Was the Bodybag Effect a Factor in Iraq?

Working Draft

Babak Bahador International Relations Department London School of Economics

Comments welcome: b.bahador@lse.ac.uk

Prepared for the 2005 International Studies Association Conference Honolulu, Hawaii, USA March 1-5, 2005

Can news of mounting US casualties1 turn American public opinion against a war or put pressure on decision makers to change a war policy away from its original objectives? The so-called bodybag effect assumes such a relationship and has been blamed for a number of US policy reversals during war.2 Perhaps the most blatant alleged case of the bodybag effect occurred during the Vietnam War, when news of US casualties, in addition to television images of death and destruction, were widely blamed for turning the US public against the war and forcing the hand of politicians towards withdrawal.3 Since Vietnam, according to Lawrence Freedman, it has almost been taken for granted that public opinion in Western countries, and in particular the United States, is fragile and easily turned.4 Bill Clinton, perhaps with the aftermath of the October 1993 Somalia debacle still fresh on his mind, seemed extremely concerned with a potential bodybag effect when deciding how military intervention over Kosovo would occur. On the eve of the intervention, Clinton went on national television and stated, I do not intend to put ground troops in Kosovo to fight a war.5 From a military perspective, this declaration seemed nave, as it revealed information that could put the US at a disadvantage by allowing the adversary to prepare for the tactical choices that remained. From a political perspective, however, many advisors believed that the loss of American life could not be sustained over this particular conflict. This concern was further demonstrated by the decisions to fly fighter jets at 15,000 feet, placing them out of anti-aircraft firing range, and to avoid the use of Apache helicopters.6 Data from public opinion polls at the time supported Clintons assumption. Although the majority of Americans supported the air war throughout its entire duration, support for the war declined significantly in hypothetical scenarios involving American casualties in a ground war. 7 When asked Would you still favour sending ground troops to Kosovo if 100 American soldiers were killed? only 24 percent of respondents stated yes, while 65 percent stated no. These numbers fell to 20 percent in
Casualties refer to the number of soldiers killed (from combat and non-combat related deaths) throughout this paper. 2 Also referred to as the bodybags effect in Lawrence Freedman, "Victims and Victors: Reflections on the Kosovo War," Review of International Studies 26, no. 3 (2000), p.337, and the casualties hypothesis in James Burk, Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis. Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 1 (1999), pp.53-78. 3 According to Richard Nixon, Whatever the intention behind such relentless and literal reporting of the war, the result was a serious demoralization of the home front, raising the question whether America would ever again be able to fight an enemy abroad with unity and strength of purpose at home. In Daniel C. Hallin, The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam (Berkley: University of California Press, 1989), p.3. 4 Freedman, Victims and Victors, p.337. 5 White House Office of the Press Secretary, Address by the President to the Nation, March 24, 1999. 6 It was estimated that the loss rate of these helicopters was five percent per sortie or higher, while fixedwing aircraft loss rates were estimated to be less a hundredth of a percent. Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p.94. 7 According to the Pew Research Center, Support for US involvement in the Kosovo conflict registered 60% approval in March 1999. This figure increased to 62% in April, before dropping to 53% in May. The Pew Research Center for The People & the Press, Collateral Damage Takes its Toll. Cited in Steven Livingston, "Media Coverage of the War: An Empirical Assessment," in Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship, ed. Albrecht Schanabel and Ramesh Thakur (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000), p.377.
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favour and 69 percent opposed if 500 Americans were killed and 15 percent for and 72 percent against if 1,000 were killed.8 Even Slobodan Milosevic seemed cognisant that Western casualties would have a potentially fatal role in the Wests mission to save the Kosovo Albanians, boldly telling German Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher on one occasion, I can stand death lots of it but you cant.9 With the onset of the war on terror and George W. Bushs more resolute approach to policymaking, it would certainly appear less likely that a bodybag effect would emerge during the 2003 war and subsequent occupation of Iraq. Could a president who claimed to be different from rivals by not being swayed by the polls ever be pressured to change course during a war if opinion turned against him? This paper assesses the bodybag effect hypothesis (BBEH) in relation to public opinion on Iraq during the year following the official end of major combat operations. The paper is divided into three sections. The first highlights a number of different variations of the BBEH, reviews a leading challenge to it, distinguishes it from a related notion, and describes the role of the political context in the likelihood of its emergence. The second reviews US casualties in Iraq to identify patterns that might fit into the different variation of the BBEH outlined in the first section. The section looks at public opinion over the same period to assess if periods of likely impact changed public support levels. Section 