6Nov98

Power System Dynamics Analysis

Complexity in the WSCC
August 10, 1996 System Disturbance
David P. Chassin, October 16, 2002
Contact: david.chassin@pnl.gov
2
August 1996 West Coast Blackout
Summary of Events
WSCC 8-10-96 15:48 PAST major disturbance
4 islands, 7.5M customers out up to 9 hours
Initiating event: 500 kV Keeler-Allston flashover to trees
Trip cause: poor right-of-way maintenance
Numerous supporting events
Follow-up events
COI limit lowered to 3200 MW (Aug 11)
Account for limits at McNary (exciter) and The Dalles (fish)
Raised Aug 12-14 to 3600 MW to avoid blackouts in CA


3
PNNL and Power Systems
DOE Transmission Reliability Program
Real-Time Grid Reliability Management
Reliability and Markets, Load as a Resource
Distributed Energy Resources Integration
Infrastructure Assurance Outreach Program
Utility vulnerability assessments
Interaction with NERC, others on security topics
Interest in SCADA security
Energy System Transformation Initiative
Integrated econophysics modeling and simulation
Next generation power technology development


4
Wide-Area Measurement System
Dynamic monitor network supports advanced
analysis
Better information supports better
- and faster - decisions.
System planning
Observed
response
Power
System
Unobserved
response
Information
Automatic control
System operation
Disturbances
Decision
Processes
Measurement
Based
Information
System
5
Real-Time System Data
Collected from various monitors throughout the grid
Bonneville Power Administration Phasor Data Concentrator
6
Power System Measurement Tools
Tools for managing data & signal analysis
7
Ringdown Analysis Tool
Advanced dynamic analysis
model fitting window
Time in Seconds
165 170 175 180
Malin MW
Unfiltered signals
Brake insertion #2, 09/04/97
(Alberta stronglyconnected)
Reference time 09-04-97 23H42m35s
PACI Mode: 0.294 Hz @ 5.3% damping
Alberta : 0.418 Hz @ 5.1% damping
900
1000
1100
1200
Data collected on Dittmer PPSM
sample rate = 60/second
Extracting a linear model
from measured data
Dynamic analysis
Model validation
Control design
8
Advanced Dynamic System
Analysis and Model Validation
4000
4200
4400
4600
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
4000
4200
4400
4600
Time in Seconds
Simulated COI Power (initial WSCC base case)
Observed COI Power (Dittmer Control Center)
August 10, 1996 post-disturbance analysis
Determine if model
calibration is needed.
Currently working with western utilities to improve power grid models
9
Abstract
Transactive
Machine
Power System Econophysics
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
20000 25000 30000 35000 40000 45000
Quantity (MWh/h)
P
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b
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y
0%
20%
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80%
100%
$10 $100 $1,000
Price ($/MWh)
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$0
$250
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$750
$1,000
20000 30000 40000 50000
Quantity (MWh/h)
P
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(
$
/
M
W
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)
Control
process
State m
Thermodynamic
process
State x
Qwaste
Qin
Qout Cin
Cout
Cprofit
control
data
( )
85 . 0 2 6 . 1 2
2
3
2
85 . 0 2
6 . 1
4

|
.
|

\
|

=
Q
e Q

Q P
PJM 1999 Load/Price Probability Distributions
Q = Qmax (11/P
2
)
4.54

10
59.860
59.880
59.900
59.920
59.940
59.960
59.980
60.000
60.020
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0
With GFA: Frequency Excursion Arrests at 59.950 Hz within 0.7
sec.
Without GFA: Frequency Drops to 59.886 Hz within 5.8
sec.
Four Corners Unit 5 Tripped with 710 MW on May 8, 2002 At 13:38
PDT
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y

(
H
z
)

Seconds (from 13:38:20 PDT)
Grid Friendly Appliances
Grid-Friendly Appliance Controller
=100 10
6
Loads and Reserves on a
Typical U.S. Peak Day
Industrial
28%
Residential
(GFA) 20%
Residential
(non-GFA)
10%
Commercial
29%
Operating
reserves
13%
GFA potential
exceeds US
operating reserve
requirements!
Grid-friendly appliances
rapid, automatic response to grid crises
platform for active communication &
control
pre-heat/pre-cool to coast through peaks
utilize & value thermal storage
increase reliability & security
unnoticeable by consumer
mass customization/marketing

given enough ants, you can move a mountain!...
impromptu reaction from a utility power engineer
Overview of WSCC August 10, 1996
15:48 PAST Disturbance
Based on WSCC Disturbance Report
Approved by WSCC Operations
Committee on October 18, 1996
12
High northwest transmission loading
High imports to CA
Heavy imports from Canada
and Idaho
COI at 4750 MW
Similar to conditions prior to
7/2/96 disturbance
Warning signs visible
Previous high-load issues
Small power/large voltage
swings
Suggested voltage support
problems in NW
13
Equipment out of service
Lines
500 kV: Big Eddy-Ostrander,
John Day-Marion, and Marion-
Lane (reactive support around
Portland) flashover to trees
115 kV: Allston-Rainer degraded
hdwr, Longview-Lexington cable
installation.
Breakers
500 kV: Marion, Keeler
(modifications)
Transformers
500/230 kV: Keeler (modification)
Static VAR Comp (SVC)
Keeler reduced support to
500 kV (tied to 230 kV side)
x
x
x
14
Triggering Events
15:42:37 Keller-Allston
Sags into trees, flashes, trips
Overload par-lines hold 5 min
McNary react-power at max
15:47:29 St. Johns-Merwin
Lines trip on relay malfunc.
KA par-line loads increase
15:47:36 Ross-Lexington
Tree flashover and trip
207 MW from Swift lost
System voltage sags
15:47:36 McNary
Units trip, exciter problem
System power/voltage osc. begins
ID-UT-CO-AZ-NM-NV Surge
COI power flows down east side
Out-of-step trips
CA-AZ remain tied together

!
!
!
!
!
15
Final Result
28,000 MW of under-frequency load shedding
20,000 MW of undesired generation loss
Four major islands
Northern California (North of LA to Oregon border)
Losses: 11,600 MW load; 7,900 MW generation
Frequency excursions: 58.54 60.7 58.3, restored in 2.5 hrs.
Southern California (SoCal, NV, AZ, NM, El Paso, Baja)
Losses: 15 820 MW load; 13,500 MW generation
Frequency excursions: 61.3 58.5, restored in 70 min.
Northern (BC, OR, WA, MT, WY, ID)
Losses: 2,100 MW load; 5,700 MW generation
Frequency excursions: 60.4, restored in 7 minutes
Alberta
Losses: 970 MW load; 146 MW generation
Frequency excursions: 60.4 59.0, restored in 6 minutes
16
Open Questions re. Complexity
Report only identifies the incontrovertible points
and fails to address more controversial questions:
Why was line maintenance inadequate?
Why was system operated in single-contingency mode?
Why did AZ-CA separation scheme fail to operate?
Why did models fail to predict oscillations?
Why did system damping fail?
Lesson for us:
Dont go just by the official reports. Much more is not
reported or discussed because of sensitivities. The
social dynamics of a tightly knit community factors into
what is knowable. We have to look deeper.




17
Problems Persist
WECC Oct 8 2002 15:31 PDT
59.550
59.600
59.650
59.700
59.750
59.800
59.850
59.900
59.950
60.000
60.050
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Time
F
r
e
q
2900 MW generation tripped
1400 MW Chief Joe brake inserted
~86 MW UFLS
~350 MW load loss
480 MW generation dropped
Questions and Comments