A Critical Exchange on the Idea of Dhtu-vda

Response
M ATSUMOTO Shir

FIND YAMABES ESSAY on the idea of dhtu-vda both important and full of valuable information and interpretations, and I am grateful for his studied critique of my hypothesis. While I am not prepared to accept his views and conclusions, I welcome the serious response and wish to respond to it briey here. Yamabe sums up his position succinctly near the end of his essay:

The Yogacara theory of gotra is indeed discriminatory, but it is not based on monism. Tathgata-garbha thought is clearly monistic, but the gotra distinction does not seem to signify anything essential. Some texts, such as the Abhisamaylakra-vtti, show an apparent dhtu-vda structure, but that structure would appear to be an inconsistency brought about by a reinterpretation of the gotra theory.

I cannot, however, accept his conclusion, because I nd the Yogacara theory of gotra to be based on monism, and because the gotra distinction seems to be of essential importance to tathgata-garbha thought. Moreover, unlike Yamabe, I nd the dhtu-vda structure of the Abhisamaylakra-vtti to be completely consistent. To clarify my position, let me take up the denition of gotra from the Bodhisattvabhmi that Yamabe cited in his essay. Before discussing the denition, I should like to express my surprise at the way he goes about criticizing my hypothesis. I should have thought he would have given attention to my essays On the Ekayana Theory in Yogacara and The rmldev Sutra and Ekayana Theory, on which my framing of the hypothesis of dhtu-vda is mainly based. The former essay is especially pertinent to Yamabes critique in that its arguments are focused on the important passage of the Mahynastralakra-bhya
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commenting on Krik XI. 53, which seems to clarify the meaning of the term dharmadhtu for the Yogacara thinkers. The passage in question reads because the dharmadhtu of the rvaka etc. is undifferentiated (rvakdn dharmadhtor abhinnatvt). Here we have a clear statement of the uniqueness of dhtu for the Yogacara thinkers. I would be interested in knowing how Yamabe would interpret this passage. Now let us turn to the Bodhisattvabhmi denition of gotra.1 Yamabes conclusion draws on the work of other scholars (among them, Hakamaya2) who take the terms gotra, bja, dhtu, and prakti that appear in the denition as all synonymous. Yamabe cites the phrase, tat punar gotra bjam ity apy ucyate dhtu praktir ity api, which he renders, Further, this gotra is also called seed (bja), dhtu, and origin (prakti).3 I do not nd the translation inaccurate,4 but I believe it is also possible to render it, But that gotra is also called bja, and the dhtu is also called prakti. The Tibetan translation of the passage, it should be recalled, is rigs de ni sa bon shes kya bya khams de ni ra bshin shes kyan byao (Derge edition, Wi, 2b5). This is clearly consistent with my own reading. Admittedly there are passages in which Sthiramati states that the words gotra, bja, and dhtu are synonymous, as Yamabe points out,5 and even where he takes gotra and prakti as synonyms. But that is Sthiramatis interpretation.6 The Tibetan translation of the sentence cited above suggests to me the possibility of a slight difference between the two groups of words. In other words, one must admit the possibility that dhtu and prakti are taken to be different from gotra. This interpretation of mine is supported by the appearance of the term prakti-stha gotram in the denition of gotra cited above. Yamabe follows other scholars in translating the term as [the gotra] existing by nature, based on the Tibetan translation, ra bshin gyis gnas pa (Derge edition, Wi, 2b4). I nd fault with the translation, however, and prefer instead to read it as the gotra located on prakti or the gotra existing on prakti. I further consider this prakti to be the unique locus or dhtu of manifold gotra, giving this gotra theory the structure of a dhtu-vda. I admit the interpretation is altogether novel, but this does not make it wrong. The author of the Bodhisattvabhmi appears to equate prakti with dharmat in the word dharmatpratilabdha7 (acquired by dharmat). And this equation is reinforced by the passage of the Abhisamay206

