Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. XXXII, No.

1, Fall 2008

Pakistans

Relations

with

Central

Asian

Republics (CARs) and the Impact of United States (US) Policies in Shaping Regional Dynamics
Roy Sultan Khan Bhatty*

Four factors determine the foreign policy of Pakistan: ideological obligation, historical legacy, economic compulsions, and geographical imperatives. Historically as well as ideologically people of Pakistan have a very close sentimental affiliation with the Muslim states. Though economic compulsions have always forced Pakistan to develop close ties with United States (US) and other western countries, its geographic and strategic position force it to play an active role in regional politics to escape from any encirclement and isolation. Pakistan has a long border of 2252 Km with Afghanistan and the Pak-India border has a length of 1610 Km. These long borders have affected Pakistan in shaping its foreign policy towards the region. Close relations with the Muslim world has been a main pillar in Pakistans foreign policy to counterbalance the Indian threat right from the beginning. Pakistan since its independence has tried to achieve its foreign policy objectives through alignment, bilateralism, and non-alignment, but has not been able to achieve all of its foreign policy goals 1 through these endeavors. The conflict over Kashmir illustrates this point. South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) could not help Pakistan in the 1965 Pak-India war. In 1971 Pakistan

* Roy Sultan Khan Bhatty is an M.Phil/Ph.D candidate at Area Study Centre for Europe, University
of Karachi, Karachi, Pakistan. His topic of dissertation is Russian and American Interests in Central Asia Since 1991: Problems and Prospects for Pakistan. He is currently working as Election Officer Lahore under Election Commission of Pakistan. G M Solangi, Pakistans Ties with Central Asia, Masters thesis, (Islamabad: Department of International Relations, Qauid-i-Azam University, 1994), p.21.

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remaind unable to secure strong US support to deter Indias military action in East Pakistan. The emergence of Central Asian Republics (CARs) made India the close ally of Russia and provided Pakistan an opportunity to develop close relations with CARs. The CARs independence was warmly welcomed by Pakistan. Pakistani people trace their historical and cultural links to CARs and consider Central Asia to be the Islamic heartland. At this time, a downturn in US relations pushed Pakistan even closer to the CARs. The US was increasingly pressuring Pakistan on the nuclear issue and Pakistan was portrayed as a terrorist state by the US government due to alleged support for the freedom movements in India. Additionally, in October 1990, US President George H. W. Bush endorsed the Pressler Amendment and stopped a $564 million economic and military aid package to Pakistan, which was approved by Congress for 1991. Delivery of F-16 fighter air crafts was also blocked. The US accused China of providing Pakistan with medium range M11 missile launchers, and imposed sanctions on both countries. Moreover, Pakistans nuclear program became a flash point between Pakistan and India, and it is clear that Pakistan needed strategic maneuvering. In that perspective, on January 24, 1991 Pakistans Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Mirza Aslam Beg called for a strategic consensus with the newly independent CARs to counterbalance the Indian threat and US unilateralism. Before his retirement on August 17, 1991 General Beg established a cell to closely watch the developments in Central Asia. Interestingly, in addition to Gen Begs views on Central Asia, media pundits also asserted a vision of closer relations between Pakistan and Central Asia. Writers propounded the idea of a commonwealth consisting of CARs, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. They also presented the concept of the United States of Hilal, comprising of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, Azerbaijan and the CARs.2 During the cold war Pakistan was a member of the pro-Western block and it was therefore unable to develop close contacts with CARs. The Mayor of Tashkent visited Pakistan in the 1960s, but did not return until 1989. A few Pakistani students traveled to Central Asia to study but Pakistan could not offer Central Asian students the same opportunity. From 1979 to 1989, during Afghan-Soviet war, the foreign ministry of Pakistan devoted All its energies to push the Union of Soviet Socialist

See: N Iqbal, Welcome Home Central Asia, Globe, Vol. 4, Number 10, (October 1991), p.17.

