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Student: please complete Section 1 of this form, and then include the entire form at the beginning of your electronic submission. Note: dissertations will not be returned nor feedback given, as these are treated as exam scripts. Dissertation marks will not be provided until after they have been ratified at the School Board. First marker: please complete Section 2. Second marker: please complete Section 3 (and section 4 if required). External marker: please complete Section 5. Section 1 Name of student: Email address: Programme title: Month/ year of dissertation start: Year of study (delete as appropriate): Name of supervisor: Dissertation title: Aaron Gracey A_gracey@hotmail.com War in the Modern World Apr 10 3rd David Easter
In Today's Contemporary Operating Environment Does The UK Need To Apply More Soft Power Into Its Approach To Deliver A Decisive Victory Against An Asymmetric Opponent? A Study Of Previous Campaigns (Vietnam, Russo-Afghan Conflict And The Dhofar Campaign) And The Lessons Identified Which Could Assist The Current Campaign In Afghanistan.

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In Today's Contemporary Operating Environment Does The UK Need To Apply More Soft Power Into Its Approach To Deliver A Decisive Victory Against An Asymmetric Opponent? A Study Of Previous Campaigns (Vietnam, Russo-Afghan Conflict And The Dhofar Campaign) And The Lessons Identified Which Could Assist The Current Campaign In Afghanistan. Better to conquer hearts than Citidels, Nguyen Trai.1

Since their deployment British forces have been constantly involved in a close quarter, often brutal, insurgency that has seen mounting casualties on all sides. Without any significant visual successes for the local population to credit the forces of NATO or the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with, there is the real risk of operational failure unless a different approach is taken. This dissertation examines the origins of Soft Power2 and potential uses the UK can implement against the insurgency. It will study the actions of the USSR in Afghanistan; the US in Vietnam; and the UK in Dhofar, Oman and how they employed Soft Power in conjunction with military action to try and defeat their enemy. Finally it will assess the lessons identified during the three campaigns and whether these lessons have been fully incorporated into the present British strategy, or whether the UK is continuing to follow a more aggressive military approach and failing to apply other less kinetic approaches. The very nature of war is asymmetric3; a characteristic which has been exploited by the insurgent as they seek to negate the overmatching conventional forces of the major economic-military powers4. By

concentrating on an asymmetric approach, the insurgent has raised this conflict nature to a higher level of complexity. Numerous military authors have commented on this characteristic, labelling it as 3 Block War5, `War Amongst The People`6 and recently Hybrid Warfare7.

The three campaigns have been chosen as each teaches a lesson in the implication about integrating Soft Power into a Counter-Insurgency (COIN) campaign planning strategy against an asymmetric adversary. Vietnam is a critical conflict for it demonstrated that if an insurgency is properly led, directed and allowed to mature, it can overwhelm a far greater military power, even though tactically it is often defeated. By incorporating an approach that relied more on strategic influence and Soft Power to target an international audience, the Viet Cong defeated two military powers within Indo-China. In essence the Viet Cong used a basic version of the Comprehensive Approach8 (CA) towards the campaign against the US. UK unrestricted doctrinal publication states that the CA as:

1 2

Ham (2007), p. vii. Soft Power is a term used to describe the use of power based on intangible or indirect influences such as culture, values, economics and ideology. 3 Russell, J., British Army, Asymmetry an unendorsed think piece, DGD&D, Upavon, November 2001. 4 US, Russia and China, closely followed by UK, France and Japan. 5 Krulak, Charles, C., (1999). 6 Smith, R, (2005). 7 Hoffman, F.,G., (2007) 8 The C A is a Governmental process that was brought about after the disasters of the Balkans campaign where military, government departments and non-government organisations (NGOs) were involved in the same situation but without centralised co-ordination. The CA brings the Military, Other Government Departments (OGD) and Inter Agencies (IA) together to work towards a single aim, while gaining a firm understanding of the relevant societys constituent parts.

"The CA is a conceptual framework which could be used to reinvigorate the existing, Cabinet Office-led, approach to coordinating the objectives and activities of Government Departments in identifying, analysing, planning and executing national responses to complex situations.9"

The CA is not just a military responsibility; rather it is the requirement of all government parties to ensure that the process is successfully executed.

The insurgency in the Oman can be viewed as a model of conducting a COIN campaign against an imbedded insurgency. It demonstrated that with minimum force, coupled with an accurate understanding of the culture, the needs of the population and the political issues driving the insurgency, a campaign which was seemingly lost can be rapidly turned around given the right direction and leadership, as seen from post 1970 under the direction of the Sultan's son, Qaboos. The campaign is also remarkable in that though it is not well known, the strategic results of failure would have resulted in a serious Western crisis, with the loss of vital oil supplies from the Middle East being interrupted by the loss of control of the Strait of Hormuz and access to the Persian Gulf. It highlights the effects of international non-state actors and the destabilisation of a reasonably stable Arab nation by their actions.10 Concurrently in Vietnam the Americans were failing to prevent the Communist insurgency from successfully seizing the South.

The Russo-Afghan campaign has also been chosen as it is very relevant to the current situation the British forces find themselves involved in. The Soviet forces learned many harsh lessons during the nine years they were stationed in Afghanistan, suffering dearly for failing to correctly understand issues about employing Soft Power. Rather than seeking to influence the people, understand the culture and try to unite the country under political direction and a desire to create a stable state, the USSR sought to install a compliant leadership and sought to bring communism to the nation, against the desire of the people. This catastrophic failure to employ Soft along with Hard Power resulted in an abject failure of the operation. Interestingly, similar to the Oman campaign and in contrast to the recent Afghanistan conflict, the majority of the fighting was conducted in the rural areas, rather than within the urban conurbations.

All three campaigns have serious and fundamental lessons which the United Kingdom needed to have identified and learnt prior to their entry into Afghanistan in 2001. For the purpose of this dissertation the term Soft Power will encompass the strategic actions of the nation state through political, religious, ethical and cultural channels, and at the operational and tactical level through the use of Information Operations, Cultural Awareness and Non-Kinetic effects. It will seek to identify how each of the major powers executed their relevant campaign and how they used Soft Power to multiply the actions of their military. It will seek to answer the question of whether the Soft Power practices used and lessons identified have been carried forward and adopted by the current United Kingdom government, or whether the those lessons were forgotten and have had to be re-learnt.

UK Ministry of Defence, JDN 4/05 The Comprehensive Approach, Jan 06, p.1-1. The destabilising of Oman began in the early 1950s due to religious. political and economic issues. One of the issues was the supposed rivalry of UK and US oil companies within the region. Peterson J. E., 1976, p 290.
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Britain's strategic reputation as a world leader in Counter- Insurgency (COIN) operations would seem to indicate that it would be the key player in delivering advice on the strategy within Afghanistan, considering it is fighting an asymmetric enemy over the ground it has previously fought on. The British military for many years has been held in high esteem for its ability to conduct low intensity COIN operations, with the successes of Malaya, Kenya, Dhofar and most recently Northern Ireland being seen as the means to deliver the required victory against the insurgent. For every successful campaign however, the UK forces have also failed to deliver; Palestine, Aden, and Basra. Though highlighted as military successes, the media picture of the situation in Aden and in Basra11 seem to report a different situation. Images of UK forces positioned behind compound walls awaiting American and Iraqi forces to clear Az Zubayr severely damaged the image of the UK COIN approach; the lessons learned in previous COIN situations had been forgotten. The

knowledge and experience acquired in 30 years of service in Northern Ireland had been imported into Iraq and Afghanistan, though the military had failed to understand the complete situation and tried to directly copy the Northern Ireland model, rather than adapting it for the political and geographical environment.

Though the establishment seem to possess a belief in its ability to deliver successful COIN strategies, there are others, such as Ashley Jackson, who indicates that the British Government has a rather selective history of British COIN experiences. Another aspect of the British approach during the years immediately after the Second World War was the desire to withdraw from possible confrontation against large scale rebellion, such as India and Burma. By extracting their forces and allowing the return of the sovereign state, the British government managed to avoid an Indo-China, Vietnam or Afghanistan12, until now.

Recently the United States military has displayed its ability to radically change its warfare methodology, resulting in a COIN balance of power shift. The US military, once seen as the student of the UK COIN methods, has now become the teacher, with the recent publications of FM 3.24 and more recently FM 3.24.2 demonstrating the transformation of the military. The Vietnam conflict created a wealth of successful COIN experience, though the political and military leadership strove to ignore these lessons for fear of raising the spectre of Vietnam during this current COIN situation. As Anthony James Jones states:

"The deplorable experience in Vietnam overshadows American thinking about guerrilla insurgency.13" Interestingly the Australian Army14, which had considerable success in the Vietnam conflict, and is continuing its success in COIN operations in Afghanistan, embraced the lessons learned. These COIN skills had been honed in Malaya, enabling them to quickly gain and maintain an upper hand over the communist insurgents. Though skilled, there is evidence that US forces ignored the advice given to them by Australian advisors. This is especially clear within the Strategic Hamlet project, where Colonel Ted Serong, senior Australian

11

Lack of equipment, resources and ability for commanders to plan resulted in confusion and missed opportunities. - Richard NortonTaylor, The Guardian, dated 11 Jan 2010. 12 John Newsinger. (2002) P1. 13 Joes, A. J. (2000), p.325. 14 Over 60,000 Australian and New Zealand Troops served in Vietnam, with 521 killed and more than 3000 wounded. www.awm.gov.au/atwar/vietnam. Accessed on 2 Aug 10.

advisor, clashed with the US Marine General Krulak upon the actual usefulness of the project15. He was later proven to be right about those doubts. In direct contrast to the actions of the American forces, which sought large scale engagements and the over-matching of firepower, Australian forces sought to apply a mixture of force and restraint, guided by the experience of their commanders from Malaya. Since the change in the Iraq conflict to a COIN situation, the US has transformed its military `in contact`, enabling the leadership to identify and remove the conceptual reigns that had denied it the ability to implement the lessons from Vietnam. The UK, faced with an approach which was struggling to provide success against a second generation insurgency, has been forced to re-write its COIN doctrine.

