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Roman and Del Monaco emphasized that gathering data from sensors alone won't make the grid more
robust. Knowing how to analyze information to detect and then deflect problems would lead to improved
reliability, they said.
"This is outage management," Roman said. "Our whole philosophy has been to be more proactive. (Sept.
11) also prompted us to think about security. How do we use these microsensors for security?"
PSE&G may be ahead of the curve. Roger Anderson, an advocate of a Web-enabled smart grid, said the
energy industry as a whole shies away from new technologies until it has little choice but
to adapt.
The 2001 terrorist attacks and last year's massive outage jolted the industry, but didn't
prompt any revolutionary change.
The chips combine PNNL's expertise in microsystems with its mission to provide clean
and energy-efficient technologies to the nation. The chips detect when the grid is
becoming overloaded, for instance, when it is being taxed by air-conditioning demands
on a hot and humid day.
The chips temporarily shut down air conditioners or other appliances until the grid has
recovered. At most, temporary brownouts inconvenience homeowners. But similar
outages at energy-reliant high-tech facilities such as computer chip-making plants can
prove ruinous.
"The bottom line is, we can't protect it (the grid) because it is so diverse," said Robert Pratt, a
staff scientist at PNNL and program manager for GridWise. "We need resiliency. We need the flexibility
to make sure it doesn't turn into a blackout."
Pratt said the incentive for consumers would be in cost savings more than concerns about
grid reliability. He envisions consumers installing GridWise into appliances, or buying appliances
already wired with GridWise, and enrolling in utility programs that then give them cheaper rates.
Their individual energy conservation would be small, but "it's the aggregate that makes it great," Pratt said.
EPRI's Rastler takes working outside the grid even further. The technical leader for its distributed energy
resources program, he is looking at technologies such as stationary fuel cells that can provide alternative
energy to consumers and thus ease the burden placed on the grid.
His program also explores the feasibility of renewables such as solar cells. Both will
likely benefit from nanotechnologies beinR honed in companies and research labs.
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"Several of the electric companies are interested in seeing whether these technologies can
be part of the toolbox." Rastler said. "There's been a lot of hope, and a lot of over promise."
Change is coming to the grid, even if its engineering remains unchanged, according to
Anderson. An oceanographer for 20 years, he recognizes in the grid the same kind of
dynamic interplay of forces that make complex systems like the climate so difficult to
predict.
His tracking of blackouts in the U.S. over several decades shows a recent shift toward
instability, with the frequency and magnitude of blackouts on the rise. The Five-year trend
serves as a warning that another multi-state meltdown like last August's could occur
unless the grid is healed.
"it scares us," he said, "like the way the global warming people are scared."
As NERC warned a decade ago, the transmission system was not designed to handle
rapidly-changing bulk, so-called "economy" power transfers. On the three-year
anniversary of the "Great 2003 Blackout," NERC vice president Donald Cook explained, "There's
no question that the grid is being used now in ways for which it wasn't really designed. It
was built to connect neighbor to neighbor, over the last several decades. It was not
designed to move large blocks of power from one region to another. "
The Federally built Tennessee Valley Authority system is illustrative. TVA built, owns, and operates
17,000 miles of transmission lines, to service its customers over an area including all or parts of seven
Southeastern states. FERC has been trying to force the TVA to join a Federally regulated Regional
Transmission Organization, which would require it to cede control of its transmission grid, and force it to
build new transmission capacity (for which its customers would have to pay), not to service its own
ratepayers, but to allow "economy" wheeling over its wires. So far, the TVA has refused.
It is often stated that the solution to this transmission congestion is to build new power lines. But while
more transmission capacity is certainly needed, that in itself, will not solve the problem.
Blackout Blowback
Following the August 2003 blackout, which left 50 million people from the Midwest to
the East Coast in the dark, multiple Congressional hearings and a Federal investigation
were conducted to examine the problem and propose solutions. The Department of
Energy was tasked with identifying the cause. Its final report blamed everything
possible—including operators and fallen trees—except deregulation.
But the Congress mandated that the Department produce a report, the National Electric
Transmission Congestion Study, which it released in August 2006. The report duly noted what
everyone already knew—that areas of Critical Congestion included the New York City and Connecticut
service areas, with Congestion Areas of Concern all the way from New York through Northern Virginia.
The Los Angeles area was noted as a Critical Congestion area, with parts of the West Coast, from Seattle to
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San Diego, in the Areas of Concern category. But it is not in these regions that profit-conscious, and even
foreign-owned companies, are proposing to build new power lines, or the new local generating plants that
would obviate the need for long-distance transmission lines. Why?
Under the no-holds-barred market of deregulation, this "elsewhere" has moved further and further away
from the large cities, with their large power requirements, to areas of the country where power can be
produced more cheaply, and new plants can be built with the minimum amount of local political opposition
and legal interference.
For example, PJM is a regional transmission interconnection, which coordinates the operation of the
transmission grid that now includes Delaware, Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New
Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of
Columbia. It oversees 56,070 miles of transmission lines, and plans regional transmission expansion to
maintain grid reliability and relieve congestion.
In March, PJM identified transmission constraints in its region, which were standing in the way of
"bringing resources to a broader market." PJM identified two transmission paths requiring significant
investment: a high-voltage line from the coal fields of West Virginia to Baltimore and Washington, D.C.
and another, extending from West Virginia to Philadelphia, New Jersey, and Delaware. However, these
lines, hundreds of miles long, would not be necessary, if the mandate existed to build new nuclear plants
where the capacity would be near the load centers.
While Virginia and Maryland utilities are considering such new builds, most of the nuclear power plants
that are under consideration by utilities are in the semi-rural Southeast, where there is political support for
new plants, and building more high-voltage transmission lines to carry the power is unlikely to be held up
for 15 years by "environmental" court challenges. Some of that new nuclear-generated power from the
Southeast will be used locally, for growing demand, and some will be wheeled to the energy-short regions
of the mid-Atlantic and Northeast, which refuse to build their own capacity. Companies that have been
buying up transmission capacity will make a bundle, in the process.
Investment in new transmission capacity overall has left the grid system vulnerable to
even small instabilities. The industry estimates that $100 billion is needed in new
transmission capacity and upgrades, as quickly as possible. The 2003 blackout did spur
some increase in investment industry-wide, from $3.5 billion per year to $6 billion in
2006. But profit-minded companies are only willing to invest funds where there is a
profit to be made, namely to carry their "economy transfers," regardless of how that
destabilizes the grid system overall.
In a July 2006 article, three former electric utility executives, who formed the organization, Power
Engineers Supporting Truth (PEST), out of disgust with the refusal of the government to pinpoint
deregulation as the cause of the massive grid failure, after the 2003 New York blackout, stated that the
"core issue is an almost fundamentalist reliance on markets to solve even the most
scientifically complex problems... [PJolicy makers continue to act as if some adjustment
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in market protocols is all that is required, and steadfastly refuse to acknowledge the
accumulating mass of evidence that deregulation ... is itself the problem. Social scientists
call this kind of denial, cognitive dissonance."
The engineers, who have among them, more than five decades of experience in the electrical utility
industry, insist that "new transmission lines will not by themselves improve reliability. They
may increase transfer capacities, and hence improve commercial use of the grid." but will
not necessarily improve performance of the system. "Reliability standards have already been
reduced to accomodate greater use of the grid for commercial transactions." they warned
(Table II). ~ "
There has been a huge penalty for this disruption of the functioning of the electric grid.
PEST estimates that the 2003 blackout incurred economic losses in excess of $5 billion.
The California blackouts cost in excess of $1 billion each. The national impact of
declining reliability and quality, they estimate, is in excess of $50 billion.
When the California energy crisis of 2000-2001 was raging, distraught state legislators and the embattled
Gov. Gray Davis searched for a solution. Although they knew what that solution was, they protested that it
would be impossible to put the toothpaste of deregulation back in the tube. Lyndon LaRouche and EIR
proposed that that was exactly what needed to be done.
On Monday, July 17, 2006, in the midst of an intense Summer heat wave, one of Con Edison's 22 primary
feeder lines failed, below the streets of the City of New York. Over the next several hours, five more feeder
lines were lost. Voltage was reduced
8% to limit the instability, and the utility was faced with 25,000 customers—about 100,000 people—in the
heat and dark. It took until midnight July 23—seven days later—to restore 20,000 of the affected
customers, according to Con Edison.
The New York City blackout was the result not of a Summer heatwave, but of the
decades of underinvestment in the infrastructure that distributes electric power from
central feeder lines, through transformers, to the wires that deliver power to each home,
school, factory, office building, small business, and hospital. Some of Con Edison's
underground infrastructure goes back almost as far as Thomas Edison's first central
generating station and underground cable, on Pearl Street in lower Manhattan, in 1882. It was a
length of 59-year-old cable whose failure was a factor in the July blackout.
A couple of years ago in Philadelphia, workers for PECO Energy found that some underground
utility cable still in service dated to 1899. In July 1999, the failure of outdated cable was
blamed for power outages in Manhattan affecting 200,000 people. In San Francisco, a
failed cable in December 2003 created an outage for 100.000 residents. "We've been using
equipment far beyond its original intended life because we've been concerned with the cost of replacement
and the need to keep utility rates down," remarked Dean Oskvig, president of Black & Veatch, an
engineering firm based in St. Louis, last month.
Industry-wide, there is agreement that weaknesses due to the age of the underground
distribution cable have been exacerbated by the way the system is run in today's
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deregulated world. To "save money," the industry has turned to a policy of "run to
failure." where a company waits for a failure before replacing aged power lines and other
equipment. Black & Veatch reports that although utilities currently spend more than $18 billion on local
distribution systems, most of that is to string new wire to new housing developments (which will likely
come to an end soon, along with the housing boom), and that an additional $8-10 billion per year is needed
to replace obsolete and corroded equipment.
On top of this disinvestment policy, local distribution systems, like the transmission system, are being
stretched beyond their design limits. In addition to chronological age, overheating of equipment that is
caused by heavy electricity use and is repeatedly stressed will age faster, and is more likely to fail
suddenly.
In 1986, Con Edison began a program to replace all of its older cable with a newer design. It is spending
about $25 million per year, and at that rate, the utility will not finish until 2024. By that time, some of its
replacement cable will be 38 years old. Con Edison delivers electricity to 3.2 million customers, through
95,000 miles of underground cable, and 33,000 miles of overhead wires. Estimates are that about 27% of its
underground cable needs to be replaced. Why is it taking decades to replace old cable?
According to media reports, recently Southern California Edison sought approval from the state Public
Utilities Commission to replace 800 miles of aging underground cable, after concluding that cable failures
were the leading cause of outages that could be prevented. But "consumer advocates" opposed the utility's
request to recoup the $145 million cost of replacement, on the grounds that the utility's records were not
adequate to ensure the worst cables would be replaced first. The utility will proceed and spend $250
million more than is recouped in customers' bills anyway, because they "don't want to get too far
behind." Apparently the shareholder-driven "consumer advocates" never added up the
economic, and sometimes, life-threatening costs, of the alternative—blackouts.
Between 1990 and the year 2000, utility employment in power generation dropped from 350,000 to
280,000, as utilities looked for ways to slash costs, to be "competitive." Over the same decade, employment
in transmission and distribution went from 196,000 to 156,000, in a system that is growing more complex
by the day. Today, the average age of a power lineman is 50 years.
"Quick profit," deregulation, shareholder values, environmentalism. have all run their
course, and nearly taken down the electricity grid. It is time to change the axioms.
Yes, there need to be more power plants built, to make up for the deficits in electric-
generating capacity in many parts of the country. It is also the case that entire regions, in
particular the West and East Coasts, have so much congestion on their transmission lines,
that they cannot import the power they need. And as seen in New York City this past
July, breakdowns in 100-year-old underground local distribution systems are now leaving
tens of thousands of people in the dark, and must be replaced.
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But it is foolhardy to think that the needed investments will be made under the present regime. Today,
thanks to deregulation, a company can earn more profits by not building anything, and instead charging
more for what they already produce, by creating shortages. This strategy was implemented to perfection six
years ago by Enron and other power pirates in California, which withheld power to raise prices through the
roof, allowing them to steal tens of billions of dollars out of the pockets of electricity consumers throughout
the West Coast.
Today, unregulated utility companies do not plow a large portion of their profits back into
improving infrastructure, but instead pay out higher dividends to stockholders. If even a
regulated company has any hope of raising hundreds of millions of dollars on Wall Street to finance
growth, it must prove itself creditworthy, by cutting costs and showing it can abide by
shareholder values.
Individual companies no longer cooperate to ensure the overall reliability of the electric
grid. They compete to build power plants and transmission lines based on their return on
investment, not on the physical requirements of a regional system. They make themselves
"competitive" to undercut the competition by cutting maintenance costs and getting rid of
as many employees as they can.
For two decades, industry officials and the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) have
warned that restructuring the electricity system would destroy it. An understanding of that
danger provoked Dr. Anjan Bose, former Dean of Engineering at Washington State University, to
comment, citing the advancement of power systems expertise in China and India that "the next time a
grandstanding politician in North America compares our grid to that of the Third World, he may actually
mean it as a compliment."
