The Jinx of African Leaders

© 2014 John Atangba. All rights reserved.

No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any means without the written permission of the author.

Published by AuthorHouse 06/09/2014

ISBN: 978-1-4969-8310-7 (sc)

ISBN: 978-1-4969-8311-4 (e)

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1:   LAW & ORDER

CHAPTER 2:   DEMOCRACY & MEDIA & AFRICAN DEMOCRACY DEMOCRACY

CHAPTER 3:   ECONOMY & TRANSPORT

CHAPTER 4:   ENTERPRENEURSHIP & DEVELOPMENT OBSTACLES

CHAPTER 5:   HEALTH CARE & RESEARCH

CHAPTER 6:   AGRICULTURAL PROTECTIONISM & ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

CHAPTER 7:   CORRUPTION AND NEPOTISM

CHAPTER 8:   GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

CHAPTER 9:   FAMILY PLANNING & EDUCATION

CHAPTER 10:   STOP WASTE OF RESOURCES

CHAPTER 11:   SANCTIONS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

CHAPTER 12:   THE WEST MUST NOT IMPOSE ITS WILL ON DEVELOPING NATIONS.

CHAPTER 13:   AFRICA NATIONS HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO REFORM.

CHAPTER 14:   MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP

CHAPTER 15:   AFRICANS MUST GIVE TO CHARITY, NOT RELIGION

CHAPTER 16:   THE CHALLENGE OF LIVING SUSTAINABLY

CHAPTER 17:   DON’T MIX POLITICS WITH RELIGION

CHAPTER 18:   TAXATION AND WELFARE BENEFITS

CHAPTER 19:   SECURITY AND DEFENCE

CHAPTER 20:   MISTAKES AND LESSONS

CHAPTER 21:   ETHICS AND PROFESSIONALISM

CHAPTER 22:   VALUES AND RESPECT

CHAPTER 23:   FREEDOM FROM STATE CONTROL

CHAPTER 24:   ABUNDANCE & SCARCITY

CHAPTER 25:   PEOPLE, POWER & PEACE

CHAPTER 26:   LAND & COMMON PROPERTY RIGHTS

CHAPTER 27:   SANITATION AND DECENT FACILITIES

CHAPTER 28:   KINDNESS AND EMPOWERMENT

CHAPTER 29:   INDUSTRIALISATION AND PROSPERITY

CHAPTER 30:   THE NECESSITY OF POLITICAL OPPOSITION

CHAPTER 31:   CHILDREN AND YOUTH

CHAPTER 32:   NEW WAY OF THINKING

CHAPTER 33:   TRADITION OR MODERNITY?

CHAPTER 34:   AFRICA’S FUTURE?

Africa. A giant continent, full of natural resources, but devoid of effective leadership

- John Atangba

DEDICATION

This book is dedicated to my late parents: Stephen N. Atangba and Dena R. Atangba; my family and my friends and my readers in Africa, in Europe, and all over the world.

CHAPTER 1

LAW & ORDER

African leaders need to carefully look at its existing rules and laws that governs its governments; and analyse why some of the laws are not adequately enforced and find new ways of proposing and drafting laws and rules by both reforming the whole body of its laws; especially those in respect of Law and Order.

In particular, it must consider the codification of the laws, the repeal of obsolete and unnecessary enactments, and simplification and modernisation generally.

These laws and rules must then be interpreted by the direction or command of a court without any interference.

Freedom lies in the silence of the laws, opined Hobbes. It is important that those in power must justify their decisions by reference to an existing law. All African Countries must have a well defined constitution.

The constitution is regarded as a delicately balance machine that hold in place the rule of law. For example the relative stability and economic prosperity that is enjoyed by Britain is connected with a commitment to the rule of law.

To achieve stable and progressive governance in all African Countries, the principle of the rule of law must be adhered to. This is because if the government wants good behaviour from its citizens, laws requires good qualities such as non-retrospectivity, stability, accessibility, advance publicity and open access to a means of settling disputes impartially and consistently perhaps even a right to legal advice.

