Charo P.

Aranez

1. ENCARNACION LOPEZ VDA. DE BALUYUTvs. HON. JUDGE LEONOR INES LUCIANO, G.R. No. L-42215. July 13, 1976 FACTS: In the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, probate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Sotero Baluyut was instituted by his alleged nephew, Alfredo Baluyut claiming mental incapacity of the surviving widow, Encarnacion vda. de Baluyut, to administer her affairs and that of the decedent's estate. He prayed for appointment as administrator. However, upon a counter petition, the widow was appointed administratrix and qualified as such. This appointment, was set aside by the Supreme Court in Baluyut vs. Judge Pao, etc., G.R. L-42088, May 7, 1976, because the persons contesting her capacity to act were not given an adequate opportunity to be heard and to present evidence. Meantime, in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City, two successive petitions were filed to declare Mrs. Baluyut an incompetent and to place her under guardianship. The first petition, which was filed by Alfredo Baluyut, was dismissed. The second, which was filed by her sisters, were given due course. Acting on the latter petition, the court summarily declared the widow as incompetent on the basis of a report of a psychiatrist who was not cross-examined, and without hearing the evidence of the parties, particularly Mrs. Baluyut. The court denied a motion for reconsideration of the order making such declaration. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether the resolution in the guardianship proceeding of the question as to Mrs. Baluyut's alleged incompetency should await the adjudication in the administration proceeding (pending in the probate court) of the issue as to her competency to act as administratrix. 2. Whether Mrs. Baluyot was denied due process of law when the guardianship court summarily announced its verdict on her incompetency notwithstanding that her lawyer had not cross-examined the psychiatrist. Ruling: 1. Yes. In consonance with the last sentence of section 29-A of the Charter of Quezon City which divests the Juvenile and Domestic Relation Court of jurisdiction or authority to resolve questions already in issue as an incident in any case pending in the ordinary court, the guardianship proceeding should be suspended and should

await the jurisdiction of the issue of petitioner's competency to act as administratrix pending with the probate court. 2. Yes. A finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence (Yangco vs. Court of First Instance of Manila, 29 Phil. 183, 190). That kind of proof has not yet been presented to the guardianship court to justify its precipitate conclusion that Mrs. Baluyut is an incompetent. In the nature of things, the guardianship court should have first set for hearing the psychiatrist's report and examined Mrs. Baluyut before prematurely adjudging that she is an incompetent. Its hasty and premature pronouncement, with its derogatory implications, was not the offspring of fundamental fairness which is the essence of due process. Moreover, the lower court should have adhered strictly to the procedure laid down in Rule 93 of the Rules of Court for appointment of guardians. Rule 93 provides that after the filing of the petition, the court should fix a time and place for hearing and give the proper notices. At the hearing, "the alleged incompetent must be present if able to attend, and it must be shown that the required notice has been given. Thereupon, the court shall hear the evidence of the parties in support of their respective allegations" (Sec. 5, Rule 93).

2. FELICIANO FRANCISCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-57438 January 31, 1984 FACTS: Feliciano Francisco (Feliciano) is the duly appointed guardian of the incompetent Estefania San Pedro (Estefania) in Special Proceedings No. 532 of CFI Bulacan presided over by respondent Judge. On August 30, 1974 Pelagio Francisco (Pelagio), claiming to be a first cousin of Estefania, petitioned the court for the removal of Feliciano and for the appointment in his stead. Among other grounds, the petition was based on the failure of the guardian to submit an inventory of the estate of his ward and to render an accounting. The respondent judge found the claim to be true, ordered the retirement on the ground of old age. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that he was still fit to continue with the management of the estate of his ward but the court denied the motion. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court is correct in ordering the retirement of petitioner on the ground of old age.