Unfortunately for the British military and the UK Government, the current British strategy that is being implemented in Afghanistan is failing to match the quality of strategic direction that was demonstrated in the Oman. Rather it is duplicating the Soviet example, as indicated by Alex Marshall:

`From the outset, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan represented a botched compromise between a humanitarian stabilisation operation and a full-scale war effort against Afghan insurgents.'16

Faced with the situation that maybe it had overblown its own successes along with it COIN ability, and accused by our closest ally of standing on the sidelines while screaming advice, the British Government found itself on the defensive. This situation was further exacerbated by Brigadier Alwyn-Foster's17 article on the state of the US COIN Doctrine, which further increased the backlash against the UK by some US military analysts.18

Until the campaign receives better Governmental leadership, direction and support from other governmental departments, the campaign in Afghanistan may also deliver a similar outcome to that of the Americans in Vietnam or the Russians in Afghanistan; numerous tactical successes but an overall strategic failure.

UK COIN DOCTRINE

The updated UK COIN doctrine aims to deliver a successful approach to the second generation (2G) insurgency which it is fighting in Afghanistan and may possibly face in future conflicts. Previous Doctrine was based on the lessons identified and learned by Sir Thompson and General Sir Kitson, and was mainly an extension of their personal ideas of how to fight COIN. Thompson's ideas were aimed at the strategic and operational level and were: a clear political aim; Work within the law; the development of an overall plan; defeat political subversion; and secure base areas19. General Sir Kitson on the other hand sought for a more tactical approach to COIN warfare, seeking to deliver principles that troops involved on the ground could use to understand the often fluid and non-linear situation.

15 16

Ham (2007), p. 93-94. Marshall, A. (2007). 17 Brigadier Alywn-Foster stated that the US COIN approach weighed down by bureaucracy, hierarchical outlook,... and a sense of duty that all matters had to be confronted head on. He further stated that the US Army acted like fuel on a fire with its uncultured and disorganised approach to COIN, citing the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq War. 18 Col Kevin Benson highlighted poor tactical decisions by UK military forces. Source: RUSI Journal Jun 2009, Vol 154 No. 3. 19 Sir Robert Thompson, (1966).

His four principles were: good coordinating machinery; win the propaganda war; Effective intelligence; and operating within the law. After the re-write the modern UK doctrine is based on a blending of these ideas and the COIN Doctrine is based on 10 broad principles20 (See fig 1).

The new doctrine has a heavy bias towards the new American FM 3.24 COIN doctrine, which aimed to deliver an easy-to-understand approach for the soldier on the ground. Endorsed by General Patreaus, it is now seen

as being the most relevant for the situation. It aims to break down COIN into manageable elements, delivering advice, highlighting possible situations and placing emphasis on reaction and understanding of the current situation. Ironically it is based on the direct lessons learned from the British in Malaya and the Dhofar campaign, as well as the more painful Vietnam experience of the US military.
Fig 1. Tenets of British Counter Insurgency Doctrine

The driving force has been the realisation that the "Strategic Corporal21" is now a reality and to prevent a disastrous event occurring, he/she requires guidance on the application of their knowledge and training, rather than an unwieldy, doctrinally pure document.

Previous UK COIN has been based on a situation where the UK was the legitimate power within its colonies and had access to financial power, the support of the population and a colonial police force already established to help maintain law and order; or it was asked to intervene through a mandate or formal agreement. The opponent consisted usually of only one main social group, easily identifiable and with certain ideals that may be alien to the majority of the host population. The current 2G insurgency has morphed through the use of globalisation and technology; is deeply rooted within the social and ethical elements of the host populations; is trans-national; and is mutually supported by many different factions while simultaneously remaining individual groupings in their own right. Though initially believed to be best placed to deal with a global insurgency through the 200+ years of experience obtained through colonial policing, the current situation has highlighted a major flaw in British COIN Doctrine it is based on myth and unrecorded experiences.

20 21

AFM V1 Part 10, 2010, p.1-1.

The Strategic Corporal was first coined by General Charles Krulak in his article The Three Block War(1999). It indicates the continued devolving of leadership to the lowest commander on the ground, the Corporal, when involved in complex, rapidly evolving mission environments.

The initial British COIN approach was based on an understanding obtained through the UK Special

Operations Executive (SOE) actions and the activities of T E Lawrence (see fig. 2) in the First World War. Yet there is greater material to be obtained long before that. The problem that has now occurred is that as these lessons have been passed on through Regimental knowledge and practices, myths and incorrect

assumptions have been made. These assumptions are applied to situations in current conflicts as lessons of Best Practice22, though actually they have been adopted without being fully understood or remaining in the initial context that they were applied to.
Fig 2: Lawrence of Arabia.

The inability for generations to actually understand in depth how these principles where used and tailored to the relevant situation has resulted in the improper application of COIN lessons to the current operations in the Middle East. In the current climate to defeat a classic insurgency you need to understand the reasons behind it, the people that are driving it and the political, social and economic factors that can or cannot be changed to assist your efforts to defeat it. To date no formal explanation has been allied to the term 'Global Insurgency', though Colonel Ian Rigden, British Army, has attempted to offer a possible definition:

"Coordinated simultaneous conflicts involving state and non-state actors, using both regular and irregular methods at multiple locations world-wide, based on either a single coherent vision for the new order or mutually supporting objectives that assist the participating groups towards their own goals, usually with little regard for national boundaries."23

The state of British COIN Doctrine was publicly highlighted in 2008/2009 during the uprising of the Madhi Army in Basra which resulted in the tasking of a combined Iraqi/US Force ordered to contend with a situation within the city. Brigadier Alwyn-Foster's criticism of the US COIN approach opened the means for a return examination of the British approach, resulting in some unwanted thorough examination of the procedures. Though regarded as the best model for the situation, it was discovered that the written doctrine and implemented practices varied considerably at times. Furthermore, when placed outside of the colonial comfort blanket of a military force present, supported by an imperial police force and with a majority of the population onside, the UK approach did not fare so well. The analysis by outside agencies also laid bare that the UK was unable to properly resource its campaigns, training at times was woefully inadequate to deal with the current situation, with procedures still based on tactics learned in Northern Ireland.

22

Best practice is a technique, method, process, activity, incentive, or reward that is believed to be more effective at delivering a particular outcome than any other when applied to a particular situation. 23 Rigden, I. A., (2008), p.4.

Analysis also indicated the officer corps was not as capable of dealing with the intellectual rigours of second generation insurgency, where it was faced with contending with decentralised, networked elements seeking to use information, diverse communication and the exploitation of the psychological effect of terror attacks. In the early stages of the Iraq and Afghan Wars, none of the British senior personnel had any COIN experience outside of Northern Ireland.24 The education also received by the Officer Corps was weak at best, with the majority of training still being based on Large Scale Brigade combat actions.25

During those campaigns it seemed that the insurgent was far better at using technology, the benefits of globalisation and the internet, network communications and psychological warfare than the COIN practitioner. Furthermore, the UK government, unlike the US, was unable to generate a full review of how it approached the evolving characteristics of second generation insurgency, resulting in a critical absence of vital equipment and skills. The UK was still practicing fighting a Maoist based insurgency, which used a balance of stick-and-carrot approach, rather than the contemporary evolving insurgency, which relied more on terror and coercion26. The desire to save money has changed the approach to developing the organisational thought process, once key to the UK Armed Forces, with communal courses now being replaced with internet based learning, graduated approach training and a `just enough, just in time' attitude to officer and soldier educational training. This has resulted in a serious loss of conceptual thought and discussion on current themes, as the majority of the education programmes that are web-based being regularly out of date and teaching wrong practices and procedures27. Ironically for the UK, the insurgent has fully embraced UK Manoeuvrist Doctrine, which:

"...provides for greater flexibility in combat, the opportunity to seize fleeting opportunities and the means to overcome greater force with less by inflicting on him a series of rapid, violent and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope."28

In a current environment where the military need more educators and instructional staff to increase the awareness of personnel to the contemporary threat, the Education Training Corps has ceased to exist, having been merged with the Adjutant General's Corps. To help with the financial difficulties of the MOD, military learning centres are being reduced, apparently `modernising' the way education is delivered.

