David Krajewski Philosophy 321- Final Exam 1A.

For Descartes, the minds principle (essential) attribute is thought and the bodys principle (essential) attribute is extension. In other words, what it is to be a mind is to be a thinking thing and what it is to be a body is to be a thing extended in space. Elisabeth will claim that a mind cannot causally interact with a body and vice-versa. If so, then that is not a desirable consequence for Descartes since he claims that mind and body are united and causally interact with each other. Consider mechanical (body to body) causation. Suppose Im at a pool table and I hit a cue ball. The cue ball (A) collides with the 8 ball (B). (A) and (B) are things that are extended in space. The physical particles of the two things collide together and the physical force of (A) is sufficient to cause (B) to move. Causation between two bodies appears unproblematic. Consider what would have to happen for a mind to causally interact with a body. The mind (as a thinking thing) would have to be able to cause my body to move (an extended thing). In the pool case, one extended thing caused another extended thing to move. But my mind is principally a thinking thing and is not extended in space. How then am I (through my minds volition) able to raise my arm? Elisabeth in her The Hague letter, writes ..it seems that how a thing moves depends solely on (i) how much it is pushed, (ii) the manner in which it is pushed and (iii) the surface-texture and the shape of the thing that pushes it. The first two require contact between the two things, and the third requires that the causally active thing be extended. Your notion of the [mind] entirely excludes extension, and it appears that an immaterial thing cannot possibly touch anything else. If my mind isnt extended, it appears problematic to claim that it can cause movement in my arm (an extended thing). To use Elisabeths language, my mind cannot possibly touch my arm. It seems implausible for an immaterial thing (my mind) to be able to touch a material thing (my body). In the pool case, the 8 ball required contact from the cue ball in order to move. Itd seem that in order for my arm to be raised, it too would require contact to move. But my mind is immaterial and so theres no way

for it to be extended in space and mechanically bring it about that my arm moves. From this, it might be more generally concluded that non-extended things cannot cause movement in extended things and viceversa. If thats so, the idea of Cartesian mind-body union would have to be abandoned, since Descartes claims that mind and body causally interact. B. The doctrine of primitive notions is intended to save mind-body union. Descartes claims

that there are three primitive notions. By distinguishing between the three notions, mind-body union will be better understood and avoid Elisabeths criticism. The three primitive notions are thought, extension and mind-body union. Thought, being the principle attribute of mind, applies to mind-mind interactions. I can inquire into the nature of thought through my understanding. For instance, if I was only a thinking thing and not united with a body, I introspect and understand that I would not be able to interact with something extended in bodily space. If I were only an immaterial thing, then Id only be able to interact with other immaterial things. Extension, being the principle attribute of body, applies to body-body interactions. I inquire into the nature of body through my understanding as well as imagination. I understand that a cue ball can only interact with things extended in space for it would not make sense for a cue ball (which is extended) to be able to interact with an immaterial thing. It seems impossible. Secondly, I imagine certain images and shapes that bodies might take. Lastly is the notion of mind-body union. Descartes claims that mind-body union is the only notion that applies to mind-body interactions. According to Descartes, I come to know the nature of mind-body union through sensation. When I raise my hand up, I in some sense feel the connection or union between my mind and my body. If I were just a thinking thing, I wouldnt be able to raise my hand since my hand is extended. If I were just a body, I wouldnt be able to will anything (for only minds and not bodies can will things). But these observations dont prove mind-body union. Before the notions explanatory theory is given, already Descartes can prove that theres a flaw in Elisabeths criticism. Elisabeth is conflating mind-body causal interactions with that of body-body causal

