MARIA GERVACIO BLAS, et al. vs.

ROSALINA SANTOS, in her capacity as Special Admi nistratrix of the Estate of the deceased MAXIMA SANTOS VDA. DE BLAS, et al. FACTS: Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz begot three children only one of whom, namely, Eulali o Blas, left legitimate descendants, namely, Maria Gervacio Blas, Marta Gervacio Blas, and Lazaro Blas. Lazaro Blas has 3 legitimate descendants, namely, Manuel , Leoncio, and Loida, plaintiffs in this case. Marta Cruz died in 1898, and the following year, Simeon Blas contracted a second marriage with Maxima Santos. At the time of this second marriage, no liquidation of the properties required b y Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz was made. Three of the properties left are fishpond s located in Obando, Bulacan. Maxima Santos does not appear to have apported pro perties to her marriage with Simeon Blas. Simeon Blas executed a last will and testament and declared that one-half of his properties, after the payment of indebtedness, the properties having been acqui red during marriage (conjugal properties), constitutes the share of his wife, Ma xima Santos de Blas. Maxima Blas executed a document which indicates that she promises that all the p roperties she and her husband will leave, the portion and share corresponding to her when she makes her will, she will give one-half () to the heirs and legatees or the beneficiaries named in the will of her husband, and that she can select or choose any of them, to whom she will give depending upon the respect, service and treatment accorded to her. Thus, this action is instituted by plaintiffs against the administration of the estate of Maxima Santos, to secure a judicial declaration that one-half of the p roperties left by Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas had been promised by the deceased M axima Santos to be delivered upon her death and in her will to the plaintiffs, a nd requesting that the said properties so promised be adjudicated to the plainti ffs. ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to receive inheritance from t he estate of Maxima Santos. HELD: The Court declared that the document signed by Maxima Santos is a compromise to avoid litigation, where she promised to devise to the heirs and legatees of her husband Simeon Blas, one-half of the properties she received as her share in the conjugal partnership of herself and her husband, and that she failed to comply with her aforementioned obligation. It will be noted that what is prohibited to be the subject matter of a contract under Article 1271 of the Civil Code is "future inheritance." To us future inher itance is any property or right not in existence or capable of determination at the time of the contract, that a person may in the future acquire by succession. The properties subject of the contract are well defined properties, existing at the time of the agreement, which Simeon Blas declares in his statement as belon ging to his wife as her share in the conjugal partnership. Certainly his wife's actual share in the conjugal properties may not be considered as future inherita nce because they were actually in existence at the time the document was execute d. WHEREFORE, the administratrix of the estate of Maxima Santos, is ordered to conv ey and deliver one-half of the properties adjudicated to Maxima Santos as her sh are in the conjugal properties to the heirs and the legatees of her husband Sime on Blas. Considering that all said heirs and legatees, designated in the will of Simeon Blas as the persons for whose benefit the document had been executed.

SPOUSES ERNESTO and EVELYN SICAD, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CATALINO VALDERRAMA, JUD Y CRISTINA M. VALDERRAMA and JESUS ANTONIO VALDERRAMA Facts: Aurora Virt0 Vda. De Montinola executed a deed entitled Deed of Donatio n Inter Vivos on December 11, 1979 naming as donees her three grandchildren nam ely Catalino Valderrama, Judy Cristina Valderrama and Jesus Antonio Valderrama over a parcel of land located at Panay, Capiz. The deed also contained the sign atures of the donees in acknowledgment of their acceptance of such donation. It was recorded in the Registry of Deeds and new title was issued in the name of t he donees. However, notwithstanding all these, Montinola, retained the copy of t he new title and the property as well. Ten years thereafter, on July 10, 1990 sh e transferred the title and the property to the Sicad spouses. Prior to such, on March 12, 1987, Montinola drew up a deed of revocatio n of the donation and caused the filing of a petition with the Regional Trial C ourt of Roxas City for the cancellation of the new title under the names of the donees and the reinstatement of the old title under her name. She maintained th at the donation to her three grandchildren was one of mortis causa and thus had to comply with the formalities of a will; and since it had not, the donation was void and could not effectively serve as basis for the cancellation of the old t itle in her name and the issuance in its place of the one under the name of the donees. The donees opposed averring that the donation in their favor was one in ter vivos which having fully complied with the requirements therefore set out in Article 729 of the Civil Code, was perfectly valid and efficacious. The case, originally treated as a special proceeding, was subsequently c onsidered by the lower Court as an ordinary civil action in view of the allegati ons and issues raised in the pleadings. The Trial Court then rendered judgment o n March 27, 1991, holding that the donation was indeed one inter vivos, and dism issing Aurora Montinola's petition for lack of merit. Montinola elevated the cas e to the Court of Appeals. She however died on March 10, 1993, while the appeal was pending. Shortly after Montinola's demise, a "Manifestation and Motion" dated Mar ch 31, 1993 was filed by Ernesto Sicad and Evelyn Bofill-Sicad, herein petitione rs, in which they (a) alleged that they had become the owners of the property i n virtue of a "deed of definite sale dated May 25, 1992" accomplished by Montino la in their favor, which was confirmed by "an affidavit dated November 26, 1997 also executed by the latter, and (b) prayed that they be substituted as appellan ts and allowed to prosecute the case in their own behalf. Another motion was subsequently presented, this time by the legal heirs of Auror a Montinola, namely: Ofelia M. de Leon, Estela M. Jaen and Teresita M. Valderama . They declared that they were not interested in pursuing the case, and asked th at the appeal be withdrawn. Montinola's counsel opposed the motion. On June 21, 1993, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution: (a) ordering the sub stitution of the persons above mentioned Ofelia de Leon, Estela M, Jaen, and Ter esita M. Valderama as plaintiffs-appellants in place of the late Aurora Montinol a, as well as the joinder of the spouses Ernesto and Evelyn Bofill-Sicad as addi tional appellants; and (b) denying the motion for the withdrawal of the appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court; and deni ed the separate motions for reconsideration filed by Ofelia M. de Leon, Estela M . Jaen, and Teresita M. Valderrama, on the one hand, and by the spouses, Ernest and Evelyn Sicad, on the other. Hence this present case by Sicad spouses. Issue: Whether the donation is mortis causa or inter vivos. Held: The donation in question is a donation mortis causa. The real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its language and the inte