In addition, there should also be safeguards against the abuse of power; otherwise enterprise of government by rules loses public credibility.

The law in its forms and traditions, entailed principles of equity and universality which necessarily had to be extended to all sorts and degrees of men. A. V. Dicey formulated a threefold version of the rule of law.

First that no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary Court. This means that no official can interfere with individual rights without the backing of a specific law.

Secondly, that they must be equality before the law. Everyone whether high official or ordinary citizen is subject to the same law administered by ordinary Courts. This means that if an official exceeds or abuses his power, he is personally liable just as if he were a private citizen.

Thirdly, that the constitution is the result of the ordinary law. Dicey meant here that the UK constitution, not being imposed from above in the form of a written constitution, was the result of decisions by Courts in particular cases, and was therefore embedded in the very fabric of the law and backed by practical remedies – this promotes equality between citizen and State by treating private law with its concentration on individual rights as the basic ideological perspective of the constitution and encouraging the Courts, not to construe a statute as violating basic rights.

Some African leaders are power crazy and always almost abuse power when some of their decisions are either challenged by their political opposition or the Courts. Some have no idea of the meaning of separation of powers; or if they do, then they ignore the ones that are in conflict with their self-interests.

The doctrine of the separation of powers divides government between groups with different interests or purposes so that no power centre can act without the co-operation of others and each check and balances the others.

So my dear African leaders, what is separation of powers? It is purely a way of protecting the rule of law. James Madison stated that the accumulation of all powers, legislature, executive and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one or a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.

Interestingly, there are three aspect of Montequieu’s version of separation of powers. Firstly, Separation of functions; secondly, separation of personnel, and thirdly, checks and balances.

In the UK, they have three bodies with broadly different functions and their arrangements are obviously influenced by the separation of powers. Parliament is the legislature with the roles of making law and controlling the executive. The executive is the Crown which manages the resources of the State, implements and enforces the law, develop policy, conducts foreign affairs and is the last resort in an emergency. The judiciary is independent of both parliament and the executive in relation to particular disputes before it.

Separation of personnel. For example the US constitution has been specifically influenced by Montesquieu. The president who forms the executive, and congress the legislature, are elected separately and the same persons cannot be members of both. The US constitution is designed to encourage conflict between the two branches and regards weak government as desirable, whereas the UK system is more interested in ensuring that the will of the executive is carried out.

Checks and balances is the third aspect of the separation of powers,-this lies at the heart of the republican version of constitutionalism and the rule of law. It involves each branch having some control over others but also requires each branch to be protected against undue interference by the others thus entailing the need for pragmatic compromise. For example, in the UK, the House of Lords can veto any bill to extend the life of Parliament, thus preserving the democratic right to an election. Take another example, the Court provide a check over the executive by means of judicial review, where they try to draw a line between the legality of the government action which they are entitled to police and the merits of government action is a matter for parliament.

Some of the leaders in Africa, especially those in powerful positions want to control the three separation of powers. They do not like their decisions to be challenged, especially by the judges or the media. What needs to be acknowledged and allowed to flourish is for African leaders to understand that judiciary independence requires that judges should be protected against attacks on their conduct in Court. That judges are immune from personal actions for damages in respect of their official actions done in good faith. Anything said in Court by judges, advocates and witnesses is absolutely privileged against an action in libel and slander. They must also understand that these vital safe-guards apply to juries as well.

If the rules of law and separation of powers are thoroughly observed and complied with on a day to day basis, then all the laws passed by the legislators would also be rightly enforced by the police and Courts.

The police are connected with judicial arm of government having dual responsibilities of keeping order and investigating crime. As well as the need to subject police powers to the rule of law there is concern to accommodate political accountability with police independence.