interactions. Shes attempting to criticize mind-body causal interactions through the scope of the primitive notion of extension. In other words, she expects causal relations between mind and body to work in the same way as causal relations between two bodies. But, for Descartes, this is not how causal interactions between mind and body work. He proposes that they work in a much different way. Consider the scholastic notion of heaviness. Heaviness, for the scholastics, is a real quality of a heavy object. When a heavy object is forced to the ground, the real quality of heaviness is doing the work. I may not be able to literally see the heaviness that the heavy object possesses. However, the scholastics held that the heaviness is an incorporeal quality that is united to the heavy object and yet the incorporeal quality could still exist without being united to the object (akin to a Cartesian mind being able to exist without being united to a body). Descartes claims that we dont think that the real quality of heaviness is actually making contact with the object. In other words, the causal interaction between heaviness and the object is not like a body-body interaction. There are no extended things touching each other. Likewise, when I will my hand to be raised, I dont think that my mind is coming into contact with my hand to cause movement. Its not like a body-body interaction. Instead, mind-body causal interaction is akin to heaviness-heavy object causal interaction. Through this scholastic analogy, we see how an immaterial thing (mind) can be in causal relations with a material thing (body). And just as we consider heaviness and the heavy object to be united, we also consider mind and body to be united in a similar way. C. Suppose God willed there to be a universe (since he is all-powerful, a universe was created). After he willed it, he walked away from his creation. Would the universe continue to exist or would it be annihilated? I believe the common intuition here is that the universe would continue to exist. Assuming that God gave physical objects active causal powers, itd seem that the universe would continue to exist even if God were not sustaining it. Malebranche attempts to defeat this intuition with his continuous recreation argument.

Suppose that since God created the universe and all of the finite beings in it, that everythings existence in the universe is dependent on God. In other words, the existence of a rock is contingent on the fact that God willed there to be a rock. If God hadnt willed there to be a rock, thered be no rock. Now suppose that God were to walk away from his creation. Malebranche doesnt believe that the rock would continue to exist since its essentially dependent on God for its existence. If the rock is to continue to exist, then God must continually will it (or continually create it) to exist. If he doesnt continually create it then the rock will pop out of existence. Just because God willed it to exist at an earlier time, it doesnt follow from that that it can exist without Gods help. Suppose I object and say that a rock can exist without God willing it to be so. I am insistent that as a human being, I can craft a man-made rock. Itd seem that this man-made rock is in existence as a result of me producing it. However, since Im a finite being, my existence is also essentially dependent on Gods will. In order for me to make the rock in the first place, God had to continually will me to exist. If he did not, I wouldnt have been able to make the rock. The rock wasnt created independently of Gods will. It contingently existed just as I did because of Gods will. The objection fails. Garber claims that if Descartes is committed to holding the continuous recreation argument, he cannot introduce his primitive notions doctrine in order to respond to Elisabeth. Garber notes that Descartes, in his Principles, explains Gods role in body to body causal interaction. Descartes believes that God is always changing the places of bodies from moment to moment, and this is what allows there to be motion in the world. It appears that, according to Descartes, bodies cannot move at all unless God puts them in motion. God must continually preserve bodies and just creating them (and walking away) wouldnt be sufficient for their motion. When body (A) is moving towards (B), it might have sufficient formal reality to move (B), but it requires God to put (A) into motion in the first place so that it can move (B). According to Garber, in order to completely understand body to body interaction (it is not

just explained by mechanical science now, we have introduced God), we must understand this new kind of divine causation where God moves bodies around to cause motion. But, a new primitive notion has to be introduced. The primitive notion of extension alone does not fully explain body to body interactions. Mechanical science alone is not sufficient to explain them; we also need divine causation. Descartes compared the notion of divine causation to how when I am conscious I can move my own body by my own thought. In other words, Descartes seems to think that understanding the notion of mind-body union is the key to understanding the notion of divine causation. However, Garber states that Descartes cannot claim this while at the same time saying to Elisabeth that she has confused the primitive notions. Descartes claims to Elisabeth that the notions of extension and mind-body union are intelligible, independently of each other. Clearly these notions are not intelligible independently of each other. In order to understand the notion of extension, I must understand the notion of mind-body union (since understanding mind-body union is the key to understanding divine causation). Its an inconsistent move for Descartes to make. Descartes might deny that this is much of a problem for his response to Elisabeth. He might say that whats more important in his response to Elisabeth, is his claim that Elisabeth believes mind-body union to be akin to extension. Even if the notions of mind-body union and extension are not independently intelligible, because of this new notion of divine causation, he can still provide a view to Elisabeth that explains to her how shes mistaken. Although the notion of extension ultimately is explained by the notion of mind-body union, Descartes can still allude to mechanical science to partially explain extension. He cannot allude to mechanical science at all to explain mind-body union. They remain fundamentally different. D. Malebranche claims that an event is a true cause only if there is a necessary connection between the event and its effect. Consider my mind causing an effect in my body. I notice that when my mind wills to raise my hand, my hand goes up. But it doesnt always have to be the case that my hand goes up

