Mariam Sargsyan - Letter of Motivation

The Perils of Being a National Minority: Human Rights and Chakhalyan v.
Georgia
Report on Human Rights Violations in the Republic of Georgia Prepared for Yerkir Europe by Dr Fernand de Varennes
22 May 2012
Union Yerkir - Europe

www.yerkir.eu contact@yerkir.eu
The Perils of Being a National Minority: Human Rights and Chakhalyan v. Georgia by Dr Fernand de Varennes, 22 May 2012
ABOUT THE AUTHOR Dr Fernand de Varennes is a visiting professor in human rights at Peking University in China, the Faculty of Law and Shariah at the Maldives National University in Mal, Maldives, and the University of Pretoria in South Africa. He is also a scientific advisor with the Observatoire internationale des droits linguistiques at the Universit de Moncton, Canada. He was in 2011 Professor at the Ethiopian Civil Service University in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and the Maldives National University in Mal, the Maldives. Dr de Varennes holds an LLB from the Universit de Moncton (Canada), an LLM from the London School of Economics (UK), and a Dr Juris from Maastrciht University (Netherlands). A legal expert in comparative and international human rights dealing with minority or language matters, he was awarded the 2004 Linguapax Award (Barcelona, Spain) in acknowledgement of his work in the field of linguistic diversity and multilingual education. Dr de Varennes author of some five books and 150 scientific articles and reports in 26 languages, dealing mainly with language and minority rights, he prepared in 2012 a study on the language rights of indigenous peoples for the United Nations Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and is the Convenor of the XIII International Conference on Language and Law which is to be held in Chiang Mai, Thailand this year. He has also worked with numerous international organisations such as the United Nations Working Group on the Rights of Minorities, UNESCO and the OSCE on language issues and was consulted as an expert for the preparation of a draft American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Dr de Varennes is chair of the language rights working group for Linguapax (Barcelona, Spain), editor-in-chief of the Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law, and has been on the advisory board of numerous other journals and research centres around the world, including the Journal on Multicultural Societies, the Greek Helsinki Monitor & Minority Rights Group, the Center of Documentation and Information on Minorities in Europe Southeast Europe, CEDIME, the Global Review of Ethnopolitics, the Law Review of the Universitas Pelita Harapan, etc. Dr de Varennes collaborated in the drafting of OSCE-sponsored initiatives, under the guidance of the former OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel, on a series of influential documents dealing with the rights of minorities: The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life, and the Oslo Recommendations regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities. He has also assisted in various minority rights initiatives, including the drafting of a proposed Irish language Act for Northern Ireland, and acted as expert adviser in the 2010 case of Raihman v. Latvia that was successfully concluded before the United Nations Human Rights Committee.
TABLE OF CONTENT 1. Introduction 2. Georgia and the Caucasus 3. Minorities in Georgia: The Religious and Linguistic Contexts 4. 2008: Georgias Annus Horribilis and its Victims 4.1 How not to Address Tensions in Georgia 4.2 Questions Surrounding the Accusations against the Chakhalyans 4.3 Human Rights and Justice Denied: The Trials and Tribulations of Vahagn, Ruben and Armen Chakhalyan 4.3.1 Denial of the right to examine witnesses 4.3.2 Denial of the right an accused to defend himself 4.3.3 The right to interpretation when one does not understand the language of proceedings 4.3.4 Right to a legal counsel chosen by the accused 5. International Responses and Unease 6. Human Rights and a Fair Trial: An Appeal to the European Court of Human Rights
1. Introduction Georgia, a Western ally in the volatile Caucasus region, is far from an ideal democracy in a number of respects. It is one of the few countries in Europe which has in effect a state religion and gives unheard of rights, privileges and even a role to play in state institutions to the leaders and followers of the national faith. Basic political liberties, even the freedom to organise political parties, are severely limited in Georgia, and political parties that are too regional are simply banned. 1 Most surprising for a member-state of the Council of Europe, the activities of minorities can be also severely controlled, and such objectionable conduct as holding a demonstration or meeting officials from the Council of Europe can lead to serious trouble with state authorities. 2 Even members of the media and photographers in 2011 faced the wrath of the state apparatus and criminal charges even extremely serious accusations of espionage for the apparently threatening activity of taking photos of demonstrations and sending them overseas.3 This report attempts to humanise what is occurring in Georgia by focussing on how individuals have seen their lives and that of their families literally destroyed for something as innocuous as claiming the recognition and protection of the human rights of the Armenian minority in that country. It is the story of the Chakhalyan family and in particular of Vahagn Chakhalyan, as well as that of the events which led to the imprisonment of some of them, to beatings and brutal treatment in
1
See in general the concerns expressed by outside observers in International Crisis Group, Georgia: Sliding towards Authoritarianism?, Europe Report N189, 19 December 2007. 2 Just a few weeks after meeting members of the Council of Europes Advisory Committee of Experts on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the director of an Armenian youth centre, Grigory Minasyan, and Sarkis Akopjanyan, president of a minority Armenian charitable NGO, were both arrested on 22 January 2009 and charged with separatist activities and espionage, the latter accusation connected to completing a questionnaire and receiving money from a a Belarus-based organisation allegedly set up by Russias Federal Security Service called the Association for Legal Assistance to the Population. A representative of this Association gave out questionnaires in 2008 to representatives of NGOs in the region for which they received between 300 and 800 dollars if they filled them in. Not long after this in 2010, S.M. Barbakadse, the chairman of an organisation representing this time the Meskheti minority, was arrested and put to prison on what has been described as a trumpedup fraud charge: he was sentenced in January 2011 to 11 years of imprisonment. 3 Journalists and reporters are now actively targeted and even arrested by the Government of Georgia. At 3 in the morning on 7 July 2011, police officers in civilian clothes arrested 5 photo-reporters at their homes, including Shah Aivazov, an Associated Press photographer, Zurab Kurtsikidze, photographer for the European Pressphoto Agency, and even Irakli Gedenidze, the personal photographer of the President of Georgia. The latter two had taken photos of protests in Tbilisi on 21 May 2011 and dispersal of another rally a few days later in Tbilisi on 26 May, 2011, photos which were subsequently disseminated by the European Pressphoto Agency. In an official statement, they were accused of supplying the organization, operating under the cover of a foreign countrys special service, with various information, against the interests of Georgia. More than a dozen journalists were targeted and injured or arrested by police and security personnel following peaceful demonstrations in May 2011. In 2010, a well-known investigative journalist, Vakhtang Komakhidze apparently received death threats after working on issues of corruption and disregard of human rights by state authorities, leading him to leave Georgia and apply for refugee status in Switzerland. On the current repressive atmosphere in Georgia generally towards journalists and human rights defenders, see the May 2011 Report of the Fdration Internationale des Ligues des Droits de lHomme at http://www.fidh.org/GEORGIA-20102011 which concluded: 2010 and the beginning of 2011 saw no improvement in the situation of human rights defenders in Georgia. NGOs continued to faces growing hindrances to their activities [from state authorities]. Threats, attacks and defamation campaigns targeted human rights defenders working on issues related to the consequences of the August 2008 war with the Russian Federation, who exposed corruption or who defended minorities rights. In addition, obstacles to freedom of peaceful assembly through arrests, detentions and sentencing remained commonplace.