Local police forces are answerable to their local police authority which comprises a mixture of local councillors and justices of the peace. Technical support required by the police is too expensive to be provided without substantial central government funding with its inevitable concomitant of central control.

Some African Countries tailor the police duties just to protect them from political foes instead of investigating crime and keeping order. The resources available to the police are unlikely to be adequate to enable them to perform all their many tasks. Therefore hard choices may have to be made and priorities balanced. But always almost, these priorities and balances are blatantly in favour of corrupted politicians and their cronies because they have the monies to bride these police officers.

The police are supposed to be responsible to the priorities of their local communities but that is not the case. When their hands are greased with kickbacks they instantly become biased and politically partial in carrying out their policy judgement.

The internal structure and management of the police is poor and lack vision and direction. For law and order to be restored to the African Countries; the rules of law and separation of powers must be effectively managed without fear or favour together with respect of the law by both the African leaders and the people - its citizens.

CHAPTER 2

DEMOCRACY & MEDIA & AFRICAN DEMOCRACY DEMOCRACY

African leaders are quite reluctant to criticise or assist some African Countries who are retrogressing from the principle of effective democratic governance. For example, the slide into lawlessness, the general free-fall of the Zimbabwean economy, and the presidential competition between Mugabe of the Zimbabwe Africa National Union-Popular Front (ZANU-PF) and Morgan Tsvanzirai of the Movement for Democratic Change have been the stuff of many editorials and commentaries in all the main newspapers, both in the West and in Africa.

At the same time, however, the Zimbabwe case has highlighted the perpetual reluctance of African elites to criticise one of their own, particularly in light of African leader’s reactions to what most people saw as fundamentally rigged elections. This point raises profound questions as to the seriousness and credibility of the New Partnership for African’s Development (NEPAD).

The NEPAD was launched in October 2001 and was suppose blueprint for African’s regeneration. The document asserts that African people have begun to demonstrate their refusal to accept poor economic and political leadership. These developments are, however, uneven and inadequate and need to be further expedited. There is, so the NEPAD claims, a new resolve to deal with conflicts and censure deviation from [democratic] norms.

This springs from the view that development is impossible in the absence of true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance. The NEPAD shows, the document claims, that Africa undertakes to respect the global standards of democracy, which core components include political pluralism, allowing for the existence of several political parties and worker’s unions, fair, open, free and democratic elections periodically organised to enable the populace choose their leaders freely. In short a democratic Africa will become one of the pillars of world democracy, human rights and tolerance in partnership with the developed world who have certain responsibilities and obligations" to support the NEPAD.

Tragically, that the NEPAD only lasted less than six months before its credibility was fatally undermined demonstrates the fickle nature of African elite politics. The much-vaunted desire to alter the rules of the game on how the continent interacts with the West, without any real reciprocal change in the behaviour of African elites – an absolute precondition if such partnership are ever to be taken seriously – now seems to be a one way street of demands but no duties on the part of African’s presidents.

To put it bluntly, that will never wash in the global corridors of power and it is naive of African leaders to think otherwise. Fatigue with African’s incessant problems is already high and, even though not all of African’s malaise is of its making, the refusal of African leaders to at least try to get their own house in order further exacerbates such negative altitudes in London, Washington, Paris, etc.

In the case of Zimbabwe, particularly with incessant appeals to the land issue and a desperate playing the race card, the real issues was the consorted effort by Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party to retain their hold on political power. That African leaders chose to ignore this and rather seek to cast it as some sort of neo-imperialist issue shows, it seems, that even in 2002, bad governance, corruption, violence, and vote-rigging will, in the final analysis, be defended to the hilt by many African presidents.

Mugabe’s record on the economy, setting aside the land issue, the Matabele-land massacres, the one-party state, and myriad other markets of his rule, has been lamentable. After twenty years of ZANU-PF control, not only are Zimbabwe’s citizens one-third poorer than they were at independence, but, according to IMF figures, Zimbabwe has gained the dubious distinction of being the world’s fastest-shrinking economy.