There is no way to "fix" the system, as Congress has tried to do. by piling on more and
more Federal regulations, to try to patch up the gaping holes in the broken system that
now exists. The only remedy is to return the intention of the industry to one of providing
universally reliable service, by putting the toothpaste of deregulation back in the tube.
The nearly two dozen states that have restructured their local industry, forcing utilities to sell their
generation assets to conglomerate holding companies, in order to "compete," must return responsibility and
oversight for electric generation and disribution to the state utility commissions. These public servants
should decide what should be built, and where, on the basis of providing for the general
welfare, not the profit profiles of companies headquartered a half-continent away.
There are no shortcuts. Decisive action is needed to reverse the past thirty years of failed
policies.
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Funding for new grids will be provided with grants New technologies aren't enouRh on
their own; they need to complement and be compatible with both the existing grid and the
grid of the future, said T.J. Glauthier, president and chief executive of the Electricity Innovation
Institute (E2I). An affiliate of EPRI, E2I is charged with orchestrating the coordinated
integration of next generation technologies. This year it offered $500.000 in grants to
researchers developing nanotechnologies for electric power systems. "What we need to really
have is functionality, but we need to apply it in an evolutionary way," Glauthier said. "We need to find
companies that will be able to replace and upgrade where there is the most congestion and demand. We're
looking for ways to help ease that burden." Fixing the grid from within would likely require giving it
nerves in the form of remote sensors that track its health, a network for collecting and distributing the data
and a brain for interpreting and perhaps even acting on the information. But making such a "smart
grid" would require engineers to design around high temperatures, strong electromagnetic
forces and other difficult conditions. About four years ago, PSE&G technology consultant
Harry Roman and colleagues at the New Jersey Institute of Technology decided to tackle
the first challenge: the nerves. They proposed developing a MEMS acoustic sensor to
monitor transformers, using sound rather than electrical signals to inspect the innards of
the transfornier.ln theory, sensors would track the telltale sounds of sparks that are emitted when the
insulating oil within the transformer wears down or becomes contaminated. Early detection could allow
utilities to avoid power failures or costly fires. Developing the sensor hardware proved to be the easier part
of the equation, Roman said. Once the project was underway, he discovered that the oil's temperature
affected the sound of arcing. The team had to develop software that accounted for that relationship before it
could get an accurate read on the transformer's inner workings. The sensors have progressed from
lab-based tests to a mockup placed on a pole-mounted transformer, to this year's
challenge: several months of trials in a small oil tank. Roman said "realistic
implementation" is about two to four years away. In the meantime, he is developing similar
sensors for gauging the motion of underground cables to detect mechanical stresses, and temperature
sensors to monitor transmission lines. Roman and Del Monaco emphasized that gathering data from sensors
alone won't make the grid more robust. Knowing how to analyze information to detect and then deflect
problems would lead to improved reliability, they said. "This is outage management," Roman said. "Our
whole philosophy has been to be more proactive. (Sept. 11) also prompted us to think about security. How
do we use these microsensors for security?" PSE&G may be ahead of the curve. Roger Anderson, an
advocate of a Web-enabled smart grid, said the energy industry as a whole shies away from new
technologies until it has little choice but to adapt. The 2001 terrorist attacks and last
year's massive outage jolted the industry, but didn't prompt any revolutionary change.
Researchers at the Department of Energy's Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
(PNNL) in Washington state attack the problem from another angle. They created what
they call GridWise, chips that can be installed into household appliances to monitor and
assist the grid. The chips combine PNNL's expertise in microsystems with its mission to
provide clean and energy-efficient technologies to the nation. The chips detect when the
grid is becoming overloaded, for instance, when it is being taxed by air-conditioning
demands on a hot and humid day. The chips temporarily shut down air conditioners or
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other appliances until the grid has recovered. At most, temporary brownouts
inconvenience homeowners. But similar outages at energy-reliant high-tech facilities
such as computer chip-making plants can prove ruinous. "The bottom line is, we can't protect
it (the grid) because it is so diverse," said Robert Pratt, a staff scientist at PNNL and program
manager for GridWise. "We need resiliency. We need the flexibility to make sure it doesn't turn
into a blackout." Pratt said the incentive for consumers would be in cost savings more
than concerns about grid reliability. He envisions consumers installing GridWise into appliances, or
buying appliances already wired with GridWise, and enrolling in utility programs that then give them
cheaper rates. Their individual energy conservation would be small, but "it's the aggregate that makes it
great," Pratt said. EPRI's Rastler takes working outside the grid even further. The technical leader for its
distributed energy resources program, he is looking at technologies such as stationary fuel cells that can
provide alternative energy to consumers and thus ease the burden placed on the grid. His program also
explores the feasibility of renewables such as solar cells. Both will likely benefit from
nanotechnologies being honed in companies and research labs. "Several of the electric
companies are interested in seeing whether these technologies can be part of the toolbox,"
Rastler said. "There's been a lot of hope, and a lot of over promise." Change is coming to the
grid, even if its engineering remains unchanged, according to Anderson. An oceanographer
for 20 years, he recognizes in the grid the same kind of dynamic interplay of forces that
make complex systems like the climate so difficult to predict. His tracking of blackouts in
the U.S. over several decades shows a recent shift toward instability, with the frequency
and magnitude of blackouts on the rise. The five-year trend serves as a warning that
another multi-state meltdown like last August's could occur unless the grid is healed, "it
scares us," he said, "like the way the global warming people are scared."
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Dependance on Natural Gas is likely to cause economic damage. Nuclear energy will
keep the economy stable.
Fertel 2004
(March 4, Marvin S., Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Nuclear Energy
Institute, "United States Senate Committee Energy and Natural Resources Subcommittee
on Energy", Testimony, pg online @
http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/speechesandtestimony/2004/energysubcmtefertelexte
nded)
Second, new nuclear power plants provide future price stability that is not available from electric
generating plants fueled with natural gas. Intense volatility in natural gas prices over the last several
years is likely to continue, and subjects the U.S. economy to potential damage. Although nuclear
plants are capital-intensive to build, the operating costs of nuclear power plants are stable and
can dampen volatility of consumer costs in the electricity market.
Third, new nuclear plants will reduce the price and supply volatility of natural gas, thereby
relieving cost pressures on other users of natural gas that have no alternative fuel source.
Nuclear Energy Affirmative
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And, price shocks will lead to BILLIONS of deaths, threatening humanity's very
existence.
Final Frontier 2008
(May 6 2008, "Economic Collapse", pg online @ http://www.ff2012.com/EconCollapse.htm)
The straw that breaks the camel's back may very well be the loss of cheap energy. Oil
production has been stagnant since May of 2005 even though demand has been increasing.
Mexico, one of the largest suppliers of oil to the US has stated that it will soon have no oil to
export and will become an oil importing nation. Saudi Arabia has promised to increase its
production several times, but did not, perhaps because they are currently unable to. Because of the
time required to bring a new oil field into commercial production, there will not be enough time to mitigate the oil situation
before 2012. Add to that the fact that there are currently no alternative energy supplies which can
come close to supplying the energy this country has become used to and dependent upon: and it
becomes obvious that life cannot continue its present course. Economic collapse equals death to
millions, perhaps billions as the life supporting infrastructure collapses. People living in cold
climates will not be able to heat their homes, resulting in death from cold and illness. Health
care will decline, as people out of work lose all health care. Food production will drop as farms
can no longer operate without fuel, or meet their property tax burden. The system doesn't have to suffer a
total collapse to kill off people. Those already living on the margins of society will easily be pushed to far, and they will be the
first to succumb. Is this likely? Well, it is a possibility. Only time will tell how deep our hole is. and whether we can climb out
of it.
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The national power crisis has hit farmers and other food producers hard, according to
economics professor Johan Willemse. He predicts an increase of 10% to 15% in the
prices of staple foods in the next few months. "Load shedding has this unfortunate ripple effect",
Willemse said. "I know of small butchers who have had to throw away meat valued at more than
R50000 because refrigerators went off. At the end of the day, business has to make up for
these losses by asking higher prices."
What he called the "broken cold-food chain" would have an inflationary effect on food
prices because large quantities of staples, such as milk, are being discarded daily,
resulting in shortages, he said. "This is not even taking into account the number of hours lost
by production lines", warned Willemse. "It is absolutely chaotic" is how Agri SA's director of natural
resources, Nic Opperman, described the effect of the electricity cuts. He said his agricultural association
was trying to establish how many working hours, and how many crops, had been lost as a result of load
shedding.
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"I cannot give a figure now, but I know it is going to be huge. This is a tremendous problem for
every farmer in the country." Koos Coetzee, an economist with the Milk Producers' Organisation,
said: "We are being modest when we say it is costing the dairy industry about RIOO-million a month. "It is
not only the production phase that is being hurt. Shop owners and consumers also suffer
because milk goes sour when their electricity goes off." He predicted an increase in the price of
milk, but could not quantify it.
Coetzee said the unreliable power supply had left dairy farmers with no option but to spend
more than R240-million on power- support systems. But, he said, even "their fancy
equipment won't stop the damage this [load shedding] is doinR to the industry." He
estimated that monthly milk production has dropped by 20million litres . Under normal
circumstances, about 2QOmillion litres of milk are produced every month.
Coetzee said the milk producers had sought legal advice on suing Eskom. In a submission to Business
Unity SA, which held a meeting with Eskom yesterday, Agri SA asked for special attention to be given to
farming needs. Opperman said: "Agriculture was not informed in time of the magnitude of the
crisis and was therefore unable to put contingency plans in place ... fruit destined for the
export market cannot be refrigerated in time and the cold chain, which is also so vital for
dairy products, is often interrupted or simply not available."
Opperman pleaded with Eskom and the government to play "open cards" with them.
Agri SA, too, would consider suing the electricity utility, he said. "We are in an industry in which
everything is time-related. You can't postpone a harvest because of a blackout. "Farmers are
becoming anxious and want a solution."
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This Summer, three decades of underinvestment and looting of the U.S. electrical
industry grid system came home to roost. A week-long blackout in New York City, calls
for "voluntary" conservation, the shutting off of power to large industrial enterprises, and
lowering of voltages across the nation, were all evidence of the wreckage that has been
made of this most critical infrastructure. For the past three decades, financial warfare, and
attacks by anti-technology fanatics and free-market ideologues, have created the "perfect
storm" that has left the U.S. electric grid in a condition of increasing instability. The
restructuring of the electric utility industry, begun during the mid-1970s Carter
Administration, has changed the rules of the road that had created an electric generation
and delivery system that was the envy of the world.This wreckage was accomplished by
changing the axioms. From the time of President Franklin Roosevelt's regulation of the industry in 1935,
the intention of the engineers who designed the electric grid was to deliver reliable, economical electricity,
to every farm, family, and factory in the United States. Now this extraordinarily complex and fragile
system has been degraded into a hodgepodge of hundreds of competing interests, run not by engineers, but
by financiers and lawyers, where states are increasingly losing regulatory oversight, and reliability has
taken a backseat to shareholder values. Wheeling PowerThe first sector of the electric utility
industry to be deregulated was the network of high-voltage transmission wires, which were
designed to make bulk power transfers, over relatively short distances, from large power-generating plants
to the cities and towns where the power was needed. They were built by the utility company that had built
the power plant, and as the grid grew, local lines were connected to other utilties' power lines to be
available in case of emergencies. During the 1977 blackout in New York, for example, power
was transferred in from the Tennessee Valley Authority system in the Southeast, to
restabilize the Rrid.After the mid-1970s Middle East War and orchestrated "oil crisis,"
which quadrupled prices, the Carter Administration proposed, and Congress passed, the
1978 Public Utility ReRulatory Policies Act, which promoted "conservation," and poured
billions of wasted Federal dollars into the development of small non-utility power
generators, using "non-traditional" sources of power, such as biofuels, solar, and wind
energy. This insane turning back the clock to pre-industrial 19th Century methods was reinforced by
attacks on nuclear power, reversing the policy of massive additions of new nuclear plants then underway.
The 1978 law required the traditional utility companies to purchase power from these
expensive "alternative" power sources.The utility companies objected to this potential
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anarchic use of the transmission grid, and refused to provide these non-utility generators
access to their systems. So, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which had been established
to restructure the industry, promulgated a superceding Federal rule forcing "open access" for
these new non-utility generators to the transmission system.This "open access" rule was the
foot in the door for the chaos and congestion in the transmission system that exists today. One of the huge
electric industry conglomerates, American Electric Power, is an instructive case in point.On Dec. 20, 1906,
a certificate of incorporation was filed in Albany, New York for the American Gas and Electric Company.