1: The Bodybag Effect The BBEH rests on the assumption that the publics opinion matters on issues of war and peace. In the strategy literature, the recognition of the peoples role in war was identified by Clausewitzs, who argued that, the passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people,10 if a war effort is to be successful. On the flipside, liberal thought placed a premium on the publics role in preventing war. Jeremy Bentham and James Mill advocated what E.H. Carr termed the doctrine of salvation by public opinion, believing that public opinion, if allowed to flourish, could always be counted on as a rational force for good. Rousseau and Kant, in like manner, argued that wars could be prevented if decisions on their engagement were left to the people instead of princes.11 The importance of public opinion in politics and especially foreign policy is a subject of great debate. Much of the literature on the subject is sceptical of public opinions independence, suggesting that its elusive and malleable nature makes it too susceptible to political manipulation and difficult to divorce from the political masters that summon it for their own ends.12 Furthermore, because the majority of the public in the West follow
Poll conducted by ICR Research Group for National Public Radio, Kaiser Family Foundation, and Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, between 23 April and 28 April 1999. Cited in Ibid., p.376. 9 Cited in Daalder and O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly, p.94. 10 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (London: Everyman, 1993), p.101. 11 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1940), pp.33-34. 12 According to Entman:
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international affairs only in times of crisis and are often unfamiliar with the context of such events, many have questioned the merits of public opinion. According to John Zaller: The consequence of asking uninformed people to state opinions on topics which they have given very little if any previous thought are quite predictable: Their opinion statements give every indication of being rough and superficial.13 Some have feared that public opinion, given such shortcomings, could have dire consequences for foreign policy if allowed to go unchecked. As Walter Lippman, one of the first thinkers to devote substantial effort to the subject wrote, The unhappy truth is that the prevailing public opinion has been destructively wrong at the critical juncturesIt has shown itself to be a dangerous master of decision when the stakes are life and death.14 In dealing with public opinion, it is important to differentiate between public opinion as manifested in polling data and perceived public opinion, as presented in forums such as the editorial pages of elite newspapers. The former notion of public opinion has been defined as the comprehensive preferences of the majority of individuals on an issue.15 Perceived public opinion reflects what media, politicians, and the public believe or present to be the publics opinion, which can differ from polling results at times.16 Indeed, recent research has shown that perceived public opinion is more important to politicians than actual polling results.17 Despite these limitations, it is still difficult in practice to visualise Western democratic states beginning and sustaining a war in which the majority of their people do not share the conviction of the government to fight.18
Individuals may have real preferences, but obtaining truly comprehensive data on the preferences of a majority of individuals toward any specific government decision at a given moment of time becomes, in practice, difficult if not impossible, especially for journalists who lack the scholarly luxuries of space, qualification, and abstraction necessary to make credible claims about public opinion. Making claims in wider public discussion about the status of public opinion thus requires selecting some data on some sentiments and ignoring the rest or framing. See Robert Entman, "Declarations of Independence: The Growth of Media Power after the Cold War," in Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, ed. Brigitte Nacos, Robert Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia (Lanhan, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2000), p.20. 13 John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.28. 14 Cited in Ole R. Holsti, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Analysis: Where We Were, Are, and Should Strive to Be," in Millennial Reflections on International Studies, ed. Michael Brecher and Frank P. Harvey (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), p.515. 15 Entman, "Declarations of Independence," p.19. 16 Entman points to research that showed such a divergence in the late 1970s where media claims of public opinion shifts to the right were not bore out in actual polling data at the time that showed no such movement. See Ibid., p.21. 17 Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, "Public Appetite for Government Misjudged: Washington Leaders Wary of Public Opinion" (17 April, 1998). Cited in Entman, "Declarations of Independence," pp.22-23. Also, most politicians do not have the resources to sustain ongoing polling operations. As such they consult other leaders and news coverage. Entman, Projections of Power, pp.1256. Furthermore, as an anecdotal piece of evidence to support this case, according to Presidential Special Advisor George Stephanopoulas, the Clinton White House (at least in its first term) did not conduct polls on foreign policy, but Clinton did pay real attention to the op-eds to see what people are saying. See Gowing, "Real-Time Television Coverage," pp.19-20. 18 Christopher Coker, Humane Warfare (London: Routledge, 2001), p.148.