RULING: YES. In determining the selection of a guardian, the court may consider the financial situation, the physical condition, the sound judgment, prudence and trustworthiness, the morals, character and conduct, and the present and past history of a prospective appointee, as well as the probability of his being able to exercise the powers and duties of guardian for the full period during which guardianship will be necessary. A guardian, once appointed may be removed in case he becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty (30) days after it is due to render an account or make a return. There is need for petitioner Feliciano Francisco to be retired from the guardianship over the person and property of incompetent Estefania San Pedro. As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, this finds direct support in the delay of the accounting and inventory made by petitioner. To sustain petitioner as guardian would, therefore, be detrimental to the ward. While age alone is not a controlling criterion in determining a person's fitness or qualification to be appointed or be retained as guardian, it may be a factor for consideration.

3. MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON vs. ROSARIO, ALFREDO, MARIANO, PACIFICO, ONOFRE, TEOFILO, LOLOY and TRINIDAD, all surnamed LORENZO G.R. No. L-23096. April 27, 1972 FACTS: Bienvenida de la Isla (Bienvenida), the guardian of her minor children sold a parcel of land to Spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon (hereafter, the Spouses). The validity of the sale was however challenged by her two elderly children on the ground that they were not informed of such a move notwithstanding the order issued by the court. Moreover, they contended that the guardianship proceeding was heard without them being notified although. In the said case the heirs of Silvestra Ferrer, who originally owned one-fourth of the property in question filed an intervetion. The lower court ruled that it acquired no jurisdiction over the guardianship proceedings of the minors over 14 years of age who were not notified of the proceedings and the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the real property of the minors and could not have validly authorized its sale. Petitioner spouses elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals which decided the case in its insofar as the undivided 3/4 portion of the land in question is concerned and declared the intervenors as owners in common of the remaining undivided 1/4 portion of the said land. Dissatisfied, both parties instituted the petitions for review to this Court.

ISSUE: Whether the CA is correct in ignoring the jurisdictional defects that tainted the guardianship proceeding RULING: NO. The CA is not correct in ignoring the jurisdictional defects that tainted the guardianship proceeding. Service of the notice upon the minor if above 14 years of age or upon the incompetent, is jurisdictional. Without such notice, the court acquires no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian. The failure of respondent Court of Appeals to give due weight to the grave jurisdictional defect that tainted the guardianship proceeding resulted in its judgment suffering the corrosion of substantial legal error. The rights of the children of Leoncio as upheld by the lower court must, to repeat, be maintained. When a petition for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time and place for hearing the same, and shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons mentioned in the petition residing in the province, including the minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent himself, and may direct other general or special notice thereof to be given."

4. LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI vs. ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA, all surnamed PABALE G.R. No. 151243 April 30, 2008 FACTS: A handwritten "Kasunduan Sa Pagbibilihan" (Contract to Sell) was entered into by and between Sesinando M Fernando (Fernando) and Nelly S. Nave (Nave) involving a piece of land in Calamba, Laguna. However, Nave reneged on their agreement when the latter refused to accept the partial down payment because she did not want to sell her property to him anymore. Thereafter, Fernando filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages before RTC Laguna. Nave filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that she could not be ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in favor of Fernando because she repudiated the contract and besides she already sold the property in good faith to the Pabale siblings before she received a copy of the complaint. Subsequently, the Pabale siblings filed a Motion to Intervene alleging that they are now the land owners of the subject property. Unfortunately, the trial court denied Naves Motion to Dismiss. Unsatisfied, Nave and Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo (Atty. Gesmundo) filed another motion, this time including the fact of her incapacity to contract for being mentally deficient based on the psychological evaluation report conducted by Dra. Virginia P. Panlasigui, M. A., a clinical psychologist. Finding the motion unmeritorious, the same

