2001 South First Street

Champaign, Illinois 61820

+1 (217) 384.6330
Davis Power Consultants
Strategic Location of Renewable
Generation Based on Grid Reliability
PowerWorld Users Group Meeting
November 2-3, 2005

The CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION and DAVIS POWER
CONSULTANTS contributed to the development of this analysis.

2
Strategy
Identify links between electricity needs in the
future and available renewable resources.
Optimize development and deployment of
renewables based on their benefits to:
Electricity system
Environment
Local economies
Develop a research tool that integrates spatial
resource characteristics and planning analysis.
3
Objectives
Investigate the extent to which renewable
distributed electricity generation can help
address transmission constraints
Determine performance characteristics for
generation, transmission and renewable
technology
Identify locations within system where
sufficient renewable generation can
effectively address transmission problems
4
Objectives
We want to determine the impact of large-
scale distributed projects on grid security.
We need to:
Identify weak transmission elements and
define metrics that assess system security.
Find locations where new generation would
enhance the security of the grid.
Combine maps of beneficial locations with
maps of energy resources.
5
Methodology
Simulation
Power Flow
Contingency Analysis
Security Metrics
Results
Weak Elements
Security Indices
Visualization
6
Power flow Simulation
Identify weak elements in the system by
simulating impacts from lost transmission
or capacity (NERC N-1 contingency)
More importantly, can identify locations in
system where new generation can provide
grid reliability benefits.
7
Normal Operation Example
100 MW
50 MW
280 MW
187 MW
110 MW
40 Mvar
80 MW
30 Mvar
130 MW
40 Mvar
40 MW
20 Mvar
1.00 pu
1.01 pu
1.04 pu
1.04 pu
1.04 pu
0.9930 pu 1.05 pu
A
MVA
A
MVA
A
MVA
A
MVA
A
MVA
A
MVA
A
MVA
A
MVA
67 MW
67 MW
33 MW 32 MW
57 MW
58 MW
21 MW
21 MW
66 MW 65 MW
11 MW
11 MW
23 MW
42 MW
43 MW 28 MW 29 MW
23 MW
23 MW
150 MW
200 MW
0 Mvar
200 MW
0 Mvar
A
MVA
29 MW 28 MW
One
Three
Four
Two
Five
Six
Seven
23 MW
87%
A
MVA
82%
A
MVA
System does not
have normal
operation thermal
violations
8
Contingency Example
100 MW
50 MW
280 MW
188 MW
110 MW
40 Mvar
80 MW
30 Mvar
130 MW
40 Mvar
40 MW
20 Mvar
1.00 pu
1.01 pu
1.04 pu
1.04 pu
1.04 pu
0.9675 pu 1.05 pu
A
MVA
A
MVA
A
MVA
A
MVA
A
MVA
A
MVA
45 MW
45 MW
55 MW 53 MW
0 MW
0 MW
58 MW
56 MW
52 MW 51 MW
26 MW
25 MW
43 MW
36 MW
37 MW 24 MW 25 MW
30 MW
30 MW
150 MW
200 MW
0 Mvar
200 MW
0 Mvar
A
MVA
25 MW 24 MW
One
Three
Four
Two
Five
Six
Seven
44 MW
83%
A
MV A
83%
A
MV A
95%
A
MV A
156%
A
MVA
Suppose there is a fault
and this line is
disconnected
Planning Solutions:
New line to bus 3
OR
New generation
at bus 3

Then this line gets
overloaded
(is a weak element)
This is a serious
problem for the
system
9
Contingency Analysis
Security is determined by the ability of the
system to withstand equipment failure.
Weak elements are those that present
overloads in the contingency conditions
(congestion).
Standard approach is to perform a single
(N-1) contingency analysis simulation.
A ranking method will be demonstrated to
prioritize transmission planning.
10
Results Organized by
Lines, then Contingencies
Sum each value-100 to
find the Aggregate
Percentage Contingency
Overload (APCO)
Then multiply
by limit to get
the Aggregate
MW
Contingency
Overload
(AMWCO)
11
100 MW
50 MW
280 MW
187 MW
110 MW
40 Mvar
80 MW
30 Mvar
130 MW
40 Mvar
40 MW
20 Mvar
1.00 pu
1.01 pu
1.04 pu
1.04 pu
1.04 pu
0.9930 pu 1.05 pu
A
MVA
A
MVA
A
MVA
A
MVA
A
MVA
A
MVA
A
MVA
A
MVA
67 MW
67 MW
33 MW 32 MW
57 MW
58 MW
21 MW
21 MW
66 MW 65 MW
11 MW
11 MW
23 MW
42 MW
43 MW 28 MW 29 MW
23 MW
23 MW
150 MW
200 MW
0 Mvar
200 MW
0 Mvar
A
MVA
29 MW 28 MW
One
Three
Four
Two
Five
Six
Seven
23 MW
87%
A
MVA
82%
A
MVA