The BBEH assumes that the passions amongst the public at the beginning of a war, to use Clausewitzs characterization, decline as news of military deaths trickle back home over time, and change the cost-benefit calculations of the military engagement amongst ever increasing portions of the population. There are two versions of the BBEH formula. The first is simpler and suggests only that a rise in casualties in a war leads a decline in public opinion support for that war. The second incorporates two relationships by also assuming a government policy change from the pressure of declining public opinion as part of the overall equation. These two variations of the BBEH are illustrated below: BBEH Version 1: Casualties Public Support for War BBEH Version 2: Casualties Public Support for War Policy Change In the following sections of this paper, reviews of American casualties and public opinion regarding Iraq will be conducted in sections 2 and 3, respectively, to determine if the first version of the BBEH is detectable. John Mueller, whos seminal book titled War, Presidents and Public Opinion, was the first to study the relationship between casualties and public opinion during wartime at some depth, argued that the log of cumulative casualties was the best determinant of the likely level of public opinion support in war. According to his findings, public opinion as a whole is highly sensitive to early casualty figures, more hardened towards additional casualties, and again susceptible only when large losses are recorded at the later stages of a conflict.19 This trend, according to Mueller, can be explained by looking at the entire public as subgroups, with factions that hold similar views dropping support based on criteria relevant to their group. In early stages, the support of those with considerable misgivings is lost easily with evidence of casualties. These may be individuals who only supported the war to rally around the flag20 but who were perhaps against the war in principle. After this initial drop, the public that is still supportive often becomes hardened and accustomed to news of casualties without any change in support. In the latter stages, subgroups that had always supported the war are increasingly challenged as the costs begin to clearly outweigh the benefits of the engagement. Once hardened supporters are lost, it becomes increasingly difficult for governments to sustain a war effort. While Muellers model is considered the dominant approach on the wartime casualtyopinion nexus,21 it has been challenged by Gartner and Segura, who argue that marginal
John Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley, 1973) p.62. John Zaller and Dennis Chiu, "Government's Little Helper: US Press Coverage of Foreign Policy Crisis, 1946-1999," in Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, ed. Brigitte Nacos, Robert Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia (Lanhan, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2000), pp.61-3. 21 Eric V. Larson, Casualties and Consensus: The Historic Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for US Wars and Military Operations. (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, MR-726-RC).
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figures are more important that cumulative ones in determining the direction of public opinion (especially when casualties are rising).22 By assessing marginal casualties, the authors argue that several shortcomings with Muellers model can be overcome. First, cumulative casualties cannot be divorced from the variable of time, which by itself can erode support without casualties due to war weariness and the end of the short-term support from the rally around the flag effect. Marginal casualties, on the other had, are not linked to time and should be able to account for the subtle impacts of changing casualty figures and other events on opinion. Second, marginal figures also have the benefit of potentially accounting for events that may increase support for the war effort, such as declining casualty rates or other external events. These subtleties would likely get lost in analysis based solely on cumulative casualties, especially over an extensive period of time. As such, while Muellers research found that major events in a war made no difference to public opinion, Gartner and Segura found that they did.23 In the assessment of American public opinion in relation to casualty figures over the timeline of this study, both cumulative and marginal casualty figures will be assessed to determine which may be a more accurate indicator of public opinion fluctuations. The Bodybag Effect and Elite Discourse Theory A challenge to the BBEH that must be considered when analysing this topic is elite discourse theory, which argues that events such as casualties, in general, do not directly determine the direction of public opinion. Rather, it is the discourse of elites that set the pathway of public support. According to a recent study on casualties and public opinion in Iraq, Adam Berinsky found that respondents level of support for the war was not significantly influenced by the number of casualties they believed had occurred but rather by their partisan attachments.24 According to Berinsky, who applied the theoretical findings of John Zaller, citizens follow the cues of those leaders who share their political views.25 When there is a high degree of consensus amongst elite discourse even in the face of mounting casualties, as was the case in the early years of the Vietnam War, public opinion is largely in support of a war effort. When there is elite disagreement, as was prevalent in the latter stages of the Vietnam War, segments of the population who share partisan affiliation with the dissenting elite, stop supporting the war.26 According the Berinskys interpretation, if there is to be a BBEH, it is only possible if dissenting elites play the role of an intermediary between casualties and public opinion, as illustrated:
Scott Sigmund Gartner and Gary M. Segura, War, Casualties and Public Opinion. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42, no. 3 (1998). 23 Although Gartner and Seguras findings also showed that marginal casualty rates alone could be misleading when marginal casualties were declining. In such cases, such as the period following the Tet Offensive, marginal casualties declined while opposition to the war continued to increase. Ibid. 24 Adam J. Berinsky, Assuming the Costs of War: Event, Elites, and the American Public, Paper prepared for annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1-4, 2004, Chicago, IL, USA. http://web.mit.edu/berinsky/www/war.pdf. 25 Ibid, p.5. 26 Ibid.
