Lil's Notes |Torts | 22 Nov 2011

Aquino pp. 1-11 Tort : French torquere, to twist Common Law o Unlawful violation of a private right, not created by contract, and which gives rise to an action for damages o It is an act or omission producing an injury to another, w/o any previous existing lawful relation of which the said act or omission may be said to be a natural outgrowth or incident o Private or civil wrong or injury, other than breach of contract o Black's Law Dictionary: There must always be violation of some duty that must arise from operation of law and not by mere agreement of the parties. o There is no universal formula for tort liability. o Includes: Intentional torts : assault, battery, etc. Negligence : Voluntary acts or omissions w/c result in injury to others, w/o intending to cause the same Strict Liability : person liable independent of fault or negligence upon submission of proof of certain facts Philippine Tort Law o Art 1157 (quasi-delict as a source of obligation),Art. 2176 to 2194 Provisions on Tort in NCC influenced by law and decisions in different countries Spain Roman Law US pol & eco relations b/w US & PH, common law Concept of right and wrong essentially the same throughout world. Roman Law (Institutes) main source Liability of judge misconduct s case, gives wrong decision Liability of occupier of bldg for 2x damage for anything thrown or forced out of the bldg. no matter by whom, on a public place (Art 2193) Liability of occupier if thing he suspended on a bldg falls and damages something if it fell Liability of inn keepers, shop keepers, stables for theft or damage caused by slaves or employees (Art 2000) Code Commission's general plan was for the NCC to cover unintentional acts and intentional acts to be governed by RPC, thus "tort" does not appear in NCC However, other statutes and jurisprudence by SC deviated from general plan and included intentional acts in torts. (Broader Definition) SC: Tort breach of legal duty SC: Tort the violation of a right given or omission of statutory duty imposed by law (Naguiat v. NLRC) Catch-All Provision: Arts 19-21 embody Anglo-Amer concept of tort. (include malice) PH Torts include: o Defamation o Fraud o Physical Injuries o Violation of Constitutional Rights o Negligence o Interference w/ contractual relations o Violation of Privacy o Malicious Prosecution o Product Liability o Strict liability for possession of animals o Abuse of right (CC Art 19) o Acts w/c violate good morals & custom (NCC Art 21) o Civil liability arising from criminal liability Torts adopted by SC even before NCC o Art 1902. Any person who by any act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done. Art 2176 included intentional acts. (Elcano v. Hill) Justice Bocobo: remove phrase " not punishable by law" may lead to following the letter but not spirit of law, so phrase removed from NCC. Civil Negligence : culpa aquiliana : quasi-delict : culpa extra-contractual : cuasi-delito Art 2177: acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana Purpose of Tort Law o Peaceful means of adjusting rights of parties o Deter wrongful conduct o Encourage socially responsible behavior o Restore injured parties to their original condition, as much as law can do this through compensation for injury. o Reduce the risks and burden of living in the society and to allocate them among the members of society (Phoenix v. IAC)

Report of the Code Commission (1948) pp. 161-163 Solutio Indebiti : Art 2175 : payment by mistake Quasi-Delict: obligations that do not arise from law, contracts, quasicontracts or criminal offenses. Quasi-Delict closest to ancient law of Lex Aquilia. Art 2199 : blending of American and Spanish Philippine law. (proximate cause, contributory negligence) Special Provisions for motor vehicle mishaps (2204-2206) Sergio Naguiat doing business under the name of Sergio F. Naguiat Ent. Inc. & Clark Field Taxi Inc. (CFTI) v. NLRC, Nat'l Org of Workingman and its members, Leonardo Galang etal (13 Mar 1997, Panganiban)

Labor Case Clark Air Base closed, ending CFTI's concessionaire's contract with Army Air Force Exchange Services (AAFES) and causing employees of CFTI to be separated from service. Some employees asking for more separation pay. Boundary fee $26.50-27.00. Minimum earning $15/day for 3-4 days a week. Driver's union agreed to sep. pay of P500/year of service, other union members would not accept this agreement, filed case. Naguiat: great financial losses and lost business opportunity Naguiat: Sergio F Naguiat Ent separate entity, should not be solidarily liable with CFTI Naguiat: Sergio and Antonin only officers and stockholders of CFTI, should not be personally accountable for corporate debts. NLRC: o First decided to give P1200/year of service: humanitarian consideration o After appeal by union, separation pay $120 for every year of service o Sergio Naguiat Ent. Inc., Sergio & Antonin Naguiat jointly and severally liable with CFTI. Issue: Are officers of corporations ipso facto liable jointly and severally with the companies they represent for the payment of separation pay? SC: Closure of business does not mean company suffered great financial loss. Closure due to phaseout of bases, not business losses. SC: NLRC gave decided on correct amount based on Art 283 of Labor Code. (1/2 month pay for every year of service) SC: Naguiat Enterprises not liable bec. Union members employees of CFTI and not Naguiat. No evidence that Naguiat indirect employer. SC: Sergio supervising employees as President of CFTI. Naguiat not involved in taxi business, but in trading SC: Sergio, as company president of CFTI, solidarily liable with CFTI in the

broader sense of justice. Sergio actively managed the business. SC: Corpo Code: Closed Family Corp. stockholder who manage business personally liable for corporate tort unless the corporation has obtained reasonably adequate liability insurance. (Sec 100, p5) No tort liability insurance, determine if there was "Corporate Tort" Essentially, "tort" consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law" Tort is a breach of legal duty. SC: Art 283 of Labor Code requires employer to give separation pay upon closure of business law imposed duty or obligation. SC: Antonin not liable, did not really manage business.

Liwayway Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corp (19 Jun 2007, Ynares-Santiago) Chato : Comm of BIR 10 Jun 1993: RA 7654 effective 3 July 1993. Prior to RA7654, Champion, Hope & More cigarettes considered local brands subject to ad valorem tax of 20-45% 1 Jul 1993: RMC 37-93 reclassified Champion, Hope and More as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to 55% tax, subjecting cigarette brands to Sec 142(c)(1) which applies to locally manufactured cigarettes currently classifled and taxed at 55% 2 July 1993, 5:50pm : RMC 37-93 faxed to Fortune, addressed to no one in particular. 30 July 1993,: after MR's, Fortune assessed tax deficiency of ~Php9.6M CTA, CA and SC ruled RMC 37-93 invalid and unenforceable. (short of req'm for valid admin issuance) 10 Apr 1997: Fortune sues Chato for damages in her private capacity under Art 32 of NCC (RMC 37-93 violated Fortune's constitutional right against deprivation of property w/o due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. Chato files motion to dismiss: Issued RMC in the performance of her official function, no cause of action for lack of

allegation of malice and bad faith, cert against forum-shopping. RTC: can't dismiss, premature since parties have not presented evidence CA: Art 32 of NCC: Liability may arise even if defendant did not act with malice of bad faith. Admin Code (Sec 38 Bk 1) general law on civil liability while Art 32 of NCC special law that governs this case. Admin Code: liability only attaches if there is clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence where public officer violated a constitutional right of plaintiff. (Superior Officer) o Subordinate Officer: civilly liable for willful or negligent acts done by him which are contrary to law, morals public policy and good customs even if he acts under orders of superior. Art 32: Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates, or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages. (to end official abuse) Issue: WON Administrative Code or NCC should be applied? NCC SC: Art 32 of NCC controlling. SC: The special law must prevail since it evinces legislative intent more clearly than that of a general statue and must not be taken as intended to affect the more particular and specific provisions of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to construe it in order to give its words any meaning at all. SC: Special Law exception SC: Art 32 patterned after tort in American Law.(commission or omission of an act by one, w/o right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property, or reputation.) No need for evil intent. SC: intent of leg. To create a distinct cause of action in nature of tort for violation of constitutional rights, irrespective of motive. Admin Code: deal in particular with liability of gov't officials BUT subject is

general. ("Acts" done in performance of official duties, no specific act or omission) Art 32 specifies "act" tort for impairment of rights & liberties. Subject is particular or specific provision. SC Dispositive: motion to dismiss denied, continue proceedings in RTC Marikina.

Prosser v. Keeton pp. 1-7 No definition, civil wrong, pervades entire law. Harm/justification, difficult to tell Characteristics of Tort o Harm results or about to result o Capable of being compensated in action of law for damages, though other remedies available o Breach of duties fixed and imposed upon parties by law itself, even w/o their consent (ex driving responsibly) Liability in tort is based upon relations of persons with others, may arise with large groups or classes of persons or singly/individually Liability based on conduct which is socially unacceptable. Reasonable standards, reasonable balance b/w plaintiff's claim to protection and defendant's claim to freedom of action. Accounting? Act may be reasonable logically, but be regarded as socially unreasonable (ex trespassing thinking on own land, protect scope of property rights) Torts Under the Spanish Law "Tort" as understood in common law not found in Spanish law. Nearest translation "culpa extracontractual" But tort exists in Spanish legal system under different name and condition Ex Art 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done" Classification of Tort o Arising out of crimes or

Lil's Notes |Torts | 22 Nov 2011

misdemeanors (RPC) *Acts or omissions not punished by law. (CC 1093) Acts & omissions w/c are illicit (Art 1089) refers to penal acts, Acts & omissions in which any kind o fault or negligence intervenes (Art 1089) refers to tort (1093) Culpa or negligence o Substantive an incident in the performance of an obligation w/c already exists. o Independent obligation b/w persons nto formerly bound by any other obligation Art 1089: Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. Art 1092: Civil obligations, arising from crimes or misdemeanors, shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code Art 1093: Those arising from acts and omissions in which faults or negligence, not punished by law, occur, shall be subject to the provisions of chapter second of title sixteen of this book. 1092 and 1093 show Spanish codifiers' intention to classify private wrongs. Private wrongs arising from crimes or misdemeanors o How to enforce? o (1) merging civil action in criminal prosecution o (2) bringing separate civil action in special cases only (adultery, etc) o (3) independent civil action in all cases irrespective of whether the civil liability arie from private or public wrongs. o 1882 case in Spain, dog bit plaintiff : party injured in criminal case may institute penal and civil action jointly or o separately, but only in the case in which the civil action is renounced or expressly reserved. If civil action conducted jointly with criminal action, cannot bring another civil action and plaintiff must content herself with adjudication in criminal case. o 1902: While criminal case pending, no separate civil action may be instituted until final judgment of penal action. Provisional acquittal does not give the right to institute separate civil suit. o (Fernandez v . Perez) Spanish law, additional penalty/indemnity (intangible damage) only granted if defendant guilty in criminal proceeding. o Crimes of public action (involuntary), Crimes of individual action (voluntary) 2 remedies in Art 1092 of CC. (1) Public Prosecutor to join civil and criminal actions, (2) Instituting separate civil action independent of criminal action w/o waiting for institution of criminal action. No conviction necessary (Art 116) (Art 114) if criminal action instituted subsequently, civil action suspended. Act 277 of Philippine Commission: The pendency of a criminal appeal does not suspend prosecution of the civil suit, and a judgment in one is no bar to the prosecution of the other. Civil action can be instituted independently. Civil liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as expressly provide in the law. (1093) Acts & Omissions not punished by Law o Lex Aquilia. Reparation for injuries corpora corpori (injuries done by wrongdoer on property of plaintiff and corpora sed non corpora (injuries caused indirectly by the fault of the defendant, either to the owner of the property injured, or to any one having an interest in it) o Fault of positive character : 2x damages, fault of omission insufficient o Injury to person or reputation o Practicing when unqualified Injuries real or verbal Quasi-Delict: an incident by which damage is done to the obligee (even w/o negligence or intention), and for which damage the obligor is bound to make satisfaction (Austin) Quasi-ex-delicto: damage by employee, etc, owner liable. Noxas dare: owner frees himself from liability by abandoning slave or animal. Repair injury Nature and character of damages recoverable in an exclusively civil action arising from such acts and omissions Should damages be material and capable of exact valuation? (BUT this limitation not in Civil Code) Civil Code uses broad language, does not limit damage. Manresa on Damage o Loss suffered o Profits which a person may have failed to realize. (future suffering?) Death, mental state, etc. SC of Spain and PH, no recovery for pain and mental suffering. Common law does not redress private wrongs at public expense. existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a) Barredo vs Garcia: Fausto Barredo : owner of Malate Taxicab Faustino Garcia: 16-yr old boy killed in accident Pedro Fontanilla: driver of taxi, many traffic violations, driving on wrong side of road at high speed. Pedro Dimapalis: driver of carretela Fontanilla convicted in criminal action Parents of Faustino ask for right to bring separate civil action against Barredo, granted by court. CFI: awards 2K damages, CA: reduced to 1K damages Defense: Barredo's liability is subsidiary CA: liability sought not arising from felony or misdemeanor, but obligation impored in Art 1903 of CC by reason of negligence in selection or supervision of his servant or employee. Issue: May plaintiffs bring separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under Art 1903 of CC as employer of Pedro Fontanilla. (YES) RPC 100: Every person criminally liable also civilly liable. Confusion arises from overlapping of penal crimes (negligence) and negligence under CC. (phrase no t punishable by law) Difference b/w crimes under RPC and Culpa aquiliana o Crimes are public interest, cuasi-delitos are private concern o RPC punishes criminal act, CC repairs damage by indemnification o Delicts not as broad as quasi-delicts. Rakes vs Atlantic: ruling wrong. Exercise the case of a good father (defense vs quasi-delict) Presumption of negligence of employer when there is negligence by employee, but may be rebutted.

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-

Criminal case: proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, Civil case: preponderance of evidence sufficient. SC: Affirms CA decision.

Porfiro Cinco v. Hon Mateo Canoy (CFI Cebu, Judge Barria, City Judge Mandaue City, Romeo Hilot, Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito (31 May 1979, Melencio-Herrera) Petition for review on certiorari of CFI decision Romeo Hilot, driver of jeepney operated by Pepitos was involved in vehicular accident with Cinco. While criminal case was filed against Hilot, respondents filed for suspension of civil action pending final determinations of criminal suit (Rule 111, Sec 3(b) City Court ordered suspension of civil case and CFI found no grave abuse of discretion for suspending case. Issue: WON trial of civil case should be suspended until after final judgment of criminal case. (WON an there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action? SC: Action based on quasi-delict based on Art 2176 and 2180 of NCC> SC: Liability predicated on quasidelict, civil case may proceed as separate and independent civil action (Art 2177) Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.(n) Rule 111 Sec 2 Rules of Court justifies separate civil action (inc Art 2177) Supported by Art 31 Article 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. SC: No distinction b/w damage to persons and damage to property. SC: Judge Canonoy gravely abused discretion in upholding City Court's decision to suspend civil action. Gashem Shookat Baksh v. CA and Marilou T. Gonzales (19 Feb 1993, Davide) -

Pedro Elcano and Patricia Elcano in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased v. Reginald Hill, minor and Marvin Hill, as father and Natural Guardian of minor. (26 May 1977, Barredo) Appeal from CFI Quezon City Reginald Hill killed Agapito Elcano, but was acquitted of criminal liability because of lack of intent. Parents of Agapito seek to recover damages from Marvin Hill. Issue: Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability was not reserved? NO (Barredo v. Garcia) May Art 2180 of NCC be applied against Marvin, given that Reginald though a minor was married even though he was being financially supported by his father? SC: Barreda vs Garcia covers not only negligence, but extends to fault or culpa. SC: Justice Bocobo: follow spirit and not just letter of the law. Art. 2177. Allowed to institute separate actions, but not allowed to recover damages twice. SC: Acquittal in criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasidelict, and thus acquittal not a bar to instant action against him. SC: Marvin Hill not free from responsibility despite emancipation of Reginald thru marriage. Emancipation of minor by marriage is not absolute (Art 399 CC) He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian. Art 2180: the obligation imposed by Art 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Marvin is responsible for Reginald. SC: But since Reginald is now of age, liability of Marvin is only subsidiary, as a matter of equity. SC: reverses CFI decision dismissing case

Appeal by certiorari to review and set aside decision of CA. Setting: Dagupan City, Pangasinan Marilou G: pretty, lass of good moral character, 22years old, HS grad, employed at Mabuhay Luncheonette. Baksh: Iranian citizen, exchange student, medical course at Lyceum. Engaged before 20 Aug 1987, visited parents Lived with Baksh on 20 Aug 1987, slept with him, maltreated her one week before scheduled Oct wedding. Baksh wanted to split up with her after a fight and said he was already married to someone in Bacolod. Gonzales asking for damages of 45K, reimbursement for actual expenses. AF Baksh: did not propose, asks for 25K moral damages. Not familiar with Filipino customs (Muslim, foreigner) RTC: awards 20K moral damages to Gonzales. Good moral character, expenses for preparation of wedding, non-fulfillment of promise. CA: affirms RTC ruling. (Barrio lass) Fraud and deception, conduct against morals, good customs, etc. Issue: WONN damages may be recovered for breach of promise to marry on the basis of Art 21 of NCC Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. SC: Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se.(abuse by designing women) BUT Art 21 was designed to grant adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs w/c is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in statute books. SC: Baksh cannot be held criminally liable under Art 337/338 of RPC bec Gonzales over 18. BUT is liable under Art 21 for moral seduction (deceit, abuse of power) SC: mutual lust not included in moral damages. SC: affirms CA decision, but scold parents of Marilou for allowing them to stay in the same room in their house when visiting.

Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils, Inc. v. CA, Cesar Bautista and heirs of Paciano Bautista (27 Jan 1994, Romero) Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision Cesar & Paciano owners of land in Malabon Coca-Cola leased lot Bautista's land (thru sales supervisor Manoloto) for 10years 1982-1992. Coca-Cola dumped lot with filling materials, but ground of sales office/warehouse was still sinking (rainy season May 1983). Cost or corrective measures too expensive (900K++). Coca-Cola terminates lease, but Bautista's refuse and file complaint for specific performance and damages RTC: orders Coca-Cola to pay back rentals plus interest. If Coca-Cola does not comply with the terms of the lease contract, must pay 789,606.64, representing unrealized rental income for duration of lease contract. CA: no duty by Bautista's to fill up lot so Coca Cola could properly use it. Affirms RTC's ruling. CCBPI : they had been denied rights to the enjoyment or use of thing leased under Art 1643 of NCC. Bautista's in bad faith because did not reveal that lot was originally a fishpond. Issue: WON Bautista's entitled to damages? YES Issue: WON CCBPI justified in preterminating the contract of lease. SC: CCBPI (Jose Palma) was aware that lot was under water, advised not set high price for lease. CCBPI fully aware of nature and condition of land. Ocular inspections conducted. SC: Bautista have not committed any actionable wrong. SC: Affirms CA, RTC ruling., reduces AF.

ELEMENTS OF QUASI-DELICT and TORT Natividad Andamo and Emmanuel Andamo v. IAC and Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc. (6 Nov 1990, Fernan) Andamos owner of land in Silang,

Lil's Notes |Torts | 22 Nov 2011

Cavite adjacent to that of Missionaries. In Missionaries land, waterpaths including an artificial lake was constructed such that it flooded Andamo's land causing a young man to drown, damage crops and plants, washed away costly fences, exposed them to danger during rainy season. Jul 1982: Andamos file criminal action under Art 324 of RPC against officers of corporation. 22 Feb 1983: Andamos file civil action for damages against corporation. Apr 1984: RTC suspends hearing until judgment to criminal case finalized and later dismisses civil case for lack of jurisdiction bec. criminal case still unresolved (sec 3(a) Rule 3 Rules of Court) IAC affirms RTC's ruling. Issue: WON a corporation, w/c has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductor and contrivances within its land, therby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under Art 2176 and 2177 of NCC on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case. (YES, if proven to be negligence or at fault) Issue: WON civil case should have been dismissed? (NO) SC: Elements of Quasi-Delicts: o Damages suffered by plaintiff o Fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose acts he must respond was guilty o The connection of cause and effect b/w fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by plaintiff. SC: Causal connection alleged by Andamos. Proof of fault or negligence may be the basis of recovery for damages. SC: Limitations on property: Art 431 (Sic Utero Tuo Ut Alienum Non Laedas) SC: Art 2176 covers not only acts "not punishable by law", but also criminal acts whether intentional, voluntary or negligent. Therefore, A separate civil action lies against offender in criminal act, WON he is found guilty or acquitted. SC: reverses IAC decision. RTC ordered to reinstate civil case and proceed with hearing of case. PNR v. Ethel Brunty and Juan Manuel Garcia (2 Nov 2006, Callejo) Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision. Rhonda Brunty, daughter of Ethel, going on a trip to Baguio was killed when the Mercedes Benz she was riding with Garcia collided with a PNR train on 25 Jan 1980 in Brgy Rizal, Moncada, Tarlac. Driver instantly killed, Rhonda died 10minutes after arriving at hospital, Garcia still in Makati Med for further treatment. Ethel sues PNR for actual, compensatory and moral damages. o Death and injuries direct and proximate result of gross and reckless negligence of PNR in not providing necessary equipment for railroad crossing. No Flag Bar. Flagman equipped only with flashlight. Failed to supervise its employees in the performance of their respective tasks and duties. (Asks for 4M+++, 200K actual and compensatory damages to Ethel, 2.8M unearned income of Rhonda, moral and exemplary damages, 64K++ medical expenses as actual damages and 1M unearned income of Garcia, 72K++ for actual damages to car, attorneys fees,etc) PNR: driver guilty of contributory negligence (overtaking at 70kph 50yrds from tracks, disregarded warning signs and they had right of way immediate and proximate cause of accident was driver's negligence).Mercidita (driver) had Last Clear Chance to avoid accident. No law that requires it to put up flagbars or safety railroad bars. RTC: rules in favor of Brunty.30K for death of Rhonda, 1M for moral and actual damages to heirs, 72,760.00 damages to car, 50K for AF. CA: Affirms RTC with modifications: 30K to 50K for death, deleting damages for car. Issue:WON Last clear chance rule applies? Issue: WON PNR is liable due to quasi-delict, negligence? Issue: WON Mercedita's contributory negligence clears PNR of liability? SC: Negligence is want of care required by circumstances Test of whether there was negligence o Did defendant use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? Pater familias SC: affirms RTC and CA's findings that PNR was negligent bec. of its failure to provide necessary safety device and is liable under Art 2176 of NCC. SC: Elements of Quasi-Delict. Applying elements, CA came to correct conclusion that PNR is liable (curve of road conceals by cockpit arena, lack of safety equipment by PNR) SC: Railroad companies ow to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property of railroad crossings, which duties pertain both in the operation of trains and in the maintenance of crossings. Such failure is evidence of negligence even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it because public safety demands that said device or equipment be installed. Contributory negligence: conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. To prove contributory negligence, it is necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. SC: Last Clear Chance: where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss. SC: award of 1M for actual/compensatory damages not proven. Temperate damages of 25K only. Sustain award of moral damages to heirs (50K), 500K moral damages to heirs of Rhonda, and AF 50K,

BPI v. Lifetime Marketing Corporation (25 Jun 2008, Tinga) Appeal from decision of CA ordering BPI to pay 2M++ actual damages to Lifetime for gross negligence in handling LMC's account. Alice Laurel, agent of LMC would deposit checks in various BPI branches then cancel the deposits. However, BPI tellers did not retrieve (against banking policies) from Laurel the machine-validated deposit slips which she then presented to LMC proving that she had deposited sales in the amount of 2.767M. LMC then gave Laurel 560++K as promotional discounts prizes. Laurel could no longer be found for prosecution, so LMC sues BPI to recover damages because of its negligence RTC: awards 1M actual damages and 100K AF. CA increased award to 2,075M and deleted AF BPI: no proof of actual damages, actual delivery of books, payment of promo prizes, amount of checks. BPI: machine-validated deposit slips not evidence of proximate cause of its loss. LMC violated original arrangement in Greenhills branch (3 deposit slips) and did not check

monthly statements. Issue: WON BPI exercise the highest degree of care in handling LMC's account SC: Banking industry impressed with public interest. Highest degree f diligence expected. Fiduciary nature of Banking. SC: Negligence in this case lies in tellers' disregard of the validation procedures in place and BPI's utter failure to supervise its employees. SC: even if LMC did not scrutinize its monthly statements, loss would still have occurred. SC: BPI's negligence is the proximate cause of the loss. Proximate: Cause: cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and w/o which the result would not have occurred. SC: LMC guilty of contributory negligence. SC: affirms decision but modifies damages to 1M. (same as RTC), LMC did not appeal RTC's amount.

Orlanda Garcia Jr, doing business under Community Diagnostic Center and BU Castro v. Ranida Salvador and Ramon Salvador. (20 Mar 2007, Ynares-Santiago) Petition for review of CA decision finding Garcia grossly negligent Ranida Salvador as part of her employment requirements with Limay Bulk Handling Terminal Inc, underwent medical exam conducted by CDC. CDC issued test result : Rhonda positive for Hepa B. Ranida was terminated and upon telling her father Ramon that she had Hepa B, Ramon suffered a heart attack and had to be hospitalized. Ranida underwent the test again and was found to be negative for Hepa B. Ranida and Ramon sue Garcia, a medtech who conducted the exam because she lost her job, suffered mental anxiety, trauma and sleepless nights, while Ramon was hospitalized and lost business opportunities. Castro pathologist, rubber stamp, did not conduct examination on Ranida. RTC: dismissed complaint for lack of sufficient evident to prove liability of

Garcia and Castro. Should have presented Dt. Sto Domingo who interpreted test result. CA: reversed RTC Ruling, awards 50K moral damages and 50K exemplary damages, 25K AF Degree of care required for Health Care providers : did the health care provider wiher fail to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent health care provider would not have done, and that failure or action caused injury to the patient. SC: Elements of actionable conduct: o Duty o Breach o Injury o Proximate Causation. SC: all element present in the case at bar. SC: Clinical labs' business impressed with public interest and high standards of performance are expected of them. SC: RA 4688 Clinical Laboratory Law. (licenses, pathologist, medtech, etc) SC: RA 5527: The Philippine Medical Technology Act of 1969. SC: Medical technologist should be supervised by registered pathologist and licensed physician. Results to be release only to requesting physician or rep upon direction of lab pathologist. SC: Castro: pathologist, infrequently visits clinic. No supervision of medtechs. Garcia conducted test w/o supervision of Castro, released w/o authorization of Castro. SC: Garcia breached his duty to provide standard of care. SC: Art. 20 SC: Affirms CA decision.

DISTINGUISHING TORT, QUASI-DELICT FROM BREACH OF CONTRACT Jose Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. (14 Oct 1918, Fisher) Jose Cangco works for Manila Railroad as a copy clerk. He gets to ride on the company's train free of charge. He was riding a train on his

way home to San Mateo. At about 78pm on a dark night, as the train was approaching San Mateo station, Cangco positioned himself upon the steps of the coach. Before the train fully stopped, he stepped off onto the platform. The station was dimly lit, and his foot stepped on a sack of melons which were piled on the edge of the platform. He slipped, lost his balance, fell violently on the platform, rolled and was drawn under the moving coach. The train moved about 6m before it came to a full stop. Cangco's arm was crushed and badly lacerated, necessitating amputation up to the shoulder. His medical expenses amounted to 790.25. Cangco sues Manila Railroad at CFI Manila to recover damages, founding his action based on negligence of employees of Manila Railroad for placing sacks of melons upon the platform. CFI: Rules in favor of Manila Railroad. Although negligence was attributable to Manila Railroad, Cangco himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering. Cangco appeals SC: The foundation of the legal liability of Manila Railroad is the CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE. Damage which Cangco suffered arises from breach of contract by reason of the failure of Manila Railroad to exercise due care in its performance. Its liability is direct and immediate. SC: This differs from the presumptive responsibility for the negligence of servants, imposed by Art 1903, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in the selection and supervision of its employees. SC: Art 1903 not applicable to contractual obligations, only to culpa aquiliana. Fault is attributable to master personally. SC: Liability of employers for negligent acts/omissions which cause damage that amount to a breach of contract, is not based on mere presumption of employer's negligence in their selection or control, and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence

and care in this regard does not relieve employer of his liability for breach of contract. Extra-contractual Obligation arise from relations of society's members embraced in the concept of status. The legal rights of each member constitute the measure of the corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in character, which the existence of those rights impose upon all members of society. In contractual obligations, the vinculum exists independently of the breach of voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation. Breach of Contract: Proof of existence of contract and nonperformance is sufficient to prima facie to warrant a recovery. Negligence : quasi-delict: Burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence. In breach of contract: negligence of employees not a defense. Field of non-contractual obligation is much broader than that of contractual obligations. These 2 fields are concentric. The mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. SCL Contract of Manila Railroad to transport Cangco carried with it the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (CC 1258). The duty, being contractual was direct and immediate, and its non-performance cannot be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to Manila Railroad's servants. SC: Cangco not guilty of contributory negligence because the train was barely moving when Cangco alighted. Test is that of ordinary and reasonable care. Cangco had the right to assume that the platform was clear. SC: In determining contributory negligence, the age, sex, physical condition of the passenger should be considered. SC: Cangco earned 25/month. Life expectancy of 33 years and

Lil's Notes |Torts | 22 Nov 2011

permanently disabled. Entitled to compensation of 2500 + recovery of 790.25 expenses (3,290.25) Malcolm Dissenting: Cangco guilty of contributory negligence. Manila Railroad not liable for damages. SC: No Contract b/w driver and FGU, therefore, action can only be based on culpa aquiliana. But no evidence showing accident due exclusively to driver's negligence. SC: GPS ordered to pay FGU 204,450.00 caused by lack of supervision by Erlinda) CA: affirms RTC decision. ISSUE: WON Batals liable? (YES) SC: Batals, in carrying out their contractual obligations, failed to exercise the requisite diligence. Guily of BREACH of CONTRACT, liable for damages suffered by L&K. SC: Actual damages 300K reasonable, no moral or exemplary damages. faith. FACTS: Eliza, a Phys. Ed student at Silliman University took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Calalas. The jeepney was full so Eliza was given an extension seat (wooden stool at the back of the jeepney). The jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As Eliza stood to let the passenger pass, the jeepney was hit from behind by an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verene and owned by Salva. As a result, Eliza was severely injured (fractured tibia-fibula with severe necrosis). She was confined for 2 wks and had to use crutches for 3 months. Eliza sued Calalas for damages due to violation of the CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE. Calalas sued Salva for quasi-delict. RTC absolved Calalas from liability bec in another case, Salva was found to be negligent. CA: Reversed RTC ruling on the ground that Eliza's action was based on Contract of Carriage and not quasi-delict, awarded her 50K actual damages, 50K moral damages, etc. ISSUE: Is Calalas liable for damage to Eliza? (YES) ISSUE: Did Calalas exercise extraordinary diligence? (NO) SC: Calalas: Not proximate cause of accident, bumping was caso fortuito. SC: Being a common carrier, damage based on breach of contract. When the accident happened, the presumption of negligence at once arose, and burden of proof on Calalas that he observed extraordinary diligence. SC: Calalas violated the traffic code by obstructing traffic (he improperly parked diagonally on the highway, with the rear of the jeepney exposed about 2mtrs from the shoulders of the highway. Furthermore, he also overloaded his jeepney (cap 24 passengers only.) SC: However, no evidence of Calalas being in bad faith, so moral damages should be deleted. SC: Affirms CA ruling, but deletes moral damages.

FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION v. GP SARMIENTO TRUCKING CORP. and LAMBERT EROLES. (6 Aug 2002, Vitug) GPS undertook to deliver 30 units of Condura Refs from plant site of Concepcion Indrustries in Alabang to Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City. Along MacArthur Highway in Tarlac, it collided with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall in a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes. The shipment was insured with FGU insurance. FGU paid to Concepcion 204,450.00, the value of the cargo. Being the subrogee of Concepcion, it sought reimbursement of this amount from GPS FGU filed a complaint for damages and breach of contract of carriage against GPS and its driver Lambert Eroles. GPS replied that it was not a common carrier bec. it hauls exclusively for Concepcion Industries. Moreover, it claims that the cause of damage if purely accidental RTC and CA dismissed the case for failure of FGU to prove the GPS was a common carrier. (Art 1735 re damages applies to common carriers) SC: GPS not a common carrier BUT GPS cannot escape from liability. SC: In culpa contractual, upon which FGU rests as being the subrogee of Concepcion Industries, the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, the corresponding right of relief. A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that was lost or suffered. "Expectation Interest", "Reliance Interest", Restitution Interes"

SPS ERLINDA BATAL & FRANK BATAL v. SPS LUZ SAN PEDRO & KENICHIRO TOMINAGA (27 Sep 2006, Austria-Martinez) LD: Culpa (Negligence) o Culpa Aquiliana: wrongful or negligent act or omission which CREATES vinculum juris and gives rise to an obligation b/w 2 persons not formally bound by any other obligation. (governed by Art 2176) o Culpa Contractual: fault or negligence incident in the performance of an obligation which already existed, and w/c increases the liability from such already existing obligation. (Governed by Art 11701174) Luz & Kenichiro contracted the services of Frank, who represented himself as a surveyor, to survey their lot for 6.5K. They again hired Frank to determine the exact boundaries of their lot as they wanted to enclose it. Frank then placed concrete monuments on the 4 corners of the lot which the lot owners used as guide to build their concrete fence (Cost 250K). However, they had to demolish part of the fence bec of a complaint from the brgy that their fence encroached on a designated right of way on the adjacent lot. It turns out that Frank's wife Erlinda is the licensed geodetic engineer. Frank admitted his mistake and offered to share in the expenses in the demolition and reconstruction of the fence, but he never delivered on his promise. L & K then file suit. RTC: refund 6500 to L&K, actual damages of 300K, AF (Mistake

VICENTE CALALAS v. CA, ELIZA JUJERCHE SUNGA & FRANCISCO SALVA (31 May 2000, Mendoza) LD: Quasi-Delict: negligence or fault should be clearly established bec it is the basis of the action. LD: Breach of Contract: Prove existence of contract and that the obligor failed to perform his part (For common carriers: to transport his passenger safety to his destination) LD: For common carriers: Burden of Proof on common carrier that he exercised extraordinary diligence. ( LD: Extraordinary diligence: As far as human care and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious person, with due regard for all the circumstances. LD: Doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasidelicts, not actions for breach of contract. Caso Fortuito: event that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen is inevitable. o Cause of the breach independent of the debtor's will o Event is unforeseeable or unavoidable o Event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in the normal manner o The debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor LD: Moral damages for breach of contract only awarded when passenger dies or evidence of bad

PAZ FORES v. IRENEO MIRANDA (4 Mar 1959, Reyes) LD: An action for breach of contract imposes on the carrier a presumption of liability upon mere proof of injury of the passenger; passenger does not have to establish the fault of the carrier or of his employees, and the burden is placed on the carrier to prove that it was due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. Miranda (Painter, Prof of Fine Arts) was a passenger on jeepney whose registered owner is Fores. Jeepney was speeding as it descended the Sta Mesa bridge when driver lost control, swerved and hit the bridge wall. 5 passengers were injured. Miranda fractured his right arm and has not recovered its use. The driver was found guilty of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. Fores: Sold the vehicle the day before the accident. CFI: 10K damages CA: 2K damages SC: Must have authority from the Public Service Commission to sell Public Utility vehicle. Until authority is released, seller still responsible for whatever happens to it. SC: Moral damages recoverable in contract of transportation (no bad faith) SC: The difference in conditions, defenses and proof, as well as codal concept of quasi-delict and breach of contract, prevent us from viewing the action for breach of contract as simultaneously embodying action for tort. SC: Affirms CA decision but deletes moral damages. AIR FRANCE v. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and CA (27 Sep 1966, Sanchez) LD: In breach of contract, moral damages may be awarded if there is bad faith on the part of the obligor. FACT: Carrascoso was a passenger on an Air France flight in Bangkok which was a stopover to the Rome leg of his trip to Lourdes. He had bought first-class tickets for all his flights. He was already seated in the first class

section when the manager of Air France ousted him from his seat to accommodate a white man, and relegated Carrascoso to tourist class. CFI awards 25K, MD, 10K ED, diff in price b/w first class and tourist class, AF, costs. CA: Affirms CFI ruling ISSUE: WON Carrascoso was entitled to Moral Damages given that action is based on breach of contract? (YES) Air France claims that no moral damages should be awarded bec. action based on breach of contract. SC: Evidence shows that Carrascoso had confirmed first-class tickets. SC: Racism is bad faith. A white man does not have a better right to a first class seat. SC: Art 21. Responsibility of employer for tortious act of employees. SC: Contract to transport passengers attended with a Public Duty. (not just transport safety, but passengers have a right to be treated with courtesy, etc.) SC: The act that breaks the contract may also be a tort. SC: The stress of Carrascoso's action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the air carrier a case of quasi-delict. Can apply principles of Tort even in breach of contract. Damages are proper. SC: Affirms CA decision.

FAR EAST BANK & TRUST CO v. CA, LUIS LUNA and CLARITA LUNA. (23 Feb 1995) LD: Bad faith, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. (Negligence: negative idea, no ill will.) LD: Art 21 only applicable when there is bad faith. LD: A quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort even where there is a pre-existing contract b/w plaintiff and defendant. LD: The test whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract : Where, without a pre-

existing contract b/w 2 parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that parties are contractually bound is NO BAR to the application of quasidelict provisions to the case. FACTS: Luis Luna a credit cardholder of FEBTC. He issued an extension card to Clarita, who lost the card and reported it to FEBTC. As a result, FEBTC placed the card under a "hotlist" Luis treated a friend to a despedida lunch at Bahia, Intercontinental Hotel. His card was rejected and he had to pay cash, causing him great embarrassment. After complaining to FEBTC and asking for damages, FEBTC apologized to him and sent a letter to Bahia that Luis was a valued cardholder. Bahia said that Luis' reputation was never in question. Nevertheless, Luis sued FEBTC for damages. RTC Pasig: 300K MD, 50K ED, 20K AF CA: Affirms RTC decision. FEBTC appeals. ISSUE: WON Luis entitled to moral damages? (NO) SC: Moral damages can only be awarded if breach of contracted made with bad faith. While FEBTC was negligent in personally informing Luis of his card's cancellation, no evidence of deliberate intent on FEBTC's part. SC: Luis not entitled to MD or ED. Nominal damages of 5K only.

Commerce student at PSBA when he was stabbed to death w/in the premises of PSBA by assailants who were NOT members of the school community. Carlitos' parents sue PSBA for its lack of security measure, negligence during attack PSBA moves to dismiss case, because no cause of action. PSBA being an academic institution not covered by 2180. RTC & CA: deny motion to dismiss. (Quasi-delicts) ISSUE: WON quasi-delict applies? (NO) ISSUE: WON parents entitled to damages (DEPENDS on TRIAL FINDINGS) SC: Case should NOT be dismissed, but ground of lower courts wrong. SC: Art 2180 only applicable if damage caused by pupils of the school. SC: However, there is a contractual relationship b/w student enrolled and academic institution. See Legal Doctrine. SC: School may avoid liability for violent trespass upon their premises by proving that breach of its contractual obligations to the students not due to its negligence. (circumstances of persons, time, and place.) SC: Proceed with Case.

PSBA v. CA, Judge Donez Benitez and Sps Bautista (4 Feb 1992, Padilla) LD: Art 2180 provides that damage should have been caused by students of the educational institution (loco parentis). But in this case, Carlitos' killers not students of PSBA. LD: However, an academic institution enters into a contract when it accepts students for enrollment. This contract is imbued with public interest. There is a built-in obligation to provide students with atmosphere conducive to learning. (means no distractions/dangers like grenades and bullets) There is a contractual relation b/w school and student. Carlitos Bautista was a 3rd yr

JUAN SYQUIA etal v. CA, MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY (27 Jan 1993, Campos) LD: When terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, then literal meaning of the stipulation shall control. Juan Syquia et al sued Manila Memorial for breach of contract/ or quasi-delict alleging that Manila Memorial was negligent for boring a hole in the concrete vault and not making the vault waterproof. When they were about to transfer the remains of their deceased relatives, they discovered the bodies, coffin etc covered in filth and waterlogged, causing them emotional distress, etc. Manila Memorial claims it did not promise "waterproof" vaults, but only

Lil's Notes |Torts | 22 Nov 2011

to seal it. Furthermore, they bore a hole so that the vault wouldnt float RTC & CA: dismissed case. ISSUE: WON Manila Memorial was negligent? (NO) ISSUE: WON Manila Memorial guilty of culpa aquiliana for boring a hole in the concrete vault? (NO) SC: Use the dictionary to get meaning of "sealed" Sealed does not mean waterproof. Stipulations of contract very clear. Manila Memorial not negligent. Manila Memorial exercised care of a good father of the family. SC: Negligence: def. Omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time, and of the place. SC: In the absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary, the diligence to be observed in the performance of an obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family. SC: Affirms RTC & CA ruling. existed b/w the parties, the contract can be said to have breached by toer, therby allowing the rules on tort to apply. Nicanor Navidad (drunk), husband of Marjorie, bought a token and was waiting for the train of LRT in EDSA station when Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned approached him. A fistfight ensued. Nicanor fell on the rails as the train (operated by Roman) arrived. He was killed instantly. His widow and heirs sue LRT, Roman, Escartin and Prudent Security Agency. RTC: Finds Prudent and Escartin negligent and awards damages to Navidads. CA: Finds LRTA and Roman in breach of contract. Exonerates Prudent and Escartin. ISSUE: WON LRTA was liable? (YES) ISSUE: WON Prudent was liable? (NO) ISSUE: WON Roman and Escartin are liable (NO) SC:LRT liable because contract of carriage created at the moment Nicanor paid for the fair and entered the premises. LRT liable even if employees from agency. SC: Prudent only liable for tort or quasi-delict, if ever. However, currently, not liable because negligence of its employee Escartin not proven. SC: Roman also absolved from liability because no evidence that he was negligent. LRTA liable because of the contractual tie b/w LRT and Navidad. No contractual tie b/w Roman and Navidad. SC: LRTA only liable. Deletes nominal damages. on plaintiff that defendant was negligent. LD: Banks have fiduciary relationship with depositor which require higher standards than those b/w parties with contract of simple loan. LC Diaz is a depositor of Solidbank. Calapre, a messenger of LC Diaz, deposited money into LC Diaz's account and left the passbook with Teller #6 bec of the long wait and he had to deposit funds at Allied Bank. When he returned, the teller gave him the deposit slips, but told him that someone else (she could not recall the name) picked up the savings passbook. Calapre and Macaraya (cashier) were able to make subsequent deposits without the passbook. However, Solidbank's teller informed them that a check for 90K had been deposited in their account, but had bounced (this check was from an account they had closed in PBC). The same day, they also discovered that 300K had been withdrawn from their Solidbank savings account. The teller was able to show them withdrawal slips signed by the authorized signatories (verified with signature cards). Noel Tamayo was the person who received the cash. LC Diaz charged its messenger, Ilagan and one Roscon Verdazola with estafa through falsification of commercial doc. RTC dismissed this case. LC Diaz sues Solidbank for the return of its money. RTC: dismissed LC Diaz's case. Savings Passbook contain the stipulations that govern the rights and obligations of bank and depositor. (depositor should keep passbook under lock and key) contractual relationship, no breach by Solidbank. CA: reverses RTC based on culpa aquiliana. Solidbank's negligence the proximate cause of damage to LC Diaz. 3 elements of quasi-delict present. Degree of diligence required from Solidbank more than that of a good father of the family. ISSUE: WON Solidbank liable? (YES, in part) SC: Solidbank liable for breach of contract due to negligence (culpa contractual) SC: Art 1980, but law imposes higher standards on the bank. *but savings not trust relationship* SC: Proximate cause and last clear chance not applicable to breach of contract. SC: Despite provisions on saving passbook, higher degree of diligence required when passbook in possession of bank. They should not have given it out to just anyone. SC: Burden of proof on Solidbank that it was not negligent. Solidbank failed to prove this. SC: But under Art 1172, liability for culpa contractual may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. LC Diaz guilty of contributory negligence in allowing the withdrawal slip signed by authorized signatories to fall into hands of impostor. Liability of Solidbank should be reduced. LC Diaz to shoulder 40% of actual damages.

LRT Authority & RODOLFO ROMAN, v. MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY. (6 Feb 2003, Vitug) LD: Contract of Carriage begins from the moment passenger pays for fare and enters the premises of common carrier. LD: Extraordinary diligence required from common carriers. LD: Common carrier liable for death of passengers o Negligent or willful acts of its employees. o Willful or negligent acts of other passengers or of strangers if common carrier's employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. LD: When an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasidelictual liability had no contract

THE CONSOLIDATED BANK & TRUST CORP (SOLIDBANK) v. CA & LC DIAZ& CO, CPA's (11 Sep 2003, Carpio) LD: Culpa Contractual: Burden of Proof on defendant that he was not at fault or negligent LD: Culpa Aquiliana: Burden of Proof

CONCEPT OF NEGLIGENCE

Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.

Negligence (always unintentional) v. Neglect (can be intentional or unintentional) Having the power not the same as having the duty. Need to specify what a party is required to do, as well as the extent of his obligation

Article 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict. (n)

SANGCO 5-7 Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Negligence is a conduct, not a state of mind (or used of sound judgment). Determined by behavior in situation and not personal judgment. Negligence is want of care required by the circumstances Common Law: Negligence classified as passive or active Negligence: the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinary regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, ot doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. No desire to bring about consequences (damage) or know/believe for certain that consequences will occur. Matter of risk. Reckless, Wanton, willful, between intent and negligence. External standard of risk at the time or situation the actor was in and based on what society demands.

PNR & VIRGILIO BORJA v. CA, CORAZON AMORES and 6 children. ( LD: Defines Negligence: the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstance justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. No hard and fast rule whereby degree and care and vigilance is calibrated. Dependent on circumstances in which person finds himself. Jose Amores crosses the railroad tracks in Pandacan (car). He gets hit by the train operated by Borja, car is dragged 10m and Amores is killed. His widow and children sue. Amores: defective speedometer and negligent because failed to provide precautions (flagman, semaphore, sign) proximate cause of accident PNR: Amores negligent, last clear chance RTC: Amores reckless. Absolves PNR from liability CA: reverses RTC. PNR negligent. ISSUE: WON PNR Negligent (YES) SC: Art 2176. Definition of Negligence. SC: PNR v Brunty..Railroad companies have public duty of exercising reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property to railroad crossings. (applies to both maintenance of train and crossings) SC: Circumstances beyond control of Amores. PNR negligent for failure to install semaphore or post flagman to warn the public. PROSSER & KEETON (169-173) Risk-Benefit ratio. Balance risks, benefits, expedience in setting standard for negligence. DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE

SANGCO 10-12 Amount of care demanded proportionate to the apparent risk. Slight: more careless than extraordinarily prudent people Gross: more careless than a careless person Wilful, Wanton, Reckless: QuasiIntent. Justifies award of punitive damages, extended liability. Conscious indifference. Statutory standard of care: violator liable irrespective of how careful or prudent he had been in other respects. Does not depend on surrounding circumstances. (Negligence by law or per se) ELENA AMEDO v. RIO OLABARRIETA (24 May 1954, Concepcion) LD: Notorious negligence is tantamount to gross negligence or want of even slight care and diligence" LD: Jumping into the sea, 1-1/2 miles from the sea, to recover a fallen P2 bill is an open and reckless disregard of one's safety and the resulting death is undoubtedly caused by notorious negligence FACTS: Filomeno Managuit is a seaman on board the Pilar II. He drowned when he jumped off the boat to retrieve a 2 peso bill blown by the wind. His mother sues to collect compensation for the death of her son. ISSUE: WON Filomeno was notoriously negligent? (YES see doctrine) SC: Employer not liable for accidental death of FILOMENO. (accident not arising from his employment and Filomeno's notorious negligence.

employer from stealing rides had nothing to do with safety, so only possible negligence and no negligence per se. FACTS: Mamador rode a truck owned by Marinduque on the way to a mine driven by Macunat. Macunat was trying to overtake another vehicle which resulted in the truck overturning and killing Mamador. ISSUE: WON Mamador's conduct in violating the prohibition to steal rides constitutes notorious negligence? (NO) SC: There was no apparent risk in accepting the ride despite the prohibition by the employer to do so. Therefore, there was no notorious negligence and Mamador entitled to compensation.

MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS, INC. v WORKMEN's COMPENSATION COMMISSION, HEIRS OF PEDRO MAMADOR and GERONIMO COLL (30 Jun 1956, Bengzon) LD: Stealing a ride on a haulage truck is not negligence because transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. Prohibition of

CONCEPCION ILAO-ORETA v. SPS EVA MARIE and BENEDICTO NOEL RONQUILLO (11 Oct 2007, Carpio Morales) LD: Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. Thoughtless disregard for the consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. FACTS: DRA ILAO-ORETA scheduled a laparoscopic procedure on Mrs. Ronquillo to determine the cause of her infertility. She scheduled it for 2pm, 5 Apr 1999. However, she did not show up and only arrived from her honeymoon in Hawaii at 10pm 5 Apr 1999. She said she forgot about the time difference in calculating if she could make it to the procedure in time. Spouses sued Dr. ILAO-ORETA for loss of income due to her negligence. RTC: awards damages of 9K++ CA: Finds Dr. ILAO-ORETA grossly negligent. Awards 50K MD and 25K ED and AF ISSUE: WON DRA ILAO-ORETA was GROSSLY NEGLIGENT? (NO) SC: Given the circumstances, the doctor was not negligent o Honeymoon o Elective Surgery o Showed care and intention in performing the procedure at appointed time.

Lil's Notes | Torts |01 Feb 2012

o Spouses did not talk with Dr. Ilao-Oreta before suing her. When Smith was near the pony, he swerved to the right to avoid hitting the pony. However, the car frightened the pony so it turned suddenly and its hind leg was hit and broken by the car. The pony fell and Picart was thrown off. The horse died and Picart sustained injuries and lost consciousness. Picart sues for 31K damages CFI: Smith not liable. ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence in maneuvering his car as described above? (YES) SC: Even if Picart was on the wrong side of the road, Smith, as he moved towards the center of the bridge should have perceived that it was too late for the horse to change lanes. The control of the situation passed entirely to Smith, and it was his duty to bring the car to a stop or change lanes after checking that their was no oncoming traffic. Given the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk that if the horse was unfamiliar with cars, it might get excited and jump. Smith exposed the horse and rider to this danger, and so is negligent under the law. SC: Smith liable for P200. from any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss. LD: In order for a fortuitous to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a person's participation the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. LD: Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event. LD: The diligence with which the law requires the individual at all times to govern his conduct varies with the nature of the situation in which he is placed and the importance of the act which he is to perform (to rebut cases cited where loss was excused. (Austria, etc. Times are different now.) FACTS: Lulu Jorge pawned several pieces of jewelry with Agencia de RC Sicam for P59,500.00. 19 Oct 1987: 2 armed men entered the pawnshop and took away cash and pawned items. Lulu Jorge refuses to believe that her jewelry was lost in the robbery (given that she was informed that they were to be kept in a vault at FEBTC) and demands the return of her jewelry by 6 Nov 1987. Since Sicam failed to return the jewelry, Jorje sues for indemnity and moral, exemplary damages. Sicam: Robbery Fortuitous event o Had a security guard, but armed robbers pretended to be customers, so they were let in. o No insurance, bec no insurance company would insure against burglary in pawn shops o Vault in Pawnshop kept open. Did not get fault in FEBTC because Central Bank required all pawnshops to have a vault in the premises. o Exercised due care and diligence RTC: Sicam not liable. Robbery is a fortuitous event. CA: Reverse RTC. Robberies and hold-ups are foreseeable risk in that those engaged in the pawnshop business are expected to foresee. Should have insured pawned items ISSUE: WON Sican was negligent and liable for the loss of the jewerlry (YES) SC:Art 1174: o Except in cases expressly specified by law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. SC: Robbery was not a fortuitous event (see elements) SC: Act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a loss. One's negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and injury to another. SC: The very measures that Sicam allegedly adopted show that to them the possibility of robbery was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen and anticipated. SC: The review of the records shows that Sicam failed to exercise reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation. Sicam guilty of negligence in the operation of their pawnshop business. (No security measures) SC: Sicam not negligent for no insuring the pawned items (Central bank removed the req. of insuring the items against burglary)

STANDARD OF CONDUCT IN GENERAL Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. (1104a) AMADO PICART v. FRANK SMITH, JR. (15 Mar 1918, Street) LD: How to determine Negligence? o Would a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued. LD: Contributory Negligence: o Where both parties are guilty of negligence, but the negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by an appreciable interval of time, the one who has the last reasonable opportunity to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party (LAST CLEAR CHANCE) FACTS: Picart was riding a pony on the wrong side of the Carlatan Bridge (75m long, 4.8m wide). Smith was driving his car at 10/12 miles an hour. Smith saw the pony, honked his horn a few times, but did not change lanes or slow down. The pony also did not transfer to the correct lane, but instead moved closer to the railing.