prison, and to their case being heard in 2012 by the European Court of Human Rights in the hope that their rights will somehow be finally recognised and some degree of justice prevail.4 It is also unfortunately the story of a country becoming increasingly repressive despite high hopes it would play a leading role in the Caucasus region, and drifting more and more towards violence and denial of the most basic of human rights and freedoms. For the first time an international judicial body is being asked to pass an impartial, objective judgment on how Georgia treats those who dare question that countrys denial of basic rights of many citizens and minorities. 2. Georgia and the Caucasus The Caucasus is of significant importance strategically, economically and politically for major powers such as Iran, Turkey, Russia, Europe and the United States, including in the case of Georgia as a primary conduit for Caspian Sea region oil and natural gas exports to the West.5 Georgias location in the centre of the Caucasus region, a historical crossroad for Europe and Asia, has also meant that it shares not only the regions mountainous beauty and startling ethnic and linguistic diversity, but also some of its tragedies, struggles and challenges. All of the neighbouring states Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia have been affected since the end of the Soviet Union in 1991 by various territorial and secessionist disputes, including those in NagornoKarabakh, the Ossetian-Ingush conflict Abkhazia, Dagestan, Chechnya and most recently South Ossetia. The recent history of Georgia has not been a very happy one, and events in the last two decades reads like an unfortunate tale of missteps, mistakes and miscalculations. Understanding these may help to see why there has been in the last two decades an almost inexorable slide towards ever increasing repression and denial of human rights despite the best efforts of Europe and the United States.6
4
Beatings of prisoners, especially those trying to capture the attention of the international community, is unfortunately not uncommon in Georgia, as in the recently reported cases in the US 2010 State Department report on Georgia, which gives among others the example of Archil Sakhvadze, who on August 19 was singled out by prison guards, beaten and told to withdraw the application he had filed with the European Court of Human Rights. United States Department of State, 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Georgia, 8 April 2011, available at www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/eur/154425.htm . 5 See IEA Directorate of Global Energy Dialogue, Perspectives on Caspian Oil and Gas Development, International Energy Agency Working Paper Series, December 2008. 6 See, amongst others, the Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association at the conclusion of his visit to the Republic of Georgia, Tbilisi, 13 February 2012, at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11816&LangID=E, and the disturbing conclusions of the Human Rights Violations in Georgia Alternative Report to the UN Human Rights Committee, Geneva Tbilisi 24 April 2006, at page 6: Unfortunately, the proliferation of anti-democratic tendencies has not come to an end in 2005 and significant setbacks have been observed in several fields. Step by step, Georgia is acquiring all the signs of a police State. The right to freedom of expression has clearly received the most serious setback. Arbitrary detentions, beatings, grenade attacks, defamation and pressure against journalists have almost become daily business. Dozens of journalists fell victim to pressure, violence, and arbitrary detention in 2005. Several media holdings have been closed down. According to Reporters Without Borders, the media freedom index of Georgia continues to drop catastrophically and has moved back 26 steps compared to the last few years. The central government not only proves to be unable to secure the rights of journalists, but sometimes even acts as the initiator of pressure and harassment. Other areas also show problematic signs. The judiciary has finally become simply the governments appendix. Pressure against independent minded judges is mounting, with few judges daring to speak out openly, as those who do are often punished. Impunity among law enforcement officials is widespread and no serious action has been taken to reverse this trend. Torture and ill-treatment of detainees remains an unresolved problem. The right to assembly and manifestation, guaranteed by the 5
Independence for Georgia since 9 April 1991 has been an almost continuous series of setbacks: from the first president Zviad Gamsakhurdias ill-considered nationalism against minority claims in Abkhazia and South Ossetia creating a poisoned environment which exploded into violence and population movements from 1992, a coup dtat that deposed the first president in 1991, the arrival of the countrys second president, Eduard Shevardnadze, the eruption in 1995 of violence and wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with assistance from Russia. In 2003, President Shevardnadze was deposed by the Rose Revolution, after parliamentary elections marred by fraud. Mikheil Saakashvili was subsequently elected as President of Georgia in 2004, and quickly asserted his authority in the south-western autonomous republic of Ajaria. There was initial successes also in in May 2005 when Georgia and Russia reached a bilateral agreement for the withdrawal of Russian military bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki by December 2007. Matters turned much worse on the night of 7 August 2008 when Georgian troops launched a nighttime artillery attack on Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, where some Russian soldiers have been stationed as peacekeepers under the terms of a 1992 agreement after the 19911992 South Ossetia War. Despite contradictory media reports and claims by the Government of Georgia that it was responding to persistent harassment for months from the South Ossetian side, the European Unions independent report concluded that the massive armed attack from the Georgian side against a civilian target was unwarranted in international law.7
Source: http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/44914000/gif/_44914403_georgia_320.gif
After fierce fighting, Georgian forces initially made territorial gains throughout South Ossetia and had captured almost all of Tskhinvali. Eventually, units of the Russian army and irregular forces beat them back; in addition, the separatist Republic of Abkhazia launched an offensive against Georgian troops with the support of Russian troops, with Russian forces finally crossing into Georgia proper, occupying cities such as Gori, and Poti and almost reaching the outskirts of Tbilisi before Russian President Medvedev announced a halt to military operations on 12 August 2008. The shock and embarrassment to the turn of events in 2008 have, perhaps not coincidentally, been followed by a worsening of the plight of journalists, human rights defenders and minorities within
Constitution, has frequently been violated. Peaceful protests and demonstrations have been forcefully dispersed and demonstrators detained. 7 Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG), Report Volume 1, Council of the European Union, September 2009. 6
Georgia itself, though the treatment of minorities before 2008 had already been suffering as a response to the loss of some of the countrys territory to secessionists movements. These events is a way help explain why it appears increasingly that criticisms from any Georgian who may have connections with outside countries including the Fifth Estate and the loyalty of the countrys remaining minorities outside of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, are deemed to be suspect and threatening by state authorities. The fears and insecurities associated with the turmoils of the last years largely define the prevailing attitudes and actions of state authorities towards minorities, and gradually those whose criticisms are less and less tolerated by those in power, including journalists and even human rights defenders. 3. Minorities in Georgia: The Religious and Linguistic Contexts
Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/62/Ethnic_Groups_In_Caucasus_Region_2009.jpg
In addition to the above external geopolitical factors, certain the religious and linguistic situation in Georgia itself has contributed in the last 10-15 years to an increasing erosion of human rights, in particular those of minorities. As a result, it seems that individuals who are perceived as leaders or
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troublemakers amongst minorities tend to be specifically targeted and taken care of by state authorities, at times even with the adoption of legislation specifically to deal with their situation, as in the case of Vahagn Chakhalyan. Religion and language affiliation are usually closely connected in Georgia, though of course not always identical. Based primarily on approximate figures from the 2002 national census, the largest minority groups in the country are Azeris with 285,000, Armenians with 249,000, Ossetians with perhaps 160,000, the Abkhaz perhaps 90,000, and Russians 68,000.8 Ethnic Georgians represent more than 80 percent of the population, speak the Georgian language and at least nominally associate themselves with the Apostle Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia (Georgian Orthodox Church, GOC). Most Azeris tend to speak the Azeri language and are mainly Shia, Ossetians tend to be Orthodox or Sunni Muslims in addition to identifying with their own language, Ossetic, while members of the Armenian-speaking minority are usually also followers of the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC). There are also a number of Protestant and other non-traditional denominations, including the Jehovahs Witnesses which are in particular often prevented from practising their beliefs. Gradually, Georgian nationalism since 1991 in both matters of religion and language has weakened the secular and ethnically inclusive nature of the state to one where today the country belongs to, and the institutions of the state identify with, the religious and linguistic traits of the dominant ethnic Georgians. On the religious front, Georgia has moved from a secular country with separation of church and state recognised in its Constitution in 1991, to one where this has been watered down following the conclusion ten years later in 2001 of a Constitutional Agreement,9 also known as the Concordat, whereby the Georgian Orthodox Church becomes in effect the state religion with a number of privileges, benefits and role in state affairs enjoyed by no other religious denomination. This change of the Constitution of Georgia means that the Concordat, and the ensuing privileges and role of the Georgian Orthodox Church in the affairs of state, achieves higher legal status and protection in the countrys legal system than ordinary Georgian legislation and international treaties.10 In 2009, the government of President Saakashvili tripled its annual financial support to the Georgian Orthodox Church from the national budget to 25 million lari, or roughly $US13 million in addition to a gift of ten: luxury sports utility vehicles for each of the Orthodox Churchs 10 archbishops.11
8
There are no reliable population figures for Ossetians and Abkhazians since 1989 since South Ossetia and Abkhazia have broken away from the control of the central Georgian government. 9 Constitution of Georgia, Article 9: 1. The state shall declare complete freedom of belief and religion, as well as shall recognise the special role of the Apostle Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia in the history of Georgia and its independence from the state. 2. The relations between the state of Georgia and the Apostle Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia shall be determined by the Constitutional Agreement. The Constitutional Agreement shall correspond completely to universally recognised principles and norms of international law, in particular, in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Unfortunately, despite the wording of paragraph 2 above, if there were to be a contradiction between the Constitutional Agreement and a human rights treaty, it would seem that the Concordat would prevail over human rights since Article 6(2) of the Constitution also indicates that the Constitution and as a result the Constitutional Agreement prevails over international treaties: 2. The legislation of Georgia shall correspond to universally recognised principles and rules of international law. An international treaty or agreement of Georgia unless it contradicts the Constitution of Georgia, the Constitutional Agreement, shall take precedence over domestic normative acts. 10 State of freedom of religion in Georgia since the adoption of Constitutional Agreement between Government and the Orthodox Church of Georgia, Religious freedom report 2008, Human Rights Centre of Georgia (HRIDC), 25 April 2008, Tbilisi, Georgia. Available at http://www.humanrights.ge/admin/editor/uploads/pdf/ReligionReport.pdf 11 In comparison, the 2009 government budget for the countrys national Legal Aid Service was only a fraction of this amount: 2.9 million lari or about $1.71 million. 8
