EN BANC [G.R. No.

180906, October 07, 2008] THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONERS, VS. RAYMOND MANALO AND REYNALDO MANALO, RESPONDENTS. DECISION PUNO, CJ.: While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind secret walls, they are not separated from the constitutional protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an overarching sky that covers all in its protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition for a writ of amparo filed before this Court. This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both questions of fact and law, the Decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled "Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, respondents." This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) filed before this Court by herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners (therein respondents) and/or their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders, and all other legal and equitable [3] reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our Resolution dated August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP, their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, including but not limited to the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment; and (2) enjoined them from causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as [4] [5] guaranteed under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo [6] Reliefs. They prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under Sec. 26 of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ commanding therein respondents to make a verified return within the period provided by law and containing the specific matter required by law; (3) they be granted the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed for in the petition but [7] not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after hearing, render judgment as required in Sec. 18 of [8] the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just and equitable reliefs. On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule and further resolved, viz: WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents requiring them to file with the CA (Court of Appeals) a verified written return within five (5) working days from service of the writ. We REMAND the petition to the CA and designate the Division of Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing on the petition on November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and decide the petition in [9] accordance with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads, viz:
[2] [1]

ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED. The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF STAFF are hereby REQUIRED: 1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of this decision all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already on file herein; 2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas within five days from notice of this decision. 3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts, reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days from notice of this decision. The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of respondent AFP Chief of Staff or his duly authorized deputy, the latter's authority to be express and made apparent on the face of the sworn compliance with this directive. SO ORDERED. Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein respondents: Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14, 2006, several uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of their barangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they were not informed [11] of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers when he passed by the barangay hall. On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and roused him. They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and forced to the ground face down. He was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light, then forcibly brought near [12] the road. He told his mother to follow him, but three soldiers stopped her and told her to stay. Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, "Puti" de la Cruz, and "Pula" de la Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They were all members of the CAFGU and residing in Manuzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While he was being forcibly taken, he also saw outside of his house two barangay councilors, Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers [13] and armed men. The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being blindfolded, he saw the faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names. The one who drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of age or older. The leader of the team who entered his house and abducted him was "Ganata." He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit old. Another one of his abductors was "George" who [14] was tall, thin, white-skinned and about 30 years old. The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to sit beside Raymond. Both of them were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the person beside him as his brother Reynaldo's. The van stopped several times until they finally arrived at a house. Raymond and Reynaldo were each brought to a different room. With the doors of their rooms left open, Raymond saw several soldiers continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on the head and other parts of his body with the butt of their guns for about 15 minutes. After which, Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymond's) room and it was his (Raymond's) turn to be beaten up in the other room. The soldiers asked him if he was a member of the New People's Army. Each time he said he was not, he was hit with the butt of their guns.
[10]

He was questioned where his comrades were, how many soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA [15] members he had helped. Each time he answered none, they hit him. In the next days, Raymond's interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers who beat him up would salute them, call them "sir," and treat them with respect. He was in blindfolds when interrogated by the high officials, but he saw their faces when they arrived and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed that the uniform of the high officials was different from those of the other soldiers. One of those officials was tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew much about his parents and family, and a habeas corpus case filed in connection with [16] the respondents' abduction. While these officials interrogated him, Raymond was not manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier guards beat him up. When the guards got drunk, they also manhandled [17] respondents. During this time, Raymond was fed only at night, usually with left-over and rotten food. On the third week of respondents' detention, two men arrived while Raymond was sleeping and beat him up. They doused him with urine and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his forehead twice with a .45 pistol, punched him on the mouth, and burnt some parts of his body with a burning wood. When he could no longer endure the torture and could hardly breathe, they stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to the same ordeal in another room. Before their torturers left, they warned Raymond that they [18] would come back the next day and kill him. The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to get drunk, then made noise with the chains put on him to see if they were still awake. When none of them came to check on him, he managed to free his hand from the chains and jumped through the window. He passed through a helipad and firing range and stopped near a fishpond where he used stones to break his chains. After walking through a forested area, he came near a river and an Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some women who were doing the laundry, asked where he was and the road to Gapan. He was told that he [19] was in Fort Magsaysay. He reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing him to run away. The soldiers chased him and caught up with him. They brought him to another place near the entrance of what he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled. They poured gasoline on him. Then a so-called "Mam" or "Madam" suddenly called, saying that she wanted to see Raymond before he was killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he was [20] returned inside Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo was detained. For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds were treated. When the [21] wounds were almost healed, the torture resumed, particularly when respondents' guards got drunk. Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room enclosed by steel bars. He stayed all the time in that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything there, including urinating, removing his bowels, bathing, eating and sleeping. He counted that eighteen [22] [23] people had been detained in that bartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and himself. For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay. They were kept in a small house with two rooms and a kitchen. One room was made into the bartolina. The house was near the firing range, helipad and mango trees. At dawn, soldiers marched by their house. They were also [24] sometimes detained in what he only knew as the "DTU." At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body and eyes, took their urine samples and marked them. When asked how they were feeling, they replied that they had a hard time urinating, their stomachs were aching, and they felt other pains in their body. The next day, two ladies in white arrived. They also examined respondents and gave them medicines, including orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic acid. They brought with them the results of respondents' urine test and advised them to drink plenty of water and take their medicine. The two ladies returned a few more times. Thereafter, medicines were sent through the "master" of the DTU, "Master" Del Rosario alias Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in the DTU for about two weeks. While there, he met a soldier named [25] Efren who said that Gen. Palparan ordered him to monitor and take care of them.

One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with Efren and several other armed men wearing fatigue suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents were detained for one or two weeks in a big two-storey house. Hilario and Efren stayed with them. While [26] there, Raymond was beaten up by Hilario's men. From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo. They were detained in a big unfinished house inside the compound of "Kapitan" for about three months. When they arrived in Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to them. They were brought out of the house to a basketball court in the center of the compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was already waiting, seated. He was about two arms' length away from respondents. He began by asking if respondents felt well already, to which Raymond replied in the affirmative. He asked Raymond if he knew him. Raymond lied that he did not. He then asked Raymond if he would be scared if he were made to face Gen. Palparan. Raymond responded that he would not be because he did not believe that Gen. Palparan was [27] an evil man. Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz: Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, "Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba natatakot sa akin?" Sumagot akong, "Siyempre po, natatakot din..." Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: "Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na mabuhay, basta't sundin n'yo ang lahat ng sasabihin ko... sabihin mo sa magulang mo - huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan at sa Human Right dahil niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat sa bahay na huwag [28] paloko doon. Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na sa gobyerno." Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do otherwise. At about 3:00 in the morning, Hilario, Efren and the former's men - the same group that abducted them - brought them to their parents' house. Raymond was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because he still could not walk. In the presence of Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. As they were afraid, Raymond's parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymond's parents that if they continued to join human rights rallies, they would never see [29] their children again. The respondents were then brought back to Sapang. When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave. He was talking with the [30] four "masters" who were there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse. When Gen. Palparan saw Raymond, he called for him. He was in a big white vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan told him to gain back his strength and be healthy and to take the medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. He said the medicine was expensive at Php35.00 each, and would make them strong. He also said that they should prove that they are on the side of the military and warned that they would not be [31] [32] given another chance. During his testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his picture. One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen. Palparan. The medicine, named "Alive," was green and yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a box of this medicine and instructed to take one capsule a day. Arman checked if they were getting their dose of the [33] medicine. The "Alive" made them sleep each time they took it, and they felt heavy upon waking up. After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang. Arman instructed Raymond that while in Sapang, he should introduce himself as "Oscar," a military trainee from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in Bulacan. While there, he saw again Ganata, one of the men who abducted him from [34] his house, and got acquainted with other military men and civilians. After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under the 24 Infantry Battalion. He was fetched by three unidentified men in a big white vehicle. Efren went with them. Raymond was then blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his blindfold was removed. Chains were put on [35] him and he was kept in the barracks. The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was
th

then he learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the University of the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the day, her chains were [36] removed and she was made to do the laundry. After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with "Allan" whose th name they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called "master" or "commander" by his men in the 24 Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but [37] were put back on at night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed. On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be thankful they were still alive and should continue along their "renewed life." Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name "Oscar" and holding himself out as a military trainee. He got th acquainted with soldiers of the 24 Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in his [38] affidavit. On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a camp th of the 24 Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as "Mar" and "Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help in [39] raising livestock. Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers brought him and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his [40] house. Another time, in another "Operation Lubog," Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was [41] there. They spared him and killed only his son right before Raymond's eyes. From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed [42] in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007. In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz: Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko si Donald na inaayos ang kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon man kaming makita o marinig, walang nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang katawan at ito'y sinunog. Masansang ang amoy. Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na trak at dinala sa loob ng kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas. Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng kubo,

piniringan, ikinadena at labis na binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay nila iyong isang Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito. Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba ang mga bangkay mula sa pick up trak, dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong sinilaban, at napakamasangsang ang amoy. May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila sa akin na dinukot sila sa Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila nakita. xxx xxx xxx Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil kakausapin daw siya ni Gen. Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel. Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi. Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano ang sabi ni Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na raw naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong buhay at ituloy [43] namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na kami kinakadena. On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry for Donald (Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which, he would take care of the food of their family. They were also told that they could farm a small plot adjoining his land and sell their produce. They were no longer put in chains and were instructed to use the names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent themselves as cousins from Rizal, [44] Laguna. Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they stayed. They helped farm adjoining lands for which they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved their earnings. When they had saved Php1,000.00 each, Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a cellular phone as he wanted to exchange text messages with a girl who lived nearby. A phone was pawned to him, but he kept it first and did not use it. They earned some more until they had saved Php1,400.00 between them. There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of them while their guards lived in the other three. Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards. Respondents' house did not have electricity. They used a lamp. There was no television, but they had a radio. In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his cohorts had a drinking session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. When none of the guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway, leaving behind their sleeping guards and [45] barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from captivity. Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymond's affidavit insofar as they related to matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken from their house on February 14, 2006, he saw the faces of his abductors before he was blindfolded with his shirt. He also named the soldiers he got acquainted with in the 18 months he was detained. When Raymond attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely beaten up and told that they were indeed members of the NPA because Raymond escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back and punched in the face until he could no longer bear the pain. At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang, Reynaldo was

separated from Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a mountainous area. He was instructed to use the name "Rodel" and to represent himself as a military trainee from Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along Reynaldo in his trips. One time, he was brought to a market in San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while Hilario was buying. He was also brought to Tondo, Manila where Hilario delivered boxes of "Alive" in different houses. In these trips, Hilario drove a black and red vehicle. Reynaldo was blindfolded while still in Bulacan, but allowed to remove the blindfold once outside the province. In one of their trips, they passed by Fort Magsaysay and Camp Tecson where Reynaldo saw the sign board, "Welcome to [46] Camp Tecson." Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino specialized in forensic medicine and was connected with the Medical Action Group, an organization handling cases of human rights violations, particularly cases where torture was involved. He was requested by an NGO to conduct medical examinations on the respondents after their escape. He first asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the physical examination. His findings showed that the scars borne by respondents were consistent with their account of physical injuries inflicted upon them. The examination was conducted on August 15, 2007, two days after respondents' escape, and the results thereof were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of the scars. He testified that he [47] followed the Istanbul Protocol in conducting the examination. Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their alleged abduction and torture. In compliance with the October 25, 2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying any involvement therein, viz: 13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested, forcibly abducted, detained, held incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the military. This is a settled issue laid to rest in the habeas corpus case filed in their behalf by petitioners' parents before the Court of th Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431 against M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head of the 24 th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, as Commander of the 7 Infantry Division in Luzon; Lt. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), namely: Michael dela Cruz, Puti dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza. The respondents therein submitted a return of the writ... On July 4, 2006, the Court of Appeals dropped as party respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., then Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and on September th 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan, then Commanding General, 7 Infantry Division, Philippine Army, stationed at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding that no evidence was introduced to establish their personal involvement in the taking of the Manalo brothers. In a Decision dated June 27, 2007..., it exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence establishing his involvement in any capacity in the disappearance of the Manalo brothers, although it held that the remaining respondents were illegally detaining the Manalo brothers and ordered them to release the [48] latter. Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner) Secretary of National Defense, which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of the Manalo brothers' alleged abduction. He also claimed that:

7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military directional operations, neither does he undertake command directions of the AFP units in the field, nor in any way micromanage the AFP operations. The principal responsibility of the Secretary of National Defense is focused in providing strategic policy direction to the Department (bureaus and agencies) including the Armed Forces of the Philippines; 8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable Supreme Court in this case, I have directed the Chief of Staff, AFP to institute immediate action in compliance with Section 9(d) of the Amparo Rule and to submit report of such compliance... Likewise, in a Memorandum Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I have issued a policy directive addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP that the AFP should adopt the following rules of action in the event the Writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP:

(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party; (2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible; (3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance; (4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance; (5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and (6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court. Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached to the Return of the Writ, attesting that he received the above directive of therein respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he did the following: 3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I have caused to be issued directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the petitioners. 3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result thereof to Higher headquarters and/or direct the immediate conduct of the investigation on the matter by the concerned unit/s, dispatching Radio Message on November 05, 2007, addressed to the Commanding General, Philippine Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA and CO 24 IB PA). A Copy of the Radio Message is attached as ANNEX "3" of this Affidavit. 3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters. 3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to another Petition for the Writ of Amparo (G.R. No. 179994) filed at the instance of relatives of a certain Cadapan and Empeo pending before the Supreme Court. 3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest efforts to establish the surrounding circumstances of the disappearances of the petitioners and to bring those responsible, including any military personnel if shown to have participated or had complicity in the commission of the complained acts, to the bar of justice, when warranted by the findings and the competent evidence that [50] may be gathered in the process. Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC) PA, earlier filed in G.R. No. 179994, another amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeo and Merino, which averred among others, viz: th 10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the 24 Infantry Batallion detachment as th detention area, I immediately went to the 24 IB detachment in Limay, Bataan and found no untoward incidents in the area nor any detainees by the name of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino being held captive; 11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the 24 IB in Limay, Bataan; 12) After going to the 24 IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries with the Philippine National Police, Limay, Bataan regarding the alleged detentions or deaths and were informed that none was reported to their good office; 13) I also directed Company Commander 1 Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire into the alleged beachhouse in
st th th [49]

