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Ethics

A Kantian argument against comparatively advantageous genetic modication

David Jensen
Correspondence to Dr David Jensen, Department of Philosophy, Brigham Young University, 4093 JFSB, Provo, UT 84602, USA; davidj@byu.edu Received 9 December 2010 Accepted 6 February 2011 Published Online First 12 May 2011

ABSTRACT The genetic modication of children is becoming a more likely possibility given our rapid progress in medical technologies. I argue, from a broadly Kantian point of view, that at least one kind of such modicationdmodication by a parent for the sake of a childs comparative advantagedis not rationally justied. To argue this, I rst characterize a necessary condition on reasons and rational justication: what is a reason for an agent to do an action in one set of circumstances must be a reason for any in those circumstances to do the action. I then show that comparatively advantageous genetic modication violates this principle since a childs getting ahead through genetic modication cannot be rationally justied unless other children also could receive the modication, thus rendering the advantage useless. Finally, I consider the major objection to this conclusion: it seems to disallow all cases of a parents helping a child get ahead, something that parents normally engage in with their children. I argue that typical practices of developing a comparative advantage in a child, as well as practices of societal competition in general, do not conict because they involve circumstances that mitigate the universal character of reasons. Many ordinary cases of competitive advantage that we think of as unjust, in fact, can be explained by my argument.

concludes not that modications for the sake of comparative advantage are immoral but that they are not rationally justied. Further, I consider the more controversial objection that such a conclusion conicts with our seemingly acceptable and ordinary practices of comparatively advantaging ourselves and our children.