ROBERT SICAM and AGENCIA de RC SICAM v. LULU JORGE and CESAR JORGE (8 Aug 2007, Austria Martinez) LD: Elements of Fortuitous Event o The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the debtor to comply with obligations must be independent of the human will o It must be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso fortuito or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid o The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill obligations in a normal manner o The obligor must be free

CORINTHIAN GARDENS ASSN v. SP S REYNALDO and MARIA TANJANGCO, SPS FRANK and TERESITA CUASO (27 Jun 2008, Nachura) LD:A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a situation involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of nature. LD: It is not just or equitable to relieve a subdivision assn of any liability arising from the erection of a perimeter fence w/c encroached upon another person's lot, when by its very own Manual of Rules and Regulations, it imposes its authority over all its members to the end that "no new construction can be started unless the plans are approved by the Assn and the proper cash bond and pre-construction fees are paid. (Would render Rules, inoperative) Tanjangcos own lots 68 & 69 which is adjacent to Cuaso's lot (Lot 65) Cuasos hire Geodetic Engr de Dios to survey their lot (De Dios recommended by Corinthian) Cuasos hire CB Paraz to build their house and perimeter fence. Corinthian conducted periodic ocular inspections in order to determine compliance with Approved plans pursuant to Manula of Rules and Regulation of Corinthian Gardens. Unfortunately, it was later found out that the Cuasos had encroached on the lot of the Tanjangco's by 87 aqm Tanjangco's sue Cuasos. They want Cuasos to demolish the perimeter fence. RTC: There was encroachment. But Cuasos builders in good faith. Tanjangco to give Cuasos option to buy. In case of no agreement, Cuasos to demolish wall at own expense. Meanwhile 2K/rent. CB Paraz grossly negligent. CB Paraz to pay MD and ED to Tanjangcos and Cuasos. Corinthian and Engr de dios exonerated. CA: Reversed and set aside RTC decision o Cuasos in Bad Faith o Cuasos to pay monthly

rental 10K 100K MD and 50K ED, 150K AF to the Tanjangcos o Corinthian, CB Paraz, & Engr de Dios negligent. Shoulder 5% each of damages Cuasos have to pay Corinthian: Not negligent because: o Table inspections only. Not site measurement o Only approved architectural, structural and sanitary plans. ISSUE: WON Corinthian Gardens was negligent? (YES) SC: Approval tainted with negligence. SC: Acceptance of the cash bond, etc created certain obligations on the part of Corinthian Gardens. SC: Corinthian's failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos' perimeter wall into the Tanjangco's property, despite the inspection conducted, constitutes negligence and, at the very least, contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos. o

8th and 11th Avenue of Villamor Airbase. Albayda was hit in the knee (fracture). Had to be put in traction, several surgeries. (7months) Mental suffering, social humiliation (?) His wife left him, etc. Completo: Albayda hit him. Property damage, rear right door of taxi dented. Albayda proximate cause of his own injury, negligent. Unjust enrichment. RTC: Albayda wins with damages CA: Affirms RTC, reduces damages ISSUE: WON Completo was negligent and WON Abiad, his employer was liable? (YES) SC: When employee proven to be negligent, legal presumption that employer was negligent in selection and supervision of employee. (burden of proof on employer) SC: Completo negligent: Affirms CA ruling and increases damages 100K, 500K.

was acquitted due to exempting circumstance of accident 1998: RTC : Morales negligent: ~300K damages (2180) 2005: CA: Reverses RTC decision. (no employer-employee relationship. Salesmen independent contractor : commission basis only, not negligent anyway) ISSUE: Was Morales negligent? (YES) SC: Mentions Picart v. Smith. (standard: would a prudent man.) SC: Since guns are dangerous, higher degree of diligence required. (exceptional precautions) SC: Guns accepted for repair should be unloaded of ammunition and placed in a vault. SC: Morales negligent and did not even exercise diligence of a good father of a family. SC: Reinstate RTC decision.

HEIRS of REDENTOR COMPLETO & ELPIDIO ABIAD v. SGT AMANDO ALBAYDA JR, (6 Jul 2010) LD: In negligence suits, it is the plaintiff that has the burden of proving by a preponderence of evidence that defendant (motorist) was negligent in failing to exercise the diligence required to avoid injury to the plaintiff, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury suffered. (question of fact) LD: More care is required from the motorist ro fully discharge the duty than from the bicyclist (right of way) LD: With respect to supervision of employees, employers should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof (can't just use testimonial evidence to prove diligence) 1997: While Sgt Albayda was on the way to work, he was hit by a taxicab driven by Completo (allegedly speeding) while in the intersection of

ALFREDO PACIS & CLEOPATRA PACIS v. JEROME JOVANNE MORALES (25 Feb 2010) LD: A higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character such as dangerous weapons or substances. 17 Jan 1995: Parents of Alfred Dennis Pacis (17yrs) sue Morales for his death. 19 Jan 1991: Alfred (17) died from a gunshot wound to the head. He had gone to Top Gun Firearms in Baguio City. He had picked up a gun from the counter (the loaded gun a customer had left with the shop for repairRimfire Magnum). As Alfred returned the gun to the salesman, the gun accidentally went off and killed Alfred. Top Gun owned by Jerome Morales. He was in Manila at the time. His store manager was also away and the store was being manned by two salesmen (Matibag & Herbolario) Morales had locked the gun in his drawer, but left the keys with personnel who then opened the drawer and left the loaded gun on the counter. Matibag charged with homicide but

DAVID TAYLOR v. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD & LIGHT CO. (1910) LD: The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case. LD: When the immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the plaintiff's own act, which contributed to the principal occurrence as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover damages for the injury. David Taylor is a minor (15) of above average intelligence and physical maturity (worked as cabin boy for 4 months when he was 13, worked in his father's business with mechanical eng'g skills and knows how to draft. Manuel (12) & little girl Jessie (9) 30 Sep 1905: David and Manuel go to Isla de Provisor on a Sunday afternoon (where Meralco had its power plant) looking for Murphy. They didnt find him, but wandered around until they came to where cinders and ash were being dumped. There, they found fulminating caps (detonators used for blasting dynamite) and picked up about 20-30 of them. David wanted to see the caps explode. They put the wires in the electrical socket (nothing). Tried to

Lil's Notes | Torts |01 Feb 2012

find a hammer/stone to break it open (didn't work). Got a knife and pried the caps open (success!) David and Manuel put a match to the yellow substance inside and an explosion occurred, causing injury to the 3 kids. (Jessie, ran away, cut to the neck, Manuel, burns to the hand, David, shards in his right eye, which lead to its loss after surgery.) ISSUE: WON MERALCO was negligent? (YES) ISSUE: WON MERALCO was the proximate cause of David's injury? (NO) ISSUE: WON David, being a minor, is exempted from contributory negligence? (NO) SC: Based on many US decisions (Torpedos and Turntables) Railroad v. Stout, a company is generally liable for leaving about dangerous instrumentalities that children of tender years may take a fancy to, causing injury to themselves. SC: In this case, Meralco willfully(?) threw the fulminating caps on the ground, and made no effort to remove them from the public even though they knew that people trespassed in the Isla de Provisor all the time. (Though caps were used by builders, no proof that builders were not independent contractors, so assume that they were employees of Meralco under their control and supervision) SC: The conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the same rule which governs that of an adult: BUT case to case basis in determining whether child was negligent. SC: In this case, the negligence of MERALCO in leaving caps exposed on the premises not the proximate cause of David's injury. SC: David is mentally and physically mature for his age based on the evidence. He should have known/anticipated that it was dangerous to set fire to the contents of the cap.(even 9-year old Jessie knew of the risk) Furthermore, he is able to earn P2.50 a day as a draftsman 30days after the injury occurred. SC: Dismiss complaint JARCO MKTG CORP, LEONARDO KONG, JOSE TIOPE, ELISA PANELO v. CA, CONRADO & CRISELDA AGUILAR (21 Dec 1999) DOCTINE OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE: One who maintains in his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. LD: Accident (unforeseen event) and negligence are intrinsically contradictory. One cannot be present if the other is also present. LD: Children below 9 years of age are conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence. Zhieneth (6 yrs old) dies 2 weeks after sustaining injuries when the giftwrapping counter fell on her (allegedly because she clung to it) and pinned her on the ground while her mother was signing the charge slip for her credit card purchases at Syvel's Department store in Makati. Department store refuses to reimburse parents for medical and funeral expenses. Parents sue. RTC: Absolves Jarco from liability. Counter not an attractive nuisance since it was put in a corner and was higher than the child, was safe and well-balanced. Zhieneth should not have climbed and clung to it. CA: Reverses RTC. Jarco negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter (top-heavy, shaky, not nailed on the floor). Child below 9 yrs incapable of negligence or tort., can't even be held liable for an intentional wrong. Awards damages of about 270K ISSUE: WON Zhieneth's death was caused by accident or negligence? ISSUE: WON JARCO was negligent? (YES) SC: Criselda (mother) not negligent. Can't be expected to hold child's hand while signing charge slips. Anyway, child not loitering, only a few feet away from her. Give credence to testimony that Zhieneth did not climb and cling to counter, but that counter just fell on her. SC: JARCO negligent for maintain dangerous counter. Frail child should not have been able to cause it to fall, even if they had climbed on it. SC: Affirms CA ruling. Alcantara and Ylardo jump back in the hole playfully. Abaga jumps on the stone, causing it to slide into the hole. Alonso and Alcantara were able to get out of the hole, but Ylarda was pinned by the block in a standing position, sustaining injuries in the public region and died 3 days later. Parents sue Aquino and Soriano Lower Court: Dismissed complaint. (Work Education, Aquino exercised diligence of cautious person, Ylarde recklessly imprudent, caused his own death) CA: Affirms lower court decision ISSUE: WON Ylardo recklessly imprudent? (NO) ISSUE: WON Aquino negligent and liable? (YES) SC: Principal cannot be held liable based on Art 2180. SC: Even though parents based alleged liability of Aquino on Art 2176 an and not Art 2180, Aquino negligent. His acts and omissions amounting to negligence had a causal relation to the death of his pupil. SC: Should have gotten adult manual labor, left the kids in the hole, excavation an attractive nuisance. Ylardo not alone In jumping in the hole, 3 of them jumped, showing that any other ten-year old child would have done the same. Ylarde not imprudent, just acting his age. SC: Aquino grossly negligent. Pay parents 60K.

FEDERICO YLARDE and ADELAIDA DORONIO v. EDGARDO AQUINO (teacher), MAURO SORIANO (principal) and CA. LD: It is only teachers and not the principal or head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. (In a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who can be held liable). Under Art 2180 of NCC, the teacher-in-charge of school children should be held liable for negligence in his supervision over the children and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury to their persons (in loco parentis) LD: A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience. 1963: Gabaldon Primary School: Public school located in Pangasinan. Several large concrete blocks littered the school. Since these were hazards to the schoolchildren, a couple of teachers thought it would be best to bury them. Edgardo Aquino was a teacher in this school. He gather 18 of his male pupils (10-11 yr olds) and had the dig beside a 1-ton concrete block in order to make a hole where the block could be buried. Kids did not finish that day. The next day, after classes, Aquino called 4 of the 18 to dig again (Alonso, Alcantara, Abaga, and Novelito Ylarde) When the hold was 1.4m deep, Aquino continued digging, while the boys threw the loose dirt out. Aquino leaves the kids alone while goes to get the key to the workshop to get some rope. He tells the kids not to touch the stone. While Aquino was away, Alonso,

EXPERTS IN GENERAL CULION ICE, FISH & ELECTRIC CO, INC. v. PHIL MOTORS CORP. (1930) LD: A person who holds himself out as being competent to do woek requiring special skill is guilty of negligence if he fails to exhibit the care of a prudent person would exhibilt who is reasonable well skilled in the particular work undertaker. (LACK of SKILL = NEGLIGENCE, if you hold yourself out to be skillful, same expectations as if you really were skillful/expert) HD Cranston, rep of Culion w/c owned a schooner (Gwendoline) used in the fishing trade. Cranston wanted to change the engine of the

Gwendoline from gasoline to crude oil burner to save on running costs. He went to Phil. Motors Corp. (PMC). Quest was the manager of PMC and supervised the work on the engine after selling Cranston a Zenith carburetor. It worked well when the gasoline engine was used. However, when the tank for the mixed oil was used, it leaked (placed too high, diff in pressure, etc) and the carburetor was flooding. Quest didnt think this was a serious matter that needed fixing, Anyway, after test run, a backfire resulted. The Gwendoline burnt and was unrepairable. Value of boat (10K), salvage value (150) ISSUE: Was Quest negligent (YES) SC: See legal doctrine. SC: Quest had ample experience fixing engines of cars and tractors, but not experienced with boats. Perhaps this is why the dripping fuel and flooding carburetor did not convey to him the danger of fire. Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines in boats SC: PMC liable for Quest's negligence. (9850)

US v. SANTIAGO PINEDA (22 Jan 1918) LD: Druggists Responsibility: The profession of pharmacy is one demanding care and skill. The responsibility of the druggist to use care can be qualified as the highest degree of care known to practical men. The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business w/c the law demands LD: The rule of caveat emptor cannot be applied to the purchase and sale of drugs. The nature of drugs is such that examination will not avail the purchaser anything. Consequently it must be that the druggist warrants that he will deliver the drug called for. Liability not from contract but out of the duty which the law imposes on him to avoid acts in their nature dangerous to the live of others. Pharmacy Law : Fraudulent construed (?) what is made unlawful is the giving

of a false name to the drug asked for. Feliciano Santos, upon prescription by Dr, Richardson wanted to purchase potassium Chlorate for his sick horses. Santiago Pineda, a registered pharmacist (or his employee) gave him instead barium chlorate (packaged and labeled as potassium chlorate). As a result 2 of his horses died. Santos sent a couple of chemists to buy potassium chlorate from Pineda. Upon testing, it was discovered the Pineda again dispensed barium chlorate, a poison. ISSUE: WON Santiago was Negligent? (YES- based on standard for pharmacists & Pharmacy Law) SC; Rs inter alios acta: exception: evidence of other offenses can be used to prove negligence. No better evidence than the frequency of accidents. SC: a pharmacist is responsible for the quality of all drugs and poisons that he sells. It is unlawful for him to sell any drug or poison under any "fraudulent name" SC: Question of negligence or ignorance is irrelevant. The druggist is responsible as an absolute guarantor of what he sells. Druggist warrants that he will deliver the drug called for. No caveat emptor, instead caveat venditor. (sellers beware(?)) SC: Pharmacist's mistake, inder the most favorable aspect for himself, was negligence. Mistake is negligence and care is no defense (for druggist) How the misfortune occurs is not important, if under all the circumstances the fact of occurrence is attributed to the druggist as a legal fault. SC: In view of the tremendous and imminent danger to the public from the careless sale of poisons and medicines, not to rigid a rule to hole that the law penalizes any druggist who shall sell one drug for another whether it be through negligence or mistake. SC: CFI decision affirmed (100) with subsidiary imprisonment is case of insolvency. w/o prejudice to civil action.

MERCURY DRUG CORP and AURMELA GANZON v . JUDGE RAUL DE LEON. LD: High degree of care required of druggists. Judge Raul de Leon, RTC Judge in Paranaque had reddish eyes and had difficulty reading. He later went to dinner with his friend, a doctor, who recommended CORTISPORIN OPTHALMIC (EYEDROPS) and CEFTIN to relieve his eye problems. Judge went to Mercury Drug and showed prescription to Aurmela Ganzon, a pharmacist assistant. He took the purchased medicine and had the sheriff administer the drops to his eye. Judge felt searing pain, and upon examining the medicine, discovered that it was CORTISPORIN OTIC SOLUTION (EARDROPS). Judge went back to Mercury, but Ganzon brazenly told him that she was unable to read the prescription fully. Supervisor apologized and told judge that they did not have stock of the medicine he needed. Judge wrote to the president of Mercury, but received no reply. (really bad customer service) Mercury Drug: Judge's or sheriff's failure to read the label himself was the proximate cause of his injury. Not really prescription, just a piece of paper (what was written was CORTISPORIN SOLUTION). The prescribed medicine was not available in the PH, so logically, Ganzon thought the prescription referred to the CORTIPORIN OTIC SOLUTION. RTC: rules in favor of Judge. 153.25 (medicine) 100K MD, 300K ED CA: Affirms RTC ISSUE: WON MERCURY DRUG WAS NEGLIGENT AND LIABLE? (YES) SC: Mercury Drug and Ganzon failed to exercise the highest degree of diligence expected of them. Cites many previous cases (including another one involving Mercury for dispensing a sleeping disorder medicine) SC: Mercury Drug failed to overcome the presumption that it exercised care in the selection and supervision of its employees. SC: Drugstore business imbued with public interest.

SC: Ganzon should not have sold the drug to De Leon since he did not have a prescription SC: Affirms CA ruling but reduces damages to 50K and 25K

DR NINEVETCH CRUZ v. CA & LYDIA UMALI (18 Nov 1997) Elements of Reckless Imprudence o Offender does or fails to do an act o The act or omission is voluntary o Act is without malice o Material damage results from the reckless imprudence o There is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment, or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place LD: Whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient, is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion. (burden of proof on plaintiff, he must present expert witnesses to prove his claim) Lydia and Rowena (daughter) went to Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital in Laguna. Prior to this, Dr. Cruz had examined Lydia and found a myoma in her uterus, scheduling a hysterectomy for 23 Mar 1991. Rowena wanted to postpone this elective surgery, but Dr. Cruz advised and insisted against it. Clinic was untidy, dirty. When Lydia was in the operating room, Dr Ercillo asked her relatives to buy Tagamet ampoules and blood (twice). They couldn't buy blood the second time because Type A was out of stock. They found a donor. After the operation, they noticed that Lydia was gasping for breath. Turns out the oxygen tank was almost empty. They had to buy another one. Later that night Lydia went into shock and was transferred w/o the family's

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consent to the San Pablo District Hospital where Lydia was operated on again (blood was oozing out of her abdominal section). However, eventually Lydia died from shock and blood loss. Death Certificate: Shock & Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC) ISSUE: WON; DR CRUZ was PROVEN to be RECKLESSLY IMPRUDENT? (NO) MTCC: Finds Dr. Ninevetch guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide RTC & CA affirm MTCC SC: Doctors are not guarantors of care, they do not even warrant a good result. They are not insurers against mishaps or unusual consequences. Furthermore, they are not liable for honest mistakes of judgment. SC: Inexcusable lack of precaution to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances. SC: Expert testimony is essential to establish the standard of care of the profession and also that the physician's conduct in the treatment of care falls below the standard. SC: Because of absence of any expert testimony, Dr Cruz not proven to be negligent. SC: The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the latter posses unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating SC: No proof that injury was caused by reckless imprudence. Even if negligent, no proof that it was proximate cause of injury. Other doctors testified that bleeding could have been caused by DIC, clotting defect. No evidence in autopsy that sutures became loose. DIC unrebutted. SC: Dr. Cruz acquitted but ordered to pay heirs 50K, 100K MD, 50K ED. Occurrence of injury Thing which caused injury under the control and mgmt of defendant o Occurrence in ordinary course of things, would not have happened if those who had control and mgmt had exercised proper care o The absence of explanation by defendant. Doctrine of Corporate negligence Agency by estoppel Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City because of difficult bowel movement and anal discharge. Dr. Ampil operated on her an discovered cancer of the sigmoid, and that it had spread to her left ovary. Consequently he advised a hysterectomy to be performed on Natividad. Dr Fuentes performed the hysterectomy, them Dr. Ampil took over again. At the end of the surgery, the nurses noted that 2 sponges were missing, but Dr. Ampil closed the incision anyway. Natividad was released from the hospital, but continued to experience pain, but was assured that this was natural Natividad consulted doctor in the US. When she came back, her daughter discovered another piece of gauze in her vagina. Finally, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez again found another piece of gauze that was badly infected. A recto-vaginal fistula had formed and another surgical operation was needed. Aganas file for damages against PSI, Dr. AMpil and Dr. Fuentes RTC: PSI, Ampil & Fuentes liable for negligence and malpractice. Pay damages, actual costs $20K, ~50K, MD 2M, ED 300K, AAF 250K CA: Dr. Fuentes not liable. Dr. Ampil to reimburse whatever PSI pays out. ISSUE: WON PSI liable? (YES) ISSUE: WON Dr. Ampil negligent? (YES) ISSUE: WON Dr, Fuentes negligent? (NO) SC: Elements of medical negligence o Duty o o o Breach o Injury o Proximate Causation SC: Dr. Ampil negligent. Negligence per se? He also did not inform Natividad about the 2 missing sponges. Natividad's injury can be traced to his act of closing the incision despite info that gauzes were missing. SC: Res ipsa loquitor does not apply to Dr Fuentes because he was not the lead surgeon. He had no control and mgmt. SC: When a doctor practices medicine in a hospital setting, the hospital and its employees are deemed to subserve him in his ministrations to the patient and his actions are of his own responsibility BUT in the PH, there is an employeeemployer relationship b/w hospitals and doctors (Ramos v. CA) for purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases. SC: Moreover, the hospital's liability is anchored upon the agency principle of apparent authority or agency by estoppel. Doctrine of corporate negligence SC: Affirms CA Ruling. present and heart was weak. Dr. Lasam performed a D&C or raspa procedure, but no abortus. (However, doctor thought that the meaty discharge whem Editha was urinating expelled the abortus. Dr, Lasam advised Editha for a followup check up next week, but Editha never showed up. 1-1/2 month later, Editha was suffering from vomiting and severe abdominal pains. Dr. Mayo informed her that there was a dead fetus in her womb. Editha had to go through laparotomy, and it was discovered that she had a massive intraabdominal hemorrhage and a ruptured uterus. A hysterectomy had to be performed. Hence, she can no longer have a child 7 Nov. 1994: Editha and Claro file a complaint of Gross Negligence and Malpractice against Dr. Lasam in PRC (failure to remove fetus in D&C procedure) Dr. Lasam: Hysterectomy brought about by abnormal pregnany or ectopic pregnancy (placenta increta, extremely rare) D&C had nothing to do with the result. Editha did not show up for the check up. Dr. Lasam presented Dr. Manalo, an expert on the subject (authored books, teaches at UP, etc) D&C not proximate cause of rupture of Editha's uterus. PRC exonerates Dr. Lasam from negligence, later on revokes Dr Lasam's license on appeal ISSUE: Was there sufficient proof that Dr. Lasam was negligent? (NO) SC: Need expert testimony. Editha did not provide this. Dr. Lasam's expert witness proves that Dr. Lasam was not negligent and her operation not proximate cause of hysterectomy. SC: Editha's failure to return for follow-up evaluation played a substantial part in bringing about her own injury, thus she is not entitled to damages SC: Decision of PRC exonerating Dr. Lasam is affirmed.

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES INC v. NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA. (31 Jan 2007) Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur:

FE CAYAO-LASAM v. SPS CLARO & EDITHA RAMOLETE (18 Dec 2008) LD: The right to appeal the decision of the Board of Medicine to the PRC is available to both complainant and respondent LD: Need Expert Witness to prove negligence LD: To qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired special knowledge of the subject matter about which he or she is to testify, either by study of recognized authorizes on the subject or by practical experience. LD: When plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate ause of his injury, he cannot recover damages 28 July 1994: Editha Ramolete was brought to the LMC in La Union due to vaginal bleeding. She was 3 months pregnant at the time. Via telephone, Dr. Lasam advised that she be admitted. Accrd to Editha's pelvic sonogram, no fetal movement was

PETER LUCAS etal v. DR. PROSPERO TUANO. (21 Apr. LD: The mere fact that patient does

not get well or had a bad result does not in itself indicate failure to exercise due care. Doctor not required to be infallible. LD: The clinching and critical factor in a medical negligence case is proof of the causal connection b/w negligence which the evidence established and the plaintiff's injuries. LD: If no standard is established through expert medical witnesses, then courts have no standard by which to gauge the basic issue of breach by physician or surgeon. The RTC & CA cannot be expected to determine on its own what medical technique should have been used. This would be mere speculation Peter Lucas, a sportscaster, consulted with Dr, Tuano regarding his sore eyes. He had taken Maxitrol, a steroid based eye-drop beforehand. Dr. Tuano diagnosed conjunctivitis and prescribed Spersacet-C eye drops Peter returned again and again and Dr. Tuano prescribed Maxitrol for 3 months. Peter returns again and Dr. Tuano prescribes several other medicines (Diamox, etc). 2 laser surgeries Peter's wife reads the warning label in Maxitrol which describes one of its side effects as Glaucoma. Eventually Peter is diagnosed with Glaucoma and another doctor told him he would need life-long care for the disease. (Dr. Aquino, Dr Batungbacal) Peter and family sue Dr. Tuano for medical negligence in prescribing Maxitrol which caused his glaucoma and asks for 4M damages RTC: Dismisses complaint. No medical expert. CA: affirms RTC. ISSUE: WON Dr. Tuano was negligent? (NO) SC: Peter did not present expert witnesses (Dr. Aquino did not make an undertaking) SC: Based on evidence, glaucoma not steroid-induced (temporary), but open angle (normal tension glaucoma), which is very hard to detect. Maxitrol prescription blessing in disguise as it detected the

glaucoma earlier. SC: Question of Fact. Bound by findings of fact in RTC and CA SC: Expert witnesses' testimony indispensable to establish standard of care, that Dr Tuano failed his duty to exercise that standard of care, that injury was caused by Maxitrol. SC: Ocular Routine examination SC: Dr. Tuano's qualifications not disputed (chair of dept of ophthalmology at UP PGH and St, Luke's, etc.) SC: Decision may have been different if Lucas' had presented medical expert. SC: RTC & CA decision Affirmed.

for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; (5) Order or act of competent public authority. Article 1735. In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as required in article 1733. STANDARD OF CONDUCT IN GENERAL Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. (1104a) AMADO PICART v. FRANK SMITH, JR. (15 Mar 1918, Street) LD: How to determine Negligence? o Would a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued. LD: Contributory Negligence: o Where both parties are guilty of negligence, but -

Rule 131. Burden of Proof and Presumptions Section 1. Burden of proof. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. (1a, 2a) Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable. (n) Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. (n) Article 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business. (n) Article 1734. Common carriers are responsible

the negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by an appreciable interval of time, the one who has the last reasonable opportunity to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party (LAST CLEAR CHANCE) FACTS: Picart was riding a pony on the wrong side of the Carlatan Bridge (75m long, 4.8m wide). Smith was driving his car at 10/12 miles an hour. Smith saw the pony, honked his horn a few times, but did not change lanes or slow down. The pony also did not transfer to the correct lane, but instead moved closer to the railing. When Smith was near the pony, he swerved to the right to avoid hitting the pony. However, the car frightened the pony so it turned suddenly and its hind leg was hit and broken by the car. The pony fell and Picart was thrown off. The horse died and Picart sustained injuries and lost consciousness. Picart sues for 31K damages CFI: Smith not liable. ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence in maneuvering his car as described above? (YES) SC: Even if Picart was on the wrong side of the road, Smith, as he moved towards the center of the bridge should have perceived that it was too late for the horse to change lanes. The control of the situation passed entirely to Smith, and it was his duty to bring the car to a stop or change lanes after checking that their was no oncoming traffic. Given the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk that if the horse was unfamiliar with cars, it might get excited and jump. Smith exposed the horse and rider to this danger, and so is negligent under the law. SC: Smith liable for P200.

ROBERT SICAM and AGENCIA de RC SICAM

Lil's Notes | Torts |01 Feb 2012

v. LULU JORGE and CESAR JORGE (8 Aug 2007, Austria Martinez) LD: Elements of Fortuitous Event o The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the debtor to comply with obligations must be independent of the human will o It must be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso fortuito or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid o The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill obligations in a normal manner o The obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss. LD: In order for a fortuitous to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a person's participation the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. LD: Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event. LD: The diligence with which the law requires the individual at all times to govern his conduct varies with the nature of the situation in which he is placed and the importance of the act which he is to perform (to rebut cases cited where loss was excused. (Austria, etc. Times are different now.) FACTS: Lulu Jorge pawned several pieces of jewelry with Agencia de RC Sicam for P59,500.00. 19 Oct 1987: 2 armed men entered the pawnshop and took away cash and pawned items. Lulu Jorge refuses to believe that her jewelry was lost in the robbery (given that she was informed that they were to be kept in a vault at FEBTC) and demands the return of her jewelry by 6 Nov 1987. Since Sicam failed to return the jewelry, Jorje sues for indemnity and moral, exemplary damages. Sicam: Robbery Fortuitous event o Had a security guard, but armed robbers pretended to be customers, so they were let in. o No insurance, bec no insurance company would insure against burglary in pawn shops o Vault in Pawnshop kept open. Did not get fault in FEBTC because Central Bank required all pawnshops to have a vault in the premises. o Exercised due care and diligence RTC: Sicam not liable. Robbery is a fortuitous event. CA: Reverse RTC. Robberies and hold-ups are foreseeable risk in that those engaged in the pawnshop business are expected to foresee. Should have insured pawned items ISSUE: WON Sican was negligent and liable for the loss of the jewerlry (YES) SC:Art 1174: o Except in cases expressly specified by law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. SC: Robbery was not a fortuitous event (see elements) SC: Act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a loss. One's negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and injury to another. SC: The very measures that Sicam allegedly adopted show that to them the possibility of robbery was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen and anticipated. SC: The review of the records shows that Sicam failed to exercise reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation. Sicam guilty of negligence in the operation of their pawnshop business. (No security measures) SC: Sicam not negligent for no insuring the pawned items (Central bank removed the req. of insuring the items against burglary) Tanjangco's sue Cuasos. They want Cuasos to demolish the perimeter fence. RTC: There was encroachment. But Cuasos builders in good faith. Tanjangco to give Cuasos option to buy. In case of no agreement, Cuasos to demolish wall at own expense. Meanwhile 2K/rent. CB Paraz grossly negligent. CB Paraz to pay MD and ED to Tanjangcos and Cuasos. Corinthian and Engr de dios exonerated. CA: Reversed and set aside RTC decision o Cuasos in Bad Faith o Cuasos to pay monthly rental 10K o 100K MD and 50K ED, 150K AF to the Tanjangcos o Corinthian, CB Paraz, & Engr de Dios negligent. Shoulder 5% each of damages Cuasos have to pay Corinthian: Not negligent because: o Table inspections only. Not site measurement o Only approved architectural, structural and sanitary plans. ISSUE: WON Corinthian Gardens was negligent? (YES) SC: Approval tainted with negligence. SC: Acceptance of the cash bond, etc created certain obligations on the part of Corinthian Gardens. SC: Corinthian's failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos' perimeter wall into the Tanjangco's property, despite the inspection conducted, constitutes negligence and, at the very least, contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.

CORINTHIAN GARDENS ASSN v. SP S REYNALDO and MARIA TANJANGCO, SPS FRANK and TERESITA CUASO (27 Jun 2008, Nachura) LD:A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a situation involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of nature. LD: It is not just or equitable to relieve a subdivision assn of any liability arising from the erection of a perimeter fence w/c encroached upon another person's lot, when by its very own Manual of Rules and Regulations, it imposes its authority over all its members to the end that "no new construction can be started unless the plans are approved by the Assn and the proper cash bond and pre-construction fees are paid. (Would render Rules, inoperative) Tanjangcos own lots 68 & 69 which is adjacent to Cuaso's lot (Lot 65) Cuasos hire Geodetic Engr de Dios to survey their lot (De Dios recommended by Corinthian) Cuasos hire CB Paraz to build their house and perimeter fence. Corinthian conducted periodic ocular inspections in order to determine compliance with Approved plans pursuant to Manula of Rules and Regulation of Corinthian Gardens. Unfortunately, it was later found out that the Cuasos had encroached on the lot of the Tanjangco's by 87 aqm

HEIRS of REDENTOR COMPLETO & ELPIDIO ABIAD v. SGT AMANDO ALBAYDA JR, (6 Jul 2010) LD: In negligence suits, it is the plaintiff that has the burden of proving by a preponderence of evidence that defendant (motorist) was negligent in failing to exercise the diligence required to avoid injury to the plaintiff, and that such negligence was the

proximate cause of the injury suffered. (question of fact) LD: More care is required from the motorist ro fully discharge the duty than from the bicyclist (right of way) LD: With respect to supervision of employees, employers should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof (can't just use testimonial evidence to prove diligence) 1997: While Sgt Albayda was on the way to work, he was hit by a taxicab driven by Completo (allegedly speeding) while in the intersection of 8th and 11th Avenue of Villamor Airbase. Albayda was hit in the knee (fracture). Had to be put in traction, several surgeries. (7months) Mental suffering, social humiliation (?) His wife left him, etc. Completo: Albayda hit him. Property damage, rear right door of taxi dented. Albayda proximate cause of his own injury, negligent. Unjust enrichment. RTC: Albayda wins with damages CA: Affirms RTC, reduces damages ISSUE: WON Completo was negligent and WON Abiad, his employer was liable? (YES) SC: When employee proven to be negligent, legal presumption that employer was negligent in selection and supervision of employee. (burden of proof on employer) SC: Completo negligent: Affirms CA ruling and increases damages 100K, 500K.

City. He had picked up a gun from the counter (the loaded gun a customer had left with the shop for repairRimfire Magnum). As Alfred returned the gun to the salesman, the gun accidentally went off and killed Alfred. Top Gun owned by Jerome Morales. He was in Manila at the time. His store manager was also away and the store was being manned by two salesmen (Matibag & Herbolario) Morales had locked the gun in his drawer, but left the keys with personnel who then opened the drawer and left the loaded gun on the counter. Matibag charged with homicide but was acquitted due to exempting circumstance of accident 1998: RTC : Morales negligent: ~300K damages (2180) 2005: CA: Reverses RTC decision. (no employer-employee relationship. Salesmen independent contractor : commission basis only, not negligent anyway) ISSUE: Was Morales negligent? (YES) SC: Mentions Picart v. Smith. (standard: would a prudent man.) SC: Since guns are dangerous, higher degree of diligence required. (exceptional precautions) SC: Guns accepted for repair should be unloaded of ammunition and placed in a vault. SC: Morales negligent and did not even exercise diligence of a good father of a family. SC: Reinstate RTC decision.

ALFREDO PACIS & CLEOPATRA PACIS v. JEROME JOVANNE MORALES (25 Feb 2010) LD: A higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character such as dangerous weapons or substances. 17 Jan 1995: Parents of Alfred Dennis Pacis (17yrs) sue Morales for his death. 19 Jan 1991: Alfred (17) died from a gunshot wound to the head. He had gone to Top Gun Firearms in Baguio

DAVID TAYLOR v. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD & LIGHT CO. (1910) LD: The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case. LD: When the immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the plaintiff's own act, which contributed to the principal occurrence as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover damages for the injury. David Taylor is a minor (15) of above average intelligence and physical maturity (worked as cabin boy for 4

months when he was 13, worked in his father's business with mechanical eng'g skills and knows how to draft. Manuel (12) & little girl Jessie (9) 30 Sep 1905: David and Manuel go to Isla de Provisor on a Sunday afternoon (where Meralco had its power plant) looking for Murphy. They didnt find him, but wandered around until they came to where cinders and ash were being dumped. There, they found fulminating caps (detonators used for blasting dynamite) and picked up about 20-30 of them. David wanted to see the caps explode. They put the wires in the electrical socket (nothing). Tried to find a hammer/stone to break it open (didn't work). Got a knife and pried the caps open (success!) David and Manuel put a match to the yellow substance inside and an explosion occurred, causing injury to the 3 kids. (Jessie, ran away, cut to the neck, Manuel, burns to the hand, David, shards in his right eye, which lead to its loss after surgery.) ISSUE: WON MERALCO was negligent? (YES) ISSUE: WON MERALCO was the proximate cause of David's injury? (NO) ISSUE: WON David, being a minor, is exempted from contributory negligence? (NO) SC: Based on many US decisions (Torpedos and Turntables) Railroad v. Stout, a company is generally liable for leaving about dangerous instrumentalities that children of tender years may take a fancy to, causing injury to themselves. SC: In this case, Meralco willfully(?) threw the fulminating caps on the ground, and made no effort to remove them from the public even though they knew that people trespassed in the Isla de Provisor all the time. (Though caps were used by builders, no proof that builders were not independent contractors, so assume that they were employees of Meralco under their control and supervision) SC: The conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the same rule which governs that of an adult: BUT case to case basis in

determining whether child was negligent. SC: In this case, the negligence of MERALCO in leaving caps exposed on the premises not the proximate cause of David's injury. SC: David is mentally and physically mature for his age based on the evidence. He should have known/anticipated that it was dangerous to set fire to the contents of the cap.(even 9-year old Jessie knew of the risk) Furthermore, he is able to earn P2.50 a day as a draftsman 30days after the injury occurred. SC: Dismiss complaint

JARCO MKTG CORP, LEONARDO KONG, JOSE TIOPE, ELISA PANELO v. CA, CONRADO & CRISELDA AGUILAR (21 Dec 1999) DOCTINE OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE: One who maintains in his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. LD: Accident (unforeseen event) and negligence are intrinsically contradictory. One cannot be present if the other is also present. LD: Children below 9 years of age are conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence. Zhieneth (6 yrs old) dies 2 weeks after sustaining injuries when the giftwrapping counter fell on her (allegedly because she clung to it) and pinned her on the ground while her mother was signing the charge slip for her credit card purchases at Syvel's Department store in Makati. Department store refuses to reimburse parents for medical and funeral expenses. Parents sue. RTC: Absolves Jarco from liability. Counter not an attractive nuisance since it was put in a corner and was higher than the child, was safe and well-balanced. Zhieneth should not have climbed and clung to it.

Lil's Notes | Torts |01 Feb 2012

CA: Reverses RTC. Jarco negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter (top-heavy, shaky, not nailed on the floor). Child below 9 yrs incapable of negligence or tort., can't even be held liable for an intentional wrong. Awards damages of about 270K ISSUE: WON Zhieneth's death was caused by accident or negligence? ISSUE: WON JARCO was negligent? (YES) SC: Criselda (mother) not negligent. Can't be expected to hold child's hand while signing charge slips. Anyway, child not loitering, only a few feet away from her. Give credence to testimony that Zhieneth did not climb and cling to counter, but that counter just fell on her. SC: JARCO negligent for maintain dangerous counter. Frail child should not have been able to cause it to fall, even if they had climbed on it. SC: Affirms CA ruling. school. He gather 18 of his male pupils (10-11 yr olds) and had the dig beside a 1-ton concrete block in order to make a hole where the block could be buried. Kids did not finish that day. The next day, after classes, Aquino called 4 of the 18 to dig again (Alonso, Alcantara, Abaga, and Novelito Ylarde) When the hold was 1.4m deep, Aquino continued digging, while the boys threw the loose dirt out. Aquino leaves the kids alone while goes to get the key to the workshop to get some rope. He tells the kids not to touch the stone. While Aquino was away, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylardo jump back in the hole playfully. Abaga jumps on the stone, causing it to slide into the hole. Alonso and Alcantara were able to get out of the hole, but Ylarda was pinned by the block in a standing position, sustaining injuries in the public region and died 3 days later. Parents sue Aquino and Soriano Lower Court: Dismissed complaint. (Work Education, Aquino exercised diligence of cautious person, Ylarde recklessly imprudent, caused his own death) CA: Affirms lower court decision ISSUE: WON Ylardo recklessly imprudent? (NO) ISSUE: WON Aquino negligent and liable? (YES) SC: Principal cannot be held liable based on Art 2180. SC: Even though parents based alleged liability of Aquino on Art 2176 an and not Art 2180, Aquino negligent. His acts and omissions amounting to negligence had a causal relation to the death of his pupil. SC: Should have gotten adult manual labor, left the kids in the hole, excavation an attractive nuisance. Ylardo not alone In jumping in the hole, 3 of them jumped, showing that any other ten-year old child would have done the same. Ylarde not imprudent, just acting his age. SC: Aquino grossly negligent. Pay parents 60K. CULION ICE, FISH & ELECTRIC CO, INC. v. PHIL MOTORS CORP. (1930) LD: A person who holds himself out as being competent to do woek requiring special skill is guilty of negligence if he fails to exhibit the care of a prudent person would exhibilt who is reasonable well skilled in the particular work undertaker. (LACK of SKILL = NEGLIGENCE, if you hold yourself out to be skillful, same expectations as if you really were skillful/expert) HD Cranston, rep of Culion w/c owned a schooner (Gwendoline) used in the fishing trade. Cranston wanted to change the engine of the Gwendoline from gasoline to crude oil burner to save on running costs. He went to Phil. Motors Corp. (PMC). Quest was the manager of PMC and supervised the work on the engine after selling Cranston a Zenith carburetor. It worked well when the gasoline engine was used. However, when the tank for the mixed oil was used, it leaked (placed too high, diff in pressure, etc) and the carburetor was flooding. Quest didnt think this was a serious matter that needed fixing, Anyway, after test run, a backfire resulted. The Gwendoline burnt and was unrepairable. Value of boat (10K), salvage value (150) ISSUE: Was Quest negligent (YES) SC: See legal doctrine. SC: Quest had ample experience fixing engines of cars and tractors, but not experienced with boats. Perhaps this is why the dripping fuel and flooding carburetor did not convey to him the danger of fire. Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines in boats SC: PMC liable for Quest's negligence. (9850)

FEDERICO YLARDE and ADELAIDA DORONIO v. EDGARDO AQUINO (teacher), MAURO SORIANO (principal) and CA. LD: It is only teachers and not the principal or head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. (In a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who can be held liable). Under Art 2180 of NCC, the teacher-in-charge of school children should be held liable for negligence in his supervision over the children and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury to their persons (in loco parentis) LD: A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience. 1963: Gabaldon Primary School: Public school located in Pangasinan. Several large concrete blocks littered the school. Since these were hazards to the schoolchildren, a couple of teachers thought it would be best to bury them. Edgardo Aquino was a teacher in this

EXPERTS IN GENERAL

US v. SANTIAGO PINEDA (22 Jan 1918) LD: Druggists Responsibility: The profession of pharmacy is one demanding care and skill. The responsibility of the druggist to use care can be qualified as the highest degree of care known to practical men. The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business w/c the law demands LD: The rule of caveat emptor cannot be applied to the purchase and sale of drugs. The nature of drugs is such that examination will not avail the purchaser anything. Consequently it must be that the druggist warrants that he will deliver the drug called for. Liability not from contract but out of the duty which the law imposes on him to avoid acts in their nature dangerous to the live of others. Pharmacy Law : Fraudulent construed (?) what is made unlawful is the giving of a false name to the drug asked for. Feliciano Santos, upon prescription by Dr, Richardson wanted to purchase potassium Chlorate for his sick horses. Santiago Pineda, a registered pharmacist (or his employee) gave him instead barium chlorate (packaged and labeled as potassium chlorate). As a result 2 of his horses died. Santos sent a couple of chemists to buy potassium chlorate from Pineda. Upon testing, it was discovered the Pineda again dispensed barium chlorate, a poison. ISSUE: WON Santiago was Negligent? (YES- based on standard for pharmacists & Pharmacy Law) SC; Rs inter alios acta: exception: evidence of other offenses can be used to prove negligence. No better evidence than the frequency of accidents. SC: a pharmacist is responsible for the quality of all drugs and poisons that he sells. It is unlawful for him to sell any drug or poison under any "fraudulent name" SC: Question of negligence or

ignorance is irrelevant. The druggist is responsible as an absolute guarantor of what he sells. Druggist warrants that he will deliver the drug called for. No caveat emptor, instead caveat venditor. (sellers beware(?)) SC: Pharmacist's mistake, inder the most favorable aspect for himself, was negligence. Mistake is negligence and care is no defense (for druggist) How the misfortune occurs is not important, if under all the circumstances the fact of occurrence is attributed to the druggist as a legal fault. SC: In view of the tremendous and imminent danger to the public from the careless sale of poisons and medicines, not to rigid a rule to hole that the law penalizes any druggist who shall sell one drug for another whether it be through negligence or mistake. SC: CFI decision affirmed (100) with subsidiary imprisonment is case of insolvency. w/o prejudice to civil action.

MERCURY DRUG CORP and AURMELA GANZON v . JUDGE RAUL DE LEON. LD: High degree of care required of druggists. Judge Raul de Leon, RTC Judge in Paranaque had reddish eyes and had difficulty reading. He later went to dinner with his friend, a doctor, who recommended CORTISPORIN OPTHALMIC (EYEDROPS) and CEFTIN to relieve his eye problems. Judge went to Mercury Drug and showed prescription to Aurmela Ganzon, a pharmacist assistant. He took the purchased medicine and had the sheriff administer the drops to his eye. Judge felt searing pain, and upon examining the medicine, discovered that it was CORTISPORIN OTIC SOLUTION (EARDROPS). Judge went back to Mercury, but Ganzon brazenly told him that she was unable to read the prescription fully. Supervisor apologized and told judge that they did not have stock of the medicine he needed. Judge wrote to the president of Mercury, but received no reply. (really bad customer service)

Mercury Drug: Judge's or sheriff's failure to read the label himself was the proximate cause of his injury. Not really prescription, just a piece of paper (what was written was CORTISPORIN SOLUTION). The prescribed medicine was not available in the PH, so logically, Ganzon thought the prescription referred to the CORTIPORIN OTIC SOLUTION. RTC: rules in favor of Judge. 153.25 (medicine) 100K MD, 300K ED CA: Affirms RTC ISSUE: WON MERCURY DRUG WAS NEGLIGENT AND LIABLE? (YES) SC: Mercury Drug and Ganzon failed to exercise the highest degree of diligence expected of them. Cites many previous cases (including another one involving Mercury for dispensing a sleeping disorder medicine) SC: Mercury Drug failed to overcome the presumption that it exercised care in the selection and supervision of its employees. SC: Drugstore business imbued with public interest. SC: Ganzon should not have sold the drug to De Leon since he did not have a prescription SC: Affirms CA ruling but reduces damages to 50K and 25K

DR NINEVETCH CRUZ v. CA & LYDIA UMALI (18 Nov 1997) Elements of Reckless Imprudence o Offender does or fails to do an act o The act or omission is voluntary o Act is without malice o Material damage results from the reckless imprudence o There is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment, or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place

LD: Whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient, is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion. (burden of proof on plaintiff, he must present expert witnesses to prove his claim) Lydia and Rowena (daughter) went to Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital in Laguna. Prior to this, Dr. Cruz had examined Lydia and found a myoma in her uterus, scheduling a hysterectomy for 23 Mar 1991. Rowena wanted to postpone this elective surgery, but Dr. Cruz advised and insisted against it. Clinic was untidy, dirty. When Lydia was in the operating room, Dr Ercillo asked her relatives to buy Tagamet ampoules and blood (twice). They couldn't buy blood the second time because Type A was out of stock. They found a donor. After the operation, they noticed that Lydia was gasping for breath. Turns out the oxygen tank was almost empty. They had to buy another one. Later that night Lydia went into shock and was transferred w/o the family's consent to the San Pablo District Hospital where Lydia was operated on again (blood was oozing out of her abdominal section). However, eventually Lydia died from shock and blood loss. Death Certificate: Shock & Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC) ISSUE: WON; DR CRUZ was PROVEN to be RECKLESSLY IMPRUDENT? (NO) MTCC: Finds Dr. Ninevetch guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide RTC & CA affirm MTCC SC: Doctors are not guarantors of care, they do not even warrant a good result. They are not insurers against mishaps or unusual consequences. Furthermore, they are not liable for honest mistakes of judgment. SC: Inexcusable lack of precaution to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances. SC: Expert testimony is essential to

establish the standard of care of the profession and also that the physician's conduct in the treatment of care falls below the standard. SC: Because of absence of any expert testimony, Dr Cruz not proven to be negligent. SC: The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the latter posses unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating SC: No proof that injury was caused by reckless imprudence. Even if negligent, no proof that it was proximate cause of injury. Other doctors testified that bleeding could have been caused by DIC, clotting defect. No evidence in autopsy that sutures became loose. DIC unrebutted. SC: Dr. Cruz acquitted but ordered to pay heirs 50K, 100K MD, 50K ED.

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES INC v. NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA. (31 Jan 2007) Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur: o Occurrence of injury o Thing which caused injury under the control and mgmt of defendant o Occurrence in ordinary course of things, would not have happened if those who had control and mgmt had exercised proper care o The absence of explanation by defendant. Doctrine of Corporate negligence Agency by estoppel Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City because of difficult bowel movement and anal discharge. Dr. Ampil operated on her an discovered cancer of the sigmoid, and that it had spread to her left ovary. Consequently he advised a hysterectomy to be performed on Natividad. Dr Fuentes performed the hysterectomy, them Dr. Ampil took over again. At the end of the surgery, the nurses noted that 2 sponges were missing, but Dr. Ampil closed the incision

Lil's Notes | Torts |01 Feb 2012

anyway. Natividad was released from the hospital, but continued to experience pain, but was assured that this was natural Natividad consulted doctor in the US. When she came back, her daughter discovered another piece of gauze in her vagina. Finally, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez again found another piece of gauze that was badly infected. A recto-vaginal fistula had formed and another surgical operation was needed. Aganas file for damages against PSI, Dr. AMpil and Dr. Fuentes RTC: PSI, Ampil & Fuentes liable for negligence and malpractice. Pay damages, actual costs $20K, ~50K, MD 2M, ED 300K, AAF 250K CA: Dr. Fuentes not liable. Dr. Ampil to reimburse whatever PSI pays out. ISSUE: WON PSI liable? (YES) ISSUE: WON Dr. Ampil negligent? (YES) ISSUE: WON Dr, Fuentes negligent? (NO) SC: Elements of medical negligence o Duty o Breach o Injury o Proximate Causation SC: Dr. Ampil negligent. Negligence per se? He also did not inform Natividad about the 2 missing sponges. Natividad's injury can be traced to his act of closing the incision despite info that gauzes were missing. SC: Res ipsa loquitor does not apply to Dr Fuentes because he was not the lead surgeon. He had no control and mgmt. SC: When a doctor practices medicine in a hospital setting, the hospital and its employees are deemed to subserve him in his ministrations to the patient and his actions are of his own responsibility BUT in the PH, there is an employeeemployer relationship b/w hospitals and doctors (Ramos v. CA) for purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases. SC: Moreover, the hospital's liability is anchored upon the agency principle of apparent authority or agency by estoppel. Doctrine of corporate negligence SC: Affirms CA Ruling. FE CAYAO-LASAM v. SPS CLARO & EDITHA RAMOLETE (18 Dec 2008) LD: The right to appeal the decision of the Board of Medicine to the PRC is available to both complainant and respondent LD: Need Expert Witness to prove negligence LD: To qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired special knowledge of the subject matter about which he or she is to testify, either by study of recognized authorizes on the subject or by practical experience. LD: When plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate ause of his injury, he cannot recover damages 28 July 1994: Editha Ramolete was brought to the LMC in La Union due to vaginal bleeding. She was 3 months pregnant at the time. Via telephone, Dr. Lasam advised that she be admitted. Accrd to Editha's pelvic sonogram, no fetal movement was present and heart was weak. Dr. Lasam performed a D&C or raspa procedure, but no abortus. (However, doctor thought that the meaty discharge whem Editha was urinating expelled the abortus. Dr, Lasam advised Editha for a followup check up next week, but Editha never showed up. 1-1/2 month later, Editha was suffering from vomiting and severe abdominal pains. Dr. Mayo informed her that there was a dead fetus in her womb. Editha had to go through laparotomy, and it was discovered that she had a massive intraabdominal hemorrhage and a ruptured uterus. A hysterectomy had to be performed. Hence, she can no longer have a child 7 Nov. 1994: Editha and Claro file a complaint of Gross Negligence and Malpractice against Dr. Lasam in PRC (failure to remove fetus in D&C procedure) Dr. Lasam: Hysterectomy brought about by abnormal pregnany or ectopic pregnancy (placenta increta, extremely rare) D&C had nothing to do with the result. Editha did not show up for the check up. Dr. Lasam presented Dr. Manalo, an expert on the subject (authored books, teaches at UP, etc) D&C not proximate cause of rupture of Editha's uterus. PRC exonerates Dr. Lasam from negligence, later on revokes Dr Lasam's license on appeal ISSUE: Was there sufficient proof that Dr. Lasam was negligent? (NO) SC: Need expert testimony. Editha did not provide this. Dr. Lasam's expert witness proves that Dr. Lasam was not negligent and her operation not proximate cause of hysterectomy. SC: Editha's failure to return for follow-up evaluation played a substantial part in bringing about her own injury, thus she is not entitled to damages SC: Decision of PRC exonerating Dr. Lasam is affirmed. medicines (Diamox, etc). 2 laser surgeries Peter's wife reads the warning label in Maxitrol which describes one of its side effects as Glaucoma. Eventually Peter is diagnosed with Glaucoma and another doctor told him he would need life-long care for the disease. (Dr. Aquino, Dr Batungbacal) Peter and family sue Dr. Tuano for medical negligence in prescribing Maxitrol which caused his glaucoma and asks for 4M damages RTC: Dismisses complaint. No medical expert. CA: affirms RTC. ISSUE: WON Dr. Tuano was negligent? (NO) SC: Peter did not present expert witnesses (Dr. Aquino did not make an undertaking) SC: Based on evidence, glaucoma not steroid-induced (temporary), but open angle (normal tension glaucoma), which is very hard to detect. Maxitrol prescription blessing in disguise as it detected the glaucoma earlier. SC: Question of Fact. Bound by findings of fact in RTC and CA SC: Expert witnesses' testimony indispensable to establish standard of care, that Dr Tuano failed his duty to exercise that standard of care, that injury was caused by Maxitrol. SC: Ocular Routine examination SC: Dr. Tuano's qualifications not disputed (chair of dept of ophthalmology at UP PGH and St, Luke's, etc.) SC: Decision may have been different if Lucas' had presented medical expert.