Iba, Zambales also alleged to be a detention place where Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino were detained. As per the inquiry, however, no such beachhouse was used as a detention place [51] found to have been used by armed men to detain Cadapan, Empeo and Merino. It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the affidavits of Maj. Gen Jovito S. Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons implicated by therein petitioners could not be secured in time for the submission of the Return and would be subsequently [52] submitted. Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U. Jimenez, Provost th Marshall, 7 Infantry Division, Philippine Army, based in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The territorial jurisdiction of this Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and [53] th th [54] a portion of Pangasinan. The 24 Infantry Battalion is part of the 7 Infantry Division. On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of the 7 Infantry Division, [55] [56] Maj. Gen. Jovito Palaran, through his Assistant Chief of Staff, to investigate the alleged abduction of the respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries under his unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA Randy Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning; and a civilian named Rudy Mendoza. He was directed to determine: (1) the veracity of the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by the alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) [57] the administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if any. Jimenez testified that this particular investigation was initiated not by a complaint as was the usual procedure, but because the Commanding General saw news about the abduction of the Manalo brothers on the television, and he was concerned about what [58] was happening within his territorial jurisdiction. Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them execute sworn statements [59] and conducting an investigation on May 29, 2006. The investigation started at 8:00 in the morning and [60] finished at 10:00 in the evening. The investigating officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad, took the individual sworn statements of all six persons on that day. There were no other sworn statements taken, [61] not even of the Manalo family, nor were there other witnesses summoned and investigated as [62] according to Jimenez, the directive to him was only to investigate the six persons. Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements. The six persons were not known to [64] Jimenez as it was in fact his first time to meet them. During the entire time that he was beside Lingad, a subordinate of his in the Office of the Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not propound a single question to the [65] six persons. Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza had to come back the next day to sign their statements as the printing of their statements was interrupted by a power failure. Jimenez testified that the two signed on May 30, 2006, but the jurats of [66] their statements indicated that they were signed on May 29, 2006. When the Sworn Statements were turned over to Jimenez, he personally wrote his investigation report. He began writing it in the afternoon [67] of May 30, 2006 and finished it on June 1, 2006. He then gave his report to the Office of the Chief of [68] Personnel. As petitioners largely rely on Jimenez's Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006 for their evidence, the report is herein substantially quoted: III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE 4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO who were forcibly taken from their respective homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14 February 2006 by unidentified armed men and thereafter were forcibly disappeared. After the said incident, relatives of the victims filed a case for Abduction in the civil court against the herein suspects: Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU).
[63] th

a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "B") states that he was at Sitio Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the concrete building of a church located nearby his residence, together with some neighbor thereat. He claims that on 15 February 2006, he was being informed by Brgy. Kagawad Pablo Umayan about the abduction of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. As to the allegation that he was one of the suspects, he claims that they only implicated him because he was a CAFGU and that they claimed that those who abducted the Manalo brothers are members of the Military and CAFGU. Subject vehemently denied any participation or involvement on the abduction of said victims. b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "C") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a CAA member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo being his neighbors are active members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and he also knows their elder Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of being an NPA Leader operating in their province. That at the time of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and for accusing him to be one of the suspects, he claims that on February 14, 2006, he was one of those working at the concrete chapel being constructed nearby his residence. He claims further that he just came only to know about the incident on other day (15 Feb 06) when he was being informed by Kagawad Pablo Kunanan. That subject CAA vehemently denied any participation about the incident and claimed that they only implicated him because he is a member of the CAFGU. c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "O") states that he is a resident of Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member of CAFGU based at Biak na Bato Detachment. That being a neighbor, he was very much aware about the background of the two (2) brothers Raymond and Reynaldo as active supporters of the CPP NPA in their Brgy. and he also knew their elder brother "KUMANDER BESTRE" TN: Rolando Manalo. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at Brgy. Magmarate, San Miguel, Bulacan in the house of his aunt and he learned only about the incident when he arrived home in their place. He claims further that the only reason why they implicated him was due to the fact that his mother has filed a criminal charge against their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is an NPA Commander who killed his father and for that reason they implicated him in support of their brother. Subject CAA vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of said Manalo brothers. d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in (Exhibit "E") states that he is a resident of Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being his barriomate when he was still unmarried and he knew them since childhood. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at his residence in Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that he was being informed only about the incident lately and he was not aware of any reason why the two (2) brothers were being abducted by alleged members of the military and CAFGU. The only reason he knows why they implicated him was because there are those people who are angry with their family particularly victims of summary execution (killing) done by their brother @ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo who is an NPA leader. He claims further that it was their brother @ KA BESTRE who killed his father and he was living witness to that incident. Subject civilian vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of the Manalo brothers. e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "F") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a former CAA based at Biak na Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being their barrio mate. He claims further that they are active supporters of CPP/NPA and that their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was in his residence at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. That he vehemently denied any participation of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and learned only about the incident when rumors reached him by his barrio mates. He claims that his implication is merely fabricated because of his relationship to Roman and Maximo who are his brothers. f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "G") states that he is a

resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy. Tanod and a CAFGU member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that he knew very well the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in their barangay for having been the Tanod Chief for twenty (20) years. He alleged further that they are active supporters or sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and whose elder brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader operating within the area. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 Feb 2006 he was helping in the construction of their concrete chapel in their place and he learned only about the incident which is the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo when one of the Brgy. Kagawad in the person of Pablo Cunanan informed him about the matter. He claims further that he is truly innocent of the allegation against him as being one of the abductors and he considers everything fabricated in order to destroy his name that remains loyal to his service to the government as a CAA member. IV. DISCUSSION 5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case, the proof of linking them to the alleged abduction and disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo that transpired on 14 February 2006 at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement theretofore to that incident is considered doubtful, hence, no basis to indict them as charged in this investigation. Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past to quote: the killing of the father of Randy and Rudy Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo, this will not suffice to establish a fact that they were the ones who did the abduction as a form of revenge. As it was also stated in the testimony of other accused claiming that the Manalos are active sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA, this would not also mean, however, that in the first place, they were in connivance with the abductors. Being their neighbors and as members of CAFGU's, they ought to be vigilant in protecting their village from any intervention by the leftist group, hence inside their village, they were fully aware of the activities of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in so far as their connection with the CPP/NPA is concerned. V. CONCLUSION 6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged charges of abduction committed by the above named respondents has not been established in this investigation. Hence, it lacks merit to indict them for any administrative punishment and/or criminal liability. It is therefore concluded that they are innocent of the charge. VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza, and two (2) civilians Maximo F. Dela Cruz and Rudy L. Mendoza be exonerated from the case. [69] 8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed. In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate court's assessment of the foregoing evidence and assail the December 26, 2007 Decision on the following grounds, viz: I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN BELIEVING AND GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED, CONTRADICTED, AND OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND MANALO. II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN REQUIRING RESPONDENTS (HEREIN PETITIONERS) TO: (A) FURNISH TO THE MANALO BROTHER(S) AND TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN

CONNECTION WITH THEIR CASE, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN WRITING THE PRESENT PLACES OF OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka ROLLIE CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE PRODUCED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL REPORTS, RECORDS AND CHARTS, AND REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN OR RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE A LIST OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) [70] WHO ATTENDED TO THEM FROM FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007. The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us hearken to its beginning. The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the recommendations that resulted from a two-day National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July 16-17, 2007. The Summit was "envisioned to provide a [71] broad and fact-based perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances," hence "representatives from all sides of the political and social spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders [72] in the justice system" participated in mapping out ways to resolve the crisis. On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of extralegal [73] killing and enforced disappearances." It was an exercise for the first time of the Court's expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our people's constitutional rights, which made its maiden [74] appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime. As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or [75] judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the [76] deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law." The writ of amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means "protection" in Spanish. In 1837, de Tocqueville's Democracy in America became available in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its description [78] of the practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed to many Mexican jurists. One of them, Manuel [79] Crescencio Rejn, drafted a constitutional provision for his native state, Yucatan, which granted judges the power to protect all persons in the enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated into the national constitution in 1847, viz: The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and preservation of those rights granted to him by this Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against attacks by the Legislative and Executive powers of the federal or state governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in the specific case in litigation, making no general declaration concerning the statute or [80] regulation that motivated the violation. [81] Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican constitutionalism. If, after hearing, the judge determines that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the official's superiors, to cease the violation and to take the necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the full enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo thus combines the principles of judicial review derived from the U.S. with the limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting individual rights in particular cases, but [82] prevents them from using this power to make law for the entire nation. The writ of amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving into various [83] forms, in response to the particular needs of each country. It became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one piece of Mexico's self-attributed "task of conveying to the world's [84] legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her own painful history conceived." What began as a protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes: (1) amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality
[77]

of statutes; (3) amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) amparo administrativo for the judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) amparo [85] agrario for the protection of peasants' rights derived from the agrarian reform process. In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of amparo has been constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights abuses especially committed in countries under military juntas. In general, these countries adopted an all-encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of constitutional rights, including [86] socio-economic rights. Other countries like Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the protection of the writ of amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or fundamental [87] rights. In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of amparo, several of the above amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." The Clause accords a similar general protection to human rights extended by the amparo contra leyes, amparo casacion, and amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions [88] of the 1987 Constitution. The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law tradition of judicial review, [89] which finds its roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison. While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction [90] or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102, these remedies may not be adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ of amparo through summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions - borne out of the Latin American and Philippine experience of human rights abuses - offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring [91] substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for "Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary [92] Restraining Order" to stop petitioners and/or their officers and agents from depriving the respondents of [93] their right to liberty and other basic rights on August 23, 2007, prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies including Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and other legal and equitable remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007, they moved to have their petition treated as an amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances of the Manalo brothers' enforced disappearance. The Court granted their motion. With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners' first argument in disputing the Decision of the Court of Appeals states, viz: The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and credit to the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-serving [94] affidavit/testimony of herein respondent Raymond Manalo.

In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of petitioners' cause of action, to determine whether the evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the degree of proof required. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz: Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (emphasis supplied) Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz: Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphases supplied) Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as [95] adequate to support a conclusion. After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents were abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details of respondents' harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his memory. A few examples are the following: "Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at [96] nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel." "(N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng [97] sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel." "May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo [98] habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas." "Tumigil ako sa may [99] palaisdaan kung saan ginamit ko ang bato para tanggalin ang mga kadena." "Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-bahay kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko gusto kong i-text ang isang babae na [100] nakatira sa malapit na lugar." We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalo's affidavit and testimony, viz: ...the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently identified by the petitioners (herein respondents) to be military personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the six armed men who barged into his house through the rear door were military men based on their attire of fatigue pants and army boots, and the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the CAFGU and residents of Muzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also CAFGU members, served as lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was sure that three of the six military men were Ganata, who headed the abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van, and George. Subsequent incidents of their long captivity, as th narrated by the petitioners, validated their assertion of the participation of the elements of the 7 Infantry Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries. We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the petitioners were either members or sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the abductors were looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, the brother of petitioners. The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction were, at best, merely superficial. th The investigation of the Provost Marshall of the 7 Infantry Division focused on the one-sided version of the CAFGU auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness might be due to the fact that the Provost Marshall

could delve only into the participation of military personnel, but even then the Provost Marshall should have refrained from outrightly exculpating the CAFGU auxiliaries he perfunctorily investigated... Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established. At the very least, he was aware of the petitioners' captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In fact, he or any other officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told them what he wanted them and their parents to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparan's direct and personal role in the abduction might not have been shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during their long captivity at the hands of military personnel under his command bespoke of his indubitable command policy that unavoidably encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without due process of law and without probable cause. In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth Division (Justices Buzon, chairman; Santiago-Lagman, Sr., member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr., member/ponente.) found no clear and convincing evidence to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario had anything to do with the abduction or the detention. Hilario's involvement could not, indeed, be then established after Evangeline Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario drive the van in which the petitioners were boarded and ferried following the abduction, did not testify. (See the decision of the habeas proceedings at rollo, p. 52) However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-300 van in which the petitioners were brought away from their houses on February 14, 2006. Raymond also attested that Hilario participated in subsequent incidents during the captivity of the petitioners, one of which was when Hilario fetched them from Fort Magsaysay on board a Revo and conveyed them to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan where they were detained for at least a week in a house of strong materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and then Hilario (along with Efren) brought them to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished house inside the compound of Kapitan where they were kept for more or less three months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) It was there where the petitioners came face to face with Gen. Palparan. Hilario and Efren also brought the petitioners one early morning to the house of the petitioners' parents, where only Raymond was presented to the parents to relay the message from Gen. Palparan not to join anymore rallies. On that occasion, Hilario warned the parents that they would not again see their sons should they join any rallies to denounce human rights violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-206) Hilario was also among four Master Sergeants (the others being Arman, Ganata and Cabalse) with whom Gen. Palparan conversed on the occasion when Gen. Palparan required Raymond to take the medicines for his health. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206) There were other occasions when the petitioners saw that Hilario had a direct hand in their torture. It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and forced disappearance of the petitioners was established. The participation of other military personnel like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and Caigas, among others, was similarly established. xxx xxx xxx As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally involved in the abduction. We also [101] do, for, indeed, the evidence of their participation is overwhelming. We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's statements were not corroborated [102] by other independent and credible pieces of evidence. Raymond's affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries [103] inflicted on respondents, also corroborate respondents' accounts of the torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo's familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the [104] "DTU," as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the "Division Training Unit," firms up respondents' story that they were detained for some time in said military facility. In Ortiz v. Guatemala, a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Commission considered similar evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was abducted and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was
[105]

kidnapped and tortured in early November 1989. The Commission's findings of fact were mostly based on [106] the consistent and credible statements, written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal. These statements were supported by her recognition of portions of the route they took when she was [107] being driven out of the military installation where she was detained. She was also examined by a medical doctor whose findings showed that the 111 circular second degree burns on her back and abrasions on her cheek coincided with her account of cigarette burning and torture she suffered while in [108] detention. With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise. We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of amparo. There is no quarrel that the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not "free in every sense of the word"[109] as their "movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a [110] position to threaten respondents' rights to life, liberty and security." (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even [111] killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person. Elaborating on the "right to security, in general," respondents point out that this right is "often associated with liberty;" it is also seen as an "expansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and unusual punishment." Conceding that there is no right to security expressly mentioned in Article III of the 1987 Constitution, they submit that their rights "to be kept free from torture and from [112] incommunicado detention and solitary detention places fall under the general coverage of the right to security of person under the writ of Amparo." They submit that the Court ought to give an expansive recognition of the right to security of person in view of the State Policy under Article II of the 1987 Constitution which enunciates that, "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." Finally, to justify a liberal interpretation of the right to security of person, respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa v. Enrile[113] that "the right to liberty may be made more [114] meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by the State on the exercise of that liberty" such as a [115] requirement to "report under unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a deprivation of liberty" or [116] being put under "monitoring and surveillance." In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life and liberty, and a violation of their right to security. Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been violated as respondents assert. The right to security or the right to security of person finds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which provides, viz: Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge... At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person, including the extensions of his/her person houses, papers, and effects - against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the state's power over a person's home and possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the [117] person himself. The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the Court in People v. CFI of Rizal, [118] Branch IX, Quezon City, viz:

The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the security of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and happiness and to the peace and security of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons and correspondence. (Taada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures must be deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a man's soul than the serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personal security. [119] Any interference allowable can only be for the best causes and reasons. (emphases supplied) [120] [121] While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be alive - upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property... pervades the whole history of man. It touches [122] every aspect of man's existence." In a broad sense, the right to security of person "emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the [123] nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual." A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right. First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people." (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that "freedom from fear" [124] is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right. It is the [125] "right to security of person" as the word "security" itself means "freedom from fear." Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz: [126] Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. (emphasis supplied) In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person, viz: 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. (emphasis supplied) The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR. In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to wellfounded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to security" is actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the [127] provision. Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one's body [128] cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries

constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a [129] person. Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological invasion, viz: (2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him (any person under investigation for the commission of an offense). Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will - although not involving invasion of bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of "freedom from threat" as afore-discussed. Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under investigation for the commission of an offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even under such investigation should all the more be protected from these degradations. An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against torture was made by [130] the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v. Russia. In this case, the claimant, who was lawfully detained, alleged that the state authorities had physically abused him in prison, thereby violating his right to security of person. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides, viz: "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ..." (emphases supplied) Article 3, on the other hand, provides that "(n)o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Although the application failed on the facts as the alleged ill-treatment was found baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security in holding, viz: ...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic authorities at the time when they could reasonably have been expected to take measures in order to ensure his security and to investigate the circumstances in question. xxx xxx xxx ... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply with the procedural obligation under Art.3 to conduct an effective investigation into his allegations.[131] (emphasis supplied) The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has also made a statement that the protection of the bodily integrity of women may also be related to the right to security and liberty, viz: ...gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law or under specific human rights conventions is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). These rights and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty and security of [132] person. Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full [133] respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez [134] Rodriguez Case, viz:

(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the [135] government. This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government protection has been [136] [137] interpreted by the United Nations' Human Rights Committee in not a few cases involving Article 9 of the ICCPR. While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to [138] security of person to be invoked. In Delgado Paez v. Colombia, a case involving death threats to a religion teacher at a secondary school in Leticia, Colombia, whose social views differed from those of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the Committee held, viz: The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph. Its location as a part of paragraph one could lead to the view that the right to security arises only in the context of arrest and detention. The travaux prparatoires indicate that the discussions of the first sentence did indeed focus on matters dealt with in the other provisions of article 9. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in article 3, refers to the right to life, the right to liberty and the right to security of the person. These elements have been dealt with in separate clauses in the Covenant. Although in the Covenant the only reference to the right of security of person is to be found in article 9, there is no evidence that it was intended to narrow the concept of the right to security only to situations of formal deprivation of liberty. At the same time, States parties have undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in the Covenant. It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States can ignore known threats to the life of persons under their jurisdiction, just because that he or she is not arrested or otherwise detained. States parties are under an obligation to take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect them. An interpretation of article 9 which would allow a State party to ignore threats to the personal security of non-detained persons within its jurisdiction would render totally ineffective [139] the guarantees of the Covenant. (emphasis supplied) [140] The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia, which involved a political activist and prisoner of conscience who continued to be intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his movements following his release from detention. In a catena of cases, the ruling of the Committee was of a similar import: [141] Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea, involving discrimination, intimidation and persecution of [142] opponents of the ruling party in that state; Tshishimbi v. Zaire, involving the abduction of the [143] complainant's husband who was a supporter of democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v. Angola, involving the murder of the complainant's partner and the harassment he (complainant) suffered because of his [144] investigation of the murder; and Chongwe v. Zambia, involving an assassination attempt on the chairman of an opposition alliance. Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to security" not only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford [145] protection of the right to liberty. The ECHR interpreted the "right to security of person" under Article 5(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt [146] v. Turkey. In this case, the claimant's son had been arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since. The family's requests for information and investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested that this was a violation of her son's right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz: ... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been [147] taken into custody and has not been seen since. (emphasis supplied) Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we now determine whether there is a continuing violation of respondents' right to security.