RATIONAL ACTION, REASONS AND THE UNIVERSAL CHARACTER OF REASONS

One characterisation of rational action is action performed on the basis of normative reasons: considerations that count in favour of some action. The pain in my ankle, for example, which I twisted while jogging, is a consideration that counts in favour of my seeing the doctor, and if I see a doctor because of the pain and because of its constituting a reason, my action is rational action. Implicit in this is the notion of universality: what is a reason for an agent to do x in circumstances y is a reason for anyone to do x if also in circumstances y. Thus, if the pain in my ankle is a reason to see a doctor, then it is a reason for anyone who experiences ankle paindall things being equaldto see a doctor.iii Ill call this feature of reasons the universal character of reasons (UCR for short) It constitutes a necessary condition on a considerations being a reason, and it has important consequences when combined with the principle that ought implies can (OIC for short). OIC is the principle that a true and sufcient normative claim about actiondan agent ought to do x, should do xdmust involve an action the agent can do. So, for example, if it is true that I ought to travel to Europe during the springtime, it must be the case that I can travel to Europe during the springtime. OIC likewise constitutes a necessary condition on a considerations being a reason for a particular agent.iv These two principles have important consequences when combined. Given OIC, for
The universal character of reasons is essential to their normative force. A reason for some action is not merely an articulation of why the agent rationally does or will do the act; it is a justication for the agents acting. But if a consideration is to constitute a justicationdprima facie support not only for doing the action, but for others allowing the one to do the actiondthen its constituting a justication must apply universally to other rational creatures. That is, the relevance of the consideration to the justication of the action cannot be merely local; otherwise the consideration would merely express what the agent wants, how she acts, or how she is. iv Some form of ought implies can is generally accepted among ethicists. If not accepted, apparently absurd results occur such as that I, for example, should invent the cure for cancer. It would be good if I invented the cure for cancer, but to say that I should invent it (something I cannot do) is to imply I am in error and at fault for not so doing. But this seems unreasonable for an action that I cannot do. Such examples can be reproduced ad innitum. 479
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INTRODUCTION
In this essay I present a Kantian-inspired argument against human genetic modication by a parent for the sake of a childs comparative advantage.i By comparative advantage I mean that the modication enhances its recipient so that she gets ahead or is advantaged in comparison to others. Such modications might involve making the child especially intelligent, taller than average or more athletic. I do not consider genetically modifying a child to heal a defect.ii Nor do I consider modications for the sake of societal benet: to produce geniuses or super-soldiers. Though Kantianinspired, the argument appeals to general principles of rational action that underlie Kants thinking, and
For a discussion of a more robustly Kantian view on genetic modication, see Martin Gundersons Seeking perfection: A Kantian look at human genetic engineering.1 He argues that Kants ethical theory can support genetic modication. However, while I appeal to general principles of reason that underlie Kants theorising, Gunderson bypasses these and appeals to more particular ethical conclusions that Kant reaches in his Metaphysics of Morals. As with any appeal to a historical ethical theory, such conclusions are ultimately only as good as the theoretical structure that they are derived from. ii I assume that such cases are morally permissible, though rigorously drawing the distinction between healing and enhancing has proven to be difcult. For attempts to delineate these two concepts, see, for example, Juengst or Schwartz.2 3 J Med Ethics 2011;37:479e482. doi:10.1136/jme.2010.041731
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a consideration x to do y in circumstances z to be a reason for an agent, it must be that the agent can do y, for x, in circumstances z. But given UCR, it must also be the case that anyone in circumstances z can do y for x. An action for a putative reason can fail to meet these requirements either by itself or with regard to some other previously established reason. The rst failure occurs in the following example: I have a reason to study accounting because it is steady employment (which I need). But everyone who needs steady employment cannot be an accountant: there are not enough positions. If everyone who needed steady employment were to become an accountant, it would not be steady employment as there would be too many accountants. Thus, by itself, the consideration cannot justify the action in question, and so it is not a reason for doing it. In contrast, the following putative reason is not problematic: I have a reason to study accounting because it is steady employment, I need steady employment and I am relatively good at accounting. Here, to be relatively good is to be good enough both compared to others who are good and in the context of the jobs that are available. So stated, the principle can be taken to conform to UCR/OIC because the clause I am relatively good at it excludes from the analysis many of the people who also need steady employment.v The