Sadly, rather than seeking to contribute positively to change the situation, many African leaders fell into line behind Mugabe – in effect positioning themselves in agreement with the view that there is a malevolent white racist conspiracy to recolonize Zimbabwe and make it back into Rhodesia, let by Britain’s Tony Blair and his ‘gay gangsters’. Thabo Mbeki, a man who likes to think of himself as some sort of philosopher King went to so far as to assert at the Commonwealth meeting in Australia in March 2002 that talk of ostracizing Mugabe was inspired by notions of white supremacy and that such movers were pursued because white political leaders apparently felt uneasy at their repugnant position imposed by inferior blacks. This type of extreme language is not unique preserve of Mbeki. But what is significant is that it is precisely Mbeki who has been notably active in promoting the NEPAD and the African Renaissance. Ironically, it was Mbeki who loudly proclaimed at a conference on the African Renaissance in September 1998 that: we want to see an African Continent in which the people participate in systems of governance in which they are truly able to determine their destiny and put behind as the notions of democracy and human rights as particularly Western concepts. Thus we would assume a stand of opposition to dictatorship whatever form it may assume. Thus we say that we must ensure that when elections are held, these must be truly democratic, resulting in governments which the people would accept as being genuinely representative of the will of the people.

Zimbabwe provided a clear test case for such noble sentiments to be measured against and for leaders such as Mbeki to translate rhetoric into action. This is particularly so in the context where the notion that ZANU-PF might be peaceably removed from power through the democratic wishes of the population was rejected out of hand by Mugabe. The government consistently targeted the judiciary, the independent media, and opposition activist for repression and Mugabe himself repeatedly flouted a series of Court orders barring the seizure of white-owned farmland by state-backed thugs. In January 2001 the presses of the opposition-inclined Daily News were bombed and several foreign journalists were expelled from the Country. Clearly, a stand of opposition to dictatorship was called for. Even more so with the murder of opposition activists openly and repeatedly encouraged from the very top and with vicious racism being deployed by Harare.

All of the above clearly against the supposed fundamentals of the NEPAD, which claims to push for African’s development and to protect basic human rights and democracy.

African’s leaders did, momentarily demonstrate a willingness to act with the September 2001 Abuja Agreement, brokered in Nigeria, which set out the conditions for a peaceful resolution of Zimbabwe’s crisis and a program of land reform that would take place within the rule of law. But Morgan Tsvangirai recognised the problems with such agreements well before the Abuja document was signed; remarking that you know this is the saddest thing about Africa, all these flowery declarations and all without commitment. There’s no commitment because there is no holding to account. The declarations are not worth the paper they’re written on. Releasing such paper creates a feel-good atmosphere and, when leaders are reminded of what they have signed, they retreat into the defence of the sovereignty of nations.

This is the fundamental issue: African leaders will rarely criticise their own. The self-interest of African elites under threat from democracy (linked surreptitiously in their eyes to notion of good governance) should not be played down. Nor should notions of solidarity and resentment at perceived neo-imperialist interference in the affairs of fellow African countries.

Many African leaders have highly dubious credential themselves. Zambia’s Levy Mwanawasa came to power through seriously flawed elections; aid donors have virtually given up on Malawi’s Bakili Muluzi and his corrupt regime; Tanzania’s Benjamin Mkapa ordered a crack-down on opposition activists in Zanzibar, resulting in many deaths, etc., ad nauseam. Focussing on the fact that a critic of one of their colleagues is the former colonial master neatly allows such leaders to side-step thorny issues such as democracy and accountability.

After all if they allow someone like Mugabe to be ostracised for his behaviour, who’s next on the list? Better to show a united front and protect all members of the elite club. In addition, many African leaders seem to believe that they are predestined to rule, particularly if they are head or inheritors of victorious liberation movements. Such thinking regards the Country and its people as the rightful property of the leader, who can and must never lose power. If Mugabe were to be ousted, this legend would be shattered, setting precedent for the likes of Dos Santos, Moi, Mbeki, etc.