These failings of the British COIN approach have been brought to the fore during the recent Iraq campaign, with the word Basra now replacing Malaya for the state of the British COIN doctrine. Rather than seeking to re-apply the lessons of Malaya, the British need to re-evaluate the lessons learned in Cyprus and by the French in Algeria. These two situations were urban based and may be a more accurate portrayal of the situation found in Afghanistan. British COIN practices are now being viewed as an ill-conceived, wrongly
24 25

Lt Gen Kiszely interview quoted in a Defence Research Paper Williams, Aug 2008. In 2008 the author attended ICSC(L), where COIN training was a 4 day module placed at the end of the second term with little Directing Staff input. ACSC training only devoted two days in a year long course to the topic, yet by then British forces were heavily involved in two major COIN operations. 26 Metz, S. (2007) p.14. 27 The author has recently conducted a review of the Royal Artillery elements on the Military Knowledge 2 e-learning assessment which is critical to officer career progression. The Royal Artillery lessons required a complete re-write, with elements still being routed in Cold War doctrine. 28 Design for Military Operations The British Military Doctrine (1996), p.4-21/22

applied and a `how not to do it' example, resulting in a major shift in knowledge application. The US is now seen as the leading practitioner of COIN, a view which is supported by Ashley Jackson:

At present, the Americans are the market leaders, and are thinking and investing heavily in counterinsurgency and counter terrorism'29

UNDERSTAND THE REASONS FOR THE CONFLICT.

Sun Tzu stated in the Art of War the mark of good leadership is to understand own and opposing forces:

"Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle."30

This underpins the problem that faced the US leadership in Vietnam as it failed to understand its own forces and critically failed to comprehend the nature of warfare the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) would employ. This was a critical lack of judgement, having just witnessed the French conduct the mistakes in Indo China that the US where about to commit in Vietnam. The decision process was hampered by two issues; the military staff leadership buoyed by the use of large scale military force in Korea; and there existed a conceptual mindset of `Big Unit' warfare in the central plains of Europe. Contaminated by these strands of thought, the leadership could see no other way to wage war against the communist threat. The preparation and maintenance of the capability of fighting large scale warfare came at the cost of the understanding COIN, a risk the current British Forces are taking. The incursions that the US had into COIN during the early part of the 20th Century31 resulted in numerous lessons on the use of limited force, public support and cultural awareness but these were ignored in favour of "Big Unit" tactics (see fig 3).

This approach within the jungles of Indochina would result in a long lasting and painful memory on American military psyche. Failure to understand the socio-political environment within South Vietnam resulted in the US delivering a military solution to what was primarily a political problem.

Consequently it was unable to deliver the required solution, which should have been based on a cultural and sociopolitical response tempered with force. The challenge that Vietnam posed the US military was being able to understand the situation on the strategic, operational and tactical level. Under General Westmoreland, the US sought to engage the insurgents in open warfare, seeking to fight pitched battles which enabled the US to deliver it technological superiority at will.
Figure 3 the contrasts of Regular and Irregular warfare.

29 30

Dr Ashley Jackson. (2006), p138. Sun Tzu, The Art of War accessed on www.gutenburg.org on 07 Jul 2010. 31 These experiences include the Philippines Insurrection, Nicaragua, Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

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In reality the strategic issue was not the insurgents or the North Vietnamese Army that sought to invade, conquer and unite both nations under one banner. Rather it was the lack of support the South Vietnamese leadership had from its population. This was due to its corruption, failure to provide for the majority of the people and its refusal to allow democratic elections to take place, contrary to the agreement made to end the Indo-China campaign.

Similar to the current situation in Afghanistan, the British Forces, as part of ISAF, wish to support a questionable government and assist in obtaining local support for the regime. Unfortunately the US advisor, Richard Holbrooke believes that President Karzai, similar to Diem in Vietnam, is part of the problem, as reported by the Asia Times:

"Holbrooke's version is that Karzai is corrupt and presides over a morally decrepit and decadent regime that hangs around America's neck like an albatross."32

This situation was faced previously in Afghanistan by the Russians, who sought to change the situation and defeat a growing insurgency by using the Soviet military to secure the urban areas and the Afghan military to secure the rural locations. The Russians failed to correctly understand the political landscape which resulted in a number of tribes and clans uniting to fight under the unified banner of the Mujahedeen. Rather than bringing peace and prosperity to the nation, the Russians' lack of political and cultural understanding and desire to replace Islam with Communism resulted in a violent backlash from the local population.

Unable to unite the political elements or create a workable mandate that the population would follow, the government was identified as being no more than a Soviet puppet regime, adding political support to the insurgents' claims. Given the strategic political environment at this time, the insurgents' claims struck a clear resounding note with the West, whom, having fought in Vietnam 15 years previously to prevent the spread of Communism, now saw another domino that was wavering. More importantly, the Afghan domino, if it fell, would allow the Soviet war machine easier access to the oil fields in the south.

The Russians completely misinterpreted the reasons for the conflict. They believed the insurgents were fighting to prevent an organised government to take national control and therefore threaten the dominance of the local warlords and tribal elders. The Mujahedeen were fighting to protect the Afghan way of life and religion, while, cynically, the West were fighting to bleed the USSR dry, prevent their ability to access the oil rich regions of the south, and revenge for Vietnam, as indicated by President Carter's advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski:

"We didn't push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would...That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Soviets into the Afghan trap...opportunity of giving to the Soviet Union its Vietnam War.33"

32 33

Bhadrakumar, M. K., The Alienation of Hamid Karzai, Asia Times Online dated Apr 02 2010. http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/BRZ110A.html.

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Both the US and Russia failed to understand the enemy, its cause and its will to fight, even to the death. Both insurgencies were driven by more than just a desire to rebel against the State Authority; for the Viet Cong it was ideologically based, for the Mujahedeen it was religiously inspired. It was this foundation that drove both insurgencies on, despite mounting casualties and defeats. It is accepted that the USSR and the US could have destroyed their respective enemy had they prosecuted a total war campaign, but fighting a limited war, coupled with a dislocated political and military strategy meant that the chance of success was remote. WINNING THE POPULATION SUPPORT THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF SOFT POWER UNSEATING THE INSURGENT THROUGH THE CULTURAL, DIPLOMATIC AND MORAL DOMAIN.

Before the concept of Soft Power and how it can be applied is studied, it is important to understand what is meant by power and the relationship between it and the authority seeking to use it. The New Oxford Dictionary describes power as: "the capacity or ability to direct or influence the behaviour of others or the course of events.34"

It is agreed between learned scholars and analysts that power is in fact a social phenomenon, caused by the inter-relationships and group dynamics of societies and cultures. Therefore, to be able to effectively wield power, the relationship between these cultures and societies needs to be fully understood to ensure that the authority seeking to use this power can do so to its maximum effect. Since the end of the Second World War the fear of total war or nuclear holocaust has ensured that conflicts remained limited, often through the actions of the Cold War Powers of the US and USSR. The military theorist, Bernard Fall35, A known scholar, practitioner of war, and author of The Street Without Joy36, stated in 1965 that the world was living in a "Century of Small Wars37". As the world moved into the 21st Century, many governments sought to gain control by the use of Hard Power, forcing their will and direction onto the subject population, with regular failure. The leading military analyst, William Lind38, has stated that the 21st century is "the time of Fourth Generation Warfare39", as the weaker elements seek to strike back against the Imperialistic or Colonialist powers. The 20th Century is a defining period for the differences between Hard and Soft Power. During the Cold War, the build up of military might between the Warsaw Pact and NATO was a clear cut example of Hard Power values. For Hard Power to work effectively however, the opponent must be aware of the capability, and intent, of the Political element to wield it. Therefore the Cold War was reliant on the communication of this political intent and military capability, ensuring the balance of power through the shared exercising of Hard Power capability.

34 35

The New Oxford English Dictionary, (1999). Bernard Fall was killed in Vietnam in 1967 in a Viet Cong ambush. 36 A book which studies the Indochina conflict and how the French lost the war against the Viet Minh Insurgency. 37 Fall, B., Naval War College Review (Winter 1998), article reprint from April 1965. 38 Lind William, The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation, Marine Corp Gazette, October 1989. 39 The term Fourth Generation Warfare indicates a change from the traditional State on State warfare to asymmetric warfare, either by nation states or non-state actors.

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With the onset of Globalisation, interdependence and the declining importance of the sovereignty of a state, nations place a greater reliance on protecting their shores and home population by seeking to keep the enemy at bay in their own nation. 9/11 demonstrated that this is no longer possible, and the falsehood of the Cold War that Hard Power could deliver security is chillingly shown to ring hollow. The first decade of the 21st Century has effectively demonstrated that the actions of an insurgent group in Afghanistan can have a direct consequence to the population in the UK. As Atkinson and Moffat indicate within their book,

Globalisation has resulted in a greater cause and effect ripple:

"Globalization means that no state can remain an island; we are in fact connected and interconnected with each other in ways never previously thought possible. The Afghan poppy grower exporting his crop to your streets is as connected with our markets, our national health system, police, customs, and exciseyour taxes in factas is your milkman."40

An analysis of the current British Foreign Policy will identify that there are three major strands to it, aiming to promote the belief that Britain can be, and is, a force for good. First, The Foreign Policy, through the means of Defence Diplomacy, understanding of other faiths and the portrayal of our multi-cultural values of the nation suggest that by accepting the need to further our understanding we can advance our interests and reach in the modern era of globalisation.

