Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2012

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

140 435 430 608 1522 2155 2324

24 184 81 325 597 654 991

25 244 137 538 1479 3906 8389

189 863 648 1471 3598 6715 11704

2010 2011 2012 Total*

1796 2738 943 13091

469 765 345 4435 *Data till May 13, 2012

2012*

5170 2800 1061 23749

7435 6303 2349 41275

Reasons for Police Failure in Pursuing Terrorist and Militant Organizations

(8 posts)

1. semirza
Moderator

Pursuing terrorist and militant organizations active within Pakistan is crucial to success in identifying and arresting militancy. The following I would like to share with you why our Police is not so successful: 1. A lack of coordination between police, the civilian-run Intelligence Bureau, and the military-run intelligence agencies (e.g., Inter-Services Intelligence, Military Intelligence, etc). The lack of trust between civil and military agencies also plays a negative role. Even today, to get data from telephone companies (and trace calls made by criminals and terrorists), the police and the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) have to request intelligence agencies and, at times, such delays waste crucial time. 2. A poor data collection capability as regards crimes and criminals. Many criminals who joined militant religious groups are not traced and tracked efficiently. Even banned militant organizations are not well profiled.31 In many instances, such organizations continue their publications and, in some cases, wanted criminals and terrorists simply change their affiliations to those groups that are not under government scrutiny. All the while, the police

remain clueless. They police are also handicapped as many militant groups were producing freedom fighters for Kashmir and Afghanistan in the 1990s and had working relations with elements in the intelligences services. Hence, many police officials were reluctant to go after them, thinking that they might be held accountable for harassing an intelligence agencys assets.32 According to Asif Akhtar Shah, Deputy Inspector General of Police in Mardan (NWFP), his force lacks the technical expertise, training or equipment to hunt down bigname terrorists or even identify would-be suicide bombers.33 3. In July 2003 the Special Investigations Group (SIG), under the FIA, was created to interrogate terrorists, identify and arrest the most wanted terrorists, detect terrorist financing, and coordinate with the provincial government in investigating major terrorist incidents Its strength, however, is surprisingly low and insufficient: thirty-seven investigators supported by thirteen experts led by a Deputy Inspector General of Police.34 Media reports indicate that the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was expected to train SIG officials on how-to-locate weapons of mass destruction, take post-blast action, trace terror financing, investigate money-laundering, combat corruption within law enforcing agencies, manage crises and improve techniques for fingerprinting and interviewing.35 Since 2003, on average, only four to five FIA and police officials have visited America every year for short FBI training courses. In other words, such collaboration and cooperation has been quite limited so far.36 4. No special security measures or rewards are provided to police officials, investigators, and lower court judges involved in pursuing counterterrorism cases. Consequently, a few of them have been assassinated in targeted killings, which further demoralizes the police and discourages their anti-terrorism efforts. Moreover, the police are increasingly victims of terror attacks, especially in the NWFP, Islamabad, Lahore, and Quetta.37 5. The NWFPs police were not provided with adequate resources, despite their persistent requests in 2006-07, when it was apparent to all and sundry that Pakistani Taliban were focused on expanding their influence in the various districts (especially Hangu, Kohat, D.I., Khan and, most importantly, Swat). The Swat case is even more troubling, for according to Mr. Bangash, the district police chief, around 700 out of a total of 1,737 policemen deserted when Swats Maulana Fazlullah told the local police to give up their jobs or face the Talibans wrath.38 Neither the provincial nor the federal government offered any countermeasures in terms of special incentives. In the NWFP, the figures speak for themselves: the provinces