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BBEH Version 3: Casualties Elite Support Public Support for War Berinskys and Zallers approach, however, leave a central question unanswered what causes the elite to dissent? In his attempt to address this question, Berinsky admits that this is an area in need of future research and concedes that events (including casualties) may, in fact, play an important role in influencing public opinion indirectly through elites. This is because, according to the author, there is no evidence that the mass public makes complex calculations of balancing the costs of war versus the benefits when deciding to support an administration, while it would be reasonable to expect political leaders to do so. As such, [T]he public appears rational only because the elites they follow rationally incorporate diplomatic actions and events on the battlefield into their decisions to support or oppose war.27 Berinskys research, while useful in exposing the shortcomings of knee-jerk assumptions between casualties and opinion, fails to adequately fill the voids he uncovers. Significantly, there is not evidence provided to support the assumption that the masses follow elites. It could be just as likely that elites, who share common partisan affiliations with subgroups amongst the masses, follow them when they identify a shift occurring amongst that subgroup. During the 2003/4 occupation of Iraq, as the insurgency grew and US casualties mounted, clearly a growing number of political leaders in the Democratic Party that had previously been careful about criticizing the administration in the early days of the war began to get more vocal as events on the ground soured. But was this because of their political calculations or due to the shifting political landscape amongst the segments of the public that they represented. In other words, were they leading or following? In the 2004 US Presidential election contest, John Kerrys shift to a more critical line against the war in the latter months of the election, for example, clearly appeared to be an attempt to tap into shifting public sentiment against the war. The debate over who leads whom between the public and political elites mirrors a similar debate between the indexing hypothesis and the CNN effect in the media-policy nexus. The former assumes that the media follows political elite (as determined through Congressional debates in most case studies), while the latter assumes the inverse relationship. In this debate, perhaps the most comprehensive study on the subject reviewed 42 foreign policy crisis28 between 1945 and 1999 and concluded: The empirical results are equally consistent with the thesis of press dependence on Congress, with a thesis of congressional dependence on the press, and with a thesis that some third
Ibid. p.20. A foreign policy crisis is defined by the authors as an emergency situation in which the United States uses, threatens to use, or considers using military force or aid as a means to pursue foreign policy objectives. Major escalations of force within an ongoing crisis are also considered foreign policy crises. John Zaller and Dennis Chiu, "Government's Little Helper: US Press Coverage of Foreign Policy Crisis, 1946-1999," in Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, ed. Brigitte Nacos, Robert Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia (Lanhan, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2000), pp.63-4.
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factor causes both press slant and congressional opinion, thereby inducing a spurious correlation between them.29 In like manner, without evidence to the contrary, there is no reason to assume that the public follow political leaders in opinion change. It could be just as reasonable to assume the leaders follow shifting public sentiment or that both alter positions simultaneously as events on the ground change, perhaps feeding off each other in the process. Related Effects Another effect that is often inaccurately conflated with the BBEH is the CNN effect, and especially the impediment version of the effect.30 The impediment effect argues that certain media images can raise doubts about the legitimacy of military engagements and the policies behind them by exposing the operations shortcomings and negative consequences. In many cases, emotionally disturbing images from a military operation, such as those of enemy civilian casualties or dead military personnel from the home side, raise questions about the purpose of the engagement and allegedly lower support for it. This effect is particularly exasperated when the media successfully demonstrate a gap between rhetoric from political and military leaders and actual documented events in the conflict zone. The BBEH, while also claiming to reduce support, differs from the impediment effect because it is only based on the deaths of military personnel from the home country, whereas the latter also includes civilian casualties from the enemy side. In addition, the BBEH does not necessarily require media images to be a factor just news of such events.31 Of course, when news of military deaths are validated with sensationalized media images, it makes for a powerful cocktail, as was the case in Somalia where images of a dead US Serviceman dragged around the streets of Mogadishu were widely believed to have hastened the US withdrawal.32 Related to the impediment effect is the potential impediment effect, which refers to the policies employed by the government or military to avoid an impediment effect.33 The decision to forbid media images of coffins from recent military casualties and restrictions on media access to war zones, such as the use of pools or embeds, are examples of policies used to neutralize potential impediment effect. The existence of such policies
Ibid. p.68. The impediment effect is one of Steven Livingstons three typologies of the CNN effect. See Steven Livingston, "Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media Effects According to Type of Military Intervention," (Cambridge, MA: The Joan Shorenstein Center Research on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1997), p.1. 31 Edward Luttwak has argued that television images are not necessary for a bodybag effect, citing the Soviet experience in Afghanistan in which the public turned against the war due to growing cumulative casualties even while no television images were allowed: The Soviet Union never allowed its population to see any television images of war like those shown in the United States, and still the reaction of Soviet society to the casualties of the Afghan war was essentially identical to the American reaction to the Vietnam War. Edward N. Lutwak, Where are all the Great Powers? At Home with the Kids. Foreign Affairs 73, no.4 (1994) pp.23-9. 32 George Kennan, "Somalia: Through a Glass Darkly," New York Times, 30 September, 1993, A25. 33 Piers Robinson describes a similar effect in relation to the medias potential impact. See Piers Robinson, The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention (London: Routledge, 2002), p.40.
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demonstrates a belief, at least amongst political and military leaders, that public opinion declines can be avoided through pre-emptive policies limiting information about casualties.34 But can policy changes shortly after casualties also not be used to prevent a bodybag effect (version 1 and 2)? In other words, when casualties occur, can governments, as they do with pre-emptive policies, not use policy as a tool to negate potential upcoming declines in support by demonstrating that something different is being done to avoid or minimize future casualties? If so, this opens the possibility of another version of the BBEH namely, the potential bodybag effect hypothesis or (PBBEH), as illustrated below: BBEH Version 4 (PBBEH):