The second strand is that Britain stands as the connecting point between two influential powers within the global field, having embarked on alliances with both Europe and the US. This has placed the nation in an enviable position within the sphere of international politics, being able to advise and amalgamate the pragmatism of Europe with the Hard Power capability of the United States. This position leads to the third strand, which, through its historical relations with both alliances, the depth and expansionism of its cultural history and the continued presence of the Commonwealth, has enabled Britain, almost uniquely in the current climate, its ability to combine the aspects of Soft and Hard Power41, enabling it to deliver, as coined by Hilary Clinton, Smart Power.

Incorporating Soft Power within a strategy is key to enabling the fusion of Hard and Soft Power elements. By complementing each other they can deliver a strategic effect far greater than if used in separation, enhancing the chance of a successful outcome. Smart Power can be applied to influence the political and cultural domains, enabling Britain to attempt to redefine the complicated and connective interactions between states and their various cultures and ideologies. With its multi-faith diversity, the UK is in an ideal position to use the senior elements of numerous cultures within its shores to deliver a reaching out effect and attempt to connect with nations of similar faith and ideologies. Rather than seeking to use Hard Power options of military might or financial power alone, the application of culture, morality and ideology alongside these options may also deliver a definitive effect on a population. As Tony Blair stated on 12 Jan 2007, Soft and Hard Power are intricately linked:

40 41

Atkinson and Moffat, The Agile Organization, p. 5. Prime Minister Blair HMS Albion 12 Jan 2007.

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"The reason I am against this case, is that for me "hard" and "soft" power are driven by the same principles. The world is interdependent. That means we work in alliance with others. But it also means problems interconnect."42

Nye indicates this in his analysis of Soft Power, highlighting that while Hard Power can be seen as the financial stick, exclusive and expressed more rigidly in control and rule, Soft Power can be perceived as the carrot and more flexible, exercised through trust and command.43 By using the draw of its policies, values and institutions44, such as centres of learning and business schools of excellence, the UK can make inroads into other nations' population through the absorption of UK culture by visiting students. This can in turn help spread the Soft Power effect of UK policy, helping other cultures and ideologies to understand the British approach and policies.

However, when forces are deployed to establish control, governments cannot rely on the application of Soft Power alone to stabilise the region. As demonstrated by the failed campaigns of the Americans and

Russians, relying on Hard Power alone will not bring success either. Rather there is a need to balance the use of Smart Power. The delivery of Smart Power will enable the simultaneous creation of security and employment, enabling the re-growth of fractured villages and regions in Afghanistan.

The difficulty that has faced all the major nations in the above conflicts is their understanding of the nature of the conflict and how it may morph once a foreign power became involved. An asymmetric threat is a double edged dilemma: there is the need to identify what that asymmetric threat actually is and possibly the more important question, how to target it successfully, without causing the loss of public support. This situation has been labelled Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), a recent phenomenon created by desire for the enemy to remove any advantage of the large power. To be successful against the 4GW opponent we first need to understand how the Centre of Gravity (CoG) has changed as warfare has evolved. 4GW expert, Colonel T X Hammes (USMC), re-enforces Clausewitz's direction on understanding the conflict situation presented in a Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) environment:

"The complex mix of generations of war with their overlapping political, economic, social, military, and mass media arenas makes determining the type of war we are entering more critical than ever."45

In 3GW the CoG was the physical component: nations fought through a clearly defined military environment aiming to destroy an opponent's ability to conduct operations. The military and political environments are distinct, enabling the military victory to be achieved separately from and prior to the resolution of the political situation. In contrast 4GW involves state and non-state organisations executing a lethal, non-linear,

undefined and constantly evolving activity, resulting in the political and military environments being intertwined and a military victory being unachievable without political success.
42 43

The environment is a fluid,

Ibid. Atkinson and Moffat, The Agile Organization, p 161, control is a function of rules, time, and bandwidth (itself a function of wavelength, frequency and time) whereas command is a function of trusts, fidelity, and agility. 44 The Decline of American Soft Power, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2004, and Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, Public Affairs, 2004. 45 Col T X Hammes (1994).

14

dynamic, global and uncertain arena which is inconceivably complex and evolutionary as opponents attempt to defeat each other in the moral, mental and physical domains using all available resources and means, with many of the actions of the insurgent and counter-insurgent being similar, though with a different outcome depending on the support of the local population. As David Kilcullen states in his article: "Insurgency and Counter Insurgency are two sides of the same coin.46"

In the current operational climate, with the conflict being fought amongst the urban populations of the host nation, the US field manual FM 3-24 states that an insurgency can be:

"an organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. It is normally a protracted political and military struggled

designed to weaken the existing government's power, control and legitimacy, while increasing the insurgency's power, control and legitimacy47."

Once the fundamental task of understanding the nature of the situation is achieved, an effective strategy to defeat the insurgency and address the root cause needs to be developed. This is where the understanding of how to fuse the Soft and Hard Power options can benefit the COIN state, enabling it to target the insurgents through the application of military Hard Power, while seeking to secure the host population through Soft Power options. For any strategy to be effective, the key element is identification of the actual situation faced, the enemy's organisational setup and his intent. In the three campaigns analysed, the COIN forces were faced with an insurgency of varying effectiveness and maturity.

Even within 4GW there is the requirement for the COIN force to operate within the legal guidelines, though their opponent may not. Colonel Xiangsui of the Chinese Air Force said, 'War has rules, but those rules are set by the Westif you use those rules, then weak countries have no chance'48

This creates an ethical and situational dilemma which may result in the feeling of constrained action by the military commanders on the tactical front, for legal compliance theory argues that Western governments are constrained properly by their adopted ethical and moral codes, which they perceive as appropriate behaviour in warfare. It is here that the COIN practitioner needs to identify the ethical and moral ramifications of failing to understand the situation. The legal compliances are normally expressed in international treaties and conventions, which results in International law becoming a branch of applied ethics, responsible for transforming moral principles into international standards which should, theoretically, apply to all. It is within this situation that the well managed and creative use of Soft Power options can deliver major rewards, enabling the COIN practitioner to continue the campaign against the insurgent message and tactics without mounting civilian casualties. As identified earlier through the works of Bernard Williams, the situation that

46 47

Kilcullen, D., (2006), p. 112, accessed 08 May 2010. Department of the Army, FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency (Washington: Department of the Army, 2009), p. 1-1. 48 Schwartau (2000), p.199

15

faces the UK in Afghanistan is the need to deliver an effective response to defeat the insurgents while ensuring the successful securing of the population within southern Afghanistan. While the moral principles that have been converted into International Law should apply to all, in reality for cultural and other reasons this is not the case. Therefore any opponent who has fundamentally different values and objectives is inherently asymmetric.

Unfortunately to date the UK has been unable to create a cohesive Smart Power strategy and a totally combined government approach to the conflict has not materialised. This may be due the inability for the government to accurately identify the enemy it is facing.

Throughout COIN operations the element that can tilt the balance between success and failure is population support, both host and home. By failing to understand the host population needs, the UK is faced with a situation where the insurgency can gather power and strength from the grass roots. Just as the conceptual understanding of the UK forces , along with their practices and tactics, need to change, so does the way in which the local population and troops interact. As David Galula states:

'If the forces have to be adapted to their new missions it is just as important that the minds of the leaders and men and this includes the civilian as well as the military be adapted also to the special demands of counter-insurgency warfare.'49

The regions of Afghanistan, the Dhofar and South Vietnam were poor, largely agricultural based societies where the population mass worked the land. In Afghanistan and the Oman the majority of the rural population had created farms, orchards or vineyards to survive; in Vietnam the majority of the population worked on the rice fields or subsistence farming. Rural populations were largely seen by the urban areas as apolitical, resulting in the Sultan and the governing parties of Afghanistan and South Vietnam creating policies and making decisions that quickly alienated the people outside of the cities.

In the Oman the Sultan was attempting to control the external influence on his nation, while trying to maintain old tribal ways and culture, resulting in a failure to understand the needs of the people. In Afghanistan President Karmal tried to rapidly push the Afghan economy forward through land reform and communism, resulting in a tribal backlash and ultimately a bloody resistance campaign. In South Vietnam the alienation was caused by the corrupt nature of Diem's regime, the denial of elections, the multitude of reprisal acts taken against opposition supporters and the failed Strategic Hamlet Programme.50 These acts led to the increase of the disaffected members of the population who started to support any opposition to the regime. In Oman it was the Dhofari Rebels; in Afghanistan it was the tribal Mujahedeen; in South Vietnam it was the well organised Viet Cong.

The social frameworks within the Oman and Afghanistan are fundamentally different from that of South Vietnam. In Afghanistan for example, the majority of the population belong to one of approximately 25 tribal

49 50

Galula, D. 2006, p 66. A plan by the governments of South Vietnam and the United States during the Vietnam War to combat the Communist insurgency by means of population transfer. It failed because much of the population refused to be removed from their ancestral farms and villages.

