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[127] = 311.5
GFI = 0.93
RMSEA= 0.05
Goodness-of-fit statistics for three
competing specification of the model
Results: antecedents
The decision not-to-share is individual, often
rational and well justified from the perspective of
the individual
The intention to share knowledge is formed as a
combination of the social influence (social norms),
an individuals confidence in her ability to perform
the knowledge sharing (perceived control), and
the individuals own attitude toward sharing of
knowledge (attitude).
Results: governance
mechanisms
A positive feedback on past instances of
knowledge sharing, being acknowledged of their
contribution to the work of others and/or
organizational development
Availability and use of required resources and
opportunities to carry out and successfully
complete that behavior
Results: BUT!
Contrary to commonly accepted practices
associated with knowledge management
initiatives, a felt need for extrinsic rewards
may very well hinder the development of
favorable attitudes toward knowledge sharing
Such a finding might simply be a reflection of
the specific extrinsic rewards applied in two
organizations
Insights from Motivational Theory on the link
between extrinsic motivation and performance
(e.g. Vroom)
Insights from Creativity Theory(e.g. Amabile)
Rewards and knowledge sharing (e.g. Bock et al,
2005; Minbaeva, Makela and Rabbiosi, 2010)
Performance
Rewards
Limitations
Our limitations
cross-sectional data
two MNCs from Denmark
using perceptual
instruments
Future studies
longitudinal research
a wider variety of firms
the impact of the external
environment (formal and
informal institutions)
more elaborate measures,
combining perceptual
ones with some objective
indicators
Implications
The use of external rewards seems surprisingly
enough to be counterproductive in creating a
positive attitude toward knowledge sharing.
The interactions of governance mechanisms -
complementarity effect (which could be
negative, neutral or positive)
To conclude
We need to push HRM scholars out of their
natural comfort zone (Becker and Huselid, 2006:
900)
which assumes the aggregation of individuals,
existence of an average individual and no
differences in individual perception of external
stimulus and reaction to that.