ntion of the parties as demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon its exe cution. A donation is deemed one mortis causa where the combined effect of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed of donation the most essent ial elements of ownership- the right to dispose of the donated properties and th e right to enjoy the products, profits possession- remain with the donor during his or her lifetime, and would accrue to the doness only after such donors death. In the instant case, nothing of any consequence was transferred by the deed of d onation in question to Montinola's grandchildren. They did not get possession of the property donated. They did not acquire the right to the fruits thereof, or any other right of dominion over the property. More importantly, they did not ac quire the right to dispose of the property this would accrue to them only after ten (10) years from Montinola's death. Indeed, they never even laid hands on the certificate of title to the same. They were therefore simply "paper owners" of the donated property. All these circumstances, including, to repeat, the explici t provisions of the deed of donation reserving the exercise of rights of ownersh ip to the donee and prohibiting the sale or encumbrance of the property until te n (10) years after her death ineluctably lead to the conclusion that the donatio n in question was a donation mortis causa, contemplating a transfer of ownership to the donees only after the donor's demise. Moreover, the fact that the donation is given in consideration of love and affec tion is not a characteristic of donations intervivos solely because transfers mo rtis causa may also be made for the same reason. Finally, the court expressed that in case of doubt relative to a gratuitous cont ract, the construction must be that entailing the least transmission of rights an d interests as adverted by Article 1378 of the Civil Code. The donation in question, though denominated inter vivos, is in truth on e mortis causa; it is void because the essential requisites for its validity hav e not been complied with. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court are SET ASIDE. The Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed by Aurora Virto Vda. de Montinola on December 11, 1979 in favor of Catalino M. Valderrama, Judy Cristina M. Valderrama and Jesus Antonio M. Valderrama is declared null an d void. The Register of Deeds of Roxas City was directed to cancel Transfer Cert ificate of Title, revive and reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title to the vald erramas. SO ORDERED. NENITA DE VERA SUROZA vs. JUDGE REYNALDO P. HONRADO December 19, 1981 FACTS: Mauro Suroza married Marcelina Salvador. They were childless. They reare d Agapito who used the surname Suroza and who considered them as his parents whi ch is shown in his marriage contract with Nenita de Vera. Mauro died. Agapito wa s disabled and Nenita was appointed as his guardian. Arsenia de la Cruz (apparen tly a girlfriend of Agapito) wanted also to be Agapitos guardian but the court di smissed her petition to be a guardian. Spouses Antonio Sy and Hermogena Talan be got a child named Marilyn Sy who was entrusted to Arsenia de la Cruz and who was later delivered to Marcelina Salvador Suroza who brought her up as supposed dau ghter of Agapito and as her granddaughter. Marilyn used surname Suroza but was n ot legally adopted. Marcelina executed a notarial will. That will, which is in English, was thumb ma rked by her. She was illiterate. In that will, she bequeathed all her estate to her supposed granddaughter Marilyn. Marcelina died. Marina Paje, the executrix i n her will filed a petition for the probate of Marcelinas alleged will. The case was assigned to Judge Honrado. And the judge probated the will wherein Marilyn w as instituted heiress. The judge appointed Marina as administratix. He issued or ders to allow Marina to withdraw money and an order to eject the occupants of th e testatrixs house, among who was Nenita and to place Marina in possession. Nenita filed a motion to set aside the said order, alleging that Agapito was the

sole heir of the deceased. Judge Honrado dismissed Nenitas petition. She filed a case to annul the probate proceedings, he dimissed it. Hence, this petition. Contention of the petitioner: She alleged that Judge Honrado, in spite of his knowledge that the testatrix had a son, who was preterited in the will, did not take into account the consequences of such a preterition. And he probated the fr audulent will. ISSUE: Should disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having admitted to probate a will, which on its face is void because it is written in E nglish, a language not known to the illiterate testatrix, and which is probably a forged will because she and the attesting witnesses did not appear before the notary himself? HELD: Yes. Disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for his improp er disposition of the estate case which might have resulted in a miscarriage of justice because the decedents legal heirs and not the instituted heiress in the void will should have inherited the decedents estate. In the will, it was stated that English was a language understood and known to t he testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was r ead to the testatrix and translated to Filipino language. That could only mean th at the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and therefore it is void because of the mandatory provision of Art. 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language known to the testator. In spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have personall y conducted the hearing on the probate of the will so that he could have ascerta ined whether the will was validly executed.