First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents' life, liberty and security. While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families, including them, would be killed. In Raymond's narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline after he was caught the first time he attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain "Mam," who wanted to see him before he was killed, spared him. This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed has come to pass. It should be stressed that they are now free from captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained in a camp in Limay, Bataan, respondents' captors even told them that they were still deciding whether they should be executed. Respondent Raymond Manalo attested in his affidavit, viz: Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami [148] o hindi. The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in detention. With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo, and Manuel Merino, among others. Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are [149] forced to limit their movements or activities. Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents' abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the failure of military elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents' abduction as revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners' own witness, Lt. Col. th Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7 Infantry Division. The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He merely relied on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the investigation for the first time. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was taking the sworn statements, but he did not propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of their statements or their credibility. He did not call for other witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the family or neighbors of the respondents. In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive dated October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of action in the event the writ of amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP, which should essentially include verification of the identity of the aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of relevant evidence; identification of witnesses and securing statements from them; determination of the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance; identification and apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and bringing of the [150] suspected offenders before a competent court. Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting that he received the above directive of respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the

purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of [151] the respondents, and undertook to provide results of the investigations to respondents. To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive was issued by petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have not been furnished the results of the investigation which they now seek through the instant petition for a writ of amparo. Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of respondents' right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government. In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as "freedom from threat" is violated by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military. Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners question. First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already in file with the court. Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas. Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical reports, records and charts, and reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the Manalo brothers, to include a list of medical personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007. With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production order sought by respondents partakes of the characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be complied with prior to the grant of the production order, namely: (1) the application must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (3) there exists probable cause with one specific offense; and (4) the probable cause must be personally determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.[152] In the case at bar, however, petitioners point out that other than the bare, self-serving and vague allegations made by respondent Raymond Manalo in his unverified declaration and affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be produced are only mentioned generally by name, with no other supporting details. They also argue that the relevancy of the documents to be produced must be apparent, but this is not true in the present case as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not been shown. Petitioners' arguments do not hold water. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a search warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a protection of the government from the demand of the people such as respondents. Instead, the amparo production order may be likened to the production of documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part, viz: Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order. Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control... [153] In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad, the respondent judge, under authority of Rule 27, issued a subpoena duces tecum for the production and inspection of among others, the books

and papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The company questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it violated the search and seizure clause. The Court struck down the argument and held that the subpoena pertained to a civil procedure that "cannot be identified or confused with unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution..." Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook "to provide results of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters." With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the submission of a list of medical personnel, is irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution of the petition for a writ of amparo. They add that it will unnecessarily compromise and jeopardize the exercise of official functions and duties of military officers and even unwittingly and unnecessarily expose them to threat of personal injury or even death. On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, whom respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is relevant in ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help ensure that these military officers can be served with notices and court processes in relation to any investigation and action for violation of the respondents' rights. The list of medical personnel is also relevant in securing information to create the medical history of respondents and make appropriate medical interventions, when applicable and necessary. In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed.

SO ORDERED. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, ChicoNazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-De Castro, and Brion, JJ., concur. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE Ninety-fourth session 13-31 October 2008

MR. ORLY MARCELLANA, MR. DANIEL GUMANOY, EDEN MARCELLANA AND MR. EDDIE GUMANOY v. PHILIPPINES

VIEWS Return Home

BEFORE:

CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Rafael Rivas Posada (Colombia)

VICE-CHAIRPERSONS: Mr. Ahmed Tawfik Khalil (Egypt); Ms. Elisabeth Palm (Sweden); Mr. Ivan Shearer (Australia) RAPPORTEUR: Mr. Abdelfattah Amor (Tunisia) MEMBERS: Mr. Prafullachandra Natwarlal Bhagwati (India); Ms. Christine Chanet (France); Mr. Maurice Glele-Ahanhanzo (Benin); Mr. Yuji Iwasawa (Japan); Mr. Edwin Johnson Lopez (Ecuador); Ms. Helen Keller (Switzerland); Mr. Rajsoomer Lallah (Mauritius); Ms. Zonke Zanele Majodina (South Africa); Ms. Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Romania); Mr. Michael OFlaherty (Ireland); Sir Nigel Rodley (United Kingdom); Mr. Jose Luis Perez Sanchez-Cerro (Peru); Ms. Ruth Wedgwood (United States of America) PermaLink: http://www.worldcourts.com/hrc/eng/decisions/2008.10.30_Marcellana_v_Philippines.htm Citation: Marcellana and Gumanoy v. Philippines, Comm. 1560/2007, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/94/D/1560/2007 (HRC 2008)

Represented Marie Hilao-Enriquez [Alliance for the Advancement of People's Rights- Karapatan] By:

The Human Rights Committee, established under article 28 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Meeting on 30 October 2008, Having concluded its consideration of communication No. 1560/2007, submitted to the Human Rights Committee on behalf of Ms. Eden Marcellana and Mr. Eddie Gumanoy under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Having taken into account all written information made available to it by the author of the communication, and the State party, Adopts the following: VIEWS UNDER ARTICLE 5, PARAGRAPH 4, OF THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL 1.1 The authors of the communication are Mr. Orly Marcellana and Mr. Daniel Gumanoy. They submit the communication on behalf of their relatives, Ms. Eden Marcellana and Mr. Eddie Gumanoy, who were both found dead near each other in Bansud (Mindoro Oriental, Philippines), on 22 April 2003. They allege violations by the Philippines of the victims' rights under article 2, paragraphs 1 and 3; article 6, paragraph 1; article 7; article 9, paragraph 1; article 10, paragraph 1; article 17; and article 26 of the Covenant. They are represented by Ms. Marie Hilao-Enriquez, from the Alliance for the Advancement of People's Rights- Karapatan. 1.2 The Covenant entered into force for the State party on 23 January 1986 and the Optional Protocol on 22 November 1989. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2.1 Ms. Marcellana was the former Secretary General of Karapatan-Southern Tagalog (a human rights organisation) and Mr. Eddie Gumanoy was the former chairperson of Kasama Tk (an organization of farmers). From 19 April 2003 to 21 April 2003, they were leading a factfinding mission in the province of Mindoro Oriental, to enquire about the abduction of three individuals in Gloria town

allegedly committed by elements of the 204th infantry brigade, under the command of one Col. Jovito Palparan, and the killing and disappearance of civilians and burning of properties by the military in the town of Pinamalayan. 2.2 The authors claim that Ms. Marcellana was threatened several times by the military for her advocacy work. In addition, while conducting their work, mission members were under the impression that they were under constant surveillance. At some point, when trying to see the detainees inside the 204th infantry brigade, members of the mission were photographed against their will. On 21 April 2003, the victims decided to conclude the mission and leave Pinamalayan for Calapan City. 2.3 On the same day, at around 7.00 pm, the victims (together with other members of the fact finding mission) were travelling on the highway about 5.5 kilometres from the 204th infantry brigade headquarters, when their van was stopped by ten armed men. The assailants specifically asked for Ms. Marcellana, who was forced to reveal her identity. All the belongings of the members of the factfinding mission, including mobile phones, documents and photos of the mission, were then seized. After the armed men tied them up, they were taken into a vehicle ("jeepney"). The armed men were not all hooded and some of them could be identified as being Aniano "Silver" Flores and Richard "Waway" Falla, former rebels and currently associated with the military. 2.4 At some point, the victims were ordered to step out of the vehicle while the other members of the fact-finding mission stayed inside the vehicle and were later dropped along the roadside in different parts of Bongagbong municipality. The dead bodies of Ms. Marcellana and Mr. Eddie Gumanoy were found the following day. Forensic reports and the death certificates indicate that their death was caused by gun-shot wounds. 2.5 The authors filed a complaint for kidnapping and murder before the Department of Justice (DOJ). By resolution of 17 December 2004, the DOJ dismissed the complaint and the charges against one of the alleged perpetrators on the ground of insufficient evidence. The authors filed a Petition for Review on 22 February 2005, which was dismissed on 20 November 2006. On 7 December 2006, the authors filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said resolution, which was dismissed on 17 April 2007. On 24 May 2007, the authors appealed the DOJ's decisions of 20 November 2006 and 17 April 2007 before the Office of the President of the Republic. The appeal requested that the DOJ decision be reversed and that charges be filed against Aniano "Silver" Flores and Richard "Waway" Falla. That appeal is still pending. 2.6 A complaint was also filed with the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines. This complaint was later withdrawn, due to the authors' assessment that they would not obtain justice from this body. Complaints were also filed with the House of Representatives of the Philippines, the Senate, and under the Comprehensive Agreement on respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, but no action was taken. The authors add that, in spite of widespread and public opposition, one of the principal suspected perpetrators, Col. Palparan, was later promoted to Major General by the President. 2.7 The authors recognize that domestic remedies have not been exhausted, but state that in the present case, remedies have been unreasonably prolonged and are ineffective, as they are unlikely to result in substantial justice and effective redress and do not constitute a remedy for the authors. THE COMPLAINT 3. The authors claim a violation by the State party of article 2, paragraphs 1 and 3; article 6, paragraph 1; article 7; article 9, paragraph 1; article 10, paragraph 1; article 17; and article 26 of the Covenant. STATE PARTY'S OBSERVATIONS ON ADMISSIBILITY AND MERITS 4.1 On 3 September 2007, the State party filed its observations on the admissibility and merits of the

communication. On admissibility, the State party claims that the authors have not exhausted all available domestic remedies. It states that, although the DOJ complaint was dismissed in December 2004, it could have been appealed to the Secretary of Justice. [FN1] Should the Secretary of Justice act on the basis of grave abuse of discretion, this decision could be challenged by way of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As regards the alleged delay in the proceedings at the DOJ, the State party claims that for it to have operative legal adverse effect the delay must be unreasonable and consequently the DOJ cannot be held responsible for any delay. In addition, the DOJ cannot be blamed for dismissing the criminal complaint filed by the authors, as its resolution was not arbitrary but duly considered the claims presented and ultimately concluded that the evidence for the prosecution failed to establish probable cause against the respondents. In the State party, the determination of probable cause for purpose of filing a criminal action in the courts falls within the discretion of the prosecutor [FN2] subject to the supervision and control of the DOJ Secretary. The authors could still file a criminal complaint if they gather sufficient evidence against the respondents. A preliminary investigation such as the one conducted by the DOJ- does not in itself constitute a trial. The authors could also file administrative charges against the military officials allegedly involved before the Office of the Ombudsman, or initiate civil proceedings, in accordance with article 35 of the Civil Code. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN1] Section 4, 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, Department Circular No. 70. [FN2] "The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. It cannot be controlled by the complainant", Supreme Court of the Philippines, Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 465. 467 (1987). -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------4.2 With respect to the withdrawal of the complaint pending before the Philippine Commission on Human Rights, the State party argues that such action is tantamount to accusing the Commission of bad faith, which is inconsistent with the legal presumption that this body acts in accordance with its mandate. It points out that the authors themselves attached to their communication a letter from the Commission inquiring about the probity of the confirmation of Brig. Gen. Palparan, which shows that the Commission has been discharging its mandate properly. 4.3 In the House of Representatives and the Senate, the matter was referred to the pertinent committees. In the Senate, a resolution has been issued urging its Committee on Human Rights to conduct an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the present case. The House of Representatives and the Senate constitute the legislative branch of the Government and the authors cannot expect any definitive judgment from these bodies. 4.4 In view of the above, the State party argues that the authors have chosen not to pursue available domestic remedies due to impatience and mistrust in the local government. Therefore, it contends that it is premature for the authors to conclude that domestic remedies are ineffective. 4.5 In addition, the State party argues that the communication is inadmissible under article 5, paragraph 2 (a) of the Optional Protocol as the same matter is being examined by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, who visited the country from 12- 21 February 2007. 4.6 The State party also challenges the admissibility of the communication on grounds of abuse of the right of submission, as the authors refuse to recognize and respect its authority to investigate, prosecute and resolve criminal acts within its territorial jurisdiction. The authors are trying to involve the international community in the handling of a case about the State party's domestic criminal laws, which constitutes an undue interference with the State party's domestic affairs.

4.7 Finally, the State party maintains that the communication does not sufficiently substantiate the alleged violations of the Covenant committed by the State party. The narration of the facts only establishes that Ms. Marcellana and Mr. Gumanoy were kidnapped and murdered, that some armed men were the perpetrators and that three of those men were allegedly identified. However, the required link between those facts and the authorities of the State party has not been established. 4.8 On the merits, the State party states that it actively pursues remedies concerning alleged extrajudicial killings, and refers to Administrative Order No. 157 of 21 August 2006 issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo, which creates an independent commission (the "Melo Commission") to probe the killings of media workers and activists. On 22 February 2007, the Melo Commission released its eighty-six page preliminary report, which is being studied by various branches of the Government. In addition, the Supreme Court of the Philippines has drafted guidelines for the Special Courts that will handle extrajudicial killing cases. The State party refers to the preliminary report by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, which recognizes that efforts have been made by the State party to fight extrajudicial killings. [FN3] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN3] Preliminary note on the visit of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, to the Philippines (12-21 February, 2007), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/20/Add.3, para. 4. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------4.9 Furthermore, the State party contends that the communication fails to establish how the State party has violated the Covenant. It submits that the killings of Ms. Marcellana and Mr. Gumanoy are not attributable to its armed forces or to the State but to individuals acting in their own interest. Nevertheless, it is doing its best to ensure that the fundamental rights and liberties of its citizens are respected. The State party recalls that if a State fails to investigate, prosecute or redress private, nonstate acts in violation of fundamental rights; it is in effect aiding the perpetrators of such violations for which it could be held responsible under international law. The establishment of the independent Melo Commission to investigate extrajudicial killings shows the State party's resolve to respond to the problem. 4.10 The State party regrets that human rights organizations have not informed the Commission of the numbers of victims of extrajudicial killings and the reasons why they believe that the military is responsible for those killings. It reiterates that these organizations refused to cooperate with the investigation conducted by bodies created by the State party and instead invoked the Committee's authority. AUTHORS' COMMENTS ON THE STATE PARTY'S OBSERVATIONS 5.1 On 16 February 2008, the authors commented on the State party's submission. On the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies, they reiterate that this requirement does not apply when remedies are unreasonably prolonged or ineffective. More than five years to the day the victims were kidnapped and murdered in April 2003 and two years after the communication was submitted to the Committee, the legal action which the authors have tried to pursue remains pending before the Office of the President of the State party. Despite overwhelming evidence and clear identification by four witnesses, one of the alleged perpetrators was discharged when the Chief State Prosecutor dismissed the case in December 2004. 5.2 Prior to such dismissal, congressional investigations were held before the House of Representatives and the Senate in May 2003. The House's Committee on Civil, Political and Human Rights, in its initial report, called for a further probe and the temporary relief of then Col. Palparan while the investigation was ongoing but the latter remained in active duty. The Senate's Committee on Justice and Human Rights, for its part, after conducting an initial hearing, suspended its inquiry due to the preliminary investigation before the DOJ.