Over the ensuing 30 years, the company began electric, gas, water, steam, transit, and even ice services, in
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Virginia, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, and Illinois.In
1928, the Federal Trade Commission launched a comprehensive inquiry into the entire electric power
industry, as abuses mounted, from financial pyramid schemes and the stock market speculation of the
"Roaring Twenties." The investigations culminated in the 1935 passage of President Franklin Roosevelt's
Public Utility Holding Company Act, which forced the breakup of many holding companies, and several of
American Electric Power's holdings were divested. Other legislation made it incumbent upon utilities to
provide universal service, and gave the states overall regulatory oversight. While what became American
Electric Power still maintained operations stretching from Virginia to Michigan, each state regulated its
utility companies, defined the level of reliability to be maintained, and, in return, assured each company a
modest return on investment.
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As NERC warned a decade ago, the transmission system was not designed to handle
rapidly-changing bulk, so-called "economy" power transfers. On the three-year
anniversary of the "Great 2003 Blackout," NERC vice president Donald Cook explained, "There's
no question that the grid is being used now in ways for which it wasn't really designed. It
was built to connect neighbor to neighbor, over the last several decades. It was not
designed to move large blocks of power from one region to another. "The Federally built
Tennessee Valley Authority system is illustrative. TVA built, owns, and operates 17,000 miles of
transmission lines, to service its customers over an area including all or parts of seven Southeastern states.
FERC has been trying to force the TVA to join a Federally regulated Regional Transmission Organization,
which would require it to cede control of its transmission grid, and force it to build new transmission
capacity (for which its customers would have to pay), not to service its own ratepayers, but to allow
"economy" wheeling over its wires. So far, the TVA has refused.lt is often stated that the solution to this
transmission congestion is to build new power lines. But while more transmission capacity is certainly
needed, that in itself, will not solve the problem.Blackout BlowbackFollowing the August 2003
blackout, which left 50 million people from the Midwest to the East Coast in the dark,
multiple Congressional hearings and a Federal investigation were conducted to examine
the problem and propose solutions. The Department of Energy was tasked with
identifying the cause. Its final report blamed everything possible—including operators
and fallen trees—except deregulation.But the Congress mandated that the Department
produce a report, the National Electric Transmission Congestion Study, which it released in
August 2006. The report duly noted what everyone already knew—that areas of Critical Congestion
included the New York City and Connecticut service areas, with Congestion Areas of Concern all the way
from New York through Northern Virginia. The Los Angeles area was noted as a Critical Congestion area,
with parts of the West Coast, from Seattle to San Diego, in the Areas of Concern category. But it is not in
these regions that profit-conscious, and even foreign-owned companies, are proposing to build new power
lines, or the new local generating plants that would obviate the need for long-distance transmission lines.
Why?Thanks to 30 years of irrational "environmentalist" brainwashing of sections of the
U.S. population, particularly in "liberal" large urban regions such as New York and
California, it is almost impossible to build new generating capacity—much less nuclear
power plants—where the greatest needs are. Therefore, these regions, which do not
generate enough power locally, are forced to import power from other utilities. Thanks to
the efforts of the same so-called environmentalists, these cities have not even been able to
build enough power lines to bring in the electricity from elsewhere.Under the no-holds-barred
market of deregulation, this "elsewhere" has moved further and further away from the large cities, with
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their large power requirements, to areas of the country where power can be produced more cheaply, and
new plants can be built with the minimum amount of local political opposition and legal interference.For
example, PJM is a regional transmission interconnection, which coordinates the operation of the
transmission grid that now includes Delaware, Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New
Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of
Columbia. It oversees 56,070 miles of transmission lines, and plans regional transmission expansion to
maintain grid reliability and relieve congestion.In March, PJM identified transmission constraints in its
region, which were standing in the way of "bringing resources to a broader market." PJM identified two
transmission paths requiring significant investment: a high-voltage line from the coal fields of West
Virginia to Baltimore and Washington, D.C. and another, extending from West Virginia to Philadelphia,
New Jersey, and Delaware. However, these lines, hundreds of miles long, would not be necessary, if the
mandate existed to build new nuclear plants where the capacity would be near the load centers.While
Virginia and Maryland utilities are considering such new builds, most of the nuclear power plants that are
under consideration by utilities are in the semi-rural Southeast, where there is political support for new
plants, and building more high-voltage transmission lines to carry the power is unlikely to be held up for 15
years by "environmental" court challenges. Some of that new nuclear-generated power from the Southeast
will be used locally, for growing demand, and some will be wheeled to the energy-short regions of the mid-
Atlantic and Northeast, which refuse to build their own capacity. Companies that have been buying up
transmission capacity will make a bundle, in the process.Investment in new transmission capacity
overall has left the grid system vulnerable to even small instabilities. The industry
estimates that $100 billion is needed in new transmission capacity and upgrades, as
quickly as possible. The 2003 blackout did spur some increase in investment industry-
wide, from $3.5 billion per year to $6 billion in 2006. But profit-minded companies are
only willing to invest funds where there is a profit to be made, namely to carry their
"economy transfers," regardless of how that destabilizes the grid system overall. In a July
2006 article, three former electric utility executives, who formed the organization, Power Engineers
Supporting Truth (PEST), out of disgust with the refusal of the government to pinpoint deregulation as the
cause of the massive grid failure, after the 2003 New York blackout, stated that the "core issue is an
almost fundamentalist reliance on markets to solve even the most scientifically complex
problems... [Pjolicy makers continue to act as if some adjustment in market protocols is
all that is required, and steadfastly refuse to acknowledge the accumulating mass of
evidence that deregulation ... is itself the problem. Social scientists call this kind of
denial, cognitive dissonance."The engineers, who have among them, more than five decades of
experience in the electrical utility industry, insist that "new transmission lines will not by
themselves improve reliability. They may increase transfer capacities, and hence improve
commercial use of the grid," but will not necessarily improve performance of the system.
"Reliability standards have already been reduced to accomodate greater use of the grid for
commercial transactions," they warned (Table II).There has been a huge penalty for this
disruption of the functioning of the electric grid. PEST estimates that the 2003 blackout
incurred economic losses in excess of $5 billion. The California blackouts cost in excess
of $1 billion each. The national impact of declining reliability and quality, they estimate,
is in excess of $50 billion. Where To Go From Here When the California energy crisis of 2000-2001
was raging, distraught state legislators and the embattled Gov. Gray Davis searched for a solution.
Although they knew what that solution was, they protested that it would be impossible to put the toothpaste
of deregulation back in the tube. Lyndon LaRouche and E1R proposed that that was exactly what needed to
be done.On Monday, July 17, 2006, in the midst of an intense Summer heat wave, one of Con Edison's 22
primary feeder lines failed, below the streets of the City of New York. Over the next several hours, five
more feeder lines were lost. Voltage was reduced 8% to limit the instability, and the utility was faced with
25,000 customers—about 100,000 people—in the heat and dark. It took until midnight July 23—seven days
later—to restore 20,000 of the affected customers, according to Con Edison.The New York City
blackout was the result not of a Summer heatwave, but of the decades of underinvestment
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in the infrastructure that distributes electric power from central feeder lines, through
transformers, to the wires that deliver power to each home, school, factory, office
building, small business, and hospital. Some of Con Edison's underground infrastructure
goes back almost as far as Thomas Edison's first central generating station and
underground cable, on Pearl Street in lower Manhattan, in 1882. It was a length of 59-year-old cable
whose failure was a factor in the July blackout.A couple of years ago in Philadelphia, workers for
PECO Energy found that some underground utility cable still in service dated to 1899. In
July 1999. the failure of outdated cable was blamed for power outages in Manhattan
affecting 200,000 people. In San Francisco, a failed cable in December 2003 created an
outage for 100.000 residents. "We've been using equipment far beyond its original intended life
because we've been concerned with the cost of replacement and the need to keep utility rates down,"
remarked Dean Oskvig, president of Black & Veatch, an engineering firm based in St. Louis, last
month .Industry-wide, there is agreement that weaknesses due to the age of the
underground distribution cable have been exacerbated by the way the system is run in
today's deregulated world. To "save money." the industry has turned to a policy of "run to
failure." where a company waits for a failure before replacing aged power lines and other
equipment. Black & Veatch reports that although utilities currently spend more than $18 billion on local
distribution systems, most of that is to string new wire to new housing developments (which will likely
come to an end soon, along with the housing boom), and that an additional $8-10 billion per year is needed
to replace obsolete and corroded equipment.On top of this disinvestment policy, local distribution systems,
like the transmission system, are being stretched beyond their design limits. In addition to chronological
age, overheating of equipment that is caused by heavy electricity use and is repeatedly stressed will age
faster, and is more likely to fail suddenly.In 1986, Con Edison began a program to replace all of its older
cable with a newer design. It is spending about $25 million per year, and at that rate, the utility will not
finish until 2024. By that time, some of its replacement cable will be 38 years old. Con Edison delivers
electricity to 3.2 million customers, through 95,000 miles of underground cable, and 33,000 miles of
overhead wires. Estimates are that about 27% of its underground cable needs to be replaced. Why is it
taking decades to replace old cable?According to media reports, recently Southern California Edison
sought approval from the state Public Utilities Commission to replace 800 miles of aging underground
cable, after concluding that cable failures were the leading cause of outages that could be prevented. But
"consumer advocates" opposed the utility's request to recoup the $145 million cost of replacement, on the
grounds that the utility's records were not adequate to ensure the worst cables would be replaced first. The
utility will proceed and spend $250 million more than is recouped in customers' bills
anyway, because they "don't want to get too far behind." Apparently the shareholder-driven
"consumer advocates" never added up the economic, and sometimes, life-threatening
costs, of the alternative—blackouts.Before deregulation, companies like Con Edison
would make investments in infrastructure that were deemed necessary, to maintain a level
of service and reliability that met industry-wide standards, assured that state regulators
would allow them to recover the costs, and maintain their financial health. Today, many
states have no authority to either order investments or compensate companies that make
them, leaving Wall Street and the "free market" to decide who shall have reliable electric
power.Between 1990 and the year 2000, utility employment in power generation dropped from 350,000 to
280,000, as utilities looked for ways to slash costs, to be "competitive." Over the same decade, employment
in transmission and distribution went from 196,000 to 156,000, in a system that is growing more complex
by the day. Today, the average age of a power lineman is 50 years."Quick profit." deregulation.
shareholder values, environmentalism, have all run their course, and nearly taken down
the electricity grid. It is time to change the axioms.Transmitting Power, or Just Profits?Yes,
there need to be more power plants built, to make up for the deficits in electric-generating
capacity in many parts of the country. It is also the case that entire regions, in particular
the West and East Coasts, have so much congestion on their transmission lines, that they
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cannot import the power they need. And as seen in New York City this past July,
breakdowns in 100-year-old underground local distribution systems are now leaving tens
of thousands of people in the dark, and must be replaced.But it is foolhardy to think that the
needed investments will be made under the present regime. Today, thanks to deregulation, a company can
earn more profits by not building anything, and instead charging more for what they already produce, by
creating shortages. This strategy was implemented to perfection six years ago by Enron and other power
pirates in California, which withheld power to raise prices through the roof, allowing them to steal tens of
billions of dollars out of the pockets of electricity consumers throughout the West Coast.Today2
unregulated utility companies do not plow a large portion of their profits back into
improving infrastructure, but instead pay out higher dividends to stockholders. If even a
regulated company has any hope of raising hundreds of millions of dollars on Wall Street to finance
growth, it must prove itself creditworthy, by cutting costs and showing it can abide by
shareholder values.Individual companies no longer cooperate to ensure the overall
reliability of the electric grid. They compete to build power plants and transmission lines
based on their return on investment, not on the physical requirements of a regional
system. They make themselves "competitive" to undercut the competition by cutting
maintenance costs and getting rid of as many employees as they can.For two decades.
industry officials and the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) have warned that
restructuring the electricity system would destroy it. An understanding of that danger provoked
Dr. Anjan Bose, former Dean of Engineering at Washington State University, to comment, citing the
advancement of power systems expertise in China and India that "the next time a grandstanding politician
in North America compares our grid to that of the Third World, he may actually mean it as a
compliment."There is no way to "fix" the system, as Congress has tried to do, by piling on
more and more Federal regulations, to try to patch up the gaping holes in the broken
system that now exists. The only remedy is to return the intention of the industry to one
of providing universally reliable service, by putting the toothpaste of deregulation back in the
tube.The nearly two dozen states that have restructured their local industry, forcing utilities to sell their
generation assets to conglomerate holding companies, in order to "compete," must return responsibility and
oversight for electric generation and disribution to the state utility commissions. These public servants
should decide what should be built, and where, on the basis of providing for the general
welfare, not the profit profiles of companies headquartered a half-continent away.The
now-congested and unstable long-distance high-voltage transmission systems that criss-
cross the nation must be used for the purpose for which they were intended: to enable
bulk power transfer in case of emergency, not to wheel power from one end of the
country to the other so a company can import cheaper power, charge a few cents less, and
beat out the competition. Responsibility for the transmission system should be taken out
of the hands of the Federal deregulators, and returned to the regional reliability councils
that formulated the rules of the road to keep the system robust.There are no shortcuts.
Decisive action is needed to reverse the past thirty years of failed policies.
