Methodology To Minimize The Risk of Failures (Or Hazards) To An Acceptable Target

HSEM 1/Ch.
4
HSE management View Part I - Dr. Attia Gomaa - 2007
Risk Assessment is a powerful systematic
methodology to minimize the risk of failures (or
hazards) to an acceptable target.
Chapter 4: Risk assessment
Benefits of Risk Management:
Identify the expected failures
Minimize the risk of these failures
Facilitate better business outcomes
It does this by providing insight, knowledge and
confidence for better decision-making.
HSEM 2/Ch. 4
Risk should be considered at the earliest stages of project
planning, and risk management activities should be continued
throughout a project.

Risk management plans and activities should be an integral
part of an organizations management processes.
Systematic identification, analysis and assessment of
risk and dealing with the results contributes significantly to the
success of projects.
HSEM 3/Ch. 4
Risk:
Any future bad news

Risk is the chance of something happening that will
have an impact upon objectives.

Risk Analysis:
Risk estimation + Criticality analysis

Risk Control:
Proactive policy + Remedy process

Risk Assessment:
Risk analysis + Risk Control
to help the decision making process.
HSEM 4/Ch. 4
Risk Criticality Factors:
HSE and security effect
Process effetc (production losses)
Standby availability (5/5, 4/5, 3/5, 2/5)
Costs (operation and maintenance)
Project / Site/ System / Equipment:
Item/ Maintenance: (Top 5 Failures)
Mean time to/bet. failure (MTTF or MTBF)
Mean time to repair (MTTR)
Work Order Priority
HSEM 5/Ch. 4
Case: Equipment Criticality Systems

System #1:
Equipment HSE Process Standby Level
Gas condensate pump Major Major Without A+
Feed crude oil pump Medium Major With B
Export Pump Major Major With A
Sump Pit Pump (vessels) Major Major With A
Fire fighting pump Major Minor With A
Water feed pump Normal Medium With D
Instrument Air Compressor Major Major With A
Stand By Generator (Diesel) Major Major Without A+
HSEM 6/Ch. 4
System #2: Safety first
Level Description Example
A Major effect on HSE Fire fighting pump
B Major effect on Process
=High down time cost
Feed crude oil pump
C Normal effect on HSE
Normal effect on process
Without standby
Water feed pump
D Normal effect on HSE
Normal effect on process
With standby
Water feed pump
HSEM 7/Ch. 4
System #3:

Category Criticality Consequences
HSE
1
No potential for injury, pollution, fire or effect on
safety systems
2
No effect on safety systems controlling process and no
potential for fatalities, moderate or large pollution or
fire in classified areas
3
Potential for fatalities, moderate or large pollution and
fire in classified areas.
Production
(P)
1
No effect on production
2
Brief stop in production < 1 hour or reduced product
3
Production shutdown > 4 hours
Cost ( C )
1
Insignificant consequential cost < 1,000 USD
2
Moderate consequential cost > 1,000 < 15,000 USD
3
Substantial consequential cost > 15,000 USD
(1) Low criticality. (2) Medium criticality. (3) High criticality.
HSEM 8/Ch. 4

Risk = Severity x Probability

Risk = Consequence x Frequency
Risk Level:
X
Risk :
Any future bad news (objective or subjective)
Severity :
Harm or damage caused by a hazard
Probability :
Likelihood that the harm is realized
HSEM 9/Ch. 4