was denied by the court a quo. Temporarily, the proceedings in this case was suspended in view of the filing of a Petition for Guardianship of Nave with the RTC, Branch 36 of Calamba, Laguna with Atty. Gesmundo as the petitioner. Subsequently, a decision was rendered in the said guardianship proceedings, finding Nave an incompetent placing her and her estate under guardianship. Accordingly, Atty. Leonardo C. Paner (Atty. Paner) is appointed as her regular guardian without need of bond, until further orders from the Court. On December 9, 1992, Nave died. Upon her death, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo, Naves sole heir, executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pertaining to his inherited properties from Nave. In this connection, Atty. Gesmundo filed an issuance of a writ of execution of the petition for guardianship. The Pabale siblings filed their Opposition on the grounds that they were not made a party to the guardianship proceedings and thus cannot be bound by the Decision and that the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale was never raised in the guardianship case. Surprisingly, out of nowhere, Lolita R. Alamayri (Alamayri) filed a motion for substitution alleging that the subject property was sold to her by Atty. Gesmundo. In his answer, Atty. Gesmundo refuted by stating that what he executed is a Deed of Donation and not a Deed of Absolute Sale and the same was already revoked. Subsequently, the trial court rendered its Decision recognizing Alamayri as the owner of the property. Fernando filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. CA, granted the appeals and uphold the VALIDITY of the Deed of Absolute Sale. Alamayri and Atty. Gesmundo sought reconsideration of the Decision of the appellate court but were denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Nave was an incompetent when she executed a Deed of Sale of the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings rendering the said sale void. RULING: NO, Nave was not incompetent when she executed a Deed of Sale of the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings. A finding that she was incompetent in 1986 does not automatically mean that she was so in 1984. Hence, the significance of the two-year gap herein cannot be gainsaid since Naves mental condition in 1986 may vastly differ from that of 1984 given the intervening period. Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved; that is, that at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind.23 The burden of proving incapacity to enter into contractual relations rests upon the person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed. Nave was

examined and diagnosed by doctors to be mentally incapacitated only in 1986 and she was not judicially declared an incompetent until 22 June 1988 when a Decision in said case was rendered by the RTC, resulting in the appointment of Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Thus, prior to 1986, Nave is still presumed to be capacitated and competent to enter into contracts such as the Deed of Sale over the subject property, which she executed in favor of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984. The burden of proving otherwise falls upon Alamayri, which she dismally failed to do. Alamayri did not bother to establish with her own evidence that Nave was mentally incapacitated when she executed the Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings, so as to render the said deed void.

5. BONIFACIA P. VANCIL vs. HELEN G. BELMES G.R. No. 132223 June 19, 2001 FACTS: Reeder Vancil, the father of the minors Valerie (6 yrs. Old) and Vincent (2 yrs old) died as a US navy serviceman. Bonfacia Vancil, the mother of Reeder and the grandmother of the minors, filed guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of the said minors consisting of proceeds from their fathers pension benefits with a probable value of P100,000.00 in the RTC of Cebu City. Helen Belmes, the natural mother of the minors, opposed to the guardianship proceedings asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors in Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing. She further alleged that Bonifacia Vancil is a naturalized American citizen and a resident of Colorado, USA. The trial court rejected the opposition and appointed the grandmother as the guardian of the minors. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision. Hence, this present petition alleging that Helen is unfit to be a guardian of the minors considering that Valerie was raped seven times by the mothers live-in partner while under her custody. ISSUE: Who between the biological mother and the grandmother should be appointed guardian of the minors. RULING: As to Valerie, the issue has become moot since she has attained the age of majority. As to Vincent, respondent being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian. Art. 211 of the Family

Code provide that the father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. Indeed, being the natural mother of the minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. Petitioners claim to be the guardian of the same minor can only be realized by way of substitute parental authority pursuant to Art. 214 of the Family Code, which is only available in case of parents death, absence or unsuitability. In the case at bar, petitioner did not show proof that Helen is an unsuitable guardian for the minor Vincent. Further, notwithstanding the fact that there is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians, this Court has held that courts should not appoint persons as guardians those who are not within the jurisdiction of the courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards.