This financial help was increased to 25.3 million lari in 2010. No other religious group in Georgia receives state funding or similar government gifts, raising the likelihood that this close relationship and financial support constitutes discrimination on the ground of religion, in addition to being inconsistent with the separation between church and state. The Georgian Orthodox Church has also been handed ownership or control of most church properties which had been seized by Soviet authorities including churches which belonged to other religious groups such as Catholic Church and the Armenian Apostolic Church. Control over this property has become a very contentious issue, with most religious minorities not being able to wrest control of most of their church buildings from the Georgian Orthodox Church.12 Though the government just recently in 2011 adopted legislation, after extensive international pressure, allowing for the first time religious groups other than the Georgian Orthodox Church to be registered as public organisations,13 it has not adopted legislation to facilitate their ownership of property such as church buildings, nor granted to other religious groups any of the unique privileges and role in state affairs awarded to the Georgian Orthodox Church under the Constitutional Agreement, including: Legal immunity from prosecution for the Patriarch of the Georgian Orthodox Church (Article 1.5) Only the Georgian Orthodox Church pays no tax on either salaries or property or the sale of religious paraphernalia (Article 6.5) Only Georgian Orthodox religious marriages are automatically recognized under Article 3 of the Concordat Only members of the clergy of the Orthodox Church are automatically free from military conscription; personnel of other denominations can only request postponement of the military service or claim and justify exemptions on conscientious grounds (Article 4) Church property has been returned to the Georgian Orthodox Church since Georgias independence: very few properties has been returned to the other religious groups All major Orthodox holy days are state holidays according to Article 1.6, whereas those of other religions are not Article 4.2 recognises for the Georgian Orthodox Church an official role and only for the Orthodox Church in terms of spiritual guidance and counselling to military staff and those held in state detention facilities, to be defined in legislation The Georgian Orthodox Church also is given a consultative role under Article 5 of the Constitutional Agreement in joint educational programmes with state institutions, and is entitled to state support for its educational institutions. Moreover, the State agrees to officially recognize the educational certificates issued by the educational institutions of the Orthodox. No other religious group is given a similar role to play with or support from state authorities.14
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Out of the 29 Armenian churches in Tbilisi at the beginning of the 20th century, only remain today under the control of the Armenian Apostolic Church. The ownership of the Armenian church of Norashen is particular has attracted international attention after the removal of Armenian tombstones, the mysterious apparition of Georgian tombstones from other locations, and the gradual removal of any visible inscription in the Armenian language by workmen employed by the Georgian Orthodox Church. 13 On 5 July 2011 the Georgian Parliament amended the Civil Code to allow religious organisations in Georgia to be registered as legal entities of public law. Previous to this amendment, religious groups other than the Georgian Orthodox Church could only register as non-commercial legal entities of private law, a status similar to that of an NGO or foundation. It is too early to determine what benefits or rights will be associated to this new status, if any, in the absence of further legislation. 14 The elective course in Georgian state schools on religion in society essentially deals only with the theology of Orthodox Christianity, and the main textbook used in this courses focuses on Orthodox Christianity to the exclusion of other religions. 9
Contrary to the statements of some government official that the results of the Concordat are essentially symbolic, the above examples show quite the opposite: the Georgian Orthodox Church is guaranteed through the Constitutional Agreement concrete benefits, privileges and rights which are denied to all other religious organisations. More worrisome in terms of the division between church and state, it has also been given a constitutionally protected right to be directly involved in areas of education and the operations of some state institutions (the military and detention facilities). As for the linguistic preferences of state authorities, there has been a similar gradually exclusionary and nationalistic evolution, though initially soon after independence there was an increase in the rights of minorities in general and at least the Armenian minoritys right to use its language within administrative and other public bodies in the period 1991-1995. From 1995 however, Georgia has been heading towards an ever increasing drive to make Georgian the only language of education, employment and of communication thus excluding many citizens from an active role in the social, political and economic spheres of the country and making it increasingly illegal to use minority languages except for Abkhaz.15 The following shows for example how since 1995 there has been a legislative creeping effect which has led to an increasingly marginalisation of the use of the countrys main minority languages: 1995 Constitution names Georgian state language 1998 Law on Public Service stipulates public service in Georgia is exercised using the Georgian language, and that lack of knowledge is a ground of dismissal 1999 Administrative Code, Georgian to be used in all administrative proceedings 2003 Unified Election Code of Georgia requires knowledge of Georgian for parliamentarians 2005 Self-governance Law, all governmental sessions must be in Georgian 2006 amendments to 1997 Law on Public Service mandating exclusive use of Georgian
This has led to the perception that the Government of Georgias policies and practices are increasingly disadvantaging and even excluding minorities such as the Armenians, the Azeris and Ossetians: In 2005 and 2006 mass demonstrations and political meetings were organised by SamtskheJavakheti activists, whose demands included autonomy within Georgia for Samtskhe-Javakheti and Tsalka Armenians, use of Armenian in public administration in Armenian-populated municipalities, an end to settlement of ethnic Georgians from other parts of the country in Samtskhe-Javakheti and improved Armenian representation in state institutions. Crisis Group observed a conference on 1 July 2006 in Akhalkalaki where more than 100 participants united in protest against Georgianisation policies and a call for autonomy. Armenians strongest grievance is the inability to use their language in public life. The governments new language policies are a source of strong resentment. Tbilisi is accused of abolishing minorities former rights to use Armenian or Russian and thus limiting access to jobs and education.16
15
Though a number of state schools in areas where minorities are concentrated may still teach in languages such as Armenian or Azeri, Georgian government officials have since 2005 gradually chipped away at the number of courses taught in minority languages, and reduced the number of hours where minority languages are even taught, such as in 2010 in so-called Armenian schools: Before, Armenian language classes at the elementary school were 8 hours a week with 3 hours being allotted for the Georgian language. Now however, the classes are [half and half] See Georgia Limiting Teaching of Armenian in Javakhks Schools, 17 September 2010, Asbarez Post, at http://asbarez.com/85455/georgia-limiting-teaching-of-armenian-in-javakhk%E2%80%99s-schools/ 16 Georgias Armenian and Azerbaijani Minorities, International Crisis Group, Europe Report No. 178, 22 November 2006, p. 3. 10
All police officers, lawyers, judges, medical doctors and other public servants must all eventually pass a Georgian language exam in order to keep their position, regardless of how long they have occupied or post or even whether they need to use Georgian in their daily work. Whereas state authorities appeared to be more flexible in their testing in 2006 with, for example, Armenian doctors being provided with translators, there was in 2007 a hardening of Georgian policy in 2007 when all school directors had to pass a similar language test: but this time with no translation assistance as had been permitted for public doctors, with the result that not a single director of the 150 or so Armenian schools passed. All of them were officially suspended, though remaining in their positions until the government replaces them. When the Government of Georgia attempted to replace one Armenian school director in Akhalkalaki with an ethnic Georgian director the appointment was rejected by the local school board and large scale expressions of discontent among the Armenian community. Perhaps not wanting to risk fanning the flames of discontent in the region, state authorities appear to have backed down temporarily, and not apply the law which would seem to require that all Armenian school directors be dismissed and replaced. There is finally a human dimension to the policies of the Georgian government. Contrary to the suggestions by some that the current policies and legislation are not being implemented, and therefore are victimless since in reality the government is being pragmatic in not complying with its own laws, this is not accurate. Individuals who are members of minorities are being fired, disadvantaged or excluded through the at times arbitrary or targeted implementation of the existing laws and policies. While the government is still at times not implementing every aspect of its laws on the requirement of fluency in Georgian for government positions, including elected officials, doctors, police officers, etc., neither is it true that it is not occurring: 3 Armenian lawyers in Samtskhe-Javakheti could not pass exam in Georgian in June 2006 and lost their licences The Director of the Education Ministrys municipality resource centre in Ninotsminda also could not pass exam in Georgian in June 2006 and was replaced Also in Ninotsminda, an officer of the court, the head of the statistics department, and the head of the civil register service, and 6 Armenian staff at the Support Centre for Socially Vulnerable Families (Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs), have all been replaced, mainly by ethnic Georgians, for failing the exam in Georgian Following a television interview on 18 February 2007 where he opined that Armenians were victims of violations of their rights, the Deputy Director of the Tbilisi State Armenian Theatre was forced to submit his resignation.
In some areas, the extent of the exclusion and discriminatory impact of the current denial of the protection of national minorities in particular with legislation making Georgian the necessary and exclusive language of employment is dramatic. Especially in regions where Armenians and Azeris are not a majority, they are excluded out of all proportions from state institutions to the point of being almost invisible.17 Contrary to what is often claimed as a reason why all citizens must be fluent in the Georgian language, Georgian is not the countrys only state language. Article 8 of the Constitution makes
17
For example, while Armenians constitute more than a third of the population the district of Akhaltsikhe according to the 2002 census (36.59%), they are virtually excluded from most categories of public employment such as the police force (three Armenians only among about 190 police officers); or the tax department (none out of about 48). While formerly there was a branch of Tbilisi State University in the town of Akhaltsikhe, which had an Armenian section teaching the Armenian language and culture, this no longer exist, and the new public university replacing the former Tbilisi-operated institution (the Independent Institute of Akhaltsikhe) now only teaches in Georgian. 11
clear that the country has in fact two official languages: The state language of Georgia shall be Georgian, and in Abkhazia - also Abkhazian. The status of a state language is significant, since it implies with it its use by government authorities and employment purposes in the civil service a status denied to other minorities with the result that communities such as the Azeris and Armenians tend to be almost completely excluded from many categories of jobs and find themselves socially excluded by their own governments restrictive and discriminatory language preferences.18 The point is significant because on the one hand it would allow two groups of citizens in Georgia to use their language in contacts with state authorities as well as a language of employment and education generally but no other languages even if used by hundreds of thousands of speakers. Much larger minorities on the other hand thus find their language almost completely excluded from any use by state authorities outside of public education, and corresponding employment and educational opportunities. Ironically, there is a third language, English,19 which is increasingly used by state authorities for official purposes and can be seen on highway signs, while hundreds of thousands of citizens who are fluent in Armenian, Russian or Azeri and have little or no knowledge of English, Abkhaz or Georgian are treated like second-class citizens by their own government and their languages virtually and increasingly prohibited in the public sphere for almost all intents and purposes. This anomalous state of affairs where a government refuses to communicate with large segments of its own population in a language they understand unfortunately seems to define Georgias current policy on integration of minorities: for all the talk of the need to be inclusive,20 the current government policies in matters of religion and language have quite the opposite effect, since integration seems to be understood in the sense of only recognising one language and one religion, and not trying to effectively reach out to minorities and have them successfully participate in national society. The dramatic and increasing absence of minorities since 1991 from most political, employment and educational fields is clearly connected to the exclusionary imposition of a single language Georgian instead of a reasonable and proportional use of languages such as Armenian, Azeri or Ossetian (the Abkhaz language in theory being able to be used in conjunction with Georgian in these areas in Abkhazia) where they are concentrated in substantial numbers. Ironically, the main obstacle facing minorities in the field of education as well as employment in the civil service and other branches of government is not lack of knowledge of the state languages of Georgian or Abkhaz, it is the refusal of public authorities to allow the use of the larger minority languages in the field of higher education (including admission to university) and in state institutions.
