the national bureau

of

asian research
| october 2011

nbr special report #33

the united states thailand alliance

Issues for a New Dialogue
By Catharin Dalpino

The NBR Special Report provides access to current research on special topics conducted by the worlds leading experts in Asian affairs. The views expressed in these reports are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of other NBR research associates or institutions that support NBR. The National Bureau of Asian Research is a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution dedicated to informing and strengthening policy. NBR conducts advanced independent research on strategic, political, economic, globalization, health, and energy issues affecting U.S. relations with Asia. Drawing upon an extensive network of the worlds leading specialists and leveraging the latest technology, NBR bridges the academic, business, and policy arenas. The institution disseminates its research through briefings, publications, conferences, Congressional testimony, and email forums, and by collaborating with leading institutions worldwide. NBR also provides exceptional internship opportunities to graduate and undergraduate students for the purpose of attracting and training the next generation of Asia specialists. NBR was started in 1989 with a major grant from the Henry M. Jackson Foundation. Funding for NBRs research and publications comes from foundations, corporations, individuals, the U.S. government, and from NBR itself. NBR does not conduct proprietary or classified research. The organization undertakes contract work for government and private-sector organizations only when NBR can maintain the right to publish findings from such work. To download issues of the NBR Special Report, please visit the NBR website http://www.nbr.org. This report may be reproduced for personal use. Otherwise, the NBR Special Report may not be reproduced in full without the written permission of NBR. When information from NBR publications is cited or quoted, please cite the author and The National Bureau of Asian Research. This is the thirty-third NBR Special Report. NBR is a tax-exempt, nonprofit corporation under I.R.C. Sec. 501(c)(3), qualified to receive tax-exempt contributions. 2011 by The National Bureau of Asian Research. Printed in the United States of America. For further information about NBR, contact: The National Bureau of Asian Research 1414 NE 42nd Street, Suite 300 Seattle, Washington 98105 206-632-7370 Phone 206-632-7487 Fax nbr@nbr.org E-mail http://www.nbr.org

the national bureau

nbr special report #33

of

asian research
| october 2011

The United StatesThailand Alliance: Issues for a New Dialogue

Catharin Dalpino

is the Joan M. Warburg Professor of International Relations at Simmons College and a Visiting Scholar in Southeast Asian Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). She has studied U.S.Thailand relations for 30 years and was the Asia Foundation Representative in Thailand in the late 1980s. From 2005 to 2010, Professor Dalpino was Director of Thai Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. She is currently the principal investigator for the National Bureau of Asian Researchs project on The United StatesThailand Alliance: Reinvigorating the Partnership. She can be reached at <catharin.dalpino@simmons.edu>.
CATHARIN DALPINO

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This essay assesses the history and evolution of the U.S.Thailand alliance, compares it to other U.S. security alliances in Asia, and explores the challenges they all face.

MAIN ARGUMENT Often hailed as the oldest treaty ally of the U.S. in Asia by virtue of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation signed in 1833, Thailand has been a steady and enduring partner of the U.S. in Southeast Asia. The advent of the Cold War and U.S. engagement in the region brought security to the forefront of relations and cemented the two countries as formal allies, a relationship that has served both countries well and continues today. Despite a strong history, however, the alliance is arguably in a state of drift as the security environment in Asia evolves, states in Southeast Asia increasingly integrate, China rises, and traditional Cold War threats recede. These factors, among others, call for a new dialogue that can propel the U.S.Thailand alliance into the 21st century. POLICY IMPLICATIONS As the U.S. and Thailand seek to move the alliance forward, a number of issues have emerged:
The nature of the alliance. Differences have emerged over whether the relationship is broad based or primarily a security arrangement. Clarity on this issue is important for public perception, as the rationale for the alliance is less apparent now than during the Cold War. The significance of a treaty alliance with the U.S. in the 21st century. Nonally countries increasingly receive the benefits of U.S. security cooperation without alliance responsibilities, raising questions about the relevance of formal alliances today. The changing regional threat environment. Changing regional dynamics and the absence of a Cold Warstyle threat environment have enabled Thailand to balance its relations with regional and global powers, raising key considerations for the U.S. as it assesses its security posture in the region. Thailands role in the region. The same geopolitical factors that make Thailand a desirable ally for the U.S. suggest that Bangkok could play a larger role in the region, particularly in regard to nontraditional security threats.