6. SALVACION LOPEZ vs. JOSE TEODORO, SR EULALIO LOPEZ, JR., and JESUS JALBUENA G.R. No. L-3071. May 29, 1950 FACTS: Eulalio Lopez Sr., an incapacitated under the judicial guardianship of Eulalio Lopez Jr. was the exclusive and absolute owner of a 100-hectare land in Silay, Negros Occidental. Acting upon the motions filed in the proceedings for guardianship, the court ordered the guardian to pay the movants the loans properly authorized by the court for the support and maintenance of the incapacitated. In pursuance of this authority, the guardian sold the only property of the incapacitated to Jesus Jalbuena. However, in authorizing the said sale, the court did not follow the requirement of Sec. 2 of Rule 96 that the court shall direct the next of kin of the ward, and all persons interested in the estate, to appear at a reasonable time and place to show cause why the prayer for the sale should not be granted. Although Lopez Jr. was the judicial guardian, the incapacitated was and is under the actual care and custody of his sister, Salvacion Lopez. Believing the sale is prejudicial to her brothers interest, Salvacion filed a petition for certiorari/mandamus praying that the sale be revoked after the motion for recon was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of the property should be declared null and void. RULING:

The guardianship court where the proceeding was pending had the jurisdiction to order the questioned sale. It was also undisputed that the outstanding indebtedness of the guardianship was property and legally incurred for the support and maintenance of the incapacitated. Petitioner has no legal interest in the complaint. The incapacitated has children, all of age, one of whom is the judicial guardian, while the petitioner is only the wards sister. Not being the wards forced heir, she was not prejudiced by the sale she seeks to impugn. Petitioner is wrong in asserting that she is next of kin. Next of Kin within the meaning of Rule 96 are relatives whose relationship is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributes.

7. VICENTE G. SINCO, PILAR G. SINCO vs. AGAPITO LONGA and AGUEDA LONGA. G.R. No. 27962. February 14, 1928 FACTS: Hacienda Rosario was originally owned by Don Rafael Sinco y Librado, the plaintiffs great grandfather, from whom it is passed to his son Escolastic Sinco who died during the Spanish regime. The latter left a widow, Saturnina Lopez and 3 children, Sergio, Maria Paz and Coloma all surnamed Sinco. Of these, Sergio and Maria Paz are still living, but Coloma died leaving 3 children who are the plaintiffs in this case, namely Vicente, Pilar and Desemparados. The estate of Escolastico appears to have been encumbered with debts and in order to liquidate this indebtedness, the widow and three children leased the property. The lease was continually extended until Saturnina died in 1904. After the death of the mother, Sergio was hard pressed for money to sustain numerous family and sold his undivided 1/3 share in the hacienda. The buyer, Longa insisted in acquiring the whole property and subsequently the 1/3 share of Maria Paz was included in the sale. In order to accomplish the said end, Emilio Tevez, the guardian of the then minor plaintiffs petitioned for the approval of the sale alleging that the estate was heavily encumbered and that the minors had no cash assets to meet their subsistence and education. Subsequently, the court issued its order authorizing the guardian to make the sale as requested. After the minors attained majority age, they instituted this petition seeking to annul the said sale pertaining to their 1/3 undivided interest in the hacienda alleging that the subject sale was attended with fraud. Emilio Tevez, the guardian, was anxious for the sale to obtain money for his own uses. ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale should be annulled. RULING: In passing upon controversies involving charges of fraud alleged to have been committed many years before the litigation was begun, the proof of such fraud, to be accepted by the court, should be full and convincing. Experience teaches the danger of lightly accepting charges of fraud made many years after the transaction which is the subject of question was accomplished, when death may have sealed the lips of the principal actors and changes affected by time may have given a totally different color to the questioned transaction.In this case, the participants to the alleged fraud such as the guardian Emilio Tevez, were already dead. As to the irregularity in the guardianship proceedings, the jurisdiction of the court to authorize the sale of the property of minors rests upon the averments of the petition and adequate publication or appearance of the parties interested. The fact that the statements of the petition may be untrue with respect to the existence of encumbrances on the property and necessity of the sale, does not affect the jurisdiction of the court, which rests upon the averments and not upon the truth of those averments.