18
The exclusion of minorities has increased in every area of public life despite an official government policy of integration, according to recent Minority Rights Group information on Georgia, available at http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid=1909 : In central institutions, levels of minority political representation remain extremely low. In the 235-seat parliament that sat until 2008, the only minorities were five Armenians and three Azeris. After elections for the new 150-seat parliament in May 2008, only six minorities remained (three Armenians and three Azeris). This means that for a country whose population is roughly 16 per cent minority, only four per cent of its parliamentarians are from minority groups. 19 Meskhetian Turks applying under Georgias law On Repatriation of Persons Forcefully Sent into Exile from Georgian SSR by the Former USSR in the 40s of the 20th Century had to submit all documents in Georgian or English. This created a barrier the majority of applicants were unable to cope with. 20 National Concept for Tolerance and Civic Integration, Civic Integration and Tolerance Council, Administration of the President of Georgia, 1 November 2008. 12
Finally, to make matters even worse, the political rights of minorities have been severely curtailed because of legislation which bans the formation of political parties with regional or territorial traits, effectively preventing the formation of any political party which would aim to defend and promote the rights of most minorities21; the government of Georgia has also to a large degree chosen to ignore many of the provisions of international treaties such as the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages where these contradict too directly the religious and linguistic preferences of the ethnic majority in the country,22 in what has been called by some Orthodox Georgian Nationalism. The environment has, for the most part for most minorities, been one of societal and governmental intolerance despite talk of multiculturalism and integration through policies and practices that are only willing to concede public space to the Georgian Orthodox Church and the Georgian language (and only theoretically to the Abkhaz language): non-traditional religious minorities such as Jehovahs Witnesses, Baptists and Pentecostalists in particular have for a number of years suffered more from violent attacks by right-wing Orthodox groups, with the covert support of the local authorities and the police who often appeared unable or unwilling to prevent these attacks,23 and jingoistic descriptions of other minorities such as Azeris and Armenians as not real Georgians or potentially a Fifth Column supportive of Russian goals in the region.24 Continuing fears for the unity of the country, perceived threats from a neighbouring power, an increasingly nationalistic streak in the countrys politics and resulting exclusion of minorities whose loyalty is often put into question25: it is in this context that one needs to understand the behaviour of state authorities when facing the demands of minorities for respect of their human rights and what it has meant for individuals such as Vahagn Chakhalyan.
21
See Article 6 of the Elections Act adopted 31 October 1997, available online at http://www.parliament.ge/index.php?lang_id=GEO&sec_id=69&kan_det=det&kan_id=119 > 22 Georgia did ratify the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in 2005, with political statements seeming to reject some of the treatys most important provisions dealing with linguistic use by state authorities, and still refuses to ratify the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. See on this point the Alternative NGO Report on Georgias implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in SamtskheJavakheti, Yerkir, Tbilisi/Geneva, January 2009. Available at http://www.cilevics.eu/minelres/reports/georgia/ShadowReport_YERKIR_Georgia.pdf 23 On how government officials often have seemed to be unwilling to act against Orthodox attacks on minorities, see the relatively recent judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Case of 97 Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovahs Witnesses and 4 Others v. Georgia, Application no. 71156/01, Strasbourg, 3 May 2007. 24 According to the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance: Recent reports continue to mention the existence of stereotypes, prejudice and misconceptions towards ethnic and religious minorities being expressed in Georgia, in particular by politicians, in the media and in school books There are reports according to which the situation concerning racism in public discourse has deteriorated in some aspects due to the August 2008 armed conflict in Georgia The climate of opinion towards members of religious minorities and in particular non-traditional minorities seemed to have worsened in recent times and this is said to lead to cases of manifestations of religious intolerance against these groups. ECRI Report on Georgia (fourth monitoring cycle), CRI(2010)17, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 28 April 2010. 25 Azeris and Armenians are underrepresented in all spheres of public life, especially government. The problem is especially acute for the Azeris in Kvemo-Kartli, where Georgians hold all important positions. Ethnic minorities political participation and representation a key to more effective integration is disturbingly low. Lack of dialogue between Tbilisi and minorities adds to perceptions of discrimination and alienation. International Crisis Group, Georgias Armenian and Azeri Minorities, Europe Report N178, 22 November 2006. 13
4. 2008: Georgias Annus Horribilis and its Victims 4.1 How not to Address Tensions in Georgia Fears and insecurities may explain, though not excuse, violations of basic human rights and freedoms. Feeling betrayed by the Ossetians and the Abkhaz minorities for seceding, many ethnic Georgians and as a consequence Georgian authorities appear to have a deeply rooted and unfounded fear that other minorities may do the same, and that any minority activism is a prelude to more serious challenges to the territorial integrity of the state. Unfortunately for minorities, journalists, human rights defenders and Vahagn, Ruben and Armen Chakhalyan, this context and the timing of the events of August 2008 would bring about a hardening of the behaviour of state authorities and in some cases flagrant and even brutal violations of fundamental rights. Mounting tensions due to the virtual exclusion of minorities in the field of university education, state employment, and political representation, as well at the leadership of President Saakashvili, led to a number of demonstrations from 2005 which have on occasion turned violent. Instead of encouraging minorities to address these problems through state structures which largely do not exist since there is no law to protect the rights of minorities rather than in the street, state authorities appear for a period to have chosen repression and persecution of the more visible activists. Events took a particularly dramatic turn to the worst a few weeks before the attack on Tskhinvali and the Russian riposte into Georgia, as the following chronology shows: Early 2005, Vahagn Chakhalyan, who is then a local youth leader, brings young activists together around United Javakhk by protesting the withdrawal of a local Russian, followed by mass demonstrations in Samtskhe-Javakheti for autonomy within Georgia, use of Armenian in public administration in Armenian populated municipalities, an end to settlement of ethnic Georgians from other parts of the country and improved Armenian representation in state institutions 26 9 March 2006, death of young Armenian after fight with Georgian youths 11 March 2006, rally following Armenian death becomes violent, with local state university, Orthodox church, and government buildings targeted 5 October 2006, the United Javakhk Democratic Alliance runs candidates as part of an existing national political party (as regional parties are banned under Georgian electoral legislation) in local elections and wins 30% of votes in the Akhalkalaki district. It denounces what it describes as massive electoral fraud and claims its results should have been closer to 70% according to its own survey of the local elections 9 October 2006, violent demonstrations against electoral fraud in local elections 11 October 2006, Vahagn Chakhalyan, now one of the leaders of United Javakhk Democratic Alliance, is arrested by Armenian authorities and sentenced to two months imprisonment for illegal border crossing 2007, demonstrations and violence continue in different parts of Samtskhe-Javakheti against election results, denial of language rights, and continued discrimination and exclusion of Armenian minority 25 November 2007, demonstrations against President Saakashvili in Tbilisi lead him to announce he would step and hold presidential elections in January 5 January 2008, presidential elections show a sharp decline in Saakashvilis popularity. According to official figures, he received 53.47% of the vote. While many international
26
Georgias Armenian and Azeri Minorities, Crisis Group Europe Report N178, 22 November 2006, p. 3. 14
observers from the European parliament and Council of Europe proclaimed the elections fair, others claim the results were falsified to avoid Saakashvili having to proceed to a second round of voting. Further opposition rallies in January 2008 attract up to 200,000 demonstrators. 10 January 2008, President Saakashvili cracks down on opponents. The prosecutor general charges one presidential opponent, billionaire Badri Patarkatsishvili, with conspiracy to overthrow the government and plotting a terrorist attack. He flees to the UK, receives a twomonth jail sentence in absentia on 16 January 2008, and dies suddenly in London on 13 February 2008 of a heart attack. 21 May 2008, parliamentary elections are held amidst claims of intimidation and falsification of results. With a turnout of 55%, the United National Movement of President Saakashvili obtains 59.4% of votes under a proportional system and receives more than twothirds of parliamentary seats (119 out of 150). In June 2008, the Georgian Parliament revokes the mandate of 16 opposition parliamentary members of parliament: only six members of the Christian Democratic Movement and two from the Republican Party decide to hold their seats. 17 July 2008, a blast occurs in Akhalkalaki, in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region, near the house of Police Chief Samvel Petrosyan. In response, local police arrest 15 members of a local Armenian minority political movement, the United Javakhk Democratic Alliance: some reports indicate a number of them were fiercely beaten by police. At 20.00 the same day, a group made up of police and civilians stormed the house of another Armenian activist, Gurgen Shirinyan. During this operation, reports indicate Gurgens father was fiercely beaten. One local policeman, Arthur Berudjanyan, is shot dead. 20 July 2008, another policeman, Armen Gabrielyan, dies. An initial report indicates he committed suicide. 21 July 2008, armed and masked Georgian special forces27 enter around 4 am the house of Vahagn Chakhalyan. All family members are initially arrested, though his mother is released at around 5 am. Vahagn Chakhalyan, his father Ruben and his younger brother Armen, who is less than 18 at the time, are detained first in Akhaltsikhe, then Tbilisi. There are reports suggesting Vahagn, Ruben and Armen were beaten and threatened at the time. 8 August 2008, Georgian ground troops enter Tskhinvali after an extensive artillery barrage