PETER LUCAS etal v. DR. PROSPERO TUANO. (21 Apr. LD: The mere fact that patient does not get well or had a bad result does not in itself indicate failure to exercise due care. Doctor not required to be infallible. LD: The clinching and critical factor in a medical negligence case is proof of the causal connection b/w negligence which the evidence established and the plaintiff's injuries. LD: If no standard is established through expert medical witnesses, then courts have no standard by which to gauge the basic issue of breach by physician or surgeon. The RTC & CA cannot be expected to determine on its own what medical technique should have been used. This would be mere speculation Peter Lucas, a sportscaster, consulted with Dr, Tuano regarding his sore eyes. He had taken Maxitrol, a steroid based eye-drop beforehand. Dr. Tuano diagnosed conjunctivitis and prescribed Spersacet-C eye drops Peter returned again and again and Dr. Tuano prescribed Maxitrol for 3 months. Peter returns again and Dr. Tuano prescribes several other

PROVING NEGLIGENCE Rule 131. Burden of Proof and Presumptions Section 1. Burden of proof. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. (1a, 2a)

Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable. (n) Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. (n) Article 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business. (n) Article 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; (5) Order or act of competent public authority. Article 1735. In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as required in article 1733. Res ipsa loquitur

PEDRO LAYUGAN v. IAC, GODOFREDO ISIDRO & TRAVELLERS MULTI-INDEMNITY CORP. (14 Nov 1988, Sarmiento) LD: Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur o Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of thing does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. o The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or inference that the defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence. o The doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstance involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available. The doctrine is not a substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. When applicable, the rule is not intended to and does not dispence with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the part of the defendant. It merely deteremines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence and FACILIATATES the burden of plaintiff of

proving breach of duty of due care. FACTS: Pedro Layugan is employed as a security guard (600/mo). Whenever he has free time, he moonlights as a helper (100-200/mo) on a cargo truck driven by his brother-in-law. Godofredo Isidro is the owner of the truck driven by his driver Daniel Serrano which bumped the cargo truck (10:45pm, 15 May 1979) The cargo truck was loaded with 10 logs and parked right after the curve of a highway in Nueva Vizcaya. Layugan and his companion were repairing the tire of the truck. The truck driven by Daniel Serrano bumped the cargo truck, dislodging the jack of the cargo truck and pinning Layugan under the truck. As a result, Layugan sustained injuries and his left leg had to be amputated. Layugan files for damages under Art 2176 and Art 2180. Serrano: Not negligent because the cargo truck occupied about half the right lane after the curve and there was no warning device. (later: blinded by headlights of approaching vehicle and brakes failed because brake fluid hose was cut) Isidro: Exercise the diligence of a good father in the selection and supervision of his employees (no driving violations, instructed the driver to drive carefully, etc.) o Res ipsa loquitur: it is incumbent on the driver of the cargo truck to exercise extreme care so that motorists will be properly forewarned of the danger of the parked car. (EARLY WARNING DEVICE). Absent proof of this care, driver and helper presumed negligent under doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur. RTC: Isidro negligent: (70K actual & compensatory damages-future income, 2K AF, 5K MD, 50K actual and compensatory damages (medical?) and costs) IAC: reversed RTC. Finds Layugan negligent under the Doctrine of Res

ipsa loquitur. ISSUE: WON Res ipsa loquitur can be invoked? (NO) ISSUE: WON Isidro was negligent? (YES) SC: Evidence shows that Layugan put a lighted kerosene lamp 3-4 meters behind the cargo truck to warn oncoming vehicles that it was parked. LIGHTED KEROSENE LAMP proper early warning device. SC: Isidro is negligent under Art 2180 because he did not tell his driver to check the vehicle before taking it on the road. There was also no evidence that Isidro or his mechanic properly maintained or checked the truck. (failed to exercise diligence in the supervision of his employees) SC: REINSTATE decision of RTC ROGELIO RAMOS & ERLINDA RAMOS in their own behald and as natural guardians of minors ROMME, ROY RODERICK and RON RAYMOND RAMOS v. CA, DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR. ORLINO HOSAKA and DRA PERFECTA GUTIERREZ. LD: The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjuction with the doctrine of common knowledge. (OBVIOUS BA?) LD: When the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. Requisites to invoke RES IPSA LOQUITUR: o The accident is of a kind w/c ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence o It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant(s) o The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.

Lil's Notes | Torts |01 Feb 2012

Res ipsa loquitor does not apply to all medical malpractice suits or when the desired result of an operation is not attained. FACTS: Erlinda Ramos, a robust 47-year old woman was advised by Dr. Hosaka to undergo an operation to remove a stone in her gallbladder due to the discomfort she felt that somehow interfered with her normal ways. The scheduled operation would be on June 17, 1985 9 am at DLSMC. When asked for an anesthesiologist, Dr. Hosaka claimed he would get a good one without giving a name. At around 7:30 am of June 17, she was prepared for the operation by the hospital staff. Her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, Dean of the College of Nursing of Capitol Medical Center, was there and was allowed to be in the operating room to give moral support. Cruz saw two or three nurses and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, another defendant, who was to administer the anesthesia. By 9:30 am, Dr. Hosaka was still not around. He got there at almost 12 noon and then by 12:15, final preparations for the operation began. They had problems intubating the patient and Dr. Gutierrez noticed that the patient's tummy was getting bloated and that her nailbedshad a bluish discoloration. Dr. Hosaka then called for another anesthesiologist, Dr. Calderon. The patient was placed in a tredelenburg position - a position where the head of the patient is placed in a position lower than her feet which is an indication that there is a decrease of blood supply to the patients brain. Rogelio Ramos who was outside of the operating room then saw a respiratory machine being rushed into the O.R. At almost 3 pm of that day, the patient was taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). Erlinda stayed at the ICU for a month. Four months later, the patient was released from the hospital. She has been brain damaged ever since, and comatose. Petitioners then filed a civil case for damages on January 1986. Petitioners proved that the damage sustained by Erlinda was due tolack of oxygen in her brain caused by the faulty management of her airway by private respondents during the anesthesia phase. Respondents claimed that the damage was Erlindas allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent, Thiopental Sodium (Penthonal). RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. CA overturned the decision hence this appeal. Issue: WON the surgeon, the anesthesiologist and the hospital should be made liable for the unfortunate comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy (surgical excision of the gall bladder) (YES) RATIO: The Supreme Court disagrees with the CA. Dr. Gutierrez was negligent. Witness Cruz, although not ananesthesiologist, is capable of observing the acts of the physician and surgeon, external appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any one. Res ipsa loquitor allows this where testimony of expert witness is not required. Cruz, as an experienced clinical nurse whose long experience and scholarship, delivered her statements in a straightforward manner. Plus, her testimony was affirmed by Dr. Gutierrez herself. Anesthesiologists should have assessed their patients before operation to secure the success of the operation. Dr. Gutierrez saw the patient on the day of the operation itself, only an hour before the scheduled operation. This is an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility. The operation was elective and not emergency therefore the doctor has all the time in the world to make a thorough evaluation. Dr. Jamoras testimony (a pulmonologist) that the comatose condition was brought about by Penthonal is unacceptable simply because the anesthetic drug-induced allergic mediated bronchospasm alleged in this case is within the disciplines of anesthesiology, allergology, and pharmacology, and not in pulmonology. Furthermore, there was no support in evidence of the alleged allergic reaction. No evidence of stridor, skin reactions, or wheezing appears on record. No laboratory data were ever presented on court. The wrongful intubation caused some delay in oxygen delivery into the lungs as the tube which carries oxygen is in the wrong place. The delay led to cyanosis, the bluish iscoloration of the nailbed. Dr. Orlino Hosaka as head of the surgical team is negligent, as can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. He performed another operation in another hospital at the same time as Erlindas cholecystectomy, and was in fact three hours late for the latters operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. The hospital exercises significant control in hiring and firing consultants and in the conduct of their work within the hospital premises. For the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employeremployee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. Art 2180 of the Civil Code is the basis for holding an employee solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee. While the burden of proving negligence rests on the plaintiffs, once negligence is shown, the burden shifts to the respondents (employer) whoshould prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Respondent hospital failed to adduce evidence that it exercised the diligence of a good father and with regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. Having failed to do so, hospital is consequently solidarily liable with its physicians for Erlindas condition. LUZ PALANCA TAN v. JAM TRANSIT, INC. (25 Nov 2009, Nachura) LD: Requisites to invoke RES IPSA LOQUITUR: o The accident is of a kind w/c ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence o It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant(s) o The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. Tan's jeepney, driven by Ramirez, was carrying salted eggs, balut and quail eggs for delivery to Brgy Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna. As it was about to turn left at the intersection of Maharlika Highway and the feeder or barangay road, the jeepney was hit by a JAM Transit bus. The jeepney turned turtle, sustained major damage, the driver was injured and needed medical care, and the cargo of eggs was lost. Dimayuga, the bus driver, claims the jeepney was the one overtaking and hit him, kaya nakaladkad. Based on the police testimony, blotter, etc. the bus was overtaking other vehicles and hit the jeepney just as it was turning left. Based on photographs submitted, the accident occurred at an intersection with double yellow lines (No overtaking). The position of the bus and the jeepney clearly shows that it was the bus which was overtaking. (Both vehicles on the opposite lane, with the bus and jeepney almost perpendicular to one another) RTC: rules in favor of Tan. CA: reverses ruling of RTC because res ipsa loquitur does not apply. No evidence to support that JAM Transit bus was overtaking jeepney. Res ipsa loquitur can only be invoked when direct evidence is nonexistent or accessible. Tan had access to direct evidence and the doctrine of res ipsa

loquitiur does not dispense with the requirement of establishing proof of negligence. ISSUE: Is res ipsa loquitur applicable in this case? (YES) SC: Res ipsa liquitur is a mode of proof. Tan was able to establish the requisites in order to invoke res ipsa loquitur. o No 2 vehicles traversing the same lane of a highway with double yellow lines will collide as a meter of course, unless someone is negligent. o Dimayuga had exclusive management and control over the bus o No contributory negligence could be attributed to Ramirez relative to the incident on the basis of the available evidence. SC: Dearth of testimony by witnesses. Tan should not be left with no remedy. SC: Jam Transit liable for Dimayuga's negligence.

DR. MILAGROS CANTRE v. SPS JOHN DAVID GO and NORA GO. (27 Apr 2007, Quisumbing) LD: Requisites to invoke RES IPSA LOQUITUR: o The accident is of a kind w/c ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence o It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant(s) o The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. Captain of the Ship Doctrine: Cantre, the senior consultant in charge during the delivery of Nora's baby, exercised control over the assistants assigned to both the use of the droplight and the taking of Nora's blood pressure. Hence, the use of the droplight and the blood pressure cuff is also within

Cantre's exclusive control. 20 Apr 1992: Nora gave birth to her 4th child under the care of Dr. Milagros Cantre, a specialist of ob-gyn at Dr. Jesus Delgado Memorial Hospital. However, Nora suffered profuse bleeding in her womb due to some parts of the placenta not being completely expelled from her womb. As a result, Nora suffered Hupovolemic shock and her blood pressure dropped to 40/0. The doctors performed various procedures to stop the bleeding and restore Nora's blood pressure. Her blood pressure was frequently monitored with the use of a sphygmomanometer. Meanwhile, a droplight was used to warm Nora and her baby. Nora's husband, John, noticed a gaping wound 2-1/2 x 3 inches in the inner portion of her left arm, close to the armpit. The nurses told him this was a burn, but after requesting an investigation, Dr. Cantre said it was caused by the blood pressure cuff. Roger goes to the NBI and the medico-legal officer Dr. Arizala Jr said that a droplight placed near the skin for about 10 minutes could have caused the burn. Subsequently, the plastic surgery was performed on the wound (which the hospital paid for), but Nora never regained the full functionality or mobility of her arm and it continued to ache whenever the injured arm was touched. The spouses file for damages against Dr. Cantre RTC: Rules in favor of Spouses. (786K) CA: Affirms RTC but reduces damages (200K) ISSUE: Is res ipsa loquitor applicable? (YES) ISSUE: Was Dr. Cantre negligent (YES) SC: Requisites of RIL o Gaping wound in Nora's arm not an ordinary occurrence of the act of delivering a baby o WON the injury was caused by the droplight or the blood pressure cuff is of no moment.

Both instruments are deemed within the exclusive control of the physician in charge under the "captain of the ship" doctrine o The gaping wound on Nora's left arm, by its very nature and considering her condition, could only be caused by something external to her and outside her control as she was unconscious while in hypovolemic shock. Nora, could not, by any stretch of the imagination, could have contributed to her own injury. Dr. Cantre cannot escape liability under the "captain of the ship" doctrine. The presumption that Dr. Cantre was negligent in the exercise of her profession remains unrebutted (because of res ipsa loquitur?) SC: The fact the Dr. Cantre promptly took care of Nora before infection took place shows her good intentions. Nevertheless, this does not justify negligence on the part of Dr. Cantre. SC: Affirms CA decision.

DR. VICTORIA BATIQUIN & ALLAN BATIQUIN v. CA & SPS QUEDO D ACOGIDO & FLOTILDE G. VILLEGAS (5 July 1996, Davide, Jr.) LD: It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve his testimony with respect to other facts. LD: Positive Testimony is stronger than negative testimony Mrs Villegas consulted Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care in Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital, Dumaguete City. 21 Sep 1988: Dr. Batiquin performed a simple caesarean section on Mrs. Villegas. (it was a girl (Rachel) Mrs. Villegas paid Dr. Batiquin 1500 as professional fee. However, Mrs Villegas suffered from abdominal pains and complained of being feverish soon after leaving the

hospital. Dr. Batiquin prescribed medicines, but this did not alleviate her suffering. Dr. Batiquin also certified that Mrs Villegas was physically fit to return to work at the Rural Bank of Ayungon. Because the pains continued to worsen, Mrs, Villegas consulted Dr. Salud Kho at Holy Child's Hospital in Dumaguete. Dr. Kho examined Mrs. Villegas and felt an abdominal mass one finger below the umbilicus which she suspected was a cyst or tumor. Mrs. Villegas' blood test showed that she had an infection in her abdominal cavity. Consequently, surgery was performed on Mrs. Villegas. Dr. Kho discovered that a piece of rubber material (2" x ") was embedded on the ovarian cyst on the right side of the uterus. It looked like a piece of rubber glove. This foreign body caysed the infection of the ovaries and all the discomfort that Mrs. Villegas experienced. Villegas sues Dr. Batiquin for damages. RTC: rules in favor of Dr. Batiquin (WHERE'S THE RUBBER?) The piece of rubber was lost and found Dr. Kho testimony as to the whereabouts of the rubber contradictory. (threw it away or sent it to the pathological lab in Cebu?) CA: reverse RTC decision and gives weight to Dr, Kho's testimony. Awards 17K AD, 100K MD, 20K ED, 25K AF. However, the CA did not attribute Mrs Villegas' inability to have more children (due to the removal of the ovaries and uterus) to Dr. Batiquin's negligence as there was no proof that the rubber was the direct result of this. ISSUE: Is res ipsa loquitur applicable? (YES) ISSUE: Was Dr. Batiquin proven negligent? (YES) SC: 3 requisites: o Finding a foreign object in Villegas body can only happen thru someone's negligence. o Caesarean section under exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin

Lil's Notes | Torts |01 Feb 2012

Mrs. Villegas cannot have been guilty of contributory negligence. SC: Dr. Batiquin failed to overcome the presumption of negligence and is liable for all the adverse effects Mrs. Villegas suffered. SC: CA decision affirmed o RTC: PSI, Ampil & Fuentes liable for negligence and malpractice. Pay damages, actual costs $20K, ~50K, MD 2M, ED 300K, AAF 250K CA: Dr. Fuentes not liable. Dr. Ampil to reimburse whatever PSI pays out. ISSUE: WON PSI liable? (YES) ISSUE: WON Dr. Ampil negligent? (YES) ISSUE: WON Dr, Fuentes negligent? (NO) SC: Elements of medical negligence o Duty o Breach o Injury o Proximate Causation SC: Dr. Ampil negligent. Negligence per se? He also did not inform Natividad about the 2 missing sponges. Natividad's injury can be traced to his act of closing the incision despite info that gauzes were missing. SC: Res ipsa loquitor does not apply to Dr Fuentes because he was not the lead surgeon. He had no control and mgmt. SC: When a doctor practices medicine in a hospital setting, the hospital and its employees are deemed to subserve him in his ministrations to the patient and his actions are of his own responsibility BUT in the PH, there is an employeeemployer relationship b/w hospitals and doctors (Ramos v. CA) for purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases. SC: Moreover, the hospital's liability is anchored upon the agency principle of apparent authority or agency by estoppel. Doctrine of corporate negligence SC: Affirms CA Ruling. defendant's negligence is beyond the plaintiff's power. LD: It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent the presumption or inference from arising (res ipsa loquitur). Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been established LD: A claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and proscute an ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. (no unjust enrichment) Jose Juego was a construction worker of DM Consunji. He fell 14floors (elevator core) from the Renaissance Tower and died. (2 of his co-workers managed to jump and escaped death) Upon investigation, it was found that the platform Juego and his co-workers were using fell because the cables of the platforms were hooked to a 5 ton chain block merely through the insertion of a pin or bolt without a safety lock. (It was not securely attached to the chain block). Maria Juego, Jose's widow files for damages. RTC: rules in favor of Maria. Awards 644K in damages. CA: Affirms decision of RTC. DM Consunji: o Maria already availed of benefits from the State Insurance Fund (3581.85 so far, monthly pension of 596.97, at present 716.40) o Res ipsa loquitur is not applicable despite the presence of the requisites because the presumption that it was negligent did not arise since it proved that it exercised due care to avoid the accident. (Sworn statement of Fabro that he exercised due care and presence of safety rules and regulations, as well as the inspection by the leadman and bodegero of the chain block before o each use) Cause of platform falling because of loosening of the pin or bolt (not a fact, but just an opinion of P03 Villanueva)

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES INC v. NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA. (31 Jan 2007) Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur: o Occurrence of injury o Thing which caused injury under the control and mgmt of defendant o Occurrence in ordinary course of things, would not have happened if those who had control and mgmt had exercised proper care o The absence of explanation by defendant. Doctrine of Corporate negligence Agency by estoppel Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City because of difficult bowel movement and anal discharge. Dr. Ampil operated on her an discovered cancer of the sigmoid, and that it had spread to her left ovary. Consequently he advised a hysterectomy to be performed on Natividad. Dr Fuentes performed the hysterectomy, them Dr. Ampil took over again. At the end of the surgery, the nurses noted that 2 sponges were missing, but Dr. Ampil closed the incision anyway. Natividad was released from the hospital, but continued to experience pain, but was assured that this was natural Natividad consulted doctor in the US. When she came back, her daughter discovered another piece of gauze in her vagina. Finally, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez again found another piece of gauze that was badly infected. A recto-vaginal fistula had formed and another surgical operation was needed. Aganas file for damages against PSI, Dr. AMpil and Dr. Fuentes

DM CONSUNJI INC. v. CA & MARIA JUEGO (20 Apr 2001, Kapunan) LD: The inference which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person. It is within the power of the defendant to show that there was no negligence on his part, and direct proof of

o ISSUE: WON res ipsa loquitur is applicable? (YES) ISSUE: WON DM Consunji was negligent? (YES) SC: Requisites: o No worker is going to fall from the 14th of a building unless someone was negligent o The construction site is under the exclusive control of DM Consunji o No contributory negligence was attributed to Jose Juego. DM Consunji misapprehended the procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Once the requisites are present, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant. Evidence of due care does not prevent the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur from arising, it may only serve to rebut the presumption of negligence. SC: DM Consunji's evidence of due care mere hearsay and not admissible. No other evidence to rebut presumption. DM Consunji negligent. SC: Re Maria Juego's availment of benefits under the Labor Code: (an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amount set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.) Maria Juego ignorant of the fact/her rights that she could institute civil action. She was also unaware of DM Consunji's negligence when she claimed the benefits under the State Insurance Fund. She only received the police investigation report after the criminal complaint against DM Consunji's personnel was dismissed. So she falls under the exception to

the rule. SC: What negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact. SC: Case is REMANDED to trial court for determination of damages. Payments already received by Maria Juego under the Labor Code to be deducted from 644K awarded by lower courts. In all other respects, CA decision Affirmed.

COLLEGE ASSURANCE PLAN and COMPREHENSIVE ANNUITY PLAN and ANNUITY PLAN and PENSION CORP. v. BELFRANLT DEV'T, INC. (22 Nov 2007, Austria-Martinez) Requisites of R.I.L in this case: o Fire was not a spontaneous natural occurrence, but the outcome of human act or omission o Fire originated from the store room over which CAP had possession and control o Belfranlt had no hand in the incident. Belfranlt owns a building in Angeles City, Pampanga. CAP & CAPP rents several units on the 2nd and 3rd Floor of this building. 8 Oct 1994: A fire destroyed portions of the building, including the 3rd floor being occupied by CAP. The police investigation showed that the fire originated from the Store Room occupied by CAP because the coffee percolator overheated. This was confirmed b the certification of the Fire Marshal Belfranlt gave notice to CAP to vacate and to pay 1.5M for repairs. CAP vacated the premises. Including those not affected by the fire, but did not give payment for reparation. (CAP had transferred their offices and leased space somewhere else) CAP denies liability for reparation, saying that the fire was a fortuitous event. Belfranlt sues. RTC: rules in favor of Belfranlt. 2.2M cost of rehabilitation, 14K/mo and 18K/mo unpaid rentals (Oct 1994 May 1996), 8400.mon reimbursement for unpaid rentals of other tenants forced to leave because of the fire,

200K MD, 200K ED, 50K +20% actual damages as AF, Costs CA: Affirmed RTC except that MD, ED, AF are deleted and 500K Temperate damages awarded. ISSUE: WoN Fire was a fortuitous event? (NO) Art 1667: A lessee is responsible for the deterioration or loss of the thing leased, unless he proves that it took place without his fault. This burden of proof on the lessee does not apply when the destruction is due to earthquake, flood, storm or other natural calamity. this creates the presumption that the lessee is liable. SC: To constitute fortuitous event, it must be shown that: o The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure to comply with obligations was INDEPENDENT OF HUMAN WILL o It was impossible to foresee the event, or if could have been foreseen, to avoid it o The occurrence rendered it impossible for the obligor to fulfill its obligations in a normal manner o Said obligor was FREE FROM ANY PARTICIPATION in the aggravation of the injury or loss SC: If the negligence or fault of the obligor coincided with the occurrence of the fortuitous event, and caused the loss or damage or the aggravation thereof, the fortuitous event CANNOT SHIELD the obligor from liability for his negligence. SC: In this case, legal presumption is that CAP responsible for the damage. SC: Proximate cause of fire, CAP allowed coffee percolator to overheat (CAUTION: DO NOT OPERATE WHEN EMPTY). CAP claimed insurance from fire. Denial by CAP of presence of coffee percolator in their premises self-serving. (Where's the airpot?)

SC: Evidence, pictures, training on that Saturday, etc. Fireman Sitchon is competent, etc. SC: Even without the testimony of the above, CAP's denials not sufficient because CA applied doctrin of Res Ipsa Loquitur. SC: Affirms CA's decision.

DEFENSES AGAINST CHARGE OF NEGLIGENCE Plaintiff's negligence is proximate cause. Article 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. (n) JUAN BERNARDO v. MB LEGASPI (23 Dec 1914, Moreland) LD: Where 2 automobiles, going in opposite directions, collide on turning a street corner, and it appears from the evidence and is found by the trial court that the drivers were equally negligent and contributed equally to the principal occurrence as determining causes thereof, neither can recover from the other for the damages suffered. From the evidence, both Bernardo and Legaspi were equally negligent. So both cannot recover damages. -

PLDT v. CA and ANTONIO & GLORIA ESTEBAN (29 Sep 1989, Regalado) Antonio Esteban was not only contributory for his injuries and those of his wife, but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. He also had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. 30 Jul 1968, Sps Esteban sue PLDT for damages for the injuries (Gloria, permanent scar on her cheek, arms legs, Antonio: cut lips, jeep, shattered windshield) they sustained when the

jeep Antonio was driving ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench. They allege that it was dark and that there were no warning signs or lights. PLDT denies liability and maintains that the injuries of the spouses were caused by their own negligence. (or arguendo if not, LR Barte, independent contractor, should be liable : not really important) RTC: rules in favor of Estebans (20K MD, 5K ED) CA: reverses RTC, but on 2nd MR by Estebans, affirms RTC decision ISSUE: WoN Estebans' negligence the direct cause of their injuries? (YES) SC: Esteban's jeep running along inside lane of Lacson Street. Tiremarks show that the jeep sweved to the left from the inside lane and hit the Accident Mound. Accident was caused by the unexplained swerving of Esteban from the inside lane and not from the lack of warning signs. Esteban was speeding because if he was truly driving at 25km/hr he could have braked the moment the jeep hit the accident mound instead of climbing several feet as shown by the tiremarks. Esteban should not have driven on dim lights, but should have put on his regular lights, so he could see the accident mound (Drizzle) SC: Accident Mound: big and visible 2-3ft high, 1-1/2 ft wide. If Esteban did not see the accident mound (considering its size), he would not have seen a warning sign also, if there had been one. SC: Esteban knew of the presence of the accident mound, he should have driven with caution. SC: PLDT not liable for injuries suffered by Estebans. Estebans the cause of their own misery.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. SOTERO REMOQUILLO in his own behalf and as guardian of minors MANUEL, BENJAMIN, NESTOR, MILAGROS, CORAZON, CLEMENTE, and AURORA MAGNO, and CA. (18 May 1956, Montemayor) LD: To hold that MERALCO is liable for damages for the death of the deceased, the supposed negligence

Lil's Notes | Torts |01 Feb 2012

of MERALCO must have been the proximate and principal cause of the accident. LD: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible. LD: If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. LD: If an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such act or condition is the proximate cause. 22 Aug 1950: Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of Antonio Penaloza (his stepbrother) to repair the "media agua" located below the window of the third story. Standing on the "media agua" Efren received from his son thru the window a galvanized iron sheet (3ft x 6ft). As he turned around, the lower portion of the sheet came into contact with the electric wire of MERALCO which was strung parallel to the "media agua" 2-1/2 ft from it. Efren was electrocuted. His widow and children seek damages from MERALCO RTC: 10K CD, 784 AD, 2K MD, 3K AF CAL affirmes RTC but reduces AF ISSUE: WON MERALCO's uninsulated wires so near the house was the proximate cause of Magno's death? (NO) SC: Wires installed 2 years before house was constructed. SC: City ordinance that wires should be 3 ft from the house. SC: Originally, Wires were 7 ft from the side of the house, but Penaloza built a media agua 65-3/4 inches wide despite obtaining a permit from City Hall for a media agua only 39-1/2 inches wide. City hall gave Penaloza an occupancy permit anyway. SC: MERALCO claims that no insulation for that kind of wire is available or cost-prohibitive.. SC: Anyway, Magno was the cause of his own death. He should have been more careful when swinging around, knowing that there were electric wires nearby. He was experienced as a tinsmith or carpenter and should have know the danger posed by the electric wires. In this case, his training and experience failed him. SC: MERALC O cannot be expected to be on the lookout and report every city ordinance violation by homeowners. SC: The City of Manila and MERALCO should get together and devise means of minimizing this danger to the public. SC: CA decision reversed. which had sagged until they were about 8-10ft from the ground. NPC promised to do something about it, but never did. They just said the they may transfer to another site. 27 Jun 1995: Noble and Melchor Jimenez were carrying bamboo poles (14 ft and 18ft) to be used in their pocket mining and were using the trail Noble was going uphill and turning left on a curve, when the tip of the bamboo pole he was carrying came into contact with one of the dangling high-tension wires. Melchor heard a buzzing sound for 1-2 seconds, then saw Noble fall down, dead. There was a small burned area in Noble's right middle finger. The trail is the only viable way to somewhere, since the other side was a precipice. There were also no danger signs (police) After the incident, NPC repaied the dangling and sagging lines and put up warning signs. Heirs of Noble (parents) file a claim of damages vs. NPC with RTC NPC: o There warning signs, but they were stolen by children o Noble was an illegal pocket miner o Excavations were made, but towers sank due to pocket mining in the area. o Noble died due to his own negligence RTC: Rules in favor of Heirs awards about 1M to parents of Noble. CA: Affirms RTC but reduces MD to 50K and AF deleted. ISSUE: WoN Noble was partly to blame for his own death by electrocution? (NO) SC: Questions of fact by the lower courts should not be disturbed, but in this case, let's go the extra mile and analyze if Noble was negligent. SC:The sagging high tension wires were an accident waiting to happen. SC: No contributory negligence on Noble's part. The fact that he was illegally pocket mining did not contribute to the accident. He should not be faulted for doing what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area. SC: No justification to leave transmission lines dangling even if pocket miners not licensed. SC: NPC guilty of GROSS NEGLIGENCE. Affirms CA award.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF Article 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover. NPC v. HEIRS OF NOBLE CASIONAN (27 Nov 2008, Reyes, RT) LD: Contributory Negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. LD: There is contributory negligence when the party's act showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him ahrm or put his life in danger. It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the defendant's negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury. LD: The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages IN FULL but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. Noble Casionan was a 20 yr old pocket miner (earned about 3K/mo) in Dalico, Ampucao, Itogon Benguet. NPC installed high-tension transmission lines on the trail leading to Sangilo, Itogon in the 1970s. As early as 1991, the elders of Ampucao approached NPC about the wire -

GREGORIO GENOBIAGON v. CA & PEOPLE (12 Oct 1989, Grino-Aquino) LD: The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed thru reckless imprudence 31 Dec 1959: 7:30pm, Genobiagon, driving a rig, bumped an 81-yr old woman (Rita Cabrera) as she was crossing T Padilla St in Cebu as he wanted to overtake the rig in front of him. G refused to stop, but Vicente Mangyao managed to stop him. (Genobiagon: The old woman bumped me! ) Vicente Mangyao saw the accident and brought the old woman to the hospital, but she died 3 hours later. RTC: Finds G guilt y of Reckless Imprudence resulting homicide and sentences 3mos-1yr 11days, 6K indemnity to Rita's heirs. CA: affirms conviction but increases civil liability to 12K ISSUE: WoN old woman was negligent and contributed to her own death? (NO) SC: Even if the old woman was guilty of contributory negligence, this would not exonerate the accused. The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed thru reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence. M.H. RAKES v. THE ATLANTIC, GULF and PACFIC CO (1907, Tracey) LD: Contributory Negligence: The negligence of the injured person contributing to his injury but not being one of the determining causes of the principal accident, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but only in reduction of his damages. Each party

is chargeable with damages in proportion to his fault Rakes, 1 of 8 negro laborers employed by Atlantic, was transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor. 2 hand cars with crosspieces secured to the cars, but with no sides to prevent the rails from sliding off were used. 7 rails, each weighing 560lbs were piled on them. At a spot near the water's edge, the track sagged, the tie broke and the handcar canted, the rails slid off and caught Rakes, who was working by the side of the car, breaking his leg, which then had to be amputated at about the knee. CFI: Found Atlantic negligent for failing to repair weakened track. Issue: Was Atlantic negligent? (YES) Issue: Is Atlantic liable? (YES) Issue: Was Rakes guilty of contributory negligence? (YES) SC: Cause of the sagging of the tracks and breaking of the tie, was the dislodging of the crosspiece or piling under the stringer by the water, raised by a recent typhoon. The block laid in the sand gave way. No effort was made to inspect or repair the damage at the time of occurrence even when a fellow workman of Rakes' called McKenna's (the foreman) attention to it. (They could just have straightened the crosspiece, reset the block under the stringer, and replaced the tie.) Atlantic o The employee who was supposed to inspect and repair the track should be criminally charged, and if found guilty, Atlantic should only be subsidiary liable. (No, liability can arise from quasi-delict Art. 1093) o Rakes assumed the risk as an incident to his employment. (No, Fellow-Servanr Rule not adopted in PH jurisprudence, Anyway, an employee is not presumed to have stipulated that the employer might neglect

his legal duty to inspect and repair the track.) o Rakes was careless and contributed to his injury. Having noticed the depression in the track, he continued to work and he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards, before or behind it. (The foreman instructed the men not to walk on the sides this is disputed by Rakes and some of the workers) SC: Witnesses prove that depression was not noticeable. SC: There may have been a general order to not walk on the sides, and the disobedience of Rakes in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to his injury as a proximate BUT NOT AS ITS PRIMARY CAUSE. Doctrine of Comparative Negligence: Allowing a recovery by plaintiff whose own act contributed to his injury, provided his negligence was slight as compared with that of the defendant. (Proportional damages) SC: However, the majority of American jurisprudence bars recovery, if contributory negligence, however slight, is present. SC: Look at other countries, Canada, France, Austria, Portugal SC: Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, w/o which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to it. The act of Rakes in walking by the side of the car did not contribute to the accident, although it was an element of the damage that he suffered. If the crosspiece had been out of place partly or wholly through Rake's act or omission, he would have been responsible for the accident and should not be able to recover damages.

SC: However in the case at bar, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the Atlantic should pay for the injury, less a sum deemed suitable equivalent to Rakes' own imprudence. SC: Damage incurred is P5000. Deduct P2500, the amount fairly attributable to Rakes' negligence.

NELEN LAMBERT assisted by her husband GLENROY LAMBERT v. HEIRS OF REY CASTILLON, repped by MARILOU CASTILLON and SERGIO LABANG. (23 Feb 2005, Ynares-Santiago) LD: Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. LD: Contributory Negligence: The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that the plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injuty should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. Ray Castillon borrowed his brother's motorcycle. With Sergio Labang as backrider, he roamed around Iligan City. At around 10pm, after eating supper at a restaurant and drinking a bottle of beer, the went towards Tambo at high speed. Upon reaching Brgy Sto Rosario, they had an accident with a Tamaraw jeepney, owned by Lambert and driven by Reynaldo Gamot, which was travelling in the same direction, but made a sudden left turn. Ray was killed and Sergio suffered injuries. RTC: Ruled in favor of heirs, but reduced Lambert's liability to 20% due to the contributory negligence of Castillon. (P633++K, plus other expenses) CA: Affirms ruling of RTC Lambert: Ray Castillon's negligence was the proximate cause of his death, and so she is not liable. SC: Based on the facts, as Reynaldo was approaching the side road, he veered slightly to the right then sharply turned to the left without stopping towards the side road. Ray

was following close behind, and the motorcycle sliced into the side of the jeepney, his forehead hitting the angle bar on the left front door of the jeepney. The motorcycle shot forward, while the jeepney veered back to the right and sped away. SC: Reynaldo did not keep a lookout for vehicles or persons following him. He failed to take into account the possibility that others may be following him. HE DID NOT EMPLOY THE NECESSARY PRECAUTION TO SEE TO IT THAT THE ROAD WAS CLEAR. SC: The abrupt and sudden left turn of Reynaldo was the proximate cause of the mishap. Without the abrupt left turn, the accident wouldn't have happened. SC: Ray guilty of contributory negligence as defined under Art 2179. o Ray was speeding o Ray was Tailgating the jeepney o Ray had drunk 2 bottles of beer o Ray was not wearing a helmet. SC: Re-compute damages: Lambert to pay 50% of damages (478++K). AF deleted.

FORTUITOUS EVENTS Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a) ROBERTO JUNTILLA v. CLEMENTE FONTANAR, FERNANDO BANZON, BERFOL CAMORO. (31 May 1985) LD: A tire-blow-out of a jeep is not a fortuitous event, where there exists specific acts of negligence by the carrier, consisting of the fact the jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident. LD: Fortuitous event o The cause was unforeseen and unexpected, independent

Lil's Notes | Torts |01 Feb 2012

of the human will o It must be impossible to foresee the event, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid. o The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in the normal manner o The debtor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. Berfol Camoro: Jeepney Driver Clemente Fontanar: Franchise Holder Fernando Banzon: Owner of Jeepney Juntilla was riding in the front of a jeep going from Danao City to Cebu City when its right rear tire exploded, causing the jeepney to turn turtle and jump into a ditch. Juntilla was thrown out of the jeepney. He sustained several injuries (his palm was lacerated, left arm, right thigh, back). In addition, his Omega watch worth 852.70 was missing. Fontanar etal: It was a fortuitous event. Tire was almost brand new. City Court: Rules in favor of Juntilla. Awards ~1400 damages CFI Cebu: Reverses City Court. Yes, it was a fortuitous event. ISSUE: Was the tire blow-out a fortuitous event? (NO) SC: Jeepney was running very fast and was overloaded (3 in front, 14 in the back). A jeep running at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch after a tire blow-out. Tire blow-out may have been caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact of overloading and speeding. SC: Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload or speed., thus insuring safety of passengers. SC: Not a fortuitous event because it was NOT INDEPENDENT OF THE HUMAN WILL. SC: Reinstates City Court decision. CONSOLACION and MILAGROS DIMAANO (10 Jul 1998, Purisima) LD: Fortuitous event: An event which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. Tolentino: 2 general causes: o By nature (earthquakes storms, floods, epidemics, fires,etc) o By Act of Man (armed invasion, attack by bandits, gov't prohibitions, etc) LD: When a person's negligence concurs with an act of God in producing damage or injury to another, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event. When the effect is found to be partly the result of the participation of man whether it be from active intervention, or neglect, or failure to act the whole occurrence is hereby humanized, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. ISSUE: WoN the damage to the roof of the Dimaanos caused by the ripping off of the roof of Southeastern's building due to a fortuitous event? (YES) The Dimaanos' house, and Southeastern's building are both located on College road. During Typhoon Saling, the roof of the college's building was ripped off and landed on the Dimaanos' house and destroyed parts of it. After the typhoon, a team of engineers (headed by city building official) conducted an ocular inspection and reported that the roof was ripped off because of IMPROPER ANCHORAGE of the trusses to the roof beams. 4th floor structural hazard Dimaanos sue Southeastern for damages. RTC Pasay: Rules in favor of Dimaanos. Awards 117K++ damages, 1M MD, 300K ED, 100K AF. (damage could have been avoided if construction of roof not faulty) CA: Affirms RTC but reduces MD to 200K ISSUE: WoN damage to Dimaanos' house was caused by fortuitous event? (YES) SC: Ocular inspection is very shallow and should be given as much weight as the other evidence presented. Dimaanos did not present plans, specifications, and design that showed building was defective. SC: Southeastern College's evidence: o Approval by building officials of it construction plans and building (Legal req. to get permit from city building official) o Maintenance supervisor's testimony and budget to ensure that school in tip-top condition o Years of typhoons, but this is the only time damage incurred. SC: Southeastern not negligent. Damage caused by Fortuitous Event (Typhoon Saling) (NO) SC: Art 1905 uses POSSESSOR or USER, not necessarily the owner. It was Loreto's responsibility to prevent damage to others, including himself. Affirms CFI decision.

SICAM v. JORGE PLAINTIFF'S ASSUMPTION OF RISK / volenti non fit injuria MARGARITA AFIALDA v. BASILIO & FRANCISCO HISOLE (29 Nov 1949, Reyes) LD: Under Art 1905 of CC, the owner of an animal is not liable for injury caused by it to its caretaker. Art 1905: o The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away. o The liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it. 21 Mar 1947: Loreto Afialda killed by a carabao he was tending as caretaker of the Hisoles. CFI: rules in favor of HIsoles ISSUE: WoN Hisoles liable when damage is caused to its caretaker?

SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE INC. v. CA, JUANITA DE JESUS, VDA DE DIMAANO, EMERITA DIMAANO, REMEDIOS,

THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPMAY (INELCO) v. CA and LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE JUAN YABES< VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA JUAN CARAG, and PURISIMA JUAN (6 Nov 1989, Reyes) LD: When a person's negligence concurs with an act of God in producing damage or injury to another, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event. 28 Jun 1967: Typhoon Gening 29 Jun 1967: Isabel Lao Juan "Nana Belen" ventures into waist-high floodwaters to inspect her grocery store. On the corner of Guerrero St and Rizal St, she yells "Ay!" and sinks into the waters. The 2 salesgirls with her notice that an electric wire was dangling like a snake on the waters and call for help. Ernesto says the water is grounded Eventually Nana Belen is fished out, dead after her son called INELCO to shut off electricity in the area. On her hand is a burn mark and her cause of death is electrocution. Meanwhile, Engr Antonio Juan notices flunctuations on the plant's electric meter, indicating that there must be grounded wire or a short circuit somewhere. He goes around and sees the dangling wire, but no INELCO linemen. He went to the office, but there was no one there either. Nana Belen's relatives file for damages. INELCO: o Nana Belen drowned o Nana Belen caused her own death because of the burglar alarm she installed o Her death was caused by a fortuitous event ISSUE: Is INELCO liable for Nana

Belen's death considering the presence of a typhoon, a fortuitous event? (YES) SC: In times of calamity like the one that occurred in Laoag City, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of ELECTRICTY to be in CONSTANT VIGIL to prevent or avoid any probably incident that might imperil life or limb. SC: Under the circumstances, INELCO was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the general public. Considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be. SC: Despite danger signals, INELCO had to wait for Engr Juan to request that INELCO's switch be cut off. (Explanation for delay; It wasn't my job!) Volenti non fit injuria does not apply. Nana Belen had every right to protect her property from floods. Volenti non fir injuria: When a person voluntarily assents to a known danger, he must abide by the consequences (exception: when the life or property of another is in peril, or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property) SC: Affirms CA decision.

CALALAS v SUNGA (Eliza, Phys Ed student , Leg Problem Jeep, Extension Chair, parked askew) VICENTE CALALAS v. CA, ELIZA JUJERCHE SUNGA & FRANCISCO SALVA (31 May 2000, Mendoza) LD: Quasi-Delict: negligence or fault should be clearly established bec it is the basis of the action. LD: Breach of Contract: Prove existence of contract and that the obligor failed to perform his part (For common carriers: to transport his passenger safety to his destination) LD: For common carriers: Burden of Proof on common carrier that he

exercised extraordinary diligence. ( LD: Extraordinary diligence: As far as human care and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious person, with due regard for all the circumstances. LD: Doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasidelicts, not actions for breach of contract. Caso Fortuito: event that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen is inevitable. o Cause of the breach independent of the debtor's will o Event is unforeseeable or unavoidable o Event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in the normal manner o The debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor LD: Moral damages for breach of contract only awarded when passenger dies or evidence of bad faith. FACTS: Eliza, a Phys. Ed student at Silliman University took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Calalas. The jeepney was full so Eliza was given an extension seat (wooden stool at the back of the jeepney). The jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As Eliza stood to let the passenger pass, the jeepney was hit from behind by an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verene and owned by Salva. As a result, Eliza was severely injured (fractured tibia-fibula with severe necrosis). She was confined for 2 wks and had to use crutches for 3 months. Eliza sued Calalas for damages due to violation of the CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE. Calalas sued Salva for quasi-delict. RTC absolved Calalas from liability bec in another case, Salva was found to be negligent. CA: Reversed RTC ruling on the ground that Eliza's action was based on Contract of Carriage and not quasi-delict, awarded her 50K actual

damages, 50K moral damages, etc. ISSUE: Is Calalas liable for damage to Eliza? (YES) ISSUE: Did Calalas exercise extraordinary diligence? (NO) SC: Calalas: Not proximate cause of accident, bumping was caso fortuito. SC: Being a common carrier, damage based on breach of contract. When the accident happened, the presumption of negligence at once arose, and burden of proof on Calalas that he observed extraordinary diligence. SC: Calalas violated the traffic code by obstructing traffic (he improperly parked diagonally on the highway, with the rear of the jeepney exposed about 2mtrs from the shoulders of the highway. Furthermore, he also overloaded his jeepney (cap 24 passengers only.) SC: However, no evidence of Calalas being in bad faith, so moral damages should be deleted. SC: Affirms CA ruling, but deletes moral damages.

abusively in asking Roberto Reyes to leave? NO (Which version of the story is credible?) SC: No witnesses for Mr. Reyes. His own testimony failed him. Police had to take him out. SC: Ruby Lim did not act contrary to morals and public policy in asking Reyes to leave. SC: At most, Lim guilty of bad judgment. Decision of CA reversed

POLO PANTALEON v. AMERICAN EXPRESS INT'L INC. (25 Aug 2010, Brion) LD: Every credit card transaction involves three contracts the sales contract, the loan agreement, and the promise to pay.Simply put, every credit card transaction involves three contracts, namely: (a) the sales contract between the credit card holder and the merchant or the business establishment which accepted the credit card; (b) the loan agreement between the credit card issuer and the credit card holder; and lastly, (c) the promise to pay between the credit card issuer and the merchant or business establishment. LD: When cardholders use their credit cards to pay for their purchases, they merely offer to enter into loan agreements with the credit card companyonly after the latter approves the purchase requests that the parties enter into binding loan contracts. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (SC) Pantaleon was with his family as part of a tour group in the Netherlands. Given the tight schedule, the tour group only had 40mins (8:50am9:30am) to tour and shop at the Coster Diamond House. They had to be at the bus at 9:30am in order to have a guided city tour of Amsterdam as they were leaving for Belgium at 3pm. Mrs. Pantaleon wanted to buy diamond pieces worth $13,826.00. Mr. Pantaleon used his Amex credit card to pay for the jewelry at around 9:15am. However, after swiping, it

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM v. ROBERTO REYES. Aka "AMAY BISAYA" (28 Feb 2005, Chico-Nazario) LD: Doctrine of volenti non fit injuria: "to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury" o Self-inflicted injury or to consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. GATECRASHER RTC: finds for Lim CA: Reverses RTC decision. Lim rude. ISSUE: WoN Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes to leave? NO (Which version of the story is credible?) SC: Doctrine of violent non fit injuria: Even if applicable, Lim still had the duty to treat Mr. Reyes with kindness and not expose him to ridicule (based on Art 19 and 21) ISSUE: WoN Ruby Lim acted

Lil's Notes | Torts |01 Feb 2012

took a long time for card approval (was asked bank references, depository banks, etc). In fact, Mr. Pantaleon, at 9:40am was about to cancel the purchase (when his son told him that the entire tour group was waiting for them so they could leave), but Coster's manager convinced him to wait for the approval as it would only take a few minutes longer. In the end, Coster released the jewelry without formal approval from Amex (10:05am). Upon entering the tour bus, Mr. Pantaleon saw that the other members of the tour group were visibly irritated with him. Moreover, because he was late returning to the bus, the guided city tour of Amsterdam was cancelled. Mr. Pantaleon felt humiliated and felt that the tour group blamed him for the cancelled tour. After their trip to Europe, Mr. Pantaleon and family proceeded to the US, where Mr. Pantaleon again experienced some delay in card approval for his purchases of golf equipment and children's apparel. Upon his return to Manila, Pantaleon demanded that Amex apologize to him for the humiliation he suffered. Amex explained that the delay was caused by the unusually large amount involved in the transaction which deviated from Pantaleon's usual spending pattern. Dissatisfied with Amex's response, Pantaleon sues Amex for damages. RTC: finds Amex guilty of delay (breach of contract?) and awards 500K MD, 300K ED, 100K AF and costs of suit CA: Reverses RTC ruling. No evidence of bad faith or breach of contract on Amex's part (just exercising due diligence). Deletes award of damages. SC: Found Amex guilty of mora sovendi or debtor's fault. Amex has an obligation, as the debtor to approve or disapprove of Pantaleon's purchase requests with timely dispatch. ISSUE: WON there was a perfected loan agreement b/w Amex and Pantaleon when he made his purchases? (NO) ISSUE: WON Amex guilty of delay and breach of contract? (NO) SC: The issuance of a credit card is not the loan agreement contemplated here that obligates Amex to approve a cardholder's purchase. This is merely the contract that stipulates the rights and obligations of the credit card holder and credit card issuer. SC: Each credit card transaction is considered a separate offer and acceptance. Before the credit card issuer accepts this offer, no obligation relating to the loan agreement exists between them SC: The fact that Pantaleon had no pre-set spending limit does not mean that Amex is obligated to approve all his purchases. SC: The card membership agreement stipulates that AMEX "reserve[s] the right to deny authorization for any requested Charge." SC: Since AMEX has no obligation to approve the purchase requests of its credit cardholders, Pantaleon cannot claim that AMEX defaulted in its obligation. Hence there was no delay, since there was no obligation to begin with. SC: Pantaleon also cannot claim damages because he was the proximate cause of his own humiliation. He could have insisted on cancelling the transaction, but did not. SC: Reverses its own decision. Affirms CA decision. Pantaleon not entitled to damages. Danger Does not use standard of reasonable or prudent person, but subjective (accdg to circumstances) Express Assumption of Risk: Total Bar to recover in comparative negligence cases. (except when against Statute ex. Labor Laws, unequal power) (Implied)Primary Assumption of Risk: No Duty, so breach of duty impossible, no cause of action. (Implied) Unreasonable Assumption of Risk: Looks most closely like contributory negligence. Injured party negligent in choosing to encounter the risk, serves only to reduce damages. (But some still argue for total bar to recovery) (Implied) Reasonable Assumption of Risk: Injured party's deliberate choice is completely reasonable. Kramers instituted a Complaint for damages against the private respondent before Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City. Trans-Asia filed a motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of prescription. He argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime collision is four years. He maintained that the petitioners should have filed their Complaint within four years from the date when their cause of action accrued, i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took place, and that accordingly, the Complaint filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive period. Petitioners claim: - that maritime collisions have peculiarities and characteristics which only persons with special skill, training and experience like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve - that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of action accrued only on April 29, 1982, the date when the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had become final, and that the four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be computed from the said date. ISSUE WON a Complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners against the private respondent arising from a marine collision is barred by presciption HELD : YES - Under A1146 CC, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. In Paulan vs. Sarabia, this Court ruled that in an action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) trucks, the action being based on a quasidelict, the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. - In Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, this Court held: The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b)

PRESCRIPTION Article 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years: (1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff; (2) Upon a quasi-delict; However, when the action arises from or out of any act, activity, or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year. (As amended by PD No. 1755, Dec. 24, 1980.) KRAMER VS CA (TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES) (13 Oct 1989, Gancayco) FACTS - The F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured in a collision with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned byTrans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch. - The Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was due to the negligence of the employees of Trans-Asia. The

PRECRIPTION KRAMER v. CA ASSUMPTION OF RISK Prosser & Keeton pp. 480-498 Consent to NOT Knowledge of

an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff ... It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen. From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises. It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of 2 vessels the 4 year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inqu iry, that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages. Immediately after the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners, agents or personnel of the other vessel. Thus, the respondent court correctly found that the action of petitioner has prescribed. The collision occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for damages was filed in court only on May 30, 1 985, was beyond the 4 year prescriptive period. Disposition petition is dismissed. III. CAUSE A. Proximate/Remote/Concurrent

Article 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. (n)

SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA, OSAR & ALFREDO BATACLAN repped by SALUD v. MARIANO MEDINA (22 Oct 1957)

LD: Proximate Cause: The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately, or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom (38 AmJur pp 695-696) A bus owned by Mariano Medina (Medina Transportation) was speeding from Cavite to Pasay when its tire blew out, causing it to zigzag, fall into a ditch and overturn. 4 of the 18 passengers. Though still alive, were unable to escape from the bus. 10 men carrying bamboo torches came to help, however, since gasoline had leaked out of the bus, a fire engulfed the bus and burned the 4 trapped passengers. One of the passengers was Juan Bataclan, his widow and children sues Medina to recover P87,150 in damages. CFI: Only awards 1K +100 (value of merchandise) and 600 for AF (reason: proximate cause of death was fire, the bus overturning (Driver Saylon/Medina's negligence) only resulted in physical injuries) Issue: WoN Medina's negligence was the proximate cause of Juan's death (YES) SC: Definition of Proximate Cause SC: Driver and conductor should have foreseen that the gasoline would leak out of the overturned bus. They could smell it too. Given that it was 2:30am and dark, they should also have warned the rescuers not to bring torches near the bus. Therefore, their negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Juan Bataclan. SC: 6K damages 800AF, 100 for lost merchandise.

