THE EXECUTIVE IN AUTHORITARIAN STATES

The authoritarian executive like the accountable executive, spans a wide range. It coversrule by absolute and limited monarchs, military juntas (councils), priest, communist parties, fascist parties and personal dictators. At the risk of painting an over-stark portrait, the central feature of most authoritarian executive is weak institutionalization leading to struggles over succession and the supremacy of politics over policy Typically, arrangements for decision making less well develop than in accountable executive.Structures vary more with the style of the leaders and respond more to the balance of power within the political elite. In China, Deng Xiaoping gave up allhis official post in state and party in 1984 but his political preeminence continued into the ( and his) nineties. Many forms of authoritarian rule are prone to personality cults. Absolute rulers, in particular regard themselves as a national hero (which indeed some once were). Lackling the constrations of an accountable or collegial executive, and surrounded by fawning courtiers, the cult of personalrity can reach absurd, even tragic,proportions. One consequence of weak institutions is the lack of a succession procedure (except for hereditary) monarchies). This weakness produces a struggle among potential successors, not just after leaders exit but also in the run up it. They must mount a constant watch over for threats from competitors and be prepared to neuter those who are becoming too strong. Further, the price of defeat is high politics can be a matter of of life and death. Communits states illustrated these themes. True,such states did have a clear structure of government, headed by a presidium which as inner steering body of larger Council of Ministers which was itself formally elected by the parliament. The chairman of presidium was, in effect,prime minister leading the communist equivalent of the cabinet. But in practice the ruling communist party dominated the formal institutions of the state leading figures in the party also taking on top state positions. The non accountable character of the communist executive explained two of the weaknesses that contributed to its ultimate collapse : slow turnover at the top and the lack succession procedure. The paradox of the political executive in communist party states was that strong,authoritarian leadership was incsecure in tenure and uncertain in succession. The Sovyet Union under Joseph Stalin was an extreme, but important, case of personalized dictatorship in a communist setting. Stalin had become undisputed ruler of the Soviet Unin by 1929 and remained so until his death 1953. He adopted policies of rapid,forced industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture. Propaganda was in unremitting. Political power was higly centralized and the economy operated on a command rather than a market basis, both characteristic features of totalitarian rule. The question remains of how a far the potential for Stalinsm was inherent in communits doctrine, and how far its origins lie in Russian autocratic traditions or even in the weakness of stalin himself abused as a child, he proved to be a manipulative and vindictive adults. Certainly,most communist regimes were less Stalinist than the Soviet Union. And even the soviet union began a process of destalinization.

WHEN ILLNESS STRIKES: GOVERNMENT BY THE INFIRM

The young and healthy may run for high office, but their ambition is rarely achieved until late middle age. By this time leaders are often unfit and becoming prone to serious illness. A post and Robins (1993) write aging,ailing leaders are not a rare exception illness and disability are frequently guest and occasionally permanent residents In the thore room. But The problem of declining energy among the very old is probably less serious than that of impaired judgment in late middle age brought about by drugs and mental illness. This is less obvious than physical infirmity and by its nature,poor judgment is rarely recognized by leaders themselves. How well, then do governments cope wih the problem of ailing leaders? The answers is poorly few countries publicly assess the medical condition of candidates for office. Although the sick leader is often a greater problem in presidential systems, the health-conscious USA does relatively well by international standards. Medical reports on presidential candidates,for example,are circulated. In any case, the two terms limit reduces the period by which the country can be governed by living dead (one argument for term limits is that they reduce the chance of rule by the sick) Further, the 25 amandement (1967) allows the vice president, together with the heads of executive departments, to certify that the president declares a readiness to return to the fray. Yet no system is foolproof. Becoming president is monumental challenge, remaining so, it seems depended on nothing more than the ability to read out two sentences. The recent wave democratization has reduced the number of authoritarian executives un the developing world but many examples can still be found. Personal rule remains central to politics in the Middle East,for example in Saudi Arabia (Bill and Springborg,1994,Ch.5). In Islamic countries such as Iran where religion and poltics are intertwined,rule continues to be strongly authoritarian. Thus shas,sheikhs and sultans continue to rule in the traditional patriarchal fashion identified by Webet. Sultans rule more than govern. Advandcement within the rulers circle depends not on merit but on closeness to sovereign and his network of advisors,relatives,friends,flatterers and guards. Personal rule was also central to African politics. In poor societies with weak states, and possessing strong tribal; traditions, it was natural for leaders to emerge who were adept at using the coercive and financial resources of the regime to reward friends and punish enemies. Others government institutions lacked by the weight to provide a check on personal rule. The incentives of patronage and the risks of non cooperation with the government ensured that assemblies were docile,elections were uncompetitive and the courts unassertive. Such conditions agains favoured personal rathers than institutional rule. Although personal leaders were rarely properly accountable in a constitusional sense they were tightly constrained by other political actors. These included the military,leaders of ethnics groups,landowners, the business class,the bureaucracy,students,multinational companies,foreign governments,ex president and factions in the leaders won court. To survive,leaders had to distribute the perks of the office so as maintain a viable coalition of support. This was a challenge which left little room for concern over broader issues of national development. Personal rulers were far from absolute rulers. Inadequately accountable in a constitutional sense, these personal rulers (like most authoritarian executives) were highly constrained in other ways.