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Immediate Action to change the current main source of energy is crucial to avoid the a
collapse of the economy due to the inevitable oil peak is essential. ***POSSIBLE
1AC***
Landry 2007
(March 30 2007, Cathy, of the American Petroleum Institute, "GAO warns of peak oil
threat to global economies", pg LEXIS)
World oil production will peak sometime between now and 2040. the us Government Accountability
Office said March 29, cautioning that if the phenomenon occurs "soon" and "without warning." it could
cause oil prices to surge to unprecedented levels and result in "severe" economic damage. "The
prospect of a peak in oil production presents problems of global proportions whose consequences
will depend critically 011 our preparedness." GAO. the nonpartisan investigative arm of Congress, said in a report.
"While these consequences would be felt globally, the United States, as the largest consumer of oil
and one of the nations most heavily dependent on oil for transportation, may be especially
vulnerable among the industrialized nations of the world." Despite the threat of peak oil, the US government
currently has no "coordinated or well-defined strategy" to address the uncertainties about the
timing of peak oil or to mitigate its potential effects. For that reason. GAO recommended that
the federal government take immediate action, and suggested that the US energy secretary take
the lead in coordinating a government strategy. The government effort. GAP said, should include a
monitoring of global supply and demand with the intent of reducing uncertainty about the timing of peak oil
production. It also should assess alternative technologies in light of predictions about the timing of
peak oil and periodically advise Congress on likely cost-effective areas where government could
assist the private sector with development or adoption of the new technoloeies. GAO pointed out that
there are "many possible alternatives" to using oil, but that alternatives will require large
investments and in some cases will require major investments or breakthroughs in technology.
"Investment, however, is determined largely by price expectations, so unless high oil prices are sustained, we cannot expect
private investment to continue at current levels," GAO said. But if the peak were anticipated, it said, oil prices would rise,
signaling industry to increase efforts to develop alternatives and consumers of energy to conserve and look for more energy-
efficient products.
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And, price shocks will lead to BILLIONS of deaths, threatening humanity's very
existence.
Final Frontier 2008
(May 6 2008, "Economic Collapse", pg online @
http://www.ff2012.com/EconCollapse.htm)
The straw that breaks the camel's back may very well be the loss of cheap energy. Oil production has
been stagnant since May of 2005 even though demand has been increasing. Mexico, one of the largest
suppliers of oil to the US has stated that it will soon have no oil to export and will become an oil
importing nation. Saudi Arabia has promised to increase its production several times, but did not, perhaps
because they are currently unable to. Because of the time required to bring a new oil field into commercial production,
there will not be enough time to mitigate the oil situation before 2012. Add to that the fact that there are currently no
alternative energy supplies which can come close to supplying the energy this country has become used to
and dependent upon: and it becomes obvious that life cannot continue its present course. Economic
collapse equals death to millions, perhaps billions as the life supporting infrastructure collapses. People
living in cold climates will not be able to heat their homes, resulting in death from cold and illness.
Health care will decline, as people out of work lose all health care. Food production will drop as farms
can no longer operate without fuel, or meet their property tax burden. The system doesn't have to suffer a total
collapse to kill off people. Those already living on the margins of society will easily be pushed to far, and they will be the first to
succumb. Is this likely? Well, it is a possibility. Only time w i l l tell how deep our hole is, and whether we can climb out of it.
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the nuclear nonproliferation regime has come under attack from a group of academics and policymakers
who argue that traditional tools such as export controls, diplomatic_pressure, arms control agreements, and threats of economic
sanctions are no
longer sufcient to battle proliferation They point to North Korea's reinvigoratioti
of its plutonium program. Iran's apparent progress in developing a nuclear
capability, and the breadth of the Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan network as
evidence that the regime is failing. 1 In addition, they claim that proliferation is
driven by the inevitable spread of technology from a dense network of suppliers
and that certain "rogue" states possess an un°agging determination to acquire
nuclear Weapons. Consequently, they argue tha only extreme measures such as aggressively enforced containment or regime
change can slow the addition of several more countries to the nuclear club. This "proliferation determinism,"
at least in rhetoric, is shared by many prominent members of President George W. Bush's administration and has become the main
thrust of U.S. counterproliferation policy.2 Yet current proliterators are neither as "dead set" on proliferating nor as advanced in their
nuclear capabilities as determinists claim.3 To dismantle the network of existng proliferation programs, the administration should
instead move toward a policy of "proliferation pragmatism." This would entail abandoning extreme rhetoric, using a full
range of incentives and disincentives aimed at states seeking to acquire a nuclear capability, targeting the hubs of proliferation
networks, and engaging in direct talks with the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic Peoples'
Republic of Korea (DPRK). In practice, the Bush administration's nonproliferation policies have been more varied and less aggressive
than its rhetoric would suggest. For example, it has been w i l l i n g to enter lalks with North Korea and Libya despite describing
both as "rogues." Strong words cai be used strategically to convince proliferators that accepting a settlement offer would be better
than continuing to hold out. Yet the administration's unyielding rhetoric has placed the United States in a position from which it is
dif cult to back down;4 combined with a lack of positive incentives, this stance has convinced proliferators that the
United States will not agree to or uphold any settlement short of regime change. Moreover, the administration has not formulated any
coherent counterproliferation policies other than regime change and an aggressive form of export control enforcement known as the
Proliferation Security Initiative. With respect to two of the key proliferators today—Iran and North Korea—the Bush administration
has shown little interest in offering any signiacant incentives or establishing any clear red lines. Instead, it has relied almost
exclusively on China to convince the DPRK to give up its nuclear program and has declined to join the United Kingdom, France, and
Germany in talks with Iran. Proliferation determinists present two arguments. First, dense networks
among second-tier proliferators such as Iran, North Korea, and Libya and pri-
vate agents—including A.Q. Khan and two of his middlemen, Buhary Seyed
Abu (B.S.A.) Tahir and Urs Tinner—have rapidly accelerated proliferation and
lowered technological barriers.5 Because these networks are widespread and
decentralized, global measures rather than strategies targeted at individual
states are necessary to slow these processes. Second, certain rogue states are
dead set on proliferating and thus have no interest in bargaining.
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GNEP is committed to spreading nuclear power and preventing weaponized use and
proliferation.
Lacy in '08 (Ian Hore-Lacy, Director for Public Communications at the World Nuclear Association,
"Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
(GNEP)",http://\vww.eoearth.org/article/Global_NucIear_Energy_Partnership_(GNEP), 6/24/2008)
The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) is a comprehensive strategy to expedite the
development of nuclear power around the world while improving the use of resources and
providing greater disincentives to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was initiated by the
USA early in 2006, but picked up on concerns and proposals from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Russia. The vision
was for a global network of nuclear fuel cycle facilities all under IAEA control or at least
supervision. Broadly, GNEP's mission is the global expansion of nuclear power in a safe and
secure manner while reducing the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation and the spread of
sensitive nuclear technology for non-peaceful purposes. The possible spread of nuclear material
and technology for developing weapons of mass destruction must be countered to avoid
increasing the present threat to global security.
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The greatest threat to the US and the entire civilized [but unbalanced] world is the
proliferation of former Soviet nuclear weapons to radical terrorists.
Cohen'05 (Ariel, Ph.D. is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies in the Douglas and
Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation., "Preventing a Nightmare Scenario:
Terrorist Attacks Using Russian Nuclear Weapons and Materials", 5/20/2008,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/bgl854.cfm, 6/27/2008)
Since the terrorist attacks on September 1 1. 2001. Americans have been lucky that there have not been more
atrocities on U.S. soil. However, the enemy, while weakened, is far from destroyed. Osama bin Laden and Ayman
Continue to issue threats against America from their hideouts. Their strength and support base, while diminished, is not
eliminated, other terrorist organizations inspired by radical Islamist ideology are still at large in Europe, the Middle
East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, and (presumably) the Americas.
and some of them are willing to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to bring down America.
There are also media reports of al-Qaeda buying or stealing up to 20 nuclear warheads from the
former Soviet republics, bin Laden providing $3 million and large commercial amounts of opium
to Chechens in exchange for nuclear weapons or material, and four Turkmen nuclear scientists
Working to Create an al-Qaeda Weapon. [31 The veracity of these reports cannot be independently evaluated.[4] In February
2005, Director of Central Intelligence Porter Goss testified that al-Qaeda might possess radioactive material of Russian or Soviet origin
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That's because the interest rate that any commercial bank would charge on a loan for a
nuclear facility would be so high — because of all the risks of lawsuits or cost overruns
— that it would be impossible for Exelon to proceed. A standard nuclear plant today
costs about $3 billion per unit. The only way to stimulate more nuclear power
innovation. Crane said, would be federal loan guarantees that would lower the cost of
capital for anyone willing to build a new nuclear plant. The 2005 energy bill created
such loan guarantees, but the details still have not been worked out. "We would need a
robust loan guarantee program to jump-start the nuclear industry," Crane said — an
industry that has basically been frozen since the 1979 Three Mile Island accident. With
cheaper money, added Crane, CO2-frce nuclear power could be "very competitive"
with CO2-emitting pulverized coal.
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Estimates of the levelized costs of power from new reactors are shown in Table 26.
These results, which range from 3.7 cents per kWh to 9.8 cents per kWh, are largely
driven by capital cost and financing assumptions. According to Joskow, the 6.7 cents
per kWh MIT study estimate that is shown in Table 26 falls to 5.2 cents per kWh if
the plant is built and financed by a regulated utility with ratepayers bearing the
investment risk (CEEPR 2006, pp.15, 28). Similarly, federal loan guarantees can
reduce the financing costs of a plant. According to an April 2007 Cambridge Energy
Research Associates report, Rovernment funding or loan guarantees can reduce the
levelized cost of nuclear generation by 10-15 percent (CERA 2007).
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Loan guarantees and tax credits have been recommended by the government for
nuclear power.
Charles F. Carroll and John E. Matthews, 2005
In its report dated January 10, 2005. the [Nuclear Energy Task Force] identified the
unavailability of Financing as a significant obstacle to new nuclear power plant
construction. The NETF recommended that the US government offer a range of
financial incentives for the construction of the first few reactors, such as: secured
loans, loan guarantees, accelerated depreciation, investment tax credits, production tax
credits and government power purchase agreements. The NETF's recommended
"menu" of incentives is intended to address the anticipated financing needs of
companies thought likely to pursue new plant construction without prescribing a
particular financial model. The three financial models cited by the NETF as likely to be
used for new plant construction are: the regulated utility model; the unregulated merchant
generator model; and the non-recourse project finance model.
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US Global Leadership Key. By creating nuclear energy incentives the rest of the world will
follow and in turn provide new technology and economic return.
Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, March 13, 2006 The Washington Post
The week before last President Bush concluded a historic agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation with India, arising
democratic power in a dynamic Asia. This agreement is a strategic achievement: It will strengthen international security. It will
enhance energy security and environmental protection. It w i l l foster economic and technological development. And it will help
transform the partnership between the world's oldest and the world's largest democracy.
First, our agreement with India will make our future more secure, by expanding the reach of the
international nonproliferation regime. The International Atomic Energy Agency would gain access to
India's civilian nuclear program that it currently does not have. Recognizing this, the IAEA's director
general. Mohamed ElBaradei, has joined leaders in France and the United Kingdom to welcome our
agreement. He called it "a milestone, timely for ongoing efforts to consolidate the non-proliferation
regime, combat nuclear terrorism and strengthen nuclear safety."
Our agreement with India is unique because India is unique. India is a democracy, where citizens of many ethnicities and faiths
cooperate in peace and freedom. India's civilian government functions transparently and accountably. It is fighting terrorism and
extremism, and it has a 30-year record of responsible behavior on nonproliferation matters.
Aspiring proliferators such as North Korea or Iran may seek to draw connections between themselves and India but their
rhetoric rings hollow. Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism that has violated its own commitments and is defying the international
community's efforts to contain its nuclear ambitions. North Korea, the least transparent country in the world, threatens its
neighbors and proliferates weapons. There is simply no comparison between the Iranian or North Korean regimes and India.
The world has known for some time that India has nuclear weapons, but our agreement will not
enhance its capacity to make more. Under the agreement. India will separate its civilian and military
nuclear programs for the first time. It will place two-thirds of its existing reactors, and about 65 percent
of its generating power, under permanent safeguards, with international verification -- again, for the
first time ever. This same transparent oversight will also apply to all of India's future civilian reactors,
both thermal and breeder. Our sale of nuclear material or technology would benefit only India's civilian
reactors, which would also be eligible for international cooperation from the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
Second, our agreement is good for energy security. India, a nation of a billion people, has a massive
appetite for energy to meet its growing development needs. Civilian nuclear energy will make it less
reliant on unstable sources of oil and gas. Our agreement will allow India to contribute to and share in
the advanced technology that is needed for the future development of nuclear energy. And because
nuclear energy is cleaner than fossil fuels, our agreement will also benefit the environment. A threefold
increase in Indian nuclear capacity by 2015 would reduce India's projected annual CO2emissions by
more than 170 million tons, about the current total emissions of the Netherlands.