MERCURY DRUG CORP v. SEBASTIAN BAKING (25 May 2007, SANDOVALGUITERREZ) LD: Proximate Cause: Any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Dr. Cesar Sy prescribed DIAMICRON for Sebastian Baking's High Blood Sugar Count and Benalize tablets for his high triglyceride count. Sebastian went to Mercury Drug to buy the medicines, but instead of DIAMICRON, the saleslady/pharmacist gave him DORMICUM, a potent sleeping tablet Sebastian took DORMICUM, the wrong medicine for 3 days. 8 Nov 1993 (3rd day). Sebastian was involved in a vehicular accident (collided with car of Josie Peralta) because he fell asleep behind the wheel. Suspecting that the medicine had some bearing on his physical and mental state while he was driving, he showed the medicine he bought to Dr. Sy. Dr. Sy was shocked to discover that Sebastian had been taking the wrong medicine Sebastian sues Mercury Drug for damages Mercury Drug: Proximate Cause of accident was Sebastian's negligence in driving. RTC: Finds Mercury Drug liable for damages: 250K MD, 20K AF, cost of suit CA: Affirms RTC decision Issue: WoN Mercury Drug's negligence was the proximate cause of Sebastian's injury/accident? (YES) SC: Mercury's employee was grossly negligent in selling Dormicum instead of Diamicron. Standard of care required is commensurate with the danger involved.

SC: Vehicular accident could not have occurred had Mercury Drug's employee been careful in reading Dr. Sy's prescription. Sebastian would not have fallen asleep while driving his car, resulting in the collision. SC: Art 2180: For failing to show that Mercury Drug exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees, Mercury is solidarily liable for damages caused by the latter. SC: CA decision affirmed but reduces MD to 50K, 25K ED, deletes AF and cost of suit costs.

PILIPINAS BANK v. CA & FLORENCIO REYES (25 July 1994) LD: Proximate Cause: Any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which would not have occurred and from which out to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case that the injury complained of or some injury, would result therfrom as a natural and probably consequence. FLORENCIO REYES issued 2 PDCs (10 Oct 1979) for shoe and rubber supplies to : o Winner Industrial Corp (20,927.00) o Vicente Tui (11,419.50) To cover the face value of the checks, Roberto Santos (presumably Reyes' messenger/employee) was instructed to withdraw 32K from PCIB Money Shop and deposit the 32K to the Pilipinas Bank current account. However, Roberto Santos did not know the current account number of Reyes and asked the teller what it was. The teller told him that the last 3 numbers were "815" The Current Account Bookkeeper, Efren Alegasi, of the Bank noted the account number corresponded with the account of FLORENCIO AMADOR and posted it to his account, not noticing that the Account Name in the deposit slip was FLORENCIO REYES. Consequently, the 2 PDC checks of Reyes were dishonored several times.

Lil's Notes | Torts |01 Feb 2012

His suppliers demanded that he pay in cash. Furious, he asked for verification of the deposit. Upon verification, it was discovered that the 32K was deposited in the wrong account. Reyes sues Pilipinas Bank for damages. Bank: Reyes' rep's mistake in writing down the correct number in the deposit slip caused the injury. RTC: In favor of Reyes: 200K compensatory, 100K MD, 25K AF, costs of suit CA: Affirms but reduces damages to 50K MD and 25K AF Issue: Was Bank Negligent? (YES) Issue: Was Bank's Negligence the proximate cause of Reyes' injury? (YES) SC: Def of Proximate Cause in relation to Art 2179. SC: Proximate cause in this case: Erroneous posting of cash deposit to another depositor with similar first name. Bank's negligence caused anxiety and embarrassment to Reyes, therefore, award of moral damages correct SC: Affirms CA decision. Concurrent anchor dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A brief commotion b/w the crew and master ensued, but Kavankov told Gavino nothing was wrong. Gavino noticed that the anchor had not taken hold, and ordered the engine half-astern. Capt Abellano noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. However, Gavino gave the "fullastern" code Before the right anchor could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing 1.12M++ damage. Philippine Ports Authority filed a complained against Far Eastern Shipping, Senen Gavino and MPA for sum of money. RTC: orders Far Eastern, Gavino and MPA to jointly and severally pay Phil Ports Authority 1,053,300.00 in actual damages. CA: Affirms RTC decision except that there is no employer-employee b/w MPA and Gavino, but MPA still solidarily liable not under Art 2180 but under Customs AO 15-65, may seek reimbursement from Gavino up to 75% Far Eastern: Ship under Compulsory Pilotage of Gavino. Gavino had sole command and complete control in the navigation and docking of the vessel and superseded the master. Therefore, Gavino is solely responsible for the damage caused to the pier. No negligence by Victor Kavankov in not countermanding Gavino's orders. PPA: Concurrent negligence of Far Eastern, MPA and Gavino. Concurrent negligence the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. Issue: WoN Gavino is solely responsible for damage? SC: Compulsory Pilotage: Duty of Pilot and Master o Pilot: Harbor Pilot shall be responsible for damage cause to vessel or ports due to his negligence, etc except if due to force majeure provided he execised PRUDENCE and EXTRA DILIGENCE to prevent/minize damage o Master: Retain overall command even on pilotage grounds. Can countermand or overrule Harbor Pilot on board. Negligence or Fault of Master shall be responsibility and liability of owner of vessel. SC: Gavino negligent, did not see order carried out (miscommunication) Testimony : (Not sure if anchor dropped on time etc) Should have noticed that vessel did not slow down, etc. SC: Kabankov negligent also. Unconcerned Lethargy. Master does not surrender his vessel to the pilot. Should have interfered. If master observes that pilot is NOT incompetent or physically incapacitate, OK to rely on him, otherwise, overrule him. SC: Testimony of Kabankov (did not see imminent danger) Not paying attention? Blindly relied on Gavino. SC: Since a pilot is responsible only for his own personal negligence, he cannot be held accountable for damages proximately caused by the default of others, or, if there be anything which concurred with the fault of the pilot in producing the accident, the vessel masters and owner are liable. Negligence need not be the sole cause of the injury, it is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than the plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury. SC: Can have several proximate causes each negligent liable as if his negligence the sole proximate cause of the injury SC: AFFIRMS in toto CA decision Remote (husband of Consolacion) and Basilio Ilano took a carromata near Plaza Gay in Iloilo. Agaton Araneta pulled at the reins of the carromata, protesting that he had first right to the carromata since he called it first. The driver Julio Pagnaya said that it was too bad, he already had 2 passengers. Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free it from Araneta's grasp. Due either to the lloseness of the bridle or the rottenness of the material, the bit came out of the horse's mouth Pagnaya stopped the carromata to the sidewalk in order to fix the bridle. However, the horse, became disturbed and moved forward, pulled one of the wheels of the carromata to the sidewalk and pushed Pagnaya over. Pulling the carromata further up, the carromata hit a post, and the police telephone box attached to it fell with a crash. The horse was spooked and sped up the street. Basilio was able to get off while the carromata was still on the sidewalk. However, Proceso was still inside the carromata when the horse took off. He either jumped or fell from the carromata in front of the Mission Hospital, from which he sustained serious injuries and died. Proceso's widow is suing for damages. CFI: Awards 3K to widow. Issue: WoN Araneta's action was the proximate cause of Proceso's death? (NO) SC: The mere fact that Araneta stopped the horse in the manner described does not make him liable for Proceso's death. SC: An appreciable interval (several minutes) elapsed before the horse ran away. SC: The stopping of the rig by Araneta was too remote from the accident that ensued to be the legal or proximate cause thereof. SC: Driver was primarily responsible for the control of the horse. SC: Lack of evidence to substantiate Pagnaya's claim that Araneta's arms hit the horse's nose, and caused it to run away.

B.

FAR EASTERN SHIPPING CO v. CA & PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY (1 Oct 1998) MANILA PILOTS' ASSN (MPA) v. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY & FAR EASTERN SHIPPING 20 Jun 1980: M/V PAVLODAR (USSR) owned by Far Eastern Shipping arrived at Port of Manila from Vancouver, Canada It assigned Berth 4 at the Manila Int'l Port/ Capt Roberto Abellana was tasked to supervise the berthing. Senen Gavino was assigned by the MPA to conduct docking maneuvers for safe berthing. Victor Kavankov was the master of the vessel All weather conditions were ideal for docking. mile (2K feet?) from the pier (Landmark: Big Church at Tondo North Harbor), Gavino ordered the left

C.

CONSOLACION GABETO in her own right and as guardian to her 3 children v. AGATON ARANETA (17 Oct 1921, STREET) 4 Aug 1918: Proceso Gayetano

SC: Proximate Cause: old and weak leather, freeing horse from the bridle. SC: Araneta not legally responsible for the death of Proceso. SC: REVERSE CFI decision.

MANILA ELECTRIC v. SOTERO REMOQUILLO. supra LD: The prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and injury, a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such act or condition is the proximate cause "Media Agua" case. Efren Magno "expert", his negligence proximate cause of his own electrocution. Intervening -

D.

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO CARBONEL v. IAC & LEONARDO DIONISIO (10 Mar 1987, FELICIANO) LD: Under Art 2179, the task of a court is to determine whose negligence was the LEGAL and PROXIMATE CAUSE of the injury. This task is not simply an exercise in chronology or physics. The relative location in the continuum of time of palintiff's and defendant's negligent acts or omissions, IS ONLY ONE OF THE RELEVANT FACTORS that may be taken into account. LD: Of MORE FUNDAMETAL IMPORTANCE are the NATURE of the negligent act or omission of each party and THE CHARACTER & GRAVITY OF THE RISKS CREATED by such act or omission for the rest of the community.

LD: Even the lapse of considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability of the one who created the "condition", It is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the NATURE OF THE RISK and the CHARACTER of the intervening cause. LD: Foreseeable Intervening Causes are within the scope of ORIGINAL RISK, and hence of the defendant's (injuror's) negligence. An intervening cause COMBINING with the defendant's conduct to produce the result does not break the natural chain of events arising from defendant's negligence which is still the proximate cause of the accident. The risk created by defendant MAY INCLUDE THE INTERVENTION of the FORESEEABLE NEGLIGENCE OF OTHERS. (Standard of reasonable conduct, anticipate occasional negligence of humans) Prosser & Keeton. LD: Doctrine of Last Clear Chance: a common-law theory adopted to mitigate the harshness of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff rule under which common-law countries plaintiff is barred from any recovery, unlike in our system of law where the Civil Code expressly states that it will merely REDUCE the amount to be recovered. FACTS: 15 Nov 1975, 1:30 a.m. : Leonardo Dionisio was driving home from a cocktail/dinner party with his boss when after crossing the intersection of Gen Lacuna and Gen Santos Street in Makati, he crashed into the dump truck and sustained several injuries. (facial scras, nervous breakdown, gold dentures) The dump truck was owned by Phoenix Const, Inc.. Phoenix had allowed its driver, Carbonel to take the dump truck home with him because of the work schedule early the next morning. Carbonel had parked the truck askew on the right side of Gen. Lacuna Street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There was no light/reflector or warning device to alert motorists of its presence.

Phoenix: Dionisio was the proximate cause of his own accident o Reckless Driving/Speeding o Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol o No Headlights o No Curfew Pass o Phoenix also claims to have exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its dump truck driver. CFI Pampanga: In favor of Dionisio. 15K hospital bills & dentures,150K loss of income, 10K MD for mental anguish etc, 10K for refusing to settle amicably IAC: Affirms CFI ruling, but reduces damages to 6460, 100K resigned from job, 50K MD, 10K ED, 4.5K AF ISSUES: WoN Dionisio's negligence was an efficient intervening cause that broke the chain of event s cause by Carbonel's negligence? (NO) ISSUE: Can Last Clear Chance be applied as a general rule in negligence cases in our jurisdiction? (NO) SC: CFI and IAC failed to pass upon the relevance of Dionisio's negligence. SC: Factual Issues: Dionisio did not have his curfew pass, and was in a hurry to get home. He was speeding and deliberately turned off his headlights to avoid detection by the police which had a checkpoint nearby. His headlights did not malfunction. However, Dionisio wasn't too heavily intoxicated (not enough evidence) despite policeman's testimony that he smelled of liquor and admission that he had a shot or two before dinner. Dionisio was negligent SC: Dionisio bumping the truck was no more than a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the truck driver by parking askew without warning device SC: Truck Driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was an indispensable and efficient cause. Accident would not have happened if truck not parked improperly. This created an

UNREASONABLE RISK OF INJURY for anyone driving down Gen Lacuna Street. For have CREATED THIS RISK, truck driver must be held responsible. SC: Dionisio's negligence not an efficient intervening or independent cause even though it was closer to the accident. It was a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by truck driver. Dionisio's negligence not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact b/w the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, not to sever the juris vinuculum of liability. SC: Dionisio's negligence is only contributory. SC:Truck driver OWED A DUTY NOT TO IMPOSE UPON OTHER MOTORISTS THE RISK he created. SC: Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in a society and to allocate them among the members of society. To require the injured to exercise increased diligence would weaken the very bonds of society. SC: Because Dionisio is guilty of contributory negligence, he should shoulder 20% of the damages Phoenix is liable under Art 2180 (Phoenix :80%, Dionision 20%) EXCEPT for 10K ED, and 4.5K AF and costs. SC: Affirms CA decision with modification.

TESTS FOR DETERMINING PROXIMATE CAUSE 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. But-For Substantial Factor Mixed Considerations Sufficient Link Cause v. Condition

DY TEBAN TRADING, INC. V. JOSE CHING AND/OR LIBERTY FOREST, INC. & CRESILITO M. LIMBAGA (4 FEB 2008, REYES) LD: Proximate Cause: That cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result

Lil's Notes | Torts |01 Feb 2012

would not have occurred. (ButFor???) LD: Proximate Cause: That cause acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under the circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. LD: No mathematical formula for determining Proximate Cause (Mixed Considerations of LOGIC, COMMON SENSE, POLICY & PRECEDENT) LD: There must be SUFFICIENT LINK b/w act or omission and damage/injury. Link must not be remote or far-fetched, FACTS: Prime Mover with Trailer: Cresilito Limbaga (Driver), Liberty Forest (Owner). Loaded with Caterpillar D8 Bulldozer. Nissan Ice Van: Rogelio Ortiz (Driver), Romeo Catamora (Helper), Dy Teban Trading (Owner) Joanna Paula Passenger Bus 4 July 1995: 4:45am: Prime Mover with Trailer parked askew (because of 2 tire blowouts) on National Highway. Front Right wheels on sand and gravel shoulder of the road, trailer and left wheels on the cemented highway, occupied half of the highway. Joanna Paula Bus swerved to the left to pass the trailer, but right rear portion of bus hit the sharp edge of the bulldozer, puller it further in the opposite lane, such that rear of bus rested on shoulder of opposite lane. Nissan Ice Van swerved to the left to avoid the Joanna Paul passenger van and hit the from of the Prime Mover. Driver and Helper of Nissan Van slight injuries only, but Van totally wrecked. RTC: Rules in favor of Dy Teban Trading. Proximate Cause of Accident is Improper Parking of Prime Mover and lack of early warning device. (300K+++ total damages) o No evidence of Banana Trunk o No evidence of lighted Kerosene Cans o Anyway, if present, not sufficient as early warning devices as required in Letter of Instruction No. 229. Plus even if present, makeshift early warning devices only put 3 strides/3m in front and back of truck, insufficient distance to prevent accidents. o More than enough room on shoulder of the road to accommodate prime mover and trailer. o Worn Out tires, Only 1 spare tire CA: Reverses RTC decision. Proximate Cause of collision was failure of driver of Van to yield to the right of way of bus. o Bus had right of way (shown by damage in rear of bus) o Bus and Van were trying to beat each other in occupying the single lane available. o Driver of Prime Mover with Trailer parked as best he could since it was dangerous/impossible to park further to the shoulder of the road with the risk of trailer to tilt and the bulldozer to fall. o Accepted that there were kerosene lighted tin cans in front and back of trailer truck. (OK substitute, precedent in Baliwag Transit case) ISSUE: WoN Prime Mover is the proximate cause and thus liable for the damage to the Nissan Van? (YES) SC: Definition/Requisites of QuasiDelict SC:: Limbaga was negligent in parking the prime mover on the national highway. (Picart v. Smith: Prudent Man) SC: Limbaga slept on the prime mover instead of standing guard to warn other vehicles, did not call Liberty regarding tire blowout, only his first time driving a trailer with abulldozer, which requires highly specialized driving skills. (lack of supervision by Liberty) SC: Liberty did keep the prime mover in proper condition. (Worn out tires, only 1 spare tire, improperly loaded bulldozer) SC: Police Report: Only banana leaves present SC: Cites Bataclan, Def of Prox. Cause. SC: Cites Phoenix SC: Cites PNCC v.CA & Far Eastern (concurrent negligent acts) o The concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of 2 or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury. SC: Follow Basic Traffic Rules and Regulations. Drivers have a duty not only to themselves, but to other motorists as well. SC: LTO owes a duty to the public to ensure that vehicles allowed to run meet basic and minimum safety guidelines (early warning device etc) But we see dilapidated vehicles running around. :LTO shouldn't have granted registration to the Prime Mover. SC: CA decision REVERSED, RTC decision REINSTATED. 6. LAST CLEAR CHANCE AMADO PICART v. FRANK SMITH, JR. (15 Mar 1918, Street) LD: How to determine Negligence? o Would a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued. LD: Contributory Negligence: o Where both parties are guilty of negligence, but the negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by an appreciable interval of time, the one who has the last reasonable opportunity to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party (LAST CLEAR CHANCE) FACTS: Picart was riding a pony on the wrong side of the Carlatan Bridge (75m long, 4.8m wide). Smith was driving his car at 10/12 miles an hour. Smith saw the pony, honked his horn a few times, but did not change lanes or slow down. The pony also did not transfer to the correct lane, but instead moved closer to the railing. When Smith was near the pony, he swerved to the right to avoid hitting the pony. However, the car frightened the pony so it turned suddenly and its hind leg was hit and broken by the car. The pony fell and Picart was thrown off. The horse died and Picart sustained injuries and lost consciousness. Picart sues for 31K damages CFI: Smith not liable. ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence in maneuvering his car as described above? (YES) SC: Even if Picart was on the wrong side of the road, Smith, as he moved towards the center of the bridge

should have perceived that it was too late for the horse to change lanes. The control of the situation passed entirely to Smith, and it was his duty to bring the car to a stop or change lanes after checking that their was no oncoming traffic. Given the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk that if the horse was unfamiliar with cars, it might get excited and jump. Smith exposed the horse and rider to this danger, and so is negligent under the law. SC: Smith liable for P200.

EMMA ADRIANO BUSTAMANTE in her own behalf as Guardian-Ad-Litem of minors: ROSSEL, GLORIA, YOLANDA, ERICSON and EDERIC, all surnamed BUSTAMANTE, etal v. CA & FEDERICO DEL PILAR and EDILBERTO MONTESIANO (6 Feb 1991) - LD: The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. (Inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of a jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver is likewise guilty of negligence) - LD: The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured person by reason of his discovery of the latter's peril, and it cannot be invoked as between defendants concurrently negligent. LD: The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery. - LD: A person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. - FACTS: 20 Apr 1983: 6:30am:

Collision b/w a gravel & sand cargo truck1 with Mazda passenger bus2 along sloping national road in Tanza Cavite Left side of truck sideswiped left side of the bus, ripping off wall of bus from driver's side to the rear. Several passengers thrown out and died. o Rogelio Bustamante 40 yrs old (husband and father of Bustamantes) o 4 other passengers 1618 yrs old (children of other plaintiffs) Bus Driver from 30m away saw the 1947 model cargo truck descending with speed, wheels wiggling and starting to usurp his lane from opposite lane. Bus Driver decided to shift to 3rd gear and overtook a hand tractor while ascending. RTC: Bus and Cargo Truck concurrently negligent. Negligence of both proximate cause of accident so both solidarily liable to Bustamante etal. o 30K indeminity for death of Bustamante, $127K++ indemnity for lost earning capacity 10K MD, 5K ED o 30K, 10K, 5K to 4 other plaintiffs CA: Reversed RTC decision and absolves Cargo Truck of liability since Bus had the Last Clear Chance of avoiding the accident. Cargo Truck not negligent. o Bus Driver: No license bec of traffic violations o Bus ascending, more control over the situation (Last Clear Chance) ISSUE: WoN CA correct in using the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance in absolving Cargo Truck from liability? (NO) SC: Case at bar is not a suit b/w the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers

against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, CA erred in absolving cargo truck from liability using Doctrine of Last Clear Chance. SC: CA decision REVERSED, REINSTATE RTC Decision. -

1 Driver: Montesiano; Owner: Del Pilar 2 Driver: Susulin; Registered Owner: Novelo; Franchise Owner/Operator: Magtibay & Serrado (Naic, Cavite Baclaran)

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO CARBONEL v. IAC & LEONARDO DIONISIO (10 Mar 1987, FELICIANO) LD: Under Art 2179, the task of a court is to determine whose negligence was the LEGAL and PROXIMATE CAUSE of the injury. This task is not simply an exercise in chronology or physics. The relative location in the continuum of time of palintiff's and defendant's negligent acts or omissions, IS ONLY ONE OF THE RELEVANT FACTORS that may be taken into account. LD: Of MORE FUNDAMETAL IMPORTANCE are the NATURE of the negligent act or omission of each party and THE CHARACTER & GRAVITY OF THE RISKS CREATED by such act or omission for the rest of the community. LD: Even the lapse of considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability of the one who created the "condition", It is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the NATURE OF THE RISK and the CHARACTER of the intervening cause. LD: Foreseeable Intervening Causes are within the scope of ORIGINAL RISK, and hence of the defendant's (injuror's) negligence. An intervening cause COMBINING with the defendant's conduct to produce the result does not break the natural chain of events arising from defendant's negligence which is still the proximate cause of the accident. The risk created by defendant MAY INCLUDE THE INTERVENTION of the FORESEEABLE NEGLIGENCE OF OTHERS. (Standard of reasonable conduct, anticipate occasional negligence of humans) Prosser & Keeton. LD: Doctrine of Last Clear Chance: a common-law theory adopted to mitigate the harshness of the

contributory negligence of the plaintiff rule under which common-law countries plaintiff is barred from any recovery, unlike in our system of law where the Civil Code expressly states that it will merely REDUCE the amount to be recovered. FACTS: 15 Nov 1975, 1:30 a.m. : Leonardo Dionisio was driving home from a cocktail/dinner party with his boss when after crossing the intersection of Gen Lacuna and Gen Santos Street in Makati, he crashed into the dump truck and sustained several injuries. (facial scras, nervous breakdown, gold dentures) The dump truck was owned by Phoenix Const, Inc.. Phoenix had allowed its driver, Carbonel to take the dump truck home with him because of the work schedule early the next morning. Carbonel had parked the truck askew on the right side of Gen. Lacuna Street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There was no light/reflector or warning device to alert motorists of its presence. Phoenix: Dionisio was the proximate cause of his own accident o Reckless Driving/Speeding o Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol o No Headlights o No Curfew Pass o Phoenix also claims to have exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its dump truck driver. CFI Pampanga: In favor of Dionisio. 15K hospital bills & dentures,150K loss of income, 10K MD for mental anguish etc, 10K for refusing to settle amicably IAC: Affirms CFI ruling, but reduces damages to 6460, 100K resigned from job, 50K MD, 10K ED, 4.5K AF ISSUES: WoN Dionisio's negligence was an efficient intervening cause that broke the chain of event s cause by Carbonel's negligence? (NO) ISSUE: Can Last Clear Chance be applied as a general rule in negligence cases in our jurisdiction?

Lil's Notes | Torts |01 Feb 2012

(NO) SC: CFI and IAC failed to pass upon the relevance of Dionisio's negligence. SC: Factual Issues: Dionisio did not have his curfew pass, and was in a hurry to get home. He was speeding and deliberately turned off his headlights to avoid detection by the police which had a checkpoint nearby. His headlights did not malfunction. However, Dionisio wasn't too heavily intoxicated (not enough evidence) despite policeman's testimony that he smelled of liquor and admission that he had a shot or two before dinner. Dionisio was negligent SC: Dionisio bumping the truck was no more than a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the truck driver by parking askew without warning device SC: Truck Driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was an indispensable and efficient cause. Accident would not have happened if truck not parked improperly. This created an UNREASONABLE RISK OF INJURY for anyone driving down Gen Lacuna Street. For have CREATED THIS RISK, truck driver must be held responsible. SC: Dionisio's negligence not an efficient intervening or independent cause even though it was closer to the accident. It was a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by truck driver. Dionisio's negligence not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact b/w the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, not to sever the juris vinuculum of liability. SC: Dionisio's negligence is only contributory. SC:Truck driver OWED A DUTY NOT TO IMPOSE UPON OTHER MOTORISTS THE RISK he created. SC: Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in a society and to allocate them among the members of society. To require the injured to exercise increased diligence would weaken the very bonds of society. SC: Because Dionisio is guilty of contributory negligence, he should shoulder 20% of the damages Phoenix is liable under Art 2180 (Phoenix :80%, Dionision 20%) EXCEPT for 10K ED, and 4.5K AF and costs. SC: Affirms CA decision with modification. PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE (now PCIB), ROGELIO LACSON, DIGNA DE LEON, MARIA ANGELITA PASCUAL v. CA, ROMMEL'S MARKETING CORP (RMC) repped by ROMEO LIPANA, Pres & GM (14 Mar 1997) LD: Doctrine of Last Clear Chance: Where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. FACTS: RMC President Lipana entrusted his secretary, Irene Yabut cash from his appliance store to deposit in his account with PBC. However, Yabut would deposit the cash in her husband Bienvenido Cotas' account. (Total 304K++). She would do this by filling up 2 deposit slips. The original would have the account name and account number of her husband. The 2nd deposit slip would only be partially filled up, Account Name would be blank and account number would still be filled up with Cotas' account number. Yabut would have the original and duplicate stamped, bring home the whole duplicate deposit slip to the office, fill up the account name with RMC and change the account number to RMC's account. This went on for more than a year (5 May 1975 16 July 1976) as Lipana did not check his monthly bank statements. RMC demands the return of the money from the bank. Upon refusal of the bank to comply, he sues the Bank for negligence in validating the duplicate deposit slip without ensuring that it was properly filled up. RTC: Bank negligent: Pay 304K++ plus interest, 14% ED, 25% AF, Costs CA: Affirmed RTC Decision. Modifies damages. ISSUE: Was Bank's negligence the proximate cause of RMC's injury (Majority: YES, Padiila dissenting (NO) SC: The Bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by RMC, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation procedure. (Bank had LCC, therefore, proximate cause of injury used interval of time, definition of quasi-delict, standards used: highest degree of diligence, BUT FOR TEST also, possible collusion b/w teller and Yabut) SC: The damage would not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC had execised a little vigilance in their financial affairs (Check monthly statements). This omission amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to RMC under Art 2179 (6040 ratio) Bank liable under Art 2180 PADILLA DISSENTING: Differentiate b/w Last Clear Chance and Last Possible Chance: Even if bank teller had required Yabut to completely fill up the duplicate deposit slip, the cash would still have been validated under her husband's account. Last Clear Chance was with RMC in checking the monthly statements No way for bank's tellers to reasonably foresee that Yabut might use the duplicate deposit slips to cover up her crime. RMC should not be able to recover. driven by Engr Calibo and Cargo truck driven by Zacarias collide with each other. Engr Calibo dies and 2 companions sustain injuries. (South Lizada Bridge : 59yrds in Glan-Bound) Truck minor damage, Jeep fell on its side, rested a few mtrs to the rear of the truck. o Truck usurped opposite lane by 25cm (white line in wrong position? Truck's lane should have been wider) o Other side of truck dangerous ravine. o Truck came to a full-stop 30mtrs before jeep collided with it. o Jeep zigzagging RTC: Dismisses case, Zacarias not liable for injury o Truck at Full Stop when Jeep ran into it o Companions of Calibo refused to be investigated. Zacarias submitted readily o Skid marks left by truck's tires, none for the jeep. Calibo did not reduce his speed despite curvature of the road and descending grade of jeep's lane. o Calibo had last clear chance of avoiding the accident because he had ample room in his lane to avoid truck. IAC: reverses RTC Decision: 30K, 378K, 15K Costs o Truck occupied lane of jeep when collision occurred o Truck shouldn't have braked, should have swerved. o Zacarias had no license, gave wrong license to police. o Waiver of companions of Calibo to file criminal charges should not bar them to bring civil suit. SC: Applies Picart v. Smith: (Under these circumstances, the law is that

GLAN PEOPLE'S LUMBER & HARDWARE, GEORGE LIM, FABIO AGAD, PAUL ZACARIAS v. IAC & CECILA VDA DE CALIBO & 7 children (18 May 1989) LD: Doctrine of Last Clear Chance: Assuming some antecedent negligence of the part of Zacarias, the physical facts would still absolve him of any actionable responsibility for the accident under the rule of the last clear chance. FACTS: 4 July 1979: 1:45pm: Jeep

the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, w/o reference to the prior negligence of the other party.) SC: Jeep had last clear chance. Zacarias prudent in stopping because of ravine on other side. (center line should have been 36cm farther to the left) SC: Jeep rammed into the stopped truck, intruding into the imaginary "correct" white line. SC: Jeep zigzagging, Calibo reportedly drunk. No driver's license SC: Calibo's negligence proximate cause of accident. SC: Jeep had last clear chance. SC: Reverse IAC decision: Don't act on misplaced sympathy.

CFI Pangasinan: Pantranco negligent and proximate cause of accident. Awards 2.3M++ to Maricar Baesa, 652K++ to Children of Ico and wife. CA: affirms CFI decision, reduces damages. SC: Review of evidence confirms lower courts' decision. Bus had ample room on other side to stay in its lane. Ico did not have last clear chance as he was reasonable to presume that the bus would return to its lane. Ico was not aware of the danger. Jeepney had crossed the intersection, so no right-of-way required. SC: Affirms CA decision, changes indemnity for death to 30K each.

PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS v. MARICAR BASCOS BAESA thru guardia FRANCISCA BASCOS< FE ICO & children: (14 Nov 1989) LD: LCC: The subsequent negligence of defendant in failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes the immediate or proximate cause of the accident which intervenes b/w the accident and the more remote negligence of the plaintiff. LD: Doctrine of Last Clear Chance does not apply when the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avoid the accident was not aware of the existence of the peril. LD: LCC can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered. FACTS: 12 Jun 1981: Sps Caesar & Marilyn Baesa with children and David Ico & Family, with 7 other persons on the way to picnic in Malallam River, Iligan Isabela to celebrate 5th wedding anniversary. Jeep driven and owned by Ico. While negotiating a curve, a speeding Pantranco bus encroached on jeep's lane and collided with it as the jeepney was turning right to the Malalam River. Action for quasi-delict.

OSMUNDO CANLAS and ANGELINA CANLAS v CA, ASIAN SAVINGS BANK, MAXIMO CONTRERAS and VICENTE MANOSCA (28 Feb 2000) LD: Doctrine of Last Clear Chance: Where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof (same def as PBC v. RMC) FACTS: Osmundo Canlas and Vicente Manosca decide to venture into business together. Canlas has 2 parcels of land in Paranaque. He sells this to Manosca for 850K. Manosca was to pay Canlas 500K in cash, and the remaining 350K would constitute Canlas' investment into the venture. Canlas gave Manosca the 2 TCTs for the properties. Manosca gave Canlas 2 PDCs for 40K and 460K. However the 460K bounced. Manosca with 2 impostors posing as Sps Canlas, mortgaged 2 parcels of land to Atty Magno for 100K Manosca again took out a mortgage for 2 parcels of land with Asian Saving Bank (ASB) for 500K, using the 2 imposters again. ASB approved mortgaged based only on residence certificates of impostors and mortgage contract with Atty Magno. ASB did not ask for single

proof of identification ASB forecloses mortgage on 2 parcels of land. Sps Canlas file case for annulment of deed of real estate mortgage with prayer for preliminary injunction. RTC: Deed of Mortgage VOID, Manosca to pay ASB 350K CA: Reverses RTC decision. Canlas a party to the fraud ISSUE: Did Bank have LAST CLEAR CHANCE? (YES) SC: Degree of Diligence of Bank: Highest Degree. More than food father of the family. SC: Should have asked for proof of identification. SC: VP of ASB: based on F/S of Manosca, Tax acct number, residence cert number in 1st mortgage to Atty Magno. Alleged negligence of Canlas: did not correct Manosca when introduced as Leonardo Rey, entrusted TCTs with Manosca SC: Applies Doctrine of Last Clear Chance. SC: Mortgage void.

THE CONSOLIDATED BANK & TRUST CORP (SOLIDBANK) v. CA & LC DIAZ& CO, CPA's (11 Sep 2003, Carpio) LD: Culpa Contractual: Burden of Proof on defendant that he was not at fault or negligent LD: Culpa Aquiliana: Burden of Proof on plaintiff that defendant was negligent. LD: Banks have fiduciary relationship with depositor which require higher standards than those b/w parties with contract of simple loan. LC Diaz is a depositor of Solidbank. Calapre, a messenger of LC Diaz, deposited money into LC Diaz's account and left the passbook with Teller #6 bec of the long wait and he had to deposit funds at Allied Bank. When he returned, the teller gave him the deposit slips, but told him that someone else (she could not recall the name) picked up the savings passbook. Calapre and Macaraya (cashier) were able to make subsequent deposits without the -

passbook. However, Solidbank's teller informed them that a check for 90K had been deposited in their account, but had bounced (this check was from an account they had closed in PBC). The same day, they also discovered that 300K had been withdrawn from their Solidbank savings account. The teller was able to show them withdrawal slips signed by the authorized signatories (verified with signature cards). Noel Tamayo was the person who received the cash. LC Diaz charged its messenger, Ilagan and one Roscon Verdazola with estafa through falsification of commercial doc. RTC dismissed this case. LC Diaz sues Solidbank for the return of its money. RTC: dismissed LC Diaz's case. Savings Passbook contain the stipulations that govern the rights and obligations of bank and depositor. (depositor should keep passbook under lock and key) contractual relationship, no breach by Solidbank. CA: reverses RTC based on culpa aquiliana. Solidbank's negligence the proximate cause of damage to LC Diaz. 3 elements of quasi-delict present. Degree of diligence required from Solidbank more than that of a good father of the family. ISSUE: WON Solidbank liable? (YES, in part) SC: Solidbank liable for breach of contract due to negligence (culpa contractual) SC: Art 1980, but law imposes higher standards on the bank. *but savings not trust relationship* SC: Proximate cause and last clear chance not applicable to breach of contract. SC: Despite provisions on saving passbook, higher degree of diligence required when passbook in possession of bank. They should not have given it out to just anyone. SC: Burden of proof on Solidbank that it was not negligent. Solidbank failed to prove this. SC: But under Art 1172, liability for culpa contractual may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. LC Diaz guilty of

Lil's Notes | Torts |01 Feb 2012

contributory negligence in allowing the withdrawal slip signed by authorized signatories to fall into hands of impostor. Liability of Solidbank should be reduced. LC Diaz to shoulder 40% of actual damages. ROGELIO ENGADA v, CA and PEOPLE (20 June 2003) LD: Emergency Rule: An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act w/o much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought about by his own negligence. LD: Doctrine of Last Clear Chance: A Person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. 29 Nov 1989; Iloilo: Edwin Iran (driver) with Sheila Seyan on Tamaraw. From opposite direction, saw Isuzu pick-up driven by Engada encroaching on its lane. A few meters from the Tamaraw, Engada signaled that he was turning right, but instead turned left. Iran swerved to the left , pick-up swerved to the right. Collision. Isuzu hits Tamaraw on front right passenger side (What side was the Tamaraw on?) Iran & Seyan sustained injuries, 45 day stay in hospital. Medical expenses 130K , Tamaraw damage 80K Criminal Complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and serious physical injuries. RTC: finds Engada guilty of Simple Imprudence. Art 263 pay damages 52K, 110K CA: Affirms RTC decision. Increases imprisonment to 4 months Engada: Iran caused the accident. Didn't have to swerve left as he already signaled that he was turning right and returning to his lane. Iran also had last clear chance. ISSUE: WoN Engada's negligence the proximate cause of accident? (YES) SC: Engada speeding and overtaking\ SC: Iran's cannot be faulted for swerving to the left. Emergency situation. SC: Do not invoke last clear chance. No opportunity. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a) Article 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904) Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated: Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed. (349a, 351a, 354a) Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused children and other children similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of children's homes, orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency. (314a) Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a ) Art. 236. Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. (412a) LIBI v. IAC TAMARGO v. CA 2. Teachers/School

LAPANDAY AGRI & DEVT CORP (LADECO v. HENRY BERENGUEL and APOLONIO DEOCAMPO v. MICHAEL RAYMOND ANGALA (2007) LD: Last Clear Chance: Def LD: A U-turn is done at amuch slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning compared to running straight ahead. LD: Last Clear Chance applies. (Because both at fault) FACTS: Datsun CrewCab (De Ocampo) bumped into Chevy pick-up (Angala) while Pick-up was executing a U-Turn. (5-10kph). Angala: Signalled to the left. DeOcampo: Did not see signal. Did not apply brakes because collision unavoidable. RTC: LADECO to pay 23K++ 10K MD, 10K AF. Crew Cab running very fast. Speeding proximate cause., only stopped 21m away from point of impact. Deocampo had last opportunity to avoid accident. CA: Affirms RTC ruling. Applied Last Clear Chance. LADECO: Borres (driver of Angala) violated Sec 45(B) of RA 4136, wrong lane in turning left. Violating traffic rule (Art 2185) ISSUE: SC: Petition partly meritorious SC: Both drivers negligent. SC: Applies Last Clear Chance: DeOcampo at the read, had full control of the situation, could observe the vehicle in front of him. IV. PERSONS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE 1. Person Exercising Parental Authority

See Art 2180 FC Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a) RPC

(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214; (2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and (3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.

Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments. In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by

them or their employees. Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees. Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties. SPS MOISES & BRIGIDA PALISOC v. ANTONIO BRILLANTES and TEODOSIO VALENTON, owner and President, respectively, of a school of arts and trades, known under the name and style of "Manila Technical Institute" (M.I.T), VIRGILIO DAFFON and SANTIAGO QUIBULUE. (4 Oct 1971, Teehankee) LD: Students need not live with school-teacher for the latter to be liable for the former's tort. LD: Under Art 2180, the president of a vocational school and the instructor of the student who committed the tort. Dominador Palisoc: 16 yr old automotive mechanics student at MIT (the one who died) Virgilio Daffon: fellow student, not a minor (Killer) Teodosio Valenton: President of MIT Santiago Quibulue: Instructor of Palisoc's class. 10 Mar 1966: Dominador & Virgilio got into a fight in the lab during recess. As Dominador retreated to avoid fist blows, he stumbled on engine block, fell, fainted and eventually died. (shock from fist blows causing internal injuries) RTC: Found Daffon guilty under Art 2176 of NCC, absolved other defendants. Situation out of the

control or influence of teachers/head, therefore; Art 2180 does not apply. Daffon did not live or board with the teacher of other school officials. " as long as they remain in their custody" Mercado v CA ISSUE: WoN school officials liable under Art 2180? (YES, teacher and head only) SC: Teacher and school heads in loco parentis and must exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child (Art 349, 350, 352 of NCC) SC: "so long as (the students) remain in their custody", should be interpreted to refer to teachers and school heads' protective and supervisory custody over the students as long as they are at attendance in school, even during recess time. SC: Dominador's death could have been avoided if the teacher/school head had complied with their DUTY to PROVIDE ADEQUATE SUPERVISION over the students. Therefore teacher/school head solidarily liable for quasi-delict with Daffon. JBL Concurring Plain text of Art 2180 show that pupil does not have to be a minor to make teacher/head liable. Makalintal Dissenting: Teacher's shouldn't be held liable unless the student is living with them, because it's impractical to exercise supervision over large student populations. Teachers' should not be liable for torts committed by pupils who are no longer minors. If parents' liability ends when child no longer a minor, teachers' should also.

JOSE AMADORA etal v. CA, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, etal. (15 Apr 1988) LD: Article 2180 shold apply to all schools, academic as well as nonacademic. (changing times) o Academic: teacher in charge o Arts & Trades/Technical/Vocati onal School: Head of the school -

LD: As long as the student is in the school premises in pursuance of A LEGITIMATE PURPOSE, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. LD: It is not necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent it. (Custody refers to the influence exerted over the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of such influence) LD: School may be held to ansert for the acts of its teachers or even of the head, under the general principle of respondent superior BUT may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias. (DEFENSE also available to teacher-in-charge or school head) LD: Teacher-In-Charge or School head may be held liable even if student is already of age. (Art 2180 treats parents more favorably than teachers) FACTS: Alfredo Amadora:17, 4th yr graduating student Pablito Daffon: of age, Classmate who shot Alfredo in auditorium Sergio Damaso: Dean: of boys: confiscated gun from Jose Gumban but returned it to him w/o making a report Celestino Dicon: Physics Teacher: Not present because he was not supposed to report for work Alfredo went to the school to submit/show physics experiment CFI: acquits other students, finds other defendants liable CA: Reverses CFI ruling: school not a school of arts & trades, but academic institution. Art 2180 not applicable. Exconde Case: Father and not school held liable: (Boy Scout instructed to attend Rizal Day parade, took over wheel of jeep and drove recklessly) Obiter: school exempt from liability, not a school of arts and trades Mercado Case: (Razor Blade at Lourdes Catholic) School again exempted: board and arts & trade Palisoc: changed meaning of custody. SC: Rector, HS principal, and dean of boys cannot be held liable because

none of them was the teacher-in charge. Only General Authority. SC: Probably dean of boys should be liable but need more proof of link b/w him and the gun used.. School cannot be held directly liable, only subsidiarily. SC: Petition Denied: None of defendants liable.

BENJAMIN SALVOSA & BAGUIO COLLEGES FOUNDATION v. IAC, EDUARDO CASTRO, etal (5 Oct 1988) LD: A student not at attendance in school cannot be in recess. (recess v. dismissal) School: Baguio Colleges Foundation (both academic and technical school) Jimmy Abon: of age. Working Commerce Student of BCF, armorer of ROTC. Appointed by and employed by AFP. Killer Napoleon Castro: Victim: Died of gunshot Benjamin Salvosa: President of BCF 1977, 8pm in parking lot of BCF, Jimmy Abon shot Napoleon Castro, a student of Univ. of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which Abon took from the ROTC armory in BCF. RTC: Solidary liability of Salvosa & BCF for death of Castro. CA: Affirmed but reduced damages. IssueL WoN Salvosa etal can be held solidarily liable with Jimmy Abon? (NO) SC: Crime took place after school hours, no longer in the protective and supervisory custody of the school. Therefore, Abon not "at attendance at school" Salvosa not liable under Art 2180 of NCC> SC: Abon supposed to be working at the armory with definite instructions from his superior when he shot Castro. SC: CA decision reversed. School not liable. ST. MARY's ACADEMY v. WILLIAM CARPITANOS, etal, GUADA DANIEL etal, & VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA. (6 Feb 2002) LD: The special parental authority and responsibility applies to ALL AUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES, whether inside or outside the premises of the

Lil's Notes | Torts |01 Feb 2012

school, entity or institution (Art 218) LD: For a school to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident Sherwin Carpitanos: victim. James Daniel II: minor, Driver of jeep Vivencio Villanueva: owner of Mitsubishi jeep in accident Enrollment drive by school. Jeep driven by James, turned turtle. Sherwin, a passenger in the jeep, dies. RTC: St Mary's Academy liable for death of Sherwin, Parents of James, subsidiary liability only. CA: Affirms RTC decision, reduces damages ISSUE: Is School Liable? (NO) SC: Proximate cause of Sherwin's death, not school's negligence. Immediate cause of the accident was not the reckless driving of James, but because the steering wheel guide of the jeep came off (detached?) SC: School did not allow James to drive, it was Ched Villanueva, grandson of Vivencio, who had possession and control of the jeep. He allowed James to drive. SC: The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public/third persons, for injuries caused while vehicle wsa being driven on highways or streets. SC: Remand to RTC to determine liability of other defendants, excluding St. Mary's Academy. by backsliding truck. Lampesa: owner of truck driven by Copsiyat Jeepney stopped to let truck park, but truck started to slide back towards the jeepney until its rear left portion hit the right side of the jeepney. (Lampesa: Jeep sideswiped truck) Lampesa offered 5K as humanitarian support, but De Vera refused and demaned 1M, later reduced to 75K. De Vera sues truck driver, owner, jeepney owner/driver. RTC: truck driver negligent, negligence proximate cause of injuries, Lampesa did not exercise diligence in selection and supervision of employees (required Copsiyat to have Prof. Drivers License not enough) CA: Affirms RTC ruling SC: Lampesa should have carefully examined driver's qualifications, experience, records, and supervised diligently. SC: CA decision Affirmed. over Lozano during time of accident. SC: Employer-Employee relationship cannot be assumed. SC: Municipality remains to be Lozano's employer because an employer-employee relationship exists even if the employee is loaned by the employer to another person or entity because control over the employee subsists. SC: US cases SC: The driver's duty is not one that may be delegated to others. (no matter who the backseat driver) SC: Petition denied. CA decision affirmed. death of Romeo. Abad promised to answer for hospital & medical expenses. Parents of Romeo sue Castilex for damages. RTC: Vasquez's win. Castilex solidarily liable (~900K) CA: Affirms Castilex's liability, but holds that its liability is vicarious and not solidary, Reduces awards of damages. Issue; WoN an employer can be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle? (DEPENDS, in this case NO) SC: Castilex presumes the negligence of Abad, but claims it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and death caused by Abad. SC: No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment, an employee is engaged in his employer's business in the operation of a motor vehicle, so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employee's action or inaction, but rather, the result varies with each state of facts. In this case, given the facts, location of beerhouse, time, Abad was not operating it within the course or scope of his employment. SC: US cases: Meals, commute etc. SC: Overtime work, Goldie's Restaurant, snacks, chatted with some friends. Woman in the bar "Daddy, Daddy". This shows that Abad was carrying out a personal purpose and not in line with duties of his employment. SC: CA decision affirmed. Castilex not liable.

OWNERS OF ESTABLISHMENTS CORNELIO LAMPESA & DARIO COPSIYAT v. DR. JUAN DE VERA JR, FELIX RAMOS, MODESTO TOLLAS (14 Feb 2008) LD: Once negligence on the part of the employee is established, a presumption instantly arises that the employer was negligent in the selection and/or supervision of said employee. De Vera: passenger in jeepney. Lost his left middle finger when jeepney hit

SPS BUENAVENTURA JAYME v. RODRIGO APOSTOL FIDEL LOZANO, ERNESTO SIMBULAN, MUNICIPALITY OF KORONDAL. (27 Nov 2008) LD: State and subdivisions of the state not liable for damages when performing government functions. Mayor Miguel on his way to the airport, driven by Lozano at high speed, when they hit a Marvin Jayme, throwing him 50m away from the point of impact. He died 6 days later. Lozano: employed by Municipality of Korondal (child shot out of nowhere) Apostol: owner of pick-up Simbulan: had possession of pick-up RTC: Rules in favor of Jaymes. Lozano, Apostol and Mayor solidarily liable for damages awarded. CA: Reversed with respect to Mayor not employer of Lozano, should not be liable/ Issue: May a mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent act of a driver assigned to him, which resulted in a death of a minor pedestrian? (NO) SC: The doctrine of vicarious liability finds no application in this case. Jaymes: Mayor not mere passenger, had direct control and supervision

CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORP v. VICENTE VASQUEZ etal (21 Dec 1999) LD: The phrase "even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry" found in the 5th paragraph of Article 2180 should be interpreted to mean that It is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business of industry to be liable for the negligence of the employee who is acting wthin the scope of his assigned task. LD: The mere fact that an employee was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge his employer with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment. LD: Where there is a paucity of evidence that an employee was acting within the scope of the functions entrusted to him when a tortious act occurred, the employer has no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing the employee with a service vehicle, and the employer is thus relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of te negligence of the employee. FACTS: Romeo Vasquez, was driving his motorcycle on Fuente Osmena Rotunda. No helmet or goggles, studen't permit. Benjamin Abad, manager of Castilex was counterflowing on company car and collided with motorcycle causing

FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE v. IAC and POTENCIANO KAPUNAN SR. ( 17 Aug 1992) FACTS: Funtech: working student/scholar of Filamer (janitor for 2 hours a day), student driver's license. Roxas City Funtecha requested Allan Masa, the driver of the school jeep to be allowed to drive the vehicle on his way home one late afternoon. A fast moving

truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so Funtecha swerved right to avoid a collision. The bumped against Kapunan. Jeep only had one functioning headlight. RTC: CA: Filamer Liable; SC Decision in 190 SCRA 577: Filamer not liable because no employer-employee relationship ISSUE: Is Filamer liable? (YES) SC: There was an employeremployee relationship b/w Funtecha and the chool even if he only worked as a janitor 2-hours a day. SC: Driving the vehicle eto and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of Filamer, so Funtecha's taking over the wheel of the jeep, even if not janitorial, was done in employer's behalf. NCC and not Labor Code applies. SC: Filamer Liable

driver: based on MOA b/w NPC and PHESCO detailing the power of PHESCO to undertake projects, etc (always needs NPC's consent.) SC: NPC did not present evidence of due diligence SC: NPC liable for injuries caused by accident.

