FromAggressiveAssertivenesstoAllQuieton theEastSeaFront:TheSouthChinaSeaasan IssueinChinaVietnamRelations

CarlyleA.Thayer

PresentationtoConferenceon TheSouthChinaSeaandAsiaPacificinTransition: ExploringOptionsforManagingDisputes SponsoredbytheCenterforStrategic&InternationalStudies Washington,D.C.,June2728,2012

 FromAggressiveAssertivenesstoAllQuietontheEastSeaFront: TheSouthChinaSeaasanIssueinChinaVietnamRelations CarlyleA.Thayer* Introduction

TheconferenceorganizershaveaskedspeakersinthispanelonRecentDevelopmentin the South China Sea to compare developments in the South China Sea in the period from 2009mid 2011 with developments over this past year (midJune 2011 to the present). Panelistshavebeenaskedtoaddressthreequestions: Hasthesituationchanged?Why/whynot? HasChinasapproachchanged? Wheredoproblemsremain?

ThispresentationisdividedintofourpartsandfocusesexclusivelyontheSouthChina SeaasanissueinChinaVietnamrelations.Partonereviewsmajordevelopmentsfrom 2009tomid2011.Parttworeviewsmajordevelopmentsfrommid2011tothepresent. Partthreeaddressesthequestionwhatexplainsthesechanges.Partfouridentifiesthe continuingproblems. Part1.FromAssertivenesstoAggressiveAssertiveness(2009mid2011) ThissectionaddressesashiftinChinesebehaviourtowardsVietnamintheSouthChina Seafromassertivenesstoaggressiveassertiveness.1 During the period from2009tomid2011therewere four interrelateddevelopments thatillustrateChinasshiftinbehaviour. First,theUnitedNationsCommissiononLimitstoContinentalShelfsetMay13,2009as the deadline for submissions for claims to extended continental shelves. Vietnam and Malaysia filed a joint submission related mainly to the Spratly Islands area. Vietnam madeaseparatesubmissioncoveringtheParacelIslandsarea. China protested these submissions and in so doing officially tabled for the first time a map containing ninedash lines in a ushape covering most of the South China Sea. Chinesecivilianmaritimeagencies,ChinaMaritimeSurveillance(CMS)andtheFisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC), then proceeded unilaterally to assert Chinese jurisdictionwithintheninedotedlines.
*Emeritus Professor, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra,andDirectorofThayerConsultancy.Email:carlthayer@iinet.net.au.RevisedJuly2,2012.
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SeeCarlyleA.Thayer,ChinasNewWaveofAggressiveAssertivenessintheSouthChinaSea,Paperto International Conference on Maritime Security in the South China Sea, Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies,Washington,D.C.,June2021,2011.

Second, since at least the late 1990s, China has announced an annual fishing ban (more accurately fishing restrictions) in the South China Sea north of twelve degrees north latitude from May to August. The purpose of these restrictions was to save the depletedfishstockduringthebreedingseason. In 2009 and 2010 Chinese civilian ships aggressively harassed Vietnamese fishing craft particularlyinthewatersofftheParacelIslands.ChineseshipschasedVietnamesecraft and on occasion rammed them. Several fishing boats were sunk. Chinese authorities boarded Vietnamese fishing boats and seized their catches, navigational aids (GPS), spare parts, and tools. Some Vietnamese were detained and held in custody pending paymentofheftyfines.Therewereseveralfatalities. Third, Chinese civilian ships began to interfere in the commercial operations of oil exploration vessels operating within waters that fell where Chinas ushaped line intersected Vietnams Exclusive Economic Zone. Chinese actions resulted in two publicizedinstancesofphysicalinterferencewithcablestowingseismicequipment.On May26,2011aChinesevesselcuttheseismiccabletowedbytheBinhMinhII.OnJune 9, another cable cutting incident took place involving the Viking II. A third unreported cable cutting incident may have taken place in June 2011. Vietnamese sources unofficiallyreportedthatharassmentofcommercialoilexplorationvesselsoperatingin VietnamsEEZtookplacepriorto2011butwereunreportedfordiplomaticandpolitical reasons. Fourth,VietnammaintainssovereigntyclaimsovertheParacelIslandsnowoccupiedby China. This is a strictly bilateral matter. During the period under review Vietnam continually protested Chinese oil exploration activities in waters off the Paracels and Chinasconstructionofinfrastructuretosupporttourism. Vietnamrespondedtotheabovedevelopmentsbylodgingdiplomaticprotestswiththe Chinese Embassy in Hanoi and by raising its complaints with Chinese officials during highlevelvisits.Inaddition,Vietnamrespondedinfourotherways. First, as the Chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2010, VietnaminternationalizedtheSouthChinaSeaissuebylobbyingotherASEANmembers and ASEANs dialogue partners. As a result the South China Sea was raised by twelve foreignministers,includingmostnotablySecretaryofStateHillaryClinton,atthe2010 meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum. The South China Sea issue was also raised by ministers at the inaugural meeting of the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMMPlus)hostedinHanoiinOctober2010.2 Second, nationalist Vietnamese, including students and intellectuals, staged unprecedented antiChina protests, conducting eleven demonstrations over a twelve weekperiodfromJunetoAugust2011.Atthesametimeavirulentwarofwordsbroke outontheInternetbetweenordinaryVietnameseandChinesecitizens.Attheheightof
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TheSouthChinaSeaissuewasraisedattheEastAsiaSummitinNovember2011bysixteenofthe eighteenheadsofstate/headsofgovernmentwhoattended.Chinaobjected.