when my mind wills it to, since Im a fallible being. Its logically (and actually) possible that at some point when my mind wills my hand to go up, it doesnt go up. My body might be physically exhausted, and so my hand doesnt want to cooperate with my minds volition. Therefore there appears to be no necessary connection between my mind willing my hand to go up and my hand going up. Consider a being of infinite power (God) that wills my hand to go up. Itd seem that whenever he wills my hand to go up, my hand has to go up. Whatever a being of infinite power wills, it has to happen. I cant conceive of an infinitely powerful being that wills something to happen and then it doesnt happen. There does appear to be a necessary connection between God willing my hand to go up and my hand going up. My minds volition is not a true cause of my hand going up since there appears to be no necessary connection. Likewise, in any situation where a thing with finite power wills something, there is no necessary connection between its willing and its effect. Therefore, since theres only a necessary connection between what an infinitely powerful being wills and its effect, then an infinitely powerful being (God) is the only true cause of events. But, in most cases that my mind wills my hand to go up, my hand goes up. Even if there is no necessary connection between my willing it and its effect, I do seem to be playing a causal role and God does not appear to be doing all of the work. However, according to Malebranche, God is doing all the work. For Malebranche, my mind willing my hand to go up is only the occasional cause of the effect. When I will my hand to go up, Im not the one with the causal power. God has the causal power. Im simply bringing about the occasion for God to interject and will my hand to go up. Suppose that I hadnt willed my hand to go up. If so, then there wouldve been no occasion for God to interject and my hand would not have gone up. So, in some sense, I do appear to have some freedom regarding whether my hand goes up or not. However, this doesnt mean that I could will my hand to go up independently of Gods will. I may be able to choose whether my hand goes up or not but Im dependent on God to make my hand go up at all. If God doesnt interject and will my hand to go up when I bring about the

occasion for him to do so, then my hand will never go up. I dont seem to contain within me any genuine causal activity if Im always dependent on God to cause my hand to go up. If Im just signaling to God to do his work when I will my hand to go up, then Im certainly not the true cause of my hand going up. If I will my hand to go up and God doesnt do his work, then my hand doesnt go up. I need God to do his causal work and so God is the only being in the universe with genuine causal activity. The arguments made above by Malebranche demonstrate that hes a rationalist regarding causal relations since I dont need to experience anything to draw the conclusions those arguments give. To be a rationalist regarding causation is to claim for example, that I can conclude that A causes B simply by introspecting and looking into myself. I dont need to experience anything to draw the conclusion the no-necessary connection argument gives. I may have alluded to experience to partially explain the nonecessary connection argument but I didnt need to. The main appeal of that argument is that I can only conceive of a necessary connection between cause and effect when an infinitely powerful being is willing something to be so. When I consider a finitely powerful being, I understand through introspection that the finite being is fallible and he may do something wrong. It doesnt always have to be the case that whatever he wills comes to be. Likewise, in the continuous recreation argument, I understand through introspection that if God were to walk away from his creation, and that if everything finite is essentially dependent on God, then the finite things that God created wouldnt be able to independently keep themselves in existence. Since they essentially depend on God for their existence, there are no sufficient causal powers in finite things to keep themselves in existence without Gods help. This is a necessary a priori truth concerning essential dependence. If a things existence is essentially dependent on another thing, then it needs that thing to stick around in order to continue to exist. E. A rationalist believes that causal relations are knowable a priori. For example, Malebranche believes that God being the only true cause of events is a necessary a priori truth. He does not have to

experience anything in the world to be able to know that. For Malebranche, it must be so that whenever God wills something, it comes to be. Hume, however, believes that causal relations are knowable only through inferences from past experience. This makes him an empiricist. If we do not rely on inferences from past experience, Hume claims that we cannot predict the effects of anything. Suppose I am one of the first humans to ever exist and God asks me what will happen when two pool balls collide with each other. I have had no past experiences; in fact I was just created by God. I watch pool ball (A) moving towards pool ball (B). According to Descartes (a rationalist), I should know a priori that when (A) moves towards (B), the force of (A) will move (B) in some way. According to the Cartesian causal principle, whatever is contained formally or eminently in a cause must be in the effect. Assuming (A) has a sufficient amount of formal reality to move (B), I should expect (even without prior experiences) that based on this causal principle, (A) will move (B). However, Hume claims that I wont know whats going to happen when these two things come together. Ive never seen these two objects before, so I have no idea what theyre capable of. Maybe I speculate that (A) will start to levitate. Or maybe I think that (A) will explode. I have never seen these things, and in fact, have never experienced two objects colliding with each other. So Im just taking wild guesses with my predictions. Hume doesnt think I have any good reason to expect the outcome that those with experiences of this sort will have; the outcome that (A) will move (B) forward in a very ordinary way. If I, as a mentally developed human (with no prior experiences) have no idea what will happen when (A) moves towards (B), we shouldnt think that an infant has any idea about causal relations either. An Aristotelian might claim that when fire comes into contact with cotton, the cotton necessarily will burn. But an infant doesnt know that. Not only does the infant not have inaccurate expectations (as I do in the pool ball case), but the infant has no expectations about what will happen when the fire contacts the cotton. In order to have any expectations at all, one has to be mentally developed. But,

