International Railway Safety Conference 2008 Denver, Colorado

Development and Application of Hazard Analysis & Risk Assessment Models for the Korea Railway

October 5-10, 2008

Chan-Woo Park, Jong-Bae Wang, Sang-Log Kwak, Don-Bum Choi

About KRRI : Korea Railroad Research Institute

About KRRI : Korea Railroad Research Institute

Founded in 1996, financed by Korean government

254 individuals works for railway R&D division and national project division
Key research area - Rolling stock, track & civil engineering, signaling & electrical engineering,

railway policy & operation

National projects High speed train development , upgrading conventional railway,

design urban rail transit system, transportation technology, trans-Korean railway construction
National safety R&D program from 2004 Homepage : www.krri.re.kr

Contents
I

Introduction

II

Risk Assessment Procedure

III

Hazard Identification

IV

Risk Assessment Model Development

Conclusion

1. Introduction

Background
Cyclic occurrence of major train accidents - 2003: Daegu, subway train fire accident, 191 fatalities - 1993: Gupo, train derailment accident, 78 fatalities - 1982: Kyongsan, train collisions, 54 fatalities Environmental changes in Korea - KTX (Korea Train eXpress) operation at 2004 - Structural reform of railroad industries - Electrification of conventional lines - Preparation of TCR & TSR Railway Safety Act announced in 2004 - Focused on the risk-based safety management - Nation-wide railroad safety program & safety regulations - Hazard analysis, risk assessment & control

1. Introduction

Research Objective
Since Oct. 2005, KRRI has developed the common hazard analysis & risk assessment models for the Korea Railway.

Research Objective is to introduce - Developing procedure of the risk models - Application of the developed model to the Korea railway.

2. Risk Assessment Procedure

Common Approach Risk Management

Risk Management Process
System Definition

Railway System
Context

Risk Analysis

Modification
Risk Definition

Organization

Concept

Design

Construction

Exploitation

Demolition

Operation Techniques/ Technology

Risk Evaluation

System Life Cycle

Risk Reduction Risk Management

Maintenance

2. Risk Assessment Procedure

National Railway Risk Management System Architecture

SE Management National Safety Management System
1. National Safety Policies (NSP) 2. National Safety Objectives (NSO) 3. National Safety Organization (NSOR) 4. National Safety Integrated Plan (NSP) 5. National Safety Information Sys. (NSI)

Concept Design Hazard Analysis

Establishment of Basis Direction for NSP Establishment of Basis Direction for NSO Establishment of Basis Direction for NSOR Establishment of Basis Direction for NSP Establishment of Basis Direction for NSI Establishment of Basis Direction for NRA Establishment of Basis Direction for NET Establishment of Basis Direction for NAT Establishment of Basis Direction for TS Establishment of Basis Direction for SPR Analysis of ISI Problems

Design Safety Control Measures

Establishment of plan for NSP Establishment Of National Safety Objectives NSOR Design

Production Construction of Safety Infrastructure

Construction of Basis for NSP Resource Construction & Distribution NSOR Construction Construction of Operation Basis for NSP NSI Construction NRA Construction

Operation Safety Management

NSP Management Resource Management

Evaluation Safety Evaluation

NSP Evaluation NSO Evaluation

NSOR Management NSP Operation Management NSI Management NRA Operation & Management NET Operation & Management

NSO Evaluation NSP Evaluation

NSP Establishment

NSI Design NRA Establishment

NSI Evaluation NRA Utility Evaluation NET Utility Evaluation

6. Nation Risk Assessment Sys. (NRA)

7.National Education & Training Sys, (NET) 8. National Accident Investigation Sys, (NAI) 9. Training & Supply for Safety Specialist (TS) 10. Safety P.R. Sys. (SPR) 11. Infrastructure Safety Inspection (ISI) 12. Infrastructure Safety (IS) 13. Railway Rolling Stock Safety (RS)
14. Train Operation Safety & Train Protection (TR&TP)