these exchanges in June 2011 an estimated 200 Vietnamese websites, including governmentwebsites,weresubjecttocyberattacks. Third,VietnamsPresidentandPrimeMinistermadeunprecedentedpubicaffirmations ofVietnamsdeterminationtodefenditssovereigntyandterritorialintegrity.ThePrime Minister also issued a decree on military service to signal Vietnams resolve if worse cametoworse. Fourth,inJune2011,Vietnamconductedlivefiringexercisesinvolvingcoastaldefence artilleryandnavalships.Inaddition,VietnamsMarinePolice(CanhSatBien),anagency underthecontroloftheMinistryofNationalDefence,begantoaccostChinesecivilian enforcementshipsinVietnamsEEZincludingoncecelebratedrammingincidentshown onYouTube. PartII.AllQuietontheEastSeaFront(mid2011toJune2012)3 OverthepastyeartherehavebeensignsthatChinahaspulledbackfromitsaggressive assertiveness and opted to put greater reliance on political pressure and diplomatic influence.Threepointssupportthisview. First,ChinahasshownsignsofattemptingtoclarifyitsninedashlineclaimtotheSouth China Sea. For example, Chinese officials refer to sovereignty claims over islands and rocksandtheiradjacentwaters.ThisformulationbringsChineseclaimsmoreintoline withinternationallawthatitspreviousboldassertionofhistoricrightsovertheSouth ChinaSea.AspokespersonforChinasMinistryofForeignAffairspubliclystatedthatno country(presumablyincludingChina)claimedtheentireSouthChinaSea. TherehasbeennodefinitiveofficialChineseclarificationofitsninedashlineclaimand considerablyambiguityremains,however.Chinacontinuestoasserthistoricrightsover theSouthChinaSea. Second, China has eased up in actions to enforce its annual fishing ban. Some Vietnamesesourcesclaimthiswasevidentin2010.Chinadefinitelychangedtacticsin 2011. China set up a cordon around the Paracel Islands and prevented Vietnamese fishing craft from entering. In 2011 only two major incidents were reported. The first involved a Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ship training its guns on Vietnamese fishermen. The second reportedly involved PLAN personnel attempting to rob a Vietnamesefishingboatandbeatingitscaptain. Thefishingbanfor2012remainsinforceuntilAugust.Sofaronlytwomajorincidents have taken place. A CMS ship reportedly fired at Vietnamese fishermen. And in the secondincidentChinaarrestedanddetainedtwentyoneVietnamesefishermenbefore releasingthemafterofficialprotestbytheVietnamesegovernment.

Thistitleisawordplayonthenovelandfilm,AllQuietontheWesternFront,setinGermanyduring WorldWarOne.