more importantly for Hume, one has to experience things in the world. The infant has never seen fire applied to cotton. Someone with world experience maybe has seen fire applied to cotton 100 times, and every time that it has happened, the cotton has burned. This person, taking into account what they have seen from their past experiences, makes a very probable prediction (through inference) that the cotton will burn. The infant is unable to make any such prediction. However, even as someone who has seen fire burn cotton 100 times, all this person is making is a highly probable prediction. They do not know with absolute certainty that the cotton will burn. Suppose theyve seen it burn 1 million times. Hume still would claim that the person doesnt know the cotton will burn with utter certainty. According to Hume, when a person infers The cotton will burn, they arent claiming something that is deductively true. And only deductively true (or intuitively certain) things are things we can know with utter certainty. For instance, we can know the conclusions of deductive logical arguments with certainty. One might be If it is a triangle, it has 3 sides. It is a triangle. Therefore, it has 3 sides. The two premises of the argument are known just by understanding the nature of a triangle. It will always (and necessarily) be that a triangle has 3 sides. We cannot conceive of a triangle that doesnt have 3 sides. However, we cannot know inductive arguments with utter certainty. The assumption that we make in any inductive argument, is an assumption of the truthfulness of the uniformity of nature principle, which states that the future will resemble the past. But, Hume claims that we cannot know the certainty of inductive arguments because we cannot assume the truthfulness of this principle. I know the truthfulness of premises in the triangle argument through understanding a things nature. But that understanding alone tells me nothing about things that exist in the world. Only inductive arguments can give me this information. However, we can conceive of the uniformity of nature principle not holding. I mayve seen fire burn the cotton many times. I infer, assuming that the future will resemble the past, that this cotton in front of me will burn when fire is applied to it. However, its logically possible that

the cotton wont burn, and somehow it will become immune to the flames. While I can still make a highly probable prediction that the cotton will burn, I have to concede this logical possibility. Since I have to concede this possibility, I cannot know the uniformity principle (and so any inductive argument) with absolute certainty. 2- A & B. A bodily substance for Malebranche is a thing that has no active causal powers. Suppose I get some wood and make a fire. An Aristotelian would say that this particular body (wood) has active causal powers. And that there is a metaphysical necessity in that if I put the wood together in a certain way, it will necessarily burn. However, Malebranche denies that bodies have any active causal powers and he certainly denies metaphysical necessity in body-body causal relations. Malebranche claims that bodies are passive. When considering Cartesian extension, Malebranche doesnt see how its possible for bodies to move themselves. Consider the continuous recreation argument. It concludes that all finite things (including bodies) are essentially dependent on God for their existence. And if they are essentially dependent on God for their existence, then surely they are essentially dependent on him for motion. According to Malebranche, bodies cannot move independently of Gods will since they need the extra push from him to do anything. Malebranche claims that the only thing bodies really do is consist in relations of distance. One leaf is on one tree and another leaf on another tree. In order for those leaves to move about, it takes a force of nature (like wind and wind is dependent on Gods will) to do the work. Malebranche is a Cartesian in his views about bodily substance in some sense since Descartes too saw bodies as things that consisted in relations of distance. In fact, the modes that Cartesian bodies possess are things like extension, size and shape. And it is these modes that allow bodies to exist in relations of distance. For instance, since a body is extended it takes up space. Since it is extended, it has a size and shape. And if there are multiple bodies in existence with all of these modes, then they will exist in relations of distance. It would seem to be a necessity that if multiple things take up space, they will differ in their distances between one another.