olicymakers and analysts on both sides of the Pacific are cautiously hopeful that the national elections in Thailand on July 3, 2011, have provided traction in Thailands troubled political dynamic, commonly traced to the popular uprising against then prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006 and his subsequent overthrow by a military coup. Since then, dueling popular movements have polarized Thai politics and at times brought the country to a violent brink. To the majority of Thailands international partners, any specific outcome of the elections is less important than the need to promote political stability through widespread acceptance of a certified result. Although a significant portion of Thailands foreign relations and international trade has proceeded as usual in the past five years, Bangkoks trade and security partners have often indicated that attempts to take their bilateral relations with Thailand to new levels have been hindered by the countrys internal turmoil. This perception that relations with Thailand are on hold extends to the U.S.Thailand alliance. In private, some U.S. officials and analysts have described the allianceand the broader relationshipas being adrift because of Thailands protracted political crisis. Since the beginning of the crisis in 2006, the international and Asian regional security environments have been affected by a number of factors: Chinas steady and continued rise as a global power, new initiatives in Asian regional architecture, developments in U.S. security policy with other Southeast Asian countries, and the impactglobally and in Asiaof the 2008 financial crisis in the West. Without doubt, Thailands political troubles have made dialogue with the United States and other partners more difficult, but it would be inaccurate to view political instability as the sole reason for possible drift in the U.S.Thailand alliance. Instead, broader regional and global issues and trends underscore the need for reexamining the relationship, regardless of the state of Thai politics. Placing the alliance in the context of the changing Asian security environment requires grappling with a number of complex issues; it also requires political will on both sides to find common ground in a new century. To support this process, the National Bureau of Asian Researchs project on The United StatesThailand Alliance: Reinvigorating the Partnership examines perspectives on security cooperation in both Thailand and the United States and encourages dialogue on the expanding basket of bilateral and regional security issues. An initial workshop report on views of the U.S.Thailand alliance within the Washington policy community was released in June 2010. This second report incorporates the results of consultations over the past year in Washington, Honolulu, Bangkok, Manila, and Tokyo with U.S., Thai, Philippine, and Japanese foreign affairs officials, military leaders, analysts, and scholars. These discussions focused on the U.S.Thailand security relationship as well as on U.S. security alliances in Asia more broadly and the challenges they face. The views expressed in this essay are those of the author and should not be attributed to any other individual or institution. A third and final phase of the project, made possible with the generous support of the Henry R. Luce Foundation, focuses more intensely on Thai assessments of the U.S.Thailand alliance and on finding common ground among U.S. and Thai policymakers and analysts, with most dialogue activities to be held in Thailand. The results of this dialogue will be disseminated in both Thailand and the United States.

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The Foundations of the U.S.-Thailand Alliance