5.3 As regards the hearings before the Commission on Human Rights, the authors were compelled to withdraw from them because the Commission displayed only casual interest in the case and was allegedly only going through the motions, and that the hearings were being used to eventually clear Col. Palparan and remove obstacles to his promotion. Hence, the withdrawal from proceedings before this Commission was a legitimate sign of protest. Moreover, reference by the State party to the letter sent by the Commission to the Senate is misguided, as the Commission only sent this letter after the survivors and the victims' families complained and criticized the Commission for having allowed the promotion of Col. Palparan, despite serious charges of human rights violations filed against him. 5.4 The authors filed a petition for review of the DOJ dismissal on 22 February 2005, which was dismissed on 20 November 2006, almost two years later, without providing reasons. A new motion for reconsideration was denied by the Secretary of Justice in April 2007, again in a perfunctory manner. Given the excessive time that the DOJ took to resolve the case, and given the way the appeals were disposed of, the authors disagree with the State party that the DOJ cannot be held responsible for the delay. In addition, the explanation provided by the State party on the determination of probable cause, the function of a preliminary investigation and the existence of other remedies are irrelevant to the issue of unreasonable delay. 5.5 The authors point to the pattern of consistent human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, in the State party, which makes domestic remedies ineffective and meaningless. They add that, despite the claims to the opposite by the State party, not a single perpetrator has been convicted. 5.6 With respect to the claim by the State party that the communication is inadmissible as it is being examined by another procedure of international investigation or settlement, the authors consider it to be inapplicable to the present case. On one hand, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions has concluded his investigation and therefore the matter is no longer being examined. On the other hand, the visit by a Special Rapporteur to the State party cannot be considered as an international procedure of investigation or settlement for the purposes of article 5, paragraph 2(a) of the Optional Protocol. 5.7 The authors add that their communication does not constitute an abuse of the right of submission. They state that the circumstances that give rise to an abuse of the right of submission, such as deliberate submission of false information or excessive delay in filing a complaint, do not exist in their case. Additionally, the authors are not refusing to recognize the State party's authority, but claim that domestic remedies are ineffective. 5.8 With respect to the alleged lack of sufficient substantiation invoked by the State party, the authors refer to the extensive supporting documentation attached to their initial communication. They assert that that the link to the State party's authorities as perpetrator of the crimes was clearly established and validated by the findings and reports of several independent bodies. [FN4] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN4] The authors refer to the Permanent People's Tribunal Second Session on the Philippines; the report of the US Women Lawyers Human Rights delegation, and the report of the National Council of Churches in the Philippines, which they attached to their submissions. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------5.9 On the merits, the authors recall that the remedies pursued by the State party have not effectively stopped the extrajudicial killings nor have they afforded justice to the victims. With respect to the Melo Commission, they note that its preliminary report was released in February 2007 under much public pressure, but that no final report has been issued since then. The Melo Commission suffered from lack of credibility and had little power to conduct investigations. Furthermore, several months after the release of the preliminary report, the State party is still studying its recommendations. They invoke the final report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, which states

that "[t]he many measures that have been promulgated by the Government to respond to the problem of extrajudicial executions are encouraging. However, they have yet to succeed, and the extrajudicial executions continue". [FN5] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN5] Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Mission to the Philippines, 27 November 2007, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/3/Add.2, pages 46-47. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------5.10 Finally, the authors allege that it is clear from the presentation of the facts as well as the supporting documents that the perpetrators identified were members of the State party's security forces, i.e. the 204th infantry brigade of the Philippine Army under the command of then Col. Jovito Palparan., Jr and the so-called rebel returnees who are under military control and command. The authors refer to the Sarma case [FN6] , where the Committee held Sri Lanka responsible for the disappearance perpetrated by a corporal who abducted a victim, despite the State's contention that the corporal acted beyond authority and without knowledge of his superior officers. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN6] Communication No. 950/2000, Sarma v. Sri Lanka, Views adopted on 16 July 2003. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------ISSUES AND PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION OF ADMISSIBILITY 6.1 Before considering any claims contained in a communication, the Human Rights Committee must, in accordance with article 93 of its rules of procedure, decide whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. 6.2 The Committee notes the State party's challenge to the admissibility of the communication on the ground of failure to exhaust domestic remedies. The authors have conceded nonexhaustion of domestic remedies but claim that remedies have been ineffective and unreasonably prolonged. The Committee refers to its case law, to the effect that, for the purposes of article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol, domestic remedies must both be effective and available, and must not be unduly prolonged. The victims' bodies were found in April 2003, and complaints were filed with the legislative bodies and the DOJ soon thereafter. [FN7] Proceedings at the DOJ were finally closed in April 2007. To date, an appeal filed in May 2007 before the Office of the President has not been resolved and remains pending. The Committee considers that, in the circumstances of the present case, domestic remedies have been unreasonably prolonged. The Committee accordingly finds that article 5, paragraph 2 (b), does not preclude it from considering the complaint. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN7] Complaints with the House of representative and Senate were filed in May 2003. Information in the file suggests that proceedings at the DOJ were under way in May/June 2003. No information was provided as to the date of the complaint with the Human Rights Commission. [FN8] Communications Nos. 146/1983 ; 148/1983-154/1983, Baboeram-Adhin et al. v. Suriname, Views of 4 April 1985, paragraph 9.1; Communication No. 540/1993, Laureano v. Peru, Views of 25 March 1996, paragraph 7.1. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------6.3 The Committee also notes the State party's contention that the case is inadmissible because the subject matter of the communication is being or was examined by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, who visited the country in February 2007. However, the Committee observes that fact-finding country visits by a Special Rapporteur do not constitute a "procedure of international investigation or settlement" within the meaning of article 5, paragraph 2(a), of the Optional Protocol. The Committee further recalls that the study of human rights problems in a country by a Special Rapporteur, although it might refer to or draw on information

concerning individuals, could not be regarded as being the same matter as the examination of individual cases within the meaning of article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol. Accordingly, the Committee considers that the 2007 country visit by the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, does not render the communication inadmissible under article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol. [8] 6.4 The State party argues that, by refusing to recognize the State party's authority to investigate, prosecute and resolve criminal acts within its jurisdiction and by involving the international community in a case concerning the State party's domestic laws, the authors have abused their right of submission. The Committee rejects this view: On the contrary, it is clear that pursuant to article 1 of the Optional Protocol "[a] State party to the Covenant that becomes a party to the [] Protocol recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State party". In the absence of any valid reason offered as to why the present communication constitutes an abuse of right of submission, the Committee is of the view that the case is not inadmissible on this ground. 6.5 As regards the authors' claims relating to article 2, paragraph 1; article 7; article 10, paragraph 1; article 17; and article 26 of the Covenant, the Committee observes that the authors do not provide any explanation on how the victims' rights under these provisions have been violated. The Committee considers that the authors have not substantiated these claims, for purposes of admissibility. The claims under article 2, paragraph 1; article 7; article 10, paragraph 1; article 17; and article 26, are thus inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 6.6 The Committee considers that the facts of the case give rise to issues under article 2, paragraph 3, article 6, paragraph 1; and article 9, paragraph 1, of the Covenant. In the absence of any other obstacles to the admissibility of these claims, the Committee considers them to be sufficiently substantiated, for purposes of admissibility, and proceeds to their consideration on the merits. CONSIDERATION OF THE MERITS 7.1 The Human Rights Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, as provided in article 5, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol. 7.2 As to the claim under article 6, paragraph 1, the Committee observes that it is an established fact, as recognized in the decision of the DOJ of 17 December 2004, that Ms. Marcellana and Mr. Gumanoy were kidnapped, robbed and killed by an armed group. In this regard, the Committee recalls its jurisprudence that criminal investigation and consequential prosecution are necessary remedies for violations of human rights such as those protected by article 6. [FN9] The Committee further recalls its General Comment No. 31[80], which lays down that where investigations reveal violations of certain Covenant rights, States parties must ensure that those responsible are brought to justice. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN9] Communication No.1436/2005, Sathasivam v. Sri Lanka, Views adopted on 8 July 2008, paragraph 6.4. See also the Committee's General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev/Add.13 (2004), paragraphs 15, 18. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------7.3 In the present case, though over five years have elapsed since the killings took place, the State party's authorities have not indicted, prosecuted or brought to justice anyone in connection with these events. The Committee notes that the State party's prosecutorial authorities have, after a preliminary investigation, decided not to initiate criminal proceedings against one of the suspects due to lack of sufficient evidence. The Committee has not been provided with any information, other than about initiatives at the policy level, as to whether any investigations were carried out to ascertain the responsibility of the other members of the armed group identified by the witnesses.

7.4 In view of the above, and in the absence of other pertinent explanations on this matter by the State party, the Committee concludes that the absence of investigations to establish responsibility for the kidnapping and murder of the victims amounted to a denial of justice. The State party must accordingly be held to be in breach of its obligation, under article 6, in conjunction with article 2, paragraph 3, properly to investigate the death of the victims and take appropriate action against those found guilty. 7.5 As to the claim under article 9, the authors argue that Ms. Marcellana was threatened several times because of her human rights work and that the military had previously incited violence against her. In addition, while conducting their fact-finding mission, all members of the team felt under constant surveillance. The State party does not challenge these statements, nor does it provide any other pertinent information on this allegation. 7.6 The Committee recalls its jurisprudence [FN10] on article 9, paragraph 1, and reiterates that the Covenant protects the right to security of person also outside the context of formal deprivation of liberty. An interpretation of article 9 which would allow a State party to ignore threats to the personal security of non-detained persons subject to its jurisdiction would render ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant. Moreover, States parties are under an obligation to take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect these persons. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN10] Communication No. 195/1985, Delgado Pez v. Colombia, Views adopted on 12 July 1990, paragraph 5.5, Communication No. 711/1996, Dias v. Angola, Views adopted on 20 March 2000, paragraph 8.3; Communication No. 821/1998, Chongwe v. Zambia, Views adopted on 25 October 2000, paragraph 5.3. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------7.7 In the present case, the Committee observes that, given that the victims were human rights workers and that at least one of them had been threatened in the past, there appeared to have been an objective need for them to be afforded protective measures to guarantee their security by the State. However, there is no indication that such protection was provided at any time. On the contrary, the authors claimed that the military was the source of the threats received by Ms. Marcellana, and that the fact-finding team was under constant surveillance during its mission. In these circumstances, the Committee concludes that the State party has failed to take appropriate measures to ensure the victims' right to security of person, protected by article 9, paragraph 1, of the Covenant. 8. The Human Rights Committee, acting under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is of the view that the facts as found by the Committee reveal a violations by the Philippines of article 2, paragraph 3; article 6, paragraph 1; and article 9, paragraph 1, of the Covenant. 9. In accordance with article 2, paragraph 3 (a), of the Covenant, the State party is under an obligation to provide the authors with an effective remedy, including initiation and pursuit of criminal proceedings to establish responsibility for the kidnapping and death of the victims, and payment of appropriate compensation. The State party should also take measures to ensure that such violations do not recur in the future. 10. Bearing in mind that, by becoming a party to the Optional Protocol, the State party has recognized the competence of the Committee to determine whether there has been a violation of the Covenant or not and that, pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, the State party has undertaken to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant, and to provide an effective and enforceable remedy in case a violation has been established, the Committee wishes to receive from the State party, within 180 days, information about the measures taken to give effect to the Committee's Views. The State party is also requested to publish the Committee's Views.

[Adopted in English, French and Spanish, the English text being the original version. Subsequently to be issued also in Arabic, Chinese and Russian as part of the Committee's annual report to the General Assembly.]

Made public by decision of the Human Rights Committee.

BUCK v. BELL, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) 274 U.S. 200 BUCK v. BELL, Superintendent of State Colony Epileptics and Feeble Minded. No. 292. Argued April 22, 1927. Decided May 2, 1927. [274 U.S. 200, 201] Mr. I. P. Whitehead, of Lynchburg, Va., for plaintiff in error. [274 U.S. 200, 203] Mr. A. E. Strode, of Lynchburg, Va., for defendant in error. [274 U.S. 200, 205] Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a writ of error to review a judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia, affirming a judgment of the Circuit Court of Amherst County, by which the defendant in error, the superintendent of the State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble Minded, was ordered to perform the operation of salpingectomy upon Carrie Buck, the plaintiff in error, for the purpose of making her sterile. 143 Va. 310, 130 S. E. 516. The case comes here upon the contention that the statute authorizing the judgment is void under the Fourteenth Amendment as denying to the plaintiff in error due process of law and the equal protection of the laws. Carrie Buck is a feeble-minded white woman who was committed to the State Colony above mentioned in due form. She is the daughter of a feeble- minded mother in the same institution, and the mother of an illegitimate feeble-minded child. She was eighteen years old at the time of the trial of her case in the Circuit Court in the latter part of 1924. An Act of Virginia approved March 20, 1924 (Laws 1924, c. 394) recites that the health of the patient and the welfare of society may be promoted in certain cases by the sterilization of mental defectives, under careful safeguard, etc.; that the sterilization may be effected in males by vasectomy and in females by salpingectomy, without serious pain or substantial danger to life; that the Commonwealth is supporting in various institutions many defective persons who if now discharged would become [274 U.S. 200, 206] a menace but if incapable of procreating might be discharged with safety and become self-supporting with benefit to themselves and to society; and that experience has shown that heredity plays an important part in the transmission of insanity, imbecility, etc. The statute then enacts that whenever the superintendent of certain institutions including the abovenamed State Colony shall be of opinion that it is for the best interest of the patients and of society that an inmate under his care should be sexually sterilized, he may have the operation performed upon any patient afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity, imbecility, etc., on complying with the very careful provisions by which the act protects the patients from possible abuse. The superintendent first presents a petition to the special board of directors of his hospital or colony, stating the facts and the grounds for his opinion, verified by affidavit. Notice of the petition and of the time and place of the hearing in the institution is to be served upon the inmate, and also upon his guardian, and if there is no guardian the superintendent is to apply to the Circuit Court of the County to appoint one. If the inmate is a minor notice also is to be given to his parents, if any, with a copy of the petition. The board is to see to it that the inmate may attend the hearings if desired by him or his guardian. The evidence is all to be reduced to writing, and after the board has made its order for or against the operation, the superintendent, or the inmate, or his guardian, may appeal to the Circuit Court of the County. The Circuit Court may consider the record of the board and the evidence before it and such other

admissible evidence as may be offered, and may affirm, revise, or reverse the order of the board and enter such order as it deems just. Finally any party may apply to the Supreme Court of Appeals, which, if it grants the appeal, is to hear the case upon the record of the trial [274 U.S. 200, 207] in the Circuit Court and may enter such order as it thinks the Circuit Court should have entered. There can be no doubt that so far as procedure is concerned the rights of the patient are most carefully considered, and as every step in this case was taken in scrupulous compliance with the statute and after months of observation, there is no doubt that in that respect the plaintiff in error has had due process at law. The attack is not upon the procedure but upon the substantive law. It seems to be contended that in no circumstances could such an order be justified. It certainly is contended that the order cannot be justified upon the existing grounds. The judgment finds the facts that have been recited and that Carrie Buck 'is the probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring, likewise afflicted, that she may be sexually sterilized without detriment to her general health and that her welfare and that of society will be promoted by her sterilization,' and thereupon makes the order. In view of the general declarations of the Legislature and the specific findings of the Court obviously we cannot say as matter of law that the grounds do not exist, and if they exist they justify the result. We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 , 25 S. Ct. 358, 3 Ann. Cas. 765. Three generations of imbeciles are enough. [274 U.S. 200, 208] But, it is said, however it might be if this reasoning were applied generally, it fails when it is confined to the small number who are in the institutions named and is not applied to the multitudes outside. It is the usual last resort of constitutional arguments to point out shortcomings of this sort. But the answer is that the law does all that is needed when it does all that it can, indicates a policy, applies it to all within the lines, and seeks to bring within the lines all similary situated so far and so fast as its means allow. Of course so far as the operations enable those who otherwise must be kept confined to be returned to the world, and thus open the asylum to others, the equality aimed at will be more nearly reached. Judgment affirmed. Mr. Justice BUTLER dissents.

