGE:
5
of
20
PLANT:
DAP Plant
SYSTEM:
Figure 6.7
REFERENCE: Reaction System
ANALYST(S): Mr. Ray Johnson
Item Identification
4.1
Valve B on the
phosphoric
acid solution
line
Description
Failure
Modes
Effects
Safeguards
Flow indicator
in the
phosphoric acid
line
Reactor relief
valve vented to
the atmosphere
Actions
Consider
alarm/shutdown
of the system for
high phosphoric
acid flow
Consider
alarm/shutdown
of the system for
high
pressureand
high
temperature in
the reactor
Identification
PAGE:
6
of
20
REFERENCE: Figure 6.7
ANALYST(s): Mr. Ray Johnson
Description
Failure
Modes
4.2
4.3
4.4
Safeguards
No flow of phosphoric
acid to the reactor
Ammonia carry-over to
the DAP storage tank
and release to the
enclosed work area
Small release of
phosphoric acid to the
enclosed work area
Periodic maintenance
Large release of
phosphoric acid to the
enclosed work area
Periodic maintenance
Actions
Consider
alarm/shutdown of the system for
low phosphoric acid flow
Consider using a closed tank for
DAP storage and/or ensure
adequate ventilation of the enclosed
work area