Ironically, the Country that World Opinion looked to for solid African leadership over Zimbabwe has fallen short, to put it mildly. South Africa’s support for Mugabe undermined any speedy resolution of the problem, as Pretoria’s diplomacy was effectively based on a public excusing of Mugabe’s human rights record and playing down or ignoring of any reports to the contrary. Note that, a South African observer delegation was amongst the first to proclaim solemnly that the elections were free and fair even whilst other observers were saying the exact opposite. Note for that the ANC openly welcomed Mugabe’s victory in the 2000 parliamentary elections as evidence of Zimbabwe’s increasing democratic credentials. In a statement, the ANC said, we congratulate ZANU-PF on their victory as we realise that the election process has underscored the fact that democracy is taking root not only in Zimbabwe but in the sub-region and indeed, in the whole of Africa.

In a joint statement following a meeting between senior members of the ANC and ZANU-PF in 2000, the two parties announced that they had reached common ground on resolving Zimbabwe’s land crisis, namely that that Britain should unconditionally give the Mugabe government funds for land redistribution, the ANC Secretary-General Kgalema Motlanthe, ignoring the £44 million that Briton had contributed to the process of land reform but which had been stopped due to gross mismanagement and corruption, criticised London for refusing to fund land redistribution. Motlanthe went on to say that the ANC does not accept any conditions put on funds by the British government.

Prior to the 2002 elections, Mugabe’s position was also considerably strengthened by leaders of South African Development Community (SADC) who gave him their unflinching support at the organisation’s 20th Summit in Wind Hoek, Namibia in August 2000. President Joaquim Chissango of Mozambique led a chorus of statements widely viewed as clear-cut support for Mugabe, saying there had been a tendency on the part of some big powers to put a blanket over the history of the freedom struggle by ‘portraying heroes of the freedom struggle as anti-democratic and even dictators. We cannot in SADC condone these views. We are the democrats and we want democracy to work according to the will of our people in each one of our countries".

SADC leaders went further and congratulated Mugabe and the people of Zimbabwe on the manner in which they conducted their parliamentary elections in June 2000. If Zimbabwe had a problem, they argued, it was that the foreign press has misrepresented Mugabe’s policies. We are disappointed, the leaders continued, by the partisan and biased manner in which a sector of the international media has misrepresented the land policy of the government of Zimbabwe, which seeks to effect a just and equitable redistribution of land in a situation where one per cent of the population owns over seventy per cent of the best arable land.

Part of the problem appears to be the inability of many African leaders to differentiate between colonial legacies in the region and the survival struggles of corrupt and undemocratic autocrats. When African leaders have shown any concern, it is over the fear that the still over effect from the Zimbabwe crisis would affect the entire region. In essence, whether a colleague was suppressing democracy, encouraging lawlessness, and openly stimulating racism against Southern African citizens was not an issue per se. It only became an issue when such activities impacted negatively on the region’s economy. Yet, what African leaders do is crucial. Only strong, clear-headed African leadership can create the right conditions for a constructive process contributing to the rebuilding of Africa and an escape from development impasse it has fallen into.

In the case of Zimbabwe, Mugabe has delighted in snubbing extra – African Initiatives (thus playing up his Africanist credentials as an African standing up to the colonials), but has tended to be more receptive to African input. If African leaders had used their leverage more constructively; it is possible that the situation in Zimbabwe might not have deteriorated so badly.