Thailand is often hailed as the oldest treaty ally of the United States in Asia by virtue of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation signed in 1833. From a modern perspective, which tends to equate the word ally with security partner, this statement is only partially true. The treaty established Thailand (then Siam) as the first formal diplomatic partner of the United States in Asia, 21 years ahead of Japan. However, cooperation was focused not on security but on economic relations, and the signators promised to build commercial intercourse in the parts of their respective nations as long as heaven and earth shall endure. Only three commodities were prohibited from being traded: munitions, opium, and rice (the latter was not considered to be an article of commerce). The agreement offered the ancient kingdom of Siam and the young United States specific advantages in a region increasingly dominated by Old World powers. In the midnineteenth century, the Siamese monarchs were intent on avoiding the colonization that was befalling the countrys neighbors in Burma, Malaysia, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and the more relationships they could forge with Western nations, the less likely that one would be able to dominate. For its part, the United States wanted access to markets and seaports in Asia but was hemmed in by the prior claims of Britain, France, Spain, the Netherlands, and Portugal. On mainland Southeast Asia, Thailand could offer the United States the best access. This pattern would continue into the twentieth century, when Bangkok had the only airport in mainland Southeast Asia at which the United States had access equal to that of the European powers. For the most part, however, security did not figure prominently in U.S.Thailand relations until World War II. Still inclined toward isolationism when Japan began its domination of Southeast Asia, Washington declined Bangkoks requests for support to ward off a Japanese attack. With Thailand under Japanese control in 1941, the Thai legation in Washington was under orders from Bangkok to declare war on the United States. However, legation head M.R. Seni Pramoj disregarded the order, and the United States recognized the legation as a governmentinexile and worked with Seni to establish the Free Thai Movement. Following the Japanese surrender, Britain proposed a 21point plan for British control over Thai political, foreign, and economic affairs. The U.S. veto of the British proposal helped to ensure Thai independence after the war and, to many oldergeneration Thais, launched the modern day U.S.Thailand security alliance. However, the structure of the current U.S.Thailand security relationship was not established until the early years of the Cold War and was more finely tuned during the Vietnam War. Two agreements, one both bilateral and multilateral and one bilateral, provided that structure. The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, also known as the Manila Pact of 1954, was partly a response to the Geneva Accords that partitioned Vietnam and to the perception that Southeast Asia was endangered by encroaching Communism (articulated by the Eisenhower administration as the domino theory). The signatoriesAustralia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United Stateswere bound collectively and bilaterally by the Manila Pact, which formed the diplomatic foundation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), established in 1955. Like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and similar Cold Warera structures, SEATO was a manifestation of the Truman Doctrine, which emphasized collective and bilateral defense treaties to block the spread of Communism in several regions. However, SEATO was illsuited to replicate the tight security structures of NATO. A joint integrated command was beyond reach, and even establishing a common security vision was
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difficult. SEATO lacked a clear provision for mutual selfdefense; instead, the signatories to the Manila Pact only agreed that an attack on one member would occasion consultation and action according to each [members] constitutional processes. The U.S. Senate was not required to ratify the Manila Pact, which rendered its provisions weaker than those of treaty obligations. Although SEATO survived on paper until 1977, at best it was regarded as insignificant; at worst, it was viewed as a failure. Although there were joint exercises, collective military intervention was clearly beyond SEATOs capacity. However, the existence of SEATO and the Manila Pact was often cited as the basis for U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia, such as in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.1 Although SEATO was disbanded, the signatories of the Manila Pact still generally consider the agreement to remain in effect on a bilateral basis. In 2001, for example, then president of the Philippines Gloria MacapagalArroyo cited the 1954 Manila Pact as the basis for the Philippines support of U.S. intervention in Afghanistan after September 11. By the early 1960s, Thailand had emerged as a frontline state in the Cold Wars hot war in Southeast Asia by virtue of its proximity to Indochina. The Thai government and its assertive foreign minister Thanat Khoman were justified in believing that the Manila Pact would not adequately protect Thailand in the event of a Communist invasion. The communiqu signed by Thanat and U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk in 1962 specified that the United States regards the preservation of the independence and integrity of Thailand as vital to the national interests of the United States and to world peace.2 An important tenet of the 1962 communiqu was the need for consultation and joint decisionmaking, which helped to preserve Thai sovereignty in the alliance. Such assurances of Thai independence strengthened the alliance and paved the way for the permanent presence of U.S. troops in Thailand and the establishment of nine joint bases. U.S. government documents reveal that one motivation for the ThanatRusk communiqu was Washingtons desire to enlist Thailands cooperation in Laos, whose political status the Kennedy administration considered critical to keeping Southeast Asia free of Communism.3 These same documents, however, suggest that Thanat had more complicated motivations for signing the communiqu. While Thai policymakers considered U.S. support to be essential to maintaining Thai independence in the increasingly perilous security environment of mainland Southeast Asia, they did not always agree with U.S. officials on the best means for safeguarding the region from Communist takeover. Thanat was particularly worried by U.S. support for the 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos, which consented to a coalition government that shared power between royalist and Pathet Lao (Communist) factions. Although Thailand signed the agreement, Thanat refused to put his name to it and had his deputy sign in his stead. As these agreements defined formal U.S.Thailand relations, U.S. assistance to Thailand increased rapidly from the early 1950s until the late 1960s. In 1950 the two countries signed an agreement for the United States to provide training and equipment to the Royal Thai Army; military assistance grew tenfold in just three years, from $4.5 million in 1951 to $56 million in
1

For example, the entry for SEATO in the Oxford Companion to American Military History notes that despite the purposefully vague wording of the SEATO charter the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson claimed in 1965 that SEATO allowed and even required the buildup of U.S. forces in South Vietnam. See John Whiteclay Chambers, ed., Oxford Companion to American Military History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 644. The text of the ThanatRusk communiqu can be found in The Reality of Foreign Policy Remarks by Secretary Rusk, State Department Bulletin, March 26, 1962, 49899. See Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation with President Kennedy, May 3, 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 196163, vol. XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 339, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961 63v24/d339. Kennedy is quoted as saying that the main reason we gave the commitment [ThanatRusk communiqu] to the Thaiswas to gain their help in connection with Laos.