However, Descartes believed that bodies had causal power. He believed that, for example, my body can cause sensations in my mind. But, according to Malebranche, my body cannot cause sensations in my mind. My body, like all other bodies, only exists in relations of distance. And it exists in relations of distance because of the modes that it possesses. It doesnt follow that a thing with extension, size and shape has active causal powers. For Malebranche, to ascribe active causal powers to a body would be a mistake. From the fact that my body is extended in space, I cannot conclude that it has any active causal powers. While Malebranche might concede that bodies move about in space, it doesnt follow that they move about in space on their own. Instead, it takes interference from God for bodies to move about at all. God has infinite power and so he can move what is otherwise a merely passive body. Regarding the Cartesian belief that bodies can act on minds, there is nothing in the Cartesian bodily modes that entails that a body has power to act on my mind. If my body does not have this power, there does not appear to be a connection between my body causing sensations in my mind and my mind having those sensations. Those sensations must have (ultimately) come from God. It seems that if all a body has is extension, it is necessarily passive. C. If we are to accept Malebranches occasionalist theory of bodies, then we must conclude that bodies have no active causal powers. If bodies have no active causal powers, then they cannot do anything unless God enables them to using his (infinite) causal powers. In other words, we have to conclude that God is always doing all of the causal work. Hes continually preserving and recreating things and keeping them in existence. If he doesnt continually preserve things, theyll pop out of existence. We might think, intuitively, that God would create bodies that had active causal powers. If he did, then that would lessen his workload. If he wanted to, he could take a break. He could enjoy his creation rather than eternally be active in it. But, more importantly, if we are to assume that Malebranches occasionalist theory of bodies is true, then we might conclude that God created all the bodies that he did in vain. Since bodies have no active causal powers, they are seemingly useless. They cannot do

anything under their own power and are completely dependent on God. Itd seem to be a knock against Gods infinite power and wisdom that he creates bodies in such a way that he allots himself more work in their preservation, than he necessarily has to. D. Berkeleys Relativity of Perception Argument leads to a major problem for the realist, or the one who thinks that mind-independent bodies exist. For example, according to the realist, there is an objective fact of the matter about the temperature of water in a vessel. If I put a thermometer into the vessel, and it reads 50 degrees, then the temperature of that water is 50 degrees. In other words, for the realist, the quality of the water (its lukewarmness) that is perceived in the body of water is actually in that body of water. This claim holds true whether or not there are human beings around to measure the temperature of the water. Whether or not anyone measures the temperature of the water, the water is still 50 degrees. Berkley thinks the Relativity of Perception Argument undermines the above realist assumption. Suppose that my hand is hot and your hand is cold. Also suppose that we are putting our hands into uniformly lukewarm water at the same time. Since my hand is hot, the water feels cool to me. And since it feels cool, it is a relief for me to put my hot hand into this water. Since your hand is cold, the water feels warm for you. Your hand is relieved by what feels to you, to be soothingly warm water. It appears that there are two different qualities in this body of water: coolness and warmth. However, coolness and warmth cannot exist in the same body at the same time, they are opposites. A uniform body of water, according to commonsense, should be either warm, cool, lukewarm or anything in between. It should not contain two incompatible qualities. Furthermore, the realist claims that whatever qualities we perceive to derive from bodies, are actually in those bodies. So, the realist would have to hold here that coolness and warmth are actually in the body of water simultaneously. But, since it contains two incompatible qualities, thats absurd. It seems the realist assumption (at least what has

been assumed in these two paragraphs) has been undermined. Berkeley has shown that mindindependent bodies (with objective qualities) do not exist. Next, Berkeley will argue that mind-independent bodies cannot exist. Thus far, he has only shown that mind-independent bodies do not exist in our world. However, the realist might still be able to show how mind-independent bodies could exist in another possible world. If we are able to conceive of a body that is completely mind-independent, then we might feel safe with the realist assumption that mind-independent bodies can exist. However, Berkley thinks he undermines this realist assumption with his Master Argument. Berkeley claims that in order for us to conceive of a body existing mind-independently, we must be able to conceive of a body existing unconceived. Suppose I try to conceive of a book existing mindindependently. It seems possible. Intuitively, we think that if there were no human beings (or any perceptive beings) on the planet, then the book would be able to exist without a mind perceiving it. However, theres a big problem. Im unable to conceive of this book existing unconceived. After all, theres somebody conceiving it, namely me. In other words, the idea of this mind-independent book is being conceived. This conception of this mind-independent book is located in my mind. It seems necessary that, in order for something to be conceived, it has to be conceived of by a mind. A mind is the only thing that we know of that can conceive things. Since I cannot conceive of a mind-independent body that is unconceived of by a mind, it appears that mind-independent bodies cannot exist at all. E. For Berkeley, a body is a set of sensible ideas that is located in a mind. Suppose I want to articulate that I am at my desk sitting in a chair, according to Berkeleys claim that bodies are just sets of ideas in my mind. I would not simply say, as a realist would, that I am at my desk (which exists independently of my mind) sitting in a chair (which also exists mind-independently). In order to describe the bodies