16

groupings, though of these only a few are of significant size, dominance and influence.51 Throughout Afghanistan there is also a diversity of language and culture, with Islam being the only common factor. Within the Muslim community 80% belong to the Sunni sect, while the remainder are Shi'a.52 Within the Afghan social structure it is tribal loyalty that comes before everything else, with the Qawm(social identity), not Afghanistan, being the basic unit of community and, outside the family, the most important focus of individual liberty.53 Action against the structure of the Qawm or Islam would normally be met with fierce resistance. It is this state of affairs that underlines the fragile relationship between the rural population and the authority of the State, something that the Russian General Staff failed to factor into their invasion plans.

Another difference was the dispersion of the Afghan tribes and their influence compared to the village communities of rural South Vietnam. Few of the tribal factions could be classed as being indigenous to Afghanistan, as many tribal dispersions cross international borders, resulting in the porous nature of Afghanistan's boundaries. This major factor was seemingly missed during the planning of the Soviet invasion and similarly the current ISAF mission, which has lead to problems in implementing border security. This situation would later assist the Mujahedeen with their ability to extract across the border to avoid counter attacks of Soviet forces, as well as receiving international aid to support their struggle. In Vietnam, the borders of South Vietnam remained porous, enabling the Viet Cong to receive assistance and supplies quickly via other communist nations

Until 1970 the Omani Crown witnessed the rapid growth in support for the insurgency. The population within the Dhofar region sought to find a means to voice their anger and unhappiness with the denial of modernisation and apparent persecution of their tribe by the Sultan54. This anger turned to violence and resulted in a marked increase in support for the rebels. This in turn attracted backing from the rebels in Yemen who were seeking to expand their influence into Oman, seizing territory from the Sultan. Similar to the US and Russian approach, the Sultan failed to acknowledge the concerns of the population55, seeking to defeat the insurgency through force. This response accelerated the loss of popular support, resulting in a major insurgency being entrenched by the time Qaboos took control.

In contrast to the Soviets in Afghanistan or Qaboos, who both ensured that the conflict remained within Afghanistan or Oman, the US was quick to prosecute the campaign outside of Vietnam, willingly attacking Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam to try and stem the support to the guerrillas, while the current Coalition Forces in Afghanistan, under the guise of supporting the Pakistani efforts against the Taliban, continue to conduct cross-border attacks through the use of unmanned drones.

As shown in these examples the active support of the population enabled the three insurgencies continued existence in the face of increasing application of force. The local population support maintained a validity for the campaign which in turn attracted external support from more powerful nations, and though the troops sought to provide protection, security and defeat the Viet Cong or the Dhofari, their military presence and
51 52

Goodson, 2001, p. 14. All percentages have been obtained from Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, [Online]. 53 Grau, L. W., et al,( 2002), Editors preface, p. xxi. 54 Jeapes, T. (1996). 55 Peterson, J.E. (1986 ) p.79.

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increasingly deadly use of force could not deter the insurgents from gaining strength. Through the porous borders of Cambodia, Laos or Yemen, the insurgents would receive more troops and aid. Similarly in Afghanistan the USSR with its might and financial capability it could not defeat the Mujahedeen through the application of force alone.

Unlike Westmorland's approach in Vietnam, Qaboos rapidly sought to regain the popular support, playing on his local heritage, his birthright and understanding the grievances of the population. By quickly employing consent winning activities, amnesty for the insurgents56 and seeking to minimalise the opponent's casualty figures, the actions of SAF and the Crown slowly wrestled the support away from the insurgent. Popular support was further obtained by allowing turned insurgents to serve in SAF in tribal groupings, protecting their tribal regions. This had the benefit of increasing the loyalty of the military units, or Firqats, consisting of the turned insurgent groupings. As Walter Ladwig III highlights, leadership is far more important than military might:

The most important lesson ... (the Dhofar campaign) is that while security assistance can reinforce positive political efforts, it is not enough on it's own to bring about a victory in an unfavourable political environment. ... the ultimate success of the counterinsurgency campaign was the emergence of new progressive leadership with the accession of Sultan Qaboos'57.

General Abrams also sought to apply this tactic in Vietnam once he took over from Westmoreland, seeking to use tribal guides and Special Forces trained mountain elements to seek out the Viet Cong and disrupt their Lines of Communication. Simultaneously he sought to strengthen the village's ability to protect themselves from the aggressive Viet Cong. This move increased the belief of the local population that they could withstand the Viet Cong demands and protect their lands. Increased financial support from the US, coupled with the delivery of up to date agricultural equipment enhanced the food production. This, coupled with the realisation of the local population that the Viet Cong could be defeated by the villagers, resulted in the slow dislocation of the Viet Cong from its population support base. By the early 1970s the Viet Cong had last lost a large amount of the lands it had gained during the 1960s.

In Afghanistan the Russians attempted a similar process, seeking to use tribal groups to secure the region and engage the insurgent groupings, trying to employ their local knowledge. Unlike the US or British in the relevant conflicts, the Russian troops failed to properly train or maintain control over these elements. They also used units different to the tribes that were indigenous to the region, exacerbating the localised tension. Rather than increasing the ratio in favour of the USSR and securing the population, the presence of these troops destabilised the region and caused more problems for the Russian commanders. This in turn resulted in the loss of faith in the Russian ability to protect the villages as tensions rose between the two elements, resulting in the population seeking help from the insurgents. As the support faltered, the insurgents would increase the tempo of operations, hampering Soviet attempts to maintain control and eventually demonstrate that only the Mujahedeen to protect the villages. The Russian Forces also failed to develop a COIN

56 57

Ibid, p.80. Ladwig III, W. C., (1974).

18

Doctrine, unwilling to accept that a Communist State would be involved in COIN procedures. COIN was seen to be a Western trait, as all insurgencies where seen to be "pure", attacking Capitalist beliefs in a bid to improve the situation for the common man.

Identifying the lessons that these situations demonstrate are critical for the success of the British Forces in Afghanistan. The understanding of the reasons why none the analysed campaigns defeated the insurgent through force alone, and how the lack of awareness resulted in the population losing belief in the actions of the COIN forces and supporting the insurgent.

The current UK approach has failed to gain population support, enabling the Taliban to not only maintain control through Shadow Governors, but to actually expand (see fig 4). By maintaining the insurgency as the CoG for the operational focus of the campaign, the insurgent can find it easier to disrupt the population as the COIN efforts are not aimed towards the civilian element. As Giustozzi states a small band of insurgents, hampered by COIN forces military actions against them are:

"Unable to carry out significant military activities, this small group was sufficient to intimidate hostile members of the population in the absence of any state policing of the villages."58

The question that now faces the UK is how to obtain and maintain the support of the population.

Though often asked, the answer to the situation has not yet been fully identified. The nearest the British contingent has come to delivering the required effect to the local population was during the actions of 52 Bde, which sought to change the mindset of UK forces and greatly reduce the kinetic imprint on the ground. It sought to replace these actions with consent-winning projects, mentoring teams for the Afghan security forces and aiming to deliver large-scale projects which would bring a marked increase in the population's quality of life.

Brigadier McKay sought to stabilise the Helmand region by attempting to rapidly transform the situation on a triple frontage of the provision of security, regaining the political advantage by obtaining population support for the local governors and finally changing the socio-economic envelopes. By raising the standard of life and the ability to trade commodities between villages and towns, prosperity would return to the region.
Fig 4 Increase in Taliban Presence within Afghanistan

58

Giustozzi, (2007), p.41

19

52 Bde actions mirror similar activities conducted by the Omani forces during the insurgency where the driving force was the securing the village, influencing the population to support the local government and infrastructure reconstruction to demonstrate the Crown's seriousness in providing for its people. Unfortunately the modern British approach lacks two very important elements that were present in the Omani situation, financial power and the capability to deliver quickly. Fast results by the Civil Action Teams backed by financial power greatly enhanced the regaining of popular support in the Oman COIN battle, whereas the failure to deliver is seriously hampering the British attempts in Helmand59. Though the actions of 52 Bde proved to be successful, the practice was not fully developed. Unlike the American approach of investing in Human Terrain Teams (HTT) to help understand the political, cultural, tribal and inter-regional dynamics and maintain a current situational awareness, British efforts were not maintained or followed up, resulting in countless opportunities for developing community relations being lost.

Recently the Land Warfare Centre (LWC) has begun teaching a process known as Human Terrain Analysis which is fundamentally continuing the work started by 52 Bde. The LWCl has identified that to win the campaign, rather than the battle, the population need to be secured, not geographical regions. Unfortunately the lag time between the identification of the need and the application of these activities may have resulted in too little too late. The lack of a proper continuous analysis of the people, culture and current economic situations by Ground Holding units who are operating within the community has resulted in a critical lack of situational awareness by higher elements, hamstringing the UK effort to secure the region and defeat the insurgents. USING SOFT POWER TO DEFEAT THE FOURTH GENERATION WARRIOR APPLYING THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH.