second kind of failure occurs in the following example: I should not have to pay taxes because my lifestyle has been affected by the recession. If true, then it follows that no one should pay taxes since everyone (we will assume) has been affected by it. By itself, the consideration adheres to UCR/OIC. But if we accept, on independent grounds, that we have reasons to have tax revenue, then this cannot be the sole consideration for not paying taxes since it conicts with the already accepted reason to have tax revenue. Thus, in this case we nd a consideration failing UCR/OIC in relation to other previously accepted reasons. Those familiar with Immanuel Kants moral theory will see the similarity between the UCR/OIC and the categorical imperative. For Kant, the categorical imperative is the highest principle of moral action, and can be used to distinguish right from wrong behaviour. The principle, most commonly, is to act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.4 Typically, this principle is applied by considering a state of affairs in which everyone behaves in accordance with the consideration for the action in question, and then evaluating the rationality of such a state of affairs.vi According to Kant, two sorts of contradictions can occur that show the immorality of the proposed action: a contradiction in conception or a contradiction in willing.4 The latter is a form of self-contradiction whereas the former is a form of contradiction with regard to something else that is desired. Although the principles Ive outlined are clearly Kantian in character, I note that they correlate to the least controversial and least ambitious aspects of Kants theory. For Kant, the categorical imperative is a necessary and sufcient condition on the moral rightness of an action. UCR/OIC are merely sufcient principles of the rationality of an action. Genetic modication for the sake of competitive advantage conicts directly with the universal character of reasons and OIC. A modication is comparatively advantageous only if a signicant number of those in ones community do not receive the modication. However, for the motive of being comparatively advantaged, or getting ahead, to be a reason to undertake the modication, it would have to be a reason for anyone in those circumstances. But it cannot be a reason given the reasonable assumption that most would be beneted by this sort of getting ahead, and so are in the same circumstances. As such, it fails to conform to UCR/OIC because one cannot attain the advantage if everyone else attains it. To wit, 1. If a consideration w is a reason for person x to do y in circumstances z, then w is a reason for everyone in circumstances z to do y (universal character of reasons). 2. If a consideration w is a reason for person x to do y in circumstances z, then x can do y in circumstances z where consideration w obtains (ought implies can). 3. If a consideration w is a reason for person x to do y in circumstances z, then everyone can do y in circumstances z where consideration w obtains (from 1 and 2). 4. If comparative advantage w is a reason for person x to do y in circumstances z, then some persons cannot do y in circumstances z where comparative advantage obtains (denition of comparative advantage). 5. If comparative advantage w is a reason for person x to do y in circumstances z, then everyone can do y in circumstances z where consideration w obtains (instance of 3). Therefore, 6. It is not the case that comparative advantage is a reason for person x to do y in circumstances z (from 4 and 5). Note that (6) is not avoided if it turns out that only some persons will do it. Suppose genetic enhancement is so expensive that very few do it. Those who receive the enhancement will have a competitive advantage since only they will be doing it. Still, the point is not that genetic enhancement for the sake of getting ahead will not work; the claim is that it is not rationally justied. One important objection may be raised. Suppose the cost of modifying my child approaches $10 million, and so is available to only a few. Why wouldnt the following characterisation, in a parallel form to the accounting example, allow for the enhancement: being sufciently wealthy, I have a reason to genetically modify my child to produce increased intelligence. By including the condition of sufcient wealth, the putative reason does not end up being self-defeating since the proscribed action would apply only to the few who are sufciently wealthy. This sort of manoeuvre is a problem for Kantian theories as well, and it presents enormous technical difculties. I will not try to work out all these technical difculties, but rather I will give a general response to the problem. In brief, being sufciently wealthy is not relevant to the justication for having increased intelligence: it is a means for producing it, but it is not a reason for producing it. Thus, it cannot be included in evaluating the rationality of the action. While this answer does not explain how we determine relevancy in all cases, I believe this answer leads in the right direction. I note that this sort of an answer may be problematic for a Kantian theory that understands the categorical imperative to be necessary and sufcient for moral rightness. In such a theory, the appeal to relevancy risks begging the question. But given that my appeal to the universal character of reasons makes no such foundational claims, the appeal to relevancy here is much more reasonable. At this point, the argument is relatively uncontroversial and in some sense obvious. But it is important if only because much
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COMPARATIVELY ADVANTAGEOUS GENETIC MODIFICATION