Third, our agreement is good for American jobs, because it opens the door to civilian nuclear trade and cooperation between our
nations. India plans to import eight nuclear reactors by 2012. If U.S. companies win just two of those reactor contracts, it will
mean thousands of new jobs for American workers. We plan to expaid our civilian nuclear partnership to research and
development, drawing on India's technological expertise to promote a global renaissance in safe and clean nuclear power.
Finally, our civilian nuclear agreement is an essential step toward our goal of transforming America's
partnership with India. For too long during the past century, differences over domestic policies and
international purposes kept India and the United States estranged. But with the end of the Cold War,
the rise of the global economy and changing demographics in both of our countries, new opportunities
have arisen for a partnership between our two great democracies. As President Bush said in New Delhi
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this month, "India in the 21st century is a natural partner of the United States because we are brothers
in the cause of human liberty."
Under the president's leadership, we are beginning to realize the full promise of our relationship with
India, in Fields as diverse as agriculture and health, commerce and defense, science and technology,
and education and exchange. Over 65,000 Americans live in India, attracted by its growing economy
and the richness of its culture. There are more than 2 million people of Indian origin in the United
States, many of whom are U.S. citizens. More Indians study in our universities than students from any
other nation. Our civilian nuclear agreement is a critical contribution to the stronger, more enduring
partnership that we are building.
We are consulting extensively with Congress as we seek to amend the laws needed to implement the agreement. This is an
opportunity that should not be missed. Looking back decades from now, we will recognize this momentas the time when
America invested the strategic capital needed to recast its relationship with India. As the nations of Asia continue their dramatic
rise in a rapidly changing region, a thriving, democratic India will be a pillar of Asia's progress, shaping its development for
decades. This is a future that America wants to share with India, and there is not a moment to lose.
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November 28, 2003, The Korea Herald, Yoo Soh-jung, staff reporter
Opening the electric power market is currently a global trend. Intense competition therefore looms in
Korea as demand for electric power in developing countries continues to rise.
Such conditions call for the Ministry of Science and Technology to reinforce itself with the technology
and know-how it has amassed to make inroads into markets overseas.
The ministry says it aims to strengthen Korea's participation in electric power businesses abroad. Once
it achieves this goal, the government plans to overcome the growth limitations of the domestic electric
power market and contribute to improving the national economy.
Korea's overseas business partners in this area predominantly involve nations that entered the nuclear
power industry later than the first-mover countries. The network includes countries such as China,
Romania and Vietnam. The ministry has noted that its foreign partners expect to build a strong
cooperative relationship with Korea.
These countries are currently making plans to advance on the international nuclear power market
with the support of the Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. and other domestic corporations such as
Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction Co., and through these corporations' ties with foreign
organizations
Ltd such as" the World Energy Council
~" " "" of the
" United
" ~ States
" and
~ Atomic
" Energy of Canada
With its rich experience and strong technology base, the government says it is confident it can supply
globally competitive services.
Furthermore, despite a slowdown for the nuclear energy industry in the U.S. and Europe, the
government says it is steadily promoting the nuclear power generation business in response to Korea's
increasing electricity demand. It is also seeking new sites for nuclear power plants and supporting the
development of commercial technology.
As of the end of 2001. 16 nuclear power units have been in operation in Korea, with four units under
construction. Construction of four new units began this year. Korea has about 13 gigawatts of nuclear
power generating capacity, which accounts for 28 percent of its electric power generation.
Under the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy's "Fifth Long-Term Plan for Electric Power
Demand and Supply," which was finalized in December 2001, 12 new nuclear power units will be built
by 2015. The government expects their completion to increase the share of nuclear-power capacity and
generation to 33 percent and 44.5 percent, respectively.
In addition to improving Korea's competitiveness by expanding the industry. Korea's rising status
partly comes from its relations with international organizations, particularly the International Atomic
Energy Agency. For instance, since the country became an IAEA member in 1957, it has received
assistance in training the atomic energy work force through the agency's technical cooperation projects.
Following the conclusion of a memorandum of understanding with the IAEA in 1998, theMinistry of
Science and Technology said that Korea has played a role in expanding atomic energy education and
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Nuclear Energy Affirmative
training programs for developing countries, and has plans to strengthen the activities and programs at
international training
"5 and education centers.
Furthermore, Korea hosted the regional office of the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research,
Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology in the Asia and Pacific Region
to strengthen technical cooperation and facilitate technology transfers among member states in March
2002.
Moreover, since joining the Nuclear Energy Agency in 1993, Korea has participated in joint research
projects of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and NEA, such as the
Halden Reactor, RASPLAV, International System on Occupational Exposure and International
Cooperative Decommissioning Program.
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Nuclear Energy Affirmative
The United States must lead in nuclear energy in order for global leadership and
dominance.
Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, Council on Foreign Relations, March/April 2006
This debate may now seem like ancient history, but it is actually more relevant than ever
— because the age of MAD is nearing an end. Today, for the first time in almost 50 years,
the United States stands on the verge of attaining nuclear primacy. It will probably soon
be possible for the United States to destroy the long-range nuclear arsenals of Russia or
China with a first strike. This dramatic shift in the nuclear balance of power stems from a
series of improvements in the United States' nuclear systems, the precipitous decline of
Russia's arsenal, and the glacial pace of modernization of China's nuclear forces. Unless
Washington's policies change or Moscow and Beijing take steps to increase the size and
readiness of their forces. Russia and China — and the rest of the world — will live in the
shadow of U.S. nuclear primacy for many years to come.
One's views on ilie implications of this change will depend on one's theoretical perspective. Hawks, who believe that the United States is a benevolent
force in the world, will welcome the new nuclear era because they trust that U.S. dominance in both conventional and nuclear weapons will help deter
aggression by other countries For example, as U.S. nuclear primacy grows. China's leaders may act more cautiously on issues such as Taiwan, realizing
that their vulnerable unclear forces w i l l not deter U S . intervention — and that Chinese nuclear threats could invite a U.S. strike on Beijing's arsenal. But
doves, who oppose using nuclear threats to coerce other stales and fear an emboldened and unconstrained United States, will worry. Nuclear primacy
m i g h t lure Washington into more aggressive behavior, they argue, especially when combined with U.S. dominance in so many other dimensions of
national power. Finally, a third group -- owls, who worry about the possibility of inadvertent conflict - will fret that U.S. nuclear primacy could prompt
other nuclear powers to adopt strategic postures, such as by giving control of nuclear weapons to lower-level commanders, that would make an
unauthorized nuclear strike more likely — thereby creating what strategic theorists call "crisis instability."
ARSENAL OF A DEMOCRACY
For 50 years, the Pentagon's war planners have structured the U.S nuclear arsenal according to the goal of deterring a nuclear attack on the United States
and, if necessary, winning a nuclear war by launching a preemptive strike that would destroy an enemy's nuclear forces. For these purposes, the United
States relies on a nuclear triad comprising strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and ballistic-missile-launching submarines
(known as SSBNs). The triad reduces the odds that an enemy could destroy all U.S. nuclear forces in a single strike, even in a surprise attack, ensuring
that the United States would be able to launch a devastating response. Such retaliation would only have to be able to destroy a large enough portion of the
attacker's cities and industry to deter an attack in the first place. The same nuclear triad, however, could be used in an offensive attack against an
adversary's nuclear forces. Stealth bombers might slip past enemy radar, submarines could fire their missiles from near the enemy's shore and so give the
enemy's leaders almost no time to respond, and highly accurate land-based missiles could destroy even hardened silos that have been reinforced against
attack and other targets that require a direct hit. The ability to destroy all of an adversary's nuclear forces, eliminating the possibility of a retaliatory strike,
is known as a first-strike capability, or nuclear primacy.
The United States derived immense strategic benefits from its nuclear primacy during the early years of the Cold War, in terms of both crisis-bargaining
advantages vis-a-vis the Soviet Union (for example, in the case of Berlin in the late 1950s and early 1960s) and planning for war against the Red Army in
Europe. If the Soviets had invaded Western Europe in the 1950s, the United States intended to win World War III by immediately launching a massive
nuclear strike on the Soviet Union, its Hasten) European clients, and its Chinese ally. These plans were not the concoctions of midlevel Pentagon
bureaucrats; they were approved by the highest level of the U.S. government.
U.S. nuclear primacy waned in the early 1960s, as the Soviets de\ eloped the capability to cany out a retaliatory second strike. With this development
came the onset of MAD. Washington abandoned its strategy of a preemptive nuclear strike, but for the remainder of the Cold War, it struggled to escape
MAD and reestablish its nuclear dominance. It expanded its nuclear arsenal, continuously improved the accuracy and the lethality of its weapons aimed at
Soviet nuclear arms, targeted Soviet command-and-control systems, invested in missile-defense shields, sent attack submarines to trail Soviet SSBNs, and
built increasingly accurate multiwarhead land- and submarine-launched ballistic missiles as well as stealth bombers and stealthy nuclear-armed cruise
missiles. Equally unhappy with MAD, the Soviet Union also built a massive arsenal in the hope of gaining nuclear superiority. Neither side came close to
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Nuclear Energy Affirmative
gaining a first-strike capability, but it would be a mistake to dismiss the amis race as entirely irrational: both superpowers were well aware of the benefits
of nuclear primacy, and neither was willing to risk falling behind.
Since the Cold War's end, the U.S. nuclear arsenal has significantly unproved. The United States has replaced the ballistic missiles on its submarines with
the substantially more accurate Trident II D-5 missiles, many of which carry new, larger-yield warheads. The U.S. Navy has shifted a greater proportion
of its SSBNs to the Pacific so that they can patrol near the Chinese coast or in the blind spot of Russia's early warning radar network. The U.S. Air Force
has finished equipping its B-52 bombers with nuclear-armed cruise missiles, which are probably invisible to Russian and Chinese air-defense radar. And
the air force has also enhanced the avionics on its B-2 stealth bombers to permit them to fly at extremely low altitudes in order to avoid even the most
sophisticated radar. Finally, although the air force finished dismantling its highly lethal MX missiles in 2005 to comply with arms control agreements, it
is significantly improving its remaining ICBMs by installing the MX's high-yield warheads and advanced reentry vehicles on Minuteman ICBMs, and it
has upgraded the Mimiteman's guidance systems to match the MX's accuracy
IMBALANCE OF TERROR
Even as the United States1 nuclear forces have grown stronger since the end of the Cold War, Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal has sharply deteriorated,
Russia has 39 percent fewer long-range bombers. 58 percent fewer ICBMs, and 80 percent fewer SSBNs than the Soviet Union fielded during its last
days. The true extent of the Russian arsenal's decay, however, is much greater than these cuts suggest What nuclear forces Russia retains are hardly ready
for use. Russia's strategic bombers, now located at only two bases and thus vulnerable to a surprise attack, rarely conduct training exercises, and their
warheads are stored off-base. Over 80 percent of Russia's silo-based ICBMs have exceeded their original service lives, and plans to replace them with
new missiles have been stymied by failed tests and lo\\ rates of production. Russia's mobile ICBMs rarely patrol, and although they could fire their
missiles from inside their bases if given sufficient warning of an attack, it appears unlikely that they would have the time to do so.
The third leg of Russia's nuclear triad has weakened the most. Since 2000, Russia's SSBNs have conducted approximately two patrols per year, down
from 60 in 1990. (By contrast, the U.S. SSBN palrol rate today is about 40 per year.) Most of the time, all nine of Russia's ballistic missile submarines are
sitting in port, where they make easy targets. Moreover, submarines require well-trained crews to be effective. Operating a ballistic missile submarine -
and silently coordinating its operations with surface ships and attack submarines to evade an enemy's forces — is not simple. Without frequent patrols, the
skills of Russian submariners, like the submarines themselves, are decaying. Revealingly, a 2004 test (attended by President Vladimir Putin) of several
submarine-launched ballistic missiles was a total fiasco: all either failed to launch or veered off course. The fact that there were similar failures in the
summer and fall of 2005 completes this unflattering picture of Russia's nuclear forces.
Compounding these problems, Russia's early warning system is a mess. Neither Soviet nor Russian satellites have ever been capable of reliably detecting
missiles launched from U.S. submarines (In a recent public statement, a top Russian general described his country's early warning satellite constellation
as "hopelessly outdated.") Russian commanders instead rely on ground-based radar systems to detect incoming warheads from submarine-launched
missiles. But tiie radar network has a gaping hole in its coverage that lies to the east of the country, toward the Pacific Ocean. If U.S. submarines were to
fire missiles from areas in the Pacific. Russian leaders probably would not know of the attack until the warheads detonated. Russia's radar coverage of
some areas in the North Atlantic is also spotty, providing only a few minutes of warning before the impact of submarine-launched warheads.
Moscow could try to reduce its vulnerability by finding the money to keep its submarines and mobile missiles dispersed. But that would be only a short-
term fix. Russia has already extended the service life of its aging mobile ICBMs, something that it cannot do indefinitely, and its efforts to deploy new
strategic weapons continue to flounder. The Russian navy's plan to launch a new class of ballistic missile submarines has fallen far behind schedule. It is
now highly likely that not a single new submarine will be operational before 2008, and it is likely that none will be deployed until later.