The analysed campaigns are all examples of non-state actors fighting an asymmetrically against a more technologically advanced power. The insurgents sought to use techniques and tactics that negated advanced technology advantage, enabling the limitation of the military force. The enemy that the USSR, US and UK faced employed similar tactics, techniques and approach that the current UK forces in Afghanistan are experiencing.

The US in Vietnam experienced a Compound War situation, resulting in it being unable to deploy the forces in Europe to assist with the conflict. The failure of the US to defeat the Vietcong strategically, though they were consistently successful at the tactical level demonstrated the grave misunderstanding that Hard Power alone would deliver a successful outcome to the Vietnam War. Similarly in Afghanistan in the 1980s, though they had a wealth of knowledge and information on how to fight insurgent based operations from history, the USSR again sought to rely on Hard Power, resulting in the failure to strategically defeat the Mujahedeen.

For the Russian Army, Afghanistan also presented a Compound situation where it was fighting an irregular, highly motivated and elusive enemy with allies possessing a powerful regular force60. Unable to concentrate

59 60

In Aug 10 a BBC news report indicated that the majority of the population in Sangin / Nad Ali still supported the Taliban. The NATO forces in Europe contribute as the regular force faced by the USSR in 1979 1989.

20

its effort, the Russian Army suffered a demoralising, fractured military campaign which eventually became politically and economically untenable. As with the American problem in Vietnam were the combatant was supported and shielded by the population, the USSR was hamstrung by its lack of numbers within the country.

The need to defeat the insurgent on the strategic level to ensure success requires much more than an overwhelming capacity to bring Hard Power to bear. It will also require the insurgent's powerbase to be removed from him, thereby limiting his capability. In Vietnam and the Russo-Afghanistan war both the super-powers failed to effectively resource this approach, not realising until it was too late that Soft Power options could greatly enhance their success possibility.

In contrast, in the late 1960s the British Forces supporting the sultan of Oman found that they were beginning to face an insurgency that was rapidly growing in strength, capability and lethality to the ruling element of the nation. The insurgents sought to discredit and defeat the regal forces through intimidation, population revolt and continuing defeat on the battlefield. Though the Sultan sought to initially deliver a Hard Power option, when replaced by his son Qaboos there was an immediate drive to employ Soft Power tactics to counter the insurgent tactics and message. The implementation of a balanced Soft/Hard Power approach by SAF sought to separate the insurgent from the population through Influence, Coercion and Persuasion (ICP) operations, while greatly reducing the requirement for Hard Power effects. The use of Smart Power enabled success over the insurgents where three years previously the Hard Power approach had critically failed.

This is a condition that British and Coalition forces are still struggling with at in the present situation within Afghanistan. The Coalition is struggling with a success limiting troop quota to try and secure Afghanistan while fighting an ever increasingly adaptable enemy who has proven to be very capable in fighting and living within the local population. This lethality of this type of conflict is further increased by the ability of the enemy to change the rules of the game by seeking to adapt technology the situation. As one of Frank Hoffman's students stated in his research in 2002:

"Hybrid forces can effectively incorporate technologically advanced systems into their force structure and strategy, and use these systems in ways that are beyond the intended employment parameters. Operationally, hybrid military forces are superior to Western forces within their limited operational spectrum.61"

This statement further reinforces the image of the modern conflict portrayed by Sir Rupert Smith that future conflicts are going to gravitate more towards "War amongst the people62" as the military inferior opponents seek to move into the urban populated regions to prevent the maximum use of advanced technology and weapon systems. Modern insurgents seek to remove the technical advantage of modern forces by the use of; asymmetric tactics; physically fighting among the host population; and conceptually forcing the counter61

W. J. Nemeth, USMC, (2002). Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2002). 62 Smith R., (2005)

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insurgent to fight for the minds of the people, while the insurgent experiences the support of the civilian element through intelligence feed, logistical support and financial aid to the cause.

To achieve success a conscious decision must be made from the outset of campaign planning to thoroughly study and prepare to fight the battle not only on the battlefield, but inside the mind. The governmental approach needs to concentrate on the conceptual element, seeking to win "hearts and minds" as well as the key terrain and vital ground. By the intelligent use of Smart Power, along with a strong, coherent strategic approach to the campaign and a well researched communication package, governments can deploy military forces while maximising the support they could receive from the host population in the struggle against the insurgent.

Unlike 3GW where the ultimate aim is the destruction of the military forces to then force the political element to cede defeat, in 4GW the COIN practitioner is forced into an environment where the moral probity of their actions and strategy becomes an essential component to achieving victory. In 3GW it was possible to obtain an exclusively military victory against an opponent but this is unachievable against a 4GW opponent. Therefore the COIN practitioner needs to find another means to limit the successes of the insurgent while minimising the threat to the civilian population. While nations are bound by a moral and ethical code of conduct, which is enshrined in the Geneva Convention, the 4GW opponent is not tied by such limitations and can manipulate these limitations to their advantage. COIN forces are placed on the defensive for they cannot detach themselves from their ethical code, less they lose the support of home and host population, clearly demonstrated in the calamitous outcome of the Vietnam War. The USSR managed to limit the situation by curtailing national press coverage of the Russo-Afghan conflict, though returning troops brought home frontline experiences which damaged military confidence and belief in the successful outcome of the conflict. The situation witnessed in Americain the late 1960s is now being simulated within the British public, with public support falling and the demand for the troops to come home gaining momentum. The media are continuing to respond to the current public opinion, recently highlighting that contrary to the Government's suggestion that the 307 deaths in Helmand over 9 years is a low percentage given the situation. The actual percentage is a lot higher, with the military having lost 304 personnel since 2006, when they entered into Helmand.

Without the ability to bring total military power to bear because of the possibility of collateral damage to civil infrastructure and population casualties, there needs to be another means sought to wage war against the insurgent. We can see how this complicates the objectives necessary for victory in the 4GW context by exploring Bernard Williams'63 classic example in the field of ethics. The botanist Jim, who is exploring South America, encounters a mercenary captain who presents him with 20 natives about to be shot arbitrarily. He is offered the chance to execute one himself in which case the remaining 19 will be set free. While the shooting of one of the slaves in order to save the other 19 could be justified by a consequentialist utilitarian, stating the fact that the sacrifice of the few to save the many, virtue theorists such as Philippa Foot64 hold it essential that Jim's moral integrity cannot afford to be sullied by these actions, less he becomes a murderer and lowers himself to the level of the mercenary captain. In 3GW it is possible to adopt the utilitarian
63 64

Smart and Williams (1985) 98ff. Foot (2002).

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approach; but in 4GW Jim can neither shoot the one nor fail to save the 19. In the former case he has dirty hands, having slaughtered an innocent, thus losing the battle for the population's trust; in the latter he is deemed to have failed.

While this example illustrates a prima facia impasse it however indicates the solution. What Williams and Foot fail to note is that Jim's moral dilemma becomes crushing precisely because he allows the insurgent to dictate the terms of his action with a stark choice between two unsuitable alternatives. He needs his own third course of action which will allow him to act within his moral envelope and yet prevent the death of any native through the employment of Soft Power options to change the mindset of the mercenary captain. Likewise governments must prevent the 4GW opponent from dictating terms and redefine the arena to one in which decisive victory is possible by attacking the insurgent's message and isolating them from the population. Rather than seeking to use Hard Power to deliver this effect, the implementation of Soft Power tactics may have greater success within the new battlefield, the mind of the host population. states65: Emperor

Marcus Aurelius Antoninus knew the benefits of understanding the needs of the population when he

'Benevolence is invincible, if it be genuine, and not an affected smile and acting a part'

For COIN practitioners the elusive answer to winning the battle is being able to correctly identify and target the CoG of the enemy. By accurately identifying the CoG COIN elements can apply pressure through the use of Smart Power techniques, ensuring each complements the other to deliver the desired effect. Correct application of these techniques will maximise the results, but under resourced or ill directed efforts could fundamentally damage the COIN Forces' prospects of victory against the enemy.

For the armies of 3GW the identification of the enemy's CoG was relatively simple; it was the asset or capability that was key to his success and the destruction of that asset would render his chances of success near impossible. Hence in the early period of the Vietnam War the American leadership believed that the CoG of the insurgent movement was the materiel supplies from the North, enabling the Viet Cong to maintain their offensive. For the USSR in Afghanistan it was believed the CoG for the campaign was the rapid seizure of the large urban areas and the pacification of the urban population.

Similarly the Sultan of Oman incorrectly identified that the CoG for the rebellion was the desire of the Dhofari rebels to seize the southern region and attempt to extend the borders of Yemen. He wrongly believed that the population had no need for education or medical care, a decision that would turn a tribal disagreement into a full blown insurgency within two years.

By wrongly identifying the enemy's CoG, the US, USSR and the Omani Sultan incorrectly directed the use of Hard Power to seek to rapidly destroy the perceived enemy's area of strength. The poor targeting of the insurgents' CoG resulted in the rapid increase in the insurgency and an expansion in population support for the insurgents. The use of Hard Power alone had created a deteriorating situation in all three campaigns,
65

Aurelius, Marcus translated by Long, George, The Thoughts of the Emperor M. Aurelius Antonius, (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, (1864), p. 281.

