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DELTA ANALYSIS OF LAGOS, NIGERIA ARMOURY EXPLOSION

Presented by:

James Ekwensi

Outline
Background information Population at risk Disaster case Disaster Impact Emergency response Problems NEMA Gap Analysis (SWOT) Recommendations References

Background Information
Population Area Coats line Seasons over 140 million 923,768sq km 843 km Dry and Wet

Population at risk
Estimated 2 million people live with in the 2 Local government areas surrounding the cantonment. Approximately 4500 families lived within the cantonment

Case: 2002 Lagos armory explosions


When: Sunday 27 January 2002 @ 18:00 What: Bomb explosion Where: Ikeja Military Cantonment Why: Probably caused by a fire in the adjacent local market How: Many drowned trying to cross a river to escape the explosions How much: Estimated 200+ fatalities from the initial blast and fragmentation hazards. Over 2000 fatalities from the resultant panic

Primary impact of the disaster


Massive damage to the principal blast area at the center of the cantonment up to 1.5 km2. The epicenter of the blast, including an area of approximately 400 m2, was completely obliterated and is heavily contaminated with unexploded ordnance (UXO). A total of 33 ammunition warehouses were completely destroyed, and the adjacent army barracks suffered severe damage with the 3 and 4 story accommodation largely destroyed. Several blocks of flats were completely destroyed and up to 100 blocks of flats partially damaged

Primary impact of the disaster


Many perished when crowds spilled over into the Oke-Afa canal some three kilometers from the cantonment many small children were pushed into the deep mud in the canal and drowned. Others were injured because of jumping from height or being trampled underfoot, and some were killed or injured by heavy traffic whilst trying to cross the main Ikeja dual carriageway Many families became separated in the confusion

Secondary impact of the disaster


Broken windows, holes in roofs, collapsing ceilings and walls and causing numerous minor injuries. Random shells hit buildings in areas up to 18 km away. A total of 27 schools have been affected

Emergency Response

Emergency response
Lagos State Government (Took initial command) NEMA Nigerian Red Cross Nigerian Military Nigerian Police International Red Cross United Nations Numerous foreign government agencies

Immediate problems
Search and rescue: Recovering bodies from the canal Communication: Getting word out that it was not a military coup; telling people what to do, where to go Food, Water, Shelter Environmental assessment: assessing impact and ensuring safety Healthcare

Other Problems
Total explosive content of blasts - unknown. Ammunition losses unknown due to incomplete ammunition accounting system. Inadequate Outside Quantity Distances (OQD) to reduce the risk to the civilian population. Inadequate Inside Quantity Distances (IQD) to reduce the risk of propagation of blast to adjacent explosive storehouses. No contingency plan for dealing with a disaster of this magnitude.

National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)


NEMA was established in March 1999 via Act 12 of 1999 as amended by Act 50.The Agency was saddled with the responsibility of coordinating disaster management activities for the country. Supposed emergency response lead Disaster led by the state government Took over coordination much later

NEMA: Functions and Responsibilities


Disaster preparedness and mitigation; Notifying, activating, mobilizing, deploying staff and setting up the necessary facilities for response; Evaluating and assessing disaster damage and requests; Managing Disaster Management funds; Public Information and Enlightment; Formulating policy/guidelines for Disaster Management in the country; Liaising with State Emergency Management Committees (SEMCs), Regional, International bodies and NGOs to assess and monitor, and where necessary, distribute Relief materials to disaster victims.

In an ideal situation
Proper storage of bombs (in fortified structures) Proper and effective emergency notification Early response by fire service Reliable disaster communication News/ media management Clear and established command structure during disaster Accountability

Gap Analysis: SWOT


Strengths:
Disaster response infrastructure: NEMA, SEMA, LEMA Funding and Telecommunication: Mobile phones net work

Opportunities:
international support Educated population Social Media Democracy Diaspora

Weakness:
Disaster notification Disaster preparedness Community knowledge of disaster plans Communication Coordination

Threats:
Terrorism Over population Decreased military spending Ethnic conflicts

Recommendation
Continuous proactive monitoring of all military armory all of the country Environmental impact assessment Improving the overall disaster management capacity in Nigeria is also of fundamental importance in order to mitigate the impacts of future events. Maintain an exclusion zone within and around the cantonment and the UXO armory Training and re-training of Nigerian military personnel in UXO and ammunition management

References
http://www96.reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/undac-missionlagos-nigeria-munitions-depot-explosion-report http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/pdf/mbc/I WP/SC_may02/speeches_sd/Scott_Nigeria.pdf http://tribune.com.ng/index.php/features/592-ikeja-bombblast-8-years-after http://www.irinnews.org/Report/29958/NIGERIA-Armsdepot-explosion-rocks-Lagos

Thank you

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