Third,andmostsignificantly,therehavebeennofurtherreportsofChineseinterference with the commercial operations of oil exploration vessels operating in Vietnams EEZ, includingattemptstocutseismiccables. The Paracel Islands continued to remain a special case. Over the last year China continued to announce plans to upgrade the infrastructure there to support tourism andtoprovideprotectionforChinesefishermen. PartIII.WhatExplainsTheseChanges? TherearetwobroadexplanationstoaccountforthedeclineintensionsontheEastSea front.ThefirstexplanationconcernsChinasreevaluationofitsSouthChinaSeapolicy. ThesecondexplanationfocusesoneffortsbyChinaandVietnamtocompartmentalize the South China Sea issue and prevent it from negatively affecting their bilateral relations. Chinas Reevaluation of its South China Sea Policy.4 There is evidence to support the view that China was taken aback by the response by the international community, particularlyatthe2010ASEANRegionalForummeeting.Inshort,seniorChineseleaders came to view the tactics of aggressively asserting Chinese jurisdiction as counter productive. For example, Chinese leaders quietly shelved the use of the term core interestwithrespecttotheSouthChinaSea. Inlate2010,ChinastopleadershipestablishedahighlevelLeadingSmallGroupheaded byStateCouncilorDaiBingguototakechargeofSouthChinaSeamatters.Inmid2011 theMinistryofForeignAffairswasdirectedtotakechargeofcoordinatingtheactionsof alltheciviliangroupsinvolvedintheSouthChinaSea(MaritimeSafetyAuthority,China Maritime Surveillance, Bureau of Fishery Affairs). It appears that neither the Leading SmallGroupnortheMinistryofForeignAffairshavebeeneffectiveincraftingaunified wholeofgovernmentapproach,however.5 Inapositivedevelopment,inJuly2011,ChinajoinedASEANstatesinrevivingtheirjoint WorkingGrouptoimplementthe2002DeclarationonConductofPartiesintheSouth ChinaSea. ChinaVietnam Compartmentalize Their South China Sea Dispute. The second explanationforthedeclineinChineseaggressiveassertivenessintheSouthChinaSeais thatChinaandVietnammadedeterminedeffortstopreventtheirdisputesfromspilling over and affecting their bilateral relations. There are nine indicators to support this assessment.
4

ForanoverviewoftheacademicdebateinChinasee:LiMingjiang,ChineseDebatesofSouthChinaSea Policy:ImplicationsforFutureDevelopments,RSISWorkingPaperNo.239,Singapore:S.Rajaratnam SchoolofInternationalStudies,May17,2012.

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InternationalCrisisGroup,StirringUptheSouthChinaSea(I),AsiaReportNo.223,Brussels:April23, 2012,33.

1.ChinaandVietnamcontinuedtomanagetheirbilateralrelationsthroughahighlevel Joint Steering Committee headed by their deputy prime ministers. The Joint Steering CommitteemetinMarch2009andagaininSeptember2011.Therewerenoindications thattheSouthChinaSeaissuewasimpactingonotherareasofcooperation. 2.Inearly2010officialgovernmentdelegationsresumednegotiationsonseaborders. Eightsessionswereheld(see6below). 3.VietnamandChinaelevatedtheirdefencestrategicdialoguetoviceministeriallevel. TwomeetingsoftheStrategicDefenceSecurityDialoguewereheldinNovember2010 and August 2011. There were no indications that the South China Sea issue was impactingondefenceties. 4. In January 2011, immediately after the 11th national congress of the Vietnam CommunistParty(VCP),VietnamdispatchedaSpecialEnvoytoChinatoinviteChinas topleaderstopayofficialvisitstoVietnam(seepoints6and7below). 5.InJune2011,attheheightoftensionsfollowingthecablecuttingincidentsandpublic antiChinaprotestsinVietnam,VietnamdispatchedasecondSpecialEnvoytoChina.On June25,2011thetwosidesissuedajointpressstatementreaffirmingtheirintentionto settletheirdisputepeacefully.Andtheyalsoagreedtosteerpublicopinion,inother wordstotonedownthehostilerhetoricoftheirdomesticnationalists. 6. In October 2011 the Secretary General of the VCP paid an official visit to China for discussions with his counterpart, Hu Jintao. They reached detailed agreement to develop their bilateral relations. And most significantly, they witnessed the signing of the Agreement on Fundamental Principles to Guide the Settlement of Maritime Disputes.Bothsidesagreedtocooperateformutualdevelopmentinareasformingthe mouthoftheGulfofTonkin(butnotinwaterscontestedbythirdparties). 7.InDecember2011,ChinasVicePresidentXiJinpingpaidanofficialvisittoVietnam.Xi is widely expected to replace Hu Jintao as state president and party leader later this year. 8.InFebruary2012,VietnamsForeignMinisterPhamBinhMinhpaidanofficialvisitto China. 9. And finally, throughout this period, China and Vietnam have continued to conduct regularlyscheduledjointnavalpatrolsintheGulfofTonkin.Thesehavebranchedoutto includeasearchandrescueexerciseandreciprocalportvisits. PartIV.WhereDoProblemsRemain? Sevenmajorproblemsareasmaybeidentified.Theyare: First,thereisnoprospectofaresolutionofthefundamentalsovereigntydisputesand disputesoversovereignjurisdictionalrightsoverislandsandfeaturesintheSouthChina SeaincludingboththeParacelandSpratlyarchipelagoes. WhileVietnamandChinamaymanagetheirdisputebotharecompelledtoprotestany action by the other side that is viewed as impinging on its sovereignty claims. Three