28
21
14
7
0
AMWCO
Weak Element Visualization
12
Determination of Good Locations
Overloaded Line
in this direction
New Source
Sink
Transfer helps mitigate
the overload by means
of a counter-flow
13
Determination of Good Locations
Generation could be located to produce
counter-flows that mitigate weak element
contingency overloads.
The new injection of power requires
decreasing generation somewhere else.
A good assumption is that generation will be
decreased across the system or each control
area using participation factors.
14
TLR for Normal Operation
Need to know how the new generation at a
certain bus will impact the flows in a
transmission element.
Transmission Loading Relief (TLR)
Since a TLR is calculated for every bus, the
TLR can be used to rank locations that
would be beneficial for security.
,
MWFlow
TLR
MWInjection
BRANCH
BUS BRANCH
BUS
jk
i jk
i
=
15
Specify the weak
transmission element
Specify the sink
of the transfer
Sensitivities are
calculated for each bus
16
TLR for Contingencies
Need to consider contingencies
Contingency Transmission Loading Relief
(TLR) Sensitivity is the change in the flow
of a line due to an injection at a bus
assuming a contingency condition.
,
, ,
ContMWFlow
TLR
MWInjection
BRANCH CONT
BUS BRANCH CONT
BUS
jk c
i jk c
i
=
17
Determination of Good Locations
Equivalent TLR (ETLR):
, ,
Overloaded Contingencies that
Elements overloaded branch
,
Contingent
Violations
ETLR = TLR
TLR
BUS BUS BRANCH CONT
BUS CONTVIOL
i i jk c
jk
jk
i v
v
e
e
=

18
Determination of Good Locations
Weighted TLR (WTLR) using post-
contingency TLRs:
,
Contingent
Violations
CODir
WTLR = TLR
SysAMWCO
MWCO
CONTVIOL
CONTVIOL
BUS BUS CONTVIOL
CONTVIOL
i i v
v
v
v
N
e
| |
|

|
|

\ .

,
Branches
CODir
WTLR = TLR
SysAMWCO
AMWCO
BRANCH
CONT
BUS BUS BRANCH
BRANCH
jk
i i jk
jk
jk
N
e
| |
|

|
|

\ .

Weighted TLR (WTLR) using base case

TLRs:
19
Weighted TLR (WTLR)
Complexity: A TLR is computed for each bus, to
mitigate a weak element, under a contingency.
We want a single weighted TLR for each bus.
Buses
Weak Elements
Contingencies
Buses
WTLR
20
Calculating WTLRs
The contingency information (severity and
number) of a weak element can be captured by
calculating the Aggregate MW Contingency
Overload (AMWCO).
This effectively converts the cube to a table.
Buses
Weak Elements
Buses
Weak Elements
Contingencies
21
Calculating WTLRs
Need to mitigate the weakest elements first
Weight the TLR by the weakness of each
element, which is given by the AMWCO.
Buses
Weak Elements
Buses
WTLR
22
Meaning of the WTLR
A WTLR of 0.5 at a bus means that 1MW of new
generation injected at the specific bus is likely to
reduce 0.5 MW of overload in transmission
elements during contingencies.
Thus, if we inject new generation at high impact
buses, re-dispatch the system, and rerun the
contingencies, the overloads will decrease.
Note that the units of the WTLR are:


[MW Contingency Overload]
[MW Installed]
23
Large Case Example
Project for the California Energy
Commission (CEC).
Needed to simulate N-1 contingencies (about
6,000 for California)
Simulation developed for 2003, 2005, 2007
and 2017 summer peak cases.
In 2003, there were 170 violating
contingencies, 255 contingency violations, and
146 weak elements.
24
Process Overview
Power
Flow Cases
Identify
Weak
Elements
Evaluate
Locations
(WTLR)
GIS Overlay
Test Power
Injections
at Select
Locations
MARIPOSA
MAD ERA
FRESNO
MERCED
TULARE
KINGS
MONTERREY
SAN BENITO
SANTA CLARA SANTA CRUZ
INYO
MONO
STANISLAUS PWR 1 PWR 1 PWR 1
TOULUMNE
ALPINE
CALAVERAS
AMAD OR
EL D ORAD O
SAN MATEO
ALAMED A
MARIN
CONTRA COSTA
SAN JOAQUIN
SACRAMENTO
YONO
SOLANO
NAPA SONOMA
LAKE
MEND OCH INO
COLUSA
SUTTER
BUTTE GLENN
PLACER
NEVAD A
SIERRA YUBA
PLUMAS
TEH AMA
TRIMITY
H UMBOLD T SH ASTA
LASSEN
MOD OC
SISKIYOU
D EL NORTE
SAN LUIS OBISPO
KERN
SANTA BARBARA
VENTURA
LOS ANGELES
SAN BERNARD INO
RIVERSID E
IMPERIAL SAN D IEGO
ORANGE
25
Result: Weak Element Distribution
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240
# Weak Elements
APCO
2003 2005 2007
Both number and weakness of
elements increase with time
26
Identification of Weak Elements