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lakra-vtti alluded to by Yamabe.8 I believe, then, that the gotra of rvaka and the like are positioned on a single locus, which is called prakti in the denition. Hence my conclusion that Yogacara system has a dhtu-vda structure. In this connection I would also like to remark on the new interpretation of the word lambana-pratyaya in the Yogacara texts to which Yamabe alludes. He translates the word to mean cognitive object and criticizes my interpretation of dhtu-vda as generative monism. But lambana-pratyaya does not in this context refer to a cognitive object but to cause as locus.9 In other words, I take lambana there to mean locus or basis. This reading is further supported by the term tadlambanaprabhava that appears in a section of the Madhyntavibhga-bhya in which Vasubandhu says that the dharmas of aryas are produced from that locus (tadlambana)that is, from the dharmadhtu.10 It seems clear to me, therefore, that the Yogacara system has a dhtu-vda structure. I wish to acknowledge Yamabes contribution to the elucidation of the nndhtu or different-dhtus theory of Yogacaras, but I fail to see how this is in any way inconsistent with the basic dhtu-vda structure as I propose it. Rather, the manifoldness of dhtu referred to in the passages explaining the nndhtu theory is to be taken as a plurality of gotras posited on a single locus, which is what I call dhtu. As for tathgata-garbha thought, I prefer to leave my views of Yamabes interpretations for another occasion. I would only ask him to have a second look at the passage of the Ratnagotravibhga he cites. According to his translation, it is stated there as follows: Eventually the rays from the sun-disk of the Tathgata falls even on the bodies of sentient beings xed in a state of evil (mithytva-niyata-satna).11 Does this really deny the existence of sentient beings xed in an evil state? I think not. Does the idea that we all, despite our caste, breathe the same air really provide a basis for equality rather than discrimination? Moveover, it should be noted that the Ratnagotravibhga also admits the existence of agotra (etad agotrm na vidyate)[I.41]. With this I conclude my remarks.

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Riposte

Y AMABE Nobuyoshi

O BEGIN WITH, I would like to thank Matsumoto for his careful response to my criticisms. I acknowledge that my essay did not give due attention to certain points he made in two important 1 essays, but the fact that it was an oral presentation and the restrictions of time made it difcult to enter into the necessary technical detail. My remarks were no more than an attempt to outline my own understanding of dhtu and gotra in as simple a way as possible. The Abhisamaylamkra verse I.39, which contains in a single verse the (apparent) dhtuvda structure seemed to offer an ideal pivot around which to set up my argument. Since Matsumoto himself has called on the same verse as a succinct demonstration of the basic structure of dhtu-vda,2 I assumed this would provide some common ground for discussion. In any case, I take it as my responsibility to comment now on these two papers, particularly that dealing with the Yogacara theory, and to address the points of his responseeven if, once again, time and space make it difcult to meet Matsumotos rigorous standards. Since our opinions seem to differ more radically in matters concerning Yogacara, I will focus in what follows on the Yogacara theory of dhtu and gotra. Matsumotos dhtu-vda model is essentially static. He seems to believe that the same dhtu-vda structure (discrimination based on monism) can be found throughout the Yogacara and tathgata-garbha literature. In doing so, he bases his idea of dhtu mainly on passages having to do with the monistic dhtunamely dharmadhtu and a (rather obscure) use of dhtu in the singular from the Abhidharma Sutra. He sees these singular dhtu functioning as the universal basis of all phenomena, as the ground from which all things arise. Even though dhtu is frequently dened as cause, his argument runs, this is only a secondary, derivative meaning based on the image of a (universal) locus. He does not deny that dhtu frequently appears in the plural form in Yogacara texts,