The arrests of the Chakhalyans thus occurred not only during a period of escalating tensions and violence between Georgian minorities and authorities, but also at about the same time as the government of President Saakashvili was facing widespread domestic unrest and preparing to attack South Ossetia in August 2008. In addition to the Chakhalians, Georgian authorities arrested a few months later in January 2009 two other minority Armenians civil activists, Grigol Minasyan and Sarkis Hakopjanyan, on charges of espionage for being paid to answer an opinion survey from a Belarusian non-governmental organisation, the Association for Legal Assistance to the Population. Both pleaded guilty rather risk long prison terms. By 2008-2009, the arrests and other measures by state authorities against Armenian and Azeri activists such as Vahagn Chakhalyan and members of his family seemed to have helped maintain order through the creation of an atmosphere of fear and intimation to crush the now virtually defunct organisation and silence detractors.28
27 28
The Georgian special police forces are known as spetsnaz. Georgia: The Javakheti Regions Integration Challenges, Crisis Group Europe Briefing N63, 23 May 2011, p. 4. 15
4.2 Questions Surrounding the Accusations against the Chakhalyans From the beginning the conduct of authorities seemed heavy-handed and suspicious. While the Chakhalyans were arrested on 21 July 2008 in what was in effect the middle of the night by special forces a few days after a bomb explosion and later the death of two policemen, their arrests had in the end nothing to do with those events: they were initially only charged with illegal possession of weapons and ammunition which many believe were planted there by special forces themselves, and the latter charges were also unconnected to the events of July 2008. Much later, in circumstances raising serious doubts as to the motivations and fairness of the trials, more serious charges of participation in riots, organising group action disturbing public order; resisting authorities and hooliganism were added for events in 2005 and 2006 something which had occurred between two and three years earlier. Vahagn, Ruben and Armen Chakhalyan were initially only charged under Article 236(1) of the Criminal Code of Georgia (acquisition and possession of firearms and ammunition), for which the maximum sentence could be one year in jail when they first appeared in court on 6 November 2008. The trial was postponed, and eventually when they appeared again on 3 December 2008 they were to discover to everyones great surprise a series of new criminal charges linked to protests which had occurred in 2005 and 2006, carrying with much more serious penalties that could be cumulated rather than served concurrently, raising suspicions once again Thus were added charges against Vahagn Chakhalyan under Article 226 (organising group action disrupting public order or active participation therein) and Article 239(2)(b) (hooliganism committed against a government representative or a person preventing hooliganism)29 of the Georgian Criminal Code. Specifically, the latter charges (and terms of imprisonment) relating to public demonstrations he was involved with in 2005 and 2006: Violence against pubic officials on 12 April 2005 (2 years of imprisonment); Violence and insults on 11 March 2006 in Akhalkalaki while involved in a public demonstration (1 year imprisonment); Organising actions of a group against the opening of a military policy office in Akhalkalaki on 13 and 14 June 2006 (2 years in prison for each day for a total of 4 years); Organising a demonstration protesting electoral frauds in local election on 9 October 2006 (2 years); 1 year of prison for the initial cause of his arrest, possession of a firearm and ammunition claimed to have been found during his arrest in 2008, for a total of 10 years.
To put it bluntly, grave doubts have been raised about the legitimacy of all of the accusations against the Chakhalyans. In the case of the weapons charges,30 it has been noted by outside commentators that these were found by a member of the special forces, very conveniently, while the Chakhalyans were not present in the room. Remarkably, almost the same thing happened just the previous year in 2007 in a case of a police officer fairly obviously planting a weapon and grenades in the residence of an opposition member.31
29
Hooliganism is defined in Article 239 of the Criminal Code of Georgia as the action which grossly violates public order or demonstrates open contempt toward the public, committed under violence or threat of violence. 30 Special forces assert they found a Makarov pistol under the pillow of Armen, and grenades under the bed of Ruben. 31 Joni Jikia is considered by the Fdration internationale des Ligues des Droits de lHomme to be a political prisoner. He is a member of the opposition Conservative Party and was elected to the Zugdidi municipal assembly. On 2 October 2007, he was detained by police officers who brought him to his apartment and found very quickly narcotics, a pistol and grenades. He is in jail on the basis of these charges and circumstances uncannily similar to what occurred to the 16
Subsequent requests by the accused and their lawyers for outside expertise to determine the provenance of the pistol or grenades were denied, both at trial and appeal levels. For example, despite the requests Chakhalyans lawyers, no fingerprints were ever collected on these objects reportedly found under the pillow or bed. Vahagn Chakhalyan also claims that the special forces were videotaping during this time, but that his request during the trial to have this video presented as evidence was ignored and never produced. The evidence produced in relation to the other accusations against the Chakhalyans also raise similar doubts as to the good faith and motives of the authorities involved: evidence as to the role of Vahagn Chakhalyan with hundreds of other individuals in 2005 or 2006 was contradictory and at best inconclusive, and even the government official who Chakhlyan was found guilty of hitting actually testified he did not see or know who it was who might have been responsible. Indeed, some of the evidence seemed to show quite the opposite: that Vahagn Chakhalyan attempted during the demonstrations to calm down the crowds and ensure matters did not get out of hand or that property was damaged. Whatever may or may not have happened, Vahagn, Ruben and Armen Chakhalyan on 7 April 2009 are finally found guilty of a number of offences, and in the case of Vahagn sentenced to 10 years in jail; Ruben was convicted of two charges, organising a riot directed against public order and the illegal purchase and possession of firearms, while Armen was found guilty of the illegal purchase and possession of firearms. His father and younger brother receive fines equivalent to about $3,000 and $1,200 US respectively. Nor did their ordeals end there or were limited to what occurred during their trial: 12 February 2009, the Georgian Minister of Justice refuses the request to allow a French lawyer, Patrick Arapian, from participating in the defence of the Chakhalyans 16 April 2009, Vahagn Chakhalyan is reportedly badly beaten by prison officers in Tbilisi Prison No. 8, two days after a demonstration in his defence in front of the Embassy of Georgia in Paris. 24 June 2009, an amendment to Article 78(5) Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia is approved and comes into effect: foreign lawyers are no longer allowed to defend Georgian citizens in Georgia 17 July 2009, the request before a magistrate against the decision of the Minister of Justice to refuse the appointment of a foreign lawyer is rejected on the basis of the legislative amendment adopted the previous week 27 July 2009, first hearing of the Court of Appeals of Georgia on violations of the rights of the Chakhalyans during the trial 18 September 2009, second hearing of the Court of Appeals 23 October 2009, third hearing of the Court of Appeals 30 October 2009, final conclusions of the Court of Appeals 5 July 2010, the Court of Cassation rejects the final appeals of the Chakhalyans August 2010, Application lodged to the European Court of Human Rights 6 October 2011, Vahagn Chakhalyan begins a hunger strike over inhumane and degrading conditions of his detention (not allowed to see his wife or child like other prisoners; not allowed books or water in his room, etc.) 11 October 2011, Vahagn Chakhalyan ends hunger strike at the request of Bishop Vazgen Mirzakhanyan, leader of the Armenian Eparchy in Georgia
Chakhalyans just one year later. See After the rose, the thorns: political prisoners in postrevolutionary Georgia, Fdration internationale des Ligues des Droits de lHomme, Report n 527, August 2009. 17
4.3 Human Rights and Justice Denied: The Trials and Tribulations of Vahagn, Ruben and Armen Chakhalyan There may be political reasons why Vahagn Chakhalyan one of the more visible leaders of the Armenian minority - was singled out to face a number of charges, and why he is the only one among thousands of Georgian citizens to stand accused and to be found guilty for participating in public demonstrations during 2005-2006 in Samtskhe-Javakheti. But whether or not he was targeted and punished specifically because of his prominent position in defence of the Armenian minority doesnt matter if he committed the offences he was charged with, and found guilty by a competent and independent tribunal after a fair trial. As his case to the European Court of Human Rights argues, and the position of impartial international observers and organisations shows, this unquestionably did not happen. Nor is his case unique as reports of political prisoners in Georgia are beginning to show more and more clearly in recent years. The right to a fair trial is one of the most basic of human rights in democracies, one closely connected to the very foundations of the rule of law. It is also defined in many regional and international human rights instruments, including the European Convention on Human Rights.32 Despite some variations in wording, all international human rights instruments broadly agree that as part of the right to a fair trial, individuals are entitled to a number of protections, including at a minimum: the right to be heard by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal the right to adequate time and means for the preparation of a defence the right of the accused to defend him or herself the right to examine witnesses the right to a legal counsel chosen by the accused the right to be heard within a reasonable time the right to interpretation when one does not understand the language of proceedings
The initial conduct of Georgian authorities who investigated and laid criminal charges against the Chakhalyans has raised doubts amongst observers as to whether Vahagn, Ruben and Armen Chakhalyan were being persecuted for political reasons because of their activism on behalf of the
32
Article 6, European Convention on Human Rights: Right to a fair trial: 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: a. to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusations against him; b. to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; c. to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; d. to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; e. to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court. 18