G.R. No. L-14078

March 7, 1919

RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs, vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant. D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff. Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant. MALCOLM, J.: In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History (Worcester vs. Georgia [1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of American jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to the status of an Indian) with words which, with a slight change in phraseology, can be made to introduce the present opinion This cause, in every point of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest. The legislative power of state, the controlling power of the constitution and laws, the rights if they have any, the political existence of a people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be considered. To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first, to introduce the facts and the issues, next to give a history of the so called "non-Christians," next to compare the status of the "non-Christians" with that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the constitutional questions presented. I. INTRODUCTION. This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation. The return of the Solicitor-General alleges: 1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which is as follows: The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following resolution: "Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the advancement of the non-Christian people of Mindoro, which were all a failure, "Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure is taken for the Mangyan work of this province, no successful result will be obtained toward educating these people. "Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in order to make a permanent settlement, "Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board. "Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now, therefore be it

"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and "Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor." 2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was approved by the Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917. 3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2 which says: "Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. "Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior, on February 21, 1917. "Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant to the provisions of section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than December 31, 1917. "Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code." 4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive order of the governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them. 5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711. 6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the sheriff of Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711. It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court is called upon the decide. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows: SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial governor. With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board.

In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759 of the same Code, which read as follows: SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. Any non-Christian who shall refuse to comply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section two thousand one hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site designated by said governor shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days. The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The genealogical tree of this section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology, would read: Section 2077, Administrative Code of 1916; section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of various special provincial laws, notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the Manguianes; section 69, Act No. 387. Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word, as will later be disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands. In order to put the phrase in its proper category, and in order to understand the policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands with reference to the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it is well first of all to set down a skeleton history of the attitude assumed by the authorities towards these "non-Christians," with particular regard for the legislation on the subject. II. HISTORY. A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES. The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are compiled in Book VI, Title III, in the following language. LAW I. The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21, 1551. Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on November 10, 1568. Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578, THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES). In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the evangelical law, and in order that they may forget the blunders of their ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they may live in harmony and in a civilized manner, it has always been endeavored, with great care and special attention, to use all the means most convenient to the attainment of these purposes. To carry out this work with success, our Council of the Indies and other religious persons met at various times; the prelates of new Spain assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the year one thousand five hundred and forty-six all of which meetings were actuated with a desire to serve God an our Kingdom. At these meetings it was resolved that indios be made to live in communities, and not to live in places divided and separated from one another by sierras and mountains, wherein they are deprived of all spiritual and temporal benefits and wherein they cannot profit from the aid of our ministers and from that which gives rise to those human necessities which men are obliged to give one another. Having realized that convenience of this resolution, our kings, our predecessors, by different orders, have entrusted and ordered the viceroys, presidents, and governors to execute with great care and moderation the concentration of the indios into reducciones; and to deal with their doctrine with such forbearance and gentleness, without causing inconveniences, so that those who would not presently settle and who would see the good treatment and the protection of those already in settlements would, of their own accord, present themselves, and it is ordained that they be not required to pay taxes more than what is ordered. Because the above has been executed in the greater part of our Indies, we hereby order and decree that the same be complied with in all the remaining parts of the Indies, and the encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner and form prescribed by the laws of this title.

xxx LAW VIII.

xxx

xxx

Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618. THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW. The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should have the facilities of waters. lands, and mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry and passageway of one league long, wherein the indios can have their live stock that they may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards. LAW IX. Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956. THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM. With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated in reducciones. Provided they shall not be deprived of the lands and granaries which they may have in the places left by them. We hereby order that no change shall be made in this respect, and that they be allowed to retain the lands held by them previously so that they may cultivate them and profit therefrom. xxx LAW XIII. THE SAME AS ABOVE. THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING, VICEROY, OR COURT. No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right to alter or to remove the pueblos or the reducciones once constituted and founded, without our express order or that of the viceroy, president, or the royal district court, provided, however, that the encomenderos, priests, or indios request such a change or consent to it by offering or giving information to that en. And, because these claims are often made for private interests and not for those of the indios, we hereby order that this law be always complied with, otherwise the change will be considered fraudulently obtained. The penalty of one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the judge or encomendero who should violate this law. LAW XV. Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618. THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL BE "INDIOS." We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be an indio of the same reduccion; if there be more than eighty houses, there should be two mayors and two aldermen, also indios; and, even if the town be a big one, there should, nevertheless, be more than two mayors and four aldermen, If there be less than eighty indios but not less than forty, there should be not more than one mayor and one alderman, who should annually elect nine others, in the presence of the priests , as is the practice in town inhabited by Spaniards and indios. LAW XXI. xxx xxx

Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May 8, 1581. At Madrid, on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and December 17, 1646. For this law and the one following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7. THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES, "MESTIZOS," AND MULATTOES. We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores, or mestizos to live to live in the reducciones and towns and towns of the indios, because it has been found that some Spaniards who deal, trade, live, and associate with the indios are men of troublesome nature, of dirty ways of living; robbers, gamblers, and vicious and useless men; and, to avoid the wrongs done them, the indios would leave their towns and provinces; and the negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides maltreating them and utilizing their services, contaminate them with their bad customs, idleness, and also some of their blunders and vices which may corrupt and pervert the goal which we desire to reach with regard to their salvation, increase, and tranquillity. We hereby order the imposition of grave penalties upon the commission of the acts above-mentioned which should not be tolerated in the towns, and that the viceroys, presidents, governors, and courts take great care in executing the law within their powers and avail themselves of the cooperation of the ministers who are truly honest. As regards the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos), who are children of indias and born among them, and who are to inherit their houses and haciendas, they all not be affected by this law, it appearing to be a harsh thing to separate them from their parents. (Law of the Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.) A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve the condition of the less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in "reducciones," is found in the Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows: It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory recognized as an integral part of a nation should respect and obey the laws in force therein; while, on other hand, it is the duty to conscience and to humanity for all governments to civilize those backward races that might exist in the nation, and which living in the obscurity of ignorance, lack of all the nations which enable them to grasp the moral and material advantages that may be acquired in those towns under the protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws. It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the separation and isolation of the non-Christian races from the social life of the civilized and Christian towns; to allow any longer the commission of depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is located the seat of the representative of the Government of the, metropolis. It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves with this most important question, and that much has been heretofore accomplished with the help and self-denial of the missionary fathers who have even sacrificed their lives to the end that those degenerate races might be brought to the principles of Christianity, but the means and the preaching employed to allure them have been insufficient to complete the work undertaken. Neither have the punishments imposed been sufficient in certain cases and in those which have not been guarded against, thus giving and customs of isolation. As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of things, taking into account the prestige which the country demands and the inevitable duty which every government has in enforcing respect and obedience to the national laws on the part of all who reside within the territory under its control, I have proceeded in the premises by giving the most careful study of this serious question which involves important interests for civilization, from the moral and material as well as the political standpoints. After hearing the illustrious opinions of all the local authorities, ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces of Northern Luzon, and also after finding the unanimous conformity of the meeting held with the Archbishop of Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, and the provincial prelates of the orders of the Dominicans, Agustinians, Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the meeting of the Council of Authorities, held for the object so indicated, I have arrived at an intimate conviction of the inevitable

necessity of proceeding in a practical manner for the submission of the said pagan and isolated races, as well as of the manner and the only form of accomplishing such a task. For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects, I hereby promulgate the following: DECREE. 1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this date, to be governed by the common law, save those exceptions prescribed in this decree which are bases upon the differences of instructions, of the customs, and of the necessities of the different pagan races which occupy a part of its territory. 2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races which may be divided into three classes; one, which comprises those which live isolated and roaming about without forming a town nor a home; another, made up of those subdued pagans who have not as yet entered completely the social life; and the third, of those mountain and rebellious pagans shall be published in their respective dialects, and the officials, priests, and missionaries of the provinces wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the work of having these races learn these rules. These rules shall have executive character, beginning with the first day of next April, and, as to their compliance, they must be observed in the manner prescribed below. 3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from now on, with all the means which their zeal may suggest to them, to the taking of the census of the inhabitants of the towns or settlement already subdued, and shall adopt the necessary regulations for the appointment of local authorities, if there be none as yet; for the construction of courts and schools, and for the opening or fixing up of means of communication, endeavoring, as regards the administrative organization of the said towns or settlements, that this be finished before the first day of next July, so that at the beginning of the fiscal year they shall have the same rights and obligations which affect the remaining towns of the archipelago, with the only exception that in the first two years they shall not be obliged to render personal services other than those previously indicated. 4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands appropriate for cultivation, the inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and only in case of absolute necessity shall a new residence be fixed for them, choosing for this purpose the place most convenient for them and which prejudices the least their interest; and, in either of these cases, an effort must be made to establish their homes with the reach of the sound of the bell. 5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be established an armed force composed precisely of native Christian, the organization and service of which shall be determined in a regulations based upon that of the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of the Guardia Civil). 6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand all the rights and duties affecting them and the liberty which they have as to where and now they shall till their lands and sell the products thereof, with the only exception of the tobacco which shall be bought by the Hacienda at the same price and conditions allowed other producers, and with the prohibition against these new towns as well as the others from engaging in commerce of any other transaction with the rebellious indios, the violation of which shall be punished with deportation. 7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the territory of the rebellious indios shall be fixed; and whoever should go beyond the said limits shall be detained and assigned governmentally wherever convenient. 8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the Catholic Church, all by this fact along be exempt for eight years from rendering personal labor.

9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued (aetas and mountains igorrots the following advantages in returns for their voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity among their families; concession of good lands and the right to cultivate them in the manner they wish and in the way them deem most productive; support during a year, and clothes upon effecting submission; respect for their habits and customs in so far as the same are not opposed to natural law; freedom to decide of their own accord as to whether they want to be Christians or not; the establishment of missions and families of recognized honesty who shall teach, direct, protect, and give them security and trust them; the purchase or facility of the sale of their harvests; the exemption from contributions and tributes for ten years and from the quintas (a kind of tax) for twenty years; and lastly, that those who are governed by the local authorities as the ones who elect such officials under the direct charge of the authorities of the province or district. 10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the advantages offered, shall, in return, have the obligation of constituting their new towns, of constructing their town hall, schools, and country roads which place them in communication with one another and with the Christians; provided, the location of these towns be distant from their actual residences, when the latter do not have the good conditions of location and cultivations, and provided further the putting of families in a place so selected by them be authorized in the towns already constituted. 11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes, that, disregarding the peace, protection, and advantages offered them, continue in their rebellious attitude on the first of next April, committing from now on the crimes and vexations against the Christian towns; and for the this purposes, the Captain General's Office shall proceed with the organization of the divisions of the Army which, in conjunction with the rural guards (cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the territory of such tribes. On the expiration of the term, they shall destroy their dwelling-houses, labors, and implements, and confiscate their products and cattle. Such a punishment shall necessarily be repeated twice a year, and for this purpose the military headquarters shall immediately order a detachment of the military staff to study the zones where such operations shall take place and everything conducive to the successful accomplishment of the same. 12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and other subordinates to my authorities, local authorities, and other subordinates to may authority, civil as well as military authorities, shall give the most effective aid and cooperation to the said forces in all that is within the attributes and the scope of the authority of each. 13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the provinces in the southern part of the Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied to them. 14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-Royal Patron, a council or permanent commission which shall attend to and decide all the questions relative to the application of the foregoing regulations that may be brought to it for consultations by the chiefs of provinces and priests and missionaries. 15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to the foregoing, in brining about due compliance with this decree, shall be promulgated by the respective official centers within their respective jurisdictions. (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la Administracion, vol. 7, pp. 128134.) B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES. Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the best method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one. 1. Organic law.

The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in the Philippines was President McKinley's Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly approved and ratified by section 1 of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of these instructions have remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional legislation. One paragraph of particular interest should here be quoted, namely: In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government and under which many of these tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs. Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic Act for the Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative body and, with this end in view, to name the prerequisites for the organization of the Philippine Assembly. The Philippine Legislature, composed of the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over the Christian portion of the Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain exclusive jurisdiction of that part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This transferred the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and authority theretofore exercised by the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (sec. 12). It divided the Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth district to be composed of the Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The GovernorGeneral of the Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint senators and representatives for the territory which, at the time of the passage of the Jones Law, was not represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth district (sec. 16). The law establish a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of nonChristian Tribes" which shall have general supervision over the public affairs of the inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by appointed senators and representatives( sec. 22). Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line between the territory not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which is inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. 2. Statute law. Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the Philippine Commission and Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province of Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO. 82, the Municipal Code; ;Act no. 83, the Provincial Government Act; Act No. 183, the Character of the city of Manila; Act No. 7887, providing for the organization and government of the Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial Government Act; Act No. 1397, the Township Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the organization of settlements; Act No. 1963, the Baguio charger; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have been carried forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 an d1917. Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the primitive peoples. Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United States Philippine Commission, having reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 4568, 1306 were enacted for the provinces of Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela. Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an example of these laws, because referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:

No. 547. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL GOVERNMENTS FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF MINDORO. By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission, that: SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government, the provincial governor is authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing with these Manguianes to appoint officers from among them, to fix their designations and badges of office, and to prescribe their powers and duties: Provided, That the powers and duties thus prescribed shall not be in excess of those conferred upon township officers by Act Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven entitled "An Act providing for the establishment of local civil Governments in the townships and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya." SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial governor is further authorized, when he deems such a course necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such Manguianes to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board. Manguianes who refuse to comply with such directions shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days. SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his province to acquire the knowledge and experience necessary for successful local popular government, and his supervision and control over them shall be exercised to this end, an to the end that law and order and individual freedom shall be maintained. SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of Manguianes has advanced sufficiently to make such a course practicable, it may be organized under the provisions of sections one to sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven, as a township, and the geographical limits of such township shall be fixed by the provincial board. SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the passage of the same is hereby expedited in accordance with section two of 'An Act prescribing the order of procedure by the Commission in the enactment of laws,' passed September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred. SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage. Enacted, December 4, 1902. All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Act No. 1396 and 1397. The last named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes retained the provisions in questions. These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and consistent practice with reference to the methods to be followed for their advancement. C. TERMINOLOGY. The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying forms. "Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to the Commission. The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes." These words are to be found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the Jones Law. They are also to be found in Act No. 253 of the Philippines Commission, establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and in Act No. 2674 of the Philippine Legislature, carried forward into sections 701-705 of the Administrative Code of