23

with the Viet Cong experiencing major support from the South Vietnamese population, as did the Mujahedeen from the local Afghan people. For the Anglo-Omani forces in the Oman, the Sultan's aggressive actions in 1965 1970 resulted in the Dhofari population offering logistical and financial support to the rebels while hampering SAF efforts.

This situation still exists in Helmand province, where the UK is snared in an aggressive physical and conceptual battle for the population of the region. The initial lack of understanding of the enemy's CoG resulted in UK forces being used to defeat the insurgents in an attempt to secure the region for Non Government Organisations (NGOs) and the Department for International Development (DfID) to begin civil reconstruction tasks. Poor targeting, resourcing and execution of these initial phases of the campaign through the direct use of Hard Power, with little thought for the simultaneous application of Soft Power options have resulted in the campaign being severely side tracked by insurgent forces.

The problem that faces all COIN forces is being able to apply the correct approach to the situation. As fig. 5 displays, the COIN force will try to ensure their doctrine is followed, often morphing the general warfare doctrine to suit the situation. The British Forces have a mindset that if they train for conventional warfare then they can easily "step down" to deal with a COIN situation. This conceptual idea has permeated the doctrine and planning, which has resulted in many mistakes being made as COIN is a far greater conceptual challenge with numerous moving factors. Further to the issues of the COIN practitioners' approach, which is mainly based at the tactical level, they have to contend with the insurgent's approach which is mainly aimed at the Political / Strategic sphere. Thus the first problem that faces all COIN practitioners is that the majority of the effort in fighting the insurgent is aimed at the smaller part of the insurgent's campaign plan.

In contrast to the heavy kinetic action that is conducted by the Coalition forces within Afghanistan to date, the insurgent seeks to maximise the psychological effect, using this approach to spread and force multiply their message. It is widely accepted amongst senior military

commanders, and the UK Land Warfare Centre based in Warminster that the UK approach has recently been 90% kinetic and 10% psychological, whereas the insurgent's approach has been 90% psychological and 10% kinetic, and at the moment the insurgent's message is still receiving strong backing throughout Helmand province.66 The recent "courageous restraint67" employed by UK and other Coalition forces have shown an

COIN Forces

Insurgent

understanding of the situation and a move to engage the civilian population, rather than the insurgent.

Fig. 5 COIN Forces and Insurgent campaign approach.

66 67

Lt Col Robinson RA, SO1 Influence, speaking to Royal Artillery officers at the Royal School of Artillery 10 May 2010. A term introduced by General McKrystal who has indicated that he wishes troops to use brain-power rather than fire-power to fight the enemy. He is seeking to force the reduction in collateral damage and minimise civilian casualties.

24

The incorporation of Smart Power tactics within the political process has driven the UK Governmental direction over the last decade which has driven the military approach to conflicts. The creation of the CA doctrine has finally sought to unite military and governmental department actions, generating a means of applying a focused approach to a situation.

The integration of Smart Power options would be combined under the CA to ensure the correct delivery of effects to help stabilise the situation and promote the regrowth and rebuilding of the national identity. By

individually targeting resources to the relevant constitute parts of society (see fig. 6), it is believed that the final result can greatly magnify the resources applied to the task. The correct use of Smart Power can set the conditions at political and strategic level to enable the shaping of preferences, which at the operational level would translate as the use of Smart Targeting68.
Fig. 6 The constituent parts of society.

While Soft Power seeks to change the mindset of the insurgent through intangible elements, Hard Power seeks to force him to change through a mixture of incentives and/or threats.

Soft Power is not the same as influence, though if properly applied; it generates a certain type of influence that can support operations. Soft Power is an intangible element of a nation's psyche which affects those other nations involved within its sphere of influence. It is more than persuasion and the ability to influence through discussion or argument; it is an ability to entice and attract, which may lead to an acquaintance and possibly a move to imitate. That is the force behind Soft Power, through the cultural, psychological, ethical, moral values and economic strength of a nation. The US, for example, exudes Soft Power by its ability to dominate the economic market. Likewise the Vatican, without any Hard Power assets, transmits a large amount of Soft Power through religion, beliefs and its psychological profile. The benefit is that it will allow a graduated response to the problem enabling an increase in threat level and lethality of the actions. This fusion of Hard and Soft Power is the classic 'carrot' and 'stick' approach, initially offering incentives to change the direction of the insurgent, but able to deliver lethal force if the incentive is not accepted. By enabling the graduated approach and the correct targeting of the incentives and military strikes, the COIN force can gradually dislocate the insurgent from the population, providing the targeting process is based on correct intelligence and understanding of the political and cultural situation.

68

Smart Targeting is the process of intelligence led, fusion of kinetic and non-kinetic effects, in support of Information Operations - Major Gracey 2010.

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The intent of the CA is that the COIN efforts are not directed against the insurgent; rather they are directed explicitly towards the civilian population. If we study Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs (See Fig. 7), by delivering the required resources to ensure each level of needs are met, then the population starts to turn away from supporting the insurgent as the local situation begins to improve. This effort cannot be

conducted by military forces alone, rather it is a combined effort at the strategic, operational and tactical level by all Government Departments, with the strategic aim being to deliver a working, cohesive nation willing and able to govern itself.
Fig 7. Maslows Hierarchy of Needs.

For the CA to be successful there needs to be unity amongst all elements of the government, ensuring that the correct resource and approach is initiated from the outset and properly directed. In late 2009 the UK has finally begun to implement this on an operational level through the use and development of Human Terrain Analysis (HTA). The use of this tool and the appropriate level can help direct and co-ordinate all levels of activity while assisting with the identification of key components of a particular situation. Through proper integration of civil and military elements, this process can ensure that a successful effect can be delivered in a certain region at a certain time. Recently 3 Commando Brigade Headquarters have developed their doctrine for the deployment to Afghanistan, seeking to concentrate their efforts on the population, not the insurgent. Using Information Operations as a main pillar to build upon, they have integrated Smart Power into their methods, using a "five pillars of influence" approach to deliver operational success. Hopefully this will rebuild the support and belief in the UK's ability to protect the population, for it has been critically damaged by failed results and apparent lack of cultural understanding of the situation.

The conceptual thought processes behind the CA are not new, they have been used many times to try and rebuild the trust between population and government, though on numerous occasions with minimal success as governments fail to fully understand the situation they are embarking on. The Vietnam and Russo-Afghan situations are examples where the government failed to understand the intricacies of the population: insurgent relationship. In contrast, while the Sultan of Oman failed to identify the situation and the underlying grievances, his son Qaboos quickly aimed to win the population support within the region by delivering requested aid, economic support and infrastructure. This change in focus from large scale military actions to consent winning activities resulted in a large mind shift towards the ruling party by the disaffected population, isolating support for the insurgent. To understand how to critically employ Smart Power towards the

developing situation, the leader needs to thoroughly understand the situation. Unfortunately the current British leadership has failed to grasp the importance of the full strategic employment of Smart Power, unlike Al Qua'eda. The recent propaganda campaign after the public dismissal of General McChrystal by President Obama as well as the increase in recruiting activities within Pakistan during the floods have shown that the insurgents are very capable of using Smart Power. As reported in the press: 26

"If the Pakistan government and the international community don't help these people, you will get the classic conditions that allow for insurgent groups to step into the role of providing what the government has not," said Adam Holloway, ... "If you're an insurgent group, you'll want to show people you care more about them than the government."69

In Helmand province the inability of the British to deliver their promise is constantly in the eyes of the local population, with the failure to deliver the promised electricity after the Kajaki Dam operation in 2007. Over 2 years later the turbine sits rusting, the funding to insert it having not been obtained by British forces. It leaves the wrong lasting legacy within the region.

THE MILITARY IS A SUPPORTING ACT, NOT THE MAIN EVENT.

So what lessons have these previous campaigns taught us, and can the UK use Smart Power more effectively in the current situation? The three campaigns demonstrate there is the real need to understand the political, moral, ethical, economic and cultural situation within a COIN situation, for the military can never deliver success by itself. Aggressive operations against the insurgent, often led by accurate intelligence and targeting processes can clear the ground long enough for the reconstruction teams to move forward and begin the re-building process. As demonstrated in Oman, the process of military action prior to the arrival of the reconstruction teams to secure the ground and support the delivering of projects needs to be properly organised, controlled and de-conflicted to ensure it delivers the maximum effect within the shortest possible time on the population.

This concept was not properly employed by the Americans initially or the Russians during their conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan respectively. In Vietnam the Americans sought to use firepower and troop numbers on the ground to try and win civilian consent, seeking to prevent the Viet Cong the freedom of movement of the battlefield. It was believed by General Westmoreland that the use of force and technological capability would prove to be far more capable at defeating the insurgent than any attempt at securing the civilian population.

The situation that faced the Americans in the mid 1960's was a population which already resented the American presence, with the recent failed Strategic Hamlet70 project still fresh in the minds of the local villagers. The project failure tilted the population's support to the insurgent as the military acted heavy handily, forcing the population off the land, destroying the villages and leaving the population no other option. The situation was further exacerbated by the actions of the Buddhist Monks in defiance of the Diem leadership, with the use of the South Vietnamese Army to crush a peaceful rebellion motivating the population against the leadership. The US failed to understand the ethical and moral effect that this action

69 70

Brummitt, C., Pakistan Floods leave Allies Reeling, 21 Aug 10.