Armenian minority.33 Be that as it may, the prosecution of criminal charges against them since 2008 has been frequently questioned and criticised by European and international human rights organisations as not respecting many of the minimum guarantees under the right to a fair trial, including the right to examine witnesses and to defend themselves, to have a lawyer of ones choice, and the right of interpretation where necessary. What occurred to the Chakhalyans during their trials and subsequent appeals while they were exhausting Georgian domestic remedies as they were required to do in order to be able to present their case to the European Court of Human Rights was nothing short of nightmarish. 4.3.1 Denial of the right to examine witnesses Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present [and cross-examine] witnesses in his own defense.34 Its impossible to have a fair trial if a person is not allowed to defend himself in court, and especially if he is not allowed to examine witnesses. In a sense there is no trial at all, since you cannot contradict the evidence of the prosecution to prove your innocence. This is so basic and logical that it would in most countries be almost inconceivable that a trial could be held with this kind of restrictions: and yet that is exactly what happened during the trial of the Chakhalyans. As a human right, the right to call and cross-examine witnesses is clear: Article 6(3)d of the European Convention for Human Rights provides that an accused has the right to call, examine or have examined witnesses under the same conditions as witnesses for the prosecution. There are only a very few allowable exceptions, as when witnesses are children or victims of domestic violence. The general rule is that as accused persons must be allowed to call and examine any witness whose testimony they consider relevant, and this goes also for witnesses used by the prosecution. On a number of occasions during the trial, and again during appeal, the Chakhalyans were not allowed to examine prosecution witnesses in complete disregard of this basic tenet of a right to a fair trial. For example, the Chakhalyans lawyer requested on 26 March 2009 an opportunity to cross-examine some of the prosecution witnesses, including the chief of police Samvel Petrosyan and his son Gevorg Petrosyan, in relation to what occurred on 9 October 2006. Later, his lawyer presented another motion on 4 May 2009 requesting that the court correct court records which omitted the defence motion for the accused to be allowed to examine witnesses. The accused again requested, when appealing on 15 July 2009 their convictions, that they be allowed to examine all the witnesses used by the prosecution: this request was rejected by the Court of Appeals. On 22 July 2009, their lawyer requested an opportunity to see the video of events of 9 October 2006, this was dismissed by the appeal court without any reasons. In its final conclusions of 30 October 2009, the Court of Appeals indicated that as the accused had been able to question some witnesses, there was no valid ground of appeals. Simply put, only allowing the Chakhalyans to question some of the witnesses is completely contrary to the requirements of a fair trial, and specifically in Europe to what is demanded under
33
On the conclusion of the existence of political prisoners in Georgia, see After the rose, the thorns: political prisoners in postrevolutionary Georgia, Fdration internationale des Ligues des Droits de lHomme, Report n 527, August 2009, p. 30. 34 Taylor v. Illinois (US Supreme Court) 484 US 400 (1988) 408. 19
Article 6(3) of the European Convention on Human Rights, as the European Court of Human Rights outlined in a relatively recent judgment: Paragraph 1 of Article 6 taken together with paragraph 3 (art. 6-1, art. 6-3), also requires the Contracting States to take positive steps, in particular to enable him to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him. The latter right not only entails equal treatment of the prosecution and the defence in this matter... all the evidence must in principle be produced in the presence of the accused at a public hearing with a view to adversarial argument.35 The Chakhalyans were not allowed, despite repeated requests both at the trial and on appeal, to submit key prosecution witnesses to an adversarial argument that is a basic requirement of the right to a fair trial. 4.3.2 Denial of the right an accused to defend himself It is also a basic human right that for someone to be able to defend himself at a trial, fairness requires that he be given a chance to deal with expert and other evidence in a way that gives him a reasonable chance of responding and dealing with this kind of evidence. This is sometimes connected to the idea of equality of arms in criminal proceedings. In a way, it means that everyone must have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case to the court without being at a substantial disadvantage against the prosecution, and to have knowledge of and being able to comment on all the evidence presented against him. This can for example, mean that when an expert witness appointed by the defence does not get the same facilities as an expert for the prosecution, there is a violation of Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.36 This also means that under Article 6(3) the prosecution and police have an obligation to disclose any material in their possession, or to which they could gain access, which may help the accused prove his innocence or to reduce his sentence.37 The Chakhalyans were not allowed to defend themselves in a way which respected the principle of equality of arms when they were again refused on a number of occasions to have access to expert and other type of evidence. A couple of examples are quite striking and to show why the Chakhalyans basically had little chance to defend themselves in this matter: Vahagn Chakhalyans request during the trial that the video recordings by the Imedi television station which had taped the events near the building of municipality on 9 October 2006 be produced was ignored. Vahagn Chakhalian asserted during the trial that when the special forces searched his house on 21 July 2008 and reportedly found weapons, the operation was captured on film by a special forces cameraman. His request at trial for the video to be produced as evidence was unanswered.
35
Barber, Messegu and Jabardo v. Spain, 6 December 1988, judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, para. 78. 36 Bnisch v. Austria, (1985) 13 EHRR 409. 37 Jespers v. Belgium, European Commission on Human Rights, 27 DR 61. 20
The Chakhalyans lawyer presented a motion on appeal requesting again on 22 July 2009 for the opportunity to look at the one video of events of 9 October 2006 which had been examined in court and relied by the prosecution to make its case in order to examine more closely what was captured in the video; this was denied by the Court of Appeals on 30 October 2009. The trial court rejected the repeated requests (on 22 November 2008 and again on 3 December 2008) from the defendants lawyers to appoint an expert in order to take fingerprints from the weapons allegedly found at the house of the Chakhalyans because, apparently too much time had passed (7 months) and for some mysterious reason neither the police nor the prosecution had considered fingerprints were needed. A request for fingerprinting was also denied on appeal. Numerous requests for an independent outside expert to conduct tests in the presence of the accuseds lawyers on the pant fibres on the pistols holster in addition to the tests carried out by local police were rejected. The results of the tests carried out by the polices own experts, according to the prosecution, are consistent with the clothing worn by Vahagn Chakhalyan.38
When someone is not allowed to obtain evidence, or have an expert even fingerprint some of the main evidence used in a trial evidence which quite possibly might have been planted or is not allowed to review evidence which seemed to be initially of little relevance, there have to be serious doubts about any semblance of equality of arms where an accused has a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case without being at a substantial disadvantage against the prosecution. 4.3.3 The right to interpretation when one does not understand the language of proceedings Surely, this is a scene worthy of Kafka or Orwell: a man is interrogated for several hours in a language he poorly apprehends; he signs a statement in this language, which purports to be his; then, he is given an interpreter who translates his statement into a comprehensible tongue in order that the man can understand what it was that he has said.39 There cannot be a fair trial if an accused doesnt understand what is being said: there is no way a person can defend himself because he doesnt understand the nature of criminal proceedings directed against him and how to respond. Every human rights treaty in every part of the world recognises that this is an important aspect of a fair trial, and it is also represented in the European Convention on Human Rights in Article 6(3)(e) which indicates that an accused is entitled to the free assistance of an interpreter if he or she cannot understand or speak the language used in court. The Chakhalyans do not understand or speak Georgian, although Ruben and Armen have some fluency in Russian. As a result, they are under European and international human rights law entitled to interpretation in a language they understand which is free so as they can have a fair trial. It also appears clear that to have a fair trial, the interpretation provided must be adequate, and that informal or unprofessional interpretation is not sufficient. The European Court of Human Rights has had a number of judgments on interpretation in criminal cases and has commented in some of
38
In Bnisch v. Austria, (1985) 13 EHRR 409, the European Court of Human Rights found a violation of Article 6 (3)(d) because the expert witness appointed was also the expert who had personally drafted and transmitted two reports leading to the prosecution. 39 Vargas v. Brown, 512 F. Supp. 271-72 (D.R.I. 1981). 21
them that interpretation has to be practical and effective.40 This means not only that authorities have to appoint an interpreter but, if they have been notified of a problem with the quality of interpretation, they must take steps to control the adequacy of the interpretation provided: in other words, bad interpretation is no interpretation, and a violation of the right to a fair trial as represented in Article 6(3)(e). At almost every hearing and step of the trial and appeals, interpretation was poor and in some cases non-existent as the interpreters provided could not speak Armenian. The Chakhalyans and their lawyers repeatedly brought to the notice of the trial and appeal judges, as the relevant authorities, the inadequacy of the interpretation provided. None of these were ever directly responded to in all of the criminal proceedings and appeals in Georgia. The number of incidents, and the frustrations of the accused as well as members of the public who could understand Armenian, are almost countless: Only 3 out of 171 pages of documents on the pretrial investigation leading up to the charges against the Chakhalyans were translated into Armenian When the trial hearing started on 6 November 2008, the accused warned that the interpretation provided was so bad it was incomprehensible; they requested the interpreter be dismissed. Written statements from witnesses who had passed away were never translated into Armenian for the accused. On 12 March 2009, the lawyer for the Chakhalyans warned in writing the presiding judge that the interpretation in Armenian was incomprehensible and incomplete, and requested that the records of trial hearings be translated and provided In a few instances the presiding judge himself acted as an interpreter Time, after time again, the Chakhalyans raised the issue in 2008 and 2009 that the interpreters provided during court proceedings were simply not competent to translate into Armenian, which left them not understanding the testimony of witnesses and the nature and content of some of the evidence being adduced against them. In some cases it appears that the interpreter used during some of the hearing may have been fluent in Russian and Georgian but not Armenian. In one incident on 18 September 2009, a 10 minute presentation by the judge was summarised in one sentence by the interpreter. In one incident on 23 September 2009, the lawyer acting for Vahagn Chakhalyan requested the court to dismiss the interpreter acting at that hearing since she seemed not to be able to speak Armenian at all. The court dismissed the motion and reprimanded Mr. Chakhalyan for hindering the hearing.