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but he claims that all such manifold dhtu are grounded in the singular (dharma)dhtu. Therefore, he concludes, the existence of plural dhtu does not contradict the dhtu-vda model. For my part, I have tried to delineate the development of the concept of dhtu (in most cases interchangeable with another concept, gotra) in more dynamic terms. I am persuaded that the structure of the dhtu theory in early Yogacara literatureby which I mean chiey the Yogcrabhmiwas essentially pluralistic.3 Dhtus were primarily manifold elements, each capable of producing corresponding elements. In other words, the primary meaning of the word in this tradition was (pluralistic and individual) cause, and the spacial imagery was merely subordinate to this. I nd it improbable that these manifold dhtu were always based on a single locus (Matsumotos dhtu par excellence, as it were). In particular, I do not believe that the gotra theory of the Bodhisattvabhmi was based on monism in any form. Later, these dhtu and gotra theories were restructured on a monistic model, and in the course of this reinterpretation, certain hybrid texts like the Mahynastrlamkra and the Abhisamaylakra were created with both monistic and pluralistic elements. These texts seem to support Matsumotos model of discrimination based on monism. But if one takes these texts in their historical context, the discriminatory elements show up as remnants of former pluralistic traditions. In contrast, purely tathgata-garbha texts like the Ratnagotravibhga and the rmldev Sutra do not exhibit these discriminatory factors. I do not wish my remarks to be taken to mean that I deny the existence of a dhtu-vda-type structure entirely. I believe that such a hybrid structure did in fact exist at one point in doctrinal development. For that matter, our views on the tathgata-garbha theory are not so radically different either. I, too, think that the tathgata-garbha theory had an essentially monistic structure, although I do not see it as intrinsically discriminatory. It is regarding the structure of the dhtu and gotra theories of the early Yogacara tradition that our opinions diverge most widely. Accordingly, I should like to address this question more directly.

THE MEANING OF DHTU

Matsumoto claims that the original meaning of the word dhtu is a place to put [something] on, a kind of base or locus.4 This is the crucial
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point around which virtually all dhtu-vda arguments revolve. But the importance of the idea is not matched by its clarity.5 If the claim is an etymological onethat the original meaning of dhtu is a place to put [something] onthe question is a complex one, since the verbal root dh- and the sufx -tu, the two elements that make up the word dhtu, are both multivalent, and so the range of theoretically possible meanings for the compound is correspondingly great.6 An examination of the usage of the term bears this out.7 According to Louis Renous extensive study of the sufx -tu, the word dhtu was used in two broad sets of meanings in the Rgveda: basis, . foundation and element, layer.8 In the Rgveda, he argues, the term . dhtu is almost always compounded with a numeral (saptadhtu, tridhtu)9 and gures as the principle of division.10 Hence the latter meanings (element, layer) are both prevalent and well attested. The former meanings (basis, foundation), however, are based on a single occurrence of dhtu as an independent (neuter) noun in the Rgveda (V.44.3): . atya havi sacate sac ca dhtu ca The oblation follows the steed [=Agni], it is the essence and the base [of sacrice].11 This is an exceedingly obscure verse, concerning which Renou notes that the commentator, Syana, glosses this dhtu as dhraka sarvasya (the support of everything).12 The gloss would appear to be close to Matsumotos interpretation, but it should be remembered that Syana is a very late gure (fourteenth century). Buddhist texts do occasionally interpret dhtu as dhraa, support,13 which leads me to suppose that support (or, for Matsumoto, locus) was in fact one of the meanings of dhtu.14 But this is not the same as concluding that support or locus accounts for the words etymological origins. Except for one obscure verse, the sense of element seems much more predominant in the Rgveda. If Matsumoto . wishes to make the claim that locus was the original meaning of the word dhtu from which all the other meanings derived, he needs to provide more supporting evidence. His claim concerning the etymological meaning is, at best, not obvious.
THE USE OF DHTU IN YOGACARA LITERATURE

Matsumotos interpretation of the term dhtu in Yogacara literature is based on his reading of a verse of the Abhidharma Sutra and a passage
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from the Madhyntavibhga.15 I will leave a discussion of the Madhyntavibhga for later. The verse from the Abhidharma Sutra runs:
The dhtu from the beginningless past is the common basis for all the dharmas. When it exists, all the destinies [in samsara] and the attainment of nirvana exist.16

Matsumoto asserts that The expression samraya [the common basis] clearly shows that the word dhtu has the meaning of locus.17 He goes on:
In relation to the [two] nominative-case nouns, gati and nirvdhigamo, dhtu is the locus as is shown by the locative case tasmin [a pronoun that represents dhtu]. When it is put in the locative-absolute phrase tasmin sati, the meaning if it exists is added to the basic meaning at that existing one, and here the meaning cause arises. Thus if the word dhtu has the meaning cause, it should be regarded as a secondary meaning derived from the primary meaning of locus.18