Even as Russia's nuclear forces deteriorate, the United States is improving its ability to track submarines and mobile missiles, further eroding Russian
military leaders' confidence in Russia's nuclear deterrent. (As early as 1998. these leaders publicly expressed doubts about the ability of Russia's ballistic
missile submarines to evade U.S. detection.) Moreover, Moscow has announced plans to reduce its land-based ICBM force by another 35 percent by
2010; outside experts predict that the actual cuts will slice 50 to 75 percent off the current force, possibly leaving Russia with as few as 150 ICBMs by
the end of the decade, down from its 1990 level of almost 1,300 missiles. The more Russia's nuclear arsenal shrinks, the easier it will become for the
United States to carry out a first strike.
To determine how much the nuclear balance lias changed since the Cold War, we ran a computer model of a hypothetical U.S. attack on Russia's nuclear
arsenal using the standard unclassified formulas that defense analysts have used for decades. We assigned U.S. nuclear warheads to Russian targets on the
basis of two criteria: the most accurate weapons were aimed at the hardest targets, and the fastest-arriving weapons at the Russian forces that can react
most quickly. Because Russia is essentially blind to a submarine attack from the Pacific and would have great difficulty detecting the approach of low-
flying stealthy nuclear-armed cruise missiles, we targeted each Russian weapon system with at least one submarine-based warhead or cruise missile. An
attack organized in this manner \\ould give Russian leaders virtually no warning.
This simple plan is presumably less effective than Washington's actual strategy, which the U.S. government has spent decades perfecting. The real U.S.
war plan may call for first targeting Russia's command and control, sabotaging Russia's radar stations, or taking other preemptive measures — all of which
would make the actual U.S. force far more lethal than our model assumes.
According to our model, such a simplified surprise attack would have a good chance of destroying every Russian bomber base, submai
to attack) than we expected. (Of course, the vmcla.ssified estimates we used may understate the capabilities of U.S. forces, making an attack ever
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Nuclear Energy Affirmative
To be clear, this does not mean that a first strike by the United States would be guaranteed to work in reality; such an attack would entail many
uncertainties. Nor, of course, does it mean that such a first strike is likely. But what our analysis suggests is profotind: Russia's leaders can no longer
count on a survivable nuclear deterrent. And unless they reverse course rapidly, Russia's vulnerability will only increase over time.
China's nuclear arsenal is even mote vulnerable to a U.S. attack. A U.S. first strike could succeed whether it was launched as a surprise or in the midst of
a crisis during a Chinese alert China has a limited strategic nuclear arsenal. The People's Liberation Army currently possesses no modern SSBNs or long-
range bombers. Its naval arm used to have two ballistic missile submarines, but one sank, and the other, which had such poor capabilities that it never left
Chinese waters, is no longer operational. China's medium-range bomber force is similarly unimpressive: the bombers are obsolete and vulnerable to
attack. According to unclassified U.S. government assessments, China's entire intercontinental nuclear arsenal consists of 18 stationary single-warhead
ICBMs. These are not ready to launch on warning: their warheads are kept in storage and the missiles themselves are unfueled. (China's ICBMs use
liquid fuel, which corrodes the missiles after 24 hours. Fueling them is estimated to take two hours.) The lack of an advanced early warning system adds
to the vulnerability of the ICBMs It appears that China would have no warning at all of a U.S. submarine-launched missile attack or a strike using
hundreds of stealthy nuclear-armed cruise missiles.
Many sources claim that China is attempting to reduce the vulnerability of its ICBMs by building decoy silos. But decoys cannot provide a firm basis for
deterrence. It would take close to a thousand fake silos to make a U.S. first strike on China as difficult as an attack on Russia, and no available
information on China's nuclear forces suggests the existence of massive fields of decoys. And even if China built them, its commanders would always
wonder whether U S . sensors could distinguish real silos from fake ones.
Despite much talk about China's military modernization, the odds that Beijing will acquire a survivable nuclear deterrent in the next decade are slim.
China's modernization efforts have focused on conventional forces, and the country's progress on nuclear modernization has accordingly been slow. Since
the mid-1980s, China has been Hying to develop a new missile for its future ballistic missile submarine as well as mobile ICBMs (the DF-31 and longer-
range DF-31 A) to replace its current ICBM force The U.S. Defense Department predicts that China may deploy DF-31s in a few years, although the
forecast should be treated skeptically: U.S. intelligence has been announcing the missile's imminent deployment for decades.
Even when they are eventually fielded, the DF-31s are unlikely to significantly reduce China's vulnerability. The missiles' limited range, estimated to be
only 8,000 kilometers (4,970 miles), greatly restricts the area in which they can be hidden, reducing the difficulty of searching for them. The DF-3Is
could hit the contiguous United States only if they were deployed in China's far northeastern corner, principally in Heilongjiang Province, near the
Russian-North Korean border. But Heilongjiang is mountainous, and so the missiles might be deployable only along a few hundred kilometers of good
road or in a small plain in the center of the province. Such restrictions increase the missiles' vulnerability and raise questions about whether they are even
intended to target the U.S. homeland or whether they will be aimed at targets in Russia and Asia.
Given the history of China's slow-motion nuclear modernization, it is doubtful that a Chinese second-strike force will materialize anytime soon. The
United States has a first-strike capability against China today and should be able to maintain it for a decade or more.
The improvements to the U.S. nuclear arsenal offer evidence that the United States is actively seeking primacy. The navy, for example, is upgrading the
fuse on the W-76 nuclear warhead, which sits atop most U S . submarine-launched missiles. Currently, the warheads can be detonated only as air bursts
well above ground, but the new fuse w i l l also permit ground bursts (detonations at or very near ground level), which are ideal for attacking very hard
targets such as ICBM silos Another navy research program seeks to improve dramatically the accuracy of its submarine-launched missiles (already
among the most accurate in the world) Even if these efforts fall short of their goals, any refinement in accuracy combined with the ground-burst fuses
will multiply the missiles' lethality. Such improvements only make sense if the missiles are meant to destroy a large number of hard targets. And given
that B-2s are already very stealthy aircraft, it is difficult to see how the air force could justify the increased risk of crashing them into the ground by
having them fly at very low altitudes in order to avoid radar detection - unless their mission is to penetrate a highly sophisticated air defense network
such as Russia's or, perhaps in the future, China's.
During the Cold War, one explanation for the development of the nuclear arms race was that the rival military services' competition for budget share
drove them to build ever more nuclear weapons. But the United States today is not achieving primacy by buying big-ticket platforms such as new SSBNs,
bombers, or ICBMs Current modernization programs involve incremental improvements to existing systems. The recycling of warheads and reentry
vehicles from the air force's retired MX missiles (there are even reports that extra MX warheads may be put on navy submarine-launched missiles) is the
sort of efficient use of resources that does no! fit a theory based on parochial competition for increased funding. Rather than reflect organizational
resource battles, these steps look like a coordinated set of programs to enhance the United States' nuclear first-strike capabilities.
Some may wonder whether U.S. nuclear modernization efforts are actually designed with terrorists or rogue states in mind. Given the United States'
ongoing war on terror, and the continuing U.S. interest in destroying deeply buried bunkers (reflected in the Bush administration's efforts to develop new
nuclear weapons to destroy underground targets), one might assume that the W-76 upgrades are designed to be used against targets such as rogue states'
arsenals of weapons of mass destruction or terrorists holed up in caves. But this explanation does not add up. The United States already has more than a
thousand nuclear warheads capable of attacking bunkers or caves If the United States' nuclear modernization were really aimed at rogue states or
terrorists, the country's nuclear force would not need the additional thousand ground-burst warheads it will gain from the W-76 modernization program.
The current and future U.S. nuclear force, in other words, seems designed to carry out a preemptive disarming strike against Russia or China.
The intentional pursuit of nuclear primacy is, moreover, entirely consistent with the
United States' declared policy of expanding its global dominance. The Bush
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Nuclear Energy Affirmative
administration's 2002 National Security Strategy explicitly states that the United States
aims to establish military primacy: "Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade
potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or
equaling, the power of the United States." To this end, the United States is openly
seeking primacy in every dimension of modern military technology, both in its
conventional arsenal and in its nuclear forces.
128
Nuclear Energy Affirmative
Light water reactors are safe from overheating and internal accidents.
S.S. Penner, R. Seiser, both professors at the University of California Center of Atomic Research, and
K.R. Schultz, General Atomics, 07
When a nuclear reactor is shut down, the radioactive materials in the core continue to generate some
heat. This heat must be removed to keep the reactor temperature at safe levels. The current light-
water reactors utilize active means for this purpose. There are operational and back-up pumps, pipes,
and heat exchangers to cool the reactor. In recent years, emphasis has been placed on making the
heatremoval systems operate even in case of an accident without human intervention to protect the reactor
and thus the public. This approach is referred to as using a passive safety measure. Passively safe designs
are features of the Generation III+ and later light-water reactors. Designs that tolerate massive pipe
breaks or other equipment failures are being developed for Generation IV gas-cooled reactor designs. It is
worth noting how the AP600 system is designed to produce passive safety in case of a loss of coolant
accident (LOCA). The basic idea is simply that application of gravity cannot fail. The AP600 is the first
reactor with this passive safety feature. It is certified by the US NRC. Tanks elevated with respect to the
reactor core are filled with cold water containing a dissolved salt (e.g., sodium borate). If a LOCA occurs
while the reactor-core pressure remains elevated, the core make-up tanks (CMTs) circulate cold water
through the core as the result of negative buoyancy. At somewhat reduced pressures, forced water injection
is caused by high-pressure nitrogen. At low pressures, forced water injection occurs from water-storage
tanks. The flashing steam condenses on the internal walls before it is recycled back to the water-storage
tank and the lower containment compartment. Heat generated in the reactor core drives convection-cooling
processes to operate as long as injection cooling is needed. The AP600 has sufficient redundancy to
guarantee continued reactor cooling even when some but not all of the systems fail. In the highly unlikely
event that all of the passive safety systems for water-cooled reactors fail simultaneously, safety
systems such as the containment vessels and active cooling systems are designed to ensure public
safety. Preferred over passively safe systems are inherently safe designs. These generally contain fuel
elements made entirely of ceramics that have melting points higher than the steady-state temperatures
reached in the reactor without cooling. The passive safety features of modular pebble-bed reactors
(MPBRs) and prismatic helium-cooled reactors should generally ensure operational safety (see Section 7).
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Nuclear Energy Affirmative
Most nuclear plants use light water, which is safe and cheap, alleviating any security
or cost concerns.
Most nuclear reactors, particularly in the USA, are of the light water (LWR)
variety, in either pressurized liquid or boiling variants. Improved light water systems,
focusing on safety and cost, have recently been proposed by Westinghouse, Siemens, and
General Electric. Additionally, there are departures from the LWR modes that use closed
systems for cooling and moderation. Closed systems are cooled by gas, heavy water,
liquid sodium, or liquid lead, and some employ innovative types of fuel, TRISO or
breeder fuels. They hold the most promise for redressing nuclear power concerns (Box
1). Table I characterizes representative advanced reactors. The comparative costs of
advanced power systems, both nuclear and conventional, are of significance to investors
and consumers. The best estimates are that advanced LWR systems are about 10
percent less costly to build and run than newly installed combined-cycle gas-fired
plants, and that TRISO-fueled reactors that employ Brayton cycle power conversion
units are 20 percent less costly. Breeder reactors, by way of comparison, are significantly
more expensive, up to twice the cost of conventional plants. Table II displays estimated
comparative costs in a very general way. Even though the capital costs of nuclear plants
are higher, the life cycle costs arc lower due to much lower fuel costs. Note that
although lower costs are an investment incentive, they are not sufficient to alleviate
concerns about nuclear power. Pressurized and boiling water reactors Most of the nuclear
reactors in the world use ordinary light water as coolant and moderator; a small number
uses heavy water. The most common design is the PWR (pressurized water reactor)
encompassing 65 percent of the total; boiling water reactors (BWR) are at 23 percent.
The principal disadvantages of PWR and BWR include waste disposal issues, heat
pollution, and vulnerability to terrorist attack. Light water reactors have also been
criticized on grounds of safety7 and cost, and although they actually rate highly in
these regards, the public perception is otherwise. Ironically, only safety and cost are
addressed in the newer PWR and BWR proposals. Box 1 Moderation is the process
whereby fast neutrons are slowed to what are known as thermal levels. Fast neutrons can
breed fertile materials; thermal neutrons cannot. However, thermal neutrons interact with
fissile materials more efficiently with large release of energy. Typical moderators are
hydrogen and carbon.
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Nuclear Energy Affirmative
Light water reactors are cheaper, safer, and more efficient than any other nuclear
reactor.
The Daily Yomiuri - 2007
The Daily Yomiuri, July 14 2007, Tokyo
The Economy. Trade and Industry Ministry plans to create a basic design for large light water
reactors that can generate 1.8 million kilowatts of electricity, or about 1.3 times more than
current large nuclear reactors.