My concern is with comparatively advantageous genetic modication; for example, my enhancing the intelligence of my child so she will have an advantage over other children in school.
v As a side note, I suspect that most of our statements of reasons, as stated in ordinary contexts, are understated. We do say things like you should (have a reason to) study accounting since it is good employment because we are assuming already that the person is good at it, there are jobs in it, not everyone wants to do it, they are good enough to be competitive, and so forth. vi For more on the categorical imperative procedure, see Rawls.5

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of moral wrongdoing involves making an exception of ones self. The preceding argument demonstrates that despite tempting objections (but Ill be one of the few doing the genetic modications, so it will advantage my child), genetic modication for the sake of comparative advantage is not rationally justied. As Kant points out about his own highest principle of morality, although it is in some sense obvious, it is important to make perfectly clear its justication since we are so easily led to rationalise immoral behaviour.4 I note also that the motive of getting ahead is not always explicit as a motive. For example, I might genetically modify a child for the sake of what I term his being successful in life. But being successful in life is likely to be comparative, and so a case of getting ahead. In desiring that my childs success, I likely desire, for example, that she attend a good college. But this requires that she be more intelligent (or more studious, or more intellectually capable) than others. Hence, the motive of being successful in life is comparative. Admittedly one might have a much more minimal notion of being successful in life. Perhaps one thinks that to be successful in life is merely to live happily, in some non-comparative notion of living happily. But in this case the only genetic modication that would be justied would probably be things like normalising, not getting ahead.vii an elite school not because of their effort, and so without an opportunity cost, but because of their parents position and wealth. I suspect that these sorts of cases do occur, and they are on a par, to some degree, with the advantages that I have argued against. But I believe our intuitions about such cases afrm this result: it is problematic that someone acquires something of value that requires work and sacrice for others, but not for her. What about competition in generaldsomething that is fundamental to our economic way of life? Suppose, for example, I acquire a select location for my grocery store that gives me an advantage over my competitors. With a better location, I will get more customers; the location is one that everyone wants, but of course not everyone can buy it. Why doesnt this conict with the universal character of reasons? One response is that the comparative advantage of the select location is priced into the advantage: in principle, I will pay more for the ideal location than my competitors will pay for their less ideal locations. Thus, the ideal location is not clearly a comparative advantage: I choose a more expensive but better location, my competitors choose less expensive but worse locations. For that matter, it may be incorrect to even call the rst location better as it costs more. Given the variance of pricing, arguably all options are equivalent in value. As with the response to personal cases of getting ahead, the economic choices are a matter of rearranging priorities. I prefer paying more for a better location as opposed to my competitor who wishes to pay less for a worse location. Thus, it is incorrect to say of me and my competitors that we all want to acquire the location. Rather, it is correct to say that we all want to acquire the location for a certain cost, but, given the normal workings of economic supply and demanddperhaps through a process of biddingdthat cost will change in a way that only one of us will want to buy it. Thus, again, when we describe the situation taking into account the context, we nd that it does not conict with the universal character of reasons. A second response may be made in favour of competition. We may think that there is a societal benet to competition, or other kinds of getting ahead, even if such competition conicts with the universal character of reasons. This is itself a rational claim, and implies a distinction between second-order and rstorder rational claims: the universal character of reasons being a rst-order rational claim, and the principle of setting it aside, at times, being a sort of second-order rational claim.viii The basic point here is commonplace: a rational approach to decision making may reveal particular decisions or kinds of decisions in which certain rational considerations are set aside. One clear case of these situations is competitive athletics. There may be a variety of good reasons for undertaking an athletic competition: one desires health benets of exercise by playing basketball. However, in the case of basketball, the goal of each team is to score the most points, and yet both teams cannot score the most points. But we normally think that we have a reason to score the most points, since that is the object of the game. Thus, though competitive basketball conicts with the universal character of reasons, in the larger context of the game and its purposes, we can set aside this conict as meaningful. Could this sort of consideration allow for genetic modication? Might we think that although seeking a competitive advantage for ones child is not rationally justied, is selfviii For more discussion along these lines, see Frankfurt.7 Frankfurt depicts personhood in terms of having rst-order and second-order motivational states that together account for rational action. Frankfurt has other purposes in this discussion; I mention it only as an example of how such multi-level motivates are supposed to work.

GETTING AHEAD
A major objection to the preceding argument is that it seems to disallow getting ahead in general, any actions or activities that yield a comparative advantage. Such a result may be contrary enough to our intuitions, especially given the commonplace activities we undertake (for ourselves and for our children) to get ahead of others, that we ought to reject the argument. My response is that the situations of getting ahead that we consider to be acceptable have additional, relevant factors that exclude them from the considerations in the preceding section that render genetic modication for the sake of comparative advantage not rationally justied. I will look at two kinds of cases: one, our ordinary attempts at non-genetic getting ahead, and two, economic competition. Consider some ordinary cases of getting ahead with regard to ones children. Wanting my child to make the high school tennis team, I hire a tennis coach so that he can improve enough that he will be selected for the team over the many others who will be trying out. I am clearly undertaking an activity with the intent that my child get ahead of others. Notably, these kinds of activities are commonplace and seem to be, intuitively, rationally justied. But such a child gives up other activities that could enhance her life vis--vis others. Thus, the child is not getting ahead as much as she is rearranging her pursuits. This sort of trade off happens given the nite nature of our lives: we are limited in time and opportunity. Because of this trade off, these attempts at getting ahead do not conict with the universal character of reasons. Presumably, everyone would want to be more athletic if it could be imbued by genetic modication: who would not want to have a more athletically capable body? However, not everyone would choose to be more athletic given the normal means of exercise, diet and practice that are required to develop athletic abilities. One objection to these considerations is the case of the extremely privileged. Children of the super-rich may get advantages through their parents wealth; they are accepted to
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I will consider some of these concerns in more detail in the following sections.