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Republics (USSR) back from Afghanistan and could not pay attention to the internal dynamics of Central Asia and Russia. Within Pakistans foreign ministry there were very few diplomats who knew the Russian language or had in-depth knowledge of ex-Soviet republics. From 1989 to 1991, three crucial years of USSR demise, professional diplomats working in Pakistans foreign ministry could be in jeopardy if they were found to have any soft corner for USSR.3 The first major official step in establishing close relations with the CARs was Pakistani Minister of State for Economic Affairs Sardar Asif Ahmed Alis visit to Central Asia in December 1991. In his visit, he offered CARs long-term credit of between $10 million and $30 million each. Pakistani businessmen impressed CARs leader with their active participation in the economic development of CARs. On December 9, 1991 Kazakh Prime Minister Sergia Terseshchenko asked visiting Pakistani businessmen to raise $200 million on the international money market to avoid any risk of bankruptcy. Pakistani businessmen arranged $100 million within three days.4 In 1992 the National Bank of Pakistan became the first foreign bank to open in Uzbekistan. Agreements were also singed with Uzbekistan to construct highways in the country, establish a satellite communication link, and produce telecommunication equipments. In parallel with these official steps, Pakistans most organized religious political party, Jamat-e-Islami, was making inroads in civil war torn Tajikistan in 1992. Qazi Hussain Ahmed, the Jamat-e-Islami Chief urged the Pakistani government to provide the CARs with Islamic guidance rather than economic aid. He supported confronting US imperialism and making an alliance with the newly independent CARs. Such statements were very provocative and created a sense of fear among the CARs leadership.5 When Benazir Bhutto became Pakistans Prime Minister in 1993, Pakistan was in the midst of a sensitive period and was the center of three civil wars which being fought in Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir. Benazir Bhutto attempted to exert strong control over security policy in respect to Afghanistan. Through her government Interior Minister Major General (rtd.) Naseerullah Baber, Benazir Bhutto adopted an aggressive

4 5

See: H Malik, New Relationship between Central and Southwest Asia and Pakistans Regional Politics, in H Malik, ed., Central Asia: its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, (London: MacMillan Press, 1994), p.249-250. ibid., p.272. A Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism?, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 215.

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policy vis--vis Afghanistan. Pakistan tried to develop trade links with the CARs via Afghanistan but due to instability in Afghanistan, coupled with Iran and Indias influence in Afghanistan, was unable to do so. In 1994 the US also started to take interest in Afghani and CARs affairs, especially matters concerning oil and gas. At the end of October 1995, an agreement was signed between Turkmenistan and the Saudi-US oil consortium to consider a construction of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan, called the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) pipeline. But again the unstable security environment in Afghanistan badly hampered the plan. An additional reason for the failure of the TAP pipeline was the lack of interest on the part of the Turkmen government. Due to non availability of a formal certification of Daultabad gas field reserves which are the source of the TAP gas pipeline, that project has also been pending. It was February 2006 when Turkmen Oil and gas Minister Gurbanmurtat Atayev stated that an audit by US firm GeGolyer and McNaughton had verified that Daultabad field holds 4.5 trillion cubic meters of gas which was enough for supply to TAP pipeline.6 Turkmenistans gas export agreements with Russia have and will continue to affect Turkmenistans ability to supply to Pakistan natural gas. As an energy exporter, Turkmenistan has a big bargaining chip in the shape of Russia and can thus demand high prices from Pakistan. In 2005 during negotiations between Russia and Turkmenistan on energy exports, Turkmen President Sapramurat Niyazov suggested that he would not sign an export agreement with Ukraine unless Russia gave its consent to pump the gas through its pipelines. This shows the extent of Russias influence on CARs energy resources. Turkmenistan has also from time to time negotiated with Russia for higher energy prices and has recently been able to achieve reasonable energy price. In March 2008 Russian energy giant Gazprom (which produces 20% of the worlds gas) announced, at demand of Turkmenistan, that it would increase the price of Turkmen gas exported to Russia for European customers in 2009. Presently Russia is offering Turkmenistan $130/1000 cubic meters of gas. It is expected that Turkmenistan may get $210/1000 cubic meters for its gas from Gazprom in future. Due to these higher energy prices paid by Russia, Turkmenistan stopped delivering gas to northern Iran in December 2007 due to technical fault. The Iranian media reported that Turkmenistan was seeking an almost 100% increase in the price of

Turkmenistan Gas Reserves Sufficient: Officials, Dawn, 15 February 2006, p.16.