1917, reestablishing this Bureau. Among other laws which contain the phrase, there can be mentioned Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397, 1639, and 2551. "Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the favorite nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being of a Filipinized legislature. These terms can be found in sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative Code of 1916; sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426, Administrative Code of 1917; and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine Legislatures, as well as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine Commission. The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561, Administrative Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408, sec. 3.) D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN." If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course result in giving to it a religious signification. Obviously, Christian would be those who profess the Christian religion, and nonChristians, would be those who do not profess the Christian religion. In partial corroboration of this view, there could also be cited section 2576 of the last Administrative Code and certain well-known authorities, as Zuiga, "Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-Benitez, "Philippine Progress prior to 1898," vol. I. p. 107.) Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to ascertain what is its true meaning. In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by the provisions of many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the Philippine Assembly was recognized in the "territory" of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Again, the Jones Law confers similar recognition in the authorization of the twelfth senatorial district for the "territory not now represented in the Philippine Assembly." The Philippines Legislature has, time and again, adopted acts making certain other acts applicable to that "part" of the Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The first section of this article, preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of the article applicable only in specially organized provinces. The specially organized provinces are the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These are the provinces to which the Philippine Legislature has never seen fit to give all the powers of local self-government. They do not, however, exactly coincide with the portion of the Philippines which is not granted popular representation. Nevertheless, it is still a geographical description. It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of who are Christians and some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the law specifically recognizes this. ( Sec. 2422, Administrative Code of 1917, etc.) If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical conception is likewise inadquate. The reason it that the motive of the law relates not to a particular people, because of their religion, or to a particular province because of its location, but the whole intent of the law is predicated n the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants. At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words usually introduce the term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite expression. The Secretary of the Interior who for so many years had these people under his jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact designation, speaks of the "backward Philippine peoples, commonly known as the 'non-Christian tribes."' (See

Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third session on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose of the People of the United States as to the future political status of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more autonomous government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary of the Interior of June 30, 1906, circulated by the Executive Secretary.) The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is substantiated by reference to legislative, judicial, and executive authority. The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and sections 701 et seq, and sections 2422 et seq, of the Administrative Code of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253 charged the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to conduct "systematic investigations with reference to non-Christian tribes . . . with special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing about their advancement in civilization and material property prosperity." As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The question here arose as to the effect of a tribal marriage in connection with article 423 of the Penal code concerning the husband who surprises his wife in the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the court makes use of the following language: . . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal marriage of so-called non-Christians or members of uncivilized tribes, celebrated within that province without compliance with the requisites prescribed by General Orders no. 68. . . . We hold also that the fact that the accused is shown to be a member of an uncivilized tribe, of a low order of intelligence, uncultured and uneducated, should be taken into consideration as a second marked extenuating circumstance. Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who have been called upon to interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a member of the Philippine Commission, drafted much of the legislation relating to the so-called Christians and who had these people under his authority, was the former Secretary of the Interior. Under date of June 30, 1906, this official addressed a letter to all governor of provinces, organized under the Special Provincial Government Act, a letter which later received recognition by the Governor-General and was circulated by the Executive Secretary, reading as follows: Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people who were originally nonChristian but have recently been baptized or who are children of persons who have been recently baptized are, for the purposes of Act 1396 and 1397, to be considered Christian or non-Christians. It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these islands which are not advanced far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable designation which will fit all cases. The number of individual tribes is so great that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all of them in an Act. It was finally decided to adopt the designation 'non-Christians' as the one most satisfactory, but the real purpose of the Commission was not so much to legislate for people having any particular religious belief as for those lacking sufficient advancement so that they could, to their own advantage, be brought under the Provincial Government Act and the Municipal Code. The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of civilization to which the person baptized has attained at the time the act of baptism is performed. For practical purposes, therefore, you will give the member of so-called "wild tribes" of your province the benefit of the doubt even though they may recently have embraced Christianity. The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under the jurisdiction of regularly organized municipalities or what form of government shall be afforded to them should be the degree of civilization to which they have attained and you are requested to govern yourself accordingly.

I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who concurs in the opinion above expressed and who will have the necessary instructions given to the governors of the provinces organized under the Provincial Government Act. (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214.) The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this court, has the following to say on the subject: As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but while no other better classification has as yet been made the present classification should be allowed to stand . . . I believe the term carries the same meaning as the expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the Interior (of June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is indicative of the degree of civilization rather than of religious denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of religious denomination will make the law invalid as against that Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom. Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the Collector of Internal Revenue. The question arose for ruling relatives to the cedula taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas. Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of the Interior was requested on the point, who, by return indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of the Collector of Internal Revenue. This Construction of the Collector of Internal Revenue can be found in circular letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214): The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from the payment of cedula taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted this provision of law to mean not that persons who profess some form of Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that all other person are exempt; he has interpreted it to mean that all persons preserving tribal relations with the so-called nonChristian tribes are exempt from the cedula tax, and that all others, including Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax so long as they live in cities or towns, or in the country in a civilized condition. In other words, it is not so much a matter of a man's form of religious worship or profession that decides whether or not he is subject to the cedula tax; it is more dependent on whether he is living in a civilized manner or is associated with the mountain tribes, either as a member thereof or as a recruit. So far, this question has not come up as to whether a Christian, maintaining his religious belief, but throwing his lot and living with a non-Christian tribe, would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On one occasion a prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to this office that he was exempt from the cedula tax, inasmuch as he was not a Christian. This Office, however, continued to collect cedula taxes from all the Jews, East Indians, Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion of the cedula taxes paid in this city are paid by men belonging to the nationalities mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs and other s are quite widely scattered throughout the Islands, and a condition similar to that which exist in Manila also exists in most of the large provincial towns. Cedula taxes are therefore being collected by this Office in all parts of these Islands on the broad ground that civilized people are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized people preserving their tribal relations are not subject thereto. (Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD, Collector of Internal Revenue. On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327, approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial treasurers. This letter in part reads: In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers regarding cedula taxes due from members of non-Christian tribes when they come in from the hills for the purposes of settling down and becoming members of the body politic of the Philippine Islands, the following clarification of the laws governing such questions and digest of rulings thereunder is hereby published for the information of all concerned: Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by reason of the fact that they do not profess Christianity, but because of their uncivilized mode of life and low state of development. All

inhabitants of the Philippine Islands classed as members of non-Christian tribes may be divided into three classes in so far as the cedula tax law is concerned . . . Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized mode of life, severs whatever tribal relations he may have had and attaches himself civilized community, belonging a member of the body politic, he thereby makes himself subject to precisely the same law that governs the other members of that community and from and after the date when he so attaches himself to the community the same cedula and other taxes are due from him as from other members thereof. If he comes in after the expiration of the delinquency period the same rule should apply to him as to persons arriving from foreign countries or reaching the age of eighteen subsequent to the expiration of such period, and a regular class A, D, F, or H cedula, as the case may be, should be furnished him without penalty and without requiring him to pay the tax for former years. In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in determining whether or not a man is subject to the regular cedula tax is not the circumstance that he does or does not profess Christianity, nor even his maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with some of the well known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of advancement in civilization and connection or lack of connection with some civilized community. For this reason so called "Remontados" and "Montescos" will be classed by this office as members of non-Christian tribes in so far as the application of the Internal Revenue Law is concerned, since, even though they belong to no well recognized tribe, their mode of life, degree of advancement and so forth are practically the same as those of the Igorrots and members of other recognized non-Christina tribes. Very respectfully, (Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL, Collector of Internal Revenue, Approved: (Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA, Secretary of Finance and Justice. The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue Regulations No. 1, promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of Internal Revenue, and approved on April 16, 1915, by Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the regulations is practically a transcript of Circular Letter No. 327. The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of Constabulary request the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of a non-Christian who has been baptized by a minister of the Gospel. The precise questions were these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he commit an infraction of the law and does the person selling same lay himself liable under the provision of Act No. 1639?" The opinion of Attorney-General Avancea, after quoting the same authorities hereinbefore set out, concludes: In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is probable that the person in question remains a non-Christian, so that, in purchasing intoxicating liquors both he and the person selling the same make themselves liable to prosecution under the provisions of Act No. 1639. At least, I advise you that these should be the constructions place upon the law until a court shall hold otherwise. Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says: With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has in the provisions of the Administrative code which we are studying, we submit that said phrase does not have its natural meaning which would include all non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipino or strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but simply refers to those uncivilized members of the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines

who, living without home or fixed residence, roam in the mountains, beyond the reach of law and order . . . The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as distinguished from the common Filipinos which carry on a social and civilized life, did not intended to establish a distinction based on the religious beliefs of the individual, but, without dwelling on the difficulties which later would be occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish legislation employed to designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines. The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741 of Act No. 2657 (articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes of the Philippines, not only because this is the evident intention of the law, but because to give it its lateral meaning would make the law null and unconstitutional as making distinctions base the religion of the individual. The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than De. David P. Barrows, then "Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the population in the Christian or Civilized Tribes, and non-Christian or Wild Tribes. (Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq). The present Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes that the classification likely to be used in the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, prepared in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, a sub-division under the title non-Christian tribes is, "Physical and Political Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes," which sufficiently shows that the terms refers to culture and not to religion. In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive officials, specifically, join in the proposition that the term "non-Christian" refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way , to geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a law grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. E. THE MANGUIANES. The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. The Philippine Census of 1903 divided them into four classes. Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro. Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los nombres de Rozas de Filipinas, says: In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer," "pagan," "negro." It may be that the use of this word is applicable to a great number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it has been applied only to certain inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt this name was given to those of that island who bear it to-day, but its employed in three Filipino languages shows that the radical ngian had in all these languages a sense to-day forgotten. In Pampango this ending still exists and signifies "ancient," from which we can deduce that the name was applied to men considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were pushed back into the interior by the modern invaders, in whose language they were called the "ancients." The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people. They number approximately 15,000. The manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government. (See Census of the Philippine (Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.) III. COMPARATIVE THE AMERICAN INDIANS.

Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippines Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy. From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United States. Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned, tells how the Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of civilizing the neighboring Indians." After quoting the Act, the opinion goes on "This act avowedly contemplates the preservation of the Indian nations as an object sought by the United States, and proposes to effect this object by civilizing and converting them from hunters into agriculturists." A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United States vs. Kagama ([1886], 118 U.S., 375). Reference is herein made to the clause of the United States Constitution which gives Congress "power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." The court then proceeds to indicate a brief history of the position of the Indians in the United States (a more extended account of which can be found in Marshall's opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows: The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States, both before and since the Revolution, to the people of the United States, has always been an anomalous one and of a complex character. Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of American towards the Indians who were found here, the colonies before the Revolution and the States and the United States since, have recognized in the Indians a possessory right to the soil over which they roamed and hunted and established occasional villages. But they asserted an ultimate title in the land itself, by which the Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it to other nations or peoples without the consent of this paramount authority. When a tribe wished to dispose of its lands, or any part of it, or the State or the United States wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was the only mode in which this could be done. The United States recognized no right in private persons, or in other nations, to make such a purchase by treaty or otherwise. With the Indians themselves these relation are equally difficult to define. They were, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as nation not a possessed of the fall attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided. The opinion then continues: It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress. These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. The are communities dependent on the United States. dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from the no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arise the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen . . . The power of the General Government over these remnants of race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. it must exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because the theater of its exercise is within the geographical

limits of the United States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes. In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the question to be considered was whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that Congress could prohibit the introduction of intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to statehood. The court looked to the reports of the different superintendent charged with guarding their interests and founds that these Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and protection of the government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said "that during the Spanish dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as wards requiring special protection, where subjected to restraints and official supervisions in the alienation of their property." And finally, we not the following: "Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the Indians tribes, but long-continued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian communities within its borders, whether within its original territory or territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the limits of a state." With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power of the courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always been deemed political in nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the government. (Matter of Heff [1905], 197 U.S., 488; U.S. vs. Celestine [1909], 215 U.S., 278; U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra; Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U.S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; the Cherokee Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall, 616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218; Thomas vs. Gay [1898], 169 U.S.., 264; Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553; Wallace vs. Adams [1907], 204 U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U.S., 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co. [1911], 221 U.S., 286; U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U.S.., 598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29 Okla, 281; 35 L.R.A. [N. S.], 795.) Whenever, therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as an Indian reservation, it has full authority to pass such laws and authorize such measures as may be necessary to give to the Indians thereon full protection in their persons and property. (U.S. vs. Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.) All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken line of judicial decisions. The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result in the issuance of habeas corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a hearing upon return to a writ of habeas corpus issued against Brigadier General George Crook at the relation of Standing Bear and other Indians, formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The petition alleged in substance that the relators are Indians who have formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians, now located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time previously withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the general habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or assistance from the general government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the United States, they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent, George Crook. The substance of the return to the writ was that the relators are individual members of, and connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped form a reservation situated some place within the limits of the Indian Territory had departed therefrom without permission from the Government; and, at the request of the Secretary of the Interior, the General of the Army had issued an order which required the respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory. The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment by habeas corpus. The second question, of much greater importance, related to the right of the Government to arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory from which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In discussing this question, the court reviewed the policy the Government

had adopted in its dealing with the friendly tribe of Poncase. Then, continuing, the court said: "Laws passed for the government of the Indian country, and for the purpose of regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer upon certain officers of the Government almost unlimited power over the persons who go upon the reservations without lawful authority . . . Whether such an extensive discretionary power is wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not , need not be questioned. It is enough to know that the power rightfully exists, and, where existing, the exercise of the power must be upheld." The decision concluded as follows: The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude: 1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States, and has, therefore, the right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court, or before a federal judge, in all cases where he may be confined or in custody under color of authority of the United States or where he is restrained of liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States. 2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the military department of the Platte, has the custody of the relators, under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws therefore. 3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the Indian Territory, as the respondent has been directed to do. 4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the more fortunate white race, and have the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," so long as they obey the laws and do not trespass on forbidden ground. And, 5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws thereof, the relators must be discharged from custody, and it is so ordered. As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as authority to determine that Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine Islands, is a "person" within the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine courts. (See also In re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decide. As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case are not exactly identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these reservation, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn form the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as may forceful reasons exists for the segregation as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United States. IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS. A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER. The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not delegate this power to provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature has abdicated its authority and avoided its full responsibility. That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not bee violated in his instance.