Poor, incomprehensible and in some cases non-existent translation are all violations of the right to a fair trial in the case of Vahagn Chakhalyan, and in some cases his father and brother. One last example, this time from an outside observer, this time in the case of hearings at the Court of Appeals, might highlight the continual interpretation problems and extent of the denial of this basic human right: There are two interpreters. The first is supposed to translate from Georgian to Armenian and vice versa; its a new interpreter and his first appearance in a court. He quickly appears to be as incompetent and catastrophic as the others. He sits behind the accuseds cage. The second
40
Kamasinski v. Austria, judgement of the European Court of Human Rights, 19 December 1989. 22
translates from Georgian to Russian and vice versa for the father and brother of Chakhalyan. He sits between the two of them. The rest of the Chakhalyan family are in the courtroom, including his wife and many friends, as well as journalists from Armenia During the introductory comments by the Presiding Judge, the Armenian interpreter shows his limited competence and credibility. As the accused and members in the courtroom start protesting, the Presiding Judge launches into a vicious and aggressive diatribe, recalling to everyone that the proceedings are being held in Georgia, in a Georgian court, and that only the accused and his lawyers are entitled to interpretation.41 In effect, and particularly for Vahagn Chakhalyan, it was impossible for him to participate effectively in the hearings because of the poor, incomplete or non-existent interpretation. He at times refused to be involved in the hearings, as there was simply for him no way to defend himself against the prosecution, especially after the multiple requests for better translation continued to be rejected. 4.3.4 Right to a legal counsel chosen by the accused Everyone has the right to choose their own lawyer if they so which, according to Article 6(3)(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Given the seriousness of the accusations against them, the apparent desire of Georgian authorities to make an example of them, and the increasing complexity of the case as new charges were laid against them, this is exactly what the Chakhalyans tried to do when a request was made on 14 November 2008 to the Georgian Ministry of Justice as required by the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia at the time for permission for Patrick Arapian, a member of Paris Bar Association, to be involved in the case and defend the applicants. The request was denied without any explanation or reasoning.42
41
Translation of Philippe Kalfayan, Rapport de mission dobservation judiciaire, Affaire Vahagn Chakhalyan, Tbilissi (Gorgie), Conseil de Coordination des Organisations Armniennes de France, 12 November 2009: Les traducteurs sont au nombre de deux. Le premier est suppos assurer linterprtariat du gorgien vers larmnien et inversement ; cest un nouvel interprte et cest sa premire apparition dans le procs. Il se rvle rapidement tout aussi incomptent et catastrophique que les prcdents. Il est assis devant la cage du prvenu. Le second traduit du gorgien vers le russe et inversement pour le compte du pre et du frre Chakhalyan. Il est assis entre ces deux personnes. Dans la salle, se trouvent le reste de la famille Chakhalyan, dont son pouse, de nombreux amis du prvenu, ainsi que des journalistes venus dArmnieLors des propos liminaires de la Prsidente de la Cour, linterprte armnien montre les limites de sa comptence et de sa crdibilit. Devant les protestations du prvenu et de la salle, la Prsidente se lance dans une diatribe agressive et mprisante contre la salle et rappelle que ce procs se droule en Gorgie, dans une Cour gorgienne, et que seul le prvenu et ses avocats peuvent exiger une traduction. 42 The Public Defender of Georgia sent in March 2009 a letter to the Minister of Justice stating: We conclude that the refusal of the Ministry of Justice to appoint the French advocate as defence counsel for Ruben, Armen and Vahagn Chakhalyan is groundless. Despite the fact that the Chakhalyans interests are defended by the advocates Voskanyan and Rostiashvili, in defending their interests they had a right to seek assistance from a foreign advocate in view of the fact that the Chakhalyans believe that this is essential in ensuring full defence of their rights and will not protract the proceedings. Had this issue concerned the Georgian advocates, the official in charge of the proceedings would have been obliged to make it possible for the Chakhalyans to defend their rights by all means permitted by law. In this case, the issue of the foreign advocate was within the competence of the Ministry of Justice, and since all the documents submitted by Gayaneh Chakhalyan satisfied the requirements of permitting the advocate, there were no factual or legal circumstances supporting this refusal and the request must have been granted. In conformity with the Regulation of the Ministry of Justice approved by the Order No 541 of the President of Georgia dated 7 November 2008, the Ministry of Justice is a body in charge of the legal provision of the criminal prosecution and the procedural administration of the preliminary investigation, as well as the performance of other functions prescribed by law, including permitting defence by a foreign advocate in a Georgian court. The Chakhalyans precedent testifies to the fact that conferring on the 23
Astonishingly a few months later on 24 June 2009, the Criminal Procedure Code was quickly amended without debate in the national parliament, so as to bar foreign lawyers from defending Georgian citizens. This of course led to a 17 July 2009 conclusion by a magistrate rejecting a motion against the decision of the Minister of Justice. Ordinarily, a person is entitled to hire his own lawyer at their own expense, and the only exception to this should be whether the lawyer involved has the necessary qualifications and are suitable. As the European Court of Human Rights and European Commission have indicated, restrictions on the right of an accused to a lawyer of his own choosing,43 such as qualifications, conduct, and number of lawyers is permissible, as long as these are reasonable when considering the prejudice caused to the defendant and his reasons for choosing such a lawyer.44 None of these possible reasonable restrictions in the refusal to allow Patrick Arapian to act as a lawyer for the Chakhalyans are relevant here: the request was simply rejected out of hand without any explanations by the Minister of Justice, and the law quickly changed after the Ministers decision so as to prevent the Chakhalyan from trying to have courts deal with their choice of a foreign lawyer. 5. International Responses and Unease The Fdration internationale des Droits de lHomme, the Human Rights Information and Documentation Centre, and the Civil Society Institute] conclude that the procedure against Mr. Chakhalyan was carried out with blatant violations of national, regional and international legal standards on the right to a fair trial. FIDH, HRIDC and CSI intend to follow closely the appeal trial of Mr. Chakhalyan, and call upon the Georgian authorities to guarantee him a thorough and independent trial in appeal, in conformity with Georgias obligations under regional and international Human Rights law.45 The conduct of judicial and law-enforcement authorities in apparent breach of the basic rights of Vahagn Chakhalyan and his family was frequently raised or condemned by minority and human rights NGOs within Georgia,46 though none of these efforts appeared to have any effect domestically. Even Georgias Ombudsman, Sozar Subari, intervened on a number of occasions, pointing out for example that the Minister of Justices refusal to accept Mr. Chakhalyans
Ministry of Justice the functions of both defence and prosecution is incompatible, and given the fact that the key function of this body is the criminal prosecution there is a high probability that the right to defence will be violated as exemplified by the Chakhalyans case. In view of the aforementioned and according to Article 21(b) of the Law on the Human Rights Defender of Georgia, I hereby recommend that in order to restore the violated rights of Armen, Rouben and Vahagn Chakhalyan the French advocate Patrick Arapyan must be allowed to participate in the proceedings. 43 Ensslin and others v. the Federal Republic of Germany (European Commission on Human Rights) 14 DR 64. 44 Croissant v. Germany, European Court of Human Rights, 25 September 1992. 45 Fdration internationale des Droits de lHomme, Press release, 7 May 2009, available at http://www.fidh.org/IMG//pdf/ge0705a.pdf . 46 On Georgian NGOs taking the view that the case of the Chakhalyans involved serious breaches of their human rights or seemed to be a case of political vendetta against leaders of a minority community, are the Human Rights Information and Documentation Centre, the Civil Society Institute, Democratic Alliance United Javakhk, etc. See also local media comments, in English, at http://www.humanrights.ge/index.php?a=main&pid=7843&lang=eng and http://www.georgiatimes.info/en/articles/29019.html . 24