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1953.4 However, security assistance was only one aspect of the growing U.S. presence in Thailand. In need of strong and solid allies on mainland Southeast Asia and mindful that the Communist threat was political as well as military, Washington laid the groundwork for a comprehensive assistance program that included transportation infrastructure, agricultural development, health, education, and cultural exchange. This countrywide approach defined the U.S.Thailand alliance for the ordinary Thai, as did the growing number of U.S. troops in Thailand. By 1968 the U.S. military presence in Thailand was at 45,000 soldiers, not including the tens of thousands of U.S. troops in the country for rest and rehabilitation from the Vietnam War.5 The 600 U.S. planes in Thailand at the time led some Thais to refer to their country as the worlds largest stationary aircraft carrier.6 By the late 1950s, U.S. policymakers focused increasingly on the vulnerable northeast region of Thailand, although no doubt a good deal of that focus was due to the northeasts strategic location, which enabled U.S. forces to launch or support operations in Vietnam, Laos, and later Cambodia. From the beginning of the Cold War, Thailand was drawn into the wars of the region. It contributed 4,000 soldiers and 20,000 tons of rice to the Korean War. Because of linguistic and cultural similarities between Thailand and Laos, Thais worked with U.S. operatives in the secret war in Laos between 1964 and 1972. Likewise, Thailand sent 12,000 soldiers to Vietnam, with U.S. financial support, between 1965 and 1971 and suffered 1,351 casualties.7 By the late 1960s, a decade that some Thai scholars refer to as the American period, annual U.S. military assistance to Thailand averaged $75 million and nonmilitary assistance was $60 million. Moreover, from 1965 to 1968 the United States invested $370 million to upgrade Thai military bases for the temporary use of U.S. forces. The nine joint bases provided employment for an estimated 50,000 Thais. Under this assistance, the Royal Thai Army tripled in size during the decade, which helped to consolidate the militarys role in government.8

Cold War Denouement and Dislocation

At the apex of the U.S. military presence in Thailand, however, the negative aspects and weaknesses in the alliance were becoming more apparent. The growing antiwar movement in Thailand converged with discontent over military rule in the Thai student population; in the eyes of the Bangkok political classes, both the U.S. government and the Thai military suffered from guilt by association with each other. This situation reached a boiling point in 1973, when a popular movement sparked by student protests overturned the military government. During the same period, the incremental withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam, and implicitly from Southeast Asia, alarmed Thai diplomats and military leaders. The withdrawal began with the articulation of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969, which declared that in future Asian wars the United States would provide military and economic assistance but would not contribute troops. The 1973 Paris Peace Accords, which enabled the United States to withdraw its forces from Vietnam,
4

Vimol Bhongbhibhat, Bruce Reynolds, and Sukhon Polpatpicharn, ed., The Eagle and the Elephant: 150 Years of Thai-American Relations (Bangkok: United Production, 1982), 91. Ibid., 112. Authors interview with an official from the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Bhongbhibhat, Reynolds, and Polpatpicharn, The Eagle and the Elephant, 92, 122. Ibid., 112.

5 6 7 8

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further disconcerted Thai policymakers and other U.S. allies in the region, including South Korea. Last, the rapid collapse of South Vietnam in 1975 and the hasty evacuation of personnel from the U.S. embassy in Saigon left Thailand vulnerable. Dynamics in the region were changing rapidly, and the Thais feared Vietnamese aggression and the renewed relationship between Vietnam and the Soviet Union. In response, the Thai government opened a diplomatic window to China. The heavy focus on the United States in Thai foreign relations was beginning to change in favor of the traditional Thai preference for balancing relations among several powers. However, the alliance with the United States remained the centerpiece of Thailands strategic calculation, and this central role was reinforced when Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978. Nonetheless, it had become obvious on both sides that the U.S.Thailand alliance required adjustments with the end of the Vietnam War. The maintenance of joint bases with the United States was a political liability for Thai leaders, particularly when Washington failed to consult Bangkok before using the Utapao naval airbase to launch a rescue effort in May 1975 after Cambodia seized the U.S. merchant ship Mayaguez. Moreover, Thai leaders feared that the continued presence of U.S. troops in Thailand would antagonize Hanoi and make Thailand a target for perceived Vietnamese ambitions on mainland Southeast Asia. For the United States part, with the Vietnam War behind it, Washington had little interest in maintaining an extensive military presence in Thailand. Thus, U.S. troops were withdrawn from the joint bases in 1976. Yet these structural changes did not signal the end of U.S.Thailand security cooperation. Rather, the alliance became a more flexible arrangement. Security cooperation through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program as well as other forms of military assistance continued, albeit at lower levels. The United States opposed the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and supported the policies of Thailand and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) toward Indochina in the 1980s. Although Thailand continued to be wary of Vietnam during this decade, Bangkok was able to quash the threat of the Thai Communist Party through deals made with Beijing and various other measures. With this peace dividend, the Thai economy began growing, sometimes in double digits, and Thailand underwent a peaceful transition from a military government to elected civilian rule in 1988. However, defining the alliance in this postwar period was difficult. The fraternal relationship between the U.S. and Thai militaries, a mainstay during the American period, was dissipating. Moreover, problems in other aspects of the U.S.Thailand relationship caused Thais to question the utility of the alliance, or even whether such an alliance still existed. In the late 1980s, some aspects of tradelapses in Thailands enforcement of U.S. intellectual property rights and continued U.S. subsidies for its domestic rice sectorcreated sharp tensions. When the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative threatened section 301 sanctions on Thailand for intellectual property violations, many Thais felt that the United States was violating the spirit of the alliance.9 This view was even more widely held in Thailand after the United States did not offer the country bilateral assistance in the immediate aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Although many Thais were still inclined to view the alliance as encompassing the entire U.S.Thailand relationship, as it had in the 1950s and 1960s, Americans tended to disaggregate the relationship into its separate parts and saw the alliance as confined to the security relationship.

Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the president to take appropriate action, including the imposition of sanctions, in response to a foreign government that violates an international trade agreement or takes other action that burdens or restricts U.S. commerce.

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When the Cold War ended, the U.S.Thai security relationship was affected by the stronger U.S. posture on democracy promotion and the complexities of Thailands democratization process. On its website, the Thai Ministry of Defence recounts one aspect of the militarys role in politics:
The militarys reputation as the center of political power manifested itself in nearly a score of coups and countercoups between 1932 and 1987. Over the years, its role as a political instrument had detracted from its abilities as a professional military force. Doubts about the state of combat readiness had been expressed by some members of the Thai officer corps as well as by foreign military observers. By the 1980s, the military had acted to increase the professionalism of its personnel, particularly the officer corps, and to modernize its units and weaponry.10

Although many observers agree that the Thai military has made concerted attempts to further professionalize, civilmilitary relations have ebbed and flowed over the past two decades, as have other aspects of Thai political development. The 1991 and 2006 military coups had an impact on U.S.Thai security relations. Under the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act, economic aid (which includes security assistance) must be withdrawn when an elected civilian government is overthrown and cannot be restored until the U.S. executive branch certifies to Congress that civilian control has been reestablished. After the 2006 coup, for example, the United States suspended Thailand from the IMET program, postponed joint exercises, and suspended $29 million in other forms of military assistance.11 Even after certification, it took Thailand time to regain the countrys place in the IMET cycle; when it did, the available pot of assistance funds had shrunk with the addition of fourteen new countries.

The Present State of the Alliance

During the Vietnam War, the countrys strategic position and the history of U.S.Thai cooperation made Thailand a linchpin in U.S. security policy toward Southeast Asia. Today the alliance supports the U.S. presence in Afghanistan and Iraq through the use of Thai ports and other facilities for refueling and through Thai permission for U.S. flyovers. The Utapao naval airbase, which analysts consider to be the only airfield in Southeast Asia capable of supporting a major logistical operation, still figures prominently in the security relationship. Indeed, in 2004 Thailand permitted the United States to use Utapao as a base for tsunami relief operations after airfields in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur were overwhelmed. For a month, U.S. troops returned to a Thai military base. The U.S.Thailand alliance is also the foundation for the annual Cobra Gold exercises, the largest multinational military exercises in the world. Originally a bilateral series, Cobra Gold has added Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia as partners. In 2011 eighteen countries attended the exercises as observers, including China, Italy, Russia, and South Africa. Cobra Gold has several components and often runs as long as six weeks. In addition, the United States and Thailand conduct numerous bilateral exercises throughout the year.

10 11

Ministry of Defence (Thailand) website, http://www.mod.go.th/eng_mod/index.html. Emma ChanlettAvery, Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, RL32593, February 8, 2011, 1011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32593.pdf.