Risk = Severity x Probability

Risk = Consequence x Frequency
Method of Criticality Based of Risk Concept:
Low Medium
High
Severity
Low
Medium
High
Probability
HSEM 10/Ch. 4
Consequence or Severity Probability
Or
Frequency
(3)
High
(2)
Medium
(1)
Low
3
M
2
L
1
L
(1) Low:
>2 y
6
H
4
M
2
L
(2)Medium:
1-2y
9
S
6
H
3
M
(3) High:
<1y
Risk Matrix
For Technical (site) Engineers (J ob level):
Must be customize
to the middle manag.
Must be annual
updated
- Safety Induction
- Job Safety Analysis (JSA)
- Working At Height
S: Serious (10%)
H: High (20%)
M: Medium (30%)
L: Low (40%
System #1:
HSEM 11/Ch. 4
Severity
Probability
or
Frequency
(3)
High
(2)
Medium
(1)
Low
3
N
2
N
1
N
(1) Low:
Y
6
C
4
N
2
N
(2) Medium:
6m-1y
9
C
6
C
3
N
(3) High:
<6m
System #2:
HSEM 12/Ch. 4
Severity
5 4 3 2 1
>6 f/y
5
H H H M L
5-6 f/y
4
H H M M L
3-4 f/y
3
H M M L L
1-2 f/y
2
M M L L L
<1 f/y
1
M M L L L
Probability
System #3:
HSEM 13/Ch. 4
People Assets
Environ-
ment
Repu-
tation
Severity
0
1
2
3
4
5
No injury
or damage
to health
Slight injury
or health
effects
Minor injury
or health
effects
Major injury
or health
effects
Single fatality
or permanent
total disability
Multiple
fatalities
No
damage
Slight
damage
Minor
damage
Local
damage
Major
damage
Extensive
damage
No
effect
No
impact
Slight
effect
Slight
impact
Minor
effect
Minor
impact
Localised
effect
Consider-
able
impact
Major
effect
National
impact
Inter-
national
impact
Massive
effect
Never heard of
in
EP industry
A
Low Low
Medium Medium
High High
Has
occurred in
EP industry
B
Has occurred in
the audited OU
C D
Happens
several times a
year in the
audited OU
E
Happens
several times a
year in the
audited facility
Serious Serious
RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX (HSE effect)
Frequency
System #4:
HSEM 14/Ch. 4
Risk Assessment Matrix
U.S. Army Field Manual 3-100.12.

E Extremely high risk H High risk
M Medium risk L Low risk
Severity
Probability

Frequent

Likely

Occasional

Seldom

Unlikely

Catastrophic

E

E

H

H

M

Critical

E

H

H

M

L

Marginal

H

M

M

L

L

Negligible

M

L

L

L

L

System #5:
HSEM 15/Ch. 4
Major Processes of Risk assessment
(3)
Qualitative
Risk Analysis
(4)
Quantitative
Risk Analysis
(2)
Risk
Identification
(5)
Risk
Response
Planning
Risk Planning Risk
Controlling
(6)
Risk
Monitoring
& Control
(1)
Risk
Management
Planning
HSEM 16/Ch. 4
Risk Planning
Risk
Plan
Risk I dentify
Risk Evaluate
Risk Mitigate
Store
Risk assessment Process:
HSEM 17/Ch. 4
Risk Assessment
Risk Analysis Risk Evaluation
Risk I dentification Risk Estimation
Risk Sources
=
Find
List
Elements
Risk Probability
+
Risk Impact
or
Severity

Risk Mitigate
HSEM 18/Ch. 4
Risk Estimation
Risk Impact (Severity)

Risk Probability (Frequency)
Quantitative Qualitative
Tools:
Forecasting limits
Decision tree analysis
Tools:
Failure priority system
FMEA
Fault tree analysis
Risk radar
HSEM 19/Ch. 4
Risk Response Strategies
2) Mitigation
(Corrective action)
1) Avoidance
(Prevention)
4) Acceptance
(Accept consequences)
3) Transference
(Shift Responsibility)
HSEM 20/Ch. 4
Risk Assessment Steps:
1. Select the team and team leader
2. List of job steps (break down the main activities)
3. Define the potential hazards (description and type)
4. Decide who might be harmed and how
5. Evaluate the risks (Severity & Probability)
6. Define the risk level (risk matrix)
7. Propose the proactive policy (hazard control policy)
Engineering controls.
Management controls.
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).
8. Plan your remedy (Overall planning)

Note:
Your Risk Matrix must be customize according to
your working conditions and system criticality

HSEM 21/Ch. 4
The project risk management process
HSEM 22/Ch. 4
ROOT CAUSES ANALYSIS
1. Accident (or Incident or Near-Miss or Failure) classification
(short description and hazard type)
1. Contact (area visit, interview)
2. Causes
3. Root cause
4. System defaults (root root cause):
Incomplete information,
Insufficient maintenance,
Bad design,
Limited resources for process or HSE targets
Awareness / culture / support, .. etc.
5. Responsibility (Supervisor or/and management)
6. Severity level (A, B, or C)
7. Remedy
For (A and B):
1. Set action plan and risk assessment for critical items
2. Measure actual performance
3. Evaluate your Performance .
4. KPI for critical items
HSEM 23/Ch. 4
Root Cause Analysis