NET Establishment NAI Establishment TS Establishment SPR Establishment ISI Plan Establishment Establishment of IS Safety Design Requirements Establishment of RS Safety Design Requirements Establishment of TR&TP Safety Design Requirements

NET Construction NAI Construction TS Construction SPR Construction ISI Sys. Modernization Construction of IS Safety Certification System Construction of RS Safety Certification System Construction of TR&TP Safety Certification System

NAI Operation & Management

TS Operation & Management SPR Operation ISI Sys. Operation IS Safety Certification System Operation RS Safety Certification System Operation TR&TP Safety Certification System Operation

NAI Utility Evaluation

TS Utility Evaluation SPR Appropriateness Evaluation ISI Sys. Appropriateness Evaluation IS Safety Performance Evaluation IS Safety Performance Evaluation Operation TR&TP Safety Performance Evaluation Operation

IS Hazard Analysis RS Hazard Analysis TR&TP Hazard Analysis - Terror, illegality

2. Risk Assessment Procedure

Railway Risk Assessment Procedure

Hazard Identification

Defining the Initiating Hazardous Events

Development of Accident Scenarios

Railway Accident Appearance Scenarios Hazardous Events FTA Model

Railway Accident Consequence Analysis

Progress Scenarios

Casual Analysis

ETA Model

Risk Evaluation & Reduction

3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios

Hazard Identification Procedure

System definition and boundary setting

Setting up objective of hazard identification & its boundary

Identifying hazardous events/ hazards/ barriers

Including the definition of measures which stops the increases of accident

Developing accident appearance scenarios

Defining relationships among hazardous events, hazards and barriers.

Developing accident progress scenarios

Considering the relevant key influential factors.

Accident scenario management

Drawing up hazard log.

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3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios

System & Boundary Definition

Typical railway system configuration proposed in SAMRAIL project

According to the accident classification of Railway Accident Report Regulation, The scenarios were divided into the five main areas 1) Train collision accident, 2) Train derailment accident, 3) Train fire accident, 4) Level crossing accident, 5) Railway (traffic/safety) casualty accident.
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3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios

Hazardous Event Identification

Railway Category
Misrouted train Train Collision Faults in driving Abnormal train Obstacles on the track Level Crossing Accident Being trapped in level crossing Crossing during warning signal Breaking through or detour the barrier People struck/crushed Railway Traffic Casualty Accident Trip/Slip Falling Caught/Dragged Others

Hazardous Events
Mistaking in dealing points, point faults, mistaking in dealing blockage, interlocking system faults Signal/direction violation, signal fault, mistaking in dealing braking system, braking system fault, over speeding Train separation, car rolling, train stop, backward moving External obstacles, parts from train/freight falling, infrastructure collapsing/obstruction -Engine stop -Deviation of pathway -Gangway blocking -Lack of propulsion/braking -Violation entry -Limit interference -Breaking or detour Striking with train, Striking with objects

Trip/slip during train boarding/alighting, Trip/slip by train emergency braking/emergency start

Falling from train, Falling from platform during train boarding/alighting Caught in a train door, Caught between platform and train Electric Shock, Burn, Suffocation
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3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios

Railway Accident Appearance Scenario

Built up by classifying properly the immediate causes and underlying causes.

Immediate Causes: conditions which immediately cause hazardous events

- Substandard Act: Substandard acts/behavior of who can cause hazardous events

- Substandard Conditions: Physical conditions which can cause hazardous events

Underlying Causes: reason or source of substandard acts and conditions - Human Management Factors - Technological Factors - External Factors

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3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios

Railway Accident Appearance Scenario

Hazardous Event Immediate Causes Underlying Causes

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3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios

Railway Accident Scenario

Critical factors influencing accident severity
were identified in the accident progress scenarios Example of the Accident Progress Scenarios

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4. Risk Assessment Model Development

Risk Measure Method

Risk assessment model
: the form of a cause and consequence analysis : using fault trees and event trees.