Casualties Policy Change No Change in Public Support

In such cases, one might see a rise in casualties followed shortly thereafter by a policy change and no change in public opinion support. This is in contrast to the second more traditional version of the BBEH, where a drop in public support pressures policymakers to change policy following casualty increases. The Political Context The BBEH, of course, does not operate in a vacuum but is greatly influenced by the political context within which it might emerge. In general, it can be argued that likelihood and potential impact of the BBEH is greatly tempered by the degree that a nations survival is believed to be at stake. In determining the possibility of the BBEH, in this regard, a useful model can be adopted from William Perry and Ashton Carter, who suggest that there are primarily three types of security risk environments that determine the levels of strategic interest A, B and C list threats.35 A list security threats are those that relate to state survival. Under such conditions, it would be unlikely for the BBEH to be a factor, as concern for state survival (the life of all) takes precedence over the BBEH (the life of some). B list security threats do not impact survival but are imminent threats to Western interests and could have dire consequences for the accustomed way of life, such as the standard of living. The 1991 Gulf War and the threat to affordable Middle East energy supplies represented such a threat. Under such a scenario, the cause is certainly diminished from survival, but is nonetheless important enough to merit some sacrifice. The last type of threat comes from the C list which do not directly affect Western interest, but are nonetheless important contingencies that have indirect consequences for them. In this list, the desire to prevent a humanitarian crisis, whether man-made or not, is believed to act as the key motivation for action. The military interventions of the 1990s, in places like Somalia, Bosnia and
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Perhaps giving weight to the old adage, out of sight, out of mind. Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Redefining NATO's Mission in the Information Age," NATO Review (Web Edition) 47, no. 4 (1999): pp.12-15, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9904-03.htm.

Kosovo, are all examples of C list threats. Under such scenarios, it is assumed that the potential for a BBEH is high, as the costs of casualties can often outweigh the benefits that might be gained from a successful military action. These assumptions are augmented by much of the research on the relationship between casualties in war and public opinion, which links tolerance to casualties to the purpose of the engagement. According to Lawrence Freedman, Most literature would suggest that the public does not harbour a total intolerance of casualties, but rather finds them unacceptable if suffered for no purpose.36 What constitutes a purpose, of course, is a subjective matter. To some, saving hundreds of thousands of innocents from imminent death, whether from famine or human brutality, would certainly constitute a worthwhile purpose. In polling-based research, however, saving strangers does not rank high as a purpose for war, particularly if the lives of troops are at stake. In research by John Mueller, for example, it was found that most Americans did not believe that saving hundreds of thousands of Somali lives during the 1992/3 intervention was worth a single American life.37 A similar conclusion, as mentioned earlier, was evident regarding the 1999 Kosovo intervention. Perhaps due to the relationship between purpose and tolerance to casualties, the architects of the 2003 Iraq war were careful to frame the conflict as an A list threat linked to 9/11 terrorists, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and US national security. Polling evidence showed that the American public did not fully buy this claim, especially with the passage of time and the failure of WMDs to show up.38 In polls conducted between March 21 and December 31, 2003, an average 60% of respondents believed that the war in Iraq was part of the war on terror. In polls asking the same question over approximately the same timeframe between January 1 and August 31, 2004, this number had dropped to 52%. Even more dramatically, the first five of these polls (finished on March 26, 27, April 4, 13 and May 12) resulted in an average 63% of respondents stating that the war in Iraq was part of the war on terror. The last five polls (finished on April 1, 27, June 27, July 21 and August 18) showed that this number had dropped to 50%.

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Freedman, Victims and Victors, p.337. John Mueller, Policy Principles for Unthreatened Wealth-Seekers, Foreign Affairs, 102, Spring (1996). 38 A total of 20 polls asked this question specifically between March 21, 2003 and August 31, 2004. Twelve of these polls were taken in the first period (March 21-December 31, 2003) while eight were taken in the second period (January 1-August 31, 2004). CBS news or CBS News/New York Times conducted thirteen of these polls, Fox News/Opinion Dynamics conducted three, while CNN/Gallup/USA conducted three. All data gathered from the polls section of National Journals website: http://www.nationaljournal.com.