The ministry plans to introduce the large light water reactors in about 2025 and jointly
develop them in conjunction with electric power companies and nuclear power-plant builders.
The research and development cost of 60 billion yen will be split equally between the
government and the private sector.
As the nation's nuclear power plants are expected to be rebuilt from the second half of the
2020s, the ministry has carried out basic research on light water reactors to fill the void
before fast breeder reactors are introduced.
Because fast breeder reactors use natrium—which has a high heat efficiency—as a coolant.
they need a completely new design. However, light water reactors will be an extension of the
current reactors, which use water, which is easy to handle.
In addition to increasing power output significantly, the density of the uranium used will be
enriched so that it will burn for a long time, reducing the amount of spent nuclear fuel by
about 40 percent.
With the ministry currently finding it difficult to decide on sites for the disposal of high-level
radioactive waste, finding ways to dispose of nuclear waste has become a top priority.
Toshiba Corp., Hitachi Ltd., and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd., among others, will take
part in the project.
Of the 55 nuclear power plants currently operating in the country, 20 were built in the 1970s.
Current safety regulations allow nuclear power plants to operate for 60 years.
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Nuclear Energy Affirmative
There has always been doubt as to the superiority, both technical and economic, of the light water reactor.
It is difficult to document the claim that light water is inferior in an ex post sense-light water may be
relatively good now but had a different technology dominated, we would have an even better reactor.
Nonetheless, there are indications that this hypothesis is true. In the fifties, following a debate on the
relative merits of enriched uranium (light water) and natural uranium (heavy water and gas graphite), the
journal Nucleonics stated that "to the observer of this debate it seems that enriched reactors must rely
heavily upon their development potential to do much better than match the power costs of natural uranium
systems." Further, the cost estimates made throughout the fifties, detailed later, by no means pointed to
light water as the most efficient technology.
Both the gas graphite and heavy water reactors have much lower volumetric power densities (the ratio of
power output to core volume) than do light water reactors. While this tends to raise capital costs and reduce
design flexibility, it also provides a safety advantage. In the event of a coolant loss, the core will provide
a much larger heat sink (particularly in the case of the graphite core) and so the temperature transients will
be much smaller, giving operators more time to effect an adequate response. The use of a gas coolant also
has the advantage of being safe from phase changes with changes in pressure or temperature. Thus under
many fault conditions cooling can be maintained in the gas graphite reactor, when it would be lost with
liquid coolant technologies. A second, related advantage of gas coolants is that they can be heated to higher
temperatures, which gives the advanced gas graphite reactors a higher thermal efficiency than others.
An element of considerable concern during the British debate over the merits of light water and gas
graphite technologies was the steel pressure vessel of the pressurized water reactor (PWR -Westinghouse's
light water reactor). The safety principle in the PWR was, and still is. that the vessel never comes close to
failure. If a crack does happen to reach the critical size (much smaller than the thickness of the vessel),
however, it can grow at speeds up to the speed of sound. There would be no time for reaction. To
manufacture a vessel sufficiently free of flaws to be safe from this problem requires very high technology
manufacturing abilities, which are beyond the capabilities of many countries and were beyond most
countries in the fifties. Both the Canadian heavy water reactor, the Candu, and the second—generation
British gas graphite reactor, the AGR, avoid this problem through systematic redundancy. The Candu uses
many pressure tubes rather than a single vessel. The failure of a single tube is not critical and gives warning
of other potential failures. This makes Candu less prone to meltdown due to coolant loss. The AGR uses
a prestressed concrete pressure vessel. There is considerable mechanical redundancy in the system of steel
load—bearing cables. Cables can be replaced individually, and again, the failure of a single cable is not
fatal and gives warning of other potential failures.
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Nuclear Energy Affirmative
In terms of operating experience, light water has not been significantly better than the
other technologies in spite of having logged many more reactor years-an order of
magnitude more than heavy water and three times more than gas graphite. While
occupational radiation exposure with light water has been approximately equal to that of
heavy water, it has been more than 10 times that of the British gas graphite reactors. The
annual load factor of a reactor is the ratio of the total amount of power produced in a year
to the amount it would have produced had it operated at full capacity, never shutting
down, throughout the year. This is the standard measure of reactor availability. The
average annual load factors of light water and Ras graphite reactors have been
approximately equal at 63 percent. Heavy water reactors, however, have had an average
annual load factor of 73 percent. This difference is due in part to the on—load refueling
capabilities of the Candu, which have been adopted for the AGR.
Hugh Mclntyre estimated that the heavy wrater Candu reactors at Pickering generate
power at about 75 percent of the cost of the light water reactors of equivalent size at the
Zion 2 generating station in Illinois. This is consistent with analyses done by Ontario
Hydro, which suggest that if Ontario Hydro had a mature light water reactor program, the
costs of nuclear electricity would be 20 to 25 percent higher than with the current heavy
water systems.
There is considerable evidence, then, that other technologies have inherent advantages
over light water and that with equivalent amounts of development and use might well
have proven to be better. While it is not possible to document definitively that light water
is an inferior technology, it seems clear that the dominant position held by light water
cannot be due to a unanimous belief in its technical and economic superiority.
133
Nuclear Energy Affirmative
SOLVENCY - DUPIC
By enacting DUPIC processing the waste from light water reactors can be used to fuel heavy
water reactors (CANDU reactors)—solving waste problems.
The Toronto Star (Newspaper), February 12, 2007, Lexis-Nexis "The Candu edge; Canada's
heavy-water reactors can run on spent fuel from most light-water reactors, eliminating 2
headaches: skyrocketing uranium prices and waste disposal concerns"
The international potential of Candu nuclear reactors may not be obvious to some, but rising uranium
prices and heightened concern over nuclear-waste disposal could soon shine a light on this made-in-
Canada technology.
Nobody sees this more than Myung Seung Yang of South Korea's atomic energy institute. Yang and
his fellow nuclear scientists have spent the past 15 years exploring ways of using Candu reactors to
recycle highly radioactive waste, or "spent fuel," from a majority of the world's nuclear reactors.
The approach, Yang wrote in an email message to the Star, "would have many benefits when
practically implemented." South Korea is determined to try.
It's little known - at least outside the nuclear power industry - that the heavy-water reactor technology
that lies at the heart of Candu's design can, with some technical tinkering, directly use waste fuel from
most rival light-water reactors. Candu developer Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. calls this the DUPIC
process - standing for the Direct Use of Spent Pressurized Water Reactor Fuel in Candus. In 1991, the
Canadian government established a joint research program with the Korean Atomic Energy Research
Institute to investigate the approach, and both sides have demonstrated that it technically works.
The long-term implications, if DUPIC processing can be done safely and economically, are potentially
enormous. There are hundreds of pressurized light-water reactors (PWRs) around the world being used
to generate electricity 7 and propel submarines and aircraft carriers.
In the United States alone, two-thirds of the 104 reactors in operation are based on PWR designs,
according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. This has led over the years to the
accumulation of 36,000 metric tonnes of spent fuel, which is kept in temporary storage at dozens of
locations until a safe permanent-storage site can be found.
With DUPIC processing, that waste can be turned into a reusable fuel. This can significantly reduce a
country's dependence on uranium, which many analysts predict will rise above $100 (U.S.) per pound
by the end of next year - a tenfold price increase since January 2001.
Perhaps most important, the spent light-water fuel that eventually comes out of a Candu reactor will
contain less toxic material than the fuel that goes in. shrinking the amount of radioactive waste that
must ultimately go into long-term storage.
"The DUPIC fuel cycle could reduce a country's need for used PWR fuel disposal by 70 per cent while
reducing fresh uranium requirements by 30 per cent." according to the World Nuclear Association.
It's for this reason South Korea is keen on the DUPIC process. It currently has 20 operating reactors -
16 PWRs and four Candus. Another eight PWRs are on order or being built. It sees the reuse of spent
fuel in Candus as a key strategy for managing radioactive waste.
"The accumulation of spent fuel is an urgent issue that should be resolved," Yang and his colleagues
wrote in a briefing document that was presented at the 15th Pacific Nuclear Conference in Australia
last October. They called the eventual commercial development of the DUPIC process "an extremely
important turning point in the history of nuclear power development."
134
Nuclear Energy Affirmative
David Torgerson, chief technology officer and senior vice-president of Atomic Energy of Canada, says
the way uranium resources are used by power generators is driven by cost and supply. During the
1990s, for example, uranium prices were so low that it made more economic sense to just use it once
and then stick the spent fuels in wet or dry storage.
But some countries don't have their own uranium resources, leaving them dependent on imports from
other, potentially hostile jurisdictions. As uranium prices rise, the economics of the once-through fuel
cycle also become less appealing when measured against the costs of waste management and disposal.
"As the nuclear renaissance takes off and more reactors are built, it's likely the price of uranium will
increase (even more), and people will be looking at ways of getting more value out of that uranium,"
says Torgerson.
"Any time you can convert a waste into an asset, then you're going in the right direction."
He's quick to point out that the DUP1C process is also "proliferation resistant." meaning there is no
chemical separation of the spent uranium's more dangerous components, primarily plutonium. which
could be used by extremists or rogue nations to produce nuclear weapons. Only mechanical processing
is required to change the shape of the spent fuel rods into shorter Candu rods.
Mechanical reprocessing, while it has some safety and transportation issues, could be cheaper than
conventional chemical reprocessing.
"Because this is so much simpler, you have to expect the economics are going to be so much better,"
says Torgerson. pointing out that the South Koreans studied the economics of the DUPIC fuel cycle in
the 1990s and found it could compete against other fuel options. "This is one of the characteristics
we're certainly pushing."
For countries such as China, which already have Candu reactors in their fleet, it's an approach that
could prove attractive. AECL estimates that waste fuel from three light-water reactors would be
enough to fuel one Candu.
Daune Bratt. a political science instructor and expert on Canadian nuclear policy at Calgary's Mount
Royal College, says he can envision two revenue streams going to Candu operators that choose to
embrace the DUPIC process.
One stream would be the revenue that comes in through the generation and sale of electricity; the other
would come from a tipping fee that operators of light-water reactors would pay to unload their spent
fuel.
"These (Candu) operators wouldn't be buying the spent fuel, they'd be paid to use the spent fuel for
environmental reasons," says Bratt. "If you can minimize the waste, you bring tremendous value."
135
Nuclear Energy Affirmative
SOLVENCY - DUPIC
The DUPIC process is much simpler than conventional wet-chemistry techniques for reprocessing, and
promises to be cheaper. It presents a significant anti-proliferation benefit as well, since radioactive fission
products and fissile material are not separated. In addition, since the heat load of spent DUPIC fuel is
similar to that of the original spent LWR fuel, disposal requirements do not increase. However, since
approximately 50% more energy can be derived from LWR fuel by burning it as DUPIC fuel in a CANDU
reactor, the disposal cost is expected to be lower than either spent LWR or CANDU fuel (Baumgartner,
1998).
136
Nuclear Energy Affirmative
SOLVENCY - DUPIC
DUPICs use less fuel, are more energy efficient, minimize proliferation
possibilities, and burn more dangerous radioactive waste than other nuclear
reactors.
Countries with existing and new light-water reactors could use the spent uranium fuel in
those reactors on a separate fleet of Candus. meaning less consumption of new uranium
fueL
When the spent light-water fuel is run through a Candu, it packs two times the amount
of energy as when the original fuel was used.
Turning spent light-water fuel into usable fuel in the DUPIC process only requires
mechanical separation and repackaging, a more proliferation resistant process than the
so-called "wet chemical" approach used to re-enrich spent fuel.
Finally, when the spent fuel is recycled and used in a Candu reactor, more of the
dangerous radioactive materials are burned away, meaning less bad stuff to handle
when it does eventually go into long-term storage.
137
Nuclear Energy Affirmative
SOLVENCY - DUPIC
The DUPIC process has many key advantages.
139
Nuclear Energy Affirmative
SOLVENCY - ACCIDENTS
140
Nuclear Energy Affirmative
SOLVENCY - ACCIDENTS
The nuclear power plants are much safer and able to avoid most mistakes.
Nuclear Power to Play Key Role in Meeting Energy, Environmental Goals, House Panel
Told
WASHINGTON, Wed Mar 12, 2008 /PRNewswire-USNewswire/
"Our nuclear plants are not only environmentally sound by avoiding the emission of 681
million metric tons of CO2 each year, they are also extraordinarily safe. In 2006, our lost-
time accident rate was 0.12 accidents per 200,000 worker hours. That is significantly
safer than the 3.5 accidents per 200,000 worker hours in the manufacturing sector," Flint
said.
141
Nuclear Energy Affirmative
SOLVENCY - ACCIDENTS
142
Nuclear Energy Affirmative
SOLVENCY - ACCIDENTS
Nuclear power plants are the most efficient and reliable form of alternative energy.