Entire chain of events is evaluated to find "Root Causes" as well as
the immediate cause
Promoted by National Safety Council, etc.
"Root causesare safety system inadequacies
Personal factors
Physical or mental condition, skills, knowledge, etc.
Job factors
Equipment, workplace conditions
Recommendations may include:
Policies
Equipment
Training

HSEM 24/Ch. 4
Accident
Weed
HSEM 25/Ch. 4
J ob Safety Analysis
1. Select the team and team leader
2. List of job steps (break down the main activities)
3. Define the potential hazards (description and type)
4. Evaluate the risks (Severity & Probability)
5. Define the risk level (risk matrix)
6. Toolbox Talk
7. Propose the proactive policy (hazard control policy)
Engineering controls.
Management controls.
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).
8. Plan your policy (Overall planning)

HSEM 26/Ch. 4
J ob Safety Analysis (J SA) technique

Already a part of many existing accident prevention programs
JSA breaks the job into basic steps
Identifies hazard of each step
Prescribes controls for each hazard
Review JSA if one has been conducted before the accident
Perform JSA if one is not available to determine the events and conditions that
led to the accident
The process to ensure a pre-task safety talk is carried out with all workers
1. Give safety talk to workers at start of tasks: review and identify all
risks
2. Check they understand
3. Fill in form
4. All workers sign
5. Attach start form near work location

HSEM 27/Ch. 4
Identify Task scope
State study Objectives
Break down Task to basic steps
For each step
Identify Hazards
& Threats
Assess Risk Define Controls
& Recovery measures
Record results
Summarise for each step,
Assign actions & action parties
....... for the working environment
J ob Safety Analysis
HSEM 28/Ch. 4
RCA = What Happened? Analysis = Reactive analysis

FMEA= What IF? Analysis = Proactive analysis
FMEA:
Tool to evaluate potential failure modes and their causes
Prioritize according to risk
Actions to eliminate or reduce Probability of Occurrence
RCA is a Process for identifying the contributing causal
factors that underlie variations in performance.
ROOT CAUSES ANALYSIS & Failure Mode Effect Analysis
HSEM 29/Ch. 4
The FMEA process is divided into the following six steps:

- For each Component:

Step 1: Functions

Step 2: Functional Failures

Step 3: Failure modes (failure rate date) definition

Step 4: Failure cause

Step 5: Effects of failure mode description.
Local System Plant
HSE Cost Process

Step 6: Remedy.
FMEA:
HSEM 30/Ch. 4
FMEA
100%
Item Function
Failure
mode
Failure
cause
Failure
mechanis
m
Failure
effects
Occ Det RPN
Maintenance
task
Recomm-
ended
interval
S A C
Severity
Is the part from the system or subsystem (assembly)
Is the main Task of the item
HSEM 31/Ch. 4
FMEA
Item Function
Failure
mode
Failure
cause
Failure
mechanis
m
Failure
effects
Occ Det RPN
Maintenance
task
Recomm-
ended
interval
S A C
Severity
Is the manner by which a failure is observed and is
defined as non-fulfillment of one of the equipment
functions .
Example:
valve the failure mode is open,partially open,closed
partially closed and wobble
HSEM 32/Ch. 4
FMEA
Item Function
Failure
mode
Failure
cause
Failure
mechanis
m
Failure
effects
Occ Det RPN
Maintenance
task
Recomm-
ended
interval
S A C
Severity
For each failure mode there may be several failure
causes
Select only potential failure to get root cause
By using why -why analysis you can get the root
cause for potential failure
HSEM 33/Ch. 4
FMEA
Item Function
Failure
mode
Failure
cause
Failure
mechanis
m
Failure
effects
Occ Det RPN
Maintenance
task
Recomm-
ended
interval
S A C
Severity
For each failure cause there is one or several failure
mechanisms examples of failure mechanism are
Fatigue ,corrosion and wear
HSEM 34/Ch. 4
FMEA
Item Function
Failure
mode
Failure
cause
Failure
mechanis
m
Failure
effects
Occ Det RPN
Maintenance
task
Recomm-
ended
interval
S A C
Severity
Means what is happen when each failure mode occurs
HSEM 35/Ch. 4
FMEA
Item Function
Failure
mode
Failure
cause
Failure
mechanis
m
Failure
effects
Occ Det RPN
Maintenance
task
Recomm-
ended
interval
S A C
Severity
Effect of failure is described in terms of the worst case
outcome with respect to safety and environmental impacts
,production availability and direct economic cost and all that
in numerical measure which are defined from ranking criteria
HSEM 36/Ch. 4
Item Function
Failure
mode
Failure
cause
Failure
mechanis
m
Failure
effects
Occ Det RPN
Maintenance
task
Recomm-
ended
interval
S A C
Severity
FMEA
Safety and Environment severity degree
Impact degree on Availability of production
Impact degree on Cost
HSEM 37/Ch. 4
RANK
SEVERITY
LEVEL
DESCRIPTION
10 Catastrophic I
A failure results in the major injury or death of
personnel.
79 Critical II
A failure results in minor injury to personnel, personnel
exposure to harmful chemicals or radiation, a fire or a
release of chemicals in to the environment.
46 Major III
A failure results in a low level exposure to personnel, or
activates facility alarm system.
13 Minor IV
A failure results in minor system damage but does not
cause injury to Personnel allow any kind of exposure to
operational or service personnel or allow any release of
chemicals into environment.