55,000-member police force (manning 217 police stations) in reality means one policeman for every 364 miles of some of the worlds most dangerous terrain.39 In January 2009, the US embassy in Islamabad announced its plan to provide $4.1 million worth of police equipment to NWFP including troop carriers, motorcycles, ballistic helmets, and bullet proof vests - a bit belated but positive initiative.40 Earlier, in June 2008, US Consulate in Peshawar had provided some office equipment to the NWFP police as a goodwill gesture. 6. Militant groups offer higher incentives to their potential recruits than do the police officers fighting terrorism. For instance, the former pay more than $20,000 to the families of successful suicide bombers; the government gives $6,000 to a policemans family if he is killed during a terrorist attack.41 Reforms in Pakistan; crucial for Counter insurgency and Counter terrorism Success Hassan Abbas References: 31 Interview with an official of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), March 2007. 32 See Hassan Abbas, Police Reforms: Agenda of Change, The News, March 4, 2008. 33 Gannon, AP IMPACT: Pakistan police losing terrorism fight. 34 Quoted in a presentation, entitled Terrorism in Punjab, by senior police official Sarmad Saeed (currently director of the National Police Academy, Islamabad). Available at http://www.sarmadsaeed. com. 35 The News, December 4, 2003. 36 See SIG joins police probe into Lankan team attack, The News, March 5, 2009. 37 See Laura King, Suicide bomber targets Pakistan anti-terrorism police, Los Angeles Times, October 10, 2008. Also see Tahir Niaz, 725 killed in 63 terrorist attacks, Daily Times, December 31, 2008. 38 Figures quoted in GEO TV talk show Capital Talk (anchor: Hamid Mir), February 5, 2009. 39 For NWFP Police statistics, see http://nwfp.gov.pk. 40 United States Provides Security Equipment to the Frontier Police, Press Release, Embassy of

the US, Islamabad, January 14, 2009. 41 Figures quoted in Gannon, AP IMPACT: Pakistan police losing terrorism fight.
POSTED 1 YEAR AGO ON 03 JUL 2010 8:33 #

2. Hussain Farooqui
Member

Our intelligence agencies are efficient enough to investigate and indentify the culprits of terrorism. The reason why the govt. fails is that the govt. itself and the elements committing terrorism receive financial aid from different foreign elements. The law enforcing and intelligence agencies can perfom well; if they are they are given free hand, but the govt. itself make them helpless.
Terrorism-related Fatalities in Pakistan, 2007

Civilians

Security Terrorists/Insurgents Force Personnel 16 4 21 18 10 12 143 63 67 101 94 48 597 29 8 261 83 14 40 191 117 144 154 341 97 1479

Total

January February March April May June July August September October November December Total

26 35 28 176 57 31 144 56 101 282 293 293 1523

71 47 310 277 81 83 478 236 312 537 728 438 3599

Comparative Levels of Violence in Pakistan, 2003-2007

Year

Civilians

Security Force Personnel 24 184 81 325 597

Terrorist

Total

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

140 435 430 608 1523

25 244 137 538 1479

189 863 648 1471 3599

Pakistan Assessment 2012

Pakistans continuing engagement with the production and export of Islamist extremism and terrorism continued to produce a bloody blowback at home, with a total of at least 6,142 persons, including of 2,797 militants, 2,580 civilians and 765 Security Forces (SFs) personnel killed in 2011. However, even this worrying total constituted an improvement of 17.75 per cent over the preceding year. 7,435 persons, including 5,170 militants, 1,796 civilians and 469 SF personnel, had been killed in 2010.

While civilian and SF fatalities increased by whopping 43.65 and 63.11 percent, respectively, the steep decline (45.89 percent) in fatalities among the militants, primarily due to Islamabads approach of going soft on terror, was the sole reason for the decrease in overall fatalities through 2011. Meanwhile, Federal Interior Minister Rehman Malik on August 2, 2011, informed the National Assembly that the SFs had arrested 3,143 alleged terrorists in the country and recovered 4,240 weapons from them over the preceding three years. However, the Chief Justice of Pakistan Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, on December 24, 2011, expressed dissatisfaction over the slow disposal of cases in Anti-Terrorism Courts (ATC), over delays in submission of charge sheets and frequent adjournments being sought and granted to prosecuting and defence counsel in trial courts.

Pakistan Assessment 2011

For far too long, Western powers vigorously led by the US have been party to a comprehensive cover-up, a pretence that has sought to minimize Pakistans role in the active sponsorship and export of terrorism, and an effort to distract international attention from the countrys failing institutions, to emphasise, instead, its acts of purported cooperation with global counter-terrorism efforts. This farce, and elements of the international communitys real appraisal of Pakistan and the many players in the country, lay fully exposed with the Wikileaks disclosure of US diplomatic correspondence and confidential assessments in 2010. These have fully confirmed the continuing complicity of the Pakistani establishment in terrorism in the South Asian region and beyond; the corruption and mendacity of its various institutions of Government; the countrys hurtling trajectory towards state failure; and the inescapable truth of the realities SAIR has repeatedly emphasized in the past.