As noted earlier, the operation costs of nuclear power include high levels of
internalization compared with other major electricity generating technologies. In
particular significant attempts have been made to internalize the environmentaly costs of
the industry. Other factors of national energy policy that remain problematic in the design
of liberalized electricity markets are reliability, security of fuel supply and generation
capacity margins. Conventional nuclear power plants are well suited to continuous high
quality base load electricity generation. 'Renewables' on the other hand can suffer from
intermittency and poor power quality, although important progress is now being made in
both these areas.
143
Nuclear Energy Affirmative
SOLVENCY - ACCIDENTS
The transportation of nuclear waste has so far never resulted in an accident and already
has strict guidelines.
December 3, 2007 Dispelling Myths About Nuclear Energy by Jack Spencer and Nick
Loris
FACT: The NRC and other regulatory agencies around the world take the strictest
precautions when dealing with spent nuclear fuel. Since 1971, more than 20,000
shipments of spent fuel and high-level waste have been transported more than 18
million miles worldwide without incident.
A staggering amount of evidence directly refutes this myth. Nuclear waste has been
transported on roads and railways worldwide for years without a significant incident.
Indeed, more than 20 million packages with radioactive materials are transported globally
each year—3 million of them in the United States. Since 1971, more than 20,000
shipments of spent fuel and high-level waste have been transported more than 18 million
miles without incident. [9] Transportation of radioactive materials is just not a problem.
The NRC and other regulatory agencies around the world take the strictest precautions
when dealing with spent nuclear fuel. The NRC outlines six key components for
safeguarding nuclear materials in transit:
144
Nuclear Energy Affirmative
SOLVENCY - ACCIDENTS
While environmentalists opposing nuclear war may exaggerate the proportions of nuclear reactor accidents, the
accidents are really not a big problem.
December 3, 2007 Dispelling Myths About Nuclear Energy by Jack Spencer and Nick Loris
MYTH: Incidents at Davis-Besse, I 'ermont Yankee, and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa demonstrate that continued use of nuclear power will
lead to another Chernobyl. FACT: The real consequences of Jiese three incidents demonstrate that nuclear power is safe.
Perhaps the greatest myths surrounding nuclear power concern the consequences of past accidents and their association with current
risks. All of these myths depend on a basic construct of tlawcd logic and misrepresentations that is riddled with logical and factual
errors.
First, the consequences of Chernobyl arc overblown to invoke general fear of nuclear power. Next, the Three Mile
Island accident is falsely equated with Chernobyl to create the illusion ofdanger at home. Finally, any accident, no
matter how minor, is portrayed as being ever so close to another nuclear catastrophe to demonstrate the dangers of new
nuclear power.
This myth can be dispelled outright simply by revisiting the real consequences of Chernobyl and Three Mile Island in terms of actual
fatalities. Although any loss of life is a tragedy, a more realistc presentation of the facts would use these accidents to demonstrate the
inherent safety of nuclear power.
Chernobyl was the result of human error and poor design. Of the fewer than 50 fatalities.f!2] most were rescue workers
who unknowingly entered contaminated areas without being informed of the danger.
The World Heath Organization says that up to 4.000 fatalities could ultimately result from Chernobyl-related cancers,
but this has not yet happened. The primary health effect was a spike in thyroid cancer among children, with 4.000-
5.000 children diagnosed with the cancer between 1992 and 2002. Of these. 15 children died, but 99 percent of cases
were resolved favorably. No clear evidence indicates any increase in other cancers among the most heavily affected
populations. Of course, this does not mean that cancers could not increase at some future date.
Interestingly, the World Health Organization has also identified a condition called "paralyzing fatalism," which is caused by
"persistent myths and misperceptions about the threat of radiation."! 13] In other words, the propagation of ignorance by anti-nuclear
activists has caused more harm to the affected populations than has the radioactive fallout from the actual accident.
The most serious accident in U.S. history involved the partial meltdown of a reactor core at Three Mile Island, but no
deaths or injuries resulted. The local population of 2 million people received an average estimated dose of about 1
millirem--insignificant compared to the 100-125 millirems that each person receives annually from naturally occurring
background radiation in the area.[14]
Other incidents have occurred since then, and all have been resolved safely. For example, safety inspections revealed a
hole forming in a vessel-head at the Davis-Besse plant in Ohio. Although only an inch of steel cladding prevented the
hole from opening, the NRC found that the plant could have operated another 13 months and that the steel cladding
could have withstood pressures 125 percent above normal operations.[151
A partial cooling tower collapse at the Vermont Yankee plant was far less serious than the Davis- Besse incident but is nonetheless
presented by activists as evidence of the potential risks posed by power reactors. Non-radioactive water was spilled in the collapse, but
no radiation was released.
As for vulnerability to earthquakes, the NRC requires that each nuclear plant meet a set of criteria to protect against
earthquakes.[161 Earthquakes at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa site demonstrate the effectiveness of modern earthquake
precautions. In 2004. the site survived without incident an earthquake measuring 6.9 on the Richter scale. A slightly
weaker earthquake in July 2007 caused the plant to suspend operations, but inspectors have since concluded that the
plant's safety features performed properly. While some radiation was released, it was well below dangerous levels and
did not come close to approaching Chernobyl-like levels.
145
Nuclear Energy Affirmative
SOLVENCY - WASTE
Nuclear waste materials are not being used for violent purposes as the environmentalist
propaganda would have the population believe.
146
Nuclear Energy Affirmative
SOLVENCY - WASTE
The nuclear waste can be reused, and the part that is not can be safely deposited in a
remote location.
By Jack Spencer. SPECIAL TO THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Washington Times,
October 28, 2007
But what about the disposal of nuclear waste, the No-Nukers ask? Actually, industry
solved that problem decades ago. Spent fuel is removed from the reactor. The
reusable portion is recycled by separating it and re-using it; the remainder is placed
in either interim or long-term storage, in remote locations such as Yucca Mountain.
Other countries, including France, safely do this every day. Politicians and bad
public policy prevent it from occurring in the U.S.
Waste transportation is another favorite target. The truth is that nuclear waste has
been transported on roads and railways worldwide for years without incident.
Indeed, more than 20 million waste packages are transported globally each year, and
more than 20,000 shipments have traveled some 18 million miles since 1971. It's
just not a problem.
147
Nuclear Energy Affirmative
SOLVENCY - WASTE
DUPIC solves waste problems by using the waste from light water reactors to
fuel heavy water reactors (CANDUs).
The Toronto Star (Newspaper), February 12, 2007, Lexis-Nexis "The Candu edge; Canada's
heavy-water reactors can run on spent fuel from most light-water reactors, eliminating 2
headaches: skyrocketing uranium prices and waste disposal concerns"
The international potential of Candu nuclear reactors may not be obvious to some, but rising uranium
prices and heightened concern over nuclear-waste disposal could soon shine a light on this made-in-
Canada technology.
Nobody sees this more than Myung Seung Yang of South Korea's atomic energy institute. Yang and
his fellow nuclear scientists have spent the past 15 years exploring ways of using Candu reactors to
recycle highly radioactive waste, or "spent fuel," from a majority of the world's nuclear reactors.
The approach, Yang wrote in an email message to the Star, "would have many benefits when
practically implemented." South Korea is determined to try.
It's little known - at least outside the nuclear power industry - that the heavy-water reactor technology
that lies at the heart of Candu's design can, with some technical tinkering, directly use waste fuel from
most rival light-water reactors. Candu developer Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. calls this the DUPIC
process - standing for the Direct Use of Spent Pressurized Water Reactor Fuel in Candus. In 1991, the
Canadian government established a joint research program with the Korean Atomic Energy Research
Institute to investigate the approach, and both sides have demonstrated that it technically works.
The long-term implications, if DUPIC processing can be done safely and economically, are potentially
enormous. There are hundreds of pressurized light-water reactors (PWRs) around the world being used
to generate electricity and propel submarines and aircraft carriers.
In the United States alone, two-thirds of the 104 reactors in operation are based on PWR designs,
according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. This has led over the years to the
accumulation of 36,000 metric tonnes of spent fuel, which is kept in temporary storage at dozens of
locations until a safe permanent-storage site can be found.
With DUPIC processing, that waste can be turned into a reusable fuel. This can significantly reduce a
country's dependence on uranium, which many analysts predict will rise above Si00 (U.S.) per pound
by the end of next year - a tenfold price increase since January 2001.
Perhaps most important, the spent light-water fuel that eventually comes out of a Candu reactor will
contain less toxic material than the fuel that goes in. shrinking the amount of radioactive waste that
must ultimately go into long-term storage.
"The DUPIC fuel cycle could reduce a country's need for used PWR fuel disposal by 70 per cent while
reducing fresh uranium requirements by 30 per cent," according to the World Nuclear Association.
It's for this reason South Korea is keen on the DUPIC process. It currently has 20 operating reactors -
16 PWRs and four Candus. Another eight PWRs are on order or being built. It sees the reuse of spent
fuel in Candus as a key strategy for managing radioactive waste.
"The accumulation of spent fuel is an urgent issue that should be resolved," Yang and his colleagues
wrote in a briefing document that was presented at the 15th Pacific Nuclear Conference in Australia
last October. They called the eventual commercial development of the DUPIC process "an extremely
important turning point in the history of nuclear power development."
148
Nuclear Energy Affirmative
SOLVENCY - WASTE
The best way to deal with the waste problem is being done currently.
December 3, 2007 Dispelling Myths About Nuclear Energy by Jack Spencer and Nick
Loris
FACT: The nuclear industry solved the nuclear waste problem decades ago.
Spent nuclear fuel can be removed from the reactor, reprocessed to separate unused fuel
and then used again. The remaining waste could then be placed in either interim or long-
term storage, such as in the Yucca Mountain repository. France and other countries carry
out some version of this process safely every day. Furthermore, technology advances
could yield greater efficiencies and improve the process. The argument that there is no
solution to the waste problem is simply wrong.
"Closing the fuel cycle" by reprocessing or recycling spent fuel would enable the U.S. to
move away, finally, from relying so heavily on the proposed Yucca Mountain repository
for the success of its nuclear program. This would allow for a more reasonable mixed
approach to nuclear waste, which would likely include some combination of Yucca
Mountain, interim storage, recycling, and new technologies. Regrettably, the federal
government banned the recycling of spent fuel from commercial U.S. reactors in 1977,
and the nation has practiced a virtual moratorium on the process ever since. [31
149
Nuclear Energy Affirmative
150
Nuclear Energy Affirmative
Nuclear power will produce energy using clean, environmentally friendly energy
methods
Greener energy Thursday. April 3. 2008 Former Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham,
For one, it is the most environmentally friendly source of all clean-air electricity options.
In the latest report from the Nobel Prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (TPCC). nuclear power was distinguished as an integral part in humanity's
attempt to mitigate the effects of climate change. This is because nuclear power plants
emit zero greenhouse gases or pollutants related to .ground-level ozone formation,
smog or acid rain.
151
Nuclear Energy Affirmative
The CO2 emissions from the construction of the nuclear plants are outweighed in the
long run by the steps that nuclear energy will take to reduce our dependency on fossil
fuels.
152
Nuclear Energy Affirmative
Nuclear power is a "carbon-free" energy source, and, thus, does not contribute to
climate change. Expanding nuclear power will help stave off climate change.
John M. Deutch and Ernest J. Moniz, Professors at Michigan Institute of Technology, 06
Nuclear power supplies a sixth of the world's electricity. Along with hydropower (which
supplies slightly more than a sixth), it is the major source of "carbon-free" energy
today. The technology suffered growing pains, seared into the public's mind by the
Chernobyl and Three Mile Island accidents, but plants have demonstrated remarkable
reliability and efficiency recently. The world's ample supply of uranium could fuel a
much larger fleet of reactors than exists today throughout their 40- to 50-year life span.
With growing worries about global warming and the associated likelihood that greenhouse gas emissions will be regulated insome
fashion, it is not surprising that governments and power providers in the U.S. and else\vhere are increasingly considering building a
substantial number of additional nuclear power plants. The fossil-fuel alternatives have their drawbacks. Natural gas is attractive in a
carbon-constrained world because it has lower carbon content relative to other fossil fuels and because advanced power plants have
low capital costs. But the cost of the electricity produced is very sensitive to natural gas prices, which have become much higher and
more volatile in recent years. In contrast, coal prices are relatively low and stable, but coal is the most carbon-intensive source of
electricity. The capture and sequestration of carbon dioxide, which w i l l add significantly to the cost, must be demonstrated and
introduced on a large scale if coal-powered e l e e t i i c i l s is to expand significantly without emitting unacceptable quantities of carbon
into the atmosphere. These concerns raise daihts about new investments in gas- or coal-powered plants. All of which points to a
possible nuclear revival. And indeed, more than 20.000 megawatts of nuclear capacity have come online global^ since 2000, mostly
in the Far I-ast. Yet despite the evident interest among major nuclear operators, no firm orders have been placed in the U.S. Key
impediments to new nuclear construction are high capital costs and the uncertainly surrounding nuclear waste management. In
addition, global expansion of nuclear power has raised concerns that nuclear weapons ambitions in certain countries may inadvertently
be advanced.
153