There are several questionable points in these claims. First, the argument is made that dhtu means locus because the pronoun referring to it (tasmin) is in the locative case. In this verse, as Matsumoto himself observes, tasmin constitutes a locative absolute phrase together with the following sati. But since the locative absolute is very common in Sanskrit, if anything that can be put into locative absolute has the meaning locus, it would follow that virtually all the Sanskrit nouns have that meaning. I do not, therefore, see how the appearance of the locative absolute phrase proves anything about the meaning of the word. Concerning the rst point samraya, the common basis, we should note that in the Yogacara school, the word raya is used in a very general sense, almost equivalent to pratyaya (condition).19 Although the word raya itself would have a spacial connotation, I am not sure how much of that connotation is retained in this kind of technical context. Furthermore, I cannot agree with Matsumotos claim that locus is the primary meaning of the word dhtu, and that the meaning cause derives from it.20 As far as I can see, in the early Yogacara literature, the meaning of cause is far more predominant than locus, and only when this primary meaning cannot be applied does the alternative meaning of support (or locus) come to the fore. Since the verbal root dh- has the meaning to generate or cause, and since -tu can signify an agent, it is theoretically possible to deduce the sense of cause directly from the
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components of the word without having to make the deduction indirectly through another meaning. I believe it can be shown that the basic image of dhtu in the very early Yogacara literature (the portions of the Yogcrabhmi that do not presuppose the theory of layavijna) was that of multiple (typically eighteen) elements capable of reproducing themselves from one moment to the next. By way of demonstration, I would cite a few passages, beginning with one from the rvakabhmi:
What are dhtus? What is the skillfulness in dhtus? Answer: dhtus are eighteen, namely the eye-dhtu, the color-dhtu, and the eye-consciousness-dhtu, [list of eighteen dhtus]. The ability to know, approve, and examine that these eighteen dharmas arise, issue, and become manifest from their respective dhtus, their respective seeds (bja), and their respective origins (gotra) is called skillfulness in dhtus. To know the arising of the eighteen dharmas from their own dhtus, that is, the comprehension of causes and conditions, is at the same time the comprehension of dhtus.21

The meaning of this passage becomes clearer when we read it in conjunction with the following paragraph of the Abhidharmakoa-bhya:
The meaning of dhtu is origin (gotra). Just as the manifold origins of iron, copper, silver, and gold in a mountain are called dhtus (minerals), the eighteen origins in one body or [personal] continuum are called eighteen dhtus. In this case, origins refer to mines (kara). Then whose origins are the eye and so forth? [Each of the eighteen dhtus is the origin] of [the subsequent dhtu of] its own type (jti), because [the former] is the homogeneous cause [of the latter].22 [Objection:] In that case, an unconditioned [element] (asaskta) would not be a dhtu. [Answer:] In this case, [it is a cause] of mind and mental functions.23

The two passages seem to me to be saying essentially the same thing. Each of the eighteen dhtus arises from the same element in the preceding moment that is its generative cause (dhtu). In other words, the essential nature of dhtu seems to be the capacity to reproduce itself in successive moments.24 This point is conrmed in the following passage from the Pacavijnakya-saprayukt-manobhmi of the Vinicayasagraha:
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What is eye but not eye-dhtu is the eye of an arhat in the nal [moment]. This is the rst item [of the tetralemma].25

When the arhat enters nirvana nothing is left to carry over to the next moment, which is why in this nal moment the eye no longer reproduces the same element in the following moment. And since the eye does not function here as a generative cause, it is no longer to be called dhtu. The model here is clearly one of successive causality.26 This leads me to believe that in the early Yogacara literature dhtus were primarily plural elements reproducing themselves from one moment to the next.27 The primary meaning was thus generative cause (in pluralistic contexts) and did not derive from any image of universal locus. I see no reason to argue that these plural dhtus were supported by another universal dhtu.28 On the basis of the actual usage of the words dhtu and raya, then, it is not at all certain that the dhtu in the verse of the Abhidharma Sutra meant universal locus. It should rather be taken to mean, as indeed most commentaries take it to mean, cause.29 I conclude that this verse does not support Matsumotos locus model. Even though I nd myself in disagreement with Matsumotos reasoning here, it must be admitted that the verse does give a monistic impression.30 The point is not entirely beyond dispute,31 but even if one grants that this verse is indeed monistic, this still needs to be understood in the context of the transformation of the dhtu theory from a pluralistic model into a monistic one. It is incorrect to assume that the entire Yogacara theory of dhtu was based on monism. The verse is no doubt an important one, but it does not represent the whole of the Yogacara philosophy. As we have seen, there is strong reason to believe that the dhtu theory of the early Yogacara school was pluralistic, and, in particular, that such a pluralistic dhtu model was directly related to the classical gotra theory of this school.32

MAHYNASTRLAKRA-BHSYA .