that Im interacting with while writing this paper, Id say in the strict philosophical sense that I have the idea of a firm feeling, the idea of the color tan, the idea of lukewarmness, the idea of a light wood

color and so on. These ideas account for the desk and chair that Im sitting at. I combine the ideas of lukewarmness, the firm feeling, the color tan, and the idea of a light wood color to account for the desk and chair. My mind perceives these multiple qualities from these two objects. Berkeley is able to escape the problem that the realist faces in the Relativity of Perception Argument. Suppose my friend gets in from outside and is really warm. If he were to sit in what I perceive to be a lukewarm feeling chair, he may perceive it to be a cool feeling chair. My friend would say, in the strict philosophical sense, that he has the idea of coolness to account for how the chair feels to him. In other words, he perceives the quality of coolness to be in the chair. However, I have the idea of lukewarmness to account for what appears to be the same chair. I perceive the quality of lukewarmness to be in the chair. How can these two differing qualities be contained in the same chair? It seems that Berkeley is facing the same problem that the realist faces. However, hes not. Berkley would say that we are not sitting in the same chair. Instead, I perceive a different chair from what my friend perceives. My friend sits in a chair that he perceives, among other things, to have the quality of coolness. I sit in a chair that I perceive, among other things, to have the quality of lukewarmness. Since theyre separate chairs, we can perceive differing qualities in them. Theres nothing incompatible about a quality of coolness in one chair and a quality of lukewarmness in another. The realist has to insist that differing qualities are in the same object. Berkeley doesnt, so hes able to avoid the realists dilemma. It should be noted that, when speaking in the vulgar (or everyday) sense, Berkley doesnt think its very practical for us to speak of objects in the strict philosophical sense. Suppose I were to ask someone for a cup of coffee. I might say something like Give me that set of sensible qualities that I perceive right now, which are probably very similar to the set of sensible qualities that you perceive right now. Since Berkley doesnt think its advisable to talk in this way, I might instead simply say Give me that coffee. But saying Give me that coffee implies that I and whoever I ask are looking at the same object. However, according to Berkeleys account of bodies as sets of sensible ideas, we arent

looking at the same object. I might perceive hot sensible qualities in the coffee and the person I ask might perceive lukewarm sensible qualities in the coffee. Berkley is okay with us using vulgar language to express ourselves, but he wants us to be sure that we ignore the realist implications of our everyday speech. The coffee that I look at and ask for is not the same coffee that the person I ask is looking at. He wants us to keep that in mind when using vulgar speech. Suppose that Im not just perceiving sensible qualities from one or two objects. Im not just at my desk sitting in a chair. Instead, Im at a rock concert. According to Berkeleys account of bodies, Im perceiving a great deal of sensible qualities in such a situation. I might have the ideas of loud sounds, of flashy colors, of the taste of a hot dog, of a wet feeling from sweating, of the smell of alcohol, of the smell of nicotine and so on. One might ask How do we put all of these ideas of sensible qualities together and make sense of what we are perceiving? This could be a problem for Berkeleys account. Imagine that I not only have the perceptions listed, but many more, including perceptions that seem to be in conflict with each other (barely audible sounds/loud sounds, plain colors/flashy colors etc.). If I were to combine these many sets of sensible qualities together, there might be some organization. I might be able to distinguish the taste of a hot dog from the taste of beer very easily. However, assuming that there are many more perceptions to organize, I might not be able to make similar distinctions. In fact, based on what my sets of ideas are, if one were to paint my sets of sensible qualities on a canvas, one might end up with things that appear to look unreal. Perhaps in the painting, someone would be using a bottle of beer as a cigarette, or looking at a stage that appears to be many strange looking colors at once, and it would not represent anything at all that we normally think would represent what the external world looks like. This counterintuitive result might be an undesirable consequence for Berkeley. Or it might just be a result that we have to accept, if we consider his arguments for idealism to be good ones.