The Strategic Hamlet project was a joint US-South Vietnam attempt to isolate the population from the insurgent. It was quickly infiltrated by the Viet Cong, poorly planned and executed and failed to understand the needs of the population. The result was a complete failure which resulted in ancestral villages being torched, communities shattered and peasants being forced to pay extortionate amounts to greedy landlords.

27

would have on the Vietnamese psyche as the media exported images of burning monks around the world. Conceptually and strategically the insurgency had already gained the upper hand.

The replacement of Westmoreland by General Creighton Abrams caused a paradigm shift in the approach to the conflict. Similar to General McChrystal in Afghanistan in 2009, Abrams sought to change the shape of the conflict. By removing the insurgent as the focus and providing the much needed security that the southern population required, he sought to psychologically displace insurgents from the population. This new

approach proved to be very successful, resulting in the Viet Cong losing large areas of ground as the local population, supported by American forces, fought back against the insurgent. By removing the emphasis on large scale seek and destroy missions and instead concentrate on securing the local population, Abrams swiftly turned the tables on the Viet Cong. Unfortunately, by the time the US had brought this new approach to fruition, the US had begun to lose the political will to fight, resulting in a demand for American drawdown.

For the USSR the military plan had always been to secure the urban areas and allow the Afghan military to deploy into the rural lands and deal with the insurgent. It had been intended for the Russian forces to provide the much needed security for the urban population, ensure local support for the government while the Afghan forces kept the insurgent at bay. Unfortunately the situation on the ground was not what was portrayed by the Afghan field agents, with many Russian units suffering attacks by the insurgents. The insurgents sought to harass and limit mobility, preventing the Russian forces to gaining superiority. An expert on insurgent attacks stated:

"Ambushes consisted of two groups, those providing cover and those carrying RPG launchers. They would move to within 100m of the road, which had been mined in advance. When the first vehicle is blown up, each RPG man fires one or two rockets then retires."71

The Russians, similar to the Americans in Vietnam, made the error of concentrating the COIN campaign on the insurgent rather than the security of the population. This, as the Americans and the Coalition Forces have found out in the recent Afghan conflict is due to the military's psyche of fighting the large war, and, contrary to Clausewitz's advice when he states:

"The first, supreme, far reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."72

By trying to change the conflict, rather than preparing for it, the COIN forces found themselves on the back foot and unable to react decisively against the insurgent. In Vietnam General Abrams was able to make that change in direction, in Afghanistan the USSR failed, wishing to use more military power to destroy the insurgent. In areas that were sympathetic to the insurgents, the USSR sought to use military might at its most brutal, employing a scorched earth policy. This resulted in thousands of civilian casualties, hundreds of
71 72

Bruscino, T. A., Out of Bounds, GWOT Occasional Paper 17, p.58. Clausewitz, On War, Howard (1976), p. 100.

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thousands of displaced persons and international condemnation. It failed to deliver a successful outcome, for though it cut off supplies and the mobility for the insurgents, ultimately it helped swell their ranks and galvanised the West to see the Afghan population as being under threat from Soviet brutality and therefore increased the support to the insurgent. Through its desire to change the conflict into a situation where it possessed a military advantage, the Soviet Union actually tilted the balance to the insurgent.

The situation in the Oman was dealt with differently by SAF and Qaboos, once he came to power. Previously his father had ignored all political approaches, fearing that the Dhofari tribe were untrustworthy, and used the military to quell any resistance. This resulted in defeats for the SAF and a critical lack of confidence in the Crown by the local population. Qaboos sought to change his father's approach and policy and immediately utilisied the principles of Smart Power, fusing together kinetic and non-kinetic options. Rather than hunting insurgents, he offered amnesty and payment, while at the same time brought investment and construction teams to rebuild the villages and towns. The SAF were used to secure the village, providing a security element while the civilian construction teams would drill wells, prepare the means to deliver electricity and clear and repair the sewage systems. The local insurgent commanders were welcome to village elder meetings, with Qaboos offering peace to those that would accept it. For those that refused the SAF were then tasked to seek out with lethal force, though this rarely happened. Unlike Vietnam, the Russo/Afghan conflict and the current Afghan campaign, great pains were taken by the SAF not to kill the insurgents. The desire by Qaboos not to spill blood needlessly greatly enhanced the ability of the Crown to secure the population, using the military to support the construction effort, rather than the situation today in Afghanistan, where the construction effort has been used to support the military effort.

The current Afghan conflict is reminiscent to the early stages of the Russo/Afghan, Vietnam and the Oman insurgency. As the COIN forces seek to contain the actions of a 2G insurgency, they have been lured into making the insurgent the CoG, seeking a way to eliminate him from the environment. This approach led to the failure of the Russian and American campaigns, while in Oman the change of tactics by Qaboos prevented failure. Rather than seeking to follow the military strategy that his father had in place, Qaboos sought to talk to the insurgents, offer them support if they joined the SAF and assisted with the reconstruction of their villages, accidently applying the Comprehensive Approach doctrine which is championed today.

This approach has recently been suggested by elements within the British government, which unfortunately for the forces in Afghanistan have not been given a credible hearing. The British Ambassador to Afghanistan, Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, when stating that the coalition needs to be willing to speak to the insurgent element and seriously consider placing a political agenda on the table, was removed from post. The BBC stated:

"During his time in Afghanistan he has pressed for talks with the Taliban to get greater priority."73

73

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/10398591.stm., accessed 01 Jul 10.

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The desire to follow a route similar to that which brought success in Oman has not yet been given the proper consideration by the British Government, resulting in a continued failure in the eyes of the British and Afghan public for UK forces to deliver the promised response to the increasingly effective insurgency. Unlike

Qaboos, the UK is still seeking to use force or the threat of force against the Taliban to win the ground and secure the population. Similar to the mistakes the Russians made in Afghanistan, it has failed to secure the rural regions, enabling the insurgent's free control and the ability to move with increased freedom, increasing the population's disbelief in the current campaign.

CONCLUSION

Similar to the Dhofar campaign fought 40 years previously, the opening chapter of the current Afghan campaign demonstrated very effectively that a purely military approach to a Counter Insurgency (COIN) situation will never result in a strategic success. Hard Power alone will rarely deliver success against the insurgent, as witnessed in the three campaigns that are being analysed. Though the USSR, US and the SAF greatly outclassed their opponent in regards to military might and Hard Power capability, none of them managed to defeat the insurgent, constantly losing the conceptual battle for the population's support. Unfortunately, though the British forces have a rich history of COIN practices, the regime seems to often suffer from collective operational amnesia, losing the lessons learned in the previous COIN endeavour.

By failing to offer a political answer to a cultural and political problem, the British approach is prolonging the situation, increasing the casualty rate for the British forces and the population they are supposedly trying to secure. Lessons from Vietnam are a stark reminder of the consequences of remaining focussed on tactical victories at the cost of losing sight of the strategic campaign. The failure to convert the recent victories that the British forces have obtained through the actions of Operations Panther's Claw and Moshtarak into strategic success will consign these actions as background noise. When a North Vietnamese Colonel met an American counterpart in 1975, they both agreed that in the majority of the tactical battles, the North Vietnamese lost. However, the NVA officer also highlighted that all those tactical victories were irrelevant as the US had lost the strategic campaign.74 This is an important lesson for the British Strategists to

understand, for though they seem to be successfully defeating the insurgents in the tactical engagements, at the operational level the Taliban are regaining the strength and initiative, as seen in the stark increase in attacks on UK forces in Helmand in early 2010. The recent removal of General McChrystal, the division in opinion between NATO and President Karzai about talking to the Taliban and the apparent divided between military and political leadership of the campaign has played into the insurgents' strategic plan, with ISAF seemingly unravelling as it struggles to deliver success within the Helmand region. Sun Tzu reflected on the importance of a robust strategic plan when he stated:

74

Quoted in Harry Summers Jr., On Strategy, a critical analysis of the Vietnam War On Strategy (Novato, CA, Presidio Press, 1982), 1.

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`...strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory; tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.'75
DEVELOPMENT MILITARY Proportion of effort

Unfortunately for the UK, the population of Helmand province have not seen many
POLITICAL

strategic successes within the region. The announcement of the extraction of British forces from the Sangin region, though indicated as a regular military move by the Government, has been reported by many public newspapers as a failure.
Indirect

Range of Responses

Balanced

Direct

Fig. 8 The Range of Responses.

This re-enforces the belief that the British strategy in the region was poorly led, with little support being given to the military actions by OGDs, resulting in the military being unable to provide the required support to the local population and the Government. As fig. 876 demonstrates, the approach to the conflict needs to be based on a dynamic multi-faceted approach based on the three tenets of military, political and development lines. Without proper direction and employment of Smart power, the UK efforts in Afghanistan are doomed to follow in the footsteps of the Empire's previous expeditions into Afghanistan.

75 76

Sun Tzu, The Art of War accessed on www.gutenburg.org on 07 Jul 2010. AFM V1 Pt10, p. 1-10.

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