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gas to $140/1000 cubic meters. Iran imports about 23 million cubic meters of gas per day at the rate of $75/1000 cubic meters from Turkmenistan.7 In the future, Turkmenistan may make a similar demand of Pakistan for higher energy prices, especially if the TAP pipeline project materializes. The US and Chinas Interests in Key Regional Development Projects As blood veins work in the body, so do road and rail links work in a states economy. In a developing country like Pakistan, which has rich mineral resources in its Baluchistan province, development of inter-state and intra-state road and rail links have great significance. Pakistan has started to build a road from Torkham (Pakistan) to Jalalabad (Afghanistan) with a cost of Rs. 2.4 billion, which will provide access to the CARs through Afghanistan. According to Dr. Salman Shah, financial advisor to Pakistani Prime Minister, Pakistan is planning to construct a new road from Parachinar (a city in Pakistans tribal area at the Pak-Afghan border) to Kabul that will reduce the travelling time from five hours to less than two hours. Moreover, Pakistan also wants to build railway tracks from Chaman, Pakistan to Spin Boldak in Afghanistan.8 Pakistan and Iran are planning to establish a railway from Gwadar (an emerging Pakistani port at Arabian Sea) to Taftan in Iran via Saindak, a resource rich region of Pakistans Baluchistan province. Iran is also building its own roads to the CARs. Saindak and Taftan have been linked via a 33 Km railway.9 The Saindak project was abandoned in 1995, but was revived with Chinese financial assistance of $30 million for copper and gold production. Rehabilitation of a railway from Quetta (the provincial capital of Baluchistan) to Taftan is crucial for trade development. A road from Gwadar to Saindak running parallel to Iran-Pakistan border will make it the shortest route to reach Central Asia from the Arabian sea. Another 515 Km highway from Gwadar to Panjgur, Kharan and Chagi (Baluchistan, Pakistan) to Herat in western Afghanistan was also planned. At 9th Summit of Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) held in Baku on May 5, 2006 Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz called for a free trade zone with interregional oil and gas pipelines. Additionally there are plans under consideration to link the Peshawar capital of the Northwestern Province of

Turkmenistan: Iran Admits Defeat in Gas Prices Dispute, Eurasianet, 22 April 2008, <www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/ eavo422.shtml>. 8 US asks Pakistan to Expand Trade with Afghanistan, Daily Times, 9 September 2005, p.A11. 9 K Omer, Gwadar: An Emerging Gateway to Central Asia, The News, 22 April 2007, p.III

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Pakistan (NWFP) with Termez10 in Uzbekistan and Chaman with Kushka in Turkmenistan. ECOs trans-Asia-Middle East-Europe railway project, which connects Almatay in Kazakhstan to Istanbul in Turkey, will be linked with China in the east and Europe in the west. The Chinese are playing a very significant role in these regional development projects and they have varying motives to support strategic development projects in countries like Pakistan, the CARs and Afghanistan.11 For example, Chinas Xinjiang province is one of the most backward regions of the country. It is 4500 Km away from the eastern coast of China. Thus China has chosen to invest in Pakistans Gwadar port, which is only 2500 Km from Xinjiang. And on his visit to China in April 2008, now former Pakistani President Pervaiz Musharaf, discussed with Chinese President Hu Jin Tao the possibility of constructing a railway track and gas pipeline in parallel with the Karakarum high way that links Pakistan with China. If goods are exported to western China via Gwadar port or through the Karakarum highway land rout, they will gain a huge price advantage in terms of reduced transportation costs. Goods sent by sea have to travel more than 10,000 miles to reach Chinese ports on the countrys eastern coast and then must be transported 3, 000 miles overland, across China, to reach markets in west of the country.12 Pakistan hopes to make $60 billion in transit fees over 20 years from Persian oil shipments to China through the Gwadar port. Gwadar will provide easy access for Chinas imports and exports and will develop strategic interdependence between China and Pakistan and could have broader regional impact as well. The opening of Gwadar port in March 2007 with the financial help of China is a sign of US-China competition in Pakistan and the entire region. Pakistan could become a victim of the scramble between the great giants13 and needs to maintain a balance in its relations with great powers.