Unfortunately, Zimbabwe was in many ways the test case for evaluating the credibility of the NEPAD and a clear opportunity for African leaders to signal that they had changed their ways. It is quite clear that this has not happened and the NEPAD’s trustworthiness lies in tatters. In fact, incredibly but not surprisingly, Africa felt over itself in talking up the legitimacy of the elections. An observer team from the AU said the elections were transparent, credible, free and fair; whilst Nigerian observers in Zimbabwe endorsed Mugabe’s victory saying it had recorded no incidence that was sufficient to threaten the integrity and outcome of the elections. The leaders of Kenya and Tanzania praised ZANU-PF’s deserved victory and Namibian observers proclaimed that the election was water tight, without room for rigging. Putting in their two cent worth, the South Africa observer team blamed the long lines of voters unable to vote despite waiting many hours on administrative oversight, drawing audible laughter from journalists and diplomats attending their press conference in Harare. This should not be overly surprising, bearing in mind that one of the South African observers had previously told the Washington Post that I don’t want to see Mugabe loss this election. He is still a hero to many of us. For his part, Mbeki stated that South Africa would help Zimbabwe, regardless of the outcome of the presidential election.

If Mbeki and the other proponents of the NEPAD had been serious about encouraging an African Renaissance then surely their response to Mugabe’s behaviour would have been different and signalled a brave commitment to the NEPAD’s principles. But as Tendai Biti, an MDC MP commented on elite-produced initiatives such as the NEPAD, at the end of the day they became nothing but a boy’s club of little tin-port dictators justifying the negative views of the traditional Afro-pessimist. For as long as Africans do not insist on uniform international standards of respect for human rights, respect for national confers, the sacrosanct nature of elections, and a commitment toward the eradication of poverty, then the noble ideas and concepts of African unity will become a pipe dream. The Zimbabwe debacle and the response of African leaders to this simply feed such pessimism.

In a speech to a Review Workshop on the NEPAD in January 2002, Mbeki boldly stated that if we cannot unite through an initiative that can permanently reshape this continent and bring about sustained improvement in the lives of our people, then we would lost an opportunity that will not arise for some time. The fatal undermining of the NEPAD’s credibility by inaction over Zimbabwe has, I think, produced this lost opportunity. It is most disappointing to anyone who holds out hope for Africa’s future.

THE MEDIA

The American press of coverage of African democracies is riddle with both bias and negative reporting. The coverage does not accurately or completely reflect current trends and developments toward democratisations and free market reform on the continent.

A cursory review of the headlines reveals a decided bias in the American media’s coverage of African democracies. A letter to the Washington Post (April 24 2004) entitled South Africa’s Struggles, offers a pointed summary of the viewpoint reflected in the media’s coverage of Africa. While written in response to a specific Post article it offers insightful commentary on media bias in general "Yes, South Africa faces enormous challenges. But we are far from the only society in which unemployment, Aids and crime would be rated as the ‘most pressing problems’ in opinion surveys. Whence the assumption that our democracy is threatened by these things? Might it be related to another assumption – that Africa is doomed to fail?

The not-too-subtle assumption that South Africa – and by extension African democracy is doomed to failure began to show up right at the time of the first democratic elections in South Africa’s history. The New York Times, right after elections published an article entitled, After all the Build up, the Vote is a Virtual Letdown; Near – News in South Africa cannot compete with disaster and display (April 27, 1994). The article reported the election had ‘produced no made-for-television extravaganza, despite being the first multiracial election charged with history and portent. The Times followed up, publishing stories like: Blacks in South Africa Turn to Vigilantes as Crime Soars; (November 27, 1995), Drugs, Guns and Vigilantes Justice in South Africa, (September 20, 1996); On South African’s Roads, A Grim Harvest of Death, (December 26, 1997); Young Vulnerable and Violated in the New South Africa" (July 12, 1998, Magazine).

As late as 2003, the Times ran an article entitled, Toddler’s Killing Exposes Ghoulish South African Practice, which suggestively implicates the entire Country or culture. The article, however, states Multi Killings … are still occurring, although most citizens are revolted at the custom and deny having deep-rooted superstitions … public outrage is gradually replacing fear.