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defeating, that there are higher order principles or concerns that might set this aside? This could be possible. For example, we might implement in our society a sort of ordering as in Platos Republic: various persons are assigned to various tasks and divisions of labour, and we genetically enhance where we see a lack. Our modern sensibilities go against this, but I point it out only to show how the self-defeating nature of genetic modication for the sake of getting ahead could be set aside. With regard to economics and competition, we might think that only some people can be rich, given that being rich is at least partly, if not entirely, comparative. Thus, not everyone can be rich. But one might argue that we are all better off, economically, with the pursuit of wealth.ix Thus, by way of higher order rational principles, we need not conclude that such pursuit is irrational. I am not arguing that this is the case, but only using it as an example of how we might set aside the universal character of reasons in particular cases because of some higher concern or benet. One nal objection might be raised on the basis of these latter two responses. We may suppose that genetic modication to ones child will be extremely costly. Thus, a parent who genetically modies his child for the sake of comparative advantage will be giving up signicant money and property to bring about the modication. Why should not we think of this as an opportunity cost? And, if so, then the parents purchasing the genetic modication (like the students getting an MBA, or the businessmans obtaining the better though more costly location) is not the acquiring of a costless competitive advantage but a mere rearranging of priorities: trading one advantage for another. From the point of view of the parent, this sort of analysis is correct. The problem is that it fails from the point of view of the child: the child acquires the benet without any sacrice or opportunity cost. Thus, the child gains an advantage that it is not rationally justied in gaining. We may consider, in contrast, a case in which a parent does not genetically modify the child for the sake of the child, but does it for the sake of himself: the parent has always wanted a star quarterback in the family, and so modies his son to have all the characteristics of good quarterbacks. The father may argue that in purchasing the genetic modications he is giving up other things he desires. Indeed, this would appear to be the case, and on these terms alone his action would not conict with the universal character of reasons. But for other obvious reasons, such as the wrongness of modifying ones child for ones own benet and not for his, the action is problematic.

CONCLUSION
I have argued that genetic modication for the sake of comparative advantage is not rationally justied, and this would seem to rule out much of our interest in genetic modication that is not merely restorative. The argument points to, and depends on, an important but easily overlooked fact about benet and its relationship to happiness and other values: benet which is comparative intrinsically has a lesser standing in our rational and moral deliberations. While the outcomes to individuals who secure comparative advantages will always test the inuence of such conclusions on individuals, such conclusions should play an important role in the policies and decisions we make as communities.
Competing interests None declared. Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.

REFERENCES
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Gunderson M. Seeking perfection: a Kantian look at human genetic engineering. Theor Med Bioeth 2007;28:87e102. Juengst ET. Can enhancement be distinguished from prevention in genetic medicine? J Med Philos 1997;22:125e42. Schwartz P. Defending the distinction between treatment and enhancement. Am J Bioeth 2005;5:5e15. Kant I. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Gregor M, trans. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998:1e66. Rawls J. Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2000:167e70. Rawls J. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard University Press, 1971:60e75. Frankfurt H. Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. J Philos 1971;68:5e20.

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An example of this would be Rawls contention, in A Theory of Justice, that it is permissible to favour those who are better off if such favouring will make the least well off better; thus, inequality (or a system that allows inequality) is justied if it improves the least well off.6 J Med Ethics 2011;37:479e482. doi:10.1136/jme.2010.041731

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A Kantian argument against comparatively advantageous genetic modification

David Jensen J Med Ethics 2011 37: 479-482 originally published online May 12, 2011

doi: 10.1136/jme.2010.041731

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