FMEA
HSE severity ranking criteria
HSEM 38/Ch. 4
Item Function
Failure
mode
Failure
cause
Failure
mechanis
m
Failure
effects
Occ Det RPN
Maintenance
task
Recomm-
ended
interval
S A C
Severity
FMEA
The probability that a failure will occur during the
expected life of the system can be described in potential
occurrence per unit time
HSEM 39/Ch. 4
RANK DESCRIPTION
1
An unlikely probability of occurrence during the item operating time interval.
Unlikely is defined as a single failure mode (FM) probability < 0.001 of the
overall probability of failure during the item operating time interval.
23
A remote probability of occurrence during the item operating time interval (i.e.
once every two months). Remote is defined as a single FM probability > 0.001
but < 0.01 of the overall probability of failure during the item operating time
interval.
46
An occasional probability of occurrence during the item operating time interval
(i.e. once a month).
Occasional is defined as a single FM probability > 0.01 but < 0.10 of the overall
probability of failure during the item operating time interval.
79
A moderate probability of occurrence during the item operating time interval
(i.e. once every two weeks). Probable is defined as a single FM probability >
0.10 but < 0.20 of the overall probability of failure during the item operating
time interval.
10
A high probability of occurrence during the item operating time interval (i.e.
once a week). High probability is defined as a single FM probability > 0.20 of
the overall probability of failure during the item operating interval.

FMEA
Occurrence ranking criteria
HSEM 40/Ch. 4
FMEA
Item Function
Failure
mode
Failure
cause
Failure
mechanis
m
Failure
effects
Occ Det RPN
Maintenance
task
Recomm-
ended
interval
S A C
Severity
This section provides a ranking based on an
assessment of the probability that a failure of mode
will be detected given the controls that are in place .
The probability of detection is ranked in reverse
order
HSEM 41/Ch. 4
RANK DESCRIPTION
12
Very high probability that the defect will be detected. Verification and/or
controls will almost certainly detect the existence of a deficiency or defect.
34
High probability that the defect will be detected. Verification and/or
controls have a good chance of detecting the existence of a deficiency or
defect.
57
Moderate probability that the defect will be detected. Verification and/or
controls are likely to detect the existence of a deficiency or defect.
8-9
Low probability that the defect will be detected. Verification and/or
controls not likely to detect the existence of a deficiency or defect.
10
Very low (or zero) probability that the defect will be detected. Verification
and/or controls will not or cannot detect the existence of a deficiency or
defect.

FMEA
Detection ranking criteria
HSEM 42/Ch. 4
Occurrence
x Severity
x Detection

RPN = O x S x D
Risk Priority Number
Item Function
Failure
mode
Failure
cause
Failure
mechanis
m
Failure
effects
Occ Det RPN
Maintenance
task
Recomm-
ended
interval
S A C
Severity
FMEA
HSEM 43/Ch. 4
Item Function
Failure
mode
Failure
cause
Failure
mechanis
m
Failure
effects
Occ Det RPN
Maintenance
task
Recomm-
ended
interval
S A C
Severity
An appropriate maintenance action may hopefully be found
by the decision logic in step 7
The identified maintenance action is performed at intervals
of fixed length.the length of the intervals is found in step 8
FMEA

Methodology To Minimize The Risk of Failures (Or Hazards) To An Acceptable Target

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HSEM 1/Ch.

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