10

Termez is the city where a small German contingent is deployed at air base and is under consideration between Uzbekistan and US along with Nato for converting it a base for Nato forces to facilitate their operations in Afghanistan. 11 China has recently won a $3.5 billion contract to develop Afghanistans Avnak copper field in Logar province. It is the largest foreign direct investment in Afghanistans history. See: Ron Synovitz, China: Afghan Investment Reveals larger Strategy, Eurasianet 3 June 2008, <www.eurasianet.org.departments/insight/articles/pp060308f.shtml> 12 Omer, p.III. To study further the competitive advantages of Gwadar port see: S M Shah, The Great Game Goes on, Dawn, 20 August 2007, p.7. 13 K Hasan, Road to Chinas Future Runs through Pakistan, Daily Times, 14 April 2007, p.A8. .

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US Interest in the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) Gas Pipeline Project Corresponding with Chinas involvement in different key projects in Pakistan, India is also involved in development of infrastructure in Iran and Afghanistan and taking interests in regional gas pipeline projects which can integrate the regional states. Indias participation in Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline project will have great significance for regional security and will develop interdependence among Iran, Pakistan and India. In terms of real politik Irans inclusion in such projects and the integration of entire region is not agreeable to US interests. Roman aristocrat Decimus Laberius (105 BC43 BC) once recommended to treat your friend as if he will one day be your enemy and your enemy as if he will one day be your friend. If the US follows Laberius advice, Irans involvement with the IPI gas pipeline project could provide the US one more reason to implement regime change in Iran. In terms of commercial benefits, Irans route is quite appealing to US oil and gas companies. For Turkmenistan and southern Uzbekistan, the shortest route to the sea is through Iran. The US oil and gas companies have been lobbying the US government for permission to invest in the energy sector of Iran. There seems a resemblance between the British-Iran confrontation from 1951-1953 on nationalization of British controlled oil and gas sector of Iran and present US-Iran row. Now to tackle Iran, the US has made inroads in Azer, Kurd and Baluch areas of Iran. In Pakistans Baluchistan province which borders Iran and Afghanistan, militants are targeting oil and gas pipelines in an effort to impair Pakistans internal oil and gas pipelines system. Baluch militants have also targeted Chinese engineers who are playing an important role in Baluchistans development and have no direct concern with the Baluch nationalist struggle.14 As China is investing in the Gwadar port project, the killing of Chinese engineers may be an effort to create a rift in close PakChina relations and to sabotage the project. If Pakistan is unable to protect its internal oil and gas pipeline system, it will give a message to the world that Pakistan cant provide guarantees for the security of new oil and gas pipelines laid from Iran to India and to other countries. If such is the case, importers will not take the risk of investing money in laying such pipelines, and the planed line from Iran through Baluchistan would be quickly abandoned by India. Incidentally, this would

14

See: N Saithi Baluch Masla General Pervaiz kay Zairay Intizam Pakistan ka Masla hai, (Baluch Problem is the Problem of General Pervaiz Administered Pakistan) Daily Express, 22 April 2006, p.12.

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suit US strategic interests in the region, as the US has also offered India nuclear technology to accomplish its energy requirements if it would abandon the IPI pipeline. To fulfill Pakistans energy needs, the US has helped Pakistan import 4000MW of electricity from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan via the Kabul route. $500-$800 million will be invested on this transmission line. In 2006 it was reported that the US state department had allocated funds to aid electricity import projects from Central Asia. 15 A 765 Km transmission line from Central Asia to Pakistan will be built with funds from the US, the World Bank (WB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). The Development of Road, Rail Links in Afghanistan and the Impact on Pakistan The Pakistani government has made plan to work on a sub-regional connectivity and trade facilitation project costing Rs. 27.34 billion to expand trade relations with Afghanistan and the CARs. The ADB will contribute Rs. 18.45 billion or 67.66 % of the total project cost. Under this project, key national highways that were part of the sub-regional corridor will be rehabilitated and cross border infrastructure in Afghanistan will be developed. 16 The US is also spending millions of dollars to develop road links in Afghanistan especially across the Pak-Afghan border. These roads will be for the US surveillance of the border areas and will put more pressure on Pakistan to secure these areas. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has presented a plan to Russia and the CARs for the establishment of an inter-continental rail link from Afghanistan to Europe 17 via Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. If NATOs plan to develop an intercontinental rail link from Afghanistan to Europe materializes (though in near future it will be difficult due to NATOs fierce criticism of Russia in the Georgia-Russia confrontation in August 2008), it would hold both economic and security implications for Pakistan and for the entire region. In the short term, the rail link would minimize the US

