SSLstrip,

Slowloris
& Scary SSL Attacks
Sam Bowne

Contact

Sam Bowne
Computer Networking and Information
Technology
City College San Francisco
Email: sbowne@ccsf.edu
Web: samsclass.info

Topics

sslstrip Steals passwords from mixedmode Web login pages

Slowloris Denial of Service Stops

Apache Web servers

Scary SSL Attacks--ways to completely

fool browsers

sslstrip

The 15 Most Popular Web 2.0

Sites

1. YouTube
2. Wikipedia
3. Craigslist
4. Photobucket
5. Flickr
6. WordPress
7. Twitter
8. IMDB

HTTPS
HTTP
HTTPS
HTTP
HTTPS
MIXED
MIXED
HTTPS

The 15 Most Popular Web 2.0

Sites

9. Digg
10. eHow
11. TypePad
12. topix
13. LiveJournal
14. deviantART
15. Technorati

HTTP
HTTPS
HTTPS
HTTP
Obfuscated HTTP
MIXED
HTTPS

From http://www.ebizmba.com/articles/usergenerated-content

Password Stealing
Medium
ssltrip

Easy
Wall of Sheep
MIXED,
3

HTTP, 5

HTTPS,
7

Hard
Spoofing Certificates

Mixed Mode

HTTP Page with an HTTPS Logon Button

sslstrip Proxy Changes

HTTPS
to
HTTP
To
Internet
HTTPS

HTTP
Target
Using
Facebook

Attacker:
sslstrip
Proxy
in the
Middle

Ways to Get in the

Middle

Physical Insertion in a Wired

Network
To
Internet

Attacker

Target

Configuring Proxy Server in

the Browser

ARP Poisoning

Redirects Traffic at Layer 2

Sends a lot of false ARP packets on the
LAN
Can be easily detected
DeCaffienateID by IronGeek

http://k78.sl.pt

ARP Request and Reply

Client wants to find Gateway

ARP Request: Who has 192.168.2.1?
ARP Reply:

MAC: 00-30-bd-02-ed-7b has 192.168.2.1

ARP Request
ARP Reply
Client

Gateway

Facebook.com

ARP Poisoning

Attacker
ARP Replies: I
am the
Gateway

Forwarded &
Altered Traffic
Traffic to
Facebook

Client

Gateway

Facebook.com

Demonstration

slowloris

HTTP GET

Send Incomplete HTTP Requests

Apache has a queue of approx. 256

requests
Each one waits approx. 400 seconds by
default for the request to complete
So less than one packet per second is
enough to occupy them all
Low-bandwidth DoS--no collateral
damage!

OSI Model
OSI Model

DoS Attack

7 Application

Slowloris Incomplete HTTP Requests

6 Presentation
5 Session
4 Transport

SYN Flood Incomplete TCP Handshakes

3 Network
2 Data Link
1 Physical

Cut a cable

Demonstration

iClicker Questions

Power failures brought down servers at

365 Main last year. What OSI Model
was that attack in?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Layer 1
Layer 2
Layer 3
Layer 4
Layer 5 or higher

Which type of website is the most

dangerous?
A. HTTP
B. Mixed: HTTP with HTTPS elements
C. HTTPS

What precaution protects you best when

using a public Wi-Fi hotspot?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Open Access
WEP
WPA
VPN
802.1x

What precaution seems best against

SlowLoris?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Do nothing and ignore it

Adjust Apache timeouts
Use a load-balancer
Add a module to Apache
Something else

What sort of logins do users of your

Website use?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Plaintext
Mixed-mode
HTTPS with a CA
Self-signed SSL
Something else

What plans do you have to use IPv6?

I don't care about IPv6 at all

I'll implement IPv6, but not for years
Planning to implement it within a year
Planning to implement it sooner than a
year
E. I am already using IPv6
A.
B.
C.
D.

Scary SSL Attacks

Man in the Middle

To
Internet
HTTPS

HTTPS
Target
Using
https://gmail.com

Attacker:
Cain: Fake
SSL
Certificate

Warning Message

Certificate Errors

The message indicates that the Certificate

Authority did not validate the certificate
BUT a lot of innocent problems cause
those messages
Incorrect date settings
Name changes as companies are acquired

Most Users Ignore Certificate

Errors

Link SSL-1 on my CNIT 125 page

Fake SSL With No Warning

Impersonate a real Certificate Authority

Use a Certificate Authority in an
untrustworthy nation
Trick browser maker into adding a
fraudulent CA to the trusted list
Use a zero byte to change the effective
domain name
Wildcard certificate

Impersonating Verisign

Researchers created a rogue Certificate

Authority certificate, by finding MD5 collisions

Using more than 200 PlayStation 3 game consoles

Link SSL-2

Countermeasures

Verisign announced its intent to replace

MD5 hashes (presumably with SHA
hashes), in certificates issued after
January, 2009
Earlier, vulnerable certificates would be
replaced only if the customer requested it

Link SSL-4

FIPS 140-1 (from 2001) did not recognize

MD5 as suitable for government work

Links SSL-5, SSL-6, SSL-7

CA in an Untrustworthy
Nation

Link SSL-8

Unknown Trusted CAs

An unknown entity was apparently trusted for

more than a decade by Mozilla
Link SSL-9

Zero Byte Terminates Domain

Name

Just buy a certificate for Paypal.com\0.evil.com

Browser will see that as matching paypal.com

Link SSL-10