4. State E. MERRITT v. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (1916) LD: The state not being liable to suit except by its express consent, an Act abrogating that immunity will be strictly construed. LD: An act permitting a suit against the state gives rise to no liability not previously existing unless it is clearly expressed in the act. LD: The Gov't of the PH is only liable for the negligent acts of its officers, agents and employees when they are acting as special agents within the meaning of Paragraph 5 of Art 1903 of the Civil Code., and a chauffer of the General Hospital is not such a special agent. CFI: E Merritt won a judgment of 14741, but he insists that damages owed to him should be larger (25K and 6K) Ambulance of General Hospital collided with motorcycle Merritt. Merritt was disabled for 2mos 21days. Physical and Mental condition deteriorated noticeably after accident. Income reduced/compromised (Ambulance violated ordinance/Motor Vehicle Act counterflow?) SC: Act 2457: Act authorizing Merritt to bring suit vs the Gov't. Orders Attorney-General to appear in suit. Issue: WoN Gov't liable for negligence of ambulance chauffer? SC: US cases: State normally liable because this would expose it to endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, w/c would be subversive of the public interest. SC: Scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where cause of action arises out of either tort or contract: o State simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not admit liability or create any cause of action in plaintiff's favor. Merely remedy to ENFORCE a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court. -

LOURDES VALENZUELA v. RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL. Alexander solidarily liable for injury of Lourdes Valenzuela. Company car and nature of Richard Li's work (asst mgr) show that at the time of accident, Richard Li was operating the car in furtherance of company's interest. Flat Tire, hazard lights, Richard Li, Drunk, visiting a co-worker/client? SC: Companies should ensure that employees are fit to drive when issuing company cars. MERCURY DRUG CORP and ROLANDO DEL ROSARIO v. SPS HUANG and STEPHEN HUANG (22 Jun 2007) 6 wheeler turck owned by Mercury 20 Dec 1996: Road Accident. Car on left innermost lane and truck to its right. Truck suddenly swerved to the left, slamming into front right passenger side of car. Car hurled over the island where it hit a lamppost, spun around and landed on opposite lane. Truck hit lamp post ran over the car and zigzagged towards and stopped in front of a church. Del Rosario the driver had only a TVR as his license had been confiscated for reckless driving. Massive injuries for Stephen: paralyzed for life. RTC: Mercury and driver Solidarily liable ~43M CA: affirms: reduces MD to 1M SC: Affirms Del Rosario was negligent. Evidence, driver admitted did not apply brakes. SC: no back-up driver for long trips. Driver's test: light vehicle (Galant). No supervision: Driving w/o a license. No disciplinary action. SC: No offer of help from Mercury Drug to Huangs. CA decision affirmed. IV. PERSONS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE

NPC v. CA and PHESCO INC. Independent Contractor v. Labor-Only Contracting o Undertakes work under his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer/principal. All that is important is the result o Has substantial capital or investments. o None of the above: labor only contracting. 1 of 4 dump trucks owned by NPC collided with a Toyota Tamaraw. 3 dead persons riding in Toyota Tamaraw as well as injuries to other passengers. NPC: owner of dump truck, but driver employee of PHESCO PHESCO: only contractor of NPC, main duty of supplying workers, recruiter only CFI Lanao: absolves NPC of liability CA: reverses CFI Decision ISSUE: WoN there is an employeremployee relationship b/w NPC and dump truck driver Gavino Ilumba? (YES) SC: NPC employer of dump truck

SC: Only question of jurisdiction is settled, not liability. SC: Act 2457 does not operate to extend the Gov't's liability any cause not previously recognized. Par 5, Art 1903 CC o The state is liable In this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. SC: SC of Spain: o That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by his fault or negligence is based, on that person obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the damages. o State is not responsible for the damges suffered by private individuals IN CONSEQUENCE of acts performed by its employees in the DISCHARGE OF FUNCTIONS PERTAINING to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence CAN BE PRESUMED on the part of the state in the organization of branches in public service and in the appointment of its agents. o Between private persons and the state, no relations of a private nature governed by civil law can arise EXCEPT in a case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring

Lil's Notes | Torts |01 Feb 2012

rights and contracting obligations. SC: The responsibility of the state is limited by Art 1903 to the case wherein it acts THROUGH A SPECIAL AGENT o Special Agent: one who received a definite and fixed order or commission, FOREIGN to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official, so that in representation of the state, and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. o This does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. SC: Judgment of CFI reversed. Legislature to determine if Gov't intends to open itself to liability and pay the damages. FONTANILLA v. MALIAMAN (1991)V. PERSONS SPECIFICALLY LIABLE A. Possessors of Animals B. only 6km away. SC: Based on the testimony of doctor a person infected with rabies can die of broncho-pneumonia as a complication. SC: CA decision affirmed Owner of Motor Vehicles accident place, the street car turned such that the car was facing the oncoming San Marcelino street car. To avoid a collision, swerved to the right and ran over Chapman. Trial Court: In favor of Underwood Issue: Was the chauffer negligent? (YES) Issue: Was Underwood liable for his chauffer's negligence? (NO) SC: Chauffer negligent for passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side. Chapman was not obliged to look out whether a car was coming upon him from the left hand, only from those coming from the right. SC: However, Underwood is not liable under the facts and circumstances of the case. Underwood did not have a reasonable opportunity to direct or prevent his chauffer's negligent acts. The act complained og must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by his consent, makes the driver's act his own.

Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. (1905) PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL et al v. IAC, DAVID & TERESITA UY (1989) LD: The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same shall be responsible for the damage it may cause. (What must be determined is possession of the dog that was staying in the house, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house. Art 2183) see Afialda v. Hisole. LD: Art 2183 holds that possessor liable even if the animal should escape or be lost. Even removed from his control, possessor still liable. LD Art 2183 not based on negligence, but on natural equity and social interest. One who enjoys or uses animals must answer for damage they may cause. FACTS: 3 year old Theness Tan Uy was bitten by a dog (Andoy) while playing with the child of Vestil in the house of the late Vicente Miranda (father of Purita). She died due to complications from rabies. (symptons: hydrophobia, vomiting saliva) Cause of death: Broncho-Pneumonia. Uys sue CFI Cebu: Uys lose. CA: Vestils liable under Art 2183 Vestil: Not the owner of the house, father's estate not yet partitioned. No Causal Connection b/w dog bite and death. Issue: Is Vestil liable for Theness' death? (YES) SC: Vestil is in possession of the house. Occupants of the house boarders of Vestil who paid her for meals and accommodations. Vestils maintaining the house for business purposes. They visit regularly and live

Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable. (n) JH CHAPMAN v. JAMES UNDERWOOD (1914) LD: The owner of an automobile, present in the vehicle, is not liable for the negligent acts of a competent driver unless such acts are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct the driver to desist therefrom, and to fail to do so. LD: Whether the owner of an automobile would be responsible for the acts of a competent driver, whether present or not, where the automobile causing the injury is a part of a business enterprise and is being driven in furtherance of the owner's business at the time the injury complained of is caused. FACTS: After visiting his friend, Chapman wanted to ride the Street Car "Marcelino" coming from Sta Ana and bound for Manila. This street car passed by the front of his friend's house. However, Chapman failed to get on the front platform of the street car. As he was waiting for the rear of the street car to come abreast of him, so that he could get on from there, he was hit by Underwood's car, which was driven by his chauffer while he was inside. Underwood's car was following another street car. However, near the

MARCIAL CAEDO etal v. YU KHE THAI & RAFAEL BERNARDO (1968) LD: In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. LD: The test of imputed negligence under Art 2184 is necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. (not trained or endowed with sufficient discernment to know traffic rules, etc Moreover, the law does not require that a person have some skills before buying or owning a motor vehicle. THAT'S WHY THEY HIRE DRIVERS TO BEGIN WITH. (Take into account age, etc) FACTS: 24 Mar 1958: 5:30am. EDSA. Mercury: Caedo and family going to the airport Cadillac: Yu and driver Bernardo going to Wack Wack for a round of golf. Caratella: Owned by Pedro Bautista

ROSETE v. AUDITOR GENERAL MENDOZA v. DE LEON FONTANILLA v. MALIAMAN (1989)

towing another horse. About 8m in front of the Cadillac. Bernardo tried to overtake the caratella, but the rear bumper caught the rim of the rig's left wheel, carrying it along, while the Cadillac skidded obliquely, where it collided with the oncoming Mercury. Caedo and several members of his family were injured. They sue. ISSUE: Is Yu liable for his driver's negligence? (NO) SC: Yu's driver unquestionably negligent. Shouldn't have tried to overtake. SC: Bernardo had been employed by Yu since 1937 and had no record of traddic violations. No negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to his master. SC: Car was not running at an unreasonable speed, road was wide and open, no traffic. No need for owner of car to be specially alert. Owner could not have anticipated driver's decision to pass the carretela. SC: Time element, No reasonable opportunity to assess the risks and direct the driver. SC: Yu not liable. -

city, or municipality for liability to attach. The article only required that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. FACTS: Florentina, a court interpreter, was about to board a tricycle, when she accidentally fell into a manhole located on the sidewalk, causing her right leg to be fractured. She had to be hospitalized for 16 days. When she returned to work, she had difficulty moving about. She became depressed (not her usual jovial self) and lost weight. She's still having trouble moving about. DAGUPAN: Sidewalk in Perez Blvd (owned by National Government) DAGUPAN: City engineer received honorarium from Ministry of Public Highways. Functions more for that agency. ISSUE: Is the City of Dagupan liable for damage caused by the accident? (YES) SC: Charter of Dagupan clearly shows that it has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole was located. (thru the City Engineer Tangco) SC: The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for damages or injuries sustained by persons or property due to the failure of any city officer to enforce the provisions of the charter, cannot be used to exempt the city from liability. SC: City Engineer's salary from city far exceeds honorarium given by Ministry of Public Highway. Charter only lays down GENERAL RULES re liability of the city. On the other hand, Art 2189 applies IN PARTICULAR to the liability arising from "defective streets, public buildings, and other public works." SC: CA decision reversed. RTC decision reinstated, but damages reduced. (~46K)

FULGENCIO DACARA (2005) FACTS: Minor Dacara Jr while driving his father's car, rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings from the repair being done by the QC Gov't found at Matahimik Street, QC. The car turned turtle and Jr sustained bodily injuries while the vehicle suffered extensive damage. (1987 Toyota Corolla) Dacara Sr sues QC Govt and Engr Tiamzon. QC: exercised due care, put up warning signs. Jr negligent (speeding), caused his own accident. QC: Art 2189 only applies to liability for death or injuries, not damage to property RTC: Art 2189. Dacara wins. CA. Affirms RTC. Based on Police Report no gasera, no warning signs. Art 2189 applicable to property damage. ISSUE: Is QC liable for body and property damage? (YES, but Moral Damages only for physical injury) SC: QC's negligence the proximate cause of Dacara Jr's injury. SC: Failure of QC to comply with the statutory provision in Art 2189 is tantamount to negligence per se which renders the City Gov't liable. SC: Affirms CA decision but Moral Damages deleted

Article 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused: (1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place; (2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property; (3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure; (4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the place. (1908) Article 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any defect in the construction mentioned in article 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article, within the period therein fixed. (1909)

E.

Engineer/Architect of Collapsed Building

C.

Provinces, Cities, Municipalities

Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. (n) FLORENTINA GUILATCO v. CITY OF DAGUPAN and CA (1989) LD: The liability of public corporations for damages arising for injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective conditions of roads is expressed in the Civil Code. It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province,

D.

Proprietors of Buildings

Article 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. (1907)

Article 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a building is liable for damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure, the same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the damages if the edifice falls, within the same period, on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the contractor. Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the cause of action by reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the building. (n)

QUEZON CITY GOVT & RAMIR TIAMZON v

Lil's Notes | Torts |01 Feb 2012

F. Head of a family for things thrown/Falling e in the bazaar below got wet and damaged worth around P1T Kanaans brought an action for damages against the managers (brothers Dingcong) and Echivarria (person who let the faucet leak) CFI absolved 1 Dingcong brother only (kasi namatay na yung isa) but held Echivarria liable CA reversed holding Dingcong liable for the damages Issue: WON the manager can be held liable Held: YES Ratio: Dingcong, as a colessee and manager of the hotel has to answer for the damage caused by things that thrown or falling from the hotel (Art. 1910 of the Codigo Civil) Echivarria was a guest of the hotel and was the direct cause of the damage But Dingcong did NOT exercise the diligence of a good father of the family He knew that the pipes of the hotel were under repair, presumed that the guest Echivarria would use the faucet, but only provided a bucket to deal with the problem of the leaks G. Owners of Enterprises/other employers Article 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees, even though the event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The employer is also liable for compensation if the employee contracts any illness or disease caused by such employment or as the result of the nature of the employment. If the mishap was due to the employee's own notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for compensation. When the employee's lack of due care contributed to his death or injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced. Article 1712. If the death or injury is due to the negligence of a fellow worker, the latter and the employer shall be solidarily liable for compensation. If a fellow worker's intentional or malicious act is the only cause of the death or injury, the employer shall not be answerable, unless it should be shown that the latter did not exercise due diligence in the selection or supervision of the plaintiff's fellow worker. JUSTA AFABLE and minors v. SINGER SEWING MACHINE CO (1933) The employer is not an insurer "against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment", and as a general rule an employee is not entitled to recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him while going to or returning from his place of employment, because such an accident does not arise out of and in the course of his employment. Recovery for injuries depends on the nature of his employment. FACTS: Sunday pm, 16 Nov 1930: Leopoldo Madlangbayan while riding his bike was run over by a truck and died in Manila. He was on his way home to T Alonzo St. in Manila after making collections in San Francisco del Monte (he had not told his employer, Singer, that he had changed addresses).

Article 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same. (1910) JOSE DINGCONG v. HALIM KANAAN etal. (1941) Facts: Dingcong brothers are co-lessees in the upper floor of the house owned by Saenz Brothers established the central hotel in the building where they were the managers A guest, Echivarria, occupied room 10 of the hotel for P30 per month Kanaans occupied the lower floor of the hotel where they established a bazaar Echivarria let his faucet leak while the pipes of the hotel were undergoing repairs S Water seeped through the floor the merchandis

Dispositive:Judgment Affirmed

Truck driver who ran over Leopoldo was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Ordered to indemnify heirs of Leopoldo 1K. Widow and Children sues Singer (Leopoldo's employer) to recover burial expenses and compensation under Act 3428/3812 (~1850) Act 3428, Sec 23 o When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident due to in the pursuance of the employment, or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified.

because employee free to take other means of transportation going home. Scheider: Motorcycle ridden by employee collides with car driven by fellow employee on the way home. Employer not liable for injury because employee not engaged in the furtherance of his employer's business when accident occurred. SC: Singer not liable. -

was unsafe to go down the hole, they roped one of Urzino's legs and pulled him out. Urzino was already dead, He died of asphyxia. Urzino's mother sues to recover compensation for Urizo's death under Art 1711 CFI: dismisses mother's complaint because Juan not an owner of enterprises or employer of laborers in industry or business. Issue: Is Juan Alarcon liable for Urzino's death? (NO) SC: Juan does not own any enterprise. Just a schoolteacher who needed a well. SC: Affirms CFI Decision.

on the use and hazards thereof. A product is defective when it does not offer the safety rightfully expected of it, taking relevant circumstances into consideration, including but not limited to: (a) presentation of product; (b) use and hazards reasonably expected of it; (c) the time it was put into circulation. A product is not considered defective because another better quality product has been placed in the market. The manufacturer, builder, producer or importer shall not be held liable when it evidences: (a) that it did not place the product on the market; (b) that although it did place the product on the market such product has no defect; (c) that the consumer or a third party is solely at fault. Art. 99. Liability for Defective Services. - The service supplier is liable for redress, independently of fault, for damages caused to consumers by defects relating to the rendering of the services, as well as for insufficient or inadequate information on the fruition and hazards thereof. The service is defective when it does not provide the safety the consumer may rightfully expect of it, taking the relevant circumstances into consideration, including but not limited to: (a) the manner in which it is provided; (b) the result of hazards which may reasonably be expected of it; (c) the time when it was provided. A service is not considered defective because of the use or introduction of new techniques. The supplier of the services shall not be held liable when it is proven: (a) that there is no defect in the service rendered; (b) that the consumer or third party is solely at fault. Art. 106. Prohibition in Contractual Stipulation. -

ENGRACIA ALARCON v. JUAN ALARCON (1961) LD: Under the principle of ejusdem generis, the "other employers" mentioned in Art 1711 must be construed to refer to persons who belong to a class analogous to "owners of enterprises", such as those operating a business or engaged in particular industry or trade, requiring its managers to contract the services of laborers, workers, and or employees. LD: Workmen's Compensation Act: the term "laborer" does not include a person whose employment is purely casual and is not for the purposes of the occupation of business of the employer. LD: Where the employment of the deceased was "purely casual", and was not "for the purposes of the occupation or business" of the person employing him, he is not covered by the provisions of Workman's Comp., even though he died in the course of his employment due to accident or fortuitous event. FACTS: Juan Alarcon ( a schoolteacher) hired Urzino Azaa (single, 20) and his brother to dig a well in his land in Cam Sur. After a day's work digging to a depth of 5m, they still hadn't struck water. The next day. Urzino and another worker Generoso continued digging. As Urzino was lowered in the hole, he said that he did not feel well. He fainted. Generoso called for help, but had difficulty pulling Urzino out because of a foul/toxic odor present starting 2m down the hole. Realizing it

H.

Manufacturers/Producers

ISSUE: Won Singer liable for Leopoldo's death? (NO) SC: The accident which caused the death of the employee was not due to and in pursuance of his employment. At the time the accident occurred, Leopoldo was on his way home, and not in pursuance oh his employment. He had left the territory where he was authorized to take collections. SC" :"due to and in the pursuance of" vs. "arising out of and in the course of" SC" Risks to which all persons similarly situated are equally exposed and not traceable in some special degree to the particular employment are excluded. SC: US Cases: Stacy (Colburn Pond), Because of location of employer's business, no other way home than thru the dangerous pond. Moreover, pond was owned by employer and under his control. SC: Fumicello a/ Lathrop & Shea case. F run over by a train in railroad where L& Shea did some contract work. Employer was not liable

Article 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers. (n) Article 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. (1101) Article 1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations. Any waiver of an action for future fraud is void. (1102a) Article 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. (1103) CONSUMER ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES Liability for Product & Service Art. 97. Liability for the Defective Products. Any Filipino or foreign manufacturer, producer, and any importer, shall be liable for redress, independently of fault, for damages caused to consumers by defects resulting from design, manufacture, construction, assembly and erection, formulas and handling and making up, presentation or packing of their products, as well as for the insufficient or inadequate information

Lil's Notes | Torts |01 Feb 2012

The stipulation in a contract of a clause preventing, exonerating or reducing the obligation to indemnify for damages effected, as provided for in this and in the preceding Articles, is hereby prohibited, if there is more than one person responsible for the cause of the damage, they shall be jointly liable for the redress established in the pertinent provisions of this Act. However, if the damage is caused by a component or part incorporated in the product or service, its manufacturer, builder or importer and the person who incorporated the component or part are jointly liable. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9803 AN ACT TO ENCOURAGE THE DONATION OF FOOD FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representative of the Philippines in Congress assembled: Section 1. Short Title. - ThisAct shall be known as the "Food Donation Act of 2009". Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is the policy of the State to alleviate national poverty and reduce food wastage. As such, the State shall implement measures to encourage the donation of apparently wholesome food for charitable purposes. Section 3. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows: a. Apparently Wholesome Food" refers to food that meets all quality and labeling standards imposed by a pertinent laws and administrative regulations even though the food may not be readily marketable due to appearance, age, freshness, grade, size, surplus, or other conditions. It does not include milk products as defined and covered under Executive Order No. 51, the "National Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes, Breastmilk Supplements and Other Related Products". "Donate" is to dispose of an apparently wholesome food in favor of another. It includes giving by one person to another person of an apparently wholesome food for distribution, notwithstanding that the former has charged a nominal fee from the latter, if the ultimate f. beneficiary is not required to give anything of monetary value. c. "Food" refers to any raw, cooked, processed, or prepared edible substance, ice, beverage. or ingredient used or intended for use in whole or in part for human consumption. "Gross Negligence" refers to voluntary and conscious conduct, including a failure to act, by a person who, at the time of conduct, knew that the conduct was likely to be harmful to the health or well-being of another person. "Intentional Misconduct" refers to conduct by a person with knowledge at the time of the conduct that the conduct is harmful to the health or well-being of another person. "Charitable Purposes" refers to philanthropic, humanitarian and nonprofit objectives, including the benefit of the needy, poor, sick, prisoners, orphans, etc.lawphi1 organizations including the Philippine National Red Cross and private entities shall formulate and issue the necessary rules and regulations for the implementation of this Act within ninety (90) days after the effectivity of this Act. Section 7. Repealing Clause. - Any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, rule or regulation inconsistent with the provisions of this Act is hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Section 8. Separability Clause. - If any portion or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act or any provisions not affected thereby shall remain in force and effect. Section 9. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from the date of its publication in at least one(1) newspaper of general circulation. same; (11) The privacy of communication and correspondence; (12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law; (13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances; (14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form; (15) The right of the accused against excessive bail; (16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf; (17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness; (18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and (19) Freedom of access to the courts. In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence. The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated. The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

d.

e.

VI. INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS 5. Violation of Civil & Political Rights

Section 4. Coordinating Mechanism. - To ensure effective and sustained inter-agency and multi-sectoral coordination, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) shall serve as the main coordinating agency together with the Philippine National Red Cross as auxiliary for the implementation of this Act. Section 5. Liability for Damages from Donated Food. - A person, whether natural or juridical, shall not be subject to civil or criminal liability arising from the nature, age, packaging, or condition of apparently wholesome food that a person donates in good faith for charitable purposes. This shall not apply, however, to an injury or death of an ultimate beneficiary of the donated food that results from an act or omission of a person constituting gross negligence or intentional misconduct. Section 6. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The DSWD, in coordination with the Department of Health (DOH) and its attached agencies, the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) and the National Nutrition Council (NNC); the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC); the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP); other relevant government agencies, nongovernment

Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: (1) Freedom of religion; (2) Freedom of speech; (3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication; (4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention; (5) Freedom of suffrage; (6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; (7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use; (8) The right to the equal protection of the laws; (9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures; (10) The liberty of abode and of changing the

b.

MHP GARMENTS & LARRY GUZMAN v. CA & AGNES VILLA CRUZ, MIRASOL LUGATIMAN & GERTRUDES GONZALES (1994) LD: Where a warrantless search and seizure is conducted despite the fact that there is sufficient time to apply for a judicial warrant, the persons who participate therein take the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right against unreasonable search and seizure LD: Private persons who instigate an illegal warrantless search and seizure may be held liable for damages. LD: Private persons who initiate an illegal warrantless search and seizure, accompany the raiding team and stand by during the operation, apparently assenting thereto, are liable for damages to the same extent as the public officers themselves. FACTS: MHP Garments was granted by Boy Scouts of the Phils exclusive franchise to distribute official Boy Scout uniforms, supplies, etc. In MOA, MHP was given authority to undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies Oct 1983: Info that Agnes, etal were selling Boy Scout items w/o authority. Larry de Guzman, employee of MHP tasked to undertake necessary surveillance and report to Phil Constabulary. 10:30am, 25 Oct 1983: Larry and 3 PC man went to Marikina Public Market and seized the boy and girl scout items on display at Agnes, Mirasol & Gertrudes' stalls WITHOUT A WARRANT. Items seized were turned over by PC captain to MHP for safekeeping Agnes etal charged with crime of UNFAIR COMPETITION Larry got 3100 from Mirasol to have the charges dropped against her. Fiscal dismissed the complaint against all 3 responsdents and ordered return of seized items. Agnes etal had to go to MHP to recover goods seized. Even then, they did not recover all items seized,

some were of inferior quality. Agnes etal file civilcase for SUM OF MONEY and DAMAGES against MHP. RTC: Agnes, etal win 3100 to Mirasol, 2K to Agnes, 50K MD and 15K ED, 5K AF +costs. CA: AFFIRMS RTC, reduces MD to 30K Issue: WoN MHP liable for damages for raid without search warrant? (YES) MHP: We did not conduct the raid. It was the PC. SC: Cites Art 3, Sec 2 of 1987 Consti SC: Evidence (no probable cause) did not justify warrantless search & seizure. Had sufficient time to apply for search warrant. In seizing goods without a warrant, they took the RISK OF A SUIT FOR DAMAGES in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of Agnes, etal against reasonable search & seizure. SC: Art 32 NCC (" or any private individual who directly or indirectly -- (9) the right to be secure in one's person") SC: Art 32: wrong may be civil or criminal. No need for malice or bad faith. (plea of good faith subject to abuse by officials) SC: Letter of Instruction: " upon proper application by Boy Scouts for warrant of arrest/or search warrant. To impound said paraphernalia" SC: If MHP did not have a hand in raid, they should have filed a third party complaint against PC. SC: CA decision affirmed. Except that 2K +6% + 12%

SILAHIS INT'L HOTEL & JOSE MARCEL PANLILO v. ROGELIO SOLUTA + 4 others & GLOWHRAIN-SILAHIS UNION CHAPTER (2006) LD: A violation of one's constitutional right against illegal search and seizure can be the basis for the recovery of damages under Art. 32 in relation to Art 2219(6) and (10) of NCC. Panlilio: VP Finance of Silahis Soluta etal: employees of Silahis and officers of union.

Reports of dollar smuggling, prostitution and drug pushing/using marijuana, theft syndicate at union office to GM of security agency (Rapier) With Panlilio's permission, surveillance conducted on union 11 Jan 1988: Panlilio, secretary, Manila Bulletin reporter and security guard search union office and find plastic bag with dried marijuana leaves. SIlahis (w/ permission), Union (no permission to enter union offices) RTC: Silahis, Panlilio, Maniego, Villanueva solidarily liable for damagesas a result of MALICIOUS PROSECUTION and ILLEGAL SEARCH of union office (~71K damages, 1K each to union officers, 100K each to 5 union officers MD, 30K ED to each officer, AF) CA: Silahis & Panlilio etal civilly liable for damages under Art 32 of NCC for violation of Soluta etal's right against unreasonable search of their office, halved MD. Issue: Is Silahis etal liable for damages for illegal search of union offices? (YES) Silahis etal: Being private persons, they are not covered by standards sets forth in Aruta as constitutional protection not meant to be invoke against private individuals Silahis: search reasonable under the circumstances, with consent of Babay. SC: Art 32 ".. or any private individual" (9) the right to be secure in one's persone against unreasonable searches and seizures" Indemnity shall include moral damages, Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated. SC: One must guard against abuse of constitutional rights (Code Commission: cunning devices to curtail freedom through actions not criminally punishable greatest danger to democracy) SC: Injured citizen will have adequate civil remedies under NCC because of independent civil action, even in those instances where the act or omission complained of does not constitute a criminal offense. SC: Under Art 32, no need for malice

or bad faith, violation of constitutional right sufficient. SC: Property rights no excuse. Union lawful occupants of the office and had the right to question the validity of the search and seizure SC: No proof of waiver. SC: Legal Basis of recovery of damages ,Art 32 in relation to Art 2219 (6 illegal search) and (10 Art 21, 26-30, 32, 34-35) People v. Marti not applicable: criminal case whose issue was whether an act of a private individual in violation one's constitutional rights may be invoked against the State" SC: AFFIRMS CA decision

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO V. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP (19 JUN 2007, YNARESSANTIAGO) Chato : Comm of BIR 10 Jun 1993: RA 7654 effective 3 July 1993. Prior to RA7654, Champion, Hope & More cigarettes considered local brands subject to ad valorem tax of 20-45% 1 Jul 1993: RMC 37-93 reclassified Champion, Hope and More as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to 55% tax, subjecting cigarette brands to Sec 142(c)(1) which applies to locally manufactured cigarettes currently classifled and taxed at 55% 2 July 1993, 5:50pm : RMC 37-93 faxed to Fortune, addressed to no one in particular. 30 July 1993,: after MR's, Fortune assessed tax deficiency of ~Php9.6M CTA, CA and SC ruled RMC 37-93 invalid and unenforceable. (short of req'm for valid admin issuance) 10 Apr 1997: Fortune sues Chato for damages in her private capacity under Art 32 of NCC (RMC 37-93 violated Fortune's constitutional right against deprivation of property w/o due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. Chato files motion to dismiss: Issued RMC in the performance of her official function, no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice and bad faith, cert against forum-shopping.

Lil's Notes | Torts |01 Feb 2012

RTC: can't dismiss, premature since parties have not presented evidence CA: Art 32 of NCC: Liability may arise even if defendant did not act with malice of bad faith. Admin Code (Sec 38 Bk 1) general law on civil liability while Art 32 of NCC special law that governs this case. Admin Code: liability only attaches if there is clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence where public officer violated a constitutional right of plaintiff. (Superior Officer) o Subordinate Officer: civilly liable for willful or negligent acts done by him which are contrary to law, morals public policy and good customs even if he acts under orders of superior. Art 32: Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates, or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages. (to end official abuse) Issue: WON Administrative Code or NCC should be applied? NCC SC: Art 32 of NCC controlling. SC: The special law must prevail since it evinces legislative intent more clearly than that of a general statue and must not be taken as intended to affect the more particular and specific provisions of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to construe it in order to give its words any meaning at all. SC: Special Law exception SC: Art 32 patterned after tort in American Law.(commission or omission of an act by one, w/o right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property, or reputation.) No need for evil intent. SC: intent of leg. To create a distinct cause of action in nature of tort for violation of constitutional rights, irrespective of motive. Admin Code: deal in particular with liability of gov't officials BUT subject is general. ("Acts" done in performance of official duties, no specific act or omission) Art 32 specifies "act" tort for impairment of rights & liberties. Subject is particular or specific provision. SC Dispositive: motion to dismiss denied, continue proceedings in RTC Marikina. AR RIGHT, ehich are the grounds upon which actions are founded. o Duty owing to particular individuals They serve individuals chiefly and usually receive their compensati on from fees paid by each individual who employs them. (ex. Sheriff in serving civil process for a private suitor, recorder of deeds in recording the deed or mortgage of an individual, clerk of court entering up a private judgment,et c) FACTS: See previous digest. ISSUE: Is Vinzons-Chato personally liable to Fortune Toboacco for issuing RMC 37-93? (NO) SC: Vinzons-Chato's duty was owing to the public in general. She owes a duty to the public to promulgate rules which are compliant with the req's of valid administrative regulations. SC: Consistent with the Court's previous decision (2007), An individual can hold a public officer personally liable for damages on account of an act or omission that violates a constitutional right ONLY IF IT RESULTS in a particular wrong or injury to the former. SC: Focus on injury (breach of duty, injury, proximate cause) SC: "Financial and business difficulties" is an ambiguous concept, and CANNOT TRANSLATE into a "particular injury" SC: BIR took nothing from Fortune, as company did not pay single centavo of tax assessment by virtue of RMC 37-93 With no particular injury alleged in the complaint, there is, therefore, no delict or wrongful act or omission attributable to Vinzons-Chato that would violate the primary rights of Fortune. SC: No cause of action. SC: Just because RMC was an invalid Administrative issuance, doesn't make it unconstitutional. SC: NIRC and creation of CTA provide ample remedies to aggrieved taxpayers without having to pay the assessment under protest. SC: So no violation of due process, since Fortune availed of those remedies. SC: US case: Bivens v. 6 unknown FBI Agents, but applicability doubtful when "meaningful safeguards or remedies are available" (Schweiker v. Chilicky) SC: Vennes v. An unknown number of Unidentified Agents of the USA o Alledged $250K tax liability, confiscation, forced asset sale, out of business, but turns out Vennes didn't owe the gov't a dime. o Dismissed because a taxpayer's remedies under the IRC preclude such a Bivens action. SC: Because the complaint does not impute negligence or bad faith to Vinzons-Chato, any money judgment the trial court against her will have to be assumed by the PH. As such the complaint is in the nature of a suits against the State SC: Motion for Reconsideration Granted and RTC case dismissed. 6. Defamation, Fraud, Physical Injuries

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO V. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP (2008 - NACHURA) LD: It is a fundamental principle in law of public officers that duty owing to the public in general cannot give rise to a liability in favor of particular individuals. LD: In determining whether a public office is liable for an improper performance or non-performance of a duty, it must first be determined w/c of the 2 classes of duties is involved. o Duty owing to the public IN GENERAL Individual has no cause of action, even if he or she is injured by action or inaction of public officer. (Damage but no wrong ) Remedy POLITICAL NOT JUDICIAL An individual cannot have a PARTICUL AR ACTION against a public officer without a PARTICUL AR INJURY, OR PARTICUL

Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and

physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. PILAR JOAQUIN v. FELIX ANICETO etal (1964) LD: While a separate and independent civil action for damages may be brought against the employee under Art 33 of the Civil Code, no such action may be filed against the employer on the latter's subsidiary civil liability because such liability is governed not by the Civil Code, but by the Penal Code, under which conviction of the employee is a condition sina qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability LD: Art 33 only applies to primary liability of employee, cannot file independent civil action vs employer BEFORE conviction in crim case of employee (even if it's on appeal after conviction in lower court) FACTS: 27 Apr 1960: Pilar suffered physical injuries when taxi driven by Aniceto and owned by Ruperto Rodelas bumped her while she was on the sidewalk Aniceta convicted in City Court of Manila. He appeals. No ruling on Aniceto's civil liability due to Pilar's reservation to file a separate civil action for damages. While appeal on crim case pending, Pilar sues Aniceto and Rodelas for damages in CFI Manila. Pilar blocked all attempted by Rodelas to prove that he had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of his employee. (on the ground that such defense is not available in a civil action brought under the Penal Code to recover THE SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY arising from the crime. CFI: dismissed case in the absence of final judgment against driver in crim case. Action premature. Issue: May an employee's primary civil liability for crime and his employer's subsidiary liability therefor be proved in a separate civil action while the criminal case against the

employee is still pending? (NO) ISSUE: Can Art 33 be made applicable to an employer in a civil action for subsidiary liability? (NO) SC: Without the conviction of the employee, the employer cannot be held subsidiarily liable SC: 2 choices o Under Art 100, action to enforce civil liability arising from a crime (employee convicted & insolvent) o Under Art 2176-2194, action for quasi-delict. (defense of due diligence available) If the court trying the employee's liability adjudges the employee liable, but the court trying the criminal action acquits the employee, the subsequent insolvency of the employee cannot make the employer subsidiarily liable to the injured. SC: Affirms CFI decision.

CARMEN MADEJA v. JUDGE CARO and EVA ARELLANO-JAPZON (1983) LD: Under Art 33, the civil action for damages allows to be instituted ex delicto, This is manifest from the provision which uses the provisions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution" LD: Independent civil action allowed even w/o express reservation in crim action. Art 33. Sked/suspension of civil action not up to the injured. (???) LD: Civil action for damages may proceed independently of the criminal action for homicide thru reckless imprudence LD: Under Art 33, term "physical injuries" includes death. (don't follow RPC meaning) FACTS: Dr. Eva accused of homicide thru reckless imprudence when her patient Cleto Madeja dies after an appendectomy. Widow Carmen reserves the right to file separate civil action for damages. While crim case still pending, Carmen sues Dr Eva for damages in same court. CFI Samar: Motion dismissed. Sec 3(a) rule 111. After crim case -

commenced, civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment rendered in crim case. ISSUE: May civil action be instituted while crim case pending? (YES) SC: Rule 111, Sec 2. An independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from crim action., preponderance of evidence SC: Art 33, Code Commission: underlying purpose is to allow citizen to enforce his rights in a private action brought by him, regardless of the action of the State Atty. (promote civic spirit, individual self-reliance, initiative, don't depend on the gov't) Tolentino: Art 33 exception to the general rule (when offense is defamation, fraud, or physical injuries,a civil action may be filed independently of the criminal action, even if there is no reservation made by the injured party, the law itself in this article makes the reservation. BUT claimant not given the right to determine whether the civil action should be scheduled or suspended until the criminal action has been terminated. SC: Petition granted. Civil case may proceed.

CATALINO ARAFILES v. PHIL JOURNALISTS, ROMY MORALES, MAX BUAN MANUEL VILLAREAL (2004, Carpio-Morales) LD: A civil action for libel under Art 33 shall be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence separately from and entirely independent of the institution, pendence or result of the criminal action because it is governed by the provisions of the NCC and not by the RPC governing the criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising therefrom. Catalino Arafiles (chief of NIAS/PAGASA) Emelita D charges Arafiles with forcible abduction with rape. Goes to police station after alleged 2nd attempt to rape her and relates to Patrolman Chio that her boss on one previous occasion had "drugged" her and raped her at Flamingo Hotel. That

night her boss tried to do it again, but her boss was interrupted and she "escaped". Romy Morales was the beat reporter from People's Journal Tonight and was present when Emelita gave her sworn statement. He based a report published the next day from the blotter and from an interview with Emelita. Headline: "Gov't exec rapes Coed" One year after publication and after prosecutor dismissed charges against Arafiles in rape case, Arafiles sues tabloid for damages for "grossly malicious and overly sensationalized reporting " (became object of public contempt and ridicule) RTC QC: No use of "allegedly" or "reportedly" Made the public think details reported were fact when Arafiles hd an alibi to prove story false. Awards ~2.1M total damages to Arafiles. CA: reversed and set aside RTC decision. Arafiles failed to prove with preponderance of evidence that respondents motivated by sinister intent ISSUE: Is Phil Journal liable for damages under Art 33? (NO) SC: Art 33, Art 19, Art 21 SC: Libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole. Whether it is libelous, depends on the scope, spirit, and motive of the publication taken in its entirety. SC: News item not malicious, may be sensationalized, but not illegal per se SC: Succeeding paragraphs sufficiently convey to readers that narration of events was only on account of what Emelita had reported to the police hq. SC: Give newspapers some leeway. Good faith, reasonable case, honest mistakes, etc can be excused. Danger of suppression. SC: Affirms CA ruling.

MVRS v. ISLAMIC Bulgar article says Muslims worship the pig etc. Umbrella org of Islamic groups sues MVRS for defamation under Art 26 Majority dismisses action because

Lil's Notes | Torts |01 Feb 2012

libel requires identity of a person damaged. Muslins in general too large a group Carpio dissenting: Nature of action, not a libel but a tort case Primarily relies on Art 26 (4) Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbor and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: (4) vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious belief, lowly position in life, place or birth, physical defect Prosser & Keeton pp. 771-785 HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON v. ELVIN CHAN & CA There is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22. The criminal action for violation of BP 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed. Eduardo Simon issued a check for 336K to Elvin Chan. It bounced (acct closed) 1997: Simon charged with violation of BP 22 3 years later, Chan commences civil action for collection of 336K + preliminary attachment against Simon Writ of Prelim attachment issued. Sheriff attaches Nissan vehicle of Simon But Metc later dismisses complaint of Chan because of litis pendentia (identity of parties, rights, relief, etc, res judicata) RTC : upholds dismissal of Chan's civil complaint CA: overturns RTC: Cites Rule 111 Sec 2. Civil liaibility under 32, 33, 34 and 2175 (Fraud) DMPU Employees v. Velez ISSUE: Can a separate civil action for BP 22 be filed ? (NO) SC: Rule 111 Sec 1(B) rules of court of 2000. o The crim action for violation of BP 22 shal be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately will be allowed. SC Circular 57-97 o The criminal action for violation of BP 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation t ofile such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized. SC: Rationale: Generally no filing fees for crim case, but filing fees for cases of BP 22 show that civil action included in crim action. SC: The inclusion of civil action in crim case is expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. 15 Apr 1959: Elordi acquitted of charges. 26 Sep 1958: 5yrs++ after accident, Capunos commence civil action for damages against Pepsi & Elordi Lower Court: Dismissed Capuno's claim: Prescription, Paid already ISSUE: Whether action has prescribed? (YES) SC: The question of prescription is decisive. Damages based on quasidelict must be instituted within 4 yrs (Art 1146) SC: Lower Court decision affirmed.

VICTORIA CAPUNO & JOSEPHINE CAPUNO v. PEPSI COLA BOTTLING CO & JON ELORDI (1965) LD: The institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on quasi-delict FACTS: 3 Jan 1953: vehicular collision b/w Pepsi Cola truck driven by Elordi and private car driven by Cipriano Capuno. Capuno, & Sps Buan die. 5 Jan 1953: Elordi charged with triple homicide thru reckless imprudence. 1 Oct 1953: with crim case pending, Estate of Sps Buan file civil action for damages against Pepsi. Included in claim of indemnity is 2623.00 paid by Estate of Capuna underWorkmans Comp Act In view of filing of civil action, Elordi moved to strike out appearance of private prosecutors in crim case. Court disallowed appearance of private prosecutors. 11 Jun 1958: Compromise and Settlement b/w Pepsi and Estate of Buans 290K.

CORPUS v. PAJE

BONITE v. ZOSA

JERVOSO v. PEOPLEDULAY v. CANeglect of Duty Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action. Sangco Vol I pp. 334-335 7. "Catch-All" Independent Civil Action

Article 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with the same, for which no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complaint may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings. VII. HUMAN RELATIONS TORTS A. Abuse of Rights

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. ALFREDO VELAYO in his capacity as Assignee of the insolvent COMMERCIAL AIRLINES, INC (CALI) v. SHELL CO. OF THE PHILIPPINES, ALFONSO SYCIP, YEK HUA TRADING CORP, PAUL SYCIP and MABASA & CO. (31 Oct 1956, Felix) LD: Where a creditor (SHELL) takes advantage of his knowledge that

insolvency proceedings were to be instituted by CALI o if the creditors did not come to an understanding as to the manner of distribution of the insolvent assets among them o and believing it most probable that creditors would not arrive at such understanding o schemed and affected the transfer of its credits to its sister corporation in the US, where CALI's plane C-54 was, o and by swift and unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed of CALI's property, o depriving the CALI and the assignee that was later appointed, of the opportunity to recover the plane o Creditor (SHELL) is IN BAD FAITH and betrayed the confidence and trust of other creditors of the insolvent for which IT IS HELD LIABLE in accordance to the provisions of the Civil Code. FACTS: Shell fuel supplier of CALI. As of Aug 1948: CALI owed Shell 170K++ Shell had reason to believe that CALI's financial condition was rocky since Alfonso Sycip (CALI Pres.) offer CALI's Douglas C-54 plane to partially settle CALI's accounts with Shell. However, this offer was refused as Shell believed, CALI's assets were greater than its liabilities. 6 Aug 1948: CALI's mgmt informally convened its principal creditors to inform them that it was in a state of insolvency and had to stop operations (Shell + other creditors, Firestone, Goodyear, Alfonso Sycip, Paul Sycip, etc) Total Creditors: 194, Big Creditors: 15 (~1.5M total debt to big creditors) Gist of the Meeting: Assets of CALI to

Lil's Notes | Torts |01 Feb 2012

be sold to PAL, creditors to figure out order of preference of payment and fair distribution of assets among them, in creditors don't come to an agreement, no choice but to let insolvency court decide order of preference. (Balance Sheet of Assets include C-54 plane in US) Shell rep Fitzgerald part of "working committee" formed to organize creditors, but nothing resolved that day because creditors insisted that each had preferred credit. Fitzgerald transfers its credit against CALI to Shell (US) and assigns this credit ($79,440.00 $85,081.29) thru Deed of Assignment of Credit dated 10 Aug 1948. 12 Aug 1948: Shell (US) sues CALI in California for collection of assigned credit of $85K++. Filed for attachment of C-54 plane plus misc personal property held by Pacific Overseas Airlines for CALI. 5 Jan 1949: Shell (US) wins case vs. CALI in American court by default. Not aware of Shell's assignment fo credit and attachment suit, stockholders of CALI approved sale to PAL. Sep 1948: Another CALI creditor (Nat'l Airports Corp) learns of Shell's US case, and files attachment suit vs. CALI in CFI Manila. 7 Oct 1948: CALI files for voluntary insolvency because of Shell ' action. (creditors now wouldn't amicably settle asset distribution problem) Order of insolvency issued on same day. Other creditors (incl Nat'l Airports) compelled to file claims with insolvency court. 28 Oct 1948: Alfredo Velayo appointed by creditors as assignee in proceedings. (assignee of CALI's assets, collect from CALI's debtors, deposit proceeds to bank) Velayo sues Shell PH (in Manila) to restrain it from prosecuting case in US. If assignment of credit to Shell US valid and can't get the plane, ALTERNATIVE REMEDY, asks for damages in DOUBLE THE VALUE (330K x 2 = 660K) of the plane. PH court no jurisdiction to enforce its orders against Shell US, whether assignment of credit was fraudulent or not. Action confined to recovery of damages against Shell. ISSUE: WoN Shell liable for damages to Velayo (CALI) for transfer of credit? (YES) Shell: Assignment of Credit ordinary course of business, Nothing illegal about it. CFI: dismisses complaint. Shell wins. SC: Court of Justice cannot countenance Shell' PH's cunning but immoral attitude to the detriment of PH Gov't and local business. SC: Transfer of credit only justified if Mr, Fitzgerald had declined to be part of the Working Committee and honestly declared that he had no authority to bind his principal, being only the Credit Manager. SC: However, Fitzgerald didnt do this because such admission would have dissolved all attempts to reach amicable solution and CALI would have filed for insolvency before Shell PH could have transferred its credit to Shell US. SC: Cites Art 19, 21, 23, 24 SC: Code Commission: Above provisions VOUCHSAFE ADEQUATE LEGAL REMEDY for untold numbers of MORAL WRONGS which is IMPOSSIBLE for human foresight to provide for SPECIFICALLY in the statues. SC: Boundary between morality and law? Every good law draws its breath of life from morals. Some principles not trendy, conscience of man fixed through the ages.(No to Unjust enrichment, contravention of social justice, etc) SC: Covers acts contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. SC: NCC to apply retrospectively because Shell didn't have vested rights (acts & omissions against the law) that would be impaired. (Art 2254) SC: Affirms doctrine in case of Lilius (59 JF 800) symbiosis of Spanish and American Laws. But we also act progressively. SC: Other justices: No need to apply Sec 37 (2x damages) of Insolvency law since Art 2229, 2232, 2234, 2142 and 2143 of NCC adequate. (Damages). SC: Damages: C-54 value compensatory damages, C-54 value exemplary damages. MR RESOLUTION (1957): reduce ED to 25K anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, abusive acts of Hendry. RTC: Tobias wins. ~330K damages) CA: Affirms RTC GM: we have lawful right to fire Tobias. Tobias: Inhuman treatment must be indemnified ISSUE: WoN Global Mackay liable for damages to Tobias? (YES) SC: NCC has provisions for Norms of good conscience should be observed for stability of social order. (Art 19 Principle of Abuse on Rights) SC: Primordial limitation on all rights. SC: Art 19 lays down rule of conduct, remedy for violation Art 20 and 21. SC: Case to case basis to determine if there has been abuse of rights. SC: Yes, there was abuse of rights. SC: Do not confuse right of employer to dismiss with the manner in which the right is exercised. Do not violate a person's personal dignity SC: Hendry is racist (bad faith) "you Filipinos cannot be trusted" SC: Affirms CA decision.

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE & RADIO CORP. & HERBERT HENDRY v. CA & RESTITUTO TOBIAS (25 Aug 1989, Cortes) LD: The employer is liable for damages to the employee if the dismissal is done abusively LD: To constitute malicious prosecution, there MUST BE PROOF that the prosecution was prompted by A DESIGN to vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately knowing the charges were false and groundless. (Mere filing of suit and dismissal of case does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution) LD: Damnum Absque Injuria: Damage or loss which does not constitute a violaton of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not not actionable. (does not apply in this case) Tobias was the purchasing agent & admin asst of Global Mackay (GM). He allegedly reported several anomalies (fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions) that cost GM. GM's Herbert Hendry ordered Tobias to go on forced leave, etc. When Tobias came back 1 week later, Hendry called him a crook and a swindler. H made T take a lie detector test, submit handwriting specimens, etc. Police clear Tobias of participation in anomalies. (2x) GM hires private investigator who reported that Tobias was guilty. Hendry suspends Tobias, files 6 charges (estafa, Art 290, etc) vs Tobias. All suits dismissed by fiscal. Hendry finally fires Tobias. Tobias complains to NLRC, but on appeal, Hendry and Tobias enter into compromise Tobias applies to RETELCO for new job, but Hendry, without being asked, writes RETELCO that he fired Tobias for dishonesty. Tobias sues GM for damages

ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP., JESSE YAP & BENJAMIN MENDIONA v. CA & EUGENIO BALTAO (11 Jan 1993, Bidin) LD: A right, though by itself legal, may nevertheless become a source of some illegality. When a right IS EXERCISED in a MANNER which does not conform to the norms enshrined in Art 19 and results in damages to another, A LEGAL WRONG is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be HELD RESPONSIBLE. LD: Elements of an Abuse of Right under Art 19: o There is a legal right or duty o Which is exercised in bad faith o For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. LD: In the absence of bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded. Dismissal of prosecution does not per se make the action wrongful and subject complainant to pay for damages bec law could not have

meant to impose a penalty on the RIGHT TO LITIGATE. LD: A party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if he is later absolved, MAY FILE a case for DAMAGES grounded EITHER on the Principle of Abuse of Rights, or on Malicious Prosecution. LD: The PRESENCE of PROBABLE CAUSE signifies as a legal consequence THE ABSENCE OF MALICE. FACTS: Albenson delivers to Guaranteed Industries (Guaranteed) MS plates worth 2,575. As partial payment for delivery, check was issued to Albenson that was drawn against account f E.L. Woodworks. Check bounces. Albenson discovers owner of Check, EL Woodworks and Guaranteed is Eugenio Baltao and demands payment. Baltao denies transacting with Albenson. (Guaranteed defunct) and signature on check not his. Albenson sues Baltao for BP22. Turns out Baltao has a son named Eugenio Baltao III who manages EL Woodworks with same business address as Guaranteed. Fiscal dismisses BP22 case vs. Baltao bec signature on check not Baltao Sr's Baltao sues Albenson for damages for unjust filing of criminal case. RTC: ADL 133350, 1M MD, 200K ED.100K AF, costs. CA: Affirms but reduces MD and AF to half. ISSUE: Is Albenson liable to Baltao for damages under Art 19, 20 or 21? (NO) ISSUE: Is Albenson guilty of malicious prosecution? (NO) SC: Art 19 & 21: willful act, intentional SC: Art 20: act willfully or negligently. SC: Under these 3 provisions, an act which cause injury may be made basis for an award of damages, BUT lower courts made the mistake of lumping 3 articles together. SC: No Abuse of Right. Albenson had reason to believe that Eugenio Baltao issued the check. Upon demand by Albenson, Baltao should have disclosed that there were 3 people with the same name.

SC: Baltao, devious scheme to recover damages. SC: Filing of BP22 case sincere attempt by Albenson to collect sum of money. No intent to harass Baltao, only to protect their rights. SC: reverse decision of CA.

SEGIO AMONOY v. SPS JOSE GUTIERREZ & ANGELA FORNILDA (15 Feb 2001, Panganiban) LD: Under the principle of damnum absque injuria, the legitimate exercise of a person's rights, even if it causes loss to another, does not automatically result in an actionable injury. This principle however, does not apply when there is an abuse of a person's right, or when the exercise of this right is suspended or extinguished pursuant to a court order. LD: The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others. FACTS: Sergio Amonoy lawyer of heirs of Julio Catolos, who had 6 parcels of land. Project Partition gave 2 lots to Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda. Amonoy charged 27.6K and Pasamba and Fornilda executed deed of real estate mortgage over the 2 lots in order to secure payment to Amonoy of his fees. REM not paid. Amonoy filed for foreclosure of 2 lots. Heirs of Pasamba and Fornilda opposed. AF charged unconscionable (should be ~11.7K only) RTC: Amonoy wins, foreclosure and public sale of 2 lots. Amonoy highest bidder at 23.76K. To satisfy deficiency, another execution sale (house of Sps Gutierrez) was conducted. Amonoy again highest bidder (12.14K) 25 Jun 1985 : Writ of Possession issued with Notice to vacate. Court also issues order of demolition. (30 May1986) 2 Jun 1986: TRO granted to Gutierrez to enjoin demolition of house. 5 Oct 1988: SC orders return of house to Spouses BUT too late, houses already demolished.

15 Dec 1989: Complaint for damages filed by spouses against Amonoy for destruction of house. RTC: dismisses Gutierrez's suit. CA : reversed and orders Amonoy to pay 250K AD. Amonoy: just acting in accordance with RTC's order of demolition ISSUE: WoN Amonoy liable for damages? (YES) SC: Amonoy unlawfully pursued demolition of houses. He did not heed TRO which he received on 4 Jun 1986. (House demolished middle of 1987) SC: Although acts of Amonoy legal at the outset, their continuation after issuance of TRO amounted to an INSIDUOUS ABUSE of HIS RIGHT and an INVALID EXERCISE of a RIGHT that had been SUSPENDED. SC: CA decision affirmed.

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST v. ROMEO JADER (17 Feb 2000, Ynares- Santiago) LD: Educational institutions are dutybound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages LD: It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether they would be included among those who will graduate LD: Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious.