appointment of French lawyer Patrick Arapian for his trial was a violation of the right to defence guaranteed by the Constitution: his intervention was to no avail.47 Outside of Georgia, despite the international community being distracted and dismayed by events during and following the Georgian-Russian conflict which erupted in August 2008, the situation did not go unnoticed. In addition to the Fdration internationale des Droits de lHomme taking the view expressed above that the rights of a fair trial were denied in the Chakhalyan matter, other European and American reports raised concerns that something may have gone horribly wrong in the way Georgian authorities behaved. Though couched in diplomatic language, some international organisations seem to now view the whole episode as possibly involving a political settling of accounts against the leaders of a troublesome minority, rather than a truly criminal matter. As was pointed out by one Council of Europe committee, advocating minority rights, as protected by the Framework Convention, must in no circumstances lead to measures of sanctioning of those involved, and that irrespective of the nature of the accusations and the grounds brought against these persons, the authorities should ensure that the rights of defendants and/or detained persons are fully respected.48 Along the same lines, the US State Department in its last yearly report in 2011 on the human rights situation in Georgia (the next report being released in April 2012), has begun to identify the treatment of the Chakhalyans as a human rights issue, pointing out the concerns of some NGOs that Vahagn Chakhalian and his relatives had been targeted for prosecution because of his political activity in the countrys ethnic Armenian community, mentioning the timing of the arrest (two years after the alleged incident) and the assertion that there were violations which had occurred during the trial.49 The Chakhlyans ordeal has not occurred in a vacuum, but may be symptomatic of a weakened government lashing out through the judiciary and law-enforcement agencies at perceived threats, be it from other political opponents or the leaders of minority organisations. This can help explain what today could be seen as the odd frenzy and even paranoia of some pro-government Georgian media alleging during a special Russian Plan report on Rustavi 2 television that Vahagn Chakhalyan had been detained and charged with a number of others in 2010 for spying for Moscow, and that Georgian opposition figures who supported Chakhalyan were aiding Russia and thus encouraging minority demands and allegedly fuelling tensions in Javakheti.50 That Chakhalyan was arrested and charged in 2008 rather than 2010 for matters that had nothing to do with espionage did not seem to matter in the story, but it did show how authorities may seem to connect claims of minorities with political dissent and disloyalty and repressive measures by some branches of the state apparatus, as pointed out in a recent International Crisis Report since, [p]rocedural violations during the trial and the fact that he was mainly charged with offences related to the 2006 rallies, such as organising a riot directed against public order and hooliganism, convinced his supporters that the affair was politically motivated.51
47
See the official Georgian text of his statement of 17 February 2009 at www.ombudsman.ge/index.php?m=8&newsid=979; an English translation is available at http://www.yerkir.org/index.php?level_id=226&lang=eng . 48 Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Opinion on Georgia, adopted on 19 March 2009, ACFC/OP/I(2009)001, para. 89, at p. 25. 49 United States Department of State, 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Georgia, 8 April 2011, available at www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/eur/154425.htm 50 International Crisis Group, Georgia: The Javakheti Regions Integration Challenges, Briefing N 63, 23 May 2011, p. 10. 51 International Crisis Group, Georgia: The Javakheti Regions Integration Challenges, Briefing N 63, 23 May 2011, p. 4. 25
Whatever the motivation, the spectre and sense of irregularities at the trial is now fairly widespread among international organisations, including in a recent report to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe instructed to assess Georgias progress in fulfilling its commitments and obligations as a member of the Council of Europe: 43. Recently, some tension has been reported there after [Vahagn Chakhalyan] of the local Armenian community was arrested in 2008 and convicted to a prison term, following a trial which has allegedly been marred by irregularities. Such incidents could possibly lead to the deterioration of the situation in the region....52 In addition to these official international responses and reports, there has been widespread reactions outside of Georgia of the perceived violations of the rights to a fair trial from various Armenian organisations,53 as well as other diplomatic and other expressions of disaffection and concern by members of the European Parliament54 and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,55 demonstrations in Paris56 and Yerevan,57 and in petitions and appeals to the Georgian President,58 the President of Armenia,59 the President of France,60 the President of the European Commission,61 the Secretary General of the Council of Europe,62 and finally to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,63 informing them on the human rights issues in the case and inviting them to intervene in the matter.
52
Georgia: Compliance with obligations and commitments, Directorate General of Democracy and Political Affairs, SG/Inf (2010)1 final 17 March 2010, January 2010. Available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1578745&Site=CM#P212_34127 . 53 See in particular the numerous statements of the CCAF, Conseil de Coordination des Organisations Armniennes de France, at http://www.yerkir.org/index.php?level_id=254&lang=eng and http://www.ccaf.info/item.php?r=3&id=444 , and Yerkir Union of NGO for Repatriation and Settlement, at http://www.yerkir.eu/ and http://www.yerkir.eu/Yerkir.2010.12.01-2.pdf 54 See report on Member of the European Parliament Sylvie Guillaume sending a letter to Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations, on the violations of international legal standards in the Vahagn Chakhalyan case and other human rights concerns at https://www.armradio.am/eng/news/?part=soc&id=15729 . 55 See Parliamentarian Zaruhi Postanjyan raising Chakhalyan case duringamongst others, the 2011 plenary session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe at http://tert.am/en/news/2011/01/28/postanjyan/ 56 Armenians of France Demand Release of Chakhalyan, 16 April 2009 at http://www.azg.am/EN/2009041603 57 Activists Demand the Release of Vahagn Chakhalyan, 28 November 2011, at http://www.tert.am/en/news/2011/11/28/march/ 58 Activists Demand the Release of Vahagn Chakhalyan, 28 November 2011, at http://www.armtown.com/news/en/trt/20111128/189090 59 Javakhk Armenians appeal to Armenian President, 28 November 2011, at http://tert.am/en/news/2011/11/28/petition/ 60 Yerkir Union Europe sends Letter to French President Nicholas Sarkozy, 7 June 2010, at http://www.yerkir.eu/2010.06.07-YERKIR.EN.pdf 61 Stop Discrimination by Georgian Authorities against Armenians of Javakhk, 23 February 2011, at http://www.gopetition.com/petition/43282.html 62 Stop Discrimination by Georgian Authorities against Armenians of Javakhk, 23 February 2011, at http://www.gopetition.com/petition/43282.html 63 http://www.yerkir.eu/2009.01.31%20-%20YERKIR%20EN.pdf 26
6. Human Rights and a Fair Trial: An Appeal to the European Court of Human Rights There are many other aspects in the matter of the trials of the Chakhalyans that this report does not cover: the beatings, threats against family and friends, brutal and degrading treatment in detention. It tries instead to focus on the legal ordeal and violations of their basic human rights which they have been through which may involve very serious miscarriage of justice: planted evidence, charges with little or no clear evidence, not allowed to defend themselves, refusal to allow them to question witnesses or produce evidence, little or no real interpretation in order to understand and defend themselves properly. These are all matters which can now be addressed to the European Court of Human Rights, not as a court of appeal against the behaviour of the judiciary in Georgia the European Court cannot play such a role but as the ultimate defender of the most basic of human rights in Europe: the right of a fair trial. The Chakhalyans are not the only individuals belonging to a minority in Georgia who appear to be targeted because of their high profiles, and in recent years other individuals have since 2008 been facing the wrath of state authorities to the point that it is now possible to speak of political prisoners in this country. What the cases of Vahagn Chakhalyan, his father Ruben and his younger brother Armen do uniquely represent is one of the first occasions to address in a fair, neutral and objective judicial ambiance the true nature of what they have gone through in the last four years. While in a sense this is going to be a very narrow mandate: the European Court cannot be asked to comment on the actual validity or foundation of the criminal charges against them, any finding that the Chakhalyans have not been afforded a fair trial given the nature and scope of the irregularities committed by police, prosecutorial and judicial authorities can only strongly point the finger that something is rotten in the state, to paraphrase Shakespeare. It is also possible that Vahagn Chakhalyan and his family are the unfortunate victims of a particular context of fear, suspicion, unrest and unease because of geopolitical and other factors: whatever the reasons, as human beings and individuals asking for the respect of the rights of the Armenian minority, they are still entitled to their dignity and basic human rights: the conduct of authorities can only be described in their case as obsessive and out of all proportion for what in most countries would considered as basic expressions of democratic rights.
The Perils of Being a National Minority: Human Rights and Chakhalyan v. Georgia Report on Human Rights Violations in the Republic of Georgia by Dr Fernand de Varennes 22 May 2012
Union Yerkir - Europe www.yerkir.eu contact@yerkir.eu
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Mariam Sargsyan - Letter of Motivation

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