The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of case, namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom t has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case. Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of section 21454 of the Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law? Is not this "necessary"? The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to require the Secretary of the Interior to approve the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the relator out of the lands ceded to the United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians. Section 463 of the United States Revised Statutes provided: "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President may prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all matters arising out to the Indian relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good deal, especially in view of the long established practice of the Department, before saying that this language was not broad enough to warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the rather helpless people concerned. The power of Congress is not doubted. The Indians have been treated as wards of the nation. Some such supervision was necessary, and has been exercised. In the absence of special provisions naturally it would be exercised by the Indian Department." (See also as corroborative authority, it any is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204 U.S.., 364, reviewing the previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court: U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U.S., 598.) There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the general rule. sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board. Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order?" As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state? Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head. B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his unknown clients, says that "The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English, and in words as plain and unequivocal as language can express, it provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians' and none other." The inevitable result, them, is that the law "constitutes an attempt by the Legislature to discriminate between individuals because of their religious beliefs, and is, consequently, unconstitutional." Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable the Legislature must be understood to mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial construction is then excluded; religious equality

is demanded by the Organic Law; the statute has violated this constitutional guaranty, and Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to discard the long continued meaning given to a common expression, especially as classification of inhabitants according to religious belief leads the court to what it should avoid, the nullification of legislative action. We hold that the term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines Islands of a low grade of civilization, and that section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does not discriminate between individuals an account of religious differences. C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS. The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's instructions of to the Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." This constitutional limitation is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and these provisions, it has been said "are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356.) The protection afforded the individual is then as much for the non-Christian as for the Christian. The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus: Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible with the possession of like liberty by every other. (Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.) Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. That authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and a refined idea, the offspring of high civilization, which the savage never understood, and never can understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more restraint on others to keep off from us, the more liberty we have . . . that man is free who is protected from injury. (II Webster's Works, p. 393.) Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not being forced to do what one ought not do desire. (Montesque, spirit of the Laws.) Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to ac according to one's own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others. (Field, J., in Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.) Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis, organized society could not exist with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others . . . There is, of course, a sphere with which the individual may asserts the supremacy of his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government especially of any free government existing under a written Constitution to interfere with the exercise of that will. But it is equally true that in very well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members, the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand." (Harlan, J., In Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S., 11.) Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and honorable conscience of the individual. (Apolinario Mabini.) Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal

restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by this Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live an work where he will; to earn his livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue any avocations, an for that purpose. to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the right of locomotion. In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily done by free men. (There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277; Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2 Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S., 274; Allgeyer vs. Louisiana [1896], 165, U.S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis., 530. See 6 R.C.L., 258, 261.) One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: "Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty regulated by law." Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if exercises without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty of the citizens may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. (See Hall vs. GeigerJones [1916], 242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz [1914], 189 Al., 66.) None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, an immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and customs, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law." (Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply . . . "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 1) "What is due process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subjectmatter and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.) The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature. We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be made later on. D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE. The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment to the United States Constitution particularly as found in those portions of Philippine Organic Law providing "That slavery shall not exist in said Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for crime whereof

the party shall have been duly convicted." It is quite possible that the Thirteenth Amendment, since reaching to "any place subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in the Philippine. However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary modifications, of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States Criminal Code, prescribed the punishment for these crimes. Slavery and involuntary servitude, together wit their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906], 203 U.S., 1.) The term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under what form such servitude may have been disguised. (Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U.S., 219.) So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their freedom. Next must come a description of the police power under which the State must act if section 2145 is to be held valid. E. THE POLICE POWER. Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at this moment is the farreaching scope of the power, that it has become almost possible to limit its weep, and that among its purposes is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources and add to is wealth and prosperity. (See Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27.) What we are not interested in is the right of the government to restrain liberty by the exercise of the police power. "The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill., 191.) Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempt to dam the on rushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual. The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. "There can be not doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government." (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.) With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before finally deciding whether any constitutional provision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of the Administrative Code, we should endeavor to ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting this section. If legally possible, such legislative intention should be effectuated. F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT. The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao reservation, it will be remembered, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The SolicitorGeneral adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes. The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives for its selection, the following:

To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken together to Tigbao, the Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a trip to the place. There he found that the site selected is a good one; that creditable progress has been made in the clearing of forests, construction of buildings, etc., that there appears to be encouraging reaction by the boys to the work of the school the requirements of which they appear to meet with enthusiastic interest after the first weeks which are necessarily a somewhat trying period for children wholly unaccustomed to orderly behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the impression that the results obtained during the period of less than one year since the beginning of the institution definitely justify its continuance and development. Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation. Such was naturally to be expected. But the Secretary of the Interior, upon his return to Manila, made the following statement to the press: "It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer to live a nomadic life and evade the influence of civilization. The Government will follow its policy to organize them into political communities and to educate their children with the object of making them useful citizens of this country. To permit them to live a wayfaring life will ultimately result in a burden to the state and on account of their ignorance, they will commit crimes and make depredation, or if not they will be subject to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them." The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the non-Christian people, has adopted as the polaris of his administration "the advancement of the non-Christian elements of our population to equality and unification with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants." This is carried on by the adoption of the following measures: (a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic race are induced to leave their wild habitat and settle in organized communities. (b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health throughout the regions inhabited by the non-Christian people. (c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate their development and the extention of government control. (d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among non-Christians, to promote social and commercial intercourse and maintain amicable relations among them and with the Christian people. (e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially agriculture. ( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private capital in, the fertile regions of Mindanao and Sulu. The Secretary adds: To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued among the non-Christian people. These people are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions in order that they may fully appreciate the benefits of civilization. Those of them who are still given to nomadic habits are being persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and settle in organized settlements. They are being made to understand that it is the purpose of the Government to organize them politically into fixed and per manent communities, thus bringing them under the control of the Government, to aid them to live and work, protect them from involuntary servitude and abuse, educate their children, and show them the advantages of leading a civilized life with their civilized brothers. In short, they are being impressed with the purposes and objectives of the Government of leading them to economic, social, and political equality, and unification with the more highly civilized inhabitants of the country. (See Report of the Department for 1917.)

The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called nonChristians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development and advancement in civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the Government towards the non-Christian people in the following unequivocal terms: It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work for advancement and liberty in favor of the region inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate means and in a systematical, rapid, and complete manner the moral, material, economic, social, and political development of those regions, always having in view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between, and complete fusion of, all the Christian and non-Christian elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago. (Sec. 3.) May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States, proper wards of the Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise Government, may not these unfortunates advance in the "habits and arts of civilization?" Would it be advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan, carefully formulated, and apparently working out for the ultimate good of these people? In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is evident. Here, we have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making depredations on their more fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing nothing for the advancement of the Philippine Islands. What the Government wished to do by bringing than into a reservation was to gather together the children for educational purposes, and to improve the health and morals was in fine, to begin the process of civilization. this method was termed in Spanish times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing situation, has been followed with reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the same class, because it required, if they are to be improved, that they be gathered together. On these few reservations there live under restraint in some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few thousands of the uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes protection for the manguianes. Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know that the axiom is not precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men are free, and they are not the equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens, with many but not all the rights which citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress of the State. In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops and persons protected from predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is no argument to say that such crimes are punished by the Penal Code, because these penalties are imposed after commission of the offense and not before. If immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the resources of the great Islands of Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive regions, the Government must be in a position to guarantee peace and order. Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State. Illiteracy and thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself from destruction must prod on the laggard and the sluggard. The great law of overwhelming necessity is all convincing. To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior: Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction burning and destroying the forests and making illegal caigins thereon. Not bringing any benefit to the State but instead injuring and damaging its interests, what will ultimately become of these people with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve and for which they are

now fighting in court? They will ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them. There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty and does not practice liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will going from one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caigins thereon. Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they allege that they are being deprived thereof without due process of law? xxx xxx xxx

But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law' apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise liberty in a rightful way? To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this people should be let along in the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and noble sense. In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience. xxx xxx xxx

The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more towards the education and civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those people under the tutelage of the Government is indeed encouraging and the signs of the times point to a day which is not far distant when they will become useful citizens. In the light of what has already been accomplished which has been winning the gratitude of most of the backward people, shall we give up the noble work simply because a certain element, believing that their personal interests would be injured by such a measure has come forward and challenged the authority of the Government to lead this people in the pat of civilization? Shall we, after expending sweat, treasure, and even blood only to redeem this people from the claws of ignorance and superstition, now willingly retire because there has been erroneously invoked in their favor that Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law? To allow them to successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the Government without recourse to pursue the works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus left in a permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point to attack by those who doubt, nay challenge, the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers. The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions. They are being made to understand that they object of the government is to organize them politically into fixed and permanent communities. They are being aided to live and work. Their children are being educated in a school especially established for them. In short, everything is being done from them in order that their advancement in civilization and material prosperity may be assured. Certainly their living together in Tigbao does not make them slaves or put them in a condition compelled to do services for another. They do not work for anybody but for themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary servitude. But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other places under penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this connection is invited to the fact that this people, living a nomadic and wayfaring life, do not have permanent individual property. They move from one place to another as the

conditions of living warrants, and the entire space where they are roving about is the property of the nation, the greater part being lands of public domain. Wandering from one place to another on the public lands, why can not the government adopt a measure to concentrate them in a certain fixed place on the public lands, instead of permitting them to roam all over the entire territory? This measure is necessary both in the interest of the public as owner of the lands about which they are roving and for the proper accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the government. For as people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long to return to the mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is provinced for, you can not make them live together and the noble intention of the Government of organizing them politically will come to naught. G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION. Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and to reach a general conclusion. In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go where he pleases. Could be not, however, be kept away from certain localities ? To furnish an example from the Indian legislation. The early Act of Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian reservation. Those citizens certainly did not possess absolute freedom of locomotion. Again the same law provided for the apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any doubt, this law and other similar were accepted and followed time and again without question. It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and defenseless people confined as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous official. What, it is asked, would be the remedy of any oppressed Manguian? The answer would naturally be that the official into whose hands are given the enforcement of the law would have little or not motive to oppress these people; on the contrary, the presumption would all be that they would endeavor to carry out the purposes of the law intelligently and patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus confined, there always exists the power of removal in the hands of superior officers, and the courts are always open for a redress of grievances. When, however, only the validity of the law is generally challenged and no particular case of oppression is called to the attention of the courts, it would seems that the Judiciary should not unnecessarily hamper the Government in the accomplishment of its laudable purpose. The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the right and liberties of the individual members of society be subordinated to the will of the Government? It is a question which has assailed the very existence of government from the beginning of time. Now purely an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to be decided by force, it has been transferred to the peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such an issue, the Judiciary must realize that the very existence of government renders imperatives a power to restrain the individual to some extent, dependent, of course, on the necessities of the class attempted to be benefited. As to the particular degree to which the Legislature and the Executive can go in interfering with the rights of the citizen, this is, and for a along time to come will be, impossible for the courts to determine. The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economics and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown as widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of governmental activity. The courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trial after the other two branches of the government in this progressive march. Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy. Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the law, there exists a law ; the law seems to be

reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class. As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt, would lead to the determination that section 2145 is valid. it the attitude which the courts should assume towards the settled policy of the Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord, Gambles vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes: We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new question that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined by differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior case. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or principle. But public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is wise enough to forecast its influence in all possible contingencies. Distinctions must be made from time to time as sound reason and a true sense of justice may dictate." Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called non-Christians has been in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental policy has been effective in the Philippines from early days to the present. The idea to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception of nationality. If all are to be equal before the law, all must be approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro must be populated, and its fertile regions must be developed. The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the country. Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature, a coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered case is toward noninterference on the part of the courts whenever political ideas are the moving consideration. Justice Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly famous, said that "constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some chances." (Blinn vs. Nelson [1911], 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final decision of the many grave questions which this case presents, the courts must take "a chance," it should be with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the effectuation of the general governmental policy, and with a view to the court's performing its duty in no narrow and bigoted sense, but with that broad conception which will make the courts as progressive and effective a force as are the other departments of the Government. We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue. This is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against petitioners. So ordered. Arellano, C.J., Torres and Avancea, JJ., concur.

U.S. Supreme Court Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) Terrace v. Thompson No. 29 Argued April 23, 24, 1923 Decided November 12, 1923 263 U.S. 197

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON Syllabus 1. A Washington statute (c. 50, Laws 1921,) disqualifies aliens who have not in good faith declared intention to become citizens of the United States from taking or holding interests in land in the State for farming or other purposes not excepted, and provides that upon the making of such prohibited conveyance the land shall be forfeited to the State and the grantors be subject to criminal punishment, and the alien also, if he fails to disclose the nature and extent of his interest. Citizens owning land in Washington and an alien Japanese, desirous of consummating a lease to the alien for farming, sued to enjoin the state attorney general from taking criminal and forfeiture proceedings, as he threatened Page 263 U. S. 198 if the lease were made, alleging that the restriction violated the federal and state constitutions and conflicted with a treaty with Japan. Held, that the suit was within the equity jurisdiction of the District Court. P. 263 U. S. 214. 2. State legislation withholding the right to own land in the State from aliens who have not in good faith declared their intention to become citizens of the United States does not transgress the due process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to those alien who, under the naturalization laws of Congress, are ineligible to citizenship, or as applied to citizens who desire to lease their land to such aliens. P. 263 U. S. 216. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, distinguished. 3. The treaty between the United State and Japan of February 21, 1911, 37 Stat. 1504, in granting liberty to the citizens and subjects of each party "to enter, travel and reside in the territories of the other, to carry on trade, . . . to own or lease and occupy houses, manufactories, warehouses and shops, . . . to lease land for residential and commercial purposes, and generally to do anything incident to or necessary for trade upon the same terms as native citizens or subjects," does not include the right to own, lease, or have any title to or interest in land for agricultural purposes, and the Washington statute above cited is not in conflict with it. P. 263 U. S. 222. 4. As determined by the Supreme Court of the State, the Washington statute above cited is not in conflict with 33, Art. II of the state constitution. P. 263 U. S. 224. 274 Fed. 841 affirmed.

Appeal from a decree of the District Court dismissing a bill brought by the appellants to enjoin the attorney general of Washington from enforcing the state Alien Land Law. Page 263 U. S. 211

MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellants brought this suit to enjoin the Attorney General of Washington from enforcing the Anti-Alien Land Law of that State (chapter 50, Laws 1921), on the grounds that it is in conflict with the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, with the treaty between the United States and Japan, and with certain provisions of the Constitution of the State. The appellants are residents of Washington. The Terraces are citizens of the United States and of Washington. Nakatsuka was born in Japan of Japanese parents, and is a subject of the emperor of Japan. The Terraces are the owners of a tract of land in King county which is particularly adapted to raising vegetables, and which, for a number of years, had been devoted to that and other agricultural purposes. The complaint alleges that Nakatsuka is a capable farmer, and will be a desirable tenant of the land, that the Terraces desire to lease their land to him for the period of five years, that he desires to accept such lease, and that the lease would be made but Page 263 U. S. 212 for the act complained of; and it is alleged that the defendant, as Attorney General, has threatened to and will take steps to enforce the act against the appellants if they enter into such lease, and will treat the leasehold interest as forfeited to the State, and will prosecute the appellants criminally for violation of the act; that the act is so drastic and the penalties attached to its violation are so great that neither of the appellants may make the lease even to test the constitutionality of the act; and that, unless the court shall determine its validity in this suit, the appellants will be compelled to submit to it, whether valid or invalid, and thereby will be deprived of their property without due process of law and denied the equal protection of the laws. The Attorney General made a motion to dismiss the amended complaint upon the ground that it did not state any matters of equity or facts sufficient to entitle the appellants to relief. The District Court granted the motion and entered a decree of dismissal on the merits. The case is here on appeal from that decree. Section 33 [Footnote 1] of Article II of the Constitution of Washington prohibits the ownership of land by aliens other than those who in good faith have declared intention to become citizens of the United States, except in certain Page 263 U. S. 213 instances not here involved. The act [Footnote 2] provides in substance that any such alien shall not own, take, have or hold the legal or equitable title, or right to any benefit of any land as defined in the act, and that land conveyed to or for the use of aliens in violation of the state constitution or of the act shall thereby be forfeited to the State, and it is made a gross misdemeanor, punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, knowingly to transfer land or the right to the control, possession or use of land to such an alien. It is also made a gross misdemeanor for any such alien having title to such land or the control, possession, or use thereof, to refuse to disclose to the Attorney General or the prosecuting attorney the nature and extent of his interest in the land. The Attorney General and the prosecuting attorneys of the several counties are charged with the enforcement of the act. Page 263 U. S. 214