LD: The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit FACTS: Romeo Jader is a graduating law student of UE. During the first sem of his last year, he got an INCOMPLETE for not taking the finals in Practical Court. He got approval to take removals, but the Prof gave him a failing grade of 5.0. (Final Grade not communicated to Jader) Moreover, in the preparations for graduation, Jader participated in all the events (investiture, grad ceremony, etc) and the admin included him in the list of tentative graduates. He gave a blow-out to his friends. Jader enrolled in bar review classes and took an LOA from his job without pay to review for the bar. Upon finding out that he had failed and would not be able to take the bar, he sues UE for damages for his mental suffering, etc and for expenses he incurred unnecessarily. RTC: Jader wins. Awards him 35,470 in AD and 5K AF CA: Affrims, but adds 50K moral damages. UE: Prox. Cause of Injury Jader's own negligece in not verifying with Prof about his grade. ISSUE: Is UE liable to Jader for the damage he suffered? (YES) ISSUE: Is UE liable for moral damages? (NO) SC: UE, an institution of learning involved herein is a university which is engaged in legal education, it should have practiced what it inculcates in its students, more specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. (PRACTICE what you PREACH) SC: UE knew that time was of the

Lil's Notes | Torts |01 Feb 2012

essence given common knowledge of the preparations undertaken for the Bar exam. SC: However, no moral damages may be awarded since Jader should have been responsible enough to verify his status. If he was humiliated, he brought it on himself. BARONS MARKETING CORP. v. PHELPS DODGE PHIL. (9 Feb 1998, Kapunan) LD: Test for an Abuse of Right o There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. When the objective of the actor is illegitimate, the illicit act cannot be concealed under the guise of exercising a right. o Every abnormal exercise of a right, contrary to its socio-economic purpose, is an abuse that will give rise to liability. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure another. LD: It is an elementary rule that good faith is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the same. LD: A person who, in exercising his rights, does not act in an abusive manner is not deemed to have acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy as to violate the provisions of Article 21 of the Civil Code LD: In the absence of any abuse of right, private respondent cannot be allowed to perform its obligation under such contract in parts. Otherwise, private respondents right under Article 1248 will be negated, the sanctity of its contract with petitioner defiled. The principle of autonomy of contracts must be respected. FACTS: Phelps Dodge (PD) was a supplier of Barons Marketing, who was a supplier to MERALCO. Barons enjoyed a 60-day credit term with Phelps Dodge. Barons bought 4.1M worth of wires from PD, but was only able to pay 300K Barons wanted to restructure its payment terms and offered to pay the balance by paying 500K each month at 1% interest per month. PD refuses the offer and sues Barons for recovery of sum of money (3.8M) as well as AF, ED, costs of suit Barons interposed a counterclaim against PD, alleging that it suffered injury to its reputation due to Phelps Dodge's acts. Such acts were purportedly calculated to humiliate petitioner and constituted an abuse of rights. (PD was allegedly trying to supply directly to MERALCO, thus"stealing" its customer) RTC: PD wins (but typographical error in AD 3.1M v. 3,8M, AF 25%, 10K ED) CA: Affirms RTC, but corrects amount to 3.8M and changes AF to 5% ISSUE: WoN PD committed an abuse of right (creditor's abuse) and if it is liable for damages when it rejected Barons' offer? (NO) SC: PD has a right to sue collection from Barons, PD also has a right to reject Barons offer of payment terms SC: Tolentino o Partial Prestations. Since the creditor cannot be compelled to accept partial performance, unless otherwise stipulated, the creditor who refuses to accept partial prestations does not incur in delay or mora accipiendi, except when there is abuse of right or if good faith requires acceptance. Baron: it had been a good customer of PD for 13 years. This is the first time it has been delinquent and is just asking for a small concession. SC: It was not proven that PD had intended to injure Barons when it refused Baron's offer and sued Baron for collection of sum of money. Burden of Proof is on Baron. SC: it was in PD's legitimate interest to sue Baron since acceptance of Baron's offer would prejudice PD's cash position and its ability to pay its own suppliers. SC: Affirms CA decision, but reduces AF to 10% In bringing the action, the prosecutor acted WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE o The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by improper and sinister motive. Antonio Diaz part of several corporations, one of which owns the Doa Segunda Hotel (more popularly known as the Davao Imperial Hotel) DLPC supplies electricity to the hotel. Hotel does not pay its electricity bills (190K++). After due notice, DLPC disconnects service and meter. NFA leases part of Hotel and applies for electrical service.with DLPC, DLPC grants electrical connection and installs Electric Meter (Meter1) NFA vacates but assigns its electric meter and contract with DLPC to Hotel and gets meter deposit from Hotel (1020). Allegedly informs DLPC of this arrangement. Diaz applies to DLPC in his personal capacity as Lessee of Hotel to DLPC for another electric meter/service. DLPC rejects application bec. probably a ploy to reconnect Hotel to the grid without paying previous balance. Hotel must pay outstanding bill. Upon continued non-payment, DLPC files case for collection. (Case 01) Diaz sues DLPC for denying his application for electrical service (Case 02) Space formerly occupied by NFA leased by Matias Mendiola. Mendiola opted to change 1-phase meter (Meter1) to 3-phase meter. DLPC approves this request, and executes a new service contract with Mendiola for electricity service. Under Case 02, Diaz motions court to prevent DLPC from disconnecting (Meter1) Consequently, DLPC could not disconnect (Meter1) to change it to a 3-phase meter. Instead, DLPC installs a new meter (Meter2) to accommodate Mendiola's electricity needs. Under Case02, RTC denies Diaz's motion not to disconnect (Meter1). o

ANTONIO DIAZ V. DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO, INC, MANUEL M. ORIG and ELISEO BRAGANZA (4 Apr 2007, Callejo) LD: Compromise Agreements: Art 2028 defines a compromise as a contract where the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. HOWEVER, criminal liability is not affected by compromise for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by Gov't on its own motion, though complete reparation should have been made of the damages suffered by the offended party. Moreover, a compromise IS NOT one of the grounds prescribed by RPC for extinction of criminal liability. LD: Elements of Abuse of Rights o The existence of a legal right or duty o Which is exercised in BAD FAITH o For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. LD: Good Faith refers to a state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the Intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. HE WHO ALLEGES BAD FAITH HAS THE DUTY TO PROVE THE SAME. LD: INJURY is the illegal invasion of a legal right, DAMAGE is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury and DAMAGES are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. LD: Malice and WANT OF PROBABALE CAUSE must both be clearly established to justify an award of damages based on malicious prosecution. LD: Reqs of Malicious Procesution: (To preserve right to litigate) o Fact of prosecution and the defendant now was himself the prosecutor (in the previous case)

DLPC disconnects (Meter1) Diaz went to DLPC building and thew stones at it, breaking 4 glass windows. He bought his own Electric Meter (Meter3), calibrated it with Board of Energy and installed it, thus restoring electricity to the Hotel. Diaz files a complaint for damages vs DLPC for arbitrarily removing (Meter1) and threatening to remove (Meter3) in violation of DLPC's business franchise and Art 19 (but this is not relevant) (Case 03 dismissed in RTC, still pending in CA) DLPC motions to compel removal of Meter3 which was installed w/o DLPC's consent and authority, RTC grants DLPC's motion. Meter3 removed. CA grants Diaz's petition and orders DLPC to reconnect Meter 3 or connect its own meter and Diaz pays bills on new meter. DLPC appeals to SC Compromise Agreement b/w DLPC and Diaz: o Settles Case 01and Case 02 o DLPC reduces claims to 385K o DLPC will reconnect Hotel to electrical service upon receipt of 385K. o Dismissal of Case 02 DLPC files a complaint for theft of electricity against Diaz (Case 04) City Pros. Resolution: Dismiss case, MR, DOJ also dismiss) Diaz (Harassment) DLPC files criminal complaint for violation of PD 401/BP 876 (Case 05). City Pros dismiss case. Diaz etal file criminal complaint charging DLPC with estafa thru falsification (Varying Discount Formula, losses of more than 300K, etc.) (Case 06) o Investigating Pros finds probable cause. o Appeal for finding prob cause granted, case dismissed/ Officers (Aboitiz) of DLPC file against Diaz etal in Cebu charges of Malicious Prosecution. (Case 07) RTC dismisses case, CA affirms. DLPC sues Diaz for damages for

Defamatory and Libelous remarks and Abuse of Rights. Statements Diaz made to newspapers and media. (Anomalous transactions with BOE, raising elec. price etc.) besmirched reputation and public humiliation. (Case 08) Asks for 11M++ o RTC: DLPC wins 2.3M damages. o CA still pending Diaz file a complaint for Damages, Injunction with writ of Preliminary Injunction and TRO vs DLPC (Case 09) RELEVANT CASE TO TOPIC under ARTICLE 19. Diaz alleges that DLPC filed the criminal cases for theft and Violation of PD 401 in bad faith because they did it in order to harass and humiliate him, ruin his image. Asks for 10.7M RTC dismisses complaint. While City Pros found no probable cause for crime of theft, this did not change the fact that Diaz made an illegal connection for electricity. CA: Affirmed RTC decision. DLPC was in good faith when it filed complaints. Compromise Agreement did not bar filing of criminal action. Damnum Absque Injuria. ISSUE: WoN Compromise Agreement barred DLPC from instituting further actions involving (Meter1) and (Meter 3)? (NO) ISSUE: WoN DLPC acted in BAD FAITH in instituting the criminal cases against Diaz (NO) ISSUE: WoN Diaz is entitled to damages (NO) Issue 1: See LD SC: Evidence shown negates malice and bad faith by DLPC. Diaz admits that he unilaterally installed (Meter 3) to replace (Meter 1) after it was removed by DLPC. In fact, CA admonished Diaz to observe mutual consent and pay bills promptly. Based on these facts, Diaz failed to show that DLPC instituted actions for the sole purpose of injuring him. SC: Diaz may have suffered damage as a result of criminal complaints, BUT there is a material distinction b/w damages and injury. (See LD) SC: Requisites of Malicious Prosecution not met. DLPC had probable cause to file cases to protect

its interest. SC: The mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution DOES NOT render a person liable for malicious prosecution should he or she be unsuccessful, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.

POLO PANTALEON v. AMERICAN EXPRESS INT'L INC. (25 Aug 2010, Brion) LD: In the context of a credit card relationship, although there is neither a contractual stipulation nor a specific law requiring the credit card issuer to act on the credit card holder's offer within a definite period of time, the principles set out in Art 19 of the NCC provide the standard by which to judge the credit card company's actions. o o o Act with Justice Give everyone his due Observe Honesty and Good Faith

LD: Art 21: Remedy: Observe Art 19 or else Art 21 will punish you. LD: Burden of proof on person who alleges BAD FAITH. LD: A person who voluntarily exposes himself to danger cannot claim damages for the resulting injury. LD: Material difference b/w damages and injury. AMEX did not violate any legal duty, so no violation of legal right. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (SC) Pantaleon was with his family as part of a tour group in the Netherlands. Given the tight schedule, the tour group only had 40mins (8:50am9:30am) to tour and shop at the Coster Diamond House. They had to be at the bus at 9:30am in order to have a guided city tour of Amsterdam as they were leaving for Belgium at 3pm. Mrs. Pantaleon wanted to buy diamond pieces worth $13,826.00. Mr. Pantaleon used his Amex credit -

card to pay for the jewelry at around 9:15am. However, after swiping, it took a long time for card approval (was asked bank references, depository banks, etc). In fact, Mr. Pantaleon, at 9:40am was about to cancel the purchase (when his son told him that the entire tour group was waiting for them so they could leave), but Coster's manager convinced him to wait for the approval as it would only take a few minutes longer. In the end, Coster released the jewelry without formal approval from Amex (10:05am). Upon entering the tour bus, Mr. Pantaleon saw that the other members of the tour group were visibly irritated with him. Moreover, because he was late returning to the bus, the guided city tour of Amsterdam was cancelled. Mr. Pantaleon felt humiliated and felt that the tour group blamed him for the cancelled tour. After their trip to Europe, Mr. Pantaleon and family proceeded to the US, where Mr. Pantaleon again experienced some delay in card approval for his purchases of golf equipment and children's apparel. Upon his return to Manila, Pantaleon demanded that Amex apologize to him for the humiliation he suffered. Amex explained that the delay was caused by the unusually large amount involved in the transaction which deviated from Pantaleon's usual spending pattern. Dissatisfied with Amex's response, Pantaleon sues Amex for damages. RTC: finds Amex guilty of delay (breach of contract?) and awards 500K MD, 300K ED, 100K AF and costs of suit CA: Reverses RTC ruling. No evidence of bad faith or breach of contract on Amex's part (just exercising due diligence). Deletes award of damages. SC: Found Amex guilty of mora sovendi or debtor's fault. Amex has an obligation, as the debtor to approve or disapprove of Pantaleon's purchase

Lil's Notes | Torts |01 Feb 2012

requests with timely dispatch. ISSUE: WON there was a perfected loan agreement b/w Amex and Pantaleon when he made his purchases? (NO) ISSUE: WON Amex guilty of delay and breach of contract? (NO) SC: The issuance of a credit card is not the loan agreement contemplated here that obligates Amex to approve a cardholder's purchase. This is merely the contract that stipulates the rights and obligations of the credit card holder and credit card issuer. SC: Each credit card transaction is considered a separate offer and acceptance. Before the credit card issuer accepts this offer, no obligation relating to the loan agreement exists between them SC: The fact that Pantaleon had no pre-set spending limit does not mean that Amex is obligated to approve all his purchases. SC: The card membership agreement stipulates that AMEX "reserve[s] the right to deny authorization for any requested Charge." SC: Since AMEX has no obligation to approve the purchase requests of its credit cardholders, Pantaleon cannot claim that AMEX defaulted in its obligation. Hence there was no delay, since there was no obligation to begin with. SC: Pantaleon also cannot claim damages because he was the proximate cause of his own humiliation. He could have insisted on cancelling the transaction, but did not. SC: Reverses its own decision. Affirms CA decision. Pantaleon not entitled to damages ORLANDA GARCIA JR, doing business under Community Diagnostic Center and BU Castro v. RANIDA SALVADOR AND RAMON SALVADOR. (20 Mar 2007, Ynares-Santiago) Petition for review of CA decision finding Garcia grossly negligent Ranida Salvador as part of her employment requirements with Limay Bulk Handling Terminal Inc, underwent medical exam conducted by CDC. CDC issued test result : Rhonda positive for Hepa B. Ranida was terminated and upon telling her father Ramon that she had Hepa B, Ramon suffered a heart attack and had to be hospitalized. Ranida underwent the test again and was found to be negative for Hepa B. Ranida and Ramon sue Garcia, a medtech who conducted the exam because she lost her job, suffered mental anxiety, trauma and sleepless nights, while Ramon was hospitalized and lost business opportunities. Castro pathologist, rubber stamp, did not conduct examination on Ranida. RTC: dismissed complaint for lack of sufficient evident to prove liability of Garcia and Castro. Should have presented Dt. Sto Domingo who interpreted test result. CA: reversed RTC Ruling, awards 50K moral damages and 50K exemplary damages, 25K AF ISSUE: WoN Ranida entitled to damages? (YES) Degree of care required for Health Care providers : did the health care provider fail to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent health care provider would not have done, and that failure or action caused injury to the patient. SC: Elements of actionable conduct: o Duty o Breach o Injury o Proximate Causation. SC: all element present in the case at bar. SC: Clinical labs' business impressed with public interest and high standards of performance are expected of them. SC: RA 4688 Clinical Laboratory Law. (licenses, pathologist, medtech, etc) SC: RA 5527: The Philippine Medical Technology Act of 1969. SC: Medical technologist should be supervised by registered pathologist and licensed physician. Results to be release only to requesting physician or rep upon direction of lab pathologist. SC: Castro: pathologist, infrequently visits clinic. No supervision of medtechs. Garcia conducted test w/o supervision of Castro, released w/o authorization of Castro. SC: Garcia breached his duty to provide standard of care. SC: Art. 20 SC: Affirms CA decision. Acts Contra Bonus Mores a telegram saying that everything was alright and the wedding would push through. Wassmer entitled to damages. (15K MD&ED)

TANJANCO V. CA LD: Art 21 refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse. It connotes ESSENTIALLY the idea of DECEIT, ENTICEMENT, SUPERIOR POWER or ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE on the part of the seducer, to which the woman has yielded. Araceli Santos, IBM secretary, got pregnant after affair of more than 1 year, guy refused to marry her. Not entitled to moral damages, but does not preclude action for support when the baby is born. Seduction is basis for awards of moral damages, not mutual lust. SC: Aracelo should have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises.

C.

Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. VELAYO v. SHELL supra (see above) ALBENSON V. CA supra (see above) WASSMER V. VELEZ LD: Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go thru all the necessary preparations and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is PALPABLY and UNJUSTIFIABLY CONTRARY TO GOOD CUSTOMS, for which the erring promissory must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Art 21 of the NCC. Moral Damages may be awarded (2219(10) ) and Exemplary Damages (wanton, reckless and oppressive manner) under (Art 2232) Bettina Wassmer and Francisco Velez, Velez doesn't show up on their wedding day or thereafter. He wrote her 2 days before the wedding that they had to postpone the wedding because his mother opposes the match. However, the next day he sent

B.

Illegal Acts

Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH v. CA and MARILOU T. GONZALES (19 Feb 1993, Davide) Appeal by certiorari to review and set aside decision of CA. Setting: Dagupan City, Pangasinan Marilou G: pretty, lass of good moral character, 22years old, HS grad, employed at Mabuhay Luncheonette. Baksh: Iranian citizen, exchange student, medical course at Lyceum. Engaged before 20 Aug 1987, visited parents Lived with Baksh on 20 Aug 1987, slept with him, maltrated her one week before scheduled Oct wedding. Baksh wanted to split up with her after a fight and said he was already married to someone in Bacolod. Gonzales asking for damages of 45K, reimbursement for actual expenses. AF Baksh: did not propose, asks for 25K moral damages. Not familiar with Filipino customs (Muslim, foreigner) RTC: awards 20K moral damages to

Gonzales. Good moral character, expenses for preparation of wedding, non-fulfillment of promise. CA: affirms RTC ruling. (Barrio lass) Fraud and deception, conduct against morals, good customs, etc. Issue: WON damages may be recovered for breach of promise to marry on the basis of Art 21 of NCC (NO Moral Damages Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. SC: Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se.(abuse by designing women) BUT Art 21 was designed to grant adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs w/c is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in statute books. SC: Baksh cannot be held criminally liable under Art 337/338 of RPC bec Gonzales over 18. BUT is liable under Art 21 for moral seduction (deceit, abuse of power) SC: mutual lust not included in moral damages. SC: affirms CA decision, but scold parents of Marilou for allowing them to stay in the same room in their house when visiting.

in Manila. In her aparador a letter was found where Pe arranged to meet with her on the day she disappeared. Parents and siblings awarded damages. (5K + 2K AF)

MAGTANGGOL QUE V. IAC & ANTONIO NICOLAS (1989) LD: One cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. LD: Probable Cause: Existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. LD: PRESENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE signifies as a legal consequence the ABSENCE OF MALICE LD: Failure in suit is not PER SE an actionable wrong. Que delivers canvass strollers to Nicolas, Nicolas issues 5 PDCs (total 7600), but stops payment, claiming that the strollers were defective. Que sues Nicolas for estafa. Fiscal dismisses case for lack of merit (accounting matter, not necessarily deceit) Nicolas only returns strollers a few days after estafa case instituted. Nicolas sues Que for malicious prosecution, Que counterclaims and also sues customer for malicious prosecution. Initially, Nicolas won, but upon a change of judge and MR, Que awarded 10K damages IAC reversed RTC MR decision due to procedural issues. SC: The reliance in good faith to counsel's advice given after a full and fair statement of all the facts to the attorney, does not render the party liable for damages and that it is immaterial that the attorney's advice is unsound or erroneous, and that where there is no clear showing of malice on the part of petitioner in filing the action, the worries and anxiety suffered by respondent are usually caused to the party haled into court as

a defendant, and there is no sufficient justification for awarding of damages. SC: Resolution of dismissal by the Fiscal's office not tantamount to a decision. Que wins (sort of). No malicious prosecution by either party, not a mere ploy to enforce payment (Que). RTC decision reinstated.

FRANKLIN DRILON v. CA & HOMOBONO ADAZA LD: Malicious Prosecution: An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein (Putting of legal process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or injury) LD: To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a SINISTER DESIGN to VEX and HUMILIATE a person, and it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were FALSE and GROUNDLESS. LD: The mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. LD: Elements of Malicious Prosecution: o Fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor and that the actional finally terminated with an acquittal o That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause o That the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or sinister motive. LD: Probable cause: Same def in QUE v. IAC LD: Presumption of Regularity:

CECILIO PE V. ALFONSO PE LD: The wrong Alfonso has caused Lolita and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Art 21 of the NCC. Married man Alfonso Pe (an agent for La Perla Cigar) seduced Lolita Pe, by pretending to want to learn the rosary. He stayed in Lolita's home in Marinduque, because he was a collateral relative and was welcomed by the family. After their affair was discovered through rumors and their love letters, parents of Lolita forbade them from seeing each other. However, later on, Lolita disappeared -

Burden of proof on plaintiff to show that public officials are performing their duties in BAD FAITH. Through a letter complaint based on affidavits by some military officials, Renato de Villa requests investigation and submits a list of people who may be involved in the 1989 coup d' etat. Among them was Homobono Adaza. He was charged by DOJ prosecutors for rebellion complexed with other murder and frustrated murder upon issuance of resolution finding probable cause. Sked for preliminary investigation. Adaza o Initial complaint: Deliberate, willful and malicious experimentation by DOJ in filing a charge for a crime that they were fully aware did not exist in the statute books. o On appeal, merely a suit for damages based on tort by reason of Drilon's etal various malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance in office, as well as violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft) and NOT FOR malicious prosecution. DOJ: No cause of action. Court rules that Adaza first complained malicious prosecution because Prosecutors knew there was no such crime of rebellion complexed with other crimes (Hernandez case) and berates Adaza for trying to change his complaint to one for damages for tortious acts. SC rules no malicious prosecution and NO CAUSE OF ACTION for failure to allege requisites for malicious prosecution. o Crim Case has not been terminated and Adaza not yet acquitted of charge. o No allegation that prosecution acted w/o probable cause. (18 page resolution)

Lil's Notes | Torts |01 Feb 2012

o Honest conviction by prosecutors that Hernandez case can be differentiated from the present case. Hints of it in other cases. impelled by LEGAL MALICEan improper or sinister motive. LD: A finding of probable cause does not require inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. LD: In an action for damages based on malicious prosecution, it must be established that the prosecution was impelled by legal malice. Robbery (hole in kitchen door), housemaid, jewelry. Pilar Junsay, maid Rosemarie. Alleged confession by Rosemarie (after beatings) Pilar acquitted bec of inadmissibility of confessions. Pilar: Action barred by Statute of Limitations (4 yrs, Art 1146) Rosemarie: action not for damages based on physical injuries suffered by Rosemarie during criminal investigation or violation of her rights for indignities. Action is for malicious prosecution of Rosemarie. (prescription starts from date of acquittal, not from date Junsay etal injured the rights of Rosemarie) Issue: Was Rosemarie maliciously prosecuted? (NO) Pilar cannot be faulted for reporting robbery to police. She did not tell police it was Rosemarie who committed the robbery. Police cannot be held liable for malicious prosecution because it was their job to investigate the crime. Inadmissibility of confession does not negate presence of probable cause. Court rules in favor of Pilar. (no proof of sinister motivation) which he was subjected, shouting at him, imposing him a fine, threatening to call the police and in the presence and hearing of many people at the Supermarket which brought and caused him humiliation and embarrassment, sufficiently rendered the petitioners liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code. We rule that under the facts of the case at bar, petitioners wilfully caused loss or injury to private respondent in a manner that was contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. It is against morals, good customs and public policy to humiliate, embarrass and degrade the dignity of a person. Everyone must respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons (Article 26, Civil Code). And one must act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith (Article 19, Civil Code). Rat Tail File (3.75) in pocket, Supermarket, chatting with aunt's maid. Nelia Santos-Fandino (ano, nakaw na naman ito). 5 peso fine as incentive to guards.groceries (77.00) Court rules in favor of Espino RTC: 75KD MD, 25K ED SC: Personal circumstance of Espino, education, position, character (Hmm how is a stranger to know these things?) SC: No intention by Grand Union to parade Espino in order to humiliate him or embarrass him because its business depended on the good will of the public (good public relations) SC: MD 5K, AF 2K and return 5.00 to Espino LD: One is not allowed to exercise his right in a manner which would cause unnecessary prejudice to another or if he would thereby offend morals or good customs. Thus, a person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts with prudence and good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. Wedding Planner, jewelry in paper bag in CR, aunt Court rules in favor of Valmonte, the wedding planner

PROSSER AND KEETON pp. 870-896 CONRADO MAGBANUA & ROSEMARIE MAGBANUA-TABORDA, assisted by her husband ARTEMIO TABORDA v. PILAR JUNSAY, VICENTE JUNSAY, IBARRA LOPEZ and JUANITO JACELA LD: Malicious Prosecution def: same as Drilon, but included civil suits. o US: One begun with malice without probable cause to believe the charges can be sustained. o PH: An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant herein, LD: Malicious Prosecution can be expanded to civil suits filed with intention to vex and harass. LD: The gravemen of malicious prosecution is not the filing of the complaint based on the wrong provision of law, but the deliberate initiation of an action with the knowledge that the charges were false and groundless. Malicious Prosecution (4 elements) o Prosecution occurred, and defendant was himself the prosecutor or that he instigated its commencement o The criminal action finally ended with an acquittal o In bringing the action, the prosecutor acted WITHOUT probable cause o The prosecution was

JOVITO QUISABA V. STA. INES MELALE PLYWOOD & VENEER LD: Although the acts complained of seemingly appear to constitute matters involving employee-employer relations as Quisabas dismissal was the severance of a pre-existing employee-employer relation, his complaint is grounded not on his dismissal per se, as in fact he does not ask for reinstatement or backwages, but on the manner of his dismissal and the consequent effects of such dismissal. Constructive Dismissal, internal auditor to purchase logs. NLRC v. Civil Court. Does not ask for reinstatement or backwages Right v. Manner Court rules in favor of Quisaba. Proceed with trial in lower court.

GRAND UNION SUPERMARKET & NELIA SANTOS-FANDINO V. JOSE ESPINO and CA LD: Where petitioners wilfully caused loss or injury to private respondent in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy, they are liable for damages under Arts. 19 and 21 in relation to Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the false accusation charged against the private respondent after detaining and interrogating him by the uniformed guards and the mode and manner in

SOLEDAD CARPIO V. LEONORA VALMONTE LD: To find the existence of an abuse of right, the following elements must be present: 1. there is a legal right or duty; 2. which is exercised in bad faith; 3. for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

D.

Violation of Human Dignity

Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: (1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence; (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another; (3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends; (4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition. ST. LOUIS REALTY CORP. v. CA and CONRADO ARAMIL (1984) LD: St. Louis Realtys employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mixup. It just contented itself with a cavalier rectification. LD: Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish. FACTS: St. Louis mistakenly showed Dr. Arafil's house in an ad in the Sunday Times (Where the Heart is). The ad gave the impression that Arcadio Arcadio owned Dr Arafil's house in Brookside Hills. (2x Dec 1968, Jan 1969) Dr. Arafil complained to St. Louis. St. Louis o Called up Dr. Arafil & apologized, but did not print rectification or apology o Mar 1969: New ad

with correct house, but no rectification or apology o Apr 1969: Notice of Rectification, No published apology RTC: Dr. Aramil wins. Art 26. St Louis should have published rectification & apology immediately. 8K AD, 20K MD, etc. CA: Affirms RTC. Actionable QuasiDelict under Art 21 and 26 SC: St. Louis grossly negligent. Affirms CA.

ZENAIDA R. GREGORIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., and EMMA J. DATUIN LD: Noticeably, despite alleging either fault or negligence on the part of Sansio and Datuin, Gregorio never imputed to them any bad faith in her complaint. Basic is the legal principle that the nature of an action is determine by the material averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Undeniably, Gregorios civil complaint, read in its entirety, is a complaint based on quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code, rather than on malicious prosecution. LD: Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief in cases of breach, though not necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of the following rights: o Right to Personal Dignity o Right to Personal Security o Right to Family Relations o Right to Social Intercourse o Right to Privacy o Right to Peace of Mind LD: In an action to recover damages for malicious prosecution, it must be alleged and established that the defendant was impelled by legal malice or bad faith in deliberately initiating an action against the plaintiff, knowing that the charges were false and groundless, intending to vex and humiliate her. FACTS: Sansio Phil is a supplier of

Alvi Marketing, which is co-owned by Zenaida Gregorio Sansio files a complaint against Mrs, Gregorio for violation of BP 22 when 3 checks allegedly signed by her bounced. Sansio used Alvi Marketing's business address in the complaint, Consequently, Mrs. Gregorio did not receive the information that there was a complaint against her. Thus, she was not able to air her side in a counter affidavit. The court then issued a warrant of arrest for Mrs. Gregorio. PARAC arrest her in her residence in QC at 9:30 one Friday morning. She was fingerprinted and photographed for mug shots. Her husband was only able to bail her out of jail in the afternoon. It turns out that the signature in the bounced checks was not Mrs Gregorio's as she did not even have a checking account. Sansio issues an affidavit of desistance. Mrs Gregorio sues for damages (almost 4M) on account of the mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation etc she suffered given her social standing in the community. Sansio: No cause of action because complaint is for malicious prosecution yet the complaint does not allege the requisites for malicious prosecution. Mrs Gregorio asked for moral damages which can only be awarded in action for quasi-delict if there is physical injury. Only action for malicious prosecution can ask for moral damages. RTC: Gregorio wins. Awards ~275K (200K MD). Action based on quasidelict. CA: Dismisses case, reverses RTC. ISSUE: WoN Civil Suit is quasi-delict or malicious prosecution (Quasidelict) Gregorio's complaint: o Sansio did not exercise due diligence in ascertaining the signature in the checks o Datuin gave incorrect address depriving Gregorio of her right to answer charges against

her Gregorio suffered as a result of Datuin/Sansio's negligence. o Did not impute bad faith/legal malice. SC: In tort case under 2176, injured party needs to prove by preponderance of evidence: o the damages suffered by him; o the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person to whose act he must respond; o the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred; and o that there must be no preexisting contractual relation between the parties Gregorio asking for moral damages just a mistake. SC: CA decision reversed and set aside Question: RTC awarded MD, was this deleted? o

SPS LUIGI & ANNA GUANIO v. MAKATI SHANGRI-LA (2011, Carpio-Morales) LD: Breach of contract is defined as the failure without legal reason to comply with the terms of a contract. o Guanio's failure to discharge obligation to inform hotel of increase in number of guests excuses Hotel (based on p4.5 of contract, from liability for "any damage or inconvenience" occasioned thereby. FACTS: 28 Jul 2001: Wedding reception of Sps Guanio. Guanios complain that during the reception: o Delay in service of food to guests o Banquet/Catering Manager not present as they promised o Charged 8K/hour when

Lil's Notes | Torts |24 Feb 2012

reception went on past 12 midnight, when they were promised that it would be free. o Supposed to be open bar, but guests were made to pay for their drinks. o Difference in price b/w salmon and king prawn, etc. When Guanios' complained, Hotel manager Svensson apologized in a letter, saying service was not up to hotel's standards, etc. Guanios' sue for BREACH OF CONTRACT and DAMAGES. RTC: rules in favor of Guanios. Awards 800K in damages. Relied heavily on Svensson's letter (admission of guilt) CA: reversed RTC decision. Proximate cause of Guanios' injury great increase in number of guests (350-380 to 470) ISSUE: Does proximate cause have application in this case (NO) SC: Since Guanios' complaint arose from contract, the doctrine of proximate cause finds no application. (only applicable for quasi-delicts) SC: Applicable law is Art 1170 o Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. SC: Remedy for breach of contract serves to preserve the interests of the promissee: o Expectation interest: Interest in having the benefit of his bargain o Reliance Interest: Interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on contract. o Restitution Interest: Interest in having restored to him any benefit tht he has conferred on the other party. SC: Only exemption from liability in breach of contract: extenuating circumstances like proof of exercise of due diligence (???) or attendance of fortuitous event. SC: In this case Banquet and Meeting Services contract contain a clause which requires the Sps Guanio to inform the Hotel of increase in minimum number of guests by 10% 48hours before the event, otherwise, the Hotel will not be in any way liable for any damage or inconvenience which may be caused thereby. SC: Verbal Contract vs. Written Contract? SC: Written Contract because this was entered into the latest (day before reception) SC: Re letter of Svensson: It is common practice in the service industry to apologize when complaints are given to smooth ruffled feathers of complainant. It is not an admission of guilt. SC: However, in the interest of EQUITY, 50K awarded as nominal damages to Sps Guanio beause delay in service could have been avoided if Hotel had exercised prescience in scheduling functions. Given Hotel's experience with booked events exceeding min number of guests, Hotel should have taken extra measures. Wedding once in a lifetime event. SC: 50K for "discomfiture" suffered by Sps Guianio. Every person entitled to respect of his dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. Hotel's lack of prudence is an affront to this right. Dereliction of Duty Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken. F. Unfair Competition commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage. VIII. INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS Article 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. (n) CS GILCHRIST v. EACUDDY etal, JOSE FERNANDEZ ESPEJO & MARIANO ZALDARRIAGA (18 Feb 1915, Trent) LD: The intereference with lawful contracts by strangers thereto gives rise to an action for damages in favor of the injured person. The law does not require that the responsible person shall have known the identity of the injured person. LD: The interference with lawful contracts by strangers thereto does not of itself give the injured person a remedy by injunction. LD: Injuction may be granted where the PROFITS of the injured person are derived from his contractual relations with a large and indefinite number of individuals, thus reducing him to the necessity of proving in an action against the tort feasor that the latter is responsible in each case for the broken contract, or else obliging him to institute individual suits against each contracting party, and so exposing him to a multiplicity of suits. FACTS: Appeal by defendants Jose Fernandez Espejo & Mariano Zaldarriaga (EZ). Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar 24 Apr 1913: Cuddy rents out the film to Gilchrist (cinematograph theater) for P125 from May 26 to June 1 (1 week) A few days before May 26, Cuddy refunds the money to Gilchrist, saying he had made other arrangements with the film. These "other arrangements" were the rental to EZ of the same film for P350 for the week. Gilchrist asks for injuction preventing EZ from showing the film from May 26 to June 1. 22 May 1913: Mandatory injuction issued directing Cuddy to send to Gilchrist the film "Zigomar" in compliance with their alleged contract. Moreover, another preliminary injunction was issued RESTRAINING EZ from receiving and exhibiting Zigomar in their theater until further orders from the court. Gilchrist: o Cuddy willfully violated their contract because EZ offered more money. (Letter from Cuddy apologizingand explaining why he was leasing to EZ)

Espejo & Zaldarriaga: o o o Knew Cuddy was the owner of the film No Contract b/w Cuddy & Gilchrist His agents, Pathe Brothers had told him TWICE that it was useless trying to get Zigomar because the rental price was prohibitive. His agents also assured him that he COULD NOT GET THE FILM FOR ABOUT 6 WEEKS. (26 Apr) EZ then went to Cuddy and made the offer himself. WE HAVE A RIGHT TO COMPETE!

E.

Article 28. Unfair competition in agricultural,

CFI: Permanent Injuction correct since RZ failed to show that injunction was wrongfully procured.

ISSUE: Did EZ know that they were inducing Cuddy to violate his contract with a third pary when they induced him to accept the P350? (YES) SC: Since their agents had informed them that Zigomar was unavailable for at least 6 weeks from 26 April, they must have inferred that SOMEONE had contracted to rent the film from Cuddy. ISSUE: Did EZ know the identity of the party (Gilchrist) that Cuddy had contracted with? (NO) SC: No proof that EZ knew. ISSUE: Are EZ liable for damages for interfering with the contract b/w Gilchrist & Cuddy, given that they did not know at the time the identity of Gilchrist? (DEPENDS?) o o Legal Liability (YES) Damages (If EZ knew of identity of original lessee at time of interference) -

Must have SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION for interference. (an equal or superior right in themselves) Looking after own interests, lack of improper motive, altruism etc not sufficient justification.

sue for an injunction SC: An injuction is a "special remedy" in cases where there is no "plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law" when rights of parties not yet determined BUT where MATERIAL and IRREPARABLE INJURY will be done which CANNOT BE COMPENSATED IN DAMAGES. SC: Injuction vs. Damages. ISSUE: Was the issuance of the preliminary injuction valid? (YES) SC: Extraordinary circumstances where irreparable injury is possible. SC: Irreparable Injury: species of injury, whether great or small, that OUGHT NOT TO BE SUBMITTED TO on the one hand or INFLICTED on the other. It is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law. SC: Profits of Gilchrist depended on the patronage of the public. Court takes JUDICIAL NOTICE of general character of movie theater. SC: Feature film is depended upon to secure larger attendance. Bad movies reduce ticket sales of theaters. SC: It would be difficult if not impossible to estimate the damages which Gilchrist would have suffered from non-showing of Zigomar. SC: Injuction proper as it saved Gilchrist from damage from interference of EZ, and saved the Court from computing the damages suffered by Gilchrist. SC: Elliot on Contracts: o Injuction is the proper remedy to prevent wrongful interference with contract by strangers to such contracts where the legal remedy is insufficient and the resulting injury is irreparable. But the remedy by -

injunction cannot be used to restrain the legitimate competition, though such competition would involve the violation of a contract. Moreland Concurring o Permanent Injunction v. Specific Performance.. Shouldn't extend ban on showing film beyond week of May 26. Even Gilchrist did not ask for that.

Angel v. Railway o Interference does not have to be malicious. Desire to make a profit to the detriment of one of the contracting parties is not malicious.

SC: In this case, only motive of EZ for interfering with Gilchrist-Cuddy contract was a desire to make a profit. No malice. SC: But this DOES NOT RELIEVE them of the LEGAL LIABILITY for interfering with Gilchrist-Cuddy contract and causing its breach. SC: EZ LIABLE to Gilchrist for DAMAGES UNLESS they are relieved from such liability by reason of the fact that they did not know at the time the identity of the original lessee. (Gilchrist) ????. SC: Damage does not arise from contractual obligations but is governed by Art 1902 (Art 2176 NCC) which provides that a person, by act or omission, causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage done. SC: Nothing in Art 1902 that requires a tort-feasor to know the identity of the person to whom he causes damage to make him liable for damages. SC: No knowledge (of identity) is required in order that the injured party may recover for the damage suffered. Interference with contract is Actionable. This alone does not justify Gilchrist to -

SO PING BUN v. CA, TEK HUA ENTERPRISING CORP. & MANUEL TIONG (1999, QUISUMBING) LD: One becomes liable in an action for damages for a NONTRESPASSORY INVASION of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if: o The other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with The invasion is substantial The defendant's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion. The invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under general negligence rules.

FOR COMPETITION subject to there is existence of previous contract. CJ Wells (Walker v. Cronin) o Everyone has a right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own enterprise, industry, skill and credit. He has NO RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM MALICIOUS & WANTON INTERFERENCE, DISTURBANCE or ANNOYANCE. If the disturbance or loss comas AS A RESULT OF COMPETITION, or the exercise of like rights by others, it is damnum absque injuria, UNLESS SOME SUPERIOR RIGHT BY CONTRACT or OTHERWISE IS INTERFERED WITH.

o o

Elements of Tort Interference: o o Existence of a valid contract Knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of contract Interference of the third person is w/o legal justification or excuse.

Read v. Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons & Beekman v. Marsters -

Lil's Notes | Torts |24 Feb 2012

LD: A cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one person of the enjoyment by the other of his private property. THIS MAY PERTAIN TO A SITUATION WHERE A THIRD PERSON INDUCES A PARTY TO RENEGE ON OR VIOLATE HIS UNDERTAKING UNDER CONTRACT. LD: Where there was no malice in the interference of a contract, and the impulse behind one's conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious interferer LD: Gilchrist v. Cuddy o There was no malice in the interference of a contract, and the impulse behind one's conduct lies in a PROPER BUSINESS INTEREST rather than wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious intereferer. Where the alleged interferer is financially interested, and such interest motivates his conduct, it cannot be said that his is an officious or malicious intermeddler. 1-year lease not renewed, but THTC continued to occupy premises. 1976: THTC dissolved, but original members of THTC (incl Manuel Tiong) formed Tek Hua Enterprising Corp. (THEC) 1986: So Pek Giok dies, but his grandson So Ping Bun occupied the leased warehouse for his own textile business, Trendsetter Marketing Aug 1989: Dee C Chuan sent letters addressed to Tek Hua Enterprises informing of increase in rent starting Sep. Dec 1990. Dee C Chuan increased rent by 30%. Sent letter to lessees with new leases, warining that failure of the lessee to accomplish the contracts shall be deemed lack of interest on the lessee's part, AND AGREEMENT TO THE TERMINATION OF THE LEASE. THEC did not answer any of the letters sent by Dee C Chuan BUT lease contracts were not rescinded(???) 1 Mar 1991: Tiong sent a letter to So Ping Bun that he wanted to use the warehouse as he wanted to go back to the textile business. He advised So Ping Bun to take out all his stocks within 14 days unless he had good reasons for the right to stay. So Ping Bun refuses to vacate 4 Mar 1992: Trendsetter requested formal contracts of lease with DCCSI. DCCSI assents and lease contracts executed. THEC files suit for injunction and nullification of lease contracts b/w DCCSI and Trendsetter. They also asked for damages. .RTC: Lease contracts annulled b/w Trendsetter & DCCSI. 500K AF. DCCSI and THEC may negotiate renewal of lease. CA: affirms RTC, but reduces AF to 200K, No AD, MD, ED. ISSUE: Was So Ping Bun guilty of Tortuous Interference of Contract? (YES) ISSUE: Is CA correct in awarding AF of 200K? SC: Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its favor, as a result Trendsetter deprived Tek Hua Enterprising Corp was of its property right. Clearly, elements of tort interference are present in this case. SC: Due to lack of malice (only business interest, damages not proper, only injunction and rescission of lease contracts) SC: CA did not award damages only because extent of damages not quantifiable. SC: No Malice, No Damages. Only permanent injuction and nullification of lease contracts. AF OK (Art 2208) SC: Since THEC's lease contract at time of cause of action, was on a month-on-month basis only, reduce AF to 100K which reasonable inquiry will lead to disclosure of previous contractual relations interfered with. LD: To sustain a case for Tortuous intereference, defendant MUST HAVE ACTED with MALICE or must have been driven by purely impious reasons to injure plaintiff. LD: Financial or Profit motivation will not necessarily make a person an officious interfere liable for damages as long as there is no malice or bad faith involved. FACTS: 23 Jun 1982: Jose Lagon purchased from estate of Bai Tonina Sep 2 parcels of land in Sultan Kudarat. A few months after sale, Lapuz sues Lagon for torts and damages (inducing heirs to sell property to Lagon, violating his leasehold rights over it.) Lapuz o 1964: contract of lease b/w Lapuz & Bai Tonina. Over 3 parcels of land. He contructed comm'l bldgs which would be leased to new tenants. New tenants' rents would pay for Lapuz's rent of the land to Bai Tonina 1974 Lease ends, but alleged renewed because construction of buildings not yet finished. When Bai Tonina died, Lapuz remitted rent to admin of estate. Discovered that Lagon was collecting tenants' rents when estate admin told him to stop collecting rents. Impossible for Lagon to not know of his lease contract with Bai

JOSE LAGON v. CA & MENANDRO LAPUZ (2005, Corona) LD: The interference of contractual relations is penalized bacause it violates the property rights of a party in a contract to reap the benefits that should result therefrom. Elements of Tort uous Interference: (same as So Ping Bun) o o Existence of valid contract, Knowledge of third person of existence of the contract. Interference of the third person without legal justification or excuse.

LD: Lack of malice precludes damages BUT it does not relieve interfere of LEGAL LIABILITY for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones. LD: While business desire is there to make some gain to the detriment of the contracting parties, but this does not constitute malice. FACTS: 1963, Tek Hua Trading Co (THTC): Managing Partner So Pek Giok entered into 4 lease agreement with Dee C Chuan for premises in Soler St. Binondo. Used for storing textiles. Lease for 1-year term, should lessee wish to continue, lease shall be on a month-to-month basis.

LD: Essential element to state cause of action for tortuous interference, KNOWLEDGE ON PART OF INTERFERER of the subsistence of the contract. No need to prove actual knowledge, only awareness of facts

Lagon:

o o

No inducement, heirs needed the money His personal investigation and inquiry revealed no claims or encumbrances on the subject lots. He even verified with lawyer who notarized lease contract and verified that it had not been renewed in 1974. Atty Fajardo showed him lease renewals, but all were unsigned Cerfication from Office of the Clerk of Court confirming that no record of any lease contract notarized by Atty Fajardo had been entered in to their files.

interference or *Malice*) SC: This case, Damnum Absque Injuria. No legal injury, No Malice. -

distributorship. AFFA: Cordero's exclusive distributorship refers only to 1 transaction. Side story; Landicho & Tecson met with Cordero and offered to amicable settle dispute: Purchase vessel thru him for 3 years, $1.5M etc. Only ruse to delay daw. Customs undervaluation. Malicious demand by Cordero fro $3M 21 Aug 1998: Cordero sues all for conniving and conspiring to violate his exclusive distributorship in bad faith, depriving him of his commissions. TC: Cordero wins: 16.29M++ actual damages, 1M MD, 1M ED, 1M AF. CA: Affirms RTC, but Cordero only entitled to first commission (1.355M) reduces MD, ED, AF Issue: Was Go guilty of tortious interference? SC: Yu v CA (right to perform an axclusive distributorship agreement and to reap the profits resulting from such performance are proprietary rights which a party may protect. Injuction is the proper remedy. SC: From the time Go directly dealt with Robinson in Brisbane, and ceased communicating through Cordero as the exclusive distributor of AFFA in PH, Cordero was no longer informed of payments remitted to AFFA in Brisbane. There was no sufficient evidence that Go actually purchased a second SEACAT 25 directly from AFFA, BUT this will not absolve Go from liability for invading Cordero's right under the exclusive distributorship. SC: Bad faith on part of Go in completing remaining payments to AFFA w/o advising him and furnishing him with copies of bank transmittals as they previously did. SC: While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract bec only parties can breach -

contractual provisions, a contracting paty may sue a third person not for breach but for inducing another to commit such breach. (Art 1314) SC: Different schools of though on justification for interference. SC: Reduced price of 1.15M vs 1.465 not for 2nd vessel, just undervaluation for Customs. SC: The act of Go etal, in inducing Robinson and AFFA to enter into another contract directly with ACG Express Liner to obtain a lower price for the second vessel resulted in AFFA's breach of its contractual obligation to pay in full the commission due to Cordero and unceremonious termination of Cordero's appointment as exclusive distributor. The attendant circumstance, however, demonstrated that respondents transgressed the bounds of permissible financial interest to benefit themselves at the expense of Cordero. SC: Bad Faith present. SC: Solidary liability for quasi-delicts. SC: The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual relations CANNOT be held liable for more than the amount for which the party who was induced to break the contract can be held liable: Therefore Go etal correctly held liable for the balance of Cordero's commission of (US 31K, or 1.355M). Having acted in bad faith, moral damages may be recovered, 300K MD and 200K ED reasonable.

ALLAN GO (ACG Express Liner v. MORTIMER CORDERO(2010, Villarama) MORTIMER CORDERO v. ALLAN C GO, FELIPE LANDICHO & VINCENT TECSON. LD: FACTS: Mortimer Cordero VP of Pamana Mktg Corp (PAMANA), w/c is in the business of marketing inter-island passenger vessels. Cordero met Australian Tony Robinson (Managing Director of Aluminum Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA) June-Aug 1997: Robinson signed docs appointing Cordero as the exclusive distributor of AFFA catamaran and other fast ferry vessels in the PH. (SEACAT 25) 7 Aug 1997: Cordero closed a deal for the sale of 2 SEACAT 25 (dealt with Go's lawyers Landicho and Tecson) o o o o MOA: Shipbuilding Contract Price: US$1.465M++ Cordero's commission: $328K++ or 22.43% from sale of each vessel.

RTC: in favor of Lapuz: Contract of lease renewed for 10yrs (until 1984), Lapuz owner of Bldgs. on land. He is entitled to their possession & collection of rents covered by Contract of Lease. o o Rentals for bldgs (507K) MD 1.06M, AD, 312.5K, ED 187.5K, TD 62.5K, ND, 62.5K, AF 125K. Costs of suit,, interest on damages 900K) all more than 2M Lapuz to pay Lagon 700/month for 73 months (rental of land)

Cordero made 2 trips (with Go & Family + Landicho) to AFFA and shouldered all expenses on trips. Cordero discovers that Go and AFFA dealing directly with each for purchase of 2nd catamaran when informed by Watsila Phils that Go was canvassing for a second catamaran engine. (Asked to fax quotation of engine directly to Australia) Since then, Go & Robinson refused to answer his calls. 24 Jun 1998: Cordero writes Go informing him of his exclusive

CA: affirms but most deletes damages and reduces AF. Pay 178K++ diff b/w rentals. SC: Records do not support allegation that Lagon induced the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him. Heirs, COMPLETELY ON THEIR OWN VOLITION, sold the land to Lagon. Lagon did ABSOLUTELY NOTHING to influence their judgment. Not all 3 elements present. (No

Prosser & Keeton 978-1004 VIII. Damages A. Concept of Damages

Article 2195. The provisions of this Title shall be respectively applicable to all obligations mentioned in article 1157.

Lil's Notes | Torts |24 Feb 2012

Article 2196. The rules under this Title are without prejudice to special provisions on damages formulated elsewhere in this Code. Compensation for workmen and other employees in case of death, injury or illness is regulated by special laws. Rules governing damages laid down in other laws shall be observed insofar as they are not in conflict with this Code. Article 2198. The principles of the general law on damages are hereby adopted insofar as they are not inconsistent with this Code. PEOPLE v. FELIPE BALLESTEROS. CESAR GALO & ALVIN BULUSA (1998, Romero) LD: Damages may be defined as the PECUNIARY COMPESATION, RECOMPENSE or SATISFACTION for INJURY sustained. LD: The PECUNIARY CONSEQUENCES which the LAW imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right. LD: Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained, LD: moral damages may be invoked when the complainant has experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral shock and so forth, and had furthermore shown that these were the proximate result of the offender's wrongful act or omission FACTS: Defendants Ballesteros, Galo & Bulusa convicted of murder, qualified by treachery, as defined under Art 248, RP and solidarily to pay Heirs of Jerry Agliam CD 50K, MD 20K, AD, 35755 Heirs of Eduardo Tolentino, CD 50K, 20K MD, AD 61785 Carmelo Agliam: AD 2003.40, MD 10K Vidal Agliam, Roberto Cacal & Ronnel Tolentino, MD of 5K each. 28 May 1991: Carmelo Agliam, et al met at a carinderia in Ilocos Norte & went to the barangay hall for a dance. They left because Cesar Galo & his companions were giving them dagger looks. Agliam etal had barely left when their owner jeep was fired upon. 2 of the 6 died. 4 were injured. Based on affidavits of survivors, Ballesteros, Galo & Bulusan were arrested and convicted beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery. ISSUE:Was the Trial Court correct in the award of damages to the heirs of the victims? (YES) SC: Definition of Damages SC: Actual Damages: Must present best evidence available: receipts, vouchers, and the like, as corroborated by his testimony. In this case claim for AD uncontroverted SC: compensatory damages not correct, 50K is indemnity. SC: Moral damages although inestimable, may be determined by the trial court at its discretion. plaintiff must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff. LD: In order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, the act must not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria LD The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. Principle of Abuse of Right (Art 21) o Defendant acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy The acts should be willful There was damage to the plaintiff. Exemplary Damages. ISSUE: Was Mabasa entitled to damages for lost income from lack of tenants? (NO) SC: Until the servitude or easement was given by the court, Santos etal had the right to enclose their properties (Art 430, NCC). Therefore no legal injury occurred. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. SC: Mabasa sued on basis of Art 21. However, 3rd element (damage to plaintiff) no present. SC: One may use lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose.

o o FACTS:

TYPES OF DAMAGES Article 2197. Damages may be: (1) Actual or compensatory; (2) Moral; (3) Nominal; (4) Temperate or moderate; (5) Liquidated; or (6) Exemplary or corrective. B. 1. Actual or Compensatory Damages Definition/Purpose

SPS CRISTINO & BRIGIDA CUSTODIO & SPS LITO & MARIA SANTOS v. CA & HEIRS OF PACIFICO MABASA & RTC PASIG (1996, Regalado) LD: The mere fact that Mabasa suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a LEGAL WRONG inflicted by defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. LD: Wrong without Damage, or Damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. Injury: an invasion of a legal right Damage: harm which results from the injury Damages: compensation awarded for damage suffered. LD: To maintain an action for injuries, -

Pacifico Mabasa bought 2-door apartment that was surrounded by immoveables owned by defendants. His only access to P Burgos Street was a passageway between the row of houses of Custodio, Santos & Mabasa Santos built an adobe fence, making the passageway narrower because Mabasa's tenants' dragged her daughter on one occasion and they were sometimes drunk. Morato also constructed an adobe fence that completely enclosed first passageway. Mabasa's tenants vacated premises In a civil case, Court gave Mabasa a compulsory right of way to P Burgos Street and ordered Mabasa to indemnify Custodioas and Santoses 8K as indemnity Mabasa appeals to CA on sole issue of Damages CA awards Mabasa 65K Actual Damages, 30K Moral Damages., 10K -

Article 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages. OCEANEERING CONTRACTORS v. NESTOR BARRETTO (NNB Lighterage) (2011, Perez) LD: Under Art 2199, there must be PLEADING & PROOF of actual damages suffered to recover. It must be actually proven with a REASONABLE DEGREE Of CERTAINTY, premised upon competent proof or best evidence available LD: The Burden of Proof of the damage suffered is imposed on the

party claiming the same who should adduce the best evidence available support thereof. Courts are required to state factual bases of award. (Selfserving statements of account are not sufficient basis for an award of actual damages.) NNB Lighterage (Nestor Barretto): owner of Barge "Antonieta" Oceaneering Contractors: customer. Oceanering hires barge of Barretto under Time Charter Agreement o 306K, to transport const. mat'ls from Manila to Negros Oriental Broker Manuel Velasco Oceaneering acknowledges SEAWORTHINESS of barge Barretto responsible for salaries etc of crew Oceaneering responsible for port charges, INSURANCE of all equipment, cargo loaded against ALL RISKS, theft, security, and STEVEDORING during loading and unloading operations and all other expenses pertinent to assessment, etc for any violation that may be imposed in relation to operation of barge Delivery & re-delivery to Pasig River DAMAGE TO DECK BARGE caused by CARELESSNESS or NEGLIGENCE of stevedores.

be welded on port and starboard sides of barge. 5 Dec 1997: Bargeman executed a Marine Protest: (Boat capsized) o o 16:35,, 3 Dec 1997: Left port for Negros 4 Dec 1997: rough seas. Barge rolled and pitched. Cargo of steel pipes & const' mat'ls shift to starboardside, steel stanchions broke and tore away parts of the hull, leaving holes that caused water to enter hold., Barge capsizes & sinks. Mishap caused by incompetence/negligenc e of stevedores loading cargo. Will Salvage, refloat and repair barge. (seeks reimbursement of 836,425)

Acctg Staff of law firm & accounting firm to prove AF & costs of suit. Pag-asa weather specialist (no rough seas) Other marine experts. -

Only able to salvage 9 pipes (351K), diff is 3.703M++ 125K salvaging expense (NO) 750K AF (NO)

o o

o -

RTC: dismisses claim & counterclaim: o Barretto: insufficient evidence to prove accident due to negligence of Oceaneering Oceaneering: claim for cargo no included in demand letter, failed to insure cargo against all risks, no one but itself to blame.