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Over the last decade, the challenges presented by al Qaeda and regional Asian extremist networks opened a new area of cooperation in U.S.Thailand security relations. Bilateral intelligence cooperation led to the 2003 arrest of Riduan Isamuddin (also known as Hambali), a leader of Jemaah Islamiyah. That same year, Thailand was granted major nonNATO ally (MNNA) status along with the Philippines, a designation created by Congress in 1989 that grants recipients some exemptions from the Arms Export Control Act and conveys other minor benefits. Thailand has sent small contingents to Afghanistan and Iraq, with two Thai soldiers being killed in the latter conflict. These factors combine to make the U.S.Thailand security relationship one of the stronger anchors in the bilateral relationship. This has led some analysts to worry that the alliance has become overly securitized by default. One of the more volatile areas of the relationship has been on the economics and trade side. Negotiations over a bilateral free trade agreement were suspended in 2006, in part because of the Thai political situation but also because of growing public discontent in Thailand over provisions on pharmaceuticals. Shortly thereafter, Thailand imposed compulsory licensing requirements on some U.S. pharmaceutical firms, further ratcheting up tensions. It is not clear which direction U.S.Thai trade relations will go once the political situation has stabilized. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the United States has deemphasized bilateral free trade agreements and turned instead to the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) sponsored by the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). While Thai officials have said that they are considering application to the TPP, no concrete decision in that regard has been made. Even though the security relationship remains strong compared to other aspects of the bilateral relationship, it has clearly eroded over time. To some extent, this was inevitable. As power dynamics in the AsiaPacific region have changed, particularly with the rise of China, Thailand has pursued a natural course of increasing diversity in its foreign relations. Security relations with other countries, including China, have grown stronger, although none has eclipsed the U.S. Thailand security relationship. One consequence of this broader security dynamic is the increasing diversity of the market for military weapons and equipment. Over the past two decades, Thailand has purchased military equipment from China, Sweden, and the Ukraine, among others. Russia is also moving quickly up the ladder of arms vendors, no longer selling only cutrate Cold War leftovers but instead offering higher quality weapons with attractive training and maintenance packages. Although U.S. equipment continues to be highly desirable, it is expensive and often comes with various forms of conditionality. Bangkok discovered this during the 1997 economic crisis, when financial distress left it unable to follow through on a contract to purchase F16s from the United States. Beyond changes in the regional security environment, the U.S.Thailand security relationship was further disrupted by the 2006 coup, which continues to cast a shadow over the relationship, given Thailands protracted political crisis. Thai military leaders have publicly stated that they will honor the outcome of the recent election. Both sides are aware, however, that actions similar to those of 1991 and 2006 could automatically trigger provisions in U.S. law that would have a serious impact on the security relationship, no matter how shortlived any suspension might be. Last, in the past decade Thailand has faced some security challenges that are difficult to address through the U.S.Thailand security relationship. Since 2008, a border dispute with Cambodia has led to the episodic exchange of fire and more frequent sabrerattling. Bangkok has sought to resolve this dispute through bilateral negotiations and through ASEAN. However, when the

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United States conducted joint exercises with Cambodia earlier this year, Thailand apparently viewed this as undercutting the U.S.Thailand alliance and protested the exercises.12 A longer term problem has been the communal conflict in Muslimmajority provinces in Thailands deep south. Casualties have exceeded five thousand since 2004, but the consensus among Thai and U.S. officials is that the conflict is local rather than being driven by regional or global extremist groups. As a result, there are few mechanisms in the militarytomilitary relationship to help ameliorate the conflict, although the United States does provide some economic assistance through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to help address the social and economic root causes of the conflict.

Comparative Perspectives
Although Thailand has been a security ally of the United States for more than half a centurya longstanding spoke in the U.S. hubandspoke configuration of alliances in Asiait differs from other U.S. allies in the region in several ways: The structure of the alliance. U.S.Thailand security cooperation is based more on precedent and mutual understanding than on a structured agreement that governs militarytomilitary activities. This is in contrast to the status of forces agreements that the United States has with Japan and South Korea and the Visiting Forces Agreement with the Philippines. These agreements must be renewed at established intervals and therefore have builtin requirements to examine the alliance. They also tend to be more controversial, since the domestic populations in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines are made aware of alliance requirements through the renegotiations. Moreover, in the past several years, incidents involving U.S. military personnel and citizens of these three countries have created jurisdictional issues in the alliances, which have only heightened the controversy. The threat environment. The end of the Vietnam War and the normalization of relations within Southeast Asiawith Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, in particulardramatically reduced threat levels in the region. Equally, if not more, important for Southeast Asia was the normalization of relations with China. These two processes, along with ASEANs enlargement and increasing integration, have brought an unprecedented level of peace to the region, although Muslim extremism remains a primary concern. In contrast, Japan and South Korea continue to face major threats originating from the Cold War. The lethal nature of these threats speaks to vital U.S. security interests and has, to date, warranted the retention of permanent U.S. bases in Northeast Asia. While there are significant differences between the security environments in Northeast and Southeast Asia, structural differences also exist between the U.S. alliances with Thailand and the Philippines. As a claimant to some of the Spratly Islands, Manila has greater security tensions with China. In the past, Manila and Washington have disagreed on whether this threat should be addressed by the U.S.Philippines alliance, and the issue is currently under review. In addition, some extremist groups in the Philippines have had ties to regional or global terrorist networks such as the relationship between al Qaeda and Abu Sayyafwhile, as noted above, the conflict in southern Thailand is considered to be more localized. The U.S.Philippines alliance has addressed

12

10

Stratfor Global Intelligence, Thailand: Concern Over Joint U.S.Cambodian Exercise, June 25, 2010.