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Section 2: Casualties From the beginning of the 2003 Iraq war on March 21, 2003 until a year after the official end of major combat operations on May 31, 2004, approximately 735 US soldiers died in Iraq, with approximately 600 of them in the year following major combat operations.39 In order to assess the BBEH during this period, it is first necessary to identify the pattern by which these casualties accumulated. This section reviews two potential scenarios. Under the first, as outlined in Muellers findings, early and relatively small casualties lead to a decline in public support, as those who already had misgivings about the war drop their support with the news of casualties and as the rally around the flag effect wares off. This could be considered a phase 1 of the BBEH. But then, support should remain stable until either the end of the war, or until larger casualty figure emerge at the latter stages of the conflict (phase 2). If such large figures do emerge, another drop in public support is likely, according to Muellers findings. In Graph 1 and Table 2, monthly and cumulative casualty figures from Iraq are illustrated:40

Graph 1: US Casualties in Iraq (Monthly & Cumulative), March 21, 2003 - April 31, 2004
160 140 US Military Casualties (Monthly) 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Mar- Apr- May- Jun- Jul-03 Aug- Sep- Oct- Nov- Dec- Jan- Feb- Mar- Apr03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 04 04 04 04 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 Cumulative US Military Casualties

Points of Potential Impact

Military casualty figures available from a number of sources including: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_casualties.htm. 40 A monthly study is conducted in this case because weekly casualty totals were often too infrequent to reveal any discernable trends.

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Table 1: US Casualties (Monthly & Cumulative), March 21, 2003 - April 31, 2004 Month March, 2003 April May June July August September October November December January, 2004 February March April Monthly Casualties 65 73 37 30 47 35 30 43 82 40 47 19 52 135 Cumulative Casualties 65 138 175 205 252 287 317 360 442 482 529 548 600 735

If there were to be a phase 1 bodybag effect, impact on public opinion would likely occur early in the conflict after the initial euphoria declined. In Iraq, this scenario fits well with the period immediately after the official end of major combat operations on May 1, 2003, which was approximately six weeks after the beginning of the war and three weeks after the fall of the Hussein regime in Baghdad. In these early months, the American public expected casualties to decline dramatically from the major combat stage, yet the casualties still accumulated at about half the volume per month in comparison with the major combat stage. As the months passed, polls were clearly indicating that expectations on the length of the war, success in the war, costs of the war, and especially casualties sustained by the US, were more than expected for increasing segments of the population.41 In terms of an impact on public opinion from a phase 2 of the bodybag effect, which assumes large casualty figures at the latter stages of the war, there is little evidence to point to such a scenario unfolding in the period under review. First, there were no large casualty figures in Iraq on the scale of those from earlier wars in Vietnam or Korea. Second, there was no indication that the war was coming to an end. In fact, most Americans were coming to realize that there would likely be no quick victory, as in the
In a Newsweek poll releases on April 11, 2003, for example, that asked: Would you say the level of U.S. casualties in the Iraq war so far -- that is, the number of military personnel killed or injured -- has been higher than you expected, lower than you expected or about what you expected? 16% said higher than expected. In a Pew Research Center poll on December 17, 2003, asking: So far, has the U.S. suffered more casualties in Iraq than you expected before the war began, or fewer casualties than you expected? 50% of respondents answered more than expected.
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first Gulf War, and that the insurgency might continue for years. As such, the end was not in sight for most during the period under review. According to Muellers findings, this period would most likely be one of relatively stable public opinion support once the initial phase 1 impact levels were reached. However, if one assumes that the perceived value of American lives since Korea and Vietnam has increased, as Luttwak has argued, due to changing demographics and the increased value of each child, then it is worth at least considering the impact of some other potential milestone casualty figures, such as 500.42 According to this argument, perhaps 500 American military deaths today are perceived as equal to 5,000 during Vietnam or 25,000 during World War II. As such, in the following section, public opinion will be examined when the 500-casualty milestone is reached for evidence of potential impact.43 Under the second scenario, as put forward by Gartner and Segura and outlined in section 1 of this paper, public opinion support should decline when marginal casualties increase, but not necessarily increase when marginal rates decrease. For the period under review, marginal casualty data is presented in percentile terms by month, showing the marginal increase or decrease in casualties from the month before. Graph 2 and Table 2 illustrate these findings:

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Luttwak, Where are all the Great Powers?, pp.24-5. It would also be worth reviewing public opinion when 1,000 casualties were reached, but this was not until September 2004, which is outside the period of this study.