SC: Actual or Compensatory damages are those damages which the injured party is entitled to recover for the wrong done and injuries received WHERE NONE WERE INTENDED. SC: These pertain to injuries or losses that are ACTUALLY SUSTAINED and SUSCEPTIBLE TO MEASUREMENT, intended to put the injured party in the position in which he was before he was injured. SC: Art 2199: SC: Best evidence of damage: sales & delivery receipts, cash and check voucher and other pieces of doc evidence of same nature. SC: Can't base damages on inventory of Oracion, but from receipts from O's suppliers. (Total: 2,577,620) deduct 351K SC: o Exclude items not included in inventory (bought after 29 Nov 1997 and after barge left port) Petron oil bought 28 Nov 1997 (not lost cargo or salvaging expenses described in counterclaim) Items with unspecified amount Lack of credible proof for salvaging expenses. Time Charter agreement: only refund to the extent of unused charter payment. No bad faith on

o o

o o

CA: partially grant's Oceaneering's appeal o Time charter: possession & control of barge retained by Barretto Barretto common carrier, must exercise extraordinary diligence, Failed to overcome presumption of negligence. Denies Oceaneering's claim for lost cargo ( no reasonable proof ), refund whole 306L, AF 30K

Oceaneering: o Barge hull already had a hole and that's why barge tilted. Demands return of 224,400 (unused portion of time charter)

Barretto sues Oceaneering (seeks 2.75M++ for expenses incurred, lost income and AF) o o VP for Operations: effort exerted to salvage Manuel Velasco: execution of Time Charter and circumstances of sinking barge -

o o

ISSUE: Did Oceaneering present valid documents showing real value of cargo lost? (some) Oceaneering: Docs presented: o Operations Mgr (Oracion) inventory 4.055M (SC: only Various sales receipts, order slips, cash vouchers and invoices admitted into evidence at RTC. o o o

Oceaneering hires stevedores to load const. mat'l on barge under the supervision of Velasco & Barretto Bargeman.. In addition to PE ropes, cargo secured by steel stanchions which were Oceaneering caused to

Oceaneering counterclaim, 4.055M (cargo value), 125 ED, AF, costs. o Operations Mgr: value of cargo & salvage operation

Lil's Notes | Torts |24 Feb 2012

Barretto's part, no recovery of AF & expenses except as enumerated in Art 2208 DISPOSITVE: o Grant Oceaneering's claim for value of lost cargo of 2,226,620.00 (~2.23M) with 6%, Reduce refund of consideration for Time Charter from 306K to 224,400 +6%, Delete CA award of salvaging expenses & AF for lack of legal & factual bases contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation. o Said compilation is published for the use of persons in that occupation o It is generally used and relied upon by persons of the same occupation. LD: In absence of proof on actual damages suffered, a party is entitled to NOMINAL DAMAGES. (Nominal Damages: purpose to vindicate/recognize injured party's right, NOT to indemnify for loss suffered) LD: Nominal damages are damages IN NAME only and NOT IN FACT. (recognition of existence of technical injury) LD: Unpaid docket fee considered a lien on judgment even though claim for damages different from amended complaint. FACTS: 21 Sep 1977 (Fortune Island area): M/V Maria Efigenia XV (owned by MEFC) collided with Petroparcel (owned by Luzon Stevedoring Corp PNOC) Board of Marine Inquiry, Petroparcel at fault. MEFC sues for damages, paid docket fee of 1,252 (seeks award of 692, 680) MEFC later amended its complaint bec it failed to plead for recovery of lost value of hull of boat, increases claim by 800K less insurance (600K), Inflation and devaluation of peso affected replacement value of boat and cargo, unrealized business profits/opportunities. RTC: MEFC wins. 6.438M (value of fishing boat), 50K AF, costs. o Based award on testimony of GM Edilberto del Rosario Wooden boat built in 1965 Carrying 1060 tubs of fish, value unrecovere d Lost engines, other parts Had to hire lawyer 10K and 50K o Marine Protest: 1050 tubs of fish (170K) o Quotation of 95 footer trawler issued by Magalong Engg & Construction (2.25M) o Pro Forma Invoice Power Systems (ED Daclan) o Quotation of Prices by different supplies for equipment, radar, etc. o Retainer agreement with law firm. RTC held that replacement value regularly increased at 30% from date of quotations. RTC: No sufficient rebuttal by PNOC: (quotations excessive. (senior estimator Lazaro of PNOC), but could not supply quotations that HE got from his suppliers.) CA: Affirms RTC decision in toto o No need to qualify Del Rosario as expert witness o No categorical rule by SC on admissibility or inadmissibility of quotations, trade journals, trade circulars and price lists as class of evidence. o Reception of price quotations as evidence rests on DISCRETION of court., declare in favor of admissibility. ISSUE: WoN amount of actual damages correct and proven? (NO) ISSUE: WoN failure to pay docket fee for increased claim bars MEFC from recovering? (NO) SC: Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (???) Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of the defendant, the injured is entitled to ther VALUE AT THE TIME OF DESTRUCTION, that is, the sum o f money which he would have to pay in the market for indentical or essentially similar goods, plus in a proper case damages for the loss of use during the period before replacement. SC: Need to ascertain capitalized value of vessel as a profit-earning machine not in the abstract but in view of actual circumstances. SC: Price quotations are ordinary private writings which under the Revised Rules of Court should be proffered ALONG WITH the TESTIMONY of the AUTHORS thereof. SC: as owner of vessel, self-interest may cloud Del Rosario's testimony (not expert) SC: Doc evidence offered by MFEC based on 1987 prices (10 yrs after collision) SC: Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is HEARSAY, if its PROBATIVE VALUE, is not based on the PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. SC: Price Quotations requested from dealers ARE NOT "Commercial Lists" (only exception to hearsay) for these do not belong to category of "other published compilations" used ejusdem generis (same class) SC: Letters & telegrams are admissible in evidence, but these are subject to the general principles of evidence and to various rules relating to documentary evidence. SC: Admissibility (should it be considered at all) vs. Probative Value (refers to question of WoN it proves an issue) obiter SC: Price quotations & letter not admissible as evidence of damages. SC: Inadmissibility of evidence does not mean that it totally deprices MEFC of any redress (Lufthansa v. CA) Nominal damage available. SC: Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation arising from law, contracts, quasi-contrcats, acts or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in every case where property right has been invaded. (Art 2223 award precludes further contest b/w parties & heirs/assigns)

2.

Proof Required

PNOC SHIPPING & TRANSPORT v. CA & MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING CORP (1998, Romero) LD: 2 Kinds of Actual/Compensatory Damages o Dao Emergente: the loss of what a person already possesses o Lucro Cesante: Failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him. LD: In actions based on torts or quasidelicts, actual damages include all the natural & probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. LD: Damages cannot be presumed. To enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory damages, he is required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty PREMISED UPON COMPETENT PROOFand on BEST EVIDENCE available. (preponderance of evidence) LD: (exception to Hearsay) Commercial Lists: Reqs: o Statement of matters of interest to persons engages in an occupation o Such Statement

SC: Amount of nominal damages equal or at commensurate to injury sustained considering concept and purpose of damages. Depends on Special Reasons.(???) SC: Allegations in original and amended complaints can be BASIS for determination of fair amount of nominal damages. Bound by allegations. (692K +600K) DISPOSITIVE: Lack of evidentiary evidence for 6.44M awarded in lower courts. Award 2M in nominal damages.

d.

Earning Capacity, Business Standing o

Article 2205. Damages may be recovered: (1) For loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury; (2) For injury to the plaintiff's business standing or commercial credit. REYNALDA GATCHALIAN v. ARSENIO DELIM & CA (1991, FELICIANO) LD: Damages may not be awarded on the basis of speculation or conjecture o Gatchalian was no longer employed (laid off) in public school since she was a casual employee & not Civil Service eligible. Employment as substitute teacher occasional and episodic, contingent upon availability of vancancies for substitute teachers. Therefore, she could not have in fact lost any employment after and by reason of the accident. No award for damages for loss of employment. -

ignored by driver and owner (that is only normal) Act of owner's wife in making injured passengers sign Joint Affidavit. o

doubt as to intention of person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him Gatchalian groggy from accident and just saw other passengers signing document Waiver against public policy To make waiver valid would weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence required from common carriers.

OCEANEERING CONTRACTORS v. BARETTO (supra) 3. Loss Covered a. In general

FACTS: Reynaldo Gatchalian one of passengers of "Thames" mini bus in La Union. On the way, while bus was running along highway, a "snapping sound" was suddently heard. Shortly thereafter, bus bumped flower pot on side of the ride, went off-road, turned turtle and fell in a ditch. Several passengers injured and brought to hospital While injured passengers confined in hospital, Mrs. Delim visited and paid for their medical expenses. She also gave Gatchalian tranpo fare home. She also made injured passengers sign a prepared Joint Affidavit (Waiver NO LONGER INTERESTED TO FIEL ACOMPLAINT. ACCIDENT. Driver and owners helped us to be treated upon our injuries) Gatchalian files with CFI, Action extra contractu to recover compensatory and moral damages. o Scar, mental suffering, inferiority complex, had to retire to seclusion and stay away from friends Diminished facial beauty and deprived her of opportunities for employment. (10K, loss of employment opportunity, 10K plastic surgery, 30K MD, 1K AF) -

o o

ISSUE: Was Delim negligent? (YES) o Force Majeure: Efficient Cause, Independent of Human will, Impossible to avoid.

Article 2200. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain. (1106) PNOC v. CA (supra) b. In contracts & QuasiContracts

ISSUE: Is Gatchalian entitled to damages for o loss of employment opportunities? (NO 0 casual employee/laid off) Cost of plastic surgery? (YES physical integrity) Moral Damages? (YES gross negligence 30K reasonable) AF? (YES, 1K modest)

Article 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. (1107a) c. In crimes & quasi-delicts

o o

o -

LD: a person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body, if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual & compensatory damages are due and assessable: o Cost of Plastic Surgery for removal of scar (1 x 1-1/2") on forehead. Legitimate claim for restoration to her condition ante. Cost of surgery depends on size of scar. (15K)

DISPOSITIVE: o RTC & CA ser aside. Delim must pay Gatchalian: Actual damages: 15K (plastic surgery) Moral Damages: 30K AF 1K

Article 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. Article 2204. In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

Delim: Force Majeure and Waiver. RTC: dismissed complaint: Waiver. CA : Waiver not valid, but denies claim for damages. ISSUE: Was there valid waiver? (NO) o Waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no

LD: Moral damages to be awarded where gross negligence on part of common carrier shown. o "Snapping Sound"

CANDANAO SHIPPING v. FLORENTINA SUGATA-ON (2007, Chico-Nazario)

Lil's Notes | Torts |24 Feb 2012

Fomula for Net Earning Capacity: o 2/3 x [80 age at time of death] x (gross annual income reasonable and necessary living expenses) o 2/3 x [80 age at time of death] x [gross annual income 50%(gross annual income)] o Basis of Life Expectancy (insurance/ American Expectancy able of Mortality or Actuarial of Comnined Experience Table of Mortality), Life expectancy may be reduced in case of special circumstances like deceased was sick or suffered from some medical condition to begin with. o Basis of expenses (jurisprudence) LD: The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act differ from that in giving damages under the Civil Code. The compensation acts are baed on a Theory of Compesation distinct from the existing theories of damages, payments under acts being made as compensation and not as damages (99 CJS 53) LD: Compensation: To mitigate the harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the workman and his family. Hence, employer is liable whether negligence exists or not. Liability created by law.. Recovery not based on actionable wrong on part of employer (DJS 36) LD: Damages: Awarded to one as vindication of the wrongful invasion of his rights. It is indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained injury either in his person, property or relative rights, through the act or default of another (25 CJS 452) LD: When the employee died or was injured by the occasion of employment, the obligation of the employer for indemnity automatically attaches, which indemnity may partake of the form of actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages, as the case may be depending on the factual milieu of the case and considering the criterion for award of these damages. (as sanctioned by Art 1711) FACTS: Melquiades Sugata-on employed by Cando Shipping (3rd Marine Engineer), 7800/month salary Sugata-on on M/V David Jr, when it encountered rough seas, causing it to tilt. Captain ordered crew to abandon ship. Ship sank. 12 crewmen survived, 1 dead, 7 missing. M's widow, Florentina, goes to office of Candano to claim death benefits of husband. Candano refuses to pay. Because of refusal, Florentina institutes action seeking indemnity for death of M against Candado based on Art 1711 o Article 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees, even though the event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The employer is also liable for compensation if the employee contracts any illness or disease caused by such employment or as the result of the nature of the employment. If the mishap was due to the employee's own notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for compensation. When the employee's lack of due care contributed to his death or injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced. (Under Contract for Labor Section) Candano: No cause of action. Action premature because M not yet confirmed dead, must recover body first. Presumptive death = 4 years (Art 391) RTC: in favor of Florentina. 4 years had already elapsed. 988,400 AD, 100K MD, 50K ED, 10% AF and costs. (computation based on loss of earning capacity in Villa Rey Transit v. CA) CA: Affirms RTC but AD reduced to (608,400), MD and ED deleted. Computation based on Art 194 of Labor Code. (monthly income benefit +10% for each dependent child (up to 5), guaranteed for 5 years. At least 15K ISSUE: WoN Formula based on Labor Code or NCC? (NCC) ISSUE: WoN application of Art 194 of Labor Code ousts regular courts, including Ca of jurisdiction over the case? ISSUE: Is Florentina entitled to recover under Art 1711? (YES) SC:Given: M dead and death caused by fortuitous event. SC: Remedy availed of by Florentina in filing a claim under Civil Code has been validly recognized by prevailing jurisprudence. SC: Floresca v. Philex Mining o Either recover from Workmen's Compensation Act or Provisions of NCC. o Choice of 1 remedy chosen will exclude the other remedy. o Exception: claimant already paid under Workmen's Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on bases of SUPERVENING FACTS or DEVELOPMENTS occurring after he opted for the first remedy. SC: Distinction b/w Compensation and Damages. SC: In this case, Florentina forced to institute civil suit for indemnity because Candano refused to compensate her for husband's death. SC: Given that the right of Florentina arose from the contract of employment and the corresponding obligation imposed by the NCC upon the employer to indemnify the former for death aninjury of the employee circumstanced by his employment, necessarily, the provisions of the NCC on damages shall govern the extent of the employer's liability. (Art 2199 *Art. 2200) SC: In order to give breath to provisions of NCC, they must be transformed to more tangible and mathematical form. Adopt formula for loss of earning capacity in Villa Rey v. CA. SC: Relationhip between employer and employee imbued with public interest. DISPOSITIVE: Candano to pay 748,800 in actual damages + 10% AF, costs e. Death by Crime or QuasiDelict

Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition: (1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death; (2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court; (3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

PEOPLE v. FRANCISCO "ESCO" BUBAN (2007, Quisumbing) LD: Damages that may be recovered when death occurs due to a crime: o o o o o o Civil Indemnity ex delicto for death of victim Actual or compensatory damages Moral Damages Exemplary Damages AF and costs of litigation Interest

Guilty of murder qualified by treachery with aggravating circumstance of dwelling, no mitigating Guilty, reclusion perptua

indemnity and moral damages in the amount of 50K each is granted automatically in the absence of qualifying aggravating circumstances.. These awards are mandatory without need of allegation and evidence other than the death of the victim owning to the fact of the commission of the crime. Crime: Robbery with Homicide Rodel with 2 John Does rob gasoline sation owned by Jose Buencamino in Bulacan. 40K. Shot and killed Janet Ramos(cashier) Also had fan knife. Testimony of Rodelio, gas boy. Cartographic sketch. 40K robbed, 14.5K funeral expenses. Rodel: Police Lineup: Rodelio pointed at him bec he was only one in handcuffs. RTC: Guilty. No aggravating or mitigating circumstances. RP, indemnify heirs of Janet for 75K. Owner of gas station 40K, 14.5K funeral expenses actual damages. CA: Affirms RTC: Reduces civil indemnity from 75K to 50K. SC: CA correct to reduce civil indemnity to 50K, but 50K MD should also be awarded SC: Compensatory damages properly account for. -

taken that in deceased's line of work, no documentary evidence is available o The deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than minimum wage under labor laws.

PEOPLE v. ARMAN APACIBLE (2010, Carpio Morales) FACTS: Apacible convicted of Murder Victim: Arnold Vizconde: multiple stab wounds. Drinking Spree " Putang Ina mo, papatayin kita" 8 month old sleeping beside father. Wife witnessed killing. Arnold killed allegedly for refusing to settle malicious mischief case filed against Apacible's brother. (breaking car windshield) Arnold , NPC employee 26 yrs old 10K/month salary RTC: Guilty of Murder. Reclusion Perpetua RA 7659, 50K Death Indemnity, 50K MD CA: Affirms RTC: except for civil indemnity 50K to 75K, 25K MD. Increase in indemnity based on recent jurisprudence. SC: Reduces Civil Indemnity to 50K again. SC: 75K civil indemnity lies only in cases where proper imposable penalty is death. In the outset, RTC imposed RP Dela Cruz and Tubongbanua: 75K Civil Indemnity. Accused sentenced to DEATH. SC: RA 9346: Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty, penalty reduced to RP. DISPOSITIVE: 50K civil indemnity

LD: Computation of Loss of Earning Capacity in this case: (always subtract expenses) o Necessary expenses for lease and operation of Gasoline Station) = 80% of gross income Living Expenses = 50% of Net Income = 50% (20% Gross Income)

LD: Civil Indemnity is mandatory and granted to heirs of victim without need of proof other than commission of crime. Baed on current jurisprudence award of civil indemnity of ex delicto of 75K in order. FACTS: Esco charged with killing Arsenio Imperial by shooting him with unlicensed carbine in the back of the head (nape) Eyewitness testimony, Faces lit by kerosene lamps. Corroborated testimony. Motive for murder, Arsenio witnessed cattle-rustiling activity. Credibility. RTC: Death by lethal injection; 50K civil indemnity, 50K MD, costs. CA: Guilty of murder with treachery, dwelling: DEATH. Same indemnity and MD. SC: Buban guilty SC: Civil indemnity: 75K SC: Moral damages 50K (violent death, resultant grief to family) SC: Art 2230: Crime committed with 1 or more aggravating circumstances, exemplary damages may be imposed (25K). Deterrence DISPOSITIVE: Buban ordered to pay: o o 75K Civil Indemnity 50K MD, 25K ED, 6% interest -

Phil Hawk: owner of bus, employed driver Avila Accident involved bus, jeep, motorcyclan of Silvino Tan After visiting machine shop, Lee and Tan riding in tandem on motorcycle. Stop position in highway and about to turn when bus running at fast speed towards them. Bus hit jeep parked at roadside, as wekk as motorcycle. Silvino killed, she was injured, hospitalized. Lee files complaint for damages based on quasi-delict arising from vehicular accident. Accident caused death of her husband, and physical injuries to her. Asks for MD, ED, Funeral & Interment expenses, medical & hospitalization expense, cost of motorcycle repair, AF, just and equitable reliefs. Lee: Tan leasing and operating Caltex station that earned 1M in revenue a year. Copra business: 36K a year. Avila involved in sideswiping accidents before. RTC: Avila guilty of simple negligence. Avila & Phil Hawk to pay Lee Tan 745,575 (loss of earning cap) and 50K MD

PHILIPPINE HAWK CORP v. VIVIAN TAN LEE (2010, Peralta) LD: Indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased is awarded not for loss of earnings, but for LOSS OF CAPACITY TO EARN MONEY. LD: Exceptions to general rule of presentation documentary evidence needed to substantiate claim for damages of loss of earning capacity o Deceased is selfemployed and earning less than minimum wage under current labor law. Judicial Notice may be

RODEL CRISOSTOMO v. PEOPLE (2010, Del Castillo) LD: In robbery with homicide, civil

Lil's Notes | Torts |24 Feb 2012

Bus moving from right to left, not left to right. Else wouldnt have hit jeep parked on the left side. CA: affirmed RTC with modification: o o o o o AD: 168,019.55 Temperate: 10K MD : 100K Unearned Income: 500K Civil Indemnity: 50K Lee Tan o o o o o o Civil Indemnity of 50K AD 127,192.85 MD: 80K Indemnity for loss of earning capacity: 1M Temperate Damages of 10K Costs SC: Award of 25K for ED is proper to deter other perverse fathers. SC: Affirms CA decision. said claim (even if less than minimum prescribed by law for the jurisdiction of said court, upon the theory that the right to recover AF Is but an incident of the case in which the services of counsel have been rendered. Also an assumption that court trying the case is to a certain degree already familiar with the nature and extent of the lawyer's services. THE RULE AGAINST MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS IS SUBSERVED. LD: Contract of Professional service different for Attorney's Fees as damages. o AF:as damages (Art 2208): Award made in favor of litigant, NOT his Counsel Litigant is judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for AF.

g.

Attorney's Fees

Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except: (1) When exemplary damages are awarded; (2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest; (3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff; (4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff; (5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim; (6) In actions for legal support; (7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers; (8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws; (9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime; (10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded; (11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable. JOHN QUIRANTE & DANTE CRUZ v. IAC, MANUEL CASASOLA & ESTRELLITA CASASOLA (1989, Regalado) LD: Claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the action in which the services have been rendered, or in a separate action. o If first alternative chosen, the Court may pass upon -

ISSUE: Is award of damages proper? (ReCOMPUTATION) SC: loss of income (evidence by Certificate of Creditable Income Tax Withheald at Source 950K), no award for copra business because no documentary proof. Computation of Net Earning Capacity: Net Earning Capacity (2/3 (80-65)) x (1M 80%(1M) ) 100K = 1M SC: Actual expenses substantiated by doc evidence only 114,948.6 while med expenses only 12,244.25 = 127,192.85 SC: MD of 50K correct. To obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone due to defendant's culpable action and must, perforce, be proportional to suffering inflicted. SC: Temperate Damages OK. 10K (damage caused to motorcycle) SC: Art 2224. Temperate Damages may be awarded when Pecuniary Loss has been suffered but its amount cannot from the nature of the case be proved with certainty. (Job estimate for repair 17K, not sufficient evidence) SC:Moral damages for physical injuries from 50K to 30K. prevailing jurisprudence. SC: Civil indemnity proper. 50K.Art 2206. DISPOSITIVE: Phil Hawk && Margarito Avila ordered to pay Vivan -

f.

In Rape Cases

PEOPLE v. NORBERTO ASTROLOGO (2007, CHICO-NAZARIO) LD: Civil Indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. LD: Case law also requires the AUTOMATIC AWARD of moral damages to a rape victim WITHOUT NEED OF PROOF because from thenature of the crime, it can be assumed that she has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. Such award is separate and distinct from civil indemnity. RTC: Finds Astrologo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of crime of rape (Art 266 of RPC) committed against his own daughter. o o o Reclusion Perpetua 75K civil indemnity MD: 75K

CA: Affirms RTC with modification o o o Reduces civil indemnity to 50K MD: 50K ED: 25K

LD: AF cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court. FACTS: Dr. Casasola sues his building contractor Norman Guerrero and Philamgen (surety) for failure to perform contract within specified period. RTC: Casasola wins. o Guerrero & Philamgen to pay:

ISSUE: Are damages correct? SC: Reduction in Civil indemnity proper because crime committed was SIMPLE RAPE.

AD: 129,430.00 MD: 50K ED: 40K AF: 30K

Guerrero Only: Liquidated Damages (300/day from 15 Dec 1978 to 16 Jul 1979) Philamgen: Amt in Surety Bond (120K)

SC: Filing the motion for confirmation of attorney's fees in the same action is also a proper remedy in our jurisprudence. NEVERTHELESS, the Casasola family may or may not ultimately be awarded the damages given by the RTC. (esp. since RTC ordered to certify Philamgen's appeal) Since the main case from which Quirante's claims for his fees may arise has not yet become final, the determination of the propriety of said fees and the amount thereof should be held in abeyance. SC: " an attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney's fee only arises when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid." SC: Alleged confirmation by heirs of oral contract should also be determined by lower court. Therefore, SC takes exception to and rejects the portion of the decision that holds that the alleged confirmation to Attorney's fees should not adversely affect the non-signatories thereto. Such holding may be pre-emptive of factual and evidentiary matters that may be presented.

NPC property in Baesa, QC. NPC requested MERALCO to disconnect electrical service of persons in the case. MERALCO & NPC conducted a joint survey. In due time, the electric service connection of Leoncio Ramoy, and his tenants was disconnected. (Even though Ramoy objected and showed that his house was outside NPC property and bec he was threatened with armed men who accompanied MERALCO employees) However, it was later discovered that Leoncio Ramoy's residence was OUTSIDE NPC property. RTC: Dismisses complaint of Ramoys, NO DAMAGES, but orders Meralco to restore electric power supply to Ramoys. CA: MERALCO to pay Leoncio Ramoy MD. ED & AF. Meralco at fault for not coordinating with court sheriff before complying with NPC's request. ISSUE: Is MERALCO liable for MD, ED, AF? SC: Meralco liable for damages under Art 1170 of NCC. (Breach of Contract) SC: Art 2220 o Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

Due to lack of power supply, Ramoy's tenants left. In Kierulf v. CA o While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is nevertheless essential that the claimant should satisfactorily show the existence of the factual basis of damages and its causal connection to defendant's acts. This is so because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, re in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.

o -

IAC dismisses petition for quashal of writ of execution. Case elevated to SC, still pending decision. Dr. Casasola dies, survived by family 18 Jun 1983: Atty Quirante files motion for confirmation of Attorney's Fees. Alleged had oral agreement with Dr. Casasola (alleged confirmed in writing by widow & daughters): o o If 120K surety bond recoverd: AF = 30K If damages awarded exceed 120K, damages to be divided equally b/w Heirs of Casasola, Atty John Quirante & Atty Dante Cruz.

In Francisco v. GSIS o There must be clear testimony on the anguish and other forms of mental suffering. Thus, if the plaintiff fails to take the witness stand and testify as to his/her social humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, moral damages cannot be awarded.

RTC: Grants motion of confirmation. If award of damages eventually ratified, the alleged confirmation (by family) of attorney's fees will not and should not adversely affect the nonsignatories thereto. SC: Counsel's claims for AF (as damages) may be asserted either in the very action in which the services in question have been rendered, or in a separate action. SC: However, what is being claimed here as attorney's fees by Quirante DIFFERENT from AF as an item of damages provided for under Art 2208. Here, Quirante's claims are based on an alleged contract for professional services, with Quirante et al as the creditors and the Casasola's as the debtors.

MANILA ELECTRIC CO v. MATILDE MACABAGDAL RAMOY, BIENVENIDO, ROMANA, ROSEMARIE, OFELIA DURIAN & CYRENE PANADO (2008, Austria-Martinez) LD: It is a hornbook principle that damages may be awarded only if proven. LD: In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. (should not just allege, take the witness stand and testify on mental anguish, etc, No other person could have proven moral suffering/damage) FACTS: NPC had won an ejectment case against several persons (incl Leoncio Ramoy) allegedly occupying -

In Cocoland Dev't Corp v. NLRC o Add'l facts must be pleaded and proved to warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil Code, these being.. social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc. that resulted therefrom."

SC: Meralco willfully cause injury (contrary to public policy) SC: Meralco's failure to exercise the utmost care and diligence in the performance of its obligation to Leoncio Ramoy, its customer, is TANTAMOUNT TO BAD FAITH. SC: Ramoy testified that he suffered wounded feelings bec of Meralco's action. -

SC: Since only Leoncio Ramoy testified on his wounded feelings, he

Lil's Notes | Torts |24 Feb 2012

is the only one who may be awarded Moral Damages. SC: With regard to exemplary damages, o Art 2232 of NCC provides that in contracts & quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if defendant acted in a WANTON, FRAUDULENT, RECKLESS, OPPRESSIVE or MALEVOLENT manner Art 2233 of NCC: Such damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right and the adjudication of the same is within the DISCRETION of the court. LD: Attorney's Fees are not awarded every time a party wins a suit, the court must explicitly state in the body of the decision, and not only in the dispositive portion thereof, the legal reason for the award for AF. FACTS: o Sps Briones: owners of Lot 2-S, but constructed house on 2-R. Refused to demolish upon discovery of mistake. Sps Macabagdal: owners of adjacent lot 2-R SC: No bad faith, no moral damages. Delete award to Vergon of compensatory damages and AF for litigation expenses because amounts were not specifically prayed for. SC: AF and litigation expenses recoverable only in the concept of actual damages, not as moral damages or judicial costs. They must be specifically prayed for and are not deemed incorporated within the general prayer of "such other relief and remedy as this court may deem just and equitable" SC: Body of trial court's decision was devoid of any statement regarding AF. SC: In Scott Consultants v. CA: o The power of the court to award AF under Art 2208 of Civil Code demands factual, legal & equitable justification its basis cannot be left to speculation or conjecture. Where granted, the court must explicitly state in the body of the decision, and not only in the dispositive portion of thereof, the legal reason for the award of AF. country. An employee stole 2 checks and had them encashed in the amount of 110K each in the Bank. Bank released the 220K despite irregularities in the checks. RTC: o o o CA: affirms Philippine Racing Club guilty of contributory negligence, should bear 40% of 220K (Actual damages) Delete award of AF and litigation expense. Not justified because the power of the court to award AF and litigation expenses under Art 2208 demands factual, legal and equitable justification. An adverse decision does not ipso facto justify an award of AF to the winning party. Even when claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still AF may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party's persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause. 220K wih legal interest 20K AF 10K litigation expenses and costs of suit.

o -

RTC and CA ruled in favor of Macabagdal. o Briones to demolish improvement or compensate Macabagdals by payment of prevailing price of Lot 2-R which should be greater than 1500/sqm MD: 50K, for shattering Macabagdal's dream of building their own house on their own lot. AF: 30K, costs. Briones also to pay Vergonville Realty 20K compensatory damages, and AF: 10K

SC: Meralco's actions not wanton, or malevolent. Meralco made some effort by conducting joint survey. Exemplary damages should not be awarded. SC: AF should be deleted since Art 2208 states that in the absence of stipulation, AF cannot be recovered except in cases provided for in Art. 2208. Art 2208 (1), when exemplary damages are awarded.

o o

SC: Remand to RTC. o o o Delete Moral Damages to Macabagdals Delete AD and AF to Vergon Determine present fair price, expenses, increase in value, etc. 15 day period for Macabagdals to decide which option to take.

LUCIANO & NELLY BRIONES v. JOSE & FE MACABAGDAL, VERGON REALTY INVESTMENTS CORP. (2010, Villarama) LD: Requisites for Recovery of Damages under Art 2176 o o Damages suffered by plaintiff Fault or negligence of defendant or some other person for who act he must respond The connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.

Briones: They should not bear the damage alone. Relied on Vergon's agents. Builders in good faith. SC: Sps Briones builders in good faith. However, choice of demolition or compensation lies with the OWNER OF THE LAND. (Art 448). They have right to be indemnified for necessary and useful expenses. SC: Vergon not negligent because signing of President of building permit only authority to build in subdivision and not in a particular lot. SC: Sps Briones did not show authority of agents pointing out the lot or negligence of Vergon.

SPS MOISES & CLEMENCIA ANDRADA v. PILHINO SALES CORP repped by Br Mgr JOJO SAET (2011, Bersamin) LD: It is well accepted in this jurisdiction that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate and that not every winning party is entitled to an automatic grant of AF. LD: The award of AF is the exception rather than the rule. Its basis cannot be left to speculation and conjecture. FACTS: Sps Jose Andrado owe Pilhino 240K. Pilhino sues Jose and attaches a Hino

BANK OF AMERICA NT & SA v. PHILIPPINE RACING CLUB (2009, Leonardo-De Castro) FACTS: Check signatories of PRC pre-signed checks so as not to disrupt operations while they were out of the

truck. Pilhino wins, and is highest bidder in public action. However, Pilhino unable to transfer truck in its name because truck was already registered in Moises Andrada's name and mortgaged to BA Finance. Moises fails to pay BA Finance, BA Finance sues Moises and seized truck from possession of Pilhino. BA Finance highest bidder in public sale. Compromise Agreement RTC: Sale b/w Jose and Moises simulated, dismissed Moises' counterclaim for damages, approved of compromise agreement CA: Affirms RTC decision except for declaring sale b/w Jose & Moises valid. No damages for Moises. ISSUE: Should Pilhino be liable for damages Moises sustained from levy of truck? (NO) SC: Moises counterclaim based on Art 21. However, no legal injury occurred. Pilhino in good faith. SC: Moises seek AF based on Art 2208(4) In the absence of stipulation, AF and expense of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except: o (4) in cases of clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff

interest as a part of the damages may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the court. Article 2212. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, although the obligation may be silent upon this point. (1109a) Article 2213. Interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages, except when the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. BOBIE ROSE FRIAS (REPRESENTED BY MARIE FUJITA) VS. FLORA SAN DIEGOSISON (J. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, 2007) FACTS: LD: The payment of regular interest constitutes the price or cost of the use of money and this, until the principal sum due is returned to the creditor, regular interest continues to accrue since the debtor continues to use such principal amount. (against unjust enrichment) Owner of House & Lot: Bobie Rose Frias Potential Buyer: Dra Flora San DiegoSison 7 Dec 1990: MOA o o o Purchase Price 6.4M DP of 3M (but only 2M paid, 1M stale check) 6 months for Dra Flora to make up her mind on buying property In this 6 months, Frias free to offer property to other parties. If sold, Frias to return 3M with prevailing compounded interest to Dra. Flora. Moreover, any amount in excess of 7M will also be given to Dra. Flora If Dra. Flora decides not to buy property, consider 3M a loan, and Frias to return 3M to Dra. Flora after 6mos with compounded interest prevailing for the last 6 -

months. o Frias gives TCT to Dra Flora

Sale does not push through, but Frias does not return 3M Frias executes affidavit of loss for TCT and gets a new one. Dra. Flora sues for recovery of 3M + interest RTC: o 2M + 32% interest compounded from 7 Dec 1991 until fully paid. 70K premiums paid on attachment bond 100K moral, corrected and exemplary damages 100K AF

it was expected for Frias to turn over the 2 million over to Sison, but she failed to do so. In turn, the SC states that, as discussed in State Investment House vs. CA, as the debtor continues to be in possession of the principal of the loan (and therefore take advantage of possession of the principal to enrich oneself), it would be unjust to not charge the price of such an advantage. As the payment of interest constitutes the price of the use of money, until the principal is returned in full to the owner of the money (in this case, Sison), the debtor Frias regular interest will continue to accrue while Frias is in possession of the principal. DISPOSITIVE: CA Decision Affirmed, with Modification of Deletion of Attorneys Fees. SORIAMONT STEAMSHIP AGENCIES & PATRICK RONAS v. SPRINT TRANSPORT SERVICES, RICARDO PAPA (PAPA TRANSPORT SERVICES) (2009, ChicoNazario) Sprint sues Soriamont for failure to pay rentals of 2 chassis units it leased and failure to return the 2 chassis Soriamont loses because it was shown that it authorized PTS and Rebson Trucking to withdraw the equipment from Sprint (Agency) RTC: o 320K: value of 2 chassis with interest at legal rate from filing of complaint 270,124,42: unpaid rentals with interest at legal rate from filing of complaint 20K AF Rate of Interest shall be increased to 12% once decision becomes final and executor.

o o o

CA: reduces interest to 25% p.a. from 7 June 1991 until fully paid

ISSUES: WON compounded interest should be limited to 6 months as per MOA. NO. CA decision upheld. WON compounded interest should start from 7 Dec 1991 or 7 Jun 1991? (7 June 1991) HELD: Frias contends that the MOA provides that if Sison decides not to purchase the property, Frias has another 6 months to pay only, as stated in the third paragraph of the MOA. The SC, however, agrees with the CA in its interpretation of the six-month period only clause: the first 6 months will not be charged with interest while Sison makes up her mind, while the second set of 6 months will already be charged with interest since by that time, Sison will have expressed her decision to not buy the property, in which case Frias is bound to return it to her with interest (as it will be similar to a loan). There is nothing stated in the agreement that limits the interest that will be charged against Frias. Considering that by the second 6-month period, -

SC: No bad faith by Pilhino, so cannot recover AF based on Art 2208(4)

o o

h.

Interest

Article 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum. (1108) Article 2210. Interest may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract. Article 2211. In crimes and quasi-delicts,

CA: affirms RTC with modification that specific rate of interest on rental and cost of chassis is 6% p.a. to be increased to 12% p.a. from finality of this decision until its full satisfaction SC: CA adjustment of interest rates correct. Obligation is not a loan or forbearance of money.

Lil's Notes | Torts |24 Feb 2012

SC: Cites Eastern Shipping vs. CA SC: Interim period between final judgment and satisfaction is a forbearance of credit. CA: PCI to pay1.516M with legal interest of 12%. Pan Pacific contends that interest rate should be 18% instead of 12% ISSUE: Should interest rate be 12% or 18%? (18%) CA decided that rate should be 12% because there was no stipulation in price adjustment for the rate of interest. Pan Pacific should have gotten the consent of PCI for interest in case of delay of payment of Price Adjustment. SC: Interest should be at 18% based on the contract b/w Pan Pacific and PCI o 2.5 If any payment is delayed, the Contractor may charge interest thereon at the current bank lending rates, without prejudice to Owner's recourse to any other remedy available under existing law. 70.1 : increase or decrease of cost 70.2: " add'l or reduced cost shall, after due consultation with the Owner and Contractor, be determined by the Engineer and shall be added to or deducted from the Contract Price and the Engineer shall notify the Contractor accordingly, with a copy to the Owner. Sec 2.6 and Sec 60.10 show that consent of PCI not needed for the imposition of interest at the current banking lending rate, which occurs upon any delay in payment. 4. SC: The written agreement entered into b/w Pan Pacific and Bank provides for an interest at the current bank lending rate in case of delay in payment and the PN charged an interest rate of 18%.

PAN PACIFIC SERVICE CONTRACTORS INC, and RICARDO DEL ROSARIO v. EPCI, formerly PCI Bank. (2010, Carpio) Pan Pacific enters into a contract for mechanical works on PCI Bank's airconditioning system. The contract price was ~23.3M The contract also stipulated that Pan Pacific is entitled to a price adjustment in case of increase in labor costs and prices of materials (70.1 and 70.2) 1990: Labor Costs & Prices of materials escalated o Pan Pacific: 5.165M adjustment later reduced to 4.858M TCGI Engr recommend 3.730M based on Labor & Price Indices.

Duty to Minimize

Article 2203. The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question. Article 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover. Article 2215. In contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts, the court may equitably mitigate the damages under circumstances other than the case referred to in the preceding article, as in the following instances: (1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened the terms of the contract; (2) That the plaintiff has derived some benefit as a result of the contract; (3) In cases where exemplary damages are to be awarded, that the defendant acted upon the advice of counsel; (4) That the loss would have resulted in any event; (5) That since the filing of the action, the defendant has done his best to lessen the plaintiff's loss or injury.

PCI withholds payment of price adjustment and Pan Pacific was having trouble funding the project. Its president, Del Rosario, was constrained to execute a promissory note in the amount of 1.8M in order to pay its laborers and suppliers. 1.8M loan matures but Pan Pacific refuses to pay, saying 1.8M was an advance payment for the price adjustment. PN was null and void. Pan Pacific refuses PCI's offer to offset Price adjustment with loan + interest + penalties, but agrees to the reduced price adjustment of 3.730M less 1.8M and 414K advance payment. Pan Pacific files for declaration of nullity of PN, sum of money and damages vs. PCI RTC: PN void, PCI to pay 1.389M as unpaid balance of price adjustment with interest of 12% starting 6 May 1994 (date complaint filed) until fully paid, 100K MD, 50K ED, 50K AD -

o o

SC: Art 2209

C. a.

Moral Damages Purpose

VICTOR & LUCILA KIERULF and PORFIRIO LEGASPI v. CA and PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC. (1997, Panganiban) PANTRANCO v. SPS. KIERULF and LEGASPI LD: Moral Damages though incapable of pecuniary estimation are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimants for actual injury and are not meant to enrich complainant at the expense of defendant. LD: The social and financial standing of a claimant of moral damages may be considered in awarding moral damages ONLY if he or she was subjected to contemptuous conduct despite the offender's knowledge of his or her social and financial standing. LD: Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the SPIRITUAL status quo ante, thus, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. LD: Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right. ED are awarded at court's discretion o May be imposed by way of example or correction only in addition, among others, to compensatory damages, and cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant. The claimant must first establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated r compensatory damages -

The wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and the award would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

28 Feb 1987: vehicular accident in EDSA Balintawak b/w Pantranco bus and Isuzu pickup driven by Legaspi with owner/passenger Lucila Kierulf. Pantranco: Fortuitous event. Used Engine Differential of Junk Trunk in front of bus accidentally fell and hit the under chassis of bus, making bus' driver lose control and go over central island, bump pick up, hit pedestrian and gas station. RTC: Pantranco negligent o o o o o Lucila: AD 174,100.77, MD 100K, ED 10K Victor: 96,825.15 for damage to pick-up AD for treatment of driver: 6328.19 Legaspi: 10K MD 25K AF, costs

and impairment or destruction of sexual life (Pantranco answers that Art 2219 provides only person suffering injury may claim MD) US Case: Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel: Couple in their 20s married for only 16mos. Husband paralyzed when hit by 600lb pipe. Wife suffered, no children, no sex, stress of taking care of invalid, etc. Doctrine in Rodriguez: when a person is injured to the extent that he/she is no longer capable of giving love, affection, comfort or sexual relations to spouse, that spouse has suffered a direct and real personal

loss. The loss is immediate and consequenti al rather than remote and unforeseea ble. It is personal to the spouse and separate and distinct from that of injured person. o o o o Exemplary: 500K and 50K Lost Income of Lucila Increase award for pick up to 107K Legal interest on damages

CA: o o o o Lucila: AD: 241,861.81, MD 200K, ED 100K Victor: same as RTC Legaspi: same AD, MD 25K 50K AF, costs.

SC: The established guideline in awarding moral damages takes into consideration several factors, some of which are the social and financial standing of the injured parties and their wounded moral feelings and personal pride. SC: No moral damages for "loss of consortium" because not supported by evidence. Lucila may have been badly disfigured (No teeth, thick chin, etc), but Victor did not testify that as a consequence his right to marital consortium was affected, unlike the Rodriguez spouse. For LACK OF FACTUAL BASIS, such claim cannot be ruled upon by Court. SC: The social & financial standing of Lucila cannot be considered in awarding moral damages. There was no "rude and rough" reception, no "menacing attitude" etc given to her. (see Legal Doctrine #2) SC: No award for loss of earnings because no proof. ITR for past 2 years missing.

Kierulfs and Legaspi want more damages o Moral Damages: 1M & 100K Victor is claiming based on loss of conjugal fellowship

Lil's Notes | Torts |29 Feb 2012

SC: Gross Negligence by Pantranco. SC: In order that Moral Damages may be awarded: o Pleading and Proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright & the like No proof of pecuniary loss needed Amount of indemnity at discretion of Court. Factual Basis of damages Causal connection to defendant's acts. Clear testimony on anguish and other forms of mental suffering. If injured fails to take witness stand, moral damages cannot be awarded. o o claimant There must be a culpable act or omission factually established. The wrongful act or omission of the defendant must be the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant. The award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Art 2219 of the NCC. NCC. FACTS: Dr. Cenon Curso presumed dead from sinking of M/C Dona Marilyn at sea during Typhoon Unsang. o 48yrs old, 3940/mo salary, retirement age from gov't 65. caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least 3000, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition: o Defendant shall be liable for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased, and indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter, such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death; If the deceased was obliged to give support accdg to the provisions of Art 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding 5 years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

o o o o o

Dr. Curso's closest relatives were his brothers and sisters. They sued Sulpicio Lines to claim damages based on breach of contract of carriage by sea. They want: o o o o A/C D: 1.924M MD: 100K ED: proper & just Litigation costs at least 50K, AF 50K, costs. o

LD: The omission from Art 2206(3) of brother & sisters of the deceased passenger reveals the legislative intent to exclude them from the recovery of moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. LD: To be entitled to moral damages, a party must have a right based in law. While under Art 1003 of the NCC, siblings of Dr. Curso succeeded to his entire estate in the absence of ascendants, descendants, illegitimate children and surviving spouse, however, they were not included among the persons entitled to recover moral damages, as enumerated in Art 2219 of the NCC. StatCon: Ejusdem Generis: Art 2219 does not included succession in the collateral line as a source of the right to recover moral damages the phrase "analogous cases" simply means that the situation must be held similar to those expressly enumerated in Art 2219. Art 1003 is not concerened with recovery of moral damages. LD: As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on breach of contract, UNLESS there is fraud or bad faith. As an EXCEPTION, moral damages may be awarded in case of breach of contract of CONTRACT of CARRIAGE that results in the death of a passenger, in accordance with Art 1764, in relation to Art 2206 (3), of the

RTC: Sinking due to force majeure. Failure to prove claims CA: Sulpicio negligent, should have monitored weather, ship no seaworthy o o o o MD: 100K Death Indemnity: 50K Loss of earning cap: 503,241.20 Costs of suit o

SC: Damages: o o o Lucila: 400K MD, 200K ED Legaspi: 25K ED, 16500 loss of earnings All other CA awards affirmed with 6% legal interest

SULPICIO LINES INC. v. DOMINGO CURSO etal (2010, Bersamin) LD: The purpose of moral damages is indemnity or reparation, that is, to enable the injured party to obtain the means, diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of the tragic event, LD: Conditions for awarding moral damages: o There must be injury, whether physical, mental, or psychological, clearly substantiated by

Sulpicio: Receiver for North Negros v. Ybanes: SC disallowed award of moral damages to brother and sisters of deceased passenger in action for breach of contract of carriage. ISSUE: Are siblings of deceased passenger in a case of breach of contract of carriage entitled to an award of moral damages vs carrier? (NO) Art 1764: Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in accordance with Title 18 of this Book, concerning Damages. Art 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger by breach of contract by a common carrier. Art 2206: The amt of damages

SC: Sulpicio correct to rely on Receiver of North Negros v. Ybanez. In case of death caused by quasidelict, the brother of the deceased was not entitled to the award of MD based on Art 2206 of NCC. SC: Art 2219 SC: Moral damages may be recovered in an action upon breach of contract of carriage only when

o o

Where the death of a passenger results It is proved that the carrier is guilty of fraud and bad faith, even if death does not result

and Art 2220 of NCC. LD: While amount of ED need not be proved, plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of WoN exemplary damages should be awarded. FACTS: 3 May 1989: Speeding 10wheeler driven by Onofre River (driver of BF Metal) rammed into the jeep driven by Rico Umuyon (jeep owned by Sps Lomotan) o o Jeep: Total Wreck Umuyon suffered sever injuries, hospitalized 19days. Reduced income bec can no longer driver (300 to 150/day) -

entitled to moral damages? (NO) SC: Aparty's entitlement to damages is ultimately a question of law because not only must it be proved factually, but also its legal justification must be shown. Valuation of Wrecked Jeep: Job estimate v. Acquisition Cost less 10% depreciation after 1 year. SC: No evidence of amount actually spent to repair jeep. Cost estimates not competent to prove actual damages. No-no: speculation/ conjecture. Best evidence deed of sale of jeep (72K). No depreciation deducted absent proof. SC: Rivera (driver of BF) is also liable for moral damages to Umuyon (driver) based on either culpa criminal or quasi-delict. For quasi-delict, o When an act or omission causes physical injuries, or Where the defendant is guilty of intentional tor, moral damages may be aptly recovered. (also applicable to breaches of contract where defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith)

SC: Trend in jurisprudence: Death: 50K-100K MD. Since Umuyon did not die, 30K MD enough. SC: No legal basis for awarding Sps Lomotan moral damages. o Art 2219: Physical injuries: liable only to Umuyon Art 2220: Injury to Property: MD only if injury is wilfull. No evidence that accident was willful.

SC: Art 2206 entitles descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children and surviving spouses of the deceased passenger to demand moral damages for mental aguish by reason of the death of the deceased. SC: delete 100K MD.

B.F. METAL CORP v. SPS ROLANDO & LINAFLOR LOMOTAN & RICO UMUYON (2008, Tinga) LD: Moral damage are not punitive in nature but are designed to compensate and alleviate the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar harm unjustly caused to a person. LD: In order that an award of moral damages can be aptly justified, the claimant must be able to satisfactorily prove that he has suffered such damages and that the injury causing has sprung from any of the cases listed in Art 2219 & 2220 of NCC. o Evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental, psychological suffering sustained by claimant. Culpable act or omission factually established. Proof that wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by claimant That the case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Art 2219 -

SC: Sps Lomotan entitled to compensatory damages, Umuyon can recover compensatory & moral damages. SC: o AD: 72K (jeep), 30K (MD to Umuyon) other awards affirmed with 6% interest, 12%

Sps Lomotan institute separate & independent civil action for damages vs BF Metal & Rivera. Asks for award of actual, exemplary, moral damages & AF Criminal case finds Rivera guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with physical injuries. RTC: o AD: 96700 (jeep), 15K (med exp), 50K loss of earnings of Umuyon MD: 100K ED: 100K AF 25K + 1K for every hearing., costs

EXPERT TRAVEL & TOURS v. CA & RICARDO LO (1999, Vitug) LD: Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused to a person. LD: Requisites for award of Moral Damages: o o o o Injury, physical, mental, psychological Culpable act or omission established Act or omission proximate cause of injury Award of damages predicated on any of the cases in Art 2219.

o o o

For culpa criminal, moral damages could be lawfully due when: o Accused guilty of physical injuries, lascivious acts, adultery and concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention, illegal arrest & search or defamation (Art 2219 mostly) -

o o

CA: Affirms RTC with modification o AD: 130,655.00 (jeep), 10,167.99 (med exp), 2850 (lost earnings) MD: 100K ED: 100K AF: 25K, costs

o o o -

ISSUE: WoN Sps Lomotan are also

SC: BF Metal liability based on quasidelict or negligence in the supervision and selection of its driver. So liable for MD to driver Umuyon. Moreover, since criminal case did not award moral damages, moral damages may be awarded in the civil suit.