As Matsumoto points out, the Mahynastrlakra-bhya at Mahynastrlakra XI.53 says:

Because the dharma is similar, the one-vehicle theory [was propounded]. The dharmadhtu is undifferentiated for rvakas and the like. [This 213

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explanation is based on the] interpretation that [the word] yna means goal.33

Matsumoto states that this passage clearly shows the uniqueness of dhtu for the Yogacara thinkers and asks for my reading of the passage.34 Obviously, in this passage dharmadhtu refers to something universal. I concede the point. But I question, rst, if the passage supports the model of generative monism as Matsumoto claims; and second, if the gotra distinction is indeed based on such a universal dharmadhtu. The Model of Generative Monism In order for this passage to t into the dhtu-vda model, it must fulll two conditions: dharmadhtu must be the locus of the three vehicles, and it must be the generative cause of the three vehicles. As to the rst condition, as is clearly indicated in Sthiramatis gloss shes par bya bai yul, the object to be known,35 dharmadhtu as ytavya is a cognitive object, not a locus. Matsumoto is probably correct to associate the passage from the Mahynastrlakra-bhya cited above with the following line of the Madhyntavibhga-bhya:36
Dharmadhtu is called so because it is the cause of the noble dharmas. Here, [the word] dhtu is used in the sense of cause.37

Matsumoto claims that lambana-pratyaya means cause as locus.38 But in reading this passage with the aforementioned gloss by Sthiramati, it is very difcult to take lambana in any sense other than shes par bya bai yul, cognitive object. Since the reading of lambana as locus is not the usual interpretation of the word, I should like Matsumoto to provide further supporting evidence in support of his claim. As to the second condition, that dharmadhtu must be the generative cause of the three vehicles, I have already detailed in my paper my reasons for believing this is not the case. For his part, Matsumoto criticizes my argument by citing the Jnlakrloka Sutra (de-bzhin-id ni gzhio, Tathat is the basis [*pada]).39 I wish to refute the criticism. To begin with, the Jnlakrloka is not a standard source of the Yogacara doctrine, even though it was one of the many sources of the Mahynastrlakra.40 If Matsumoto wishes to criticize my understanding of the Yogacara theory, he should reference his remarks with a mainstream Yogacara text.
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It is true that there is a similar statement in the Vinicayasagraha that describes raya-parivtti, transformation of [personal] basis, (in this context equivalent to tathat) as *pratih-hetu, supportive cause, as opposed to *janma-hetu, generative cause.41 This *pratih would be more or less equivalent to the *pada of the Jnlakrloka Sutra, but pratih does not necessarily mean locus in the Yogacara literature. What is more, supportive cause and generative cause are clearly different.42 In short, the passage in question does not in any way uphold Matsumotos generative monism model. As I have discussed earlier, tathat in this kind of soteriological context has a rich doctrinal background.43 Reading the Mahynastrlakra in this light, I see no need to amend the interpretation presented in my essay. I rather reiterate the point that tathat as a cognitive object does not directly generate supramundane wisdom, much less other worldly dharmas. The Gotra Distinction Based on a Universal Dharmadhtu As I discussed at some length,44 the passage in question from the Mahynastrlakra is not positive proof of the three-vehicle theory. It is rather an argument that presupposes an already established three-vehicle theory and attempts to explain away scriptural passages that contradict the doctrine. In a sense, this is a concession to the one-vehicle scriptures. The text is not referring to the universal dharmadhtu in order to positively establish the gotra discrimination. They are simply making a concession to the one-vehicle theory, acknowledging that the three vehicles could be considered one in the sense that all of them share the same dharmadhtu. Diversity among the three vehicles is already presupposed here. We need to look elsewhere for a principle of diversity. As Matsumoto correctly observes,45 such a principle is found in Mahynastrlakra III.11, where the existence of hetu-hna, one who lacks the cause, is afrmed. The Mahynastrlakra-bhya at III.11 is a famous section that divides those who cannot attain nirvana (aparinirva-dharmaka) into two classes: temporarily hopeless people (tat-klparinirva-dharma) and eternally hopeless people (atyanta). The explanation given by the verse and commentary, however, is quite simple and clearly presupposes an already well-established gotra theory. Such detailed arguments are found in the Bodhisattvabhmi. Judging from the broad afnities between the Mahynastrlakra and the
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Bodhisattvabhmi, and judging from the terminological similarities between the relevant sections, it is evident that the Gotrdhikra of the Mahynastrlakra was very closely related to the Gotrapaala of the Bodhisattvabhmi. In order to understand the structure of the Yogacara gotra theory, therefore, we need to understand the Bodhisattvabhmi correctly, but it is precisely at this point that Matsumoto and I diverge most radically.
BODHISATTVABHMI