2007 2017
The spatial
distribution of
weak elements
seems to
follow an
identifiable
pattern.
27
MARIPOSA
MAD ERA
FRESNO
MERCED
TULARE
KINGS
MONTERREY
SAN BENITO
SANTA CLARA
SANTA CRUZ
INYO
MONO
STANISLAUS
PWR 1
PWR 1
PWR 1
TOULUMNE
ALPINE
CALAVERAS
AMAD OR
EL D ORAD O
SAN MATEO
ALAMED A
MARIN
CONTRA COSTA
SAN JOAQUIN
SACRAMENTO
YONO
SOLANO
NAPA
SONOMA
LAKE
MEND OCH INO
COLUSA
SUTTER
BUTTE
GLENN
PLACER
NEVAD A
SIERRA
YUBA
PLUMAS
TEH AMA
TRIMITY
H UMBOLD T
SH ASTA
LASSEN
MOD OC
SISKIYOU
D EL NORTE
SAN LUIS OBISPO
KERN
SANTA BARBARA
VENTURA
LOS ANGELES
SAN BERNARD INO
RIVERSID E
IMPERIAL
SAN D IEGO
ORANGE
Good Locations
New generation at
green locations will
tend to reduce the
overloads.
New generation at red-
yellow locations will
tend to increase the
overloads.
Note that higher
imports would worsen
system security.

28
Local WTLR Visualization
SAN MATEO
ALAMEDA
CONTRA COSTA
CASTROVL
CV BART
H ICKS
JEFFERSN
LS PSTAS
MTCALF D
METCALF
METCALF
MTCALF E
MNTA VSA
MONTAVIS
MORAGA
MRAGA 1M
MRAGA 2M
MORAGA
MRAGA 3M
NEWARK F
NEWARK E
NEWARK E
NWK D IST
NEWARK D
NWRK 2 M
NEWARK D
MARTIN C
SANMATEO
SANMATEO
MARTIN C
SARATOGA
TESLA C
TESLA
TESLA E
TESLA JA
TESLA
TESLA JB
TESLA D
UAL COGN
SFIA
MILLBRAE
RAVENSWD
RAVENSWD
D MTAR_SL
SL BART SN LND RO
JENNY
ALAMED CT
OAK C115
STATIN L
WH ISMAN
MOFT. FLD
LOCKH D 1
LOCKH D 2
S. L. A. C.
MT VIEW
STELLING
JARVIS
CRYOGEN
CYTE PMP
CMP EVRS
FREMNT
CLARMNT
LKWD BART
LKWD _JCT LAKEWD -M
LAKEWD -C LK_REACT
SERRMNTE
EST PRTL
STATIN D
AMES BS2
AMES BS1 AMES J1B
AMES J1A
AMES D ST
WOLFE
E. SH ORE
EASTSH RE
EMBRCD RE
EMBRCD RD
LAWRENCE
ROSSTAP1
ROSSMOOR
ROSSTAP2
SANRAMON
TASSAJAR
TRACY
TRACY JC
TRACY
TRCY PMP
STATIN X
D LY CTYP
D ALY CTY
GRANT
UCB SUB
UCB JCT1
CLY LND G
SMATEO3M
STATIN J
ALTM MD W
OAKLND 23
MFT. FD J
LCKH D J1
LCKH D J2
SLACTAP1
AD CC
TES JCT
TES SUB
FLOWIND 2
JV ENTER
LLNL TAP
LLNLAB
LLNL
WND MSTR
D ELTAPMP
VASONA
BELMONT
CLY LNG2
PLO ALTO
LONESTAR
SH RED D ER
SH RED JCT
BAIR
JV BART
BAY MD WS
SFIA-MA
SH AWROAD
EST GRND
H NTRS PT
MISSON
LARKIN E
LARKIN F LARKIN D
POTRERO
BAYSH OR1
BAYSH OR2
AMD JCT
A. M. D
APP MAT PH LPS_JT
PH ILLIPS
BRITTN
PIERCY
IBM-CTLE
IBM-BALY
IBM-H RRS
IBM-H R J
BAILY J3
BAILY J1 BAILY J2
EVRGRN 2
EVRGRN J EVRGRN 1
GILROY
MARKH M J
MARKH AM MARKH MJ2
SWIFT
STONE J
STONE
GEN ELEC
D IXON LD
MABURY
MABURY J
MCKEE
SN JSE A
SJ B E
SJ B F
ED ENVALE
ED NVL J3 ED NVL J1
EL PATIO
TRIMBLE
NORTECH
MONTAGUE
ZNKER J1
ZANKER ZNKER J2
KIFER
SCOTT
FMC JCT
FMC
AGNEW
AGNEW J
MILPITAS
waksha j
WAUKESH A
ELLS GTY
KSSN-JC2
H J H EINZ
TEICH ERT
TH . E. D V.
NUMMI
D UMBARTN
MOCCASIN
OAKD LTID
TUOLUMN
CRTEZ
PINEER
H ILMAR
MT ED EN
OWENSTAP
OWNBRKWY
CARTWRT
MARITIME
LEPRINO
SAFEWAY
OI GLASS
EBMUD GRY
FIBRJCT2
FIBRJCT1
FIBRBJCT
FIBREBRD
D OMTAR
AEC_TP2 AEC_JCT
SFWY_TP2
AEC_300 AEC_TP1
SFWY_TP1 GWFTRACY
OWENSTP1
OWENSTP2
TCH RTJCT
TCH RT_T2 TCH RT_T1
TCY MP1
TCY MP2
TESTAB12
TRAMAX11
LS ESTRS
N_LVMORE
VINEYD _D
VINEYARD
SLACTAP2
ED ESTAP1 ED ES
ED S GRNT
ELPT_SJ1
ELPT_SJ2
LS ESTRS
NORTH ERN
NUMI TAP
NUMI JCT
SANPAULA
UAL TAP
EL ELP11
EVRMTC21
LS NWK11
LS NWK12
LS NWK13
METLS 11
METLS 12
METLS 13
MORSTA11
MORSTA21
MORSTA31
MORSTA41
MTCEVR11
NEWNEW11
SANMAR11
SANMAR12
SANPIT11
SN ELP11
BURLNGME
CAL MEC
D UBLIN
WTLR
29