NBR SPECIAL REPORT u OCTOBER 2011

problems in Mindanao through the annual Balikatan exercises, although U.S. forces serve only as advisors. Compared with other Asian allies of the United States, Thailand would appear to have fewer security threats that can be addressed through its U.S. alliance. The United States four Asian treaty allies do have similarities, however. Each places the alliance at the center of its security policy but recognizes that in the past decade trade with China has grown at a faster pace than trade with the United States. This is even true of Australia, the other U.S. treaty ally in the AsiaPacific. Although the U.S. export market is still of prime importance, if trade trends continue (as they are likely to do), U.S. allies in the region could confront conflicts within their own foreign policies. Because of this balancing act, smaller Southeast Asian countries with strong ties to both the United States and China fear conflict between the two powers, but they also fear too much SinoAmerican comity. A second common factor among U.S. allies in Asia is the dilemma of democratic allies. The closeness of the alliance relationship causes governments to make demands that do not always sit well with other countries legislatures, judiciaries, or publics. In the late 1980s, for example, the United States required that its largest trading partners in Southeast Asia (Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia) pass legislation to protect U.S. copyrights or risk sanctions. At the time, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia had authoritarian or semiauthoritarian systems that made it possible for such legislation to be quickly approved. Thailand, however, was in the midst of a democratic transition, and the increasingly assertive Thai parliament took exception to Washingtons threat. Although legislation on U.S. copyrights passed by a bare majority, several members of parliament broke ranks to vote against the bill, causing the prime minister to dissolve parliament and thereby nullifying the legislation. To Washingtons chagrin, in 2008 a Thai court refused to extradite Jamshid Ghassemi, an Iranian national accused of smuggling missile parts into the United States, because it found that Ghassemis status as a military official exempted him from extradition. In 2004 both Bangkok and Manila had to act against popular domestic opinion to accede to Washingtons request to send troops to Iraq. Because of the special relationship, both sides of the alliance are often called on to deliver results, but domestic political dynamics make it increasingly difficult to do so. Finally, if the hubandspoke system is less coherent now than it was during the Cold War by virtue of the differences in the nature and the degree of threats present in Northeast and Southeast Asia, it can also be argued that the United States is dismantling that structure in Southeast Asia by forging a more diverse set of security relationships. Although the United States and Singapore are not treaty alliesin fact, Singapore declined the offer of MNNA status13the bilateral security relationship is extensive. The U.S.Malaysia security relationship is also positive and has expanded in the past decade through cooperation on counterterrorism and other initiatives. Likewise, Washington has cautiously renewed its security ties with Indonesia, also aided by the demands of the postSeptember 11 security environment. In addition, in recent years the United States has forged security relationships with Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, with Vietnam receiving the most attention. The countrys occasional conflicts with China over the South China Sea have provided considerable traction to the security relationship with the United States in recent months. Although all three relationships are constrained by the past and will progress only incrementally as a result, they nonetheless exemplify the changes in U.S. security relations in Southeast Asia. These changes call into question what it
13

Authors interview with an official from Singapores Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

THE UNITED STATESTHAILAND ALLIANCE u DALPINO

11

means to be a treaty ally of the United States in Southeast Asia in the 21st century. With a wider spectrum of U.S. security relations and a diminished threat environment, U.S. treaty allies in the region do not always receive greater attention or enjoy closer cooperation with the United States than do countries with less formal military ties.

Issues for Consideration

Thai and U.S. officials and analysts agree that if the U.S.Thailand alliance is to be more than a legacy alliance, a vigorous dialogue on several levels and among multiple actors on the meaning of the relationship is required. A clear agenda for facilitating such dialogue has not yet emerged, but various issues have been raised for consideration on either or both sides. They can be grouped into broad categories as follows: Is the U.S.-Thailand alliance the whole of the relationship or a subset? There is still considerable cognitive dissonance between the United States and Thailand on whether the alliance is a broadbased relationship cutting across several sectors or a security relationship. Each side has been willing to play the alliance card in pressing for specific results. This question has particular bearing on Thai public perceptions of the U.S.Thailand alliance, since the rationale for the alliance is now less apparent to the ordinary Thai citizen than it was during the Cold War. This situation contrasts, for example, with the U.S. alliance with South Korea, which faces a continuing security threat from North Korea. If it is advisable to forge stronger links among different sectors of the U.S.Thailand alliance for greater coherence, which sectors deserve more attention? What is the significance (and purpose) of a treaty alliance with the United States for a Southeast Asian nation in the 21st century? As the United States expands its security relationships with several countries in the region, it is not clear what advantages an alliance offers over the proliferation of strategic partnerships. Some Thai and Philippine analysts have argued that nonally countries already receive the benefit of U.S. security cooperation without the same degree of pressure on certain policy issues. This view suggests that the United States needs to consider its Southeast Asian alliance structures in a new light. Can (and should) the U.S.-Thai security relationship be insulated from the possibility of continued political instability in Thailand? Although there are no signs at present that another coup is likely, security analysts in both countries have raised the possibility of adjustments that would enable security cooperation to continue if such an event were to occur. They point, for example, to the possibility of Thailand funding its own IMET participation, thereby ensuring that Thai officers could remain in the program. What is the significance of the U.S.-Thailand alliance in the context of changing power dynamics in Asia? Of the United States four Asian treaty allies, Thailand arguably has the closest relationship with China and, because of its geographical position, is the least likely to be pulled into regional conflicts involving China. At the same time, Bangkok is not sanguine about the impact of Chinas rise on Thai interests in the region; for example, China is an increasingly dominant power in the poorer countries of mainland Southeast Asia (specifically Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar). For the time being, Thailand seems comfortable having close relations with a number of regional and global powers. Are there scenarios in Bangkoks threat perception in which the security environment would change or the United States would take exception to Thailands quest for equilibrium in its foreign relations? These situations might include increased security relations