15
16

K Kiani, US Backs Power Import from Central Asia, Dawn, 10 May 2006, p.1. K Mustafa, Govt Planning Project for Better Trade with Afghanistan, CARs, Daily Times, Lahore, 14 September 2005, p.A12. 17 See for details: R Synovitz, Afghanistan: Key Road towards Pakistan to Improve Trade Security, Eurasianet, 3 May 2008, <www.eurasianet.org.departments/insight/articles/eav050308.shtml> and Nato making progress on Afghanistan rail Route, Eurasianet, 5 May 2008,<www.eurasianet.org.department/insight/articles/eav050508.shtml>

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dependence on Pakistan for transportation of food imports and for other logistic purposes. Consequently, the US will be in a stronger position to pressure Pakistan on security matters. The US could potentially develop a stronger relationship with the CARs and Russia in regards to Afghan affairs. But in the long run, highway links within Afghanistan and inter-continental rail links from Afghanistan to the CARs and Europe also stand to benefit Pakistan. In the Indian-subcontinent, the British first developed rail links and postal service to consolidate their occupation. US plans to develop Afghanistans infrastructure may serve a similar purpose but it may also serve to integrate the region and increase trade. The Consequences of US Presence in the Region for Pakistan Since the 2001 Afghan regime change by the US, Pak-Afghan trade is on the rise. The US has encouraged Pak-Afghan trade and Pakistan has benefited substantially. The exports from Pakistan to Afghanistan for the fiscal year 2004-05 were $1.166 billion, up substantially from the $616.66 million in fiscal year 2003-04, and even more from $30 million during the Taliban regime.18 More than 50,000 Pakistanis are working in Afghanistan, mostly in industry construction projects. The US has also pressured Pakistan to relax trade restrictions with Afghanistan. In response to US demands, Pakistan has removed many banned items19 from the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA). The US has rushed Pakistan to end restrictions on all items.20 In 2005, General Karl Eikenberry, commanding officer of US forces in Afghanistan, proposed in his meeting with Dr. Salman Shah that Pakistan import iron ore from Afghanistan which is used in steel industry. He shared US plans of developing the Shabargan gas field in Afghanistan to meet local energy needs. 21 US support for better trade ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan may spill over to trade links with the CARs. Despite improvement and great future prospects, Pak-Afghan trade currently faces an impediment-security of the Pak-Afghan border. Afghan traders are diverting their trade contracts from Pakistan to Iran and India

18

S Chaudhry, 3 More Customs Stations to Facilitate Bilateral Trade with Iran, Afghanistan, Daily Times, 19 August 2005, p.B4. Also see: Q Akhlaque, Positive trend in Pakistan-Afghanistan Ties, Dawn, 14 February 2006, p.4. 19 Three items include tyres and tubes, TV and telephone sets. Remaining three items include cigarettes, cooking oil and auto parts. 20 Pakistan Ratifies Removal of 3 Items from Negative List, Daily Times, 23 August 2005, p.A12. 21 US Asks Pakistan to Expand Trade with Afghanistan, Daily Times, 9 September 2005, p. A11.