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Graph 2: US Military Casualties in Iraq (Monthly & Marginal), March 21, 2003 - April 31, 2004
160 140 US Military Casualties (Monthly) 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Mar- Apr- May- Jun- Jul- Aug- Sep- Oct- Nov- Dec- Jan- Feb- Mar- Apr03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 04 04 04 04 200% 180%

Points of Potential Impact

140% 120% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% -20% -40% -60% -80%

Table 2: US Casualties (Monthly & Marginal), March 21, 2003 - April 31, 2004 Month March, 2003 April May June July August September October November December January, 2004 February March April Monthly Casualties 65 73 37 30 47 35 30 43 82 40 47 19 52 135 Marginal Casualties (% Change) 12% (49) (19) 57 (26) (14) 43 91 (51) 18 (60) 174 160

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Marginal Casualty Change (in Percentiles)

160%

According to the marginal accounting of casualties, four months manifested significant increases in casualties from the previous month, recording casualty increases of over 50%. Of these months - July and November 2003 and March and April 2004 two appear most likely to influence public opinion, assuming the marginal BBEH assumptions were correct. The first of these was in November 2003, when 82 casualties occurred. This figure was quite notable as it was over twice as large as any monthly total since end of major combat operations, and in fact, was larger than any single month during major combat operations. Tactically, the downing of several US helicopters in November in close succession and the relatively large single-event casualties involved demonstrated a new capability by insurgents, who appeared to be increasing the means by which they could inflict casualties. The second notable month was April 2004, when over 100 casualties were recorded in a single month for the first time. This month also recorded the toughest fighting for the US since the end of major combat operations, with what appeared to be simultaneous and coordinated uprisings in both Sunni and Shia areas of Iraq. Section 3: Public Opinion This section now turns to the second variable of the BBEH public opinion. In this section, US opinion regarding the Iraq war is reviewed in comparison to both cumulative and marginal casualty figures to determine if there is evidence to support either manifestation of the BBEH. In the period under review, which has been extended by one month to include May 2004 and capture the potential public opinion reaction from April 2004 casualties, 106 polls by six US media organizations (in conjunction with partner organizations) were tracked:44 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) CNN / USA Today / Gallup (25 polls) ABC News / Washington Post (17 polls) Newsweek (12 polls) Pew Research (20 polls) CBS News / New York Times (22 polls) Fox News / Opinion Dynamics (10 polls)

For each organization, the question that appeared consistently most often (with only minor variation) within the available data and that dealt directly with the level of support for the Iraqi operation was reviewed.45
All data gathered from the polls section of National Journals website: http://www.nationaljournal.com, http://www.pollingreport,com, and the websites of the respective news organizations. 45 CNN / USA Today / Gallup: "All in all, do you think it was worth going to war in Iraq, or not?"; ABC News / Washington Post: "All in all, considering the costs to the United States versus the benefits to the United States, do you think the war with Iraq was worth fighting, or not?"; Newsweek: "From what you know now, do think the United States did the right thing in taking military action against Iraq last year, or not?"; Pew Research: "Do you think the U.S. made the right decision or the wrong decision in using military force against Iraq?"; CBS News / New York Times: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling the situation with Iraq?"; Fox News / Opinion Dynamics: "Do you approve or disapprove of the job George W. Bush is doing handling the situation in Iraq?"
44

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Overall, opinion in support of the war declined from approximately 71% in support in March 2003 to 41% by May 2004 a substantial 30% drop.46 In terms of public opinion data in relation to cumulative casualties, Graph 3 and Table 3 illustrate the findings:

Graph 3: US Cumulative Casualties in Iraq and Public Opinion Support of War, March 21, 2003 - May 31, 2004
800 700 Cumulative US Military Casualties 600 500 Potential Phase 1 Decline 400 Potential Phase 2 Decline 300 200 100 0 Mar- Apr- May- Jun- Jul- Aug- Sep- Oct- Nov- Dec- Jan- Feb- Mar- Apr- May03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 04 04 04 04 04 30 20 10 0 40 80 70 US Public Opinion Support 60 50

46

Results are based on the average level of support from all polls conducted in each month.

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Table 3: US Casualties (Monthly & Cumulative), March 21, 2003 - April 31, 2004 Month March, 2003 April May June July August September October November December January, 2004 February March April May Cumulative Casualties 65 138 175 205 252 287 317 360 442 482 529 548 600 735 Public Opinion Support (%) 71% 72% 72% 59% 61% 60% 56% 54% 52% 53% 57% 51% 54% 45% 41% Change (%) 1 0 (13) 2 (1) (4) (2) (2) 2 4 (6) 3 (9) (4)