12

NBR SPECIAL REPORT u OCTOBER 2011

with rising powers, such as China, or conflicts with Thailands neighbors, such as the present border tensions with Cambodia. How can the U.S.-Thailand alliance draw on (and possibly enhance) Thailands role in the region? The same geopolitical factors that make Thailand a desirable ally for the United States give it the potential to play a larger role in the region. Put another way, Thailands location in the region makes it the turnstile for a number of nontraditional security threats, ranging from human trafficking to epidemics, but also positions it to address these regional threats. Thailand likewise serves as a natural base for regional disaster relief efforts. Finally, its position as Myanmars neighbor inevitably raises several security concerns, ranging from border instability to nuclear proliferation. How would the U.S.-Thailand alliance figure into the United States future plans for its security posture in Asia? For the past decade, U.S. defense officials have periodically raised the possibility of increased reliance on flexible basing in Asia, particularly if permanent bases in Northeast Asia are dismantled. As noted above, the United States enjoys considerable access to Thai facilities, but this access is on an ad hoc basis. A more formal arrangement for flexible basing would require schedules for rotating U.S. troops, prepositioning equipment, and other measures. It is not clear what the limits of such increased cooperation would be in the U.S.Thailand alliance. Are there possibilities for greater coherence within the U.S. alliance system in Asia? Could, for example, the U.S. alliances with Thailand and the Philippines be triangulated? There appears to be little cooperation or consultation between Bangkok and Manila on security issues as a function of their common status as U.S. allies. This contrasts with Northeast Asia, where South Korea and Japan share common security concerns over North Korea. Although U.S. analysts and officials occasionally allude to the benefits of greater linkages among U.S. allies in Southeast Asia, it is not clear if such triangulation would be a natural fit for Thailand or the Philippines or on what issues such a triangular agenda would be based.

THE UNITED STATESTHAILAND ALLIANCE u DALPINO

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strategic asia 201112

asia responds to its rising powers

China and India
Edited by Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner, and Jessica Keough
The National Bureau of Asian Research September 2011 396 pp Paper 6x9 ISBN 978-0-9818904-2-5 $34.95 (paperback) $19.95 (PDF)

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About the Book
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Overview The United States and Asias Rising Giants

u Ashley J. Tellis, Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace and NBR

Special Study International Order and the Rise of Asia: History and Theory
u Kenneth B. Pyle, University of Washington

Strategic Asia 201112: Asia Responds to Its Rising PowersChina and India explores how Asian states are responding to the rise of China and India and the strategies these states are pursuing to preserve their national interests. In each chapter, a leading expert investigates how a country or region perceives Chinas and Indias growth based on geopolitical, economic, cultural, military, and historical interactions and draws implications for U.S. interests and leadership in the Asia-Pacific.

Previous Volumes
Strategic Asia 201011: Asias Rising Power and Americas Continued Purpose Strategic Asia 200910: Economic Meltdown and Geopolitical Stability Strategic Asia 200809: Challenges and Choices Strategic Asia 200708: Domestic Political Change and Grand Strategy Strategic Asia 200607: Trade, Interdependence, and Security Strategic Asia 200506: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty Strategic Asia 200405: Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of Power Strategic Asia 200304: Fragility and Crisis Strategic Asia 200203: Asian Aftershocks Strategic Asia 200102: Power and Purpose

Country Studies China Views Indias Rise: Deepening Cooperation, Managing Differences
u M. Taylor Fravel, Massachusetts

Institute ofTechnology

India Comes to Terms with a Rising China

u Harsh V. Pant, Kings College London

Japan, India, and the Strategic Triangle with China

u Michael J. Green, Center for Strategic

and International Studies

Coping with Giants: South Koreas Response to Chinas and Indias Rise
u Chung Min Lee, Yonsei University

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u Rory Medcalf, Lowy Institute

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u Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Endowment for

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u S. Enders Wimbush, German

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u Teresita C. Schaffer,

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u Carlyle A. Thayer,

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