8. MARCELO E. INTON, FE SEVERA E. INTON and her husband FRANCISCO MABINI, ANTONIO E. INTON, and OLIMPIA E. INTON vs. DANIEL QUINTANA G.R. No. L-1236 May 26, 1948 FACTS: Marcelo E. Inton, Fe Severa, E. Inton, Antonion E. Inton and Olimpia E. Inton, brothers and sisters, were the owners in equal and individed shares of a parcel of land having an area of 15,167 square meters and situated in Samal, Bataan. Macelo E. Inton, Fe Severa E. Inton, both of age, and their mother Fileda Enrile, the latter acting "in representation" of Antonio E. Inton and Olimpia E. Inton, then under age, sold that land to Alejandro Malibiran, husband and wife.

By virtue of the sale, the purchaser took possession of the property and held it until they died, and the land, in the extrajudicial partition among their heirs, passed into the hands of Daniel Quintana, Alejandro Quintana's brother and the principal or virtually the sole defendant in this case. ISSUE: Whether the mother may sell the properties of her minor children.

RULING: No. Although the mother was said to be the minor children's guardian an allegation on which there is not the slightest evidence it does not appear that she was authorized to enter into this transaction or that the sale was approved by the competent court. Without the court's authority or approval, the sale was ineffective as to the minor children even if she were the minors' judicial guardian. A guardian has no authority to sell real estate of his ward, merely by reason of his general powers, and in the absence of any special authority to sell conferred by will, statue, or order of court. A sale of the wards realty of guardian without authority of the court is void.

9. J. ANTONIO ARANETA vs. ANTONIO PEREZ G.R. No. L-18872 July 15, 1966 FACTS: A trust was established pursuant to the will of the late Angela S. Tuason. J. Antonio Araneta was appointed trustee and he qualified when he took his oath of office. The beneficiaries of the trust are Benigno, Angela and Antonio, all surnamed Perez y Tuason, the last two being represented by appellant Antonio Perez, who is their father and judicial guardian. In the order appealed from the lower court approved, upon petition of the trustee, a deed of donation executed by him in favor of the City of Manila covering a lot pertaining to the trusteeship. Such approval was given over the opposition of appellant Antonio Perez. On the lot in question the trustee had been paying an annual realty tax. Appellant does not deny the beneficial aspects of the donation. But he maintains that it is invalid on the ground that under Article 736 of the Civil Code "guardians and trustees cannot donate the properties entrusted to them". ISSUE: Whether guardians and trustees cannot donate the properties entrusted to them. RULING: In this case, the guardian may donate the properties entrusted to him. Although Article 736, New Civil Code provides that, "guardians and trustees cannot donate the properties entrusted to them", the same cannot be applied considering that the aforecited provision only took effect on August 30, 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) and does not apply retroactively to the testamentary trust established upon the death of Angela S. Tuason on March 20, 1948.

There being nothing in the old Civil Code which prohibits a trustee from donating properties under trusteeship, and considering that the powers given to herein appellee as trustee are of a plenary character, subject only to the limitation that they should be permissible under the law; considering further that when the testatrix conferred such powers she must have had in mind the law that was in force at the time; and considering finally that after all a trust is created for the benefit of the cestuis que trust and that in this particular case the acts of the trustee are subject to the supervision of the Court.

10. In re Guardianship of the minor Maria Exaltacion Castillo. COSME U. CASTILLO vs. POTENCIANO BUSTAMANTE G.R. No. 44466. September 30, 1937 FACTS: Serapia de Gala instituted a civil action against her husband Cosme U. Castillo, praying for the legal separation of both, as spouses, and for the division of the property acquired by them during their marriage. In a compromise agreed by the court, the spouses agreed to assign to their daughter Maria Exaltacion their conjugal properties. A deed of donation was then executed by the spouses in compliance with the compromise in favor of their daughter Maria Exaltacio which was accepted by the latters duly authorized guardian, Potenciano Bustamante. Subsequently, the guardian filed a petition in court praying that the property belonging to the guardianship be delivered to him by Cosme U. Castillo who retains it in his possession. The court, acting favorably upon his petition, ordered the turnover of said property to Potenciano. In the same order, to cure any defect in the acceptance of the donation by the guardian, the court directed Potenciano to execute the necessary deed to this effect and to notify the donors Cosme U. Castillo and Serapia de Gala thereof. The appellant Cosme alleges that the donation has been revoked prior to its acceptance, hence the same is of no effect. Hence, this case for the Courts resolution. ISSUES: 1. Whether guardian is under obligation to take possession and recover donated property to the ward. 2. Whether the donation is of no effect, having been revoked before it was accepted. RULING:

1. Yes. Inasmuch as the conjugal partnership property of the appellant and his wife was donated to their only daughter, and the donation was duly accepted by the donee's guardian, said guardian is under obligation to administer it, being entitled to take possession thereof and to recover it from the appellant who retains it. 2. No. As the donation was made by virtue of a compromise made by the spouses to terminate a suit between them, it has, in itself, the authority of res judicata and, furthermore, it is the decision rendered by the court in said civil case pursuant to the terms of the compromise (art. 1816 of the Civil Code). The appellant, by himself alone, cannot revoke said donation having such requisites.

11. CRISANTO RAFAELITO G. GUALBERTO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JOYCELYN D. PABLO-GUALBERTO G.R. No. 156254 June 28, 2005 FACTS: Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn D. Pablo Gualberto, with an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4-year-old son, minor Rafaello. The father argues that she is "unfit" to take care of their son; hence, for "compelling reasons," he must be awarded custody of the child. Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody. It has indeed been held that under certain circumstances, the mothers immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of custody. ISSUE : Whether or not Crisanto has the right for custody of his minor child. RULING: No. As a general rule, a mother is to be preferred in awarding custody of children under the age of seven. The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mothers unfitness. The mother has been declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable disease. But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. In this case, not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor child. To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending

spouse from exercising proper parental care. It is therefore not enough for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a lesbian. He must also demonstrate that she carried on her purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of their son or under circumstances not conducive to the childs proper moral development. Such a fact has not been shown here. There is no evidence that the son was exposed to the mothers alleged sexual proclivities or that his proper moral and psychological development suffered as a result.

12. EMILIA O'LACO and HUCO LUNA vs. VALENTIN CO CHO CHIT, O LAY KIA and COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 58010 March 31, 1993 FACTS: Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company, Ltd., sold a parcel of land with the Deed of Absolute Sale naming Emilia O'Laco as vendee. Private respondent-spouses Valentin Co Cho Chit and O Lay Wa learned from the newspapers that Emilia O'Laco sold the same property to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila with assumption of the real estate mortgage constituted thereon. Respondent-spouses asserting that petitioner Emilia O'Laco knew that they were the real vendees of the Oroquieta property sold by Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company, Ltd., and that the legal title thereto was merely placed in her name. They contend that Emilia O'Laco breached the trust when she sold the land to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. Emilia OLaco and Huco Luna deny the existence of any form of trust relation. They averred that the property was actually bought using Emilias own money. Finding no trust relation between the parties, the trial court dismissed the complaint together with the counterclaim. Petitioners and respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which set aside the lower courts decision. When the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners filed this instant petition to the Supreme Court for relief. ISSUE: Whether a trust relation existed between the half sisters. RULING: Yes. By definition, trust relations between parties may either be express or implied. Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words evincing an intention to create a trust. Implied trusts are those which, without being express, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent, or which are super induced on the

transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties. Implied trusts may either be resulting or constructive trusts, both coming into being by operation of law. Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature or circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. On the other hand, constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. Unlike express trusts concerning immovables or any interest therein which cannot be proved by parol evidence, implied trusts may be established by oral evidence. However, in order to establish an implied trust in real property by parol evidence, the proof should be as fully convincing as if the acts giving rise to the trust obligation were proven by an authentic document. It cannot be established upon vague and inconclusive proof. In this case, a resulting trust was intended by the parties under Art. 1448 which provides that There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. The former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. As stipulated by the parties, the document of sale, the owner's duplicate copy of the certificate of title, insurance policies, receipt of initial premium of insurance coverage and real estate tax receipts ware all in the possession of respondent spouses which they offered in evidence. As emphatically asserted by respondent O Lay Kia, the reason why these documents of ownership remained with her is that the land in question belonged to her.