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due to harsh security measures taken by the security officials from both sides. Since the start of the US war on terrorism, Pakistan and Irans links with the CARs have been strengthened.22 Russia and Turkey have taken advantage of this opportunity and signed agreements with the CARs to import energy. If peace is maintained and security hurdles are removed, then Pak-CARs trade may also see a boom. Present conditions, however, stand to limit rather than encourage trade growth between Afghanistan, Pakistan and the CARs. Strategically and politically, the US presence on Pakistans border with Afghanistan has limited Pakistans strategic maneuvering and put constant pressure on Pakistan to relent US demands. In the future, the US may pressure Pakistan to give India a passage to export its goods to Afghanistan, which Pakistan has already denied under slightly different circumstances in the past. In early 1950s, the US tried to integrate Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to check the USSRs influence in the region. In1978, the Shah of Iran gave generous aid to India and Pakistan to develop infrastructure. At that time, the pro-US Iran took a keen interest in enhancing trade ties with India via a Pakistani route. Gen. Zia ul Haqs government in Pakistan took very little interests in developing these routes though, as he suspected that Iran and India would benefits more than Pakistan itself would. 23 Now Pakistan is taking same its in respect to providing India transit facility for its exports to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Cooperation with Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan serve two purposes for the US. The first is to mitigate Chinas growing influence in the region and the second is to secure complete victory over the Taliban. India is emerging as a great power in Asia, which may counterbalance China. But to acquire the status of a great world power India needs a peaceful environment in order to facilitate economic growth. To encourage such an environment, the US since has pushed Pakistan and India to improve relations. The US also stands to benefit from improved relations with the three nations in that a more peaceful environment will permit Pakistan to deploy its army more substantially along the western Pak-Afghan border. Currently, Pakistan has deployed about 100,000 troops on its Afghan border to check Taliban movement through Pak-Afghan border.

22

Pak-Uzbek trade had reached around $80 million in 1998 that dropped to $8 million in 2000, $10 million in 2006. 23 See: Malik, p.257-259.

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Conclusions To maintain peace in Afghanistan, Pakistans support will always be needed by the US.24 There are inconsistencies in Pak-US relations. Despite the fact that US has time and again affirmed Pakistan as a close ally in the war against terrorism and has sanctioned more than $6 billion in aid since 2001 (and much more in the pipeline), the US has made several cross-border attacks on Pakistans tribal areas. On June 26, 2008, the US Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated that a 40% rise in violence in eastern Afghanistan in the first five months of the year is a matter of concern, thereby putting pressure on Pakistan to help secure the border area. Following that statement, the US army launched new attacks on Pakistans tribal areas, in which many Pakistan army soldiers were killed. In January 2007, Senator Mushaid Hussain Syed, Chairman of Pakistans Senate Foreign Relations Committee, held a briefing in Washington and stated that some US government policy makers were trying to use Pakistan as a scapegoat to hide their failure in Afghanistan. He referred to a statement made by then Homeland Security Chief John Nagroponte who said that Pakistan permitted the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to organize a command and control centre in Pakistan. 25 Given the cross border attacks, the US could conceivably directly threaten Pakistan with its military might if in the future Pakistan works against US strategic interests in the region. The US would not like to see the materialization of any project such as the IPI gas pipeline and is probably quite fearful of emerging Chinese influence in Pakistan and the region as a whole. Iran and Chinas close ties with Pakistan will help to integrate the entire region and will increase interdependence among the states. Such interdependence is against the great power policy of divide and rule. The US has shown its concern over the security of Pakistans atomic weapons and would like to play role in controlling these weapons. While the US is unable to create stability in Afghanistan and could not justify its presence there, it is searching for military bases in Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

24

Though US has installed a pro-US government in Afghanistan but most of the power brokers in that government hail from former Mujahideen. In Afghan Wolesi Jirga, the lower house of Afghan parliament, 47.4% are Pushtuns, 21.3% Tajiks and Aimaq, 12% Uzbeks, 8% Hazars, six other ethnic groups cover 11%. Possibly 133 out of 249 represent the former Mujahideen. See: T A Khan, Afghan War: the Way out, Dawn, 27 February 2006, p.7.
25

US Looks Pakistan to do More Against Taliban, Dawn, 27 January 2007, p. 16.

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At the moment, the US presence in Afghanistan is preventing civil war in the country, and facilitating improved trade relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. US presence could also assist Pakistan in developing close relations with the CARs. But the US presence has also affected Pakistans national security and internal political environment. Clearly, the US wants to maintain stability in the region on its own terms. But just as the US develops strategic policies with consideration to international dynamics, Pakistan must do so as well to protect its own national interests. If the US is not careful, its greatest ally in the war on terror, however conditional this status might be, may see itself grow closer to China.

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