Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Four Phases
1. 1949-1988 mutual suspicion and restraint 2. 1988-1994 normalization and honeymoon 3. 1994-2004 convergence and cooperation 4. 2004-present pragmatism and caution
1948-88
Heavily dominated by Cold war politics. The legacy of the Korean War, PRC volunteers intervention, and the role of alliances. Very limited contacts until 1980s, when economic interest began to grow and sporting events (1986 Asian Games and then 1988 Olympics) provided catalyst for semi-official contacts.
1988-1994
South Korean push for normalization of relations with PRC, achieved in 1992. President Roh Tae Woos nordpolitik road to Pyongyang led through Beijing and Moscow. Economic reasons predominated for China (though Taiwan factor also important), but political and strategic objectives paramount for South Korea.
1994-2004
Increasingly positive relationship. Frequent high-level exchanges, strong commercial links (an emergency exit from Asian financial crisis), and Korean public opinion seemed to be becoming more pro-China and anti-American. South Korean expectation of constructive Chinese role in ensuring stability on peninsula and over North Korean nuclear crises. President Roh Moohyuns balancer concept exemplified this rethinking.
2004-present
Economic links remained strong each became a major trading and investment partner of the other (by 2004 China was S.Koreas largest trading partner and top investment destination), but Chinas Koguryo project, apparent antiKoreanism in Chinese society, growing concern about Chinese treatment of North Korean refugees and, above all, the spectacular rise of Chinese economic and military power began to worry some South Korean elites.
Koguryo controversy
dispute about historical extent of ethnic Korean territories in N.E.China,
added to which came disputes over Mt Paekdu
MB Doctrine
President Lee came to power advocating two fundamental pillars to his foreign and security policy thinking: (1) reciprocity in relations with North (economic benefits for de-nuclearization) (2) revitalising the alliance with US. China did not feature prominently in initial formulations.
US in the MB Doctrine
President Lee puts greater positive emphasis on alliance with US an approach which the recent nuclear/missile tests have encouraged further but the Obama administration has broader perspectives than the Bush administration on North-east Asian affairs.
North Korea
North Korea is a difficult neighbour for both China and South Korea. Chinas centrality in six-party talks and its strong links with the North make it necessary for the South to court China.At the same time, China is the Norths strongest ally.
Korean reconciliation?
Both the Koreas would like to sort out reunification between themselves, but they know that China like other major powers cannot be ignored. China has acted as a conduit or catalyst for interKorean talks from time to time, but South Koreans (and maybe North Koreans too) worry that China prefers two Koreas to one Korea (or stability to reunification).
Role of Japan
Both Koreans and Chinese have bitter memories of past Japanese wartime actions and their nationalisms are frequently reactive against Japanese current actions or statements. But convergence of Chinese and South Korean views on Japan may be more apparent than real, as China does see pragmatic reasons for working with Japan which do not always sit well with more emotional Korean perspectives.
3. Engagement rewarding a dissatisfied power to socialise it into accepting rules and institutions of existing international order 4. Balancing against a perceived potential adversary, either internally (shifting resources to military) or externally (cooperation with another state which faces same potential adversary)
South Korea, currently, seems be favouring a low-intensity version (Denny Roys term) of external balancing, which implies keeping some constructive relations with China while also cooperating with its ally the United States.