13. INES FELICIANO vs.ELISA CAMAHORT G.R. No. L-6962 March 14, 1912 FACTS: This petition arose from the removal of appellant Ines Feliciano as guardian of a certain minor and replaced by one Manual Navarro. ISSUE: Whether the judge committed grave abuse of discretion in removing the appellant as guardian for being unfit. Ruling:

No, the facts of the case are bereft of any showing that the judge committed grave error or fraud. Matters of this nature is within the judges discretion. It is the judge who deals directly with the parties, and for this reason, is in the best position to form a correct opinion as to the special needs of the minors, the character and qualifications of persons whose names are proposed for appointment as guardian, and the wise and prudent course to be adopted under all the varying circumstances of each particular case. In the case at bar, it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting the guardian. In the absence of a grave error or of any allegation and proof of fraud, the exercise of such discretion will not be disturbed on appeal.

14. RESTITUTO CENIZA and JESUS CENIZA vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 46345. January 30, 1990 FACTS: Jose Ceniza and Vicente Dabon jointly purchased Lot 627 on installment basis and they agreed, for convenience, to have the land registered in the name of Dabon. Since then, Jose Ceniza, Vicente Dabon, and their heirs have possessed their respective portions of the land, declared the same for taxation, paid real estate taxes on their respective shares, and made their respective installment payments to the Seminario de San Carlos de Cebu. Thereafter, Jacinta Dabon and Restituto Ceniza, one of the children of the co-owners Jose and Vicente, subdivided the property in question into Lot 627 A, B & C. However, private respondents Magno, Vicenta, Teresita, Eugenia and Tomas all surnamed Dabon, children of co-owner Vicente refused to convey Lots Nos. 627-B and 627-C to the petitioners, children of co-owner Jose Ceniza. They claimed that their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Dabon, was the sole and exclusive owner of Lot 627, by purchase from the Seminario de San Carlos de Cebu and that petitioners' right of action had already prescribed. Therefore, case was then filed at the Court of First Instance (now, RTC) where the trial court rendered judgment for the petitioners on the ground of the existence of co-ownership among the parties. However, said decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. ISSUES: 1. Whether there exists an implied trust between Vicente Dabon and Jose Ceniza. 2. Whether the registration of the title of the land in the name of one of the coowners constituted a repudiation of the co-ownership for purposes of acquisitive prescription. RULING:

1. Yes. The registration of Lot No. 627 in the name of Vicente Dabon created a trust in favor of his co-owner Jose Ceniza, and the latter's heirs. Article 1452 of the Civil Code states: "If two or more persons agree to purchase property and by common consent the legal title is taken in the name of one of them for the benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law in favor of the others in proportion to the interest of each." 2. No. In Custodio v. Casiano, 9 SCRA 841, it has been ruled that:"Where title to land was issued in the name of a co-heir merely with the understanding that he would act as a trustee of his sisters, and there is no evidence that this trust relation had ever been repudiated by said trustee, it is held that a relation of co-ownership existed between such trustee and his sisters and the right of the successors-in-interest of said sisters to bring the present action for recovery of their shares therein against the successors-in-interest of said trustee cannot be barred by prescription, despite the lapse of 25 years from the date of registration of the land in the trustee's name." Further, the Court has ruled in numerous cases involving fiduciary relations that, as a general rule, the trustee's possession is not adverse and therefore cannot ripen into a title by prescription. Adverse possession requires the concurrence of the following circumstances: a) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to the ouster of the cestui que trust; b) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust; and c) that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive. Apparently, the foregoing is not present in this case. Hence, respondents cannot claim title to such property on account of acquisitive prescription.