The New York Times picture of South Africa is a portrait of disfunctionality. South Africa has had one of the highest per capita highway fatality rate worldwide, and South Africa has had a murder rate ten times higher than the U.S. Assertions like these often appear without historical or contemporary context. Thus, the inference is that there is a correlation between such data and black majority rule. A more balanced assessment of such data would, at least, offer comparisons to the apartheid period; or, disaggregate such members and make comparisons to other Countries on other continents at the same stage of development.

The lack of historical context can be seen in a USA Today article, which noted the height of American investment in South Africa was 1981, before the end of apartheid (during the period of violent repression of black democratic aspirations). One could logically conclude from such coverage that violence in the name of apartheid seemed to have less of an impact on investment than violence under a black majority democratic government.

A series of such stories follow almost immediately after election: USA Today reported South Africa: Open for Business But foreign investors remain wary, (May 31, 1994). Such coverage continued through the second democratic elections in 1999: South Africa’s Image Problems Deters Investor, (October 17, 1999). According to that Washington Post article, Germans complained about crime, the British were concerned about the high rate of Aids, and this despite, the peaceful transition from white minority rule to a democracy, and the free-market reforms that have been widely lauded. The New York Times followed a year later with South Africa’s Economic Lament; With Things Looking UP, Foreign Investors Remain Aloof, (November 11, 2000).

Another editorial letter to the Washington Post – this one about Kenya –is instructive. The Post has not told it readers of the many positive developments in Kenya, the writer states, "Especially in economic reforms … it has also ignored Kenya’s efforts in mediation in regional conflicts, especially in Somalia and the Sudan.

One of the more poignant examples of this bias is election coverage, which almost reflexively used negative terms and descriptions. A typical example is The Post’s coverage of the 1996 elections in Benin, when it reported that, analysts said the fact that Nicaphore Soglo could be toppled by former president Mathieu Kerekou … is evidence that this is a working democracy. However, it was a democratic change of leadership, which would result in the re-election of Kerekou, whose 19-Year reign as Benin’s president shredded the economy and caused great Social Upheaval. This is a pejorative description of a free and open election by media. Such reporting reflects something other than news purporting to be fair and balanced.

Other examples of coverage of similar to that of Benin are Zambia and Nigeria. In Zambia, former president Kenneth Kaunda was described as The Big Man and an autocrat in headlines and articles, when he attempted to run for re-election after having been defeated in democratic elections. Nigeria’s president Olusegun Obansanjo was described as a strongman after being re-elected in 2002.

Another area on which American media tends to focus is press freedom. The slant of stories on the subject were suggestive that press freedom should be equated with the right of the press to merely criticise developing democracies. Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa were all criticised by the publications tracked in the survey for alleged repression of journalistic freedom. Like other statement of fact about Africa that find their way into print, such claims were usually made without context – that is Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa have a larger variety of print media than most Western Countries and different organisations have come to different conclusions viewing the same landscape.

So, how are we to address this unjust and unbalanced news coverage from the Western media and press? African Countries and multilateral institution like the Africa Union should develop a set of counter strategies to this negative media portrayal of Africa.

Included among the initiatives that should be considered are:

• Developing alternative medium through which to tell African’s positive stories;

• A multimedia campaign to counter African’s negative image in the African media; and

• A strategy for engaging major media outlets, in order to encourage more fair and balanced coverage of Africa.

Relative to the point, Europe has taken the initiative, arguing for helping to build capacity in entities like All African.Com, as a way of enhancing the media infrastructure capacity of the continent. Sally Ann Wilson, of DFID, suggested the establishment of a specific project enabling and monitoring improved media coverage of and from Africa within the G8 Countries. Wilson wrote, "The media in G8 nations have a corporate responsibility to accurately reflect Africa to their own population and to provide room for the African voice to be heard and African viewpoint to be considered.

A plan should be devised to encourage more American NGO’s and non-commercial media forums