A Quagmire called Afghanistan

( by Tanmeet Gujral, Ewrt 2- 64Z)

David Halberstams The Making of a Quagmire is one of the most brilliant books on the subject of Vietnam War. The book, which was first published in April 1965, tells the story of the Vietnam War as seen firsthand by Halberstam, a war correspondent at the time. With vivid recollections of what life in the war zone was like, and how Vietnams social and political structures prevented America from making any real progress there, the book has become a resource guide for any who want to research the war and for those seeking to draw parallels with the war in the Middle east. In the book, Halberstam offers a great deal of insight into the American tactical and strategic policies that were at play in Vietnam and though these might be different than what is presently going on in Afghanistan, there are still a number of valuable lessons that can be learnt from this brilliant book.

As the war in Afghanistan goes on, having started more than a decade ago, a lot of people have drawn comparisons between the American effort in Vietnam and what we are doing in Afghanistan. Both the wars were started in the name of a good cause- defeating communism in Vietnam, and defeating terrorism in Afghanistan (terrorism here suggests Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden). Also, many consider the Taliban in Afghanistan to be similar to VietCong of Vietnam, both being highly popular local

governments. The Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, too reminds us of the then President of Vietnam, Ngo Din Diem, who was similarly favored by the U.S. government as our ally in the anti-communist competition in Vietnam. They believed they could change the Diem governments attitude towards its people and make Vietnam a better country (Snow, 7 Apr 2012). But as Halberstam suggests, the Ngo family wanted American aid, American equipment and some American troops, but it did not want American advice (Halberstam 41). This would be the first lesson to be learnt from Halberstams book; that America needs to learn to recognize that sometimes you may back the wrong horse, but strategy for winning needs to evolve as the horse shows its true abilities.

As Robert Wright, a blogger with the New York Times, puts it The Afghanistan war is as bad as the Vietnam War except for the ways in which its worse. According to him, though Vietnam War resulted in heavy human losses and a waste of American resources, strategically it was just a medium-sized blunder and didnt make America more vulnerable to enemy attack. On the other hand, he suggests that the U.S. attack on Afghanistan, which came in response to 9/11 and the desire to root Al Qaeda from Afghanistan, has empowered the narrative of terrorist recruiters that America is at war with Islam and has given them a large base of families of people killed in the war to recruit from. This sentiment is similarly echoed in the Quagmire as Halberstam writes that the Viet Cong had no trouble recruiting its forces from the downtrodden and frequentlybombed-by-America peasants who generally did not trust the American forces (50). So a

second lesson that one gets from the book would be that when civilians, in any warVietnam or Afghanistan, suffer serious collateral damages- loss of life and property, they become easy recruiting grounds for the very elements that the war tries to defeat. Then the fundamental task of separating the Viet Cong guerillas or Al Qaeda operatives from the people will be far more difficult to achieve.

But where does that leave us then in terms of whether to withdraw completely from Afghanistan, or to stay there and keep doing what we are doing? With the war costing a hundred billion a year, and the Al Qaeda no longer being a significant threat to U.S. security, all that remains of the conflict in Afghanistan now is the civil war about powersharing between local sects. As we saw during Vietnam, there is no clear definition of success in this endeavor too. One definition of success may be to facilitate a peace process between conflicting factions that enables power-sharing and to encourage the local forces to take over their own domestic security issues (that the international forces have been resolving for them since the war began). Also, encouraging economic growth and prosperity of the people will reduce the number of these people who look to terrorism, drugs, human trafficking, and other illegal activities then for income.

Given our present economic situation and the fact that Al Qaeda now has international presence, continuing a massive military campaign in Afghanistan will probably work against us by fostering local resentment of our presence and aiding the very

forces we are trying to defeat, in recruitment and a sense of purpose. So, although the U.S. should not give up its support of democracy, human rights and economic development, it should realize that its capacity to influence other societies, in what may be their internal conflicts, is inherently limited. As the Afghanistan Report Groups study suggests, The bottom line is clear: Our vital interests in Afghanistan are limited and military victory is not the key to achieving them. A better path would be to deescalate the military presence in Afghanistan, while building a global counter-terrorism force that can adequately take care of these issues as and when they arise, with pooled resources of all nations.

David Halberstam echoes this complicated definition of success as perceived by us and them (the Afghans and the Vietnamese) in the final paragraph to his book, The Making of a Quagmire:

I do not think we are winning in any true sense, nor do I see any signs we are about to win. That is why this is such a sad story to write, for I share that special affection for the Vietnamese, and I would like to write that though the price is heavy, it is worth it. I do not think our Vietnamese friends can win their half of the war, nor do I think we can win it for them. I think finally we will end up lowering our sights, encouraging our Vietnamese to talk to their Vietnamese, hoping somehow they can settle what we cannot. That is what

this country longs for right now, and it may well be that even if we stay here another five years, it is all we will end up with anyway (219).

Works Cited

Halberstam, David. The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam during the Kennedy Era. Ed. Daniel J. Singal. Revised ed. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008. Print.

Snow, Donald M. "Watching Karzai, Seeing Diem." Web log post. What After Iraq? N.p., 7 Apr. 2010. Web. 2 June 2012. <http://whatafteriraq.wordpress.com/2010/04/07/watching-karzai-seeing-diem/>.

Wright, Robert. "Worse Than Vietnam." Web log post. Opinionator. The New York Times, 23 Nov. 2010. Web. 2 June 2012. <http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/23/afghanistan-and-vietnam/>.

A NEW WAY FORWARD: Re-thinking Us Stratergy in Afghanistan. Rep. The Afghan Study Group, 16 Aug. 2010. Web. 2 June 2012. <http://www.afghanistanstudygroup.org/read-the-report/>.