Collective Risk
(Average Number of FWI/year)

Frequency
(Average frequency at which the scenario sequence occurs)

Consequences
(the number of FWI/scenario sequence) 1 FWI = 1 fatality = 10 major injuries = 200 minor injuries
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4. Risk Assessment Model Development

Data Population
Industry safety data: safety related incidents within industry database. Incidents recorded range from train collisions to passenger burns from coffee spills Many thousands of records are reviewed and classified Where data was not available, Use was made of:

- Human error probability assessments

: using a revised Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) - Safety expert judgment from in-house expertise within Korea railway. - Statistical methods including Monte Carlo simulation and Bayesian uncertainty distributions.

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4. Risk Assessment Model Development

Railway Risk Assessment & Information Management System (RAIMS) RAIMS

Safety Requirement Verification Management Safety Requirement Management

Accident Analysis Accident Search Environment Analysis Hazard Analysis Damage Analysis Options Analysis

Risk Analysis Event Tree Analysis Fault Tree Analysis Risk Evaluation Human Factor Analysis

System Management User Management Code Management Classification Management

Railway System Management

Safety Requirement Change Management Requirement Traceability Management

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4. Risk Assessment Model Development

Web-Based Accident Analysis Subsystem

Application running on the web One purpose is to provide - Fundamental information for an in-depth risk assessment of railway accidents - Information on railway safety performance levels to both assessors and the public This system is composed of three modules 1) Accident input module. 2) Accident analysis & statistics module 3) Hazard management module.

Environment Analysis

Accident Analysis

Accident Statistic Analysis

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4. Risk Assessment Model Development

Risk Analysis Subsystem

Windows-based application Dedicated railway risk assessment software package - Event Tree Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, Risk Evaluation, Human Factor Analysis

The risk of the railway systems can be assessed by the ET/FT linking approach
- Accident progress scenarios: defined as event trees, using an event tree editor. - Each branch of the accident progress sequences requires one or more supplementary fault trees, which can be developed by a fault tree editor.

- Sum of the frequency of each sequence becomes the total frequency of the accident of concern.

Event Tree Editor View

ET/FT Linking approach

Fault Tree Editor View

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4. Risk Assessment Model Development

Railway Human Reliability Analysis (R-HRA) Module

Supporting the analysts in analyzing potential human errors
Used under the railway risk assessment framework Computer software developed for aiding the R-HRA process. Revised R-HRA method supplementing the original R-HRA method developed by RSSB Providing a specific task analysis guideline and a classification of performance shaping factors (PSFs)

General Information Input

Error Analysis & Quantification

Reporting Results

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4. Risk Assessment Model Development

Railway Accident Risk Assessment Results

Railway accident data until 2005 year on the main line of South Korea Train operation on the main line fully carried out by Korea Railroad Corp.. The total risk: 217 FWI per year Accident Category Risk (FWI)

Train collision accident

Train derailment accident Train fire accident Level crossing accident Railway traffic casualty accident Railway safety casualty accident Total

0.6744
3.6898 14.1 16.94 161.138 20.742 217.284

The overall risk made up from different profiles of frequency and consequences. Railway casualty accident : Tend to consist of high frequency low consequence type events (slips, trips and falls) Train accidents : Tend to have a risk contribution from the low frequency high consequence type events : Increase the risk contribution for the hazardous events above the level seen in practice.
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4. Risk Assessment Model Development

Future Development of the Risk Model

The model is being prepared currently and will include:

Feasibility and uncertainty test in the results of the developed model Improved level of human factors modeling Use of more sophisticated statistical analysis techniques

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5. Conclusion

This study has proposed

Developing procedure of the risk models for the Korea railway

Application of their application to the Korea railway

The developed model will provide a generic model of the safety risk on the Korea railway Which will Increase the industrys knowledge of the risk from the operation and maintenance Allow the identification of areas of railway operation that need further risk controls

Allow sensitivity analyses to be carried out to determine the risk reduction

Allow cost benefit analysis of proposed changes

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Thank you!

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