1.50

0.75

0.00

0.75

1.50
WTLR
Eastern Interconnection
30
Towards a Locational Value
Determination of locations where new
generation would enhance security needs to
be combined with availability and
economics of energy resources.
Valuation requires monetizing the security
benefits.
31
Towards a Locational Value
GIS spatial analysis techniques are needed
to determine feasible generation
alternatives for each location in a large-
scale system.
$
MW
cost of least-cost alternative
i ij
c g ( =

Based on existing energy potential and
technology, a least-cost alternative can be
determined for each location.
32
Towards a Locational Value
Units of WTLR are [AMWCO/MW installed].
The security cost/benefit can be obtained as
follows:
Assume WTLR is negative: Injection reduces the
AMWCO
$
, ,
MW
cos
i i k i k i
benefits k ts k
Value B C s ( =


$
$
AMWCO
AMWCO
MW
i
MW
i
i
c
s
WTLR
(

( =

(

33
Security-Penetration Curves
Once a set of proposed sites is defined, the
effect of simultaneous distributed injections
with different levels of penetration can be
simulated using security-penetration
curves.
The effectiveness of the solution is affected
for large injections due to:
Local transfer capability of the grid
Reversed flows

34
Security-Penetration Curves
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
0 650 1300 2000 New Generation
SysAMWCO in 2005
69
500
115
230
35
Policy Analysis
A fundamental goal of integrated electricity
systems is to ensure dependable supply to
customers.
This goal cannot be achieved if the system
consistently exhibits overloaded elements and
congestion.
System AMWCO can be utilized to:
Evaluate system security for different seasons/years
Design policy goals regarding security
Can use security-penetration curves

36
Policy Analysis
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000
New Generation
AMWCO
2007 2005 2003
Indicates how much generation
is needed to maintain the current
level of reliability.
Approx. 500MW every two years
(at strategic locations)
ANewGen
AAMWCO
Indicates the effect of new generation
Approx. -3.5 MWCO/MW Installed
37
Policy Analysis
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000
New Generation
AMWCO
2007 2005 2003
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000
New Generation
AMWCO
2007 2005 2003
Generation needed to maintain
the current level of reliability.
Generation needed in the next two
years (2005) to solve the problems
by 2017. Approx. 950MW
7300
38
Integrated Model
Power Flow
Model
Weak Element
Ranking
Spatial Rep. of
New Generation
Contingency Analysis
Energy
Resources
Maps of Energy Potential
List of Proposed Sites
Security
Indices
Generation
Expansion
Security-
Penetration
Curves
WTLR Calculation
GIS Spatial Overlay
Transmission
Expansion
Transmission
Policy
Energy
Policy