According the first scenario, public opinion support for the war would likely drop after the end of major combat operations if casualties continued to accumulate. This is precisely what happened one month later, when support for the war dropped a staggering 13% in June 2003 from the month before, never to return to the 70% range of the major combat stage. As support for the war had hovered around 50-60% for months before the actual fighting began, it would be reasonable to assume that many of those who had misgivings about the war in principle, but supported it when the fighting actually began to be patriotic, lost their enthusiasm when casualties continued in what was supposed to be a post-war period. Once this ambivalent group withdrew their support, the remaining public should have been more resolute, according to this scenario, and only relinquished support if larger numbers of casualties mounted. In the months after the June decline, there was relative stability for a number of months, but a general trend downward throughout the autumn and early winter. When the 500-casualty milestone was reached in January, it could be argued that there was an impact, as public support dropped 6% in February, although this figure appears too small to represent a significant change in opinion on its own. In general, while the relationship between cumulative casualties and support from Muellers previous research seemed particularly insightful regarding the early drop in support, it is less useful as a guide in explaining the gradual decline in support following this initial drop a period that should have been characterized with greater support

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stability. Perhaps the volatility that is recorded over this period and the overall decline can better be explained by the findings from marginal casualty analysis. In the previous section, marginal casualty figures revealed increases of over 50% in July and November of 2003 and March and April of 2004. In comparing public opinion support and casualties, it is not clear if the impact on public opinion from casualties would be immediate or take time to dispense, perhaps appearing in the data of the following month. In addition, the opinion data of one month may actually not be influenced by the casualties of the same month, as the majority of the casualties, in some cases, could occur late in the month or after most polls have already been conducted. Therefore, in assessing the impact of casualties on polling numbers, public opinion from the following month is assumed to bear the greatest impact from recent casualty trends. Table 4 compares marginal casualty data with the percentage change in public opinion support for the war. In the third column, it also states if evidence exists for the BBEH Version 1, which is possible if an increase in casualties in one month is followed by a decrease in support for the war the following month, or if a decrease in casualties is followed by an increase in support. Table 4: US Marginal Casualties (Monthly % Change), Public Opinion Support (Monthly % Change), and the Bodybag Effect, March 21, 2003 - May, 2004 Marginal Casualties (% Change) N/A 12% (49) (19) 57 (26) (14) 43 91 (51) 18 (60) 174 160 N/A Public Opinion Support (% Change) N/A 1% 0 (13) 2 (1) (4) (2) (2) 2 4 (6) 3 (9) (4)

Month March, 2003 April May June July August September October November December January, 2004 February March April May

BBEH N/A N N N Y Y N N Y N Y Y Y Y Y

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Of the four months identified as recording the most notable casualty increases (over 50% from the previous), all except November 2003 recorded decreases in public opinion support the following month. Decembers public opinion results, interestingly, were skewed by a single event more significant than Novembers high casualties the capture of Saddam Hussein on December 13th, which temporarily increased support for the war for about one month. Conversely, of the two months over the timeline that recorded marginal casualty decreases greater than 50% (December 2003 and February 2004), both recorded an increase in support levels the following month. Overall, evidence supported the BBEH in five of six potential cases based on marginal casualty figures. Conclusion and Future Research The first section of this study, through a review of the literature, highlighted four different versions of the BBEH, as outlined below: BBEH Version 1: Casualties Public Support for War BBEH Version 2: Casualties Public Support for War Policy Change BBEH Version 3: Casualties Elite Support Public Support for War BBEH Version 4 (PBBEH):

Casualties Policy Change No Change in Public Support

Sections 2 and 3 dealt with the papers primary question: was the bodybag effect (based on BBEH Version 1) a factor in Iraq during the year after the end of major combat operations. Through the use of both cumulative and marginal casualty data, as well as trends identified by Meuller and Gartner & Segura, respectively, useful insights were gained on the nature of the bodybag effect in Iraq. The cumulative approach was useful in explaining the relationship between casualties and public opinion in the early months of the war. Like Vietnam, early casualties from Iraq easily turned a segment of the population against the war who had initially been eager to rally around the flag, so long as casualties werent involved. The cumulative approach, however, did a poor job of explaining public opinion beyond this stage, and in fact, could not provide an explanation for gradually declining support levels after the initial drop-off. Marginal casualty figures, on the other hand, proved much more valuable in charting the monthly casualty fluctuations and their impact of public opinion, and also accounting for other notable events, such as the capture of Saddam Hussein. As mentioned in section 3, marginal data successfully accounted for five out of six potential bodybag effect scenarios, and seemed to clearly demonstrate that important events on the ground do have an impact on public opinion, in contrast to Muellers findings.

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In future research, it will be important to devise mechanisms to test other versions of the bodybag effect. In particular, it will be useful to understand the role of declines in public opinion support on policy. For this case study on Iraq, it will be necessary to find ways to identify specific US policies on Iraq, assess if those policies changed over the timeline of the study, and determine if evidence can be generated to link any changes to public opinion declines.

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