LD: Requisites for awarding MD (4)

Lil's Notes | Torts |29 Feb 2012

LD (Obiter??): In culpa contractual: MD may be recovered if defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation, and exceptionally, when the breach of contract itself is constitutive of tort resulting in physical injuries. LD: Art 1764 in re 2206: MD awarded in case of death of passenger from breach of carriage. LD: In quasi-delict/culpa acquiliana: o o When act or omission causes physical injuries Where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort. times be a legal justification for an award of AF, such filing, however, has almost invariably been held not to be a ground for moral damages. SC: The rationale for the rule is that the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. The anguish suffered by a person for having been made a defendant in a civil suit would be no different from the usual worry and anxiety suffered by anyone who is haled to court, a situation that cannot by itself be a cogent reason for the award of moral damages (???) SC: If the rule were otherwise, then moral damages must every time be awarded in favor of the prevailing defendant against an unsuccessful plaintiff. SC: Award of MD deleted. Even before Mano had purchased the land, he had it surveyed. The survey measured land as 2739sqm. Jose Mano applies for Free Patent using survey measurement of 2739sqm. OCT issued Jose Mano sells portion of land (2292sqm) to Roberto Balingcongan and retains 447sqm. (2 TCTs issued for 2292sqm land, and 447sqm land) 1999: Federico instructs his nephew to built a perimeter fence around his property, but prevented by Jose Mano, claiming that 447 sqm was his property under TCT RTC: Disputed area of 447sqm belongs to Federico, Jose Mano to pay Fedrico 50K MD, 30K ED, AF. Cancel TCT of Jose Mano. CA: Reversed and set aside RTC ruling. Jose Mano owner of land. Failure to prove fraud. ISSUE: SC: Preponderance of evidence that Federico is owner of land.(based on Deed of Sale b/w Mano & Feliciano). Ocular Inspection, etc.Testimony of Feliciano (aware that eastern part of prop belonged to Andres/Federico). SC: The Torrens System is intended to guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of the cert of reg but is not intended to perpetrate fraud against the real owner of the land. TCT cannot be used to protect usurper from true owner. SC: Jose committed fraud in obtaining the title to the disputed property because he had the survey done before buying the property (???) and stated survey measurement in application for Free Patent. SC: See Legal Doctrine: MD: there must be bad faith in causing mental anguish, etc. SC: CA decision reversed and set aside. RTC decision reinstated. PNR v. BRUNTY supra LD: The relatives of the victim who incurred physical injuries in a quasidelict are not proscribed from recovering moral damages in meritorious cases. LD: Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, etc. and similar injury unjustly caused a person. LD: Even though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages must be nevertheless be somehow proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted FACTS: Rhonda, daughter of Ethel Brunty dies when Mercedes Benz she was riding collides with PNR train. PNR negligent. RTC: o o o o 30K, death of Rhonda 1M moral and actual damages to heirs. Damage to Mercedes Benz: 72760 AF: 50K

LD: Culpa criminal: accused guilty o fphysical injuries, lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention, etc MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. Analogous cases refers to similar to those expressly enumerated in Art 2219. FACTS: Lo bought round trip tickets to HK from Expert Travel. (39,677.20). Demands payment from Lo and sues him for recovery of amount plus damages. Lo says he gave 42,175.20 to Ms Ma Rocio de Vega, chairperson of Expertravel through check. Ms. De Vega issued 50K to Expertravel with notation "placement advance for Ricardo Lo, etc). Expertravel had issued an invoice for transaction. RTC: Lo wins. Payment to de Vega valid. o Expertravel to pay Lo 30K MD, 10K AF, costs.

SPS FEDERICO & LUZ VALENZUELA v. SPS JOSE & ROSANNA MANO (2010, Del Castillo) LD: When a person committed fraud in obtaining title to a disputed property he should be liable for both moral and exemplary damages. LD: Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. LD: The person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith. FACTS: Land Dispite Federico is the son of Andres Valenzuela, and currently owns and possesses a parcel of land 938sqm in Dampol 1st, Pulilan Bulacan (no TCT, Declaration of Real Property 7187 under father's name, Tax Dec under Federico's name) 7 Feb 1991: Feliciano Geronimo sells 2056sqm (size under Deed of Sale) parcel of land to Jose Mano.

CA: Affirms with MOD. 30K to 50K indemnity, delete award for damage to Mercedes Benz SC: No proof of actual damages. However, since relatives of Rhonda undeniably incurred expenses for the wake and burial of Rhonda, temperate damages of 25K awarded based on prevailing jurisprudence. SC: Testimony of Ethel ",,, I felt earnest anguish she was my life just like losing my own life or worse in constant medication to be able to sleep does not take away pain and loss.." SC: MD 500K proper. Prevailing jurisprudence 50K indemnity and 50K AF

CA: Affirms RTC ISSUE: WoN moral damages may be recovered in a clearly unfounded suit? (NO) SC: Purpose of MD: Not punitive, but to compensate mental anguish, etc. SC: Although the institution of a clearly unfounded civil suit can at -

popular, limited time slot, etc. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING v. CA, REPUBLIC BROADCASTING CORP, VIVA PRODUCTIONS, INC & VICENTE DEL ROSARIO (1999, Davide) LD: The award of Moral Damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation because, being an artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses. It cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish, which can be experienced only by one having a nervous system. (People v. Manero /Mambulao Lumber v. PNB, statement that a corp. may recover damages if it "has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social humiliation" is obiter dictum) LD: Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose penalty on wrongdoer. The award is not meant to enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant, but to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to obviate the moral suffering he has undergone. It is aimed at the restorantion, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. LD: Trial court smust guard against the award of exorbitant damages, they should exercise balanced restrained and measured objectivity to avoid suspicion that it was due to passion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the trial court. FACTS: Film Exhibition Agreement: o ABS-CBN has first refusal to the next 24 Viva films for TV telecast. Right to be exercised by ABS=CBN in writing Viva (thru del Rosario) offers 52 orig titles and 52 reruns for 60M, ABS CBN counters with 14 films for 36M. Misunderstanding in restaurant. Official offer from ABS-CBN (53 films for 35M). Rejected by Viva Board Viva contracts with RBS (GMA 7) for 60M 104films ABS sues RBS, VIVA. Causes delay in airing of Maging Sino Ka Man + 13 other films (TRO) In the end, court rules that there is no perfected contract b/w ABS-CBN and VIVA. ABS CBN did not exercise its right of first refusal. ABS-CBN to pay: o Premiums on surety bond paid by RBS: 107,727.00 Print adverstising for Maging Sino Ka Man: 191,843.00 AF: 1M MD: 5M ED: 5M o

bad faith For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; (8) Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in article 309; (Article 309. Any person who shows disrespect to the dead, or wrongfully interferes with a funeral shall be liable to the family of the deceased for damages, material and moral). (10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35. The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages. The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named. Article 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. SULPICIO LINES v. CURSO supra B.F. METAL v. LOMOTAN supra

SC: Art 20 General Sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction. SC: Art 21: deals with acts contra bonus mores: o o There is an act w/c is legal But which is contrary to morals, good customs, public order, public policy It is done with intent to injure.

o -

SC: Malice and bad faith at the core of Art 19,20, 21.Malice must be substantiated with evidence. SC: Moral damages is not warranted where the record is bereft of any proof that a party acted maliciously or in bad faith in filing an action. Free resort to courts for redress of wrongs is a matter of public policy. SC: Corporations cannot be awarded Moral Damages. SC: CA decision reversed except for AF. No Moral or exemplary damages. Damnum Absque Injuria.

o o o -

CA: affirms RTC. Moral damages ok because RBS's reputation debased by non-showing of film "Maging Sino Ka Man". ED ok bec ABS-CBN sued despite knowledge that it had no cause of action bec contract not perfected. Reduced MD to 2M, ED to 2M and AF to 200K ISSUE: Can RBS recover Moral Damages? (NO) SC: Claim of RBS against ABS-CBN is not based on contract, quasicontract, or quasi-delict. Hence, the claims for moral and exemplary damages can only be based on Art 19, 20, 21 of NCC. SC: The elements of abuse of right under Art 19 are: o o Existence of legal right or duty Which is exercised in

b. When Recoverable

Article 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission. Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

ERLINDA FRANCISCO doing business under Cebu Fountainhead Bakeshop and JULIANA PAMAONG v. RICARDO FERRER JR, ANNETTE FERRER, ERNOSTO & REBECCA LO (2001, Pardo) LD: Moral damages may be awarded in breaches of contracts where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation and, exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract itself is constitutive of tort resulting in physical injuries. LD: It must be shown that the proximate cause of besmirched

o -

Concio complains that of the list of 3 packages, only likes 10 (Maging Sino Ka Man). Action movies not too

Lil's Notes | Torts |29 Feb 2012

reputation, sleepless nights, etc. was unlawful act or omission of defendant. LD: Conditions required in awarding Moral Damages o Injury, mental , physical, psychological sustained by claimant o Culpable act or omission factually established o Wrongful acct or omission proximate cause of injury o Award of damages predicated on any of cases stated in Art 2219 of NCC LD: Exemplary Damages Reqs: o May be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages o Cannot be recovered as a matter of right o Act must be accompanied by bad faith, or done in wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, malevolent manner. FACTS: Mrs Lo and daughter Annette order 3-layer wedding cake from Fountainhead Bakeshop. Cake did not arrive on time. Excuses: o 7pm: traffic, on the way o 8pm: no wedding cake, because order slip got lost Because of tradition of cutting wedding cake, couple just bought only available cake: sans rival 10pm: 2 layer cake delivered by bakeshop. Not accepted. After wedding, Erlinda apologizes and gives 5K check. Rejected. Ferrers & Los sue Bakeshop for breach of contract and damages. RTC: cost of cake (3175), MD (30K), AF (10K), costs. CA: o MD: 250K o ED: 100K o Cost of wedding cake: 3175 o AF: 10K o Costs of litigation ISSUE: WoN Moral Damages recoverable and what amount is correct. SC: There was no fraud or bad faith in this case. SC: See conditions needed to award MD. SC: However, for prevaricating that cake was on the way when no cake was made at all, Bakeshop liable for nominal damages for insensitivity, inadvertence or inattention to customer's anxiety and need of the hour. SC: Nominal damages are recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have benn or can be shown. SC: Purpose of Nominal Damages: Recognizing the right violated, not indemnifying plaintiff for any loss suffered. SC: Bakeshop to pay cost of wedding cake (3175), Nominal Damages (10K), AF (10K), costs. Bus was speeding and racing with another Bus in South Expressway and bumped rear left side portion of Bondad's Jeepney which was at full stop due to a flat tire, The impact caused the Bus to collide with the right portion of Morales' Moving Car. Car was dragged and hit concrete wall All vehicles sustained damage and occupant of Bus and Jeepney were injured and brought to hospital. (Traffic Investigation Report) Industrial Insurance pays Morales 29800 for damage to her insured car. Industrial sues driver of Bus and Jeepney, as well as their employers for negligence to recover amount paid. Bondads: Industrial Insurance acted in bad faith in impleading them, and no prior demand had been made upon them. o DM Transit and Mendoza to pay Industrial Insurance 29800 (amt paid to Grace Morales, 2K Litigation expenses, 15K AF Industrial Insurance to pay Bondads AF: 15K, Appearance fees: 6300 Expenses for 21 hearings (jeepney, meals) 10500 (AlaminosMakati) MD: 75K ED: 25K Cross claimants to pay Bondad 8K, cost of jeepney repairs +interest CA: Affirms RTC but reduces damages to MD 50K, ED 10K, deletes 10500. (Bondads were compelled to litigate an unfounded suit because of Industrial's negligence and lack of prudence in not verifying the facts before filing this action.) SC: Clear from Traffic Report that there contact b/w Jeepney (full stop) and Car was due to Bus. SC: Suit manifestly unjustified. Industrial knew that Bondads were not the cause of the accident, Evident from failure to even make prior formal demand on Bondads before initiating suit. SC: SC: Absence of good faith is shown by the fact that Industrial Insurance recklessly filed suit anyway and wantonly pursued pointless appeals, thereby causing Bondads to spend valuable time, money and effort in unnecessarily defending themselves, incurring damages in the process.

EXPERT TRAVEL v. CA supra INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE v. BONDAD LD: Reqs for Moral Damages: o o Claimant suffers injury Injury spring from cases listed in Art 2219 and 2220 It is not enough that the claimant alleges mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like as a result of the acts of the other party. It is necessary that such acts be shown to have been tainted with bad faith or ill motive. o

TRIPLE EIGHT INTEGRATED SERVICE, INC v. NLRC & ERLINDA OSDANA (1998, Romero) LD: Moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. FACTS: Erlinda recruited by Triple Eight for employment with its principal, Gulf Catering Co (GCC) in Saudi Arabia. Erlinda was supposed to be a "food server" for 36 months with salary of 550 Saudi rials Erlinda paid 11950 placement fee + charges, no OR or medical exam Employment Contract: Waitress, 12mos, US$280/mo, approved by POEA In Saudi Arabia, Erlinda did not work as food server, worked as dishwasher, janitor, other jobs unrelated to waitressing. Worked 12 hours a day. No overtime Erlinda suffered pain and numbness in arms. Confined to Lady's Villa (Jun-

LD: As a rule, a person's right to litigate should not be penalized. The right, however, must be exercised in good faith. FACTS: Vehicular incident involving 3 vehicles

Aug) No pay while not working Erlinda worked again at a Hospital 7 days a week, no salary, confined again. Erlinda diagnosed with Bilateral Carpal Tunnel Syndrome. Hospitalized and had 2 surgeries. No work After 2nd operation, good improvement 4 days later dismissed, no separation pay or payment of salaries when not working RA8042: Migrant Workers & Overseas Filipino Act (jurisdiction with NLRC) NLRC: US$2499 salaries, US$1076 salary differential, 50K MD, 20K ED, 10% AF Labor Code: Must present medical certificate that employee's condition/illness cannot be cured within 6months. If no medical cert, cannot dismiss but just take leave, must reinstate after 6mos. (Art 284 of Labor Code, Sec 8 Rule 1 Book 6 of Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code) SC: Manner by which Erlinda was terminated was a violation of Labor Code. SC: Moral damages proper but should be reduced. NLRC affirmed and modified: o USD 1260 salaries for unexpired term of contract, USD 1076 unpaid salaries for 7 months and underpaid salary of 1 month o MD : 30K o ED: 10K o AF: 10% SC: Decision is without prejudice to any remedy or claim Triple Eight may institute against its foreign principal, GCC.

Epifanio & Teodorico Cleopas struck Pedro with an iron pipe and piece of wood, respectively. Pedro dies. Accused convicted mostly based on testimony of eyewitness Cipriano Supero RTC: Cleopas & Pirame guilty of MURDER o Reclusion Perpetua o Civil Indemnity: 50K o Burial and incidental expenses: 23214 o MD: 50K o ED: 50K SC: Affirms conviction but deletes moral and exemplary damages because widow did not testify on any mental anguish or emotional distress which she suffered as a result of her husband's death.

CARLOS ARCONA y MOBAN v. CA & PEOPLE (2002, Ynares-Santiago) LD: Moral Damages must be awarded even in the absence of any allegation and proof of heirs' emotional suffering. o As borne by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim's family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. o Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. For this reason, moral damages must be awarded even in the absence of any allegation and proof of heirs' emotional

suffering. 1986: Brothers Carlos and Benito Arcona charged with Murder and Frustrated Murder Napoleon Ong and Edgardo Talanquines walking along national highway (Palawan) from a birthday party. Near house of Jerry Boston, Edgardo hear a loud thud, saw Napoleon slump to the ground (stabbed in the stomach, died). Meanwhile, Edgardo hit with a piece of bamboo from behind, fell, stood up and ran towards house to ask for help. Carlos Arcona voluntarily surrendered. (Self-Defense) RTC: Convicted Carlos of Homicide. o 6-14 yrs o Death indemnity: 30K o Actual Damages: 10K o Moral Damages: 10K CA: Affirmed RTC but increased Civil Indemnity to 50K SC: Moral damages should be increased from 10K to 50K. see Legal Doctrine.

SPS VALENZUELA v. SPS MANO supra RODOLFO REGALA v. FEDERICO CARIN (2011, Carpio Morales) LD: To be entitled to moral damages, the claimant must satisfactorily prove that he has suffered damages and that the injury causing it has sprung from any of the cases listed in Art 2219 and 2220 of NCC. The damages must be shown to be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission. The claimant must this establish the factual basis of the damages and its causal tie with the acts of the defendant. LD: Requisites for Award of Moral Damages: o Evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental, psychological suffering sustained by the claimant o A culpable act or omission factually established. o Proof that the wrongful act or omission of the

PEOPLE v. TEODORICO CLEOPAS and FLORENCIO PIRAME (2000, Quisumbing) LD: The award of moral and exemplary damages is unsupported where the widow of the victim did not testify on any mental anguish or emotional distress, which she suffered as a result of her husband's death. FACTS: 18 Mar 1993: Pirame held arms of Pedro Torrenueva while

defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by claimant o The proof that the act is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Art 2219 and Art 2220 of the NCC. LD: Malice or Bad Faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. FACTS: Rodolfo Regala and Federico Carin are neighbors in BF Resort Village, Paranaque. Regala wanted to renovate his 1storey residence by constructing a 2nd floor. Under the guise of merely building an extension to his house, he approached Carin and ask permission to bore a hole through a perimeter wall share by both properties. Carin verbally consent on condition that Regala clean area affected by work. Carin: o Wife Marietta suffered from dust and dirt which fell on their property o Lack of Building Permit o Regala demolished perimeter wall, not only bore a whole through it. o Regala's laborers went in and out of his property without his consent, trampled on his vegetable garden o Owns perimeter wall, construction continued despite his protests Regala: o Owns the perimeter wall since it was built within confines of property, part of package bought from developer o Securing consent of neighbors formality in order to get Building Permit (does not mean acknowledgement of

Lil's Notes | Torts |29 Feb 2012

Carin's ownership of wall) o Was able to secure Building Permit (after construction was done) o Did not demolish entire wall, diligently cleaned area every day until Carin demanded that scaffolding should be dismantled and barred workers from cleaning his area. o Carin instituted case so that he would withdraw criminal case for slander and light threats. o Carin must prove that he acted in bad faith in causing injury and his acts caused injury RTC: Carin Wins (Regala misrepresented true intent, Art 2176) o MD: 100K o ED: 100K o AF: 50K CA: affirms RTC with modification (Art 19) o MD: 50K o ED: 25K SC: See Legal Doctine: SC: Carin failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the injuries he sustained were the proximate effect of Regala's act or omission. It thus becomes necessary to instead look into the manner by which Regala carried out his renovations to determine whether this was directly responsible for any distress Carin may have suffered since the law requires a WRONGFUL or ILLEGAL ACT or OMISSION must have preceded the damages sustained by claimant. SC: Regala was engaged in the lawful exercise of his property rights to introduce renovations to his abode. While he initially did not have a bldg permit and may have misrepresented his real intent when he initially sought Carin's consent, the lack of permit was inconsequential since it only rendered Regala liable to administrative sanctions and penalties. SC: Regala actually took measures to prevent or at least minimize the damage to Catin's property (Architect's testimony) SC: While the Court harbors no doubt that the incidents which give rise to this dispute have brought anxiety and anguish to Carin, it is unconvinced that the damage inflicted upon Carin's property was malicious or willful, an element CRUCIAL to meri an award of moral damages under Art 2220 of the Civil Code. SC; Nominal damages may be awarded in order that a right of Carin which was violated or invaded by Regala, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him SC: CA decision Vacated. Nominal Damages: 25K Operate 26000has of forest land o Annual allowable cut of 60 cm of timber o Export of 10 cu m of mahogany/narra (this is prohibited, allegedly earned 45M) When Marcos was ousted, Cory formed PCGG which sequestered TwinPeaks' assets, records, etc, on the ground that the assets were illgotten wealth, having been acquired through fraudulent/illegal means PCGG seeks to recover funds allegedly acquired by Twin Peaks, in flagrant breach of trust and fiduciary obligations with grave abuse of right and power in violation of the Constitution and laws of PH. PH asks for o AD: 48M o MD, TD, ED o Litigation expenses, etc. Sandiganbayan: PH failed to establish any violation of Arts 19, 20 and 21 of NCC. Barred from questioning validity of TLA under principle of res judicata. What could have made Twin Peaks feel emboldened to directly request Pres Marcos for the grant of TLA despite the obvious problems relating to its capacity to engage in timber activities? The reasonable assumption is that the official and personal proximity of Juan Tuvera to Pres Marcos was a key factor, considering that he was the father of Twin Peaks' most substantial stockholder. Delicadeza SC: If only the Court's outrage were quantifiable in sums of money, Tuvera etal are due for significant pecuniary hurt. Instead, the Court is forced to explain why Tuvera etal cannot be forced to recompensate the Filipino people in appropriate financial terms. The fault lies with those engaged y the government to litigate this case in behalf of the State. o SC: There is the bare allegation in the complaint that the State is entitled to 48M by way of actual damages, but no single proof presented as to why the State is entitled to such amount. Actual damages must be proven, not presumed. Gov't prosecutors: Incompetent, indolence, inability obtain financial docs? , etc. Inexcusable lapse. SC: Notwithstanding the fact that a claim for both actual and temperate damages is internally inconsistent, there is sufficient basis for the award of temperate damages. SC: No moral damages, State cannot have hurt feelings (juridical person) SC: Art 2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any form of defamation and claim for moral damages. SC: No moral damages under Art 2217 SC: We cannot discount the heavy influence of common law, and its reliance on judicial precedents, in our law on tort and damages. Notwithstanding the language of Art 2224, a line of jurisprudence has emerged authorizing the award of temperate damages even in cases where the amount of pecuniary loss could have been proven with certainty, if no such adequate proof is presented. SC: o o Temperate Damages: 1M Exemplary Damages: 1M (Art2234)

ABS-CBN v. CA supra REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUAN TUVERA, VICTOR TUVERA, TWIN PEAKS DEV'T CORP. (2007, Tinga) LD: A juridical person is not entitled to moral damages under Art 2217 of NCC, It may avail of moral damages under the analogous cases listed in Art 2219, such as libel, slander or any other form of defamation. LD: Jurisprudence applying Art 2224 is clear that Temperate Damages may be awarded even in instances where pecuniary loss could theoretically have been proved with certainty. LD: Temperate or Moderate damages avail when "the court finds some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty" FACTS: Timber License Agreement (TLA) given to Twin Peaks Dev't Corp because Victor's father, Juan, was the Presidential Executive Assistant to President Marcos (Juan used his position to write to Bureau of Forestry and say that the President had granted Twin Oaks' request to go into logging) despite Twin Oaks' lack of capability in the industry. No public bidding etc. TLA: -

c.

Factors considered in determining amount

KIERULF v. CA supra (SEE FACTS above) LD: The social and financial standing of a claimant of moral damages may be considered in awarding moral damages ONLY if he or she was subjected to contemptuous conduct despite the offender's knowledge of his or her social and financial

standing. Since each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances, there is no hard and fast rule in determining the proper amount. The yardstick should be that the amount awarded should not be so palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial judge. Neither should it be so little or so paltry that it rubs salt to the injury already inflicted on plaintiffs. EXPERT TRAVEL v. CA, supra FERNANDO LOPEZ v. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS (1966, Benzon) LOURDES VALENZUELA v. RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL. (supra) LD:In case of moral damages, while said damages are not intended to enrich the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant, the award should nonetheless be commensurate to the suffering inflicted. LD: It would be highly speculative to estimate the amount of psychological pain, damage and injury which goes with the sudden severing of a vital portion of the human body. The resultant anxiety, sleeplessness, psychological injury, mental and physical pain are inestimable. (A prosthetic device, however technologically advanced, will only allow a reasonable amount of functional restoration of the motor functions of the lower limb. The sensory functions are forever lost. Alexander solidarily liable for injury of Lourdes Valenzuela. Company car and nature of Richard Li's work (asst mgr) show that at the time of accident, Richard Li was operating the car in furtherance of company's interest. Flat Tire, hazard lights, Richard Li, Drunk, visiting a co-worker/client? Lourdes left leg severed up to middle of thigh (traumatic amputation), confined to hospital for 20days, hospital expenses 120K, Artificial Leg (27K) paid by car insurance. o Asks for MD of 1M, ED o

of 100K and other medical and related expenses of 180K, including loss of expected earnings. RTC: Li negligent under 2176, Employer under 2180. o o AD: 41840, misc expenses AD: 37500. Unrealized profits from restaurant (3weeks stoppage) AD 20K/mo unrealized profits from Aug 1990 to judgment AD 30K/month unrealized profits in Valenzuela's 2 beauty salons from July 1990 until date of decision. MD: 1M ED: 50K AF: 60K, Costs.

o o o -

CA: Absolved employer, MD reduced to 500K, affirms award of other damages. SC: Companies should ensure that employees are fit to drive when issuing company cars. SC: MD should be 1M

PNR v. BRUNTY supra PEOPLE v. FILOMENO LIZANO (2007, Tinga)

Lil's Notes | Torts |29 Feb 2012

IV. A. Nominal Damages Nature & Purpose even without that stipulation, Art 2209 of NCC, Millan would be entitled to recover the amount paid by her with Legal Rate of Interest which is even more than the 4% provided for in the clause. The clause is so worded as to work to the advantage of RFRDC. Inconceivable that this would be construed as a penal clause. Article 1226. In obligations with a penal clause, the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of noncompliance, if there is no stipulation to the contrary. Nevertheless, damages shall be paid if the obligor refuses to pay the penalty or is guilty of fraud in the fulfillment of the obligation. Gonzales convicted of arson (started fire in his rented room in Canlas' 2 story bldg after fight with aunt) which caused property damage to several property owners in La Loma, QC (Total: 5.465M). Specific value of property of complainants who testified: o Carlos Canlas: 3M o Andres Villaflor: 350K o Francis Simpao: 170K RTC QC: Nominal damages of 10K each to private complainants who testified. CA: Affirms RTC SC: No proof of actual or compensatory damages. Cannot grant actual damages SC: Can award Nominal Damages SC: The assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion of the trial court according to the circumstances of the case. SC: Generally, nominal damages by their nature are small sums fixed by the court without regard to the extent of the harm done to the injured party. HOWEVER, it is generally held that a nominal damage is a substantial claim, if based upon the violation of a legal right; in such case, the law presumes damage although actual or compensatory damages are not proven. SC: Nominal Damages are damages in name only and not in fact, and are allowed, not as an equivalent of wrong inflicted, but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury. SC: Temperate Damages may be recovered when the court finds that some PECUNIARY LOSS has been suffered, but its amount cannot from the nature of the case be proved with certainty. SC: Temperate Damages: o Canlas: 500K o Simpao & Villaflor: 100K SC: Exemplary Damages o 50K each to Canlas, Villaflor & Simpao SC: Affirms RTC with modifications 920yrs, no mention of Nominal Damages in Dispositive (assume it remains at 10K) B. When Awarded Article 2222. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any source enumerated in article 1157, or in every case where any property right has been invaded. Article 1157. Obligations arise from: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Law; Contracts; Quasi-contracts; Acts or omissions punished by law; and Quasi-delicts. (1089a)

Article 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. ROBES-FRANCISCO REALTY & DEV'T CORP. v. CFI & LOLITA MILLAN (1978, MunozPalma) LD: Nominal Damages are not for indemnification of loss but vindication of right violated or invaded. They are recoverable where some injury has been done the amount of which the evidence fails to show, the assessment of damages being left to the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of the case. FACTS: Lolita Millan sues RFRDC for failing to transfer to her the title of the property she had bought & fully paid. o 1963: Sale o 1971: Full Payment o Lot: Camarin, Caloocan RFRDC was unable to transfer title to Millan because subdivision was mortgaged with the GSIS & original title with GSIS. GSIS would not make partial releases of mortgage untile whole 10M debt of RFRDC paid. There was a "penalty clause" in the contract of sale which stated that upon delay/failure by RFRFC to release title to property (warranty), it would refund purchase price + 4% interest CFI: o Millan wins. Refund 5193.63 + 4% interest o Nominal Damages: 20K o AF: 5K + costs SC: RFRDC guilty of delay amounting to non-performance of obligation. Legal basis for damages Art 1170 Article 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. (1101) SC: Re: penalty clause. There was no penalty clause (Art 1226) because

FRANCISCO v. FERRER (supra) Fountainhead Bakeshop (Sans Rival) case. Nominal damages are recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown. Nominal damages may be awarded "to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered" (Cojuangco v. CA) For prevaricating that the cake was on the way, when in truth, no cake could be delivered because the order slip got lost, bakeshop (Francisco) must be held liable for Nominal Damages for Insensitivity, Inadvertence or inattention to their customer's anxiety and need of the hour. Nominal Damages: 10K

The penalty may be enforced only when it is demandable in accordance with the provisions of this Code. (1152a) SC: Definition of Nominal Damages (Art 2221, Art 2222) SC: American Jurisprudence, nominal damages by their very nature are SMALL SUMS fixed by the court w/o regard to the extent of the harm done to the injured party. SC: Nominal damages are in name only and not in fact (Fouraker v. Kidd Springs Boating Club) SC: Nominal damages CANNOT COEXIST with compensatory damages SC: The circumstances of a particular case will determine whether the amount assessed as nominal damages is within the scope or intent of the law, more particulary, Art 2221 of NCC. SC: 20K nominal damages excessive SC: No bad faith by RFRDC, they expected that they could arrange with GSIS partial release of subdivision lots from mortgage. SC: No proof by Millan of actual or compensatory damage. SC: 10K nominal damages fair under the circumstances. (3 yrs delay) SC: Affirms CFI except for nominal damages JOEL GONZALES v. PEOPLE (2007, Quisumbing)

SPOUSES GUANIO v. MAKARI SHANGRI-LA, supra Salmon & Prawn case, Slow dinner service during wedding, overflowing guests (unexpected attendance). Under considerations of equity, the Court deems it just to award the amount of 50K by way of nominal

damages to Guanios for the discomfiture that they were subjected to during the event. The Court recognizes that every person is entitled to respect of his dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. Respondent's lack of prudence is an affront of this right. RTC: 350K AD, 250K MD, 100K ED, 100K AF. CA: reversed RTC. SC: 50K nominal damages.

C.

invaded must be vindicated and recognized, thereby justifying the award of nominal damages. SC: Affirms CA decision. 20K ND, 50K MD. Effect of Award

Article 2223. The adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon the right involved and all accessory questions, as between the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns. V. Temperate or Moderate Damages

PEOPLE v. AIDA MARQUEZ (2011, LeonardoDe Castro) SC: It took Merano a year to legally recover her baby. Justine was 3mos old when this whole debacle began. She was 9mos old when Merano saw her again. Justine spent 1st birthday in DSWD. Evidently, Merano's right as a parent which was violated and invaded must be vindicated and recognized, thereby justifying the award of nominal damages. LD: Moral Damages: The crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor is analogous to illegal and arbitrary detention or arrest, thereby justifying the award of moral damages. Aida Marquez found guilty of Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor (Art 270) Carolina Merana, mother of Justine, 3month old baby, and a beautician, accused Marquez of refusing to return her daughter unless she paid 50K for Marquez's sons hospital bills. Marquez: Merano asked her to help her find adoptive parents for Justine. Justine found with Castillos, who wanted to adopt her. RTC: Guilty: 50K MD, 20K ED CA: affirms RTC: adds Nominal Damagaes of 20K in addition to MD, ED deleted. SC: The award of nominal damages is also allowed under Art 2221 of NCC. SC: It took Merano a year to legally recover her baby. Justine was 3mos old when this whole debacle began. She was 9mos old when Merano saw her again. Justine spent 1st birthday in DSWD. Evidently, Merano's right as a parent which was violated and

Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be provided with certainty. Article 2225. Temperate damages must be reasonable under the circumstances. IV. When Recoverable

MAXIMO PLENO v. CA & PHIL. PAPER PRODUCTS, & FLORANTE DE LUNA (1988, Gutierrez) LD: Temperate Damages are included within the context of compensatory damages. LD: In arriving at a reasonable level of temperate damages to be awarded, trial courts are guided by our ruling that "xxx There are cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, although the court is convinced that there has been such a loss. For instance, injury to one's commercial credit or to the goodwill of a business firm is often hard to show certainty in terms of money. Vehicular accident o Truck driven by de Luna hit Volkwagen Kombi Pleno was driving, which caused it to ram into truck parked on shoulder of the road. o Pleno sustained serious injuries. Shortened leg, Double Vision in one eye. -

Pleno Engineering Topnotcher. Entrepreneur. President of Mayon Ceramics. Passenger New Zealander Langley thrown out of van. o De Luna left without assisting victims or reporting to authorities incident. Employer tried to bribe traffic investigators. o Ruben Rivera, Driver of parked truck urinating when collision happened. Sustained injuries. Pleno asks for 100K AD, 500K MD, 300K ED, 100K AF RTC: o AD: 48244.08 AD o Temperate: 200K o MD: 200K o ED: 50K o AF: 30K, costs CA: Affirms RTC, but reduces Temperate Damages to 100K, MD to 100K and AF to 15K (RTC awards too high) o Phil Paper's liability is subsidiary. SC: The liability of an employer in quasi-delict is PRIMARY & SOLIDARY and not subsidiary. SC: The award of temperate, moral, and exemplary damages as well as AF lies upon the discretion of the court based on the facts & circumstances of each case. SC: Temperate damages are included within the context of compensatory damages. SC: In arriving at a REASONABLE LEVEL of temperate damages to be awarded, trial courts are guided by SC ruling that (Legal Doctrine #1) SC: Impairment of Earning Capacity. Pleno's actual income has not been sufficiently established so that this Court cannot award actual damages, but an award of Temperate or Moderate damages may still be made on loss or impairment of earning capacity. SC: Moral damages: shortened leg, inferiority complex, anxiety sufficiently o

ROGELIO & ERLINDA RAMOS v. CA, DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR ORLINO HOSAKA, and DRA PERFECTA GUTIERREZ, supra (1999, Kapunan) Medical Negligence case. Negligent Intubation. Res Ipsa Loquitur RTC: o 8K actual monthly expenses from 15 Nov 1985 to 15 Apr 1992. (632K) subject to being updated o AF: 100K, costs o MD: 800K o ED: 200K CA: Reversed RTC, but hospital bills to be paid (mercy) SC: At current levels, 8K/month grossly inadequate to cover actual costs of home-based care for comatose individual. (8K not actual cost of hospice care, but of homebased care to avoid bankruptcy) SC: Given these considerations, the amount of actual damages recoverable in suits arising from negligence should at least reflect the correct minimum cost of proper care, not the cost of the care the family is usually compelled to undertake at home to avoid bankruptcy. However, the provisions of the NCC on actual or compensatory damages present us with some difficulties. SC: Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assum that at the time of lititgation, the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence has been COMPLETED and that the cost can be liquidated. However, these provisions neglect to take into account those situations, as in this case, where THE RESULTING INJURY MIGHT BE CONTINUING and possible future complications directly arising from the injury, WHILE

proved. Exemplary damages: Gross negligence. Bad faith by company when it attempted to bribe police officers. SC: RTC decision reinstated, except AF changed to 20K SC: TD 200K

Lil's Notes | Torts |29 Feb 2012

CERTAIN TO OCCUR, ARE DIFFICULT TO PREDICT. In these case, the amount of damages which should be awarded, if they are to adequately and correctly respond to the injury caused, should be one which compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up to the time of trial; AND one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which could not, from the nature of the case, be made with certainty. SC: In other words, temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. And because of the unique nature of such case, NO INCOMPATIBILITY arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided for. The reason is that these damages cover 2 distinct phases. SC: It would not be equitable or in the best interest of justice for the victim to constantly come before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments to the compensatory damages previously awarded. Temperate damages are appropriate. SC: The amount given as temperate damages though to a certain extent speculative, should take into account the cost of PROPER CARE (Optimal Care). SC: Temperate Damages: 1.5M >> even this would be inadequate if Erlinda's condition remains unchanged for next 10 years. SC: AD: 1.352 AD +8K monthly up to the time Erlinda expires or recovers. SC: MD: 2M SC: ED: 100K SC: AF: 100K FACTS: Bonifacio Arambala drives truck owned by OMC. Brakes fail, he and helper jump out. Truck crashed into house and tailor shop of Celedonio Tan, killing him as he was standing on the doorway. Leticia: Celedonio self-employed tailor: earned 13K a month Minimum wage at time of accident was 145/day, 3770/month. RTC: Res ipsa Loquitur o Death: 50K o Loss of Earning Capacity: 500K o AD: 355,895.00 o MD: 500K o ED: 500K o AF: 500K CA: Affirms RTC, but reduces actual damages to ~72K and deleted award for loss of earning capacity. (No documentary evidence) ED reduced to 200K, deleted AF. SC: While absent competent proof of actual damage to Tan's house & tailoring shop, Tan still has the option of claiming temperate damages, which may be allowed in cases where, from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some pecuniary loss. (Art 2224) (Photographs show damage), but dont prove with certainty amount of loss. 200K. SC: RE Temperate Damages in lieu of loss of earning capacity: CA correct in disallowing the award of AD for loss of earning capacity SC: 13K/month greatly exceeded the prevailing monthly minimum wage at the time. Thus the exception set forth in Art 2206.does not apply. SC: in this case, income-earning cap of Tan never disputed. Temperate Damages of 300K (roughly 2yrs gross income) awarded to compensate for loss of earning capacity of deceased. SC: CA's reduction of ED to 200K proper (purpose of ED not to impoverish another) SC: AF in order since there is ED. SC: o Death Indemnity: 50K o Funeral Expenses/AD: o o o o 72,295 Temperate Damages for damage to house and appliances: 200K Temperate Damages: Loss of Earning Capacity: 300K MD: 500K ED: 200K V. AF: 10% of total amount +6% Factors in Determining Amount o

GIOVANI SERRANO v. PEOPLE (2010, Brion) LD: If the actual damages, proven by receipts during the trial, amount to less than 25K, the victim shall be entitled to Temperate Damages in the amount of 25K, in lieu of actual damages (Cites People v. Andres) FACTS: Brawl involving 15-18 members of 2 rival groups at UP Diliman. Anthony Galang was stabbed by Giovani Serrano after Giovani's brother, Gener, lost in a fistfight. Anthony was beaten up and left in a ditch. He saw his intestines, but was able to get up, walk and seek medical help. RTC: Guilty of Frustrated Homicide: (19K total damages) o AD (Medical Expenses): 15K o AD (Loss of 1mo income): 4K CA: Guilty of Attempted Homicide (Wound not fatal) o AD: reduced to 3,858.50, lost earnings deleted. SC: In People v. Andres: if actual damages, proven by receipts amount to less than 25K, the victim shall be entitled to temperate damages in the amount of 25K SC: Legal Basis for above(???): Art 2224: Temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss was suffered but its amount cannot be proven with certainty. SC: o MD: 10K (Art 2219, crim offense w/ physical injuries) o TD: 25K, delete AD awarded in lower courts.

REPUBLIC v. TUVERA supra LETICIA TAN & children v. OMC CARRIERS & BONIFACIO ARAMBALA (2011, BRION) Temperate Damages in lieu of actual damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded where earning capacity is plainly established but no evidence was presented to support the allegation of the injured party's actual income.

PEOPLE v. JESSIE MURCIA (2010, Perez) LD: Temperate Damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven with

certainty. (In this case, it is reasonable to expect that the value of the house burned down amounted to at least 200K) FACTS: Jessie convicted of arson & frustrated homicide. Jessie is the adopted son of Felicidad, living in Eulogio Quilates' house in La Union with Aunt Alicia & cousin Herminio. Drinking Spree that became an argument over who would take care of Felicidad when she went to hospital. Jessie burned clothes in sala and stabbed Alicia. 8 houses razed by fire. Felicidad died from burns. RTC: Guilt of Arson & Frustrated Homicide o Arson Death Death indemnity to heirs of Felicidad: 50K MD: 50K AD: 10K TD: 10K AD for Eulogio's burned house: 250K o Frustrated Homicide (410yrs) TD: 10K to Alicia. CA: Affirmed RTC, but reduced penalty to RP SC: Review limited to arson. SC: Crime of simple arson bec information states that residential houses were burned down. SC: Penalties: o TD: increased to 25K (People v. Villanueva, if AD less than 25K, delete AD, give TD of 25K) o 250K for burned house merely an estimate (not competent proof or best evidence) Therefore, award 200K Temperate Damages for house (reasonable value)

Liquidated Damages A. Definition o

Article 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach thereof PENCAPITAL INVESTMENT CORP v. MAKILITO MAHINAY (2010, Nachura) LD: Attorney's Fees are in the nature of Liquidated Damages. As long as provision for AF does not contravene law, morals or public order, it is strictly binding upon respondent. However, the Courts are empowered to reduce such rate if the same is iniquitous or unconscionable. (Art. 1229, Art 2227) Art 1229: The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there has been no performance, the penalty may also be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable. FACTS: Pentcapital Investment (PIC): holder of PN's signed by Atty Mahinay. Atty Mahinay: Counsel of Ciudad Real Dev't Inc (CRDI) (creditor: 1.715M++) Pencapital Realty Corp (PRC).: Buyer from CRDI of Molino Properties at 400/sqm PIC sues Mahinay for collection of sum of money for 2 PNs that he hasn't paid (1.52M + 416.8K = 1,936,800) Mahinay claims he received no consideration for PNs as PNs were conditional and would only take effect if sale b/w CRDI & PRC does not push due to adverse decision in civil case involving the properties. Sale b/w PRC & CRDI o PRC only paid DP of 12M o CRDI instructed PRC to pay its creditors (among them Mahinay) o Mahinay received the 1.715M++ check but returned it as a sign of good faith. o Mahinay allegedly entitled to 20% commission (charging lien) of 10.277M++ for Mahinay: o

the sale price. Molino Properties continue to be haunted by court actions initiated by different parties which prevented Mahinay from collecting commission.

Counterclaim for MD, ED & AF o Supplemental Supplemental Counterclaim for 20% commission o Mahinay had instituted an action for Specific Performance against PRC (for his commission), but this was dismissed by RTC. RTC & CA: Allow counterclaim & Supplemental Counterclaim RTC: rules in favor of Mahinay. PIC to pay: o 1.715M++ as provided for in deed of sale +16% interest p.a. o 10.316M++ (Mahinay's charging lien) in sale at 16% int. p. a. o AF: 50K (quantum meruit) o Litigation expenses: 50K. CA: Affirmed RTC: (no perfected contract of loan for lack of consideration) SC: Mahinay did not prove that he did not receive money in PNs. Did not overturn presumption of regularity. (Mahinay only gave uncorroborated, self-serving assertions that there was no consideration, Mahinay lawyer & law professior, should know all about PNs) SC: Mahinay's liability not negated by fact that he has uncollected commissions from sale of Molino properties. SC: Based on PN, aside from payment of principal obligation of 1.936M++, Mahinay agreed to pay 25% interest. (25% excessive, void. Reduce to 12%) SC: PN's have penalty charge of 3% per month or 36% p.a. (Rates unconscionable, reduce to 12% p.a.)

Art 1229. SC: PNs stipulate that Mahinay promises to pay 25% of outstanding obligations as AF in case of nonpayment thereof. SC: Attorney's Fees here are in the nature of Liquidated Damages. (See Legal Doctrine) SC: Reduce AF from 25% to 10% Dispositive: Mahinay to pay PIC, 1,936,800 _ 12% interest p.a., 12% p.a. penalty charge starting 17 Fen 1997. Must also pay 10% of outstanding obligation as AF. DETERMINING the Amount

B.

Article 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable. Article 2228. When the breach of the contract committed by the defendant is not the one contemplated by the parties in agreeing upon the liquidated damages, the law shall determine the measure of damages, and not the stipulation. TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORP v. UNI-FIELD ENTEPRISES INC. (2007, Carpio) LD: A stipulation on liquidated damages is a penalty clause where the obligor assumes a greater liability in case of breach of an obligation. Courts are empowered to reduce the penalty if it is iniquitous or unconscionable. LD: The obligor is bound to pay the stipulated amount without need for proof on the existence and on the measure of damages caused by the breach. LD: The determination of whether the penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and depends on several factors such as the type, extent, and purpose of the penalty, the nature of the obligation, the mode of breach and its consequences. FACTS: 1995: Unifield sues Titan for sum of money with damages for failing to pay for construction

Lil's Notes | Torts |29 Feb 2012

materials it had purchased from Unifield in the amount of 1.404,637.42 from 1990 to 1993. RTC: Unifield wins o o o o Principal Amount Interest Charges Liquidated Damages AF: 25% of whatever amount is due and accumulated appearance fees of 1K per hearing Costs of suit VI. A. Exemplary/Corrective Damages Purpose o Liquidated damages: 324,147.94 SC: Therefore, reduce amount of AF to 25% of PRINCIPAL OBLIGATION ONLY, or 351, 028.50. temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages. Article 2235. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages are renounced in advance shall be null and void. PNB v. CA & LORETO TAN (1996, Romero) LD: Requirements for award of Exemplary Damages (Based on Jurisprudence) o May be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimant's right to them has been established. Cannot be recovered as matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant. The act must be accompanied by bad faith, or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner. However, PNB releases it to Sonia Gonzaga, allegedly on the strength of an SPA presented by Sonia executed by Tan. Tan claims he never gave SPA and sues PNB for recovery of 32K (But no check or SPA presented in Court) RTC: PNB & Tagamolila to pay Tan o o o 32580 + legal interest ED: 5K AF 5K + costs

o -

CA:Affirms RTC Stipulation for Damages in Invoice. Titan o DRs & Invoices not formally offered as evidence by Unifield (But Titan offered them as evidence) Contract of Adhesion (Contract of Adhesion Binding, Titan free to reject contract or find another supplier. Not a small construction firm or weaker party)

Article 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. REPUBLIC v. TUVERA , supra LD: Under Art 2234 of NCC, a showing that the plaintiff is entitled to Temperate Damages allows for the award of exemplary damages. Even as exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, the courts are empowered to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. LD: Ill gotten wealth cases are hornbook demonstrations where damages by way of example or correction for the public good should be awarded. Fewer causes of action deserve the stigma left by exemplary damages, which "serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions." SC: TD: 1M SC: ED: 1M plus costs

CA: Affirms RTC, but deleted ED & AF. SC: Tan entitled to AF (Art 2208, compelled to litigate) SC: Exemplary damages should be deleted. SC: Under Art 2232 of NCC, exemplary damages may be awarded if a party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. However, they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, the court has yet to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. While there is a clear breach of PNB's obligation to pay Tan, there is no evidence that it acted in a fraudulent manner. Furthermore, there is no award of compensatory damages which is a prerequisite before exemplary damages may be awarded. RTC's award of ED baseless SC: Affirms CA decision, AF: 5K , BUT NO EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

SC: Barons Mktg v. CA: See Legal Doctrine: SC: Unifield adequately protected itself from a possible breach of contract because of the stipulations on the payment of interest, liquidated damages, and attorney's fees. SC: The court finds the award of AF equivalent to 25% of whatever amount is due and payable, to be exorbitant because it includes the o o Principal: 1.404M++ Interest Charges: 504K+ + plus accrued interest charges 24% p.a. compounded yearly reckoned from Jul 1995 to time of full payment

B. 1. When Imposed In general -

LD: Award of Compensatory Damages is a Prerequisite to the award of exemplary Damages. FACTS: Loreto Tan is owner of land subject to expropriation proceedings by Gov't in Bacolod City. Tan requests for issuance of an order for the release to him of the expropriation price of 32480 Court requires PNB to release to Tan the amount deposited by Gov't

FRANCISCO v. FERRER supra LD: To warrant the award of exemplary damages, the wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith and the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner, LD: Reqs for award of Exemplary Damages

Art 2229, supra Article 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. Article 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, -

May be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after claimant's right to them has been established. They cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant The act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner. -

exemplary damages based on Art 2230, even if the aggravating circumstance has NOT BEEN ALLEGED, so long as it has been proven, in criminal cases instituted BEFORE the effectivity of the Revised Rules which remained pending thereafter (1 Dec 2000) Cites People v. Catubig: Retroactive application of Revised Rules should not adversely affect the vested rights of private offended party. LD: Exemplary damages can be awarded not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. (Art 2229) FACTS: 10 July 2003: Rape of 16 yr old daughter of Dalisay's live in partner. Dalisay had been molesting girl since she was 13. (No date) Information states that Dalisay raped his stepdaughter RTC: Qualified Rape (RP due to RA 9346) o CI: 50K MD: 50K ED: 25K -

damages. (When criminal cases instituted. o o Before 1 Dec 2000: Do not Apply Revised Rules After 1 Dec 2000: Apply Revised Rules -

figure of victim, a minor is outrageous conduct that justifies award of exemplary damages to discourage and deter such aberrant behavior (ED increased to 30K) SC: CA Affirmed but ED increased to 30K

SC: Case instituted in 2003, Court can deny based on Art 2230, but SC: Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. SC: In common law, there is a preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendantassociated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraudthat intensifies the injury. SC: The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often refered to those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future. (People v. Catubig) Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstance of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. SC: In this case, Dalisay a father

PEOPLE v. SAMUEL DIUNSAY-JALANDONI (2007, Ynares-Santiago) LD: In this case, the presence of the qualifying circumstance of knowledge by the offender of the offended party's mental disability, although not alleged in the information, was proved during trial, which justifies the award of exemplary damages in the amount of 25K in consonance with current rulings. FACTS: 3 Apr 2000: Information Filed (stated that victim was retardate, but not that Samuel knew she was a retardate at commission of rape) 31 Mar 2000: Samuel, ice cream man, rapes AAA, a 21yr old retardate with mental age of 4yr old, in guard outpost of subdivision 15 Mar 2005: RTC: Guilty of Qualified Rape o o o Death CI: 50K MD: 50K, costs.

RTC: Wedding cake cost (3175), MD: 30K, AF: 10K, Costs. CA: Increases MD to 250K , awards ED of 100K, affirms RTC SC: No bad faith, Not entitled to Moral Damages or Exemplary Damages. SC: Wedding Cake Cost, ND: 10K, AF: 10K, costs.

REPUBLIC v. TUVERA supra 2. In crimes -

o o

Article 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party. PEOPLE v. ANTONIO DALISAY (2009, Nachura) LD: With the promulgation of the Revised Rules (2000), courts no longer consider the aggravating circumstances NOT ALLEGED and PROVEN in the determination of the penalty and the award of damages. Thus, even if an aggravating circumstance has been proven, but was not alleged, courts will not award exemplary damages. LD: Courts MAY STILL AWARD

CA: Simple Rape, RP, affirms damages. SC: Affirm conviction of simple rape. SC: Special Qualifying circumstance of relationship and minority were not sufficiently alleged in the information. (Information said victim a minor(???) SC: Information states that Dalisay stepfaither, but he was only commonlaw husband of victim's mother (Not married) CI: 50K, MDL 50K (prevailing jurisprudence) SC: Art 2229, 22230 SC: Sec 8,9 of Rule 110. SC: Dichotomize award of exemplary

CA: Affirms, increases CI to 75K SC: Simple Rape only, based on Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (retroactive effect bec it benefits accused) SC: Civil Indemnity Reduced to 50K SC: AAA entitled to ED of 25K People v. Catubig SC: CI: 50K, MD:50K, ED: 25K

PEOPLE v. RENATO DADULLA y CAPANAS (2011, Bersamin, Jr)

Lil's Notes | Torts |29 Feb 2012

28 Jan 1998: Charged with Rape & Attempted Rape 15 Jan 1998: Rape 22 Jan 1998: Attempted Rape Father of victim raped her while siblings sleeping beside her. RTC: Guilty of RAPE & Attempted Rape o o o Death for rape, 4-5yr for attempted rape CI: 50K MD: 20K for rape, 20K for attempted rape. award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended pary who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather, than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Art 2230 of NCC The ruling in People v. Catubig settled the circumstances when Art 2230 of NCC applied, thereby reflecting the meaning and state of that legal provision. The retroactivity of the ruling vis-avis the accused could not be challenged or barred by virtue of its being civil, not penal, in effect SC: CA affirmed, but ED of 30K and 10K added.

CA Affirms RTC, Guilty of Simple Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness. o o o RP for Rape, 6mos-4yrs for AoL CI: 50K for rape MD: 50K for rape, 30K for AoL 3.

SC: The failure to allege qualifying circumstance of RELATIONSHIP in information precluded a finding of qualified rape., cannot affect the criminal penalty even if proven during trial. Civil Liability SC: Award 30K ED for Rape and 10K ED for AoL under Art 2230. SC: Although an aggravating circumstance not specifically alleged in the information, yet proven at trial cannot be appreciated to increase the criminal liability of the accuse, the established presence of one o 2 aggravating circumstances of any kind or nature entitles the offended party to ED under Art 2230 of NCC because the requirement of specificity in the information affectedonly the criminal liability of the accused, not his civil liability. People v. Catubig. SC: Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the

Quasi-Delicts

Article 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. 4. In Contracts & Quasi Contracts

Article 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.