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No link – Silicon
American Elements “Solar Energy,” 6/2/2008 http://www.americanelements.com/AEsolarenergy.html
The history of solar energy materials began in the 1970s with the first silicon-based photovoltaic (PV)
cells. These basic cells were created by doping silicon to form two oppositely charged layers. A positively charged or p-type layer
underneath a negatively charged or n-type layer. In first configurations the p-type layer was doped with Boron to create the positive
charge and n-type layer was doped with phosphorous. When the sun's energy in the form of photons collects in the cell layers in a
volume sufficient to force electrons in the layer materials from their "Valence Band" to their "Conduction Band", electrons from the
layers are released. This energy threshold is referred to as the "Band Gap". These freed electrons naturally attempt to flow from the
negatively charge N-type layer to the positively charged P-type layer. For this reason, the P-type layer is also sometimes called the
"Absorption Layer" and the N-Type layer is called the "Emitter Layer". However, the boundary between these two layers, which is
called the "P-N Junction" or "Adhesion Layer" blocks their flow. Collection circuits are attached from the N-type layer to the P-type
layer to allow for the electrons to reach their target and complete the circuit. Energy in the form of electricity is collected or harvested
from this external circuit. These silicon based photovoltaic cells have gone through several generations of
development designed to reduce production costs. Originally the layers were produced by growing and slicing doped
single crystals of silicon. To save cost producers began casting shapes using polycrystalline silicon. While less expensive to produce,
efficiencies are also lower. A silicon single crystal may have as high as 30% efficiency; polycrystalline silicon might reach 10-15%. The
least expensive approach but also the least efficient cell (approximately 5%) is produced through thin film deposition of amorphous
silicon using sputtering techniques.
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It is also proven by the fact that producers just switch to platinum – answers their autos
scenario specifically and proves the Russia scenario is dumb because the run on palladium
prices will be short-term
Emanuel Balarie, Vice President, Investments at Euro Pacific Capital, advises high net worth individuals and
institutions on managed futures and commodity trading systems. “The Case for Palladium,” Fast Break, August 19,
2005 http://partners.futuresource.com/fbp/2005/0819.htm
From a cost-effective point of view, palladium catalytic converters are substantially cheaper. However,
as the charts above show, this has not always been the case. When palladium was at record highs, the
automobile industry switched to platinum based catalytic converters and in the process, accumulated a
substantial amount of reserves.. As the automobile industry starts to deplete its platinum reserves, they
will revert back to the cheaper palladium. In fact, this has already started to happen. Industry reports show
that demand for platinum from the North American automobile industry declined by 10 % in 2004.
Conversely, the demand for palladium increased by 20 % in 2004.
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Oil swamps their palladium link – palladium is one of MANY minerals, which ALL
combine to only be 1/5th of the market – proves we only effect a TINY fraction of Russia’s
economy – their author
Heather Connon, from Money Observer. “Waking giant,” Interactive Investor 6/27/08
http://www.iii.co.uk/articles/articledisplay.jsp?section=Markets&article_id=9937459
The surge in oil prices - 10 years ago oil was trading at just $10 a barrel; this year it has passed $135 - has
undoubtedly been a key factor in Russia's emergence as a global economic force. Despite a wave of
flotations in financial services, telecoms and other consumer industries, oil companies still account for half
of the stock market and the industry represents a quarter of GDP. Putin has managed the wealth well,
investing it in the Stabilisation fund, which reached $156.8 billion by the end of 2008 and is now being
divided between the Reserve fund and National Wellbeing fund
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Oil is not Russia's only resource. The country is also among the world's largest producers of gold,
palladium and nickel and has substantial reserves of commodities ranging from coal to diamonds.
Minerals and mining is the next largest stock market sector, accounting for a fifth of total market
capitalisation. The soaring income from these commodities is also helping finance an investment boom as
the authorities bid to reverse decades of under-investment in the country's infrastructure. Roland Nash, head of
research and chief strategist at Renaissance Capital, has lived in the capital since 1994. He says net investment has been negative since
the break-up of the Soviet Union, leaving the average age of its assets older than they were then: "With the huge wealth in the
Stabilisation fund, the debate is whether to invest that money in infrastructure. The problem is that this would fuel
inflation." Inflation is one of the biggest problems facing Putin, who has just moved from the post of president to prime
minister, and his successor Dmitry Medvedev. At almost 15%, it is already higher than in any other developing market
and, experts fear, rising sharply. That is not just because of rising food and fuel prices - although, with food accounting for 40%
of the average Russian's spending, it is a key factor - but also because of labour constraints. Russia's population is in decline and male
life expectancy averages just 58 years, leading to skill shortages. That is partly alleviated by immigrant labour - some estimate there are
as many ?as three million foreigners in Moscow alone - but is also pushing wages sharply higher. Putin has made it clear that he
is prepared to see the rouble rise further to control inflation, rather than rein back his commitment to
infrastructure spending. Huge amounts of that are needed: road and rail transport networks are extremely poor, while the housing
stock is outdated and in poor condition. Investment spending has been doubling in recent years, with the bulk of it going on roads and
airports.
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The real problem with Russia’s economy is lack of infrastructure – the current economy is
built on air
Tom Lasseter, “Russia worries about its high inflation,” McClatchy Newspaper July 17, 2008
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/164/story/44620.html
Dmitry Sorokin, a prominent economist in Moscow, said Russia's inflation generally was thought to be fueled by the infusion of cash
into the economy as well as the higher prices of oil and gas. But lurking beneath everything, he said, is the fundamental
problem that the country's infrastructure was never fully rebuilt after chronic underinvestment by the
Soviets, followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union and then the 1998 economic crisis. For instance, the total volume of
agricultural production in Russia in 2007 was roughly 25 percent less than in 1989, said Sorokin, the deputy
director of the economics institute at Russia's academy of sciences in Moscow. Why, then, is Russia's gross domestic
product — about $1.29 trillion last year — so high? "The answer is obvious. It's because of high oil prices, which have
given us money, but not products," Sorokin said. "I call it a GDP made of air; it's not true growth."
Even if economic crisis causes political crisis, it won’t escalate—the 1998 crisis proves
David Kotz, teaches economics at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Nov/Dec 1998,
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Economics/CapitalistCollapse_Russia.html
Despite the unprecedented economic depression, until recently Russian bankers kept getting richer and the stock market soared, buoyed by the lucrative
trade in Russia's valuable oil, gas, and metals. Western banks helped to finance the speculative binge that drove up Russian stock prices, making it one of the
world's best-performing stock markets in 1997. Then in the late spring of this year, Russia's stock market began to fall and
investors started to pull their money out of the country. The Clinton administration, fearing that Yeltsin's government would not
survive a looming financial crisis, pressed a reluctant IMF to approve a $22.6 billion emergency loan on July 13. This bailout proved
unsuccessful. Four weeks later the financial crisis resumed as investors fled and Russia's government had
to pay as much as 300% interest to attract buyers for its bonds. After Washington rejected Yeltsin's
desperate plea for still more money, Russia did the unthinkable: it was forced to suspend payment on its
foreign debt for 90 days, restructure its entire debt, and devalue the ruble. Panic followed, as Russia's
high-flying banks teetered on the edge of collapse, depositors were unable to withdraw their money,
and store shelves were rapidly emptied of goods. The financial collapse produced a political crisis, as
President Yeltsin, his domestic support evaporating, had to contend with an emboldened opposition in the parliament.
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