In his response, Matsumoto attempts to read praktistha-gotra as the gotra existing on prakti [i.e., monistic dhtu].46 This is clearly in line with his view that plural gotra, as the cause of enlightenment, are different from the universal dhtu or garbha.47 Indeed, his reading makes sense only when we can differentiate gotra from dhtu. The problem is that such a differentiation is very difcult. Gotra and dhtu are frequently treated synonymously, as Matsumoto himself later admits.48 As for the compound prakti-stha-, it is true that when stha- is used as the second member of a compound, it usually means existing in [some place]. Nevertheless, such general usage would not automatically guarantee that Yogacara writers used the term in the same sense. The sense of a Yogacara technical term must be determined primarily by its usage in the Yogacara literature itself. In this regard, we may note in the rst place (and again, as Matsumoto himself admits)49 that the Tibetan version translates the compound as ra bzhin gyis gnas pa, reading the instrumental sense (prakty, by nature) into the rst member of the compound. This interpretation is further supported by the following passage from the Bodhisattvabhmi:
What is the enhancement of dhtu? Because of the former practice of wholesome dharmas based on the existence by nature of the seeds of wholesome dharmas (prakty kuala-dharma-bja-sampada), the seeds of wholesome dharmas in each subsequent moment become more enhanced, [then] most enhanced; they arise and they abide. This is called the enhancement of dhtu (dhtu-pui).50

The scheme seems to t neatly with the aforementioned gotra theory according to the following pattern:
prakty kuala-dharma-bja-sapada praktistha-gotra dhtu-pui samudnta-gotra 216

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Indeed, prakty kuala-dharma-bja-sampada, the existence by nature of the seeds of wholesome dharmas, seems to supply the concrete meaning of the notion of praktistha-gotra. The interpretation looks still more plausible when one takes into account the repeated use of the instrumental form prakty in the Gotrapaala of the Bodhisattvabhmi.51 In the case of the dharmat-pratilabdha, it is probably not even possible to read it in any way other than as an instrumental tatpurua. (Matsumotos own translation is acquired by dharmat.52) Thus I believe that here both prakti and dharmat are used in an instrumental (adverbial) sense (by nature) and do not refer to anything transcendental.53 It is of course true that the Abhisamaylakra-vtti records an opinion that interprets the term praktistha-gotra as dharmadhtu.54 Two points, however, should be noted in this regard. First, Matsumotos claim is that prakti is the universal locus, and that gotras are plural super-loci, but what the Abhisamaylakra-vtti says is that praktistha-gotra as a whole is identied with (singular) dharmadhtu, not just prakti. Such an idea does not t into Matsumotos dhtu-vda model. Second, this interpretation of the Abhisamaylakra-vtti relies on a rejection of the original denition of a^yatana-viea given by the Bodhisattvabhmi. It is evident that the Abhisamaylakra-vtti is employing the idea of praktistha-gotra for its own agenda; it does not convey the original meaning of the Bodhisattvabhmi at all. As for the a^yatana-viea itself, I can only direct the reader to the argument spelled out in my essay.55 This expression may have had something to do with the tradition that the Bodhisattva had six keen sense-faculties.56 In any case, a^yatana clearly refers to concrete psycho-physical elements; it cannot refer to dharmadhtu. As already mentioned, the Bodhisattvabhmi is the locus classicus of the gotra theory of the Yogacara school, but in the Bodhisattvabhmi there is nothing to suggest that the gotra system was based on monism. This is clear proof that the Yogacara gotra system does not theoretically require a monistic basis. On the contrary, it was actually based on pluralism at the time of the Bodhisattvabhmi. The Gotrdhikra of the Mahynastrlakra is also very likely based on a pluralism.57 I can only conclude that pluralism was the principle that accounts for the diversity of views among those in the Yogacara school. Monism cannot offer a positive explanation.
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RATNAGOTRAVIBHGA