recent events illustrate this point. On June 15, 2012 Vietnam announced the commencement of regular air patrols over the Spratlys and dispatched two Su27 jet fighters over the area. Subsequently, Vietnams National Assembly passed a Maritime Law(LuatBien)thatforthefirsttimelaidthelegalbasisforVietnameseadministration andcontroloveritsterritorialsea,contiguouszone,EEZ,continentalshelf,islandsand archipelagoesintheSouthChinaSea.Chinavehementlyprotestedbothdevelopments and immediately announced the upgrading of the Sansha administrative unit that has responsibilityovertheParacels,SpratlysandMaccledfieldBank. Second, domestic nationalism remains a virulent domestic force in both China and Vietnam. Third, both China and Vietnam are continuing to produce oil and gas and award oil explorationcontractstoforeigncompaniesindisputedwaters.Chinahasprotestedthe involvement of Indias ONGC Videsh in oil blocks abandoned by BP, and Russias GAZPOMextensionofitsactivitiesfurthersouth.Inturn,Vietnamhasprotestedactions by the China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) on June 23, 2012 in putting to tendernineblocksthatlieoffVietnamscentralcoastentirelywithinVietnamsEEZ(see maponcoverpage). Fourth,despiteChinasattemptstoexertsomeformofcoordinationovertheplethora ofcivilianmaritimeagencies,thereisgrowingevidencethattheseagenciescontinueto actindependentlyifnotwithimpunity.AsfishstocksclosetoChinaandHainanIsland havebeendepletedlocalfishermenarebeingencouragedtogofurthersouth.Boththe CMSandFLECdeploytheirshipstoprovideprotection.Insum,Chinahasfailedtoexert effectivefisheriesmanagementinitsownwatersortocooperatewithregionalstates. Fifth,Chinacontinuestobedismissiveofanyandallprotestsandcomplaintsaboutthe conduct of its civilian paramilitary agencies in the South China Sea. China remains intractable all complaints are portrayed as wrong and inaccurate or as normal jurisdictionalactivitiesbyChineseagencies. Sixth,bothChinaandVietnamcontinuetoexpandtheircivilianmaritimeenforcement agencies,andmoresignificantly,modernizetheirnavalandairforcesintheSouthChina Sea region. As the bathtub of the South China Sea becomes more crowded, the probabilityofanaccidentalnavalclashrises. Seventh, ASEAN continue to remain divided about how to deal with China over the SouthChinaSeadispute.Thisdoesnotaugurwellfortheadoptionofalegallybinding and enforceable Code of Conduct to regulate state behaviour. And that in turn underminespeaceandstabilityintheSouthChinaSea. Insummary,althoughallmaybequietontheEastSeafront,theunderlyingtrendsare worrisome. To paraphrase a report by the Lowy Institute, Southeast Asias waters are contested,becomingincreasinglycongested,andpronetoarmedstrife.6 6RoryMedcalfandRaoulHeinrichs,CrisisandConfidence:MajorPowersandMaritimeSecurityinIndo PacificAsia(Sydney:LowyInstituteforInternationalPolicy,June2011),3.