1. The Attorney General questions the jurisdiction of the court to grant equitable relief even if the statute be unconstitutional. He contends that the appellants have a plain, adequate and speedy remedy at law; that the case involves but a single transaction, and that, if the proposed lease is made, the only remedy which the State has, so far as civil proceedings are concerned, is an escheat proceeding in which the validity of the law complained of may be finally determined; that an acquittal of the Terraces of the criminal offense created by the statute would protect them from further prosecution, and that Nakatsuka is liable criminally only upon his failure to disclose the fact that he holds an interest in the land. The unconstitutionality of a state law is not of itself ground for equitable relief in the courts of the United States. That a suit in equity does not lie where there is a plain adequate and complete remedy at law is so well understood as not to require the citation of authorities. But the legal remedy must be as complete, practical and efficient as that which equity could afford. Boise Artesian Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U. S. 276, 213 U. S. 281; Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. 1, 172 U. S. 11-12. Equity jurisdiction will be exercised to enjoin the threatened enforcement of a state law which contravenes the federal Constitution wherever it is essential in order effectually to protect property rights and the rights of persons against injuries otherwise irremediable, and, in such a case, a person who is an officer of the State is clothed with the duty of enforcing its laws and who threatens and is about to commence proceedings, either civil or criminal, to enforce such a law against parties affected may be enjoined from such action by a Federal court of equity. Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U. S. 453, 248 U. S. 456; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 239 U. S. 37-38. See also Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 209 U. S. 155, 209 U. S. 162; Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 244 U. S. 592; Greene v. Louisville & Interurban Page 263 U. S. 215 Railroad Co., 244 U. S. 499, 244 U. S. 506; Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278, 227 U. S. 293; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 223 U. S. 621; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Andrews, 216 U. S. 165; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223, 195 U. S. 241; Davis & Farnum Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U. S. 207, 189 U. S. 217. The Terraces' property rights in the land include the right to use, lease and dispose of it for lawful purposes (Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 245 U. S. 74), and the Constitution protects these essential attributes of property (Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 169 U. S. 391), and also protects Nakatsuka in his right to earn a livelihood by following the ordinary occupations of life (Truax v. Raich, supra; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390). If, as claimed, the state act is repugnant to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, then its enforcement will deprive the owners of their right to lease their land to Nakatsuka, and deprive him of his right to pursue the occupation of farmer, and the threat to enforce it constitutes a continuing unlawful restriction upon and infringement of the rights of appellants, as to which they have no remedy at law which is as practical, efficient or adequate as the remedy in equity. And assuming, as suggested by the Attorney General, that, after the making of the lease, the validity of the law might be determined in proceedings to declare a forfeiture of the property to the State or in criminal proceedings to punish the owners, it does not follow that they may not appeal to equity for relief. No action at law can be initiated against them until after the consummation of the proposed lease. The threatened enforcement of the law deters them. In order to obtain a remedy at law, the owners, even if they would take the risk of fine, imprisonment, and loss of property, must continue to suffer deprivation of their right to dispose of or lease their land to any such alien until one is found who will join them Page 263 U. S. 216 in violating the terms of the enactment and take the risk of forfeiture. Similarly Nakatsuka must continue to be deprived of his right to follow his occupation as farmer until a land owner is found who is willing to make a forbidden transfer of land and take the risk of punishment. The owners have an interest in the freedom of the alien, and he has an interest in their freedom, to make the lease. The state act purports to operate directly upon the consummation of the proposed transaction between them, and the threat and purpose of the Attorney General to enforce the punishments and forfeiture prescribed prevents each from dealing with the other. Truax v. Raich, supra. They are not obliged to take the risk of prosecution, fines

and imprisonment and loss of property in order to secure an adjudication of their rights. The complaint presents a case in which equitable relief may be had, if the law complained of is shown to be in contravention of the federal Constitution. 2. Is the act repugnant to the due process clause or the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Appellants contend that the act contravenes the due process clause in that it prohibits the owners from making lawful disposition or use of their land, and makes it a criminal offense for them to lease it to the alien, and prohibits him from following the occupation of farmer; and they contend that it is repugnant to the equal protection clause in that aliens are divided into two classes -- those who may and those who may not become citizens, one class being permitted, while the other is forbidden, to own and as defined. Alien inhabitants of a State, as well as all other persons within its jurisdiction, may invoke the protection of these clauses. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 118 U. S. 369; Truax v. Raich, supra, 239 U. S. 39. The Fourteenth Amendment, as against the arbitrary and capricious or unjustly discriminatory action of the State, protects the owners in their Page 263 U. S. 217 right to lease and dispose of their land for lawful purposes and the alien resident in his right to earn a living by following ordinary occupations of the community, but it does not take away from the State those powers of police that were reserved at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 113 U. S. 31; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 123 U. S. 663; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 127 U. S. 683; In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 136 U. S. 449; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 152 U. S. 136; Phillips v. Mobile, 208 U. S. 472, 208 U. S. 479; Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 235 U. S. 622-623. And, in the exercise of such powers, the State has wide discretion in determining its own public policy and what measures are necessary for its own protection and properly to promote the safety, peace, and good order of its people. And, while Congress has exclusive jurisdiction over immigration, naturalization and the disposal of the public domain, each State, in the absence of any treaty provision to the contrary, has power to deny to aliens the right to own land within its borders. Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483, 100 U. S. 484, 100 U. S. 488; Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U. S. 333, 180 U. S. 340; Mr. Justice Field, speaking for this court (Phillips v. Moore, 100 U. S. 208) said (p. 100 U. S. 212): "By the common law, an alien cannot acquire real property by operation of law, but may take it by act of the grantor, and hold it until office found; that is, until the fact of alienage is authoritatively established by a public officer, upon an inquest held at the instance of the government. [Footnote 3] " Page 263 U. S. 218

State legislation applying alike and equally to all aliens, withholding from them the right to own land, cannot be said to be capricious or to amount to an arbitrary deprivation of liberty or property, or to transgress the due process clause. This brings us to a consideration of appellants' contention that the act contravenes the equal protection clause. That clause secures equal protection to all in the enjoyment of their rights under like circumstances. In re Kemmler, supra; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657, 148 U. S. 662. But this does not forbid every distinction in the law of a State between citizens and aliens resident therein. In Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, this court said (p. 257 U. S. 337): "In adjusting legislation to the need of the people of a State, the legislature has a wide discretion, and it may be fully conceded that perfect uniformity of treatment of all persons is neither practical nor desirable, that classification of persons is constantly necessary. . . . Classification is the most inveterate of our

reasoning processes. We can scarcely think or speak without consciously or unconsciously exercising it. It must therefore obtain in and determine legislation; but it must regard real resemblances and real differences between things, and persons, and class them in accordance with their pertinence to the purpose in hand." The rights, privileges and duties of aliens differ widely from those of citizens, and those of alien declarants differ substantially from those of nondeclarants. Formerly, in many of the States, the right to vote and hold office was extended to declarants, and many important offices have been held by them. But these rights have not been granted to nondeclarants. By various acts of Congress, [Footnote 4] Page 263 U. S. 219 declarants have been made liable to military duty, but no act has imposed that duty on nondeclarants. The fourth paragraph of Article I of the treaty, invoked by the appellants, provides that the citizens or subjects of each shall be exempt in the territories of the other from compulsory military service either on land or sea, in the regular forces, or in the national guard, or in the militia; also from all contributions imposed in lieu of personal service, and from all forced loans or military exactions or contributions. The alien's formally declared bona fide intention to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to the sovereignty to which he lately has been a subject, and to become a citizen of the United States and permanently reside therein [Footnote 5] markedly distinguishes him from an ineligible alien or an eligible alien who has not so declared. By the statute in question, all aliens who have not in good faith declared intention to become citizens of the United States, as specified in section 1(a), are called "aliens," and it is provided that they shall not "own" "land," as defined in clauses (d) and (b) of section 1 respectively. The class so created includes all, but is not limited to, aliens not eligible to become citizens. Eligible aliens who have not declared their intention to become citizens are included, and the act provides that unless declarants be admitted to citizenship within seven years after the declaration is made, bad faith will be presumed. This leaves the class permitted so to own land made up of citizens and aliens who may, and who intend to, become citizens, and who in good faith have made the declaration required by the naturalization laws. The inclusion of good faith declarants in the same class with citizens does not unjustly discriminate against aliens who are ineligible or Page 263 U. S. 220 against eligible aliens who have failed to declare their intention. The classification is based on eligibility and purpose to naturalize. Eligible aliens are free white persons and persons of African nativity or descent. [Footnote 6] Congress is not trammeled, and it may grant or withhold the privilege of naturalization upon any grounds or without any reason, as it sees fit. But it is not to be supposed that its acts defining eligibility are arbitrary or unsupported by reasonable consideration of public policy. The State properly may assume that the considerations upon which Congress made such classification are substantial and reasonable. Generally speaking, the natives of European countries are eligible. Japanese, Chinese and Malays are not. Appellants' contention that the state act discriminates arbitrarily against Nakatsuka and other ineligible aliens because of their race and color is without foundation. All persons of whatever color or race who have not declared their intention in good faith to become citizens are prohibited from so owning agricultural lands. Two classes of aliens inevitably result from the naturalization laws -- those who may and those who may not become citizens. The rule established by Congress on this subject, in and of itself, furnishes a reasonable basis for classification in a state law withholding from aliens the privilege of land ownership as defined in the act. We agree with the court below (274 Fed. 841, 849) that: "It is obvious that one who is not a citizen and cannot become one lacks an interest in, and the power to effectually work for the welfare of, the State, and, so lacking, the State may rightfully deny him the right to own and lease real estate within its boundaries. If one incapable of citizenship may lease or own real estate, it is within the

Page 263 U. S. 221 realm of possibility that every foot of land within the State might pass to the ownership or possession of noncitizens." And we think it is clearly within the power of the State to include nondeclarant eligible aliens and ineligible aliens in the same prohibited class. Reasons supporting discrimination against aliens who may but who will not naturalize are obvious. Truax v. Raich, supra, does not support the appellants' contention. In that case, the Court held to be repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment an act of the Legislature of Arizona making it a criminal offense for an employer of more than five workers at any one time, regardless of kind or class of work, or sex of workers, to employ less than 80 per cent. qualified electors or native-born citizens of the United States. In the opinion, it was pointed out that the legislation there in question did not relate to the devolution of real property, but that the discrimination was imposed upon the conduct of ordinary private enterprise covering the entire field of industry with the exception of enterprises that were relatively very small. It was said that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is a part of the freedom which it was the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to secure. In the case before us, the thing forbidden is very different. It is not an opportunity to earn a living in common occupations of the community, but it is the privilege of owning or controlling agricultural land within the State. The quality and allegiance of those who own, occupy and use the farm lands within its borders are matters of highest importance, and affect the safety and power of the State itself. The Terraces, who are citizens, have no right safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment to lease their land to aliens lawfully forbidden to take or have such lease. Page 263 U. S. 222 The state act is not repugnant to the equal protection clause, and does not contravene the Fourteenth Amendment. 3. The state act, in our opinion, is not in conflict with the treaty [Footnote 7] between the United States and Japan. The preamble declares it to be "a treaty of commerce and navigation," and indicates that it was entered into for the purpose of establishing the rules to govern commercial intercourse between the countries. The only provision that relates to owning or leasing land is in the first paragraph of Article I, which is as follows: "The citizens or subjects of each of the high contracting parties shall have liberty to enter, travel and reside in the territories of the other to carry on trade, wholesale and retail, to own or lease and occupy houses, manufactories, warehouses and shops, to employ agents of their choice, to lease land for residential and commercial purposes, and generally to do anything incident to or necessary for trade upon the same terms as native citizens or subjects, submitting themselves to the laws and regulations there established." For the purpose of bringing Nakatsuka within the protection of the treaty, the amended complaint alleges that, in addition to being a capable farmer, he is engaged in the business of trading, wholesale and retail, in farm products and shipping the same in intrastate, interstate and foreign commerce, and, instead of purchasing such farm products, he has produced, and desires to continue to produce, his own farm products for the purpose of selling them in such wholesale and retail trade, and if he is prevented from leasing land for the purpose of producing farm products for such trade he will be prevented from engaging in trade and the incidents to trade, as he is authorized to do under the treaty.

Page 263 U. S. 223

To prevail on this point, appellants must show conflict between the state act and the treaty. Each State, in the absence of any treaty provision conferring the right, may enact laws prohibiting aliens from owning land within its borders. Unless the right to own or lease land is given by the treaty, no question of conflict can arise. We think that the treaty not only contains no provision giving Japanese the right to own or lease land for agricultural purposes, but, when viewed in the light of the negotiations leading up to its consummation, the language shows that the high contracting parties respectively intended to withhold a treaty grant of that right to the citizens or subjects of either in the territories of the other. The right to "carry on trade" or "to own or lease and occupy houses, manufactories, warehouses and shops," or "to lease land for residential and commercial purposes," or "to do anything incident to or necessary for trade" cannot be said to include the right to own or lease or to have any title to or interest in land for agricultural purposes. The enumeration of rights to own or lease for other specified purposes impliedly negatives the right to own or lease land for these purposes. A careful reading of the treaty suffices, in our opinion, to negative the claim asserted by appellant that it conflicts with the state act. But if the language left the meaning of its provisions doubtful or obscure, the circumstances of the making of the treaty, as set forth in the opinion of the District Court (supra, 274 Fed. 844, 845), would resolve all doubts against the appellants' contention. The letter of Secretary of State Bryan to Viscount Chinda, July 16, 1913, shows that, in accordance with the desire of Japan, the right to own land was not conferred. And it appears that the right to lease land for other than residential and commercial purposes was deliberately withheld by substituting the words of the treaty, "to lease land for residential and commercial purposes," for a more comprehensive clause Page 263 U. S. 224 contained in an earlier draft of the instrument, namely, "to lease land for residential, commercial, industrial, manufacturing and other lawful purposes." 4. The act complained of is not repugnant to 33 of Article II of the state Constitution. That section provides that "the ownership of lands by aliens . . . is prohibited in this State. . . ." Appellants assert that the proposed lease of farm land for five years is not "ownership," and is not prohibited by that clause of the state Constitution and cannot be forbidden by the state Legislature. That position is untenable. In State v. O'Connell, 121 Wash. 542, 209 Pac. 865, a suit for the purpose of escheating to the State an undivided one-half interest in land, or the proceeds thereof, held in trust for the benefit of an alien, a subject of the British empire, decided since this appeal was taken, the Supreme Court of Washington held that the statute in question did not contravene this provision of the Constitution of that State. The question whether or not a state statute conflicts with the Constitution of the State is settled by the decision of its highest court. Carstairs v. Cochran, 193 U. S. 10, 193 U. S. 16. This court "is without authority to review and revise the construction affixed to a state statute as to a state matter by the court of last resort of the State." Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Commission, 255 U. S. 445, 255 U. S. 448, and cases cited. The decree of the District Court is affirmed. MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS and MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS think there is no justiciable question involved, and that the case should have been dismissed on that ground. MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. [Footnote 1] "Section 33. The ownership of lands by aliens, other than those who in good faith have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States, is prohibited in this State, except where acquired by

inheritance, under mortgage or in good faith in the ordinary course of justice in the collection of debts; and all conveyances of lands hereafter made to any alien directly or in trust for such alien, shall be void: Provided, that the provisions of this section shall not apply to lands containing valuable deposits of minerals, metals, iron, coal, or fire clay, and the necessary land for mills and machinery to be used in the development thereof and the manufacture of the products therefrom. Every corporation, the majority of the capital stock of which is owned by aliens, shall be considered an alien for the purposes of this prohibition." [Footnote 2] "Section 1. In this act, unless the context otherwise requires," "(a) 'Alien' does not include an alien who has in good faith declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, but does include all other aliens and all corporations and other organized groups of persons a majority of whose capital stock is owned or controlled by aliens or a majority of whose members are aliens;" "(b) 'Land' does not include lands containing valuable deposits of minerals, metals, iron, coal or fire clay or the necessary land for mills and machinery to be used in the development thereof and the manufacture of the products therefrom, but does include every other kind of land and every interest therein and right to the control, possession, use, enjoyment, rents, issues or profits thereof. . . ." "* * * *" "(d) To 'own' means to have the legal or equitable title to or the right to any benefit of;" "(e) 'Title' includes every kind of legal or equitable title. . . ." "Section 2. An alien shall not own land or take or hold title thereto. No person shall take or hold land or title to land for an alien. Land now held by or for aliens in violation of the constitution of the State is forfeited to and declared to be the property of the State. Land hereafter conveyed to or for the use of aliens in violation of the constitution or of this act shall thereby be forfeited to and become the property of the State." [Footnote 3] In Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch 603, 11 U. S. 609, 11 U. S. 619-620, it was said, per Story, J.: "It is clear by the common law that an alien can take lands by purchase, though not by descent; or, in other words, he cannot take by the act of law, but he may by the act of the party. . . . In the language of the ancient law, the alien has the capacity to take, but not to hold, lands, and they may be seized into the hands of the sovereign." See also 1 Cooley's Blackstone (4th Ed.) 315, *372; 2 Kent's Commentaries (14th Ed.) 80, *54.