My riposte has already run on too long, and I must therefore refrain from delving into the details of the tathgata-garbha texts. I would only like to react briey to points raised in Matsumotos response. In doing so, I must admit, in all honesty, that I cannot make much sense of his comments on the passage I quoted from the Ratnagotravibhga.58 The passage clearly denies the idea of eternally hopeless icchantikas.59 The situation is basically the same with regard to the rmldev Sutra. It seems fair to say, with Matsumoto, that the doctrinal structure of this sutra is monistic.60 Nevertheless, the sutra does say:
O Blessed One, rvaka-yna and pratyekabuddha-yna are all gathered in Mahayana. Thus, the three vehicles are counted as one. O Blessed One, realizing the one vehicle, one realizes the unsurpassed enlightenment.61

Although Matsumoto would object to this type of inclusive approach,62 it is hard to read the above quotation as discriminatory. Matsumoto himself states that the rmldev Sutra is based on the one-vehicle theory.63 This being the case, there is no textual basis to claim that the rmldev Sutra, the most typical dhtu-vda text,64 was discriminatory. As I state in my essay,65 I do not doubt that tathgata-garbha thought has a monistic structure. But I do believe that the dhtu-vda type of monism becomes discriminatory only when the differences among the super-loci are xed and made unchangeable. Both the Ratnagotravibhga and the rmldev Sutra clearly reject such xation. Given the teachings of these two representative texts of the tathgata-garbha tradition, one is hard put to see how a monistic tathgata-garbha theory can be intrinsically possessed of discriminatory elements. Quite the contrary, it seems to me that only when such tathgata-garbha ideas were mixed into Yogacara doctrine, which had a discriminatory and pluralistic gotra theory as part of its tradition, does the problem of monistic discrimination (i.e., dhtu-vda) come about. This is why I have claimed that dhtuvda was essentially a patchwork of these two different traditions.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Needless to say, the interaction between the Yogacara and tathgatagarbha traditions is a complex issue. There is no doubt that certain parts of the Yogacara and the tathgata-garbha traditions are closely inter218

A CRITICAL EXCHANGE ON DHTU-VDA

twined, and that there are many aspects in which the two look alike. In this sense, I may have overstated the difference between these traditions. Still, it does not seem to me that the whole of these two traditions can be said to have shared the kind of clear-cut structure that Matsumoto calls dhtu-vda. If there was indeed any coherent structure to their commonality, one has to wonder why such vehement arguments were exchanged between the followers of tathgata-garbha and Yogacara Buddhism in China and Japan. It rather seems to me that, in spite of many shared terms, the classical Yogacara dhtu/ gotra system as is found in the older parts of the Yogcrabhmi had a radically different structure from its counterpart in full-edged tathgata-garbha texts such as the Ratnagotravibhga. In conclusion, I wish to thank Matsumoto once again for taking my critique seriously. I am aware that universal and discriminatory elements often coexist in a single text, and I do not necessarily doubt that there is a side to the tathgata-garbha theory that could well function to obscure discrimination. Although I do not happen to think that discrimination is the inevitable conclusion of the tathgata-garbha doctrine, I certainly acknowledge his contribution in pointing out the potentially dangerous aspects of this theory. If I have not properly understood him on certain points, I would like to ask him kindly to address misunderstandings on some future occasion.

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