Pakistan Assessment 2010

Pakistans free fall, which had gained momentum in 2008, continued with an added velocity through 2009. By March 23, 2009, David Kilcullen, who advises United States Central Command (CENTCOM) commander, General David H. Petraeus, on the war on terror, was warning that Pakistan "could collapse within six months if immediate steps are not taken to remedy the situation". This somewhat extravagant prophecy has, of course, been belied for the time being. Nevertheless, the progression towards failure appears irreversible. Terror now engulfs the entire nation. Militants have thrown up a serious challenge to the authority of the Federal Government in every Province in the country Balochistan, North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Punjab and Sindh as well as in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Devoid of a strong political leadership and the necessary will to square up to terrorism, Islamabad, as always, has failed to respond adequately and recover some measure of control. 2009 has been the bloodiest year yet. As SAIR noted earlier, Pakistan was already being viewed as a place of instability and widespread strife by 2003. But 2009, with at least 11,585 fatalities (the actual numbers could be significantly higher, since Pakistan denies access to the media and independent monitors in most areas of conflict) came very close to the cumulative fatalities between 2003 and 2008 at 13,485. Fatalities have augmented significantly each year since 2003. At least 723 major incidents (involving three or more fatalities) were reported through 2009, according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database. Annual Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan, 2003- 2009 Civilians Security Forces (SFs) Terrorists Total

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total

140 435 430 608 1523 2155 2307 7598

24 184 81 325 597 654 1011 2876

25 244 137 538 1479 3906 8267 14596

189 863 648 1471 3599 6715 11585 25070

Pakistan Assessment 2009

Pakistan's descent towards state failure gathered momentum in year 2008. Conflict data and broad governance indicators demonstrate that Pakistan is, today, a nation at war with itself. The country's progressive collapse has been much more rapid and irretrievable than most had envisaged. In a vast swathe of Pakistani territory today, the state has simply withered away. A wide array of militant groups is currently

engaged in varying degrees of violence and subversion across the country. A cursory look at the map indicates that the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Balochistan are witnessing large-scale violence and insurrections. Violence also increasingly afflicts parts of Punjab, Sindh, and the Gilgit-Baltistan region. Islamabad's writ is thus being challenged vigorously - violently or otherwise - in wide geographical areas, and on a multiplicity of issues. More than half of the territory presently under Pakistan's control, including Gilgit-Baltistan and 'Azad Jammu and Kashmir', has passed outside the realm of civil governance and is currently dominated essentially through military force. The sheer rate of acceleration of violence is an index of the enveloping loss of control. In year 2003 - when Pakistan was already being viewed as a place of instability and widespread strife - total fatalities in terrorism-related violence amounted to just 189. By 2004, this number had risen to 863, to slide marginally to 648 in 2005, but mount dramatically thereafter to the unprecedented minimum of 6,715 killed in 2008.

Pakistan Assessment 2008

Pakistans slide towards state failure accelerated dramatically in year 2007, and the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto on December 27 was a sharp reminder that the countrys progressive collapse was much more rapid and irretrievable than most had envisaged. In more ways than one, 2007 was a cumulative reflection on all of President Pervez Musharrafs errors of omission and commission since he took power in the coup of October 1999. A simple truth in vast regions of Pakistan today is that the state has withered away. A wide array of anti-state actors is currently engaged in varying degrees of violence and subversion in an extended swathe of territory. A cursory look at the map indicates that the North West Frontier Province ( NWFP), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Balochistan are witnessing large-scale violence and insurrection. Violence in parts of the Sindh, Punjab and Gilgit-Baltistan has also brought these areas under the security scanner. Islamabads writ is being challenged vigorously violently or otherwise in wide geographical areas, and on a multiplicity of issues. Well

over half of the territory presently under Pakistans control, including Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu & Kashmir, has passed outside the realm of civil governance and is currently dominated essentially through military force.
Terrorism-related Fatalities in Pakistan, 2007

Pakistan Assessment 2002

Pakistan has, since September 11, 2001, been trapped in an unenviable position, as it struggles, at once, to extricate itself from the web of Islamist terror it had woven through the 1980s and 1990s, to come to terms with the collapse of its long held Afghan policy and its pursuit of strategic depth, and to continue to maintain what it has long regarded as its core interests in Kashmir through covert action. Such contradictions and convulsions have been manifested in two incidents of the year 2002, namely, the abduction cum murder of US journalist Daniel Pearl and the March 17 terrorist attack on a church in Islamabad in which five persons were killed and 40 others injured. Daniel Pearl disappeared on January 23 during his attempts to establish contacts with Islamist groups in order to investigate links between Richard Reid, the British man accused of trying to use explosives in his shoes to blow up a Paris-to-Miami jetliner on December 22, 2001 and Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda network. On January 27, Pakistani and US media organisations received an e-mail which said that Pearl was abducted by a hitherto unknown group calling itself "The National Movement for the Restoration of Pakistani Sovereignty" (NMRPS). Pakistani police announced on January 30 that it had detained Mubarak Ali Gilani, leader of an Islamist group Jamaat-ul-Fuqra (JF), as a suspect in the case. On the same day, the

NMRPS sent e-mails to news organisations threatening to kill him within 24 hours unless the US frees Pakistani prisoners being held at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. Even as the series of e-mails and threats continued, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) terrorist Omar Sheikh was arrested in Lahore on February 12 and is currently a prime suspect in the case. Sheikh Mohammed Adeel, a constable with the police department's special branch and a JeM activist is a co-accused in the abduction case. On February 21, US and Pakistan announced that they received a videotape showing scenes of Pearl's murder by his abductors. Investigations thus far have focused on cadres of two terrorist groups, JeM and .Harkat-ulJihad-al-Islami (HuJI). Separately, in what is being discerned as a backlash from the Islamist forces within Pakistan, five persons including the wife of an American diplomat and her daughter, were killed and more than 40 injured, including the High Commissioner of Sri Lanka to Pakistan, in a grenade attack on a church in Islamabad on March 17.
Sectarian Violence in Pakistan (1989-2001)

Source: Constructed from media reports Earlier, Pakistan was forced to abruptly reverse the course on Afghanistan, apparently severing its deep and continuous links with the Taliban and the Al Qaeda, under extraordinary American pressure after the 9/11 outrage. The severance, in its initial phases, was reluctant and fitful, but the collapse of the Taliban-Al Qaeda axis in Afghanistan, the installation of a new regime in that country, the imminent collapse of Pakistans economy in the absence of immediate international financial relief, and the manifest US interests in the destruction of the networks of Islamist terrorism across the world, eventually forced a commitment to the dismantling of what have been referred to as the assembly lines of jihad in Pakistan the complex of Islamist fundamentalist institutions, private Islamist armies and extremist madrassas (religious seminaries) that have sustained sectarian violence within Pakistan and exported terrorism across the globe for over a decade now. Pakistan, consequently, turned against its own protgs and long-time partners the now fugitive Osama bin Laden, his Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

No useful strategic purpose could be served by a continued association with these groupings, and such an association could, in fact, jeopardise Pakistans own survival. As it cast itself into the unlikely role of a frontline state in the global war against terrorism, however, the Pakistani government has been hard pressed to justify its continuing support to terrorism in the Indian State of Jammu & Kashmir, as well as in other theatres. Despite a radical address to the nation on January 12, 2002, in which Pakistans military dictator, General Pervez Musharraf, committed himself to dismantling the structures and networks of terrorism based in his country, there is yet no evidence to conclude that the Pakistani raison de etre of a radical Islamist political agenda, and its strategy of waging an Islamic jehad against India has been abandoned or reversed. Pakistan is yet to demonstrate that it has chosen to alter the perverted course of its history, and terrorist strikes in J&K have, in fact, seen a spurt in the post-9/11 phase. There has also been an escalation in Islamist terrorist violence in other parts of India. Dramatic attacks were, thus, launched against the J&K Legislature complex in Srinagar on October 1, in which 38 persons were killed. Responsibility for the attack was immediately claimed by the now proscribed Pakistan-based Jaish-eMohammed (JeM), though it later retracted this claim. Similarly, the December 13, 2001, suicide attack on Indias Parliament, once again engineered by the JeM, brought Indian democracy under direct threat. On September 15, 2001, the Pakistani government had announced that it would extend full support to the world community in combating international terrorism, consistent with its policy of support to the decisions of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. However, the government clearly stated that it would not permit US ground forces to land on its soil for any possible attack on Afghanistan. At the outset, Pakistan assured the US administration that 'every possible help' against terrorism would be rendered in the best national interest of Pakistan. President Pervez Musharraf on September 18, is reported to have said, during a meeting with former foreign ministers, former generals and others, that the decision to extend unstinting support to the United States had been taken under tremendous pressure. He added, during this meeting, that the US authorities had conveyed in categorical terms that Pakistans decision would determine its future relationship with Washington. The President also indicated that the US Administration had fixed a deadline on Pakistans accession to US demands regarding extension of support, including the use of airspace, as well as logistic and intelligence support. In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Pakistani government had initiated apparent attempts to prevail upon its protg, the Taliban, to hand over bin Laden to the US. Towards this end, a delegation of senior Pakistani officials headed by Lt. General Mahmud Ahmed, the then Chief of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistans external intelligence agency undertook a trip to Kandahar, headquarters of the erstwhile Taliban regime in Afghanistan, on September 17, 2001, in order to convince the Taliban militia to either deport bin Laden, or risk a massive retaliatory action by the US. Media reports, however, suggest that the delegation did exactly the opposite.

(D)

authorities of the Defence Forces

LAHORE: Despite repeated letters and requests from Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), Punjab Police on different pretexts is resisting the registration of cases against an incumbent MNA, an MPA and a former MNA, all from the PML-N for holding fake graduation degrees. Regional Election Commission officers in their numerous letters to the provincial election commission have complained that the local police are not complying with their continuous requests regarding initiating legal proceedings against MNA Syed Salman Mohsin Gilani (Pakpattan NA-165), MPA Zulfiqar Ali (Bahawalpur PP-271) and former MNA Mudassar Qayyum Naehra (Gujranwala NA-100) on the charges of possessing fake graduation degrees. In its monthly progress report published in April sent by the provincial election commissioner to the federal election commission, it has clearly mentioned the names of abovementioned political figures elected or removed that police were not adopting legal procedures against them. Interestingly, despite that the local police were directed by the IGP office and provincial law department following pressure by the ECP to proceed as per law against the culprits, they had never bothered to adopt the legal procedures against them. In a recent such letters written by the Regional Election Commissioner Sahiwal Ishaq Bajwa alleged that Pakpattan DPO Jahanzeb Nazir Khan and RPO concerned were working as party to support culprit MNA from NA-165 Syed Salman Mohsin and intentionally prolonging the case to provide protection to the culprit. According to this letter written to ECP on December 2, 2011 available with The News, REC stated that as per directions contained in ECP office letter no.F.20 (51)/2010-law dated 27.12.10, REC personally met the Pakpattan DPO on 31.12.10 and handed over the complaint vide this office letter of even number dated 31.12.10 for registration of an FIR against Syed Muhammad Salman Mohsin and the DPO promised him that after examining the case within two days he will order for registration of FIR and copy will be sent to the ECP office but no positive response was given to this office. The REC in his letter claimed that besides contacting with DPO, he had also contacted with the Sahiwal RPO for complying with the orders of ECP but they just made false promises and no practical step was initiated. REC mentioned in his letter that on 8.2.11, the DPO informed over phone that he had requested to the higher authorities for guidance in the matter which was still awaited and as soon as guidance will be received he will lodge an FIR against the culprit. It is further mentioned in the letter that the IGP Punjab vide memo no. 128840PS-III dated 8.2.11 also sent the directions to the Sahiwal RPO and same direction were passed on by the RPO to the Pakpattan DPO for registration of an FIR against the culprit. Again vide this office letter of even number dated 14.2.11, the Pakpattan DPO was asked to register a case as the guidance from IGP has already been conveyed through Sahiwal RPO as well as IGP to finalise the matter at an early date but all in vain and the DPO was not ready to take legal action as per law intentionally and trying to prolong the case for providing protection to the culprit. Not only this, district Pakpattan Election Commissioner visited the DPO office as per letter written to ECP dated March 4, 2012 but he was informed that DPO was not available. Anyhow, DEC negotiated with the DSP legal for instant registration of an FIR against the MNA but he said the matter will be

discussed with the DPO. Despite repeated calls and